Critical and strategic factors for scenario development and discontinuity tracing

ARTICLE IN PRESS FUTURES Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures Critical and strategic factors for scenario development and discontinuity tracing Iris Grossmann Institute of Coastal Research, GKSS Research Centre, Max Planck Strasse 1, 21502 Geesthacht, Germany Available online 27 March 2007 Abstract This paper discusses the contribution of critical and strategic factors to three open questions in scenario development and futures research: discontinuities, multi-dimensionality in scenarios, and communicating and learning about change and complexity. It is observed that discontinuities do not necessarily take the form of rapid breaks within one single field. The term ‘‘hidden discontinuity’’ is employed to describe developments that arise from (a) the combination of several trends that may each be unspectacular or (b) gradual, long-term processes. The second open question concerns the tension between the need to work in multi-dimensional spaces while also keeping complexity manageable and selecting ‘‘representative’’ futures. The third problem concerns difficulties to recognize, accept and communicate the above two effects (a) and (b). After discussing these questions, two examples of recent scenario studies are used to illustrate how the identification of critical factors can contribute to identifying meaningful discontinuities and meaningful subsets within the multidimensional space of possibilities, and to learning about the scale and scope dimensions of long-term change processes and the impact of the interplay between different fields. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction This paper discusses the contribution of critical and strategic factors to three open questions in scenario development and futures research: discontinuities, multi-dimensionality of scenarios, and communicating and learning about change and complexity. Critical and strategic factors are understood to be factors that describe, respectively, significant and plausible weaknesses or risks, and strengths of a system or development (Section 2). Tel.: +1 412 268 5489. E-mail address: irisg@andrew.cmu.edu. 0016-3287/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2006.12.010 ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 879 The discussion of discontinuities (Section 3) evolves from the observation that discontinuities do not necessarily take the more obvious form of a sudden break within one condition. The discontinuities of interest here are in particular those that could be called ‘‘hidden discontinuities’’1—discontinuities that are either due to a combination of several trends in different fields—all of which may be unspectacular by themselves–, or to a gradual, long-term process of change [1]. If the power of these causes to produce discontinuities is better understood, the inclusion of discontinuities into scenarios can be facilitated. My discussion (Section 3.1) points in particular to critical factors that function as logical base for discontinuities. The contribution of such factors to discontinuities taking the form of sudden breaks is discussed thereafter (Section 3.2). Section 4 explores the contribution of critical and strategic factors to aspects of multi-dimensionality. Given the insufficiency of employing just two axes of development in dealing with today’s complex problems [2], critical and strategic factors contribute firstly to highlighting further necessary dimensions and secondly to a structuring of multi-dimensional approaches. Section 5 discusses how the analysis of critical and strategic factors contributes to recognizing and communicating change and complexity, via explaining difficult to understand mutual dependencies between different fields and long-term change processes on the basis of more familiar properties. The role of critical and strategic factors in two exemplary sets of regional, multidimensional scenarios is discussed in Sections 6 and 7. In the first example, scenarios for the Metropolitan region of Hamburg [3,4], such factors have been employed consciously. The second set of scenarios, which presents futures of the Maroon forest people of Suriname [5], does not explicitly use such factors. However, once the concept of critical factors is used explicitly, they are apparent in this study. In this less obvious form, critical and strategic factors have been part of scenario development and future studies for a while.2 Through making these factors explicit, their contributions to a scenario study can be enhanced and some of the pitfalls outlined in the next section may be avoided [8,9]. The second set of scenarios is also instructive through its in-depth consideration of cultural forces, which provide a particularly interesting and often neglected source for critical factors. In this scenario set, changes in attitude are not assumed to be located mainly on one particular axis or related to one particular topic of interest. Rather, a broad range of possible, qualitatively different cultural patterns are considered. This allows cultural forces to fully come into play as factors in which change processes may originate and that are able to significantly influence other drivers. 2. Critical and strategic factors In analyzing possible futures, critical and strategic factors can be seen as two sides of the same idea, with the former looking at plausible or likely high impact weaknesses, risks, 1 1 An early reference to the frequently hidden character of discontinuities is given by Drucker [1], who distinguishes between ‘‘revolutions’’—which tend to be violent and spectacular—and discontinuities, which are more quiet and gradual but imply an extremely large-scale change which may actually include a ‘‘revolution’’. 2 Compare for instance Schwartz [6, p. 245] on steps in scenario development, or Ayres [7, p. 88] on factors leading to discontinuities in the form of violent conflict. Rotmans et al. [8] employ a related concept referred to as ‘‘weak signals’’. ARTICLE IN PRESS 880 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 bottlenecks or reasons for a not expected turnaround, and the latter describing existing and significant strengths of a system. The point is that, depending on one’s position, one and the same factor may be seen as either critical or strategic. If the continuation or success of some development is seen as desirable, possible weaknesses or bottlenecks constitute critical factors. On the other hand, the aim may be to change the direction of the present system in a certain way, in which case factors supporting such a change will be interpreted as strategic. This polarity implied in critical and strategic factors can be useful in that it creates a tractive force for envisaged developments on the one hand and exerts pressure on the other. This can become problematic, however, when done in an unconscious or intransparent manner [10, p. 812]. While aims are frequently implied in planning for the future, these are often not as value-free as it appears and only self-evident from certain points of view [11–14]. For instance, regional development scenarios, which have frequently made use of critical and strategic factors [15], often pursue aims such as regional competitiveness and attractivity. Alternative and still fairly common aims are sustainability, or equity and the solving of social problems. However, if the aim of regional competitiveness is taken for granted without proper acknowledgement, this generates a bias towards certain critical and strategic factors and thus leads to the exclusion of qualitatively different futures. Cumming et al. [9] point out that implicit assumptions may also be incorrect or inconsistent.3 A biased selection of critical and strategic factors will also restrict the capacity to identify possible discontinuities. Discontinuities often arise from a combination of factors in different fields—also fields that are not regarded as relevant at first sight, or that are not visible on the surface of the situation. The scenarios discussed in Sections 6 and 7 employ factors situated in several layers [16], of which the visible, un-interpreted reality of e.g. economic and demographic trends is just one part. On the next deeper layer may be factors relating to underlying social, cultural and political causes, then factors arising from discourses and views (the third layer in the approach of Inayatullah [16]), and finally deeper metaphors that are unconsciously part of the situation (fourth layer). In the Hamburg scenarios, the discourse on the port of Hamburg and the perception of its contribution to the city (third layer) plays a considerable role in addition to factors situated in the first and second layers. In the first Maroon scenario, the Maroons’ determination to preserve their cultural practices and right for self-determination (third and fourth layer) turn out to outweigh promised improvements of the health and education system (first and second layer). Through explicitly looking for critical factors in all four layers the importance of deeper layers gains visibility. Critical factors may also be a reason for the affecting of deeper layers. In both sets of scenarios, changes in socioeconomic and political conditions that significantly differ from prevailing assumptions and discourses are found to affect these in unexpected ways. This is the starting point for the first Hamburg scenario, in which the city as a whole opts for a different port development course.4 3 The inconsistencies in [9] refer to ecosystem properties and their interaction with society. The third scenario features a different port development course too—however, here the decisions originate within the corporate level. 4 ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 881 3. Critical factors in relation to discontinuities Discontinuities in scenario studies face at least two problems. Firstly, there is a tension between the need, on the one hand, to include discontinuities, and on the other, to avoid ‘‘arbitrary’’ futures resulting from the elaboration of discontinuities that may be too unlikely. Secondly, discontinuities may emerge as quietly as they are eventually farreaching in their consequences [1,17]. This frequently leads to the omission of discontinuities from scenario studies [7,9,16,18,19]. In the following, I will distinguish three different ways in which discontinuities can arise. If the causal conditions underlying different types of discontinuities are better understood, the inclusion of the latter into scenarios is facilitated. Such causal conditions can be investigated, for instance, through the analysis of critical and strategic factors. Some factors will strongly depend on human activities within the scenarios. Factors may also depend on natural processes in a way that is usually not noticed because the time-frame considered is too short. In either case, awareness of these factors, their potential change due to assumed human activities or natural processes, and the potential discontinuities affected by them can give a logical grounding to the inclusion of discontinuities into a scenario. The following three categories of discontinuities will be distinguished: 1. A break of temporary or permanent nature within one condition or field. 2. A significant change occurring without a break in any particular condition through the combined influence of several trends in different fields—all of which may be unspectacular by themselves. 3. A significant change due to a gradual, long-term process of change. Within literature, both category one and three are considered (e.g. [1,7,14,19–21]). Category two is usually not made explicit though frequently implied (e.g. [6,8,9,22]). Obviously, discontinuities can belong to more than one category—in fact, this is very often the case. The distinction between the three categories is made here in order to emphasize the wide range of forms that discontinuities can take and thus facilitate their inclusion into future studies. In the examples presented in the following, Section 3.1 will focus on discontinuities for which multiple factors or long-term processes are decisive, while in Section 3.2 the emphasis will be on sudden breaks. 3.1. Multiple-cause and long-term discontinuities Discontinuities of the first category usually imply a singularity—that is, a point at which the development of a condition over time is not defined or not well-behaved. This is usually not the case with discontinuities of the second and third category. In the second category, several often unspectacular (and not singular) developments in different fields combine to produce the discontinuity. In the third category, the discontinuity builds up over time and is not necessarily singular at any point. The reason why these two types are nevertheless often not easily recognized lies in the challenge of recognizing the possible impact of complex interactions—in particular with fields not regarded as related or relevant [9,22]— and of longer time scales. Thus, the discontinuousness of category two and three is actually due to the differing of these developments from prevailing expectations or discourses [23]. The term ‘‘hidden discontinuities’’ may be useful to characterize this quality. ARTICLE IN PRESS 882 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 Fig. 1. Multiple-cause discontinuities. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate different forms of multiple-factor discontinuities. Whether state B will be reached from state A according to projections depends on factors outside the immediate reality surrounding the driver (chain-dotted line in Fig. 1, top left). For instance, Cumming et al. [9] point to certain socio-economic impacts following from ecological feedbacks that are not considered in most global scenarios.5 Examples given by Cumming et al. are long-term changes in agricultural systems, or pest outbreaks due to changed predator–prey relationships among carriers—which are in turn due to human activities. Two classic outcomes of critical influences by external forces are a change of direction (dotted line in Fig. 1, top right and bottom left), or dispersion due to factors forcing the driver in opposite directions (dotted line in Fig. 1, bottom right). The alternative futures for the port of Hamburg in two of the scenarios in Section 6 exemplify a change of direction in a situation where the present direction is taken for granted: a complete reversal (scenario 1) and a new direction (scenario 3). These futures evolve from the discontinuous development of port-dependent jobs in Hamburg, which is in fact a weak version of dispersion (Fig. 1, bottom right). Job-losses over the last decades have arisen from the combination of forces that are inconspicuous enough when seen individually not to receive serious mention in political decisions and the dominant portdiscourse. Technological change has made containerization and automation possible. Together with the simultaneously happening economic shift towards a post-industrial economy, which implies declining profits, growing competitive pressure and the need for rationalization in industrially based sectors, this has led to a loss of approximately 20% of port-dependent jobs from 1991 to 2001 [4].6 This is a noticeable discontinuity: overall turnover showed impressive growth rates during the same time period (and in fact still 5 Given the uncertainty of tipping points in more complex ecosystems, Cummings et al. distinguish three different properties (‘‘brittle’’, ‘‘fairly resilient’’ and ‘‘highly resilient’’) with which ecosystems may respond to growing pressures, as well as the possibility that ecosystem services turn out much less relevant than presently assumed. 6 As discussed in [4], the only available data on port-dependent jobs in 1991 is not fully reliable (and there is no data for other points in time aside from 1991 and 2001). In [4] estimates are given for the reliability of the numbers indicated for different sectors. ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 883 Fig. 2. Multiple-cause and time-delayed discontinuities. does, [4])—and growth of turnover has traditionally been an engine for job creation. Anticipating dispersion implies the often-difficult task to recognize that a force has stopped existing or become irrelevant relative to a new force of overriding importance. An important case concerns forces that have been necessary to support or prevent a prevailing system state. Examples include gradual shifts in attitude—such as the erosion of people’s trust in the Soviet system which was critical to the eventual collapse [6, p. 54–55, p. 113]— or the decline of family structures in most parts of Europe leading to lower birth rates and possibly a retirement pension problem or other potentially severe social and political problems. Fig. 2 illustrates the role of factors that are critical in the sense of being necessary. This includes developments that are only possible if several factors are all present (chain-dotted line in Fig. 2, left). This was one of the lessons learned within urban renewal processes in the industrialized nations [24], which moved from a narrow focus on physical reconstruction of housing to approaches integrating a range of interrelated issues concerning education and training, the addressing of social problems, economic reorientation, infrastructure and housing, city marketing and recreational and cultural offers. Fig. 2, right illustrates a critical factor whose effect (dotted line) only manifests once a critical mass is reached. Over longer time scales, a small difference between two trends or fields can create a large imbalance. An early definition of discontinuities by Drucker [1] was based on the notion of an imbalance, for instance between an underlying reality involving attitudes and the more visible reality of institutions and human behavior. A discontinuity to restore balance will occur once a critical level of tension is reached [1]. However, this imbalance is often not perceived, as it does not fit with the prominent discourse on the development of the fields involved. Critical factors may point to such imbalances as well as to the involved critical threshold. In the case of the port of Hamburg, the dominant discourse which portrays the port as successful ‘‘growth engine’’ of the city is usually not questioned. The developments outlined in the scenarios 2 and 3 in Section 6 are based in the need to re-establish the balance between a city that has become postindustrialized, and its port which involves the high resource and area requirements and various impacts that are characteristic of industrial economies. They also illustrate possibilities to respond to the risks identified for port and economic development in Hamburg. In ecological systems, gradual, multiple-factor discontinuities occur when the system’s resilience7 towards stresses has reached a tipping point due to the combination of multiple 7 Understood here as capacity to either resist, adapt or reorganize [17]. ARTICLE IN PRESS 884 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 stresses that each on their own would not cause this effect [17]. This may have an unexpected quality if stresses from known sources are successfully prevented, but qualitatively new stresses emerge, e.g. through climate change. In fact, the absence of disturbances (and thus of opportunities to practice resilience) is also recognized as a possible contributing factor to the occurrence of the breakdown of some ecological system [17]. Discontinuities displaying properties of all three categories also occur in democratization processes and in evolution. For the former, the above categorization is of interest to underline the role of interdependencies between a range of necessary factors, and the role of long-term processes which often cannot be substituted for through external intervention or other rapid, forced shifts.8 In species evolution, long periods of gradual change are known to alternate with short periods of rapid change in which new species or major species traits emerge, given a certain environmental influence [27,28]. Evolutionary change processes of complex systems, as described by Hideg [29] or Laszlo [30] also exhibit properties of breaks on the basis of the combined influence of different fields–i.e. external and internal developments–and of the long-term nature of these developments. In fact, in these processes, it is the coming together of a change of the external environment with the system itself, which creates the fluctuations that eventually set off an evolutionary shift. 3.2. Discontinuities in the form of sudden breaks Discontinuities of the first category often combine with one or both of the other two categories. Characteristic for this category is the quality of a sharp break. There is usually no visibility problem like those posed by hidden discontinuities. However, the difficulty to predict and even to take the possibility of a pronounced break serious is heightened. This has led to the frequent exclusion of discontinuities of this category from scenarios. A mathematical illustration is provided by bifurcations. Bifurcations are the points within a set for which any small neighborhood contains at least one point that is not topologically equivalent (i.e., a point of qualitatively different form) [31]. In these points, a small parameter change can affect qualitative changes. This is known for instance from the cusp catastrophe Y ¼ x4 þ ax2 þ bx. Here, for a certain set of points (the bifurcation set), the system state ‘‘jumps’’. For points of the bifurcation set, two states are possible, otherwise only one. Notably, bifurcations may have both scale and scope dimensions. That is, firstly, different possible system states may show considerable qualitative differences from each other. The scope dimension, on the other hand, comprises the number of different states, which can be reached from a given point (e.g., two within the bifurcation set of the above example). Critical factors are analogs for the parameters determining the boundaries of the bifurcation set. Critical factors may involve several dimensions, that is, the bifurcation set may require the fulfillment of a specific relationship between parameters in two dimensions. In scenarios, bifurcations often take the form of decisions. Decisions may be taken by individuals, as in the case of, for instance, political decisions, investment decisions, or technological decisions. Category one, two and three may overlap here. Thus, factors in different fields may enable or lead to the decision–possibly after a considerable time delay required for the build-up of the factors. Decisions taken by groups, in particular, often 8 Compare Zon’s [25] analysis of necessary conditions for democratization processes in Central Europe in the early 1990s, or [26]. Zon also underlines the necessarily long-term nature of these processes. ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 885 depend on the presence of a critical mass, which will build up gradually. Technological inventions are an example. Frequently, the advancement (and impact) of an invention ‘‘creeps’’ until several deliberate improvements, applications, or combinations of several smaller, related innovations have been carried out. Thorough investigation may reveal critical factors pointing to both possible decisions and the threshold for a critical mass or a critical point in time. The (un-)predictability of discontinuities of the first category varies greatly. This is an important point to consider when employing critical factors. A critical required mass may be somewhat predictable [6]. Critical factors may also be helpful for the description of gaps in the available initial data, which are known to lead to unstable behavior. Another important example are events or breaks for which the identification of critical factors is possible in advance, but which are powerfully absent from the prevailing social discourse. Examples are certain political shifts, violent outbreaks or terrorist attacks before September 11th, epidemics, or ‘‘crashes’’ in larger economic or financial systems. Scenario studies have been able to pick up the risk for such an event through the explicit or implicit analysis of underlying conditions and critical factors.9 Important reflections in order to identify such risks concern possible factors that could lead to the opposite of what is expected, or factors that are necessary for the situation to develop as tacitly assumed [6]. Finally, discontinuous and potentially highly damaging events may be part of the prevailing discourse and object of in-depth scientific investigation, but may not afford any certainty. Critical factors for such events may still exist, but they are typically both hard to locate and highly uncertain or insufficient. Possible abrupt climate change is an important example [32], as are the possible consequences of far-reaching new technologies [7,13]. Dupuy and Grinbaum [32], examine in detail the cognitive barriers forestalling human actions to prevent or mitigate such events. Part of the strategy suggested by Dupuy and Grinbaum to circumvent paralysis in the face of uncertainty is to strictly assume that the respective damaging future is going to take place. Actions taken subsequently in order to prevent the respective damaging future will reflect back into the future [32, pp. 465–466]. Potentially, any future study or analysis of risks has this effect, given the impossibility to remove human influences from a system of which we are an integral part. Therefore, an ongoing re-assessment of where one is situated with respect to the assumed damaging future is suggested [32, pp. 470–474]. If critical factors describing how human activities make the damaging event more likely can be identified, the re-assessment can be performed on the basis of the factors. In the Hamburg scenarios (Section 6) this could take the form of assuming that the major identified risks will definitely take place, re-modeling the city’s actions on the basis of this assumption, and re-assessing the resulting change in the risks thereafter in periodic intervals. Potentially, this could be applied to a range of uncertain developments and risks. 4. Contributions to multi-dimensionality Axes along which developments occur can be useful in structuring and communicating different possible futures [33,34]. This approach can become problematic, however, if it camouflages unconscious or not debated assumptions about the future. Basing the scenarios on the four-quadrant structure resulting from the selection of the assumed two 9 e.g., [21, Chapter 8 on terrorism], [7] on economic crashes and violent outbreaks, or [6]. ARTICLE IN PRESS 886 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 most uncertain and most significant drivers may have this kind of consequence. In order to follow the prescribed structure, further important drivers tend to be given insufficient space to develop their potential and to influence the primary two drivers into a new direction. Also it is implicitly assumed that the development of the selected two main drivers in a representative set of futures can be polarized into two opposing directions or specifications. This precisely forecloses the inclusion of qualitatively different futures which scenario studies were meant to investigate in the first place [6,11,12]. Interestingly, Klooster and Asselt [2] relate a case study in which due to the above points of critique this reduction to two drivers could only be enforced by the team-leader after ‘‘additional criteria’’ were added to the criteria of uncertainty and importance. This problem may be due to a tension between the need to fulfill dimensional requirements while keeping the complexity resulting from a large number of drivers manageable, and hitting ‘‘representative’’—in the sense of most probable—futures. Approaches that combine both aims frequently rely on the analysis of critical factors. A possibility pointed out, for instance, by Schwartz [6] and employed in La Prospective [14] involves the inclusive identification of a range of most important and most uncertain axes and trends, which are then placed together according to ‘‘connections and mutual implications’’ [6, p. 245]. Critical and strategic factors point to such inter-connections. The scenarios discussed in Section 6 were developed in this manner. In La Prospective, this procedure is carried out twice, leading first to ‘‘mini-scenarios’’, then to the actual scenarios [14]. Another interesting possibility are approaches in which two axes are present, which serve, however, at most the purpose of facilitating navigation and communication of the results. An example are the IPCC scenarios [35]. In this case, the axes may be identified after the actual analysis and scenario development, thereby precluding an unnecessary narrowing down of possibilities. The scenarios discussed in Section 7 employ another variant of this, in which two main axes are identified early on, but do not determine the qualitative outcome. Rather, critical factors in a variety of fields play an equally important role and yield a number of additional axes of development. More than two drivers may yield a high number of mathematical combinations (e.g., 2n if just two specifications are considered for each of n drivers). By elucidating mutual dependencies and long-term effects, critical factors can point out that some of these combinations may not be possible. This also prevents the a-priori assumption that a certain ‘‘endpoint’’ will necessarily be reached and the subsequent construction of the scenarios to fit this endpoint. Impossible combinations here include not only obvious contradictions such as allocations of the same resource to mutually exclusive uses. Combinations may also turn out impossible on longer time-scales, e.g. due to unforeseen impacts. In addition, the analysis of critical factors for the development of each driver may yield that a more compelling collection of causes is present for certain specifications of each driver (compare Fig. 3). Finally, the employed factors can be used to improve communication about why certain futures were selected and others omitted. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5. 5. Contributions to learning about and communicating change Most, if not all, parts of our world and lives are in constant change. Tools like scenarios are necessary because changes are not recognized, misestimated, or are not acted upon [32,33]. Change is uncomfortable and potentially threatening, not merely with respect to ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 887 Fig. 3. Axes of development in the Hamburg scenarios. The numbers indicate the position of the scenarios on the axes. Each endpoint may accommodate different qualitative variants or interpretations of, e.g., success. Additional axes for which such positioning is not possible are: ‘‘Attitudes, values, culture, internationality’’ and ‘‘Global and EU-wide economic and institutional trends’’. the practical dimensions of our life, but on a deeper level through the challenging of worldviews, beliefs and ideologies [12,36]. Change is particularly difficult to relate to when longer time scales or complex interactions between different fields are involved [37, p. 106, p. 115, 38], when discontinuities are present, or if the available knowledge is not reliable or not seen as reliable [32]. This is also reflected in scientific approaches [14]. Ayres [7] points out that earlier theories explaining biochemical evolution were centered on the idea of continuous evolution, although continuous models of chemical evolution preclude the explanation of certain key facts. This changed with the demonstration of the importance of disequilibrium, nonlinearities and fluctuations by Prigogine and his colleagues and the incorporation of discontinuities into the explanatory framework [39]. Dupuy and Grinbaum [32] discuss applications of their approach for possible abrupt climate change, while pointing out clearly that climate change is by no means a special case. Highly similar cognitive barriers that prevent actions to positively deal with change are, in fact, known for instance from large-scale economic changes [4,40,41]. The contribution of critical factors to learning about and communicating change lies in their capacity to use known features of the present state of different fields as a logical basis for the identified future states, impacts and risks. Critical factors constitute characteristics of the system in question that may already be known and that can be more easily related to and accepted. Also, critical and strategic factors can point towards strategies that would be useful or necessary for specific developments or aims. This was one point emphasized by Kahn [37] if scenarios are to come to bear on societal actions. Kahn’s recommendation was to give the users of a scenario study access to the underlying assumptions and techniques, so that they can arrive at their own conclusions and develop policies accordingly [37, p. 108]. Critical factors may be one structured way to present underlying assumptions and point towards requirements for strategies that prevent risks or enable desirable states. In both scenario sets discussed below, changes that are unexpected or not consistent with prevailing discourses occur. To communicate these changes despite that, a logical analysis is employed, which bases the alternative futures on critical and strategic factors. Thus, each of the Hamburg scenarios directly corresponds to one of the main risks and possibilities identified in the preceding factors discussion. The Maroon scenarios employ a thoroughly ARTICLE IN PRESS 888 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 convincing analysis of cultural dynamics and other factors that may be found in a similar form also in other minority non-western cultures. The risks inherent in each scenario logically follow from these. 6. An example of consciously employed critical factors The three scenarios introduced in Grossmann [3,4]10 explore different future pathways for the greater Hamburg region for the next 30 years, given global and national dynamics on the one hand, and activities within the region on the other. These dynamics and activities are situated in a range of different fields, and yield a variety of new requirements, challenges and possibilities. International dynamics include the transition of industrialized countries to a post-industrial service economy and society, the new role of city regions as players within global competition, changes in the EU framework, and climate change. On the local level, several major city development projects are underway, including the new city quarter Hafencity. Urban renewal includes the initiative ‘‘Wachsende Stadt’’ (‘‘The growing city’’) and the revitalization of the port-adjacent city quarter Wilhelmsburg. At the same time, with the ongoing loss of highly valuable habitats near and in the river, the need to protect remaining sites has increased—yet this is often not easily addressed due to the priority of the port, the division of the region into different Federal states and incompatibilities of agri-environmental programs with local farmers’ needs. The port is of special interest for the scenarios since it has traditionally played a major role in Hamburg’s economy, but also constitutes a possible decelerating factor in Hamburg’s transition to a post-industrial metropolis. This is due to the port’s high costs in terms of monetary expenses, inner city space requirements and environmental, social and quality of life impacts. Monetary costs show a tendency to increase due to technological progress and changing competitive requirements for ports—including the need for deep-water access (and the possible preference of coastal ports), efficient turnover, and rapid transshipment to other means of transport, and a stronger bargaining position of shipping companies [4]. At the same time, port-related value and job creation has declined and is declining strongly.11 Critical and strategic factors are formally listed in [3,4] for general economic development, city development and port development (Table 1). However, for all axes of development (Fig. 3), critical factors that inform the scenarios have been identified. For the port, two main risks are identified: Firstly, the port may not be able to continue to fulfill changing competitive requirements, in particular vis-à-vis the new coastal competitor Wilhelmshaven, and may thus lose market shares. Secondly, if port expansion is successful, the high costs may result in too low investments and efforts regarding new economic sectors and urban renewal. The second scenario explores a combination of the first and second risk: the port loses market shares and the city finds itself not competitive enough in new economic sectors. This leads to a rising unemployment rate, social problems in portadjacent city quarters and an enhanced population loss. The first and the third scenario explore two qualitatively different alternative courses for the port. In the first scenario, port subsidies and funding are withdrawn and the port 10 In [4], more detailed information is provided and additional topics are covered. There is no reliable data on these losses, but studies commissioned by the city indicate a loss of 20% of portdependent jobs between 1991 and 2001 and a loss of 21% in tax revenues [4]. 11 ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 889 Table 1 Selected critical and strategic factors in the Hamburg scenarios Waterfront revitalization and building of new city quarter  Planning style: connecting       historic and modern elements, flexibility Public participation. Rail-based public transport to new city quarter Professional business environment in Hafencity Creative use of water as asset for quality of life Mix of uses and population groups in Hafencity Internationality, cultural attractivity, vision Urban renewal, revitalization of problematic city quarters  Masterplan for Wilhelmsburg   that addresses structural problems and strategically uses green and water areas Integrated locally empowering measures (e.g. social infrastructure, special educational needs such as German classes) Attitude towards internationality Economic transition to postindustrial city  Discourse on port and Hamburg’s economy  Recognition of need to     support new sectors and of associated requirements Business climate, e.g., legal frameworks and assistance in company formation New airport with intercontinental capacity Quality of life to attract highly qualified workers Investments in education, research, know-how and technology transfer declines. New economic sectors and waterfront housing are built up in abandoned port areas. The third scenario is oriented towards regional cooperation. The ports of Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven establish a division of labor, with Wilhelmshaven being responsible for turnover, and Hamburg for value-adding services and the development of advanced port technologies that are sold to other ports. City development and new economic sectors also play a major role. Given the range of possible interpretations of what successful urban renewal may look like, the first and the third scenario explore different factors and strategies for urban renewal, new economic sectors and quality of life, and lead towards very different end states. The first scenario involves the construction of a large new waterfront city quarter with a high degree of public participation, a relaxed, flexible planning style, and the involvement of public–private partnerships. The large water areas function as strategic factor through creative uses such as houseboats, extensive walkways and the establishment of an artificial water area as beach and new landmark. The third scenario is more focused on regional cooperation and a narrowing down on central city development projects. Regional cooperation also plays a critical role for the protection of sites near the Elbe, most notably through the establishment of a Lower Elbe biosphere reserve as joint action of the Federal states Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig Holstein. Further specific measures include the construction of a new airport with intercontinental capacities outside the city borders in scenario 3 (for this, regional cooperation is critical), efforts to communicate a clear economic concept for the Hafencity and to establish a professional business environment for new sectors (both scenarios), and a reform of the education system (both scenarios). 7. An example of not consciously employed critical factors Heemskerk [5] introduces a set of scenarios on the life of forest people, called Maroons, in Suriname (a small country just north of Brazil). The scenarios were developed on the ARTICLE IN PRESS 890 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 basis of extensive anthropological fieldwork. Of the 425,000 people living in Suriname, about 50,000 are Maroons of six culturally distinct groups. The Maroons are descendants of escaped African slaves. The Maroons’ rights to land are theoretically acknowledged by the government, but neither rights to land nor to education and health care are reflected in current governmental practices. The Maroons have a disproportionate share among the lowest income class and a high involvement in artisanal gold mining. The recent history has seen a civil war between a Maroon group and the then ruling military government. Thus, there are a variety of political, economic and cultural conditions involved in producing the Maroons’ dissatisfying living conditions. This leads to the need to look for critical factors in a range of areas as well as deeper layers. Two basic steering factors identified by Heemskerk are the national government and multinational resource extraction. The outcomes of opposite governmental and multinational actions yield four scenario quadrants: supportive government and active exploitation, supportive government and passive or leaving exploitation, indifferent government and active exploitation, and indifferent government and passive or leaving exploitation. This may look at first like a classic two axes approach with four relatively predetermined scenarios. Quite the opposite is the case, however. The two steering factors describe actions or strategies but do not determine the outcome. The outcome, that is, the qualitative way the plot unfolds, depends on critical factors in a range of different fields (Fig. 4). It is these factors which lead to unexpected discontinuities in the scenarios. Two of the four scenarios are discussed in more detail by Heemskerk. The first, ‘The snake and the worm’, corresponds to governmental indifference and active exploitation. The government’s lack of initiative to counter the spread of Malaria and to improve the school system is tolerated until new plans of large-scale resource extraction are suddenly carried out. The Maroons are asked to abandon their traditional way of life and take up a new life closer to the city supported by a per-family lump-sum. The Maroons, however, Fig. 4. Critical factors for the improvement of the living conditions of the Maroons, identified by the author on the basis of [5]. The four main categories (rectangles) and the factors in the center mutually depend on each other. ARTICLE IN PRESS I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 891 Table 2 Axes of development in the Suriname scenarios Governmental actions towards indigenous land rights Multinational resource extraction Maroon cultural attitudes, values, preferences and perception of justice /injustice Actions taken by the Maroons Availability of physical infrastructure and social infrastructure (health system, education, etc.) Economic development (including tourism) International support for the Maroons decide to stay and demand the right to take their own decisions about their lives. A civil war ensues, which has at its base both long-term trends that have built up over time and more recent events. Governmental indifference towards the Maroons’ living conditions is one such long-term trend (Fig. 4, center). The Maroons’ growing discontent with the situation is another (Fig. 4, center). The sudden intensification of logging and mining come on top of this, together with governmental orders to relocate out of the traditional living space (Fig. 4, center). After several years of war, a peace treaty is signed. There are serious losses, also in terms of destruct infrastructure and family fragmentation. At the same time, some of the deeper lying causes of the problems prior to the war have been positively affected: Most importantly, the government has accepted the necessity to act towards an improvement of the Maroons’ rights and conditions (Fig. 4, center). This is supported by pressure from international donors and by the withdrawal of resource extraction companies. The Maroons—having experienced the bite of the proverbial snake—are taking cautious but also clear and assertive measures to negotiate for their rights (Fig. 4, center). In the second scenario, land rights are ratified. It turns out, however, that a number of required conditions are not in place, including well defined, communicated and accepted territorial boundaries pertaining to different ethnic groups (Fig. 4, top). Also, the equality of the new rights is neither theoretically clear—i.e. with respect to how the rights are divided between village captains and villagers—, nor is it clear in terms of the practical conditions which determine the beneficiaries of these changes. This includes in particular the availability of education and infrastructure (Fig. 4, right). Thus, while selected villages and selected individuals within villages are able to benefit from the emerging ecotourism, the majority is not equipped with the required education, acculturation and infrastructural access (Fig. 4, center, bottom and right). According to the factors identified here, functioning Maroon land rights, political stability, effective social and physical infrastructure, and sufficient income opportunities for the Maroons are necessary components of an improved situation (four rectangles in Fig. 4). All four areas require certain core critical factors (dashed ellipse in the middle), and mutually support each other (e.g., tourism as one important income source both supports and requires the establishment of physical and social infrastructure). Note that it is somewhat unlikely that both the necessary practical factors, such as infrastructure, and the necessary cultural factors will all be provided. A factor that can strategically support improvements is the support of international donors or international pressure.12 Table 2 gives an overview of the axes of development. Although two steering factors have been 12 Not given in Fig. 3, as the focus in the figure is on critical, i.e. required, rather than strategic factors. ARTICLE IN PRESS 892 I. Grossmann / Futures 39 (2007) 878–894 identified as central (government and resource extraction), both scenarios involve pronounced changes in several other fields, which can be viewed as additional axes of development. 8. Discussion and conclusions The power of discontinuities lies in the fact that they are often not well visible, not well predictable and may forestall preventive action due to their very uncertainty, while at the same time their consequences may be devastating. There is therefore a very strong need to bring discontinuities more into scenarios. For this, a clarification of the different forms that discontinuities can take is needed. As a piece in the puzzle, this paper suggests the possible distinction of three categories–breaks in one field, multiple-cause discontinuities and gradual discontinuities. Investigation of the latter two categories shows that they may be well compatible with scenarios due to their being based on patterns such as mutual dependencies between different elements and processes of long-term change, which are necessary components of scenarios. The frequent exclusion of discontinuities from scenarios has sometimes been said to be due to scenarios being inappropriate for the consideration of discontinuities [19]. It appears however, that cognitive barriers towards the effect produced by multiple interacting causes, and the effect of long-term processes may also be an important reason. The identification and inclusion of discontinuities based on these causes can be facilitated by the analysis of critical and strategic factors that describe these very causes. Critical and strategic factors can also contribute to a lesser degree to the study of discontinuities in which the quality of a sudden, sharp break dominates. Given the high uncertainty of many of these discontinuities and the consequent cognitive barrier to action [32], a possibility here may be to combine the identification of critical factors that make the damaging event more likely with the ongoing assessment suggested by Dupuy and Grinbaum [32]. This means that a re-assessment of the respective risk is performed in periodic intervals on the basis of the factors and of possible changes through human actions that have been taken to prevent the respective damaging future. Critical and strategic factors also often underlie multi-dimensional scenarios in an implicit form, by assisting in the identification of necessary dimensions and providing a framework for combining a high number of dimensions and specifications into a much smaller number of possible futures. It is to be noted that at some point, the choosing of one possible future rather than another will often have to take place nevertheless. Finally, the analysis of critical and strategic factors may aid in communicating the choice of the selected dimensions and possible futures, and the potential risks or opportunities inherent in critical interdependencies and long-term change processes. This is due to the using of known features of the present state of different fields as a logical basis for the identified— and often unfamiliar or uncomfortable—scenarios, risks or discontinuous changes. Acknowledgements I am grateful to Marieke Heemskerk for encouraging me to include her scenarios into this research. She is, by the way, continuing her work with the Maroons in Suriname. 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