Frances Kamm

In this paper, the ethical and spiritual aspects of the trolley problem are discussed in connection with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, I show that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problems in their decision-making processes and justifications. Second, I discuss five aspects of " the problem of the trolley problem; " that is to say, " Rarity, " " Inevitability, " " Safety Zone, " " Possibility of Becoming a Victim, " and " Lack of Perspective of the Dead Victims Who Were Deprived of Freedom of Choice, " in detail. Third, I argue that those who talk about the trolley problem are automatically placed in the sphere of the expectation of response on the spiritual level. I hope that my contribution will shed light on the trolley problem from a very different angle, which has not been made by our fellow philosophers.

"The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm.  This Doctrine seems to play an important role in commonsense morality, but requires defence.  I defend this Doctrine by arguing that it is necessary for our bodies or other resources to genuinely belong to us.  A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has a special authority over it.  Previous attempts to defend the Doctrine on this basis have not explained why we need precisely the authority provided by the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing for our bodies and other resources to genuinely belong to us.  I explain the connection between the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the conditions for genuine belonging.  I argue that the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is best understood as a principle that protects us against harmful imposition - against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is properly ours.  This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person.  The opponent of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing must claim that nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body.

Key words:  Ethics; Doctrine of Doing and Allowing; Self-Ownership; withdrawal of aid; Frances Kamm; Jeff McMahan; Warren Quinn
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Fiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically proximate to the victims of the emergency; by being the only person who can help the victims; or by having a personal encounter with the victims. Each of these factors is claimed to be defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involvement, and thus a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid. Woollard defends this view on the basis of a number of cases. We show that Woollard’s cases contain various confounding factors. In view of the more precisely drawn cases offered here, it is clear that neither proximity nor uniqueness nor personal encounter is intuitively defeasibly sufficient in the way Woollard claims.

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about "supererogatory" deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about "supererogatory" deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.