Stalin's Terror?

One of the most difficult periods of Soviet history to comprehend and one of the most complex and controversial, is the period of mid-1930s, when the Stalinist regime subjected the Soviet population and especially the Communist party, to unprecedented levels of violence. The horrifying events from 1935-1938 led to total destruction of the Leninist party. Why did Stalin elect to pursue such policy against the party over which he enjoyed almost total control? Why did he resort to such brutal and merciless cruelty?

“In Stalin’s time - and even in Stalin’s worst times - the regime was supported by more than simple terror” - Vera Dunham. Through the analysis of interviews of former Soviet Citizens, letters to the Politburo and memoirs of Soviet Citizens, this research essay discusses this statement in regard to the 1930s.

States of Violence and the Civilising Process, 2016

Journal of Cold War Studies, 2000

2018

This history of the Red Army as an institution is frequently described in terms of its proximity to the Stalinist purges. Especially in wartime, the strategic deployment of terror begs the question of whether it was an effective motivational technique compared to other methods of non-coercive motivation such as propaganda or awards of medals. Examining various case studies and memoirs, it becomes clear that terror tended to reduce morale and group cohesion, while positive motivators were far more effective at ensuring an effective fighting force. When the Red Army soldiers feared being caught in the net of terror, they were less likely to trust their comrades, and more likely to act in self, rather than group, interests. As terror decreased, activity such as desertion or voluntary capture declined across all fronts. Soldiers worked far more effectively as a unit, with increased confidence in decisions by high command. This result strongly contests the frame that Soviet soldiers acte...

The American Historical Review, 1997

CRITIQUE-GLASGOW-, 1995

Social History, 2014