On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvo’s application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the... more
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvo’s application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvo’s application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the... more
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvo’s application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?
