Front National

The following article intends to investigate the growth of far-right movements in Europe and the radicalization of political thought, trying to develop synthetic forms the historical process occurred in France. We can observe that the constitution of the ideology of the extreme right goes through several transformations over the past two centuries, logging advances in popularity in some moments, but also presenting several times a setback in projects prepared by radical movements that led to the failure itself and destruction. The aim of the paper is to make a historiographical survey of the process of formation and consolidation of the extreme right in France, whereas today the country has one of the biggest parties of the extreme right Front National, led by Marine Le Pen.

La critique de l’Union européenne constitue une ligne doctrinale stable du programme du FN depuis la fin des années 1980. La nouvelle équipe de direction menée par Marine Le Pen inscrit ainsi son opposition à Bruxelles dans une continuité avec l’héritage du passé. Ce discours de dénonciation s’est néanmoins durci ces dernières années, à partir de la revendication d’une sortie de l’euro notamment. Or ce durcissement peut également être réinscrit dans une continuité de pratiques au sein du FN. Il vient pérenniser des usages de l’arène européenne et de sa critique comme outils de la lutte politique nationale mis en place par les dirigeants du FN depuis vingt ans. En restant radicale, la critique frontiste de l’Europe s’adapte à un nouveau contexte au sein du système partisan pour continuer à permettre aux acteurs FN de gagner à la fois en visibilité, en crédibilité et en distinction, ainsi qu’à maintenir la cohésion au sein du parti.

The electoral growth of several ‘anti-political establishment parties’
in Europe since the end of the Cold War, was accompanied by the
growth of the use of the catch-all category of populism to
describe them. Despite the countless analyses related to
populism, less attention – with some relevant exceptions – has
been given to the impact of populism on party organizations. Still,
populist parties do organize. While it is common to compare the
organization of political parties belonging to the same party
family, the attention on the impact of populism in shaping parties
with different ideological backgrounds is scarce. This paper
focuses on this literature gap, analyzing four parties, which the
literature labels as ‘populist’. The conclusion reached in this paper
is that populism can be an ideological feature incorporated by
different parties; however, its impact on the organization differs
substantially from one party to another.

Pouvoirs, 2016, n°157, p.85-103.
Abstract : Les résultats électoraux du Front national depuis 2012 témoignent d’une dynamique électorale positive et interrogent : le FN peut-il l’emporter ? Son ascension électorale permet d’étudier, d’une part, les déterminants de sa victoire dans le système électoral de la Ve République et de questionner, d’autre part, le devenir du système partisan face à l’essor de ce parti.

This abstract is a part of paper (presented in Vienna 015) which analyzes how Marine Le Pen is presented in French press. This paper shows how press is using "femine" streotypes and while presenting her press takes part to "dediabolisation". The penomena is not unique, this same is used also in Finland.

A l’instar des formations politiques européennes, les partis politiques français sont confrontés à plusieurs défis et soumis à nombre de tensions à l’aube de ce XXIe siècle, alors même que leur attractivité n’a jamais semblé aussi faible.

Longtemps dominée par un agencement autour du Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) et de l’Union pour la démocratie française (UDF) à droite, et du parti socialiste (PS) et du parti communiste français (PCF) à gauche, le système de partis a lui-même considérablement évolué sous l’effet de la recomposition de la droite parlementaire, de l’effondrement du parti communiste ou de la percée de nouveaux venus, tels le Front national ou Les Verts.

Après la séquence des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012, cet ouvrage analyse en profondeur l’état de chacun des partis actifs dans le système politique. Comment chacun d’entre eux se positionne-t-il au regard des transformations du fait partisan ? Comment les partis interprètent-ils les mutations auxquelles ils font face ? Comment agissent-ils face à la désaffection qu’ils subissent ? Quelles évolutions idéologiques et organisationnelles connaissent-ils ?

Ces questions sont examinées dans ce livre de référence. Les auteurs présentent un tableau d’ensemble original, offrant de manière systématique une analyse des partis à l’œuvre dans le système politique français ; laquelle est complétée par une réflexion sur les grandes transformations de la géographie électorale.

Depuis quelques années, le vote d'extrême droite progresse dans de nombreux pays européens. Si dans certains d'entre eux, il s'agit d'une manifestation récente, dans d'autres pays, l'extrême droite a connu un enracinement certain. Ainsi, en Belgique, en France ou en Autriche, les partis d'extrême droite font désormais partie de l'échiquier politique. Ces formations influencent profondément les débats politiques et pèsent sur les orientations gouvernementales. Cela est particulièrement vrai sur des thèmes tels que l'identité nationale, la sécurité intérieure, les politiques sociales, l'intégration des étrangers et les flux migratoires. Le présent ouvrage aborde l'extrême droite en France et en Belgique de manière comparative, ce qui constitue sa principale originalité. En effet, cinq sujets identiques guident les analyses réalisées respectivement sur le Front national en France, le Vlaams Blok en Flandre et le Front national dans la partie francophone de la Belgique. La première question a trait aux étapes de la formation de ces partis, à leur identité politique, à leur organisation et leur personnel politique et, enfin, à leur enracinement progressif. Le deuxième sujet, qui est très souvent oublié mais qui nous renseigne sur leur filiation idéologique, porte sur leur programme économique et social. Le troisième thème concerne l'électorat des partis d'extrême droite et vise à donner une analyse nuancée, capable de restituer l'hétérogénéité des groupes qui votent pour les partis d'extrême droite. Le quatrième champ analyse des effets de la progression des partis d'extrême droite sur les autres formations politiques. Enfin, la cinquième problématique évoque la situation de deux villes sous l'emprise des partis d'extrême droite, Toulon à l'heure du Front National et Anvers à portée de main du Vlaams Blok. Ces deux monographies nous montrent aussi ce que signifie ou peut signifier l'administration de la collectivité par des partis d'extrême droite.

L’élection présidentielle du 22 avril 2007 et le scrutin législatif qui l’a suivie ont été une terrible désillusion pour Jean-Marie Le Pen et le Front national (FN). Après avoir dominé l’agenda politique et médiatique durant les années quatre-vingt-dix et créé une secousse inédite dans le système politique lors des élections présidentielles de 2002, le FN était ramené à une expression électorale et un poids politique extrêmement modestes. Ce résultat, en phase avec le mouvement de déclin observé dans les années 2000, est confirmé au scrutin municipal de 2008 où l’extrême droite française est évanescente. D’aucuns évoquent alors la fin sans gloire de Jean-Marie Le Pen et de son parti.

A la veille des élections présidentielles et législatives de 2012, la présentation et le regard sont pourtant tout autres. En janvier 2011, Marine Le Pen a « hérité » de la présidence du parti ; trente-neuf ans après l’accession de son père à cette même présidence. Le Front national a opéré une percée aux élections cantonales du printemps 2011 et les enquêtes d’opinion créditent Marine Le Pen de scores oscillant entre 15 et 20% des intentions de vote pour le premier tour de la présidentielle.

Après le pain noir, le pain blanc ? Les choses sont indubitablement plus nuancées. Dans un environnement européen où l’extrême droite a (re)trouvé des couleurs dans certains Etats, une nouvelle analyse approfondie du phénomène frontiste s’imposait, tant il est vrai que le déclin politico-électoral de la deuxième moitié des années 2000 avait asséché les recherches consacrées au Front national.

L’ouvrage, qui rassemble des contributions de spécialistes réputés de l’extrême droite française, retrace et analyse tour à tour l’histoire du Front national, les rapports du FN à l’extrême droite européenne, le modèle organisationnel et militant du parti, ses axes idéologiques et programmatiques, de même que son implantation électorale et la question des alliances politico-électorales. Enfin, trois zones de force du Front national, dissemblables dans leur profil, sont très finement observées : le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, l’Alsace et Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur.

Depuis un quart de siècle, plusieurs partis d’extrême droite ou de la droite populiste ont opéré une percée dans leur système politique national : le Front national en France, le FPÖ en Autriche, le parti du progrès en Norvège et au Danemark, le parti populaire danois, le parti national slovaque, le Mouvement social italien-Alliance nationale, la Ligue du nord, les Republikaner, le NPD et la DVU en Allemagne, la Liste Pim Fortuyn et le parti de la Liberté aux Pays-Bas, Ataka en Bulgarie, le parti populaire de la Grande Roumanie, le Vlaams Belang et le Front national en Belgique, l’Union démocratique du Centre en Suisse, LAOS en Grèce… Au surplus, un fait politique nouveau s’est imposé ces dernières années : outre la progression électorale et politique observée par nombre de ces partis, plusieurs formations d’extrême droite ont accédé aux responsabilités gouvernementales ou ont soutenu des gouvernements de l’extérieur. Par-delà les riches travaux consacrés aux développements des partis d’extrême droite, il s’imposait donc d’analyser les conditions et les conséquences de cette nouvelle donne. Tel est l’angle d’approche de cet ouvrage, qui réunit des contributions des meilleurs spécialistes de la question. La réflexion porte sur la vie et les choix internes de ces partis. Souhaitent-ils accéder au pouvoir ? Cette question suscite-t-elle des débats difficiles ? Observe-t-on un processus de modération quand ces formations rentrent au gouvernement ? Les militants endossent-ils ce choix ? Le parti est-il sanctionné ou conforté aux élections suivantes ?... Mais elle se fixe aussi sur les dimensions extérieures à ces formations. Les thèmes portés par les partis d’extrême droite percolent-ils chez les partis démocratiques ? L’apport de l’extrême droite est-il marquant sur certains thèmes qui lui sont chers ? Embrasser l’extrême droite est-ce mieux l’étouffer ? ... A partir d’études de cas et d’approches comparées, l’ouvrage fournit des réponses inédites à ces questions contemporaines.

The paper examines the connections between Russia and far-right political parties in Europe. It argues
that these close relationships are based both on ideology and strategy. The European far right sees in Russian
President Vladimir Putin the model of a strong, conservative leader who defends traditional values and
opposes the decadent West. Since most far-right parties are at the same time against European integration
and anti-American, they also see a close relationship with Russia as a necessary foothold in order to
achieve the gradual disassociation of their countries from Euro-Atlantic institutions. The Kremlin, for its part,
views these parties as possibly being useful for the achievement of its own objectives. Thus, it is interested
in gathering them under its wing.

In this context, in recent years far-right parties all over Europe have established cordial relations with
Moscow. Far-right leaders pay regular visits to Russia, have meetings with Russian officials and often
appear on state-owned Russian media. The fact that they are discussants with the Kremlin boosts their
credibility at home and improves their image. At the same time, they are often invited to monitor electoral
procedures in disputed territories, thus offering some sort of credibility and international recognition for the
results of ballots. The secessionist referendum which was held in Crimea in March 2014 is the latest example
of this trend. More generally, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has offered a great opportunity
for the expression of the pro-Russian sentiments of most European far-right parties. These organisations
see Putin’s policy as tangible proof of his resolve to impose his will on his opponents and to mark the reemergence
of Russian power at the international level. From the Kremlin’s point of view, these parties can
also help Moscow to expand its geopolitical influence. Even if Putin does not manage to see parties with
pro-Russian leanings forming governments, he can still hope that their growing influence will exert considerable
pressure on EU governments, especially as far as relations with Russia are concerned.

After the latest European electoral cycle, right wing parties on the far side of the political spectrum along with right-wing euro-sceptics and conservative anti-federalists won 112 seats. The presence of the radical right in the European Parliament (EP), has often been attributed to the second order election model theorised by Reif and Schmitt (1980). In European elections, turnout is traditionally lower compared to “first” order national elections, parties in government tend to lose vote-shares while smaller parties benefit from the European system of proportional representation. This article analyses the relationship between radical parties and the EP by examining the French and Danish results in the 2014 elections. Though both constitute the third political force in their countries at that time, Front National and Dansk Folkeparti’s electoral support is representative of a second order election. The former party benefited from a classic sanction vote while the second one owes its breakthrough to a particular Danish voting behaviour, somewhat singular in the European Union. The article offers an in-depth overview of the literature on both the radical right, the Second Order Election model as well as radical right parties’ dynamic at the European Parliament level.

Alors que le discours politique est l'objet privilégié, l'objet « noble », presque naturel de l'analyse de discours française (du côté de la lexicologie comme de la rhétorique), peu de chercheurs se sont penchés sur les discours des dirigeants du Front national. Et pourtant, comme l'indique Cécile Alduy en ouverture de Marine Le Pen prise aux mots, l'histoire du Front national « c'est aussi, fondamentalement, une histoire de mots » (p. 14). Ce paradoxe s'explique si l'on considère le discours frontiste, dans le champ du discours politique, comme un objet dont l'étude est périlleuse, parce qu'il interpelle et provoque la subjectivité du chercheur et qu'il l'oblige par là à se positionner par rapport aux questions de neutralité et d'engagement scientifique. Le choix d'un tel objet peut d'ailleurs s'apparenter à un geste militant. L'écueil en s'attaquant à l'analyse du discours frontiste est alors de glisser de l'analyse dépassionnée au commentaire politique chargé d'affect. Si un tel discours peut être considéré comme un objet scientifique sensible et piégé, il n'en demeure pas moins un objet que l'analyse de discours se doit d'étudier.

Nicolas Lebourg et Avec Jonathan Preda, « Ordre Nouveau : fin des illusions droitières et matrice activiste du premier Front National», Studia Historica.Historia Contemporánea, Salamanca, n°30 (numéro spécial sur les droites radicales en Europe et Amériques au XXe siècle), 2012, pp. 205-230.

The 2014 European elections confirmed the prominence in the media of what is commonly called the far right. While parties such as the Front National and UKIP were successful in the elections, their performance has since been exaggerated and they have benefited from a disproportionate coverage. Aiding their apparently ‘irresistible rise’, their normalisation was greatly facilitated by their description as ‘populist’ parties. However, while this term ‘populism’ has been almost universally accepted in the media, it remains a hotly debated concept on the academic circuit, and its careless use could in fact prove counterproductive in the assessment of the current state of democracy in Europe.

Instead of focusing on the reasons behind the rise of these parties, similarities and differences already widely covered in the literature, this article hypothesises that a skewed and disproportionate coverage of the European elections in particular, and the ‘rise’ of ‘right-wing populism’ in general, have prevented a thorough democratic discussion from taking place and impeded the possibility of other political alternatives.

Le Front National, parti classé traditionnellement à l'extrême-droite, a continué à occuper une place significative au sein de l'échiquier politique français tout au long des années 1990. Les thématiques traditionnelles qui sont les siennes, l'immigration, l'insécurité, la perte de souveraineté, comme beaucoup peuvent le constater, n'ont point cessé d'attirer l'attention des eurosceptiques.

PhD monograph on the media strategies of European nationalists.

Case study subjects: the French Front National, the Danish People's Party, Vlaams Belang, Bloc Identitaire.

Considers the representation of Islam by successful nationalist populist political parties and social movements in Western Europe.

En la presente comunicación trato de abordar el fascismo como fenómeno histórico y, también, en su relación con la actualidad, el objetivo fundamental es tomarlo en serio desde una perspectiva política a la par que historiográfica, es decir, útil para la sociedad actual. Para ello aprovechamos el prisma que nos proporciona su proyecto político para un Nuevo Orden, muy vinculado a una concepción concreta de la utopía y nacido en un momento tan particular de crisis como el periodo de entreguerras.

Özet Aşırı sağın Avrupa genelinde yükselişe geçmesiyle başlayan tartışmalar gerek pratik gerek teorik düzeyde devam etmektedir. Bölgenin en istikrarlı ve iddialı partisi olması itibariyle Fransız aşırı sağ popülist partisi Front National'in bu doğrultudaki bir analizi hem Avrupa'daki diğer aşırı sağ partilerin genel görünümüne hem de bu partilerin geleceğine dair bir fikir verecektir. Bu varsayımdan hareketle çalışmanın temel amacı Front National'in kuruluşundan günümüze kadar geçirdiği dönüşümü, devralınan mirası ve dönemin şartlarını ihmal etmeden açıklamaya çalışmaktır. Bu bağlamdaki ana iddia ise 2011 yılındaki başkanlık değişiminin parti içinde ve ülke siyasetinde temel bir kırılma yarattığıdır. Öncesinde Jean-Marie Le Pen özellikle baskın aşırı sağ ideolojisinin etkisiyle sınırlı bir başarı elde etmiştir. Marine Le Pen'le birlikte ise parti büyük oranda ideolojik bagajını terk edip güçlü bir cumhuriyet vurgusuyla popülist kimliğini öne çıkarmaya başlamıştır. Dolayısıyla en genel anlamda makalede aşırı sağ bir ideolojinin popülizm gömleği altında neye bürünebileceği gösterilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Fransız siyasetinde özellikle 19. yüzyıldan beri bazı aşırı sağ hareketler ortaya çıkmış ancak kısa sürede etkisini kaybetmişlerdir. Front National ise özellikle 2011'den sonra (neo)popülist siyaseti dönemin şartlarının da yarattığı manevra alanıyla hegemonyası için işlevsel kılabilmiş, başarıya ulaşmıştır. Front National son birkaç seçim dikkate alındığında kurumsal-yapısal engellemelere rağmen yükselişine devam etmektedir. Gelinen noktada bu yükselişin etkisi ve toplumsal meşruiyetinin de vermiş olduğu itkiyle politik sistem ve kurumsal partiler üzerinde büyük bir baskıya yol açarak onları değişime zorlamaktadır. Abstract The debate that started with rise of the radical right-wing parties across Europe continues both practically and theoretically. An analysis about French radical right-wing populist party, Front National, will present both a general idea and a prediction about such parties since it is the most stable and assertive party in the region. Starting from this assumption, the main purpose of the paper is explaining the transformation of Front National from its foundation up to now without neglecting the inherited legacy and

Depuis l’élection présidentielle de 1995, le vote des ouvriers pour le FN est l’objet d’un débat scientifique animé, qui porte à la fois sur son ampleur réelle et sur sa signification profonde dans le paysage politique français. La poussée historique du FN lors des élections européennes de 2014, notamment dans le
nord et l’est industriels de la France, ont relancé ce débat en alimentant l’idée d’une nouvelle percée dans les milieux ouvriers liée à l’arrivée de Marine Le Pen à la présidence du parti en 2011. Or, replacée dans le temps long, la progression
des votes ouvriers pour le FN renvoie fondamentalement à la reconfiguration durable des structures de la compétition électorale française intervenue au début des années 1980. Dans ce cadre, l’électorat de Marine Le Pen ne diffère pas de
celui de Jean-Marie Le Pen. Le vote des ouvriers en faveur du FN est le produit d’un réalignement électoral indépendant de l’identité des candidats.

« Le Front national et la galaxie des extrêmes droites radicales », dans  Sylvain Crépon , Alexandre Dézé , Nonna Mayer  (dir.), Les faux-semblants du Front national. Sociologie d’un parti politique, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2015, pp. 121-139.

On the verge of deep economic, social, political, and ultimately existential crisis, the rise of the global Right brings about an anxiogenic mythopoeic questioning most often satiated with simplistic identitary responses. The aim of this article is to explore the mythical dimensions that underpin the ideological structures of both the feminist activist group Femen and the far-right National Front (FN) party in France. This is matched by a parallel concern to critically engage with Femen from a feminist scholarly perspective, beyond simplistic “either/or” approaches to the movement, and do justice to their project of reclaiming an alternative ontological space. I first examine the emergence, the development, and the specific function of the myths Femen and the FN deploy, embodied in their respective idolatry of the Amazons and Joan of Arc. I then offer a comparative reading of their competing mythologies to explore the ways in which gender and sexuality serve as structuring principles for national processes in contemporary France. Ι adopt a myth-critical approach based on works by leading political myth theorists Raoul Girardet and Jean-Pierre Sironneau, which may add to our understanding of the continuing appeal of the movements considered, beyond analyses of positivist tradition that deal merely with the realm of the legible. Drawing significant parallels between systems of belief ranging from right-wing nationalism to leftist ideologies of Progress, both theorists offer patterns of thought that allow us to appreciate the sacralization of modern politics in movements as divergent as Femen and the FN at the current historical juncture.

Since the 1990s, the term 'populism' has become increasingly linked to reconstructed radical right parties in Europe such as the French Front National and UKIP. Through its many uses and misuses in mainstream discourse, this association has created a mythology around such parties and their appeal to the 'people'. This development has facilitated the return of nationalism and racism to the forefront of the mainstream political discourse and simultaneously obscured the deeper causes for such a revival. This article explores the ways in which populist hype, based on a skewed understanding of democracy as majority, has divided the 'people' along arbitrary lines, tearing communities apart at the expense of more emancipatory actions. Based predominantly on electoral analysis and discourse theory, with a particular focus on the role of abstention, the aim of this article is to examine the process through which, by way of its involuntary and constructed association with the radical right, the 'people', and the working class in particular, have become essentialised in a nationalist project, moving further away from a narrative of class struggle towards one of race struggle.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv10crdt6.6
This chapter on the flooding of the French Mediterranean town of Fréjus in 1959 due to the collapse of the Malpasset dam supports the book’s larger argument about the inseparability of the disasters of 1954-1960 from short- and long-term experiences of decolonization.  Responses to the Fréjus flood are examined in order to interrogate, at the local level, the impact of two key transformations in official French policy: the attempt, beginning by 1958, to undermine Algerian nationalist narratives by promoting Muslim Algerians’ advancement within French society and then, in 1962, the exclusion of Muslim Algerians from French citizenship.  The chapter examines survivors’ accounts linking the Algerian Revolution to the Fréjus flood, and argues that such linkages went beyond literary metaphor and beyond the symptoms of psychological trauma, demonstrating that the long history of the subjugation of Algerians by France was perpetuated in responses, official and popular, to the Fréjus flood.

Este artículo describe la forma como se abordó la modernización del Estado durante el Frente Nacional (1958-1974). Intencionalidad vista como una necesidad para construir un futuro mejor por medio de la inversión en desarrollo social, posibilitar una democracia saludable y solucionar por esta vía el conflicto presente en Colombia. Lo anterior en el contexto de la Guerra Fría y el encuentro de los proyectos políticos de las potencias mundiales. Los diferentes periodos presidenciales que tuvo el Frente Nacional se analizan, sus apuestas y reformas, además de las relaciones que tuvieron con Estados Unidos y el lugar que ocuparon los militares y la clase media, mostrando así, la respuesta que tales medidas suscitaron en la fuerza pública y la población civil. Se concluye entonces que, un periodo de apertura y oportunidades sociales enmarcadas en un proyecto como el de la modernización de Estado, liderado por Estados Unidos, alteró los ánimos de la sociedad e hizo que se presentaran críticas a la capacidad que tenían las instituciones estatales para brindar mejores condiciones de vida.
***
This article describes how the State was modernized during the National Front (1958-1974). This intention was seen as a necessity to build a better future through investing in social development, to make a healthy democracy possible, and to solve in this manner the conflict present in Colombia. This happened in the context of the Cold War and the encounter of the political projects of world powers. We analyze the different presidential terms of the National Front, their bids and reforms, as well as their relationships with the United States and the place occupied by the military and the middle class, thus showing how the public forces and the civilian population responded to these measures. We conclude, therefore, that a period of openness and social opportunities framed by a project such as State modernization, led by the US, affected society’s spirits and caused criticism against the ability of state institutions to bring about better living conditions.
***
Este artigo descreve a forma como a modernização do Estado foi abordada durante a Frente Nacional (1958-1974). A intencionalidade vista como uma necessidade para construir um futuro melhor por meio do investimento no desenvolvimento social, possibilitar uma democracia saudável e resolver desta forma o conflito presente na Colômbia. O exposto no contexto da Guerra Fria e do encontro dos projetos políticos das potências mundiais. São analisados ​​os diferentes períodos presidenciais que teve a Frente Nacional, suas apostas e reformas, além das relações que mantiveram com os Estados Unidos e o lugar ocupado pelos militares e pela classe média, mostrando assim a resposta que tais medidas suscitaram na força pública e a população civil. Conclui-se então que um período de abertura e oportunidades sociais enquadradas em um projeto como o da modernização do Estado, liderado pelos Estados Unidos, alterou o ânimo da sociedade e gerou críticas à capacidade das instituições estatais de proporcionar melhores condições de vida.

La ville de Perpignan est au centre de la campagne des élections municipales de 2020. Objectif prioritaire du Rassemblement national, elle serait, en cas de victoire de la liste menée par Louis Aliot, la plus grande commune aux mains du parti de Marine Le Pen. Cette étude de Jérôme Fourquet, Nicolas Lebourg et Sylvain Manternach, réalisée en partenariat avec Le Point et l'IFOP, propose une radiographie de la préfecture des Pyrénées Orientales afin de mettre à jour comment cette dynamique électorale est le fruit d'une structuration ethno-sociale du territoire, de facteurs économiques, sociaux et culturels, et, enfin, de la rencontre d'une offre et d'une demande politiques.

To promote their message about the decadent West, the Russian media have engaged with activists and politicians from the fringes of socio-political life in the West, namely the far right, far left, conspiracy theorists and isolationists who would be ideologically inclined to corroborate Moscow’s line of argument. In the course of time, the Russian media also established structural relations with the EU-based pro-Russian media managed by far right activists, and this article discusses these relations with a special focus on France, Italy and Slovakia.

How can the resurgence of the FN since 2007 be explained? Has it finally normalise? Has the mainstream right radicalised and thus, helped in such a process? How did the FN benefit from the rejection of mainstream politics?
This paper will argue that this renaissance is due to endogenous and exogenous political factors that had a 'normalising-effect' on the FN's rhetoric and, in turn, placed it at the point of confluence between national and social protests, hence widening its electoral basis. To demonstrate that, we will, firstly, analyse the strategy of de-demonisation, focusing on the replacement of anti-semitism by islamophobia and the corruption of republican symbols. Secondly, the era of Sarkozism and the strategy of droitisation will be reviewed and we will be able to assess the extent to which the mainstream right has radicalised and, thus, legitimised the FN's rhetoric. Finally, we will explain the widening of Le Pen's electorate by looking at her social volte-face on political economy and the way she profited from both the economic and political crisis.

In modern discourse, the terms extreme right, far-right, populist right and radical right are often used interchangeably. Using case studies, this short essay looks at how such assertions are incorrect by analysing the differences between the various ideologies.

The success of the extreme right in France in the past two decades has not been limited to their electoral rise; a more long-lasting victory has taken place in the ideological field, where the discourse of the extreme right occupies now a prominent place in the mainstream liberal democratic agenda. Increasingly, their ideas are seen in the media and within the ranks of mainstream parties as ‘common sense’, or at least acceptable.
The growing acceptance of this ‘common sense’ is the result of very carefully crafted strategies put in place by extreme right thinkers since the 1980s. For over three decades now, in order to change perceptions and renew extreme right-wing ideology, New Right thinktanks such as the French GRECE believed it was necessary to borrow the tactics of the left, and more specifically the Gramscian concept of hegemony: cultural power must precede political power. With the use of contemporary examples, this article will demonstrate the continuing impact these ideas have had on the Front National and French politics and society, and how this change has originated in the association of populist rhetoric with the neo-racist stigmatisation of an ‘Other’.

This book attempts to account for the resurgence of significant political movements of the Radical Right in France since the establishment of democracy in the country at the end of the nineteenth century. Taking to task historical treatments of the Radical Right for their failure to specify the conditions and dynamics attending its emergence, and faulting the historical myopia of contemporary electoral and party-centric accounts of the Front National, it tries to explain the Radical Right's continuing appeal by relating the socio-structural outcomes of the processes of industrialization and democratization in France to the persistence of economically and politically illiberal groups within French society. Specifically, the book argues that, as a result of the country's protracted and uneven experience of industrialization and urbanization, significant pre- or anti-modern social classes, which remained functionally ill-adapted and culturally ill-disposed to industrial capitalism and liberal democracy, subsisted late into its development.

Este artigo discute os fatores que melhor elucidam a lógica da preferência eleitoral a favor do partido de extrema-direita francês Frente Nacional nas presidenciais de 2012, particularmente verifica o efeito dos valores na preferência pela candidata Marine Le Pen, que conquistou 17,9% dos votos no pleito em questão, posicionando-se em terceiro lugar. A hipótese central é de que as orientações valorativas dos eleitores são fundamentais para compreender este tipo de escolha eleitoral, particularmente a oposição ao fenômeno da globalização e seus efeitos, como a imigração e a União Europeia. Realizou-se uma análise de regressão logística multinomial, em que a variável dependente foi o voto para presidente no primeiro turno de 2012 e as variáveis independentes foram extraídas das teorias explicativas do comportamento eleitoral: sócio-demográficas (sexo, idade, escolaridade, religião e profissão), ideologia, preferência partidária, satisfação com o funcionamento da democracia, confiança nos políticos, avaliação da economia, voto para presidente em 2007 (1º turno), euroceticismo, xenofobia e conservadorismo. Conforme esperado, identifica-se que as preferências políticas e culturais dos eleitores ancoram o voto na extrema-direita, que não pode ser explicado simplesmente a partir de avaliações econômicas ou visto como um voto temático, mesmo em um momento de crise.

The paper is dedicated to the image of Russia and the Russian people in political rhetoric of certain right-wing populist (Eurosceptic) parties of Western Europe, namely the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Alternative for Germany (AfD), Italy’s Northern League (LN) and France’s National Front (FN). Having analyzed these parties’ speakers’ statements related to Russia, we’ve found out that their attitude towards the country is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon which, nevertheless, has a number of basic characteristics. Russia has become an important part of Eurosceptic rhetoric quite recently, in 2013–2014, which coincided with the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent events, including the ongoing “sanctions wars” between the EU and Russia. Being opposed to Brussels by default, the Eurosceptics put the blame for the Ukraine crisis solely on the anti-Russia policies of the EU and US; conversely, Russia’s response to the western powers’ pressure, for instance the referendum in, and the reunification with, Crimea in March 2014, is viewed by the right-wing populists as legitimate or at least predictable and fully understandable. According to the Eurosceptics, any attempts to put political pressure on Russia by using economic sanctions are in vain due to several reasons, among them are certain features ascribed to Russian national character, which was forged by the two bloodiest world wars. Russians’ resilience to yield to outside pressure is associated by some with the person of President V.V. Putin. Moreover, the right populists perceive Russia as a country pivotal to war against islamist terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere, emphasizing Russia’s experience in dealing with homegrown extremists. Russia is also viewed by some Eurosceptics in a “Gaullist” perspective of making a Greater Europe “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” that could be a strong geopolitical center alternative to the US.

The paper deals with Russia’s civilizational identity as presented in political rhetoric of certain right-wing Eurosceptic parties of the EU, viz. the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), the Finns Party (PS), the Sweden Democrats (SD), and the French National Front (FN). “Civilizationism” is a new approach to assessing right-wing/far-right ideologies, which now address not only strictly national/nationalist issues but tend to frame their worldview in a broader way of a conflict between “our” Judeo-Christian European civilization and “their” Muslim civilization associated with unintegrated and radicalizing immigrant communities of the continent. Islam has been Europe’s “Constitutive Other” for centuries. However, Russia historically has played a somewhat similar role to Europe’s self-identity even though it’s image has been much more ambivalent than Islam’s. Along with anti-Russia rhetoric of European thinkers and politicians there’s always been a Russia-friendly one: from the French nobles who found refuge from the carnage of the French revolution in the “old regime” Russian empire to the “conservative revolutionaries” of interwar Germany to the “new right” of postwar France. Today some scholars claim that Russia is viewed by right-wing Eurosceptics of the EU as a positive example of a sovereign “white Christian state” preserving it’s national and civilizational identity, unlike contemporary Europe. Indeed, the conceptualisation of Russia as a “genuine Europe” occurs in the rhetoric of this or that nationalist party, yet there are different aspects of this image. Thus, some Eurosceptics criticise Russia for being nondemocratic and illiberal, lacking proper political institutions and respect for human rights. However, when it comes to the issues of preventing mass immigration from Asia and Africa and countering Islamic terrorism, even non-Russia friendly Eurosceptics mark Moscow as “one of us” and as Europe’s “natural ally”.