18th century British military

The conquest of the North American wilderness and its native population by English settlers is one of the most compelling topics in American history. The military misadventures of the English colonists in New England illuminated tensions between American conditions and European military conventions. Successful Indian attacks on colonial forces during King Philip’s War have led some contemporary and modern observers to conclude that the combination of firearms and Indian tactics was too potent for English forces, relying on conventional European tactics. Consequently, it has been argued, exposure to Indian tactics improved the efficiency of English military forces by forcing them to ‘unlearn’ what their European military manuals had taught them. Chet demonstrates that English soldiery did not improve when “textbook knowledge of European tactics” was complemented by experience in wilderness warfare. Moreover, King Philip’s War and the later colonial wars were not won through a succession of tactical victories, but through logistical campaigns of attrition.
  A comparison between the first generation of European veteran commanders in America and the supposedly “Americanized” commanders of the later colonial wars reflects poorly on the latter. Similarly, the British army’s tactical victories during the Seven Years’ War indicate that the British were, in fact, more successful than provincials in countering the challenges of wilderness warfare. Colonists’ military ordeals during the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century did not lead to a reevaluation and transformation of their military doctrine. Rather than revitalizing the settlers’ military establishments, these episodes highlighted the ongoing degeneration of colonial armed forces. Indeed, it was the poor performance of colonial forces in King Philip’s War and King William’s War that led colonial magistrates to address their shortcomings through greater reliance on British forces and imperial administrators. Thus, English military achievements in New England during the eighteenth century reflected an increasing degree of British participation, as well as British planning, administration, and command.

A daily collection primarily from contemporary writings about Braddock's expedition to the Monongahela that I was able to find on the Internet, and posted to the F&I Grand Encampment: July 16-19, 2015 BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT Facebook Public Group page.

In 1757, Fort William Henry fell to the French under Montcalm.  Although in Halifax during the actual Siege, Lord Loudoun played a significant role in setting the stage for the defeat of the British.  Loudoun's overall campaign strategy for 1757 is examined including his role in reducing the defensive character of Fort William Henry in favor of increasing the defensive character of Fort Edward, a position never threatened by the French.  Clarifications as to the nature of the 35th regiment and the actual artillery inventory and losses are documented.  The correspondence between Loudoun, Webb, and Monro relating to the defense of Fort William Henry is reviewed. The Text and Final Appendix includes full transcriptions without edit of important letters between Pitt, Loudoun, Cumberland, Shirley, Eyre, Webb, and Monroe.  Full transcriptions of some one hundred letters are presented.  The clash between Loudoun and Shirley is explored as it relates to the capture of Oswego (1756).  Loudoun's failed Louisbourg 1757 Campaign and his subsequent recall is presented via transcriptions,  Holburne and Hardy.  Although 1757 Louisbourg is often considered a British fiasco, it was the death knell of the French Navy.

This is the chronicle of a young 18th-century German musician shipped to America as a musketeer in the Anspach-Bayreuth military forces sent to aid Britain in her effort to quell the rebellion of the "Thirteen Colonies."  With the initial focus on the 1st Anspach Regiment, it follows the movements of the Margrave's troops at their departure from Ansbach in March of 1777 through the conflict until their capture at Yorktown in 1781...it continues through their dreadful incarceration for virtually two years. Yet, just following their long awaited release and prior to their embarkation for return to the Fatherland in 1783, the captivating story of the young soldier unfurls as he embraces the "new experiment," remains in Philadelphia, assimilates into the local population, becomes one of the earliest professional musicians of the early Federal period and, ultimately, meets his untimely demise in the capital city's horrific Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1793.

Contents

1. British Knapsack Timeline, 1758-1794
2. Discussion of British Knapsack Evolution, Single-Pouch and Double-Pouch Packs, and Carrying Blankets
3. Notes Regarding the Use of Over-the-Shoulder Blanket Rolls
4. Follow-Up: “Like a Pedlar's Pack.”: Blanket Rolls and Slings
5. Articles on Knapsacks and What Soldiers Carried in Them




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British Knapsack Timeline, 1758-1794

1758-1765 (and earlier), Single-pouch purse-like leather knapsack carried by British troops, as pictured in paintings by David Morier (1705-1770) and Edward Penny, R.A. (1714-1791). These knapsacks could not accommodate a blanket. 1768, Cuthbertson recommends “square” knapsacks with two shoulder straps.
1771, Painting of a private soldier of the 25th Regiment of Foot shows him wearing a hair pack with two shoulder straps. His knapsack seems to be a single-pouch model made of hide covered with hair, and, given the maud (a plaid cloak, worn by shepherds in Scotland) slung over his shoulder, could not accommodate a blanket. 
1774, Timothy Pickering describes a single-pouch, double-shoulder-strap leather knapsack being used in the British Army.
1776, An American contractor touts his double-pouch, single-shoulder-strap linen “new Invented Napsack and haversack” to Maryland officials. One pouch was meant for food, the other for soldiers’ necessaries. Some Maryland units are known to have been issued the knapsack, and there is some indication it was used by Pennsylvania troops as well. 
1776-1777, British regiments are issued knapsacks, but many Crown units use blanket slings instead of packs in these two campaigns. (Possibly because the knapsacks then being used could not accommodate a blanket, which were deemed necessary for American service.) 
1778, The first known image of a double-pouch British knapsack appears in a 71st Regiment order book. One pouch is shown as holding food, the other, soldiers’ necessaries. 
1778, On 28 July “1096 Knap & Haversacks” (from the context likely the same as the “new Invented Napsack and haversack”) are sent from Reading, Pennsylvania to supply Continental troops.
1780, Benjamin Warner was likely issued his double-pouch double-shoulder-strap linen knapsack while serving with a Continental artillery regiment. `
1782, First known documentary references to double-pouch knapsacks.
1782, British 29th Regiment order book seems to refer to rolled blankets worn on top of knapsacks.
1782, L’Enfant painting of West Point showing soldiers with rolled blankets attached to the top of their knapsacks.
1794, The earliest known surviving British double-pouch, double-shoulder-strap linen knapsack, made for the 97th Inverness Regiment, raised in 1794 and disbanded the same year.

This thesis investigates British amphibious operations in the American War of Independence between the outbreak of war in 1775 and the Peace of Versailles in 1783. It assesses the strategic, operational and tactical context of the efforts of Great Britain to impose a settlement on the rebellious colonists by use of expeditionary warfare techniques. Particular attention is given to command decision making, both local and national, with reference to the North American theatre of war. The response of the military and government to the entry into the war of France and Spain is investigated. Fighting techniques and operational art are also evaluated. The findings are compared with secondary writing to determine whether traditional narratives adequately explain the failure of the ‘British Way of War’ in this insurgency conflict.

A foot soldier's most important assets, after native intelligence and discipline, are a strong back and healthy feet. An important factor that added to the comfort or distress of marching troops was the load which they were expected, or chose, to carry with them. The intent of the complete monograph will be to examine the items Revolutionary soldiers carried in their knapsacks, but this preliminary study lays out the complement prescribed in British military treatises as well as actual usage by Crown troops in service. 
    On an active campaign the load carried by soldiers could be quite heavy, especially when increased by three or four days’ rations and forty to sixty rounds of ammunition. Ensign Thomas Anburey, 24th Regiment of Foot serving with Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne’s army in 1777, left a colorful account of British common soldiers’ encumbrance and attitude:

... nothing can be more repugnant to the ideas of a rapid march, than the load a soldier generally carries during a campaign, consisting of a knapsack, a blanket, a canteen for water, a hatchet, and a proportion of the equipage belonging to his tent [which included a camp kettle]; these articles, (and for such a march there cannot be less than four days provision) added to his accoutrements, arms, and sixty rounds of ammunition, make an enormous bulk, weighing about sixty pounds. As the Germans must be included in this rapid march, let me point out the incumbrance they are loaded with, exclusive of what I have already described, especially their grenadiers, who have, in addition, a cap with a very heavy brass front, a sword of an enormous size, a canteen that cannot hold less than a gallon, and their coats very long skirted. Picture to yourself a man in this situation, and how extremely well calculated he is for a rapid march.
    It may be urged, that the men might be relieved from a considerable part of this burthen, and that they might march free from knapsacks and camp equipage, being divested of which, they might have carried more provision. Admitting this it would not remedy the evil, it being with difficulty you can prevail on a common soldier to husband his provision, in any exigency whatever. Even in a settled camp, a young soldier has very short fare on the fourth day after he receives his provision; and on a march, in bad weather and bad roads, when the weary foot slips back at every step, and a curse is provoked by the enormous weight that retards him, it must be a very patient veteran, who has experienced much scarcity and hunger, that is not tempted to throw the whole contents of his haversack into the mire, instances of which I saw on several of our marches. When they thought they should get fresh provision at the next encampment, and that only when they were loaded with four days provision: soldiers reason in this manner: the load is … grievous … want but a little way off - and I have often heard them exclaim, "Damn the provisions, we shall get more at the next encampment; the General won't let his soldiers starve." 1

    Lt. Loftus Cliffe, 46th Regiment, wrote similarly of British and German foot soldiers at the Battle of Brandywine,

The 11th Sepr. being pretty near [the enemy] … we divided Gen. Kniphausen taking the right column, marching towards them fell in [with them] early in the Day … we the 2d Column have taken a circuit of 17 miles to get round them … passed the forks of the Creek 6 miles from where Kniphausen crossed … were instantly arranged for Battle and in two hours utterly routed them … The fatigues of this Day were excessive: some of our best men were obliged to yield, one of [the] 33[rd Regiment] droped dead, nor had we even Day Light, we could not make any thing of a pursuit. If you knew the weight a poor Soldier carries, the length of time he is obliged to be on foot for a train of Artillery to move 17 miles, the Duties he goes thro’ when near an Enemy, that the whole night of the 9th we were marching, you would say we had done our Duty on the 11[th] to beat an Army strongly posted, numerous & unfatigued.2

Cet article se veut un outil précis et fouillé à l’usage des chercheurs souhaitant approfondir le domaine de la petite guerre et des troupes légères (mise à jour, 2005).
Depuis un article d’André Martel paru dans la « Revue Historique » en 1971, la communauté des historiens militaires en France n’a cessé périodiquement de souligner jusqu’à nos jours – avec des approches actualisées – le renouveau de cette histoire militaire. L’intérêt pour la petite guerre s’inscrit dans ce mouvement. Il a été porté aussi par la réalité de beaucoup des conflits d’aujourd’hui, dits « de basse intensité », dans lesquels la tactique des troupes légères d’autrefois, alternative à la bataille, trouve son avatar contemporain. L’article attire d’abord l’attention sur la plus ou moins grande pertinence de l’emploi de l’expression de « petite guerre » dans l’historiographie, en français, en allemand et en anglais. Il procède ensuite à la généalogie de l’étude de la petite guerre à l’époque moderne (XVIe - XVIIIe siècles), en France et dans les mondes anglo-saxon et germanique. Il pointe enfin le problème du cloisonnement des travaux, entre les périodes historiques comme d’un pays à l’autre.

In the early modern period, leaders of the British Empire sought to establish their dominance on a global scale through aggressive colonial expansion backed by a military with continuously evolving firearms technology. One of the British military's most effective weapons in this time period was a musket of eighteenth-century design, now colloquially known as the Brown Bess. A number of patterns (the British corollary of " models ") of Brown Bess muskets were produced throughout the eighteenth century for 1 use in the British military and Royal Navy. Many thousands of these muskets saw service during the Revolutionary War, one of which is now commemorated in the NRA National Firearms Museum. This Museum contains over 3,000 firearms and specializes in recounting the stories of firearms which play a significant role in American history.

ABSTRACT in English: "‘Partisan warfare’, ‘war in detachment’: the ‘petite guerre’ seen from England (18th century)"
The article aims to measure and to explain the gradual realisation, in Great Britain during the 18th century, of the importance of the "petite guerre" or the "partisan warfare" in military thinking (later that elsewhere in Europe). It shows then the creation and the increase in numbers of British light troops in the course of this century, the Government's policy with regard to them, and the awareness of the British for the "petite guerre" in the field, through a new case study regarding the War of Austrian Succession.

It was only in 1770 that a British author, Stevenson, wrote and published for the first time a treatise on the "petite guerre". Indeed, the British remained for some time on the sidelines of the stream of publications in Europe on this subject. Some historians are asserting that British officers in the 18th century didn't really care about refining their military knowledge. The researches of J. Houlding allow nuancing this statement. The fact remains that a prevailing tactical routine was real, with a tendency in military treatises to instruct only parade and garrison duties.

The article explores the context that brought the real – albeit late – interest expressed by English officers for the "petite guerre" in the years 1760-1770. It should be noted that there have been more translations of foreign books than real national works. 

More important than it seems is the question of the translation – or rather the non-existence of any translation! – of the wording for the "petite guerre" in English during the 18th century ; and, therefore, the difficulty for British historians of the 20th century to suggest an adequate wording in order to express a reality which was only translated with circumlocutions in the 18th century... The article points out the shortcomings of military vocabulary in the English language during the 18th century (recognized at the time), makes an inventory of the authors' choices to express the reality of the "petite guerre", as well as the solutions considered by today's historians. A consequence of this underestimated question is the confusion often remaining nowadays between the "petite guerre" in singular and the small wars in plural (that is, between the tactic of irregular warfare and the small wars in the sense used by Charles Edward Callwell).

Numerous studies have been written within the historiography in English language about the American War of Independence and about the tactic which it used; because civil wars make a bigger mark on the national consciousness than other types of conflicts, especially in the case of an independence war, leading to the birth of a new state! However, contrary to what one might think accordingly, the tactic of "guerrilla" in the American War of Independence only had later an influence of British strategic thinking. To be sure, a theoretician like Emmerich (a Hessian officer who fought with the British in this conflict, and who cites it as an example in his treatise of the "petite guerre" in 1789) has the merit, with his fellow countryman Ewald, of having understood the role that would have from now on the civilian populations and the ideological motivations in conflicts.

However, on one hand real light troops existed in the British army well before the American War of Independence, even if their inception came later than for the main European neighbours. On the other hand, those troops were unfortunately disbanded every time peace was made, and this didn't help the perpetuation of a certain know-how regarding an indirect style of operations. The first real regiment of light troops, the Light Dragoons, was raised in 1745 in order to fight the Jacobite rising. Other were raised on this model, always temporary, on the occasion of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and then of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).

The article concludes with a new case study (to be continued) which presents the "petite guerre" understood and conducted by the British during the campaigns in Flanders of the War of Austrian Succession, and especially in 1747. This case study focuses on a period and on a theatre of operation still unexplored regarding this aspect of the art of war, as the British saw and experienced it. We can see that some of their generals didn't wait for the conflicts of the second half of the century and for the American theatre of operation to clearly understand the role of the "petite guerre". Beside some military accounts of British authors published after the conflict, this case study is based mainly on archives still waiting to be used on this subject : the military papers of the Duke of Cumberland, the English commander in chief of the Allies opposed to the French in 1747.

This published article aims to be an accurate and detailed tool for the researchers who want to study the subject of the “petite guerre” and the light troops (update 2005).

Since the historian André Martel published in 1971 his article in the “Revue Historique” (France), the military historians in France regularly underscored until nowadays the renewal of military history – with updated approaches. The interest for the “petite guerre” is part of this movement. Additionally, the interest for the “petite guerre” has been supported by the reality of many conflicts today, which are told “low intensity conflicts”. The tactic of light troops of olden times, which filled the theatre of operations between the battles, finds here its contemporary transformation. The present article draws attention first upon the use of the terms of “petite guerre” in the French, German and British historiography, and its relevance, or not. Second, the article details the history of the study of the “petite guerre” of the early modern times (16th – 18th centuries) in France, in Germany and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Finally, it points out the problem of the compartmentalisation of the researchers’ works, both between the historical periods and between the different countries.

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

From the late eighteenth century the British military produced official ‘fight  books’  outlining  the  methods  with  which  the  cavalry  were  to  use  their  swords. As these ‘fight books’ were military manuals for instructors, designed to turn trainees into effective soldiers they are, for the most part, clear and precise compared to the sometimes esoteric nature of earlier ‘fight books’. In addition, as they  coincided  with  the  introduction  of  standard  patterns  of  cavalry  swords  the  exact  types  of  swords  employed  can  be  established.  Hence,  unusually  in  fight  book  studies,  a  full  picture  of  why  these  works  were  produced,  who  they  were  aimed at, how widely they were disseminated and what exact forms of weapons these precise techniques were to be employed with can be known. The existence of  contemporary  accounts  and  other  supplementary  evidence  can  also  help  us  understand how such ‘fight books’ were received and how effectively the theory contained within was borne out in practice on the battlefield. Over the first sixty years  of  British  cavalry  sword  exercises,  the  role  of  cavalry  and  the  threats  they  faced from other arms and weapon technologies did not drastically alter; but the way  they  fought  with  swords,  and  the  swords  themselves,  did  undergo  considerable change.

The Jacobite record is a living entity with plenty of room for growth. Renewed work with the mass of archival documents relating to Jacobite prisoners from the rising of 1745-6 affirms that the compilations of names published between 1890 and 2001, heavily relied upon by modern scholars to assess the Jacobite constituency, are insufficient. Marred by inadequate methodologies, limited sources, and clumsy editing, these printed lists distort the larger record of Jacobite prosecution in the wake of the last rising and provide only static data that can hinder meaningful prosopographical analysis. The Jacobite Database of 1745 project offers a means to compare and contrast large-scale biographical information from an unlimited number of sources in a digital context, preserving both data lineage and integrity while allowing manipulable, interactive analysis to be carried out remotely. The brief working case study illustrated in this paper compares the data from some well-known publications and the manuscript sources from which they are drawn, while providing some relevant visualisations that describe the demographic constituency of nearly a thousand Jacobite prisoners taken during and after the rising of 1745-6.

In this episode, Dr Darren Layne (u/Funkyplaid) talks to u/Aquatermain about the 275th anniversary of the battle of Culloden and the end of the Jacobite uprising. Topics include Darren's work on the digital history of Jacobitism, the myth and reality of the Jacobite uprising, and why the battle of Culloden remains so compelling for so many people.

The thesis analyses the public reaction to the actions of four British generals 1745-1760, specifically as seen through the lens of their courts-martial. These were Brigadier General Richard Ingoldsby at the battle of Fontenoy, Sir John Cope at the battle of Prestonpans, Sir John Mordaunt and the expedition against Rochefort, and Lord George Sackville at the battle of Minden. The debate on their actions, their impact, and the mooted punishments reveal that the anxieties concerning national honour, masculinity, and patriotism were only partially satisfied by recourse to the ultimate court of honour, the court-martial.