Formal-legalism

Part of a larger monograph in progress, what follows may be described broadly as an explanation on explanation.  More specifically, it seeks to explain how a dominant perspective or paradigm of explanation has sought to define and describe the phenomenon of secessionism and as a problem within the formal-legalist paradigm. But this essay will not delve so much directly into the empirical conditions that come to play in the process of secession but, rather, on how the practitioners of the formal-legalist paradigm describe these conditions, how they define secession itself as a problem, and how they propose to solve it, all within the logic of their paradigm. In the process, this essay will attempt to reconstruct the formalist worldview with the end in mind of laying bare the practitioners’ fundamental presuppositions and problems therein. An assumption taken here is that it is only in the context of these presuppositions could the practitioners render comprehensible and meaningful occurrence of concrete events, like secession. A further assumption, reflecting the post-behavioral mood in the social sciences, is that the truncation of reality into the realm of facts and that of values has apparently brought humanity no closer to an understanding of these events in a manner that is both decisive and convincing. This is illustrated by the rise of the United States as a rogue empire that has arrogated unto itself the role of guardian of the Enlightenment tradition and the formal-legalism putative to it but which has been deformed almost beyond recognition consequent to its unilateral pursuit of global hegemony especially since 9/11 and in the context of neoliberal globalization.

The essay explains the singular event of the declaration of martial law in the Philippines in September 1972 through the lens of two competing paradigms of explanation: formal-legalism (or legalism), and, structural-functionalism (or functionalism). The respective basic postulates, definition of the problem, and solutions to the problem offered by each of these paradigms are examined, highlighting the work of the leading practitioners of each of these paradigms. Critique is then offered as to the adequacy of each of these paradigms in accounting for the phenomenon, or event, being explained, i.e., martial law in the Philippines. Implications are also drawn as to the broader viability of these paradigms in accounting for other phenomena in other settings and at other times.