The author traces the theory of meaning in relation to speech acts from John Austin to John Searle and those who reacted to the latter. He agrees with Searle that the study of the meaning of sentences is not distinct from the study of... more
The author traces the theory of meaning in relation to speech acts from John Austin to John Searle and those who reacted to the latter. He agrees with Searle that the study of the meaning of sentences is not distinct from the study of speech acts since the same sentences are used to perform certain speech acts. However, the author believes that the logical term proposition is superfluous and argues that in asserting a compound or molecular constative like {P or Q}, we likewise assert the simple or atomic constatives alternatively, like P or Q, albeit the illocutionary force of each is suppressed or only implied. Moreover, if we take into consideration most if not all elements of contextual sentential meaning, then we will notice that constatives may share family resemblances with each other and even with some performatives. Hence, in view of the fact that John Searle believes the act of predication partakes of the nature of the illocutionary force, then Searle’s proposition cannot be force-neutral and, consequently, it can be replaced with any constative—such as a statement in the sense of what is stated, a prediction in the sense of what is predicted, etc.—depending upon the context.
