This article examines the efforts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to manage tensions in Ukraine between the substantial Russian minority and the... more
This article examines the efforts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to manage tensions in Ukraine between the substantial Russian minority and the Ukrainian government, and to prevent potentially violent conflict in Crimea from 1994 to 2001, as well as the subsequent efforts to promote peace and stability. It questions why the HCNM was remarkably successful in crisis management from 1994 to 2001, especially in averting secessionism in Crimea, but was hampered in his efforts to achieve a solid foundation for durable peace through the creation of a robust system of minority rights protection. The central argument is that regional politics often preclude the construction of a minority rights regime that could otherwise provide the foundation for durable peace.
As a confl ict prevention institution of ‘quiet diplomacy’, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is not associated, at a first glance, with civil society. Th is... more
As a confl ict prevention institution of ‘quiet diplomacy’, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is not associated, at a first glance, with civil society. Th is article analyses the working methods of the HCNM and demonstrates the all but irrelevant contribution of civil society to the successful implementation of the HCNM mandate. The paper first identifies the categories of civil society mostly involved with the work of the HCNM and then illustrates the different forms of involvement of each of them. It focuses, in particular, on two important instruments of the HCNM ‘toolbox’, the project work and the elaboration of general recommendations, looking at the essential role played by civil society actors. It concludes by maintaining that the role of the conflict prevention mandate of the HCNM has evolved significantly since his early years and that such evolution has effected (and was in turn affected by) substantial contribution from the side of civil society. As a result, a structural triangle of conflict-prevention comprising the HCNM, national authorities and civil society is emerging as reference, even if the balance among the three actors is defined separately in each individual case.
