Bernard Lonergan

This paper aims to show that the thought of Aristotle can shed much light on the irksomeproblems that lurk around the philosophical foundations of neuroscience. First, we will explorethe ramifications of Aristotle’s mereological principle, namely, that it is not the eye that sees, butthe human person that sees by the eye. Next, we shall draw upon the riches of Maxwell Bennett’sand Peter Hacker’s Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (=PFN) in order to elucidate howAristotle’s mereological principle can be of service to contemporary neuroscientists, psychologists,and philosophers. In the third and fourth parts we aim to complement the project of PFN byshowing how Aristotle’s philosophical anthropology and doctrine of pros hen equivocation canstrengthen PFN’s response to eliminativists, reductionists, and other critics of “folk psychology.”Finally, our last section will investigate the kinds of correlations involved in brain scanningtechniques, such as fMRI, so as to determine whether the most recent empirical discoveries do infact support various critics’ rejection of “folk psychology.” We will show that the empiricalevidence does not in fact favor eliminativist or reductionist views, and that we would do well toturn to the more Aristotelian approaches to neuroscience adopted by PFN and ourselves.

In this essay I argue that contemporary versions of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the “new mechanist philosophy” in biology, neuroscience, and psychology share significant commitments about the reality of the organized causal components of mechanisms. My aim is to challenge the well-known narrative that hylomorphic and mechanistic ontologies are fundamentally incompatible by establishing that the new mechanist philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism are not only complementary, but are defending many of the same ontological claims.
I begin with a brief sketch of the fundamental claims of hylomorphism (§I). I then situate the new mechanist philosophy (NMP) within recent developments in philosophy of science, before introducing the basic framework of NMP. In the last two sections of the paper I argue for the compatibility of hylomorphism and NMP. I start with the major points of agreement between hylomorphism and NMP (§III). Significantly, I establish that NMP is committed to organization or structure realism (a touchstone of hylomorphism), and neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is committed to the reality of mechanisms or causal powers that produce, underlie, or maintain the behavior or capacity of (i) phenomena that are constituted through the (ii) spatial, temporal, and active organization of their (iii) component entities and (iv) component activities (the four hallmarks of NMP). In the last section (§IV) I introduce some possible points of disagreement between these two positions pertaining to hylomorphism’s substance–attribute ontology, emergence, downward causation, and teleology. I show that the disagreements about these topics do not distinguish hylomorphists from new mechanists, but represent disagreements among hylomorphists and among new mechanists. I conclude that Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism should not been seen as fundamentally opposed to mechanisms, but that it can and should embrace the many complementary features of the new mechanist philosophy in biology, neuroscience and psychology.

Shows how a cumulative and remarkably fertile tradition of theological understanding developed from Augustine. Augustine grounded the missions of Word and Spirit on their distinctive processions in God, and coordinated the missions in relation to the interior and exterior conditions for redemption. Thomas Aquinas built on this tradition by refining the Trinitarian theology, systematically distinguishing nature and grace, and making charity as friendship central to his account of redemption. Lonergan situated this achievement within an account of divine-human intersubjectivity and the structure of history.

This paper aims to establish some of the taxonomical groundwork required for developing a robust philosophy of perception on the basis of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power (vis cogitativa). The formal object of the cogitative power will be divided into aspectual, actional, and affectional percepts. Accordingly, the paper contends that there is an internal sense power capable of a non-conceptual and pre-linguistic perceptual estimation of what some particular is, what could be done with respect to it, and what is to be done with respect to it. The argument begins with a synopsis of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. It then presents an extensive taxonomical analysis of three different kinds of cogitative percepts. This analysis is followed by a short exegetical defense of the threefold division of percepts. Finally, the essay concludes with a comparison of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power with recent work in the philosophy of perception.


De Haan, “Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88, 3 (2014): 397–
437

The purpose of this article is to show in what respects Strauss’ account of the three waves of modernity and Lonergan’s account of the longer cycle of decline mutually illuminate and add to each other. For reasons of scope, I will largely con- fine myself to Strauss’ article, “The Three Waves of Modernity,”6 and the sections of Lonergan’s Insight7 on the longer cycle of decline. I will show that the three waves of modernity as described by Strauss qualify as instances of the succession of ever lower viewpoints spoken of by Lonergan, which have their beginnings in a scotosis, which at once is productive of bias and leads both to shorter cycles and the longer cycle of decline. At the same time as Lonergan provides an explanation for what happened cognitionally in the successive waves of modernity, Strauss provides the content. Strauss also adds an important critical detail to Lonergan’s account of the longer cycle. While Lonergan mostly attends to the cognitional aspects of the longer cycle, beginning with a scotosis engendered by the disordered passions, Strauss points out that the origin of modern political philosophy began not with disordered passions (which had already produced scotosis, in Lonergan’s terminology), but with the deliberate choice to elevate the passions and the scotosis to the level of philosophy in a conscious rejection of all previous political philosophy. Failure to grasp either the cognitional aspects or the conscious, deliberate act at the origin of modernity necessarily leads to the misunderstanding of it and undercuts any attempt to deal adequately with the problems of modern thought so manifest in the totalitar- ian breakdowns of the twentieth century. I will proceed first by explaining Lonergan’s account of the longer cycle of decline, from the production of scotosis by disordered passion wanting to avoid inconvenient insights, to the formation of bias, to the systematic exclusion of theoretical concerns by practical common sense characteristic of the longer cycle. I will then outline Strauss’ argument in “Three Waves,” first by presenting the three waves and by explaining how each are waves, that is, further developments of what came before— what Lonergan calls successive lower viewpoints—and then by showing Strauss’ account of the continuity of the starting point of modernity in Machiavelli and the ending point with twentieth-century totalitarianism. Finally, I will briefly present the suggestions of Lonergan and Strauss for what is needed to engage with modern thought after its origin, character, and the root of its break-down have been grasped.

Originally a lecture at Seton Hall University, January, 2015, this paper is an introduction to a few of the more striking themes from Lonergan's Christology, including Lonergan's approach to the NT, the development of Christological dogma, and the consciousness and knowledge of Christ. Lonergan's Latin treatise, De Verbo Incarnato (1964), is expected to appear later this year in Collected Works, vol. 8: The Incarnate Word, trans. Michael Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and Jeremy D. Wilkins (University of Toronto Press).

Lonergan contributed to the theology of Christ's consciousness in several ways.  He refined the definition of consciousness so as to perfectly harmonize the person of the looker with the act of looking according to his own nature.  Lonergan demonstrated a precise parallel between the ontological and psychological constitution of Christ such that the person of Christ experiences himself as the subject of two consciousnesses.  Lonergan also clarified the role of the beatific vision in the consciousness of Christ, which is very useful in turn in helping to navigate the difficulties of Rahner's psychology of Christ.

Recent advances in historical Jesus studies have built directly or indirectly upon the work of Ben F. Meyer. This paper explores Meyer's work, situating it in relationship to that of Bernard Lonergan, and considers how Meyer might help us resolve yet further difficulties in historical Jesus studies.

This paper will be delivered to the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, Toronto, Ontario, March 20, 2015.

Using the work of Bernard Lonergan and Hans Urs von Balthasar to enhance our understanding of the individual within the community, I argue that the African notion of Ubuntu enriches our understanding of humanity through recognizing the role and importance of community. I use Lonergan to show that awareness of another’s humanity leads to a deeper awareness of one’s own and that the ultimate form of being-in-relationship is a being-in-love which requires authenticity and self-transcendence. I argue that Ubuntu is another way of naming self-transcendence from an African perspective. Drawing on the works of Balthasar, theologically this recognition of community not only enhances our understanding of humanity but alludes to the profound theological recognition that the Imago Dei in the other is most profoundly an Imago Trinitatis. Since God cannot be God out of relationship with God, human persons require community, and the ecclesial community to be most fully human persons.

Reviews the historical origins and principal elements of Karl Rahner's critique of Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan. Argues that Rahner's critique fails to come to terms with the basic problematic of Trinitarian theology, and misunderstands the significance of Thomas Aquinas's achievement.

Considering the knowledge man purports to possess, it is the case that it at
times, admits error. This prods one to take a look at how man attains
knowledge. The question one is left with is: Is man’s knowledge as a result of
an act or a cumulative achievement of several acts? For Lonergan, it is a
cumulative achievement of acts such as experiencing, understanding and
judging. Spurred by this Lonergan’s claim, this thesis explicitly studies
Lonergan’s epistemology using critical analysis as its method. The intention
here is that the reader of this work should begin to pay attention to the
conscious operations involved in his or her own knowing with the view to
knowing how come these errors to human knowledge and how they can be
averted.

My thesis, in brief, is that Lonergan is important today because the contemporary situation puts in stark relief the perennial problem for theology: the wisdom of theologians. The solution is not in the appropriation of any external ‘system’ but in the practices of self-appropriation by which the dimensions of the problem of measuring up to our tradition become explicit. The classic office of wisdom is to order, which means knowing what problems are the first problems. In theology, what is existentially first is the concrete reality of theologians in their attention, intelligence, and honesty, their freedom and loving self-surrender to Christ. The adequacy of the theologian is, concretely, theology’s first problem. Hence, I speak of Lonergan’s program as a ‘wisdom of the concrete’. It is a wisdom, for it deals with first principles; but it is of the concrete, a wisdom not through the appropriation of a system but through self-appropriation. It is a wisdom of praxis, of promoting religious, moral, and intellectual order in the soul.

This study examines Lonergan’s metaphysical method and some of its implications for a renewed theology, in the context of Robert Doran’s efforts to bring Lonergan’s scholastic theology forward. Doran and I share a commitment to Lonergan’s metaphysical program, but understand its entailments differently. The difference comes to light in our respective readings of Lonergan’s statement, “for every [metaphysical] term and relation, there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.” For Doran, the statement includes the categories of (Lonergan’s) scholastic theology; in my judgment, it is limited to metaphysical categories in the strict sense.

[This is a slightly revised version uploaded April 13, 2017, after the introduction of a further paragraph on the pivot from insight into phantasm to the philosophic concepts of matter and form. It is the paragraph starting on p. 15.]

Investigates the influence exercised by Thomas Aquinas on the development of Lonergan's project of "intentionality analysis."

The hypothesis of this (preliminary) study is a development in Lonergan’s thought on ‘first philosophy’. He was raised on
the scholastic assumption of metaphysics as first philosophy. In Verbum he made an initial break by expounding the psychology of Aquinas before the metaphysics. Insight marks a fundamental shift toward self-appropriation as the basic task of philosophy, and self-knowledge as its basic science. It sets up what Prof. Muratore has described as a ‘methodological demand’. The subsequent decade witnessed a series of
attempts to relate his procedure to the tradition he had inherited and to implement the method he had
devised. By the late 1960s, the methodological demand had effected a fundamental transformation, first in
Lonergan’s thinking about philosophy and then in his thinking about philosophy.

I'm working this up for possible use in a Trinity course with seminarians, many of whom are later-in-life vocations. This will be at the end of the semester, and they will have seen some of Rahner before they read this. The introductory parts about Rahner, scholasticism, and method are long, but I think they are necessary for clarifying what's going on in Lonergan's Trinitarian theology.

Are all God’s activities identical to God?  If not, which are identical to God and which not?  Although it is seldom noticed, the texts of Aquinas (at least on the surface) suggest conflicting answers to these questions, giving rise to a diversity of opinion among interpreters of Aquinas.  In this paper, we draw attention to this conflict and offer what we believe to be the strongest textual and speculative support for and against each of the main answers to these questions.

This thesis examines Fr. William A. Van Roo's contribution to the wide field of theological reflection on the relationship between theological method and the religious experience of the theologian as believer. While the 'turn to experience' became a hallmark of theology after 1952, and much was written on the topic, no solid consensus emerged. The thesis concludes that Van Roo's contribution, which passes through his reflection on symbols and symbolizing, offers a synthesis of the important elements of the question, around which a consensus could be built.

A review essay on Frederick Lawrence, *The Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Common Good,* ed. Randall Rosenberg and Kevin Vander Schel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). The version posted here is the version originally submitted to the journal, prior to their editorial process. Any use of this essay should refer to the published version.

This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates scientific, philosophical and theological features of addiction. I will argue first, that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides a cogent explanation of the causal interactions between human action and neuroplasticity. I employ Karol Wojtyła’s account of self-determination to further clarify the kind of neuroplasticity involved in addiction. Next, I will elucidate how a Thomistic anthropology can accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological and psychological elements of addiction, and finally, I will make clear how Thomism can provide an ethics and theology of grace that can be integrated with these ontological and scientific considerations into a holistic theory of addiction.

Since 1979, the Animal and Earth Liberation Fronts have claimed thousands of attacks worldwide targeting property. While these protest movements have been relatively impervious to infiltration, disruption and arrest, the US and UK governments have made investigation and prosecution of these groups a number one priority. Since the mid 2000s, with the disclose of the State’s targeted surveillance and criminalization of these movements, activists quickly labeled the prevailing political environment the “Green Scare”—drawing linkages to the surveillance and prosecution of leftist activists in the century prior. The Green Scare, as diagramed within a matrix of juridical, legalistic and political mechanisms has criminalized forms of political dissent—providing a disincentive for activists’ oppositional political engagement. The current study’s analysis applies an emergent method of conflict analysis and mediation to the subject of the violent non-State actor. In this manner it attempts to adapt this conflict mediation approach to examine how counter-terrorism exists as an articulation of the State’s epistemological framework and lived experience of State-personhood. Though examining the State as an entity capable of synthesizing experiences and generating a perceived “threat”, one can examine a resulting juridical “defense”. Utilizing the Insight approach to conflict mediation as developed by scholars including Bernard Lonergan (1992; 1998; 2004), Robert Fitterer (2008), Cheryl Picard (2010; 2011) and Jamie Price (2012), one can understand the State’s threat perception, narrative construction, and finally, policies that emanate from such a conflict understanding. The analysis contained herein attempts to adopt the Insight approach in order to undertake a critical, interpretive analysis of the Green Scare. The aim here is to extend Insight’s application to an analysis of Statecraft and by doing so, offer a challenging case study for consideration.

Gaven Kerr argues that Lonergan is a metaphysical realist but follows an inherently idealist method. Furthermore, Kerr claims, Lonergan’s isomorphism of cognitional and ontological elements does not hold, because ontological act is not parallel to cognitional judgment. In so arguing, however, Kerr conflates ontological act with efficient causality, misunderstands the nature of the parallel asserted by Lonergan’s isomorphism, and involves himself in apriori speculation about the implications of Lonergan’s method. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle, whereas ‘act’ names an intrinsic constituent of contingent being. The parallel between ontological and cognitional composition, moreover, and the isomorphism of ontological and cognitional elements, is subtler than Kerr appreciates. The suspicion, finally, that Lonergan’s method is somehow inherently idealist is idle and not borne out by the facts.

The Catholic Church professes that everyone is offered grace sufficient for salvation and that this grace is not necessarily identical to the grace of explicit Christian conversion. This paper  is an effort to connect this doctrine with the traditional Christian claim that Christ is head of all and no one is saved apart from him. What is sanctifying grace, what are the requirements of saving faith, and how might they be related to the historical Jesus Christ, even if they may be given and received apart from explicit Christian confession?

written in 2012 for a doctoral course on grace, based in part on my Master’s thesis in Philosophy (2010-2011), which was based largely on stuff I wrote as a teenager (c. 2001-2003), thus not the most mature treatment of this incredibly complex topic, about which I’ve been writing a book for a few years now

Post-modern theology is highly suspicious of social theory and its secular origins. After all, the founder who gave us the word “sociology” also coined the term “positivism.” An alternative strategy is that of Bernard Lonergan, a theologian with a highly developed sociological imagination. He was quite aware of the secularity but devoted a life-time in trying to think through some of the key issues. His was a mind on the move and perhaps it is not surprising that his contribution has yet to be assimilated.
In this paper I shall take a look at a key text from Lonergan’s magnum opus, Insight. I will suggest that, in a sense, this may be regarded as “social physics” (another phrase from Auguste Comte). As we shall see, Lonergan’s thought wrestled with many issues of concern to the other founders of sociology: Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber, but his vision is quite original, and in fact, he will draw on Arnold J. Toynbee.
I do not believe Lonergan’s work is beyond criticism—as his later developments suggest—so I will try to identify some difficulties by examining closely some of those later changes. Before offering my appraisal, then, I will look at Lonergan’s social theory from five periods. First, I shall simply record his interest in the 1930s by referring to some work he retained in a file but never published. Then I shall give a more careful exposition of a chapter written in the early 1950s. I will suggest that Lonergan’s deployment of mathematical analogies to understand social theory underwent some changes and so I will look at that transition in the 1960s. I will then be able to take a glance at the new way Lonergan presented his ideas in Method in Theology (1972) and go on to sample a few developments in the last decade up to 1980. In my appraisal we will be able to see some of the strengths and weaknesses Lonergan encountered in his project of social physics and perhaps make a small increase to the stock of ideas myself.

The study moves from the most general categories—finality and history—to the specifically theological categories of grace and providence.  After a brief glance at the precursors to Insight, the study turns to Insight itself to explore how Lonergan brought metaphysics into conversation with modern science. A third section places this consideration of natural and historical process within the context of God’s transcendent dominion, while a fourth shows how human and historical finality is transformed by the supernatural gift of participation in the divine life. The study concludes by outlining a heuristic perspective on human history as the dialectical unfolding of finality, sin, and redemptive grace.

Lonergan's well-known disciple Robert Doran has proposed to transpose the concepts of Scholastic theology by identifying corresponding elements within consciousness. This article suggests that Doran's method rests on a dubious exegesis of Lonergan and does not seem a viable way to achieve the desired results. Lonergan himself proposed and practiced a different solution: his dialectical method.

A fundamental tenet of Ernest Fortin’s learning and teaching – if not a basic orientation of his entire intellectual life – is the realization that classical philosophers and theologians can teach us lessons most important to contemporary culture and thought. Fortin’s essays carry forward the ongoing debates between the ancients and the moderns, masterfully illustrating how many a modern genius failed to understand this or that classical thinker.  There is no hint of archaism in Fortin’s writings; he is not an archeologist of the past retrieving the ancients only to entomb their teachings in crusty museum reliquaries.  Rather, Fortin is adept at showing the relevance of ancient wisdom to some of the most pressing issues of our time.

The overall aim of this project is to contribute to the development of a contemporary systematic theology of the cross that meets the exigencies of a secular age, is rooted in Scripture, and affirms the philosophical commitments of theology. Augustine maintains that the cross of Christ responds to the fundamental problem of evil in a way that communicates and enacts God's preference for " justice over power. " This dissertation selectively traces key transpositions of this soteriological notion from Augustine through Bernard Lonergan. The results of this analysis are then brought into conversation with contemporary biblical exegesis to propose an interpretation of Lonergan's " Law of the Cross " conducive to further developments.