Discusses and defends Peter Strawson’s argument in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ that our practice of holding agents responsible for their actions is not something that can be given a justification or stands in need of one, since it is not... more
Discusses and defends Peter Strawson’s argument in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ that our practice of holding agents responsible for their actions is not something that can be given a justification or stands in need of one, since it is not something we could choose to give up. Part 1 outlines Strawson’s arguments and replies to some recent criticisms. Part 2 argues that despite our inability entirely to relinquish blaming and holding responsible, there are considerations about the role of acquired perspectives in the initiation of wrongful actions that give us reason to question whether these are ever appropriate responses to wrongdoing. Part 3 attempts to identify and diffuse the impulse to seek a justification for holding agents responsible. Part 4 goes on to argue that the real force of the problem of moral responsibility lies in a tension in our moral sentiments about whether to blame or to try to understand particular instances of wrongdoing, and that, while there is no general philosophical resolution of this tension, we need not be faced with an irresolvable dilemma about whether to blame or to attempt to understand whenever we are confronted with wrongdoing.
