Politicians often say “To win information war is not half way to victory, it is the victory itself.” In this study I am describing Russian-Georgian 5-day war in 2008. I am using Jowett & O’Donnell’s 10-step plan to analyse propaganda to... more
Politicians often say “To win information war is not half way to victory, it is the victory itself.” In this study I am describing Russian-Georgian 5-day war in 2008. I am using Jowett & O’Donnell’s 10-step plan to analyse propaganda to examine both sides of the conflict. Russian and Georgian sides were both active in engaging psychological warfare and psychological operations (PSYOP). Russia was using cyber war by blocking Georgian newspaper and NGO websites as well as official networks such as president Saakasvili’s website. Georgian hackers were blocking Russian news agencies’ websites. Russian newspapers were using personification by making Georgian president a war criminal and mentally instable person. Georgia was aiming most of its PSYOP to neutrals as well as home audience being successful in it by employing a small army of international PR personnel. Russia had no problem defeating Georgia militarily but when it comes to war of images, the task was much more difficult. The West still remembers the situation in Chechnya or more recent, Russia’s diplomatic crisis in Estonia were Russian hackers were blocking official web-sites in Estonia and Estonian diplomats were attacked in Moscow. Foreign investments decreased in Russia after Georgian conflict and although president Medvedev denies this having nothing to do with the conflict, even super power like Russia understands the language of money.
Neither Georgia nor Russia has free press according to Press Freedom Index 2011-2012. Nationalism has increased in Russia and even opposition newspapers use self-censorship in their reporting, In Georgia president and other official government officials were quoted the most in international newspapers. The Five Day War was very complicated, it was long difficult to access information and this resulted partly to why Georgia won the world's sympathy. However according to European Unions committee to investigate the war, all sides of the conflict (Russia, Georgia and South Ossetia) were proven to have committed crimes against humanity. No one was innocent in this conflict. However one side is portrayed as one. How was Georgia able to win the information war?
The obvious reason is the ”underdog” position as being minor actor when considering military power and the smaller size of the state. Georgia as a very small country had virtually no chance against mighty Russia using as in many Western news-papers described "overestimated power" against Georgia. This however does not mean that Georgia was innocent in the conflict, which is the image left in the Western world. Georgia’s main messages in PSYOP were being a democratic state fighting against Russia for human rights, freedom and other European and Western values. Georgia wanted to present itself as a European state and Russia attacking Europe and Western world. This can be seen as reminder of Soviet Union era. Russia’s PSYOP messages were more practical by stating that Georgia’s attack was illegal and Russia was protecting its civilians in South Ossetia whom Georgia had attacked. In Russian rhetoric both to home audiences and neutrals there were ex-pressions such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder and humanitarian conflict. By doing so Russian side adapted similar rhetoric used by UN and NATO. In Russian PSYOP to home audiences the war was personalized to president Saakasvili.
I will use different studies about Russian newspapers reporting on the war as well as a research about Russian psychological warfare. I use also a research about the rhetoric Russian and Georgian presidents were using during the conflict. I will bring out journalists' point of view by presenting the gatekeeper theory. Who writes stories in conflicts and who chooses which of the news are published and therefore which ankles of the conflict frame our views on that situation? In a war situation this is relevant because information is difficult to get and it is always been affected either by propaganda from both sides of the conflict, journalist's personal background and cultural effects or the news agency’s agenda. With this study I want to show the reasons behind why Georgia won the information war in the Five Day War.
Based on the comparative analysis models of constructive and destructive external informational impacts on social transformations in modern Ukraine are characterized. The unsubstantiated conspiracy versions of «subversive activity of... more
Based on the comparative analysis models of constructive and destructive external informational impacts
on social transformations in modern Ukraine are characterized. The unsubstantiated conspiracy versions
of «subversive activity of the covert western centers» actively distributed in the Russian-speaking
segment of Internet in regard to the collapse of the USSR and social transformations in the post-Soviet
political space are criticized. The methods of countering external destructive and subversive informational
influences are analyzed.
Key words: external information influences, information war, state political consolidation.
THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT VERSION. FOR THE APPROVED AND EDITED VERSION WITH PAGE NUMBERING PLEASE GO TO THE PUBLISHER'S WEBSITE USING THE LINK ABOVE. The developments in Ukraine in 2014, including Euromaidan demonstrations, annexation... more
THIS IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT VERSION. FOR THE APPROVED AND EDITED VERSION WITH PAGE NUMBERING PLEASE GO TO THE PUBLISHER'S WEBSITE USING THE LINK ABOVE. The developments in Ukraine in 2014, including Euromaidan demonstrations, annexation of Crimea by Russia, and war in the country's two Eastern regions, became so intensely reported by Russian media that they often overshadowed internal news.1 In this review, I will try to take a closer look at the Russian discourses on Ukraine.
Indice Cap.I Guerra economica 1.Guerra economica e patriottismo economico nella riflessione di Christian Harbulot e di Jean Pichot Duclos 2.Problemi e prospettive della guerra economica nella interpretazione della Scuola di geopolitica... more
Indice Cap.I Guerra economica 1.Guerra economica e patriottismo economico nella riflessione di Christian Harbulot e di Jean Pichot Duclos 2.Problemi e prospettive della guerra economica nella interpretazione della Scuola di geopolitica e geoeconomia di Grenoble Cap.II Guerra della informazione 1.Patrimonio informativo e guerra della informazione 2.Guerra della informazione e intossicazione nella interpretazione di Christian Harbulot 3.Guerra della informazione e terrorismo islamico nella interpretazione della Scuola di guerra economica di Parigi 4.Guerra della informazione ed ecoterrorismo nella interpretazione di Eric Denécé
As transatlantic experts focusing on security and Russia, we recognize the confusion among policymakers who have genuine interest in Euroatlantic security after the presidential election in the United States. The Russian Federation and... more
As transatlantic experts focusing on security and Russia, we recognize the confusion among policymakers who have genuine interest in Euroatlantic security after the presidential election in the United States. The Russian Federation and its proxies use an extensive toolkit to manipulate sovereign policy and decision-making in various democratic countries, both in Western and Eastern Europe. We are convinced that to challenge this tendency, a strong Euro-Atlantic cooperation is needed. A geopolitical vacuum in the region would only encourage Russian players to interfere more actively. And while Russia is calling for a friendship with the West, they are treating the West as an enemy: an easy target for information warfare and active measures. We aim to build on the US initiative (Portman-Murphy Counter-Propaganda Bill) and to enhance the synergy with the European effort. Based on the experience of hostile Russian influence in Europe, we give suggestions where the US foreign and defense policy interest and resources should be targeted in order to support and enhance the European response. We would suggest focusing on the following practical steps: 1) Create a program which will make use of existing European knowledge (mainly in think-tanks) on how democratic states can form their policy responses to massive hostile disinformation. 2) Support scholarships for fact-checkers, investigative journalists and researchers focusing on exposing and scrutinizing hostile influence operations. 3) Support non-governmental watchdog organizations which promote an agenda of digital and media literacy, critical thinking and countering disinformation and conspiracy theories, with a special focus on education. We think that the exchange of ideas and experience between the Unites States and its European allies is crucial to be able to challenge this threat. For example, strategies to win an information war or to counter hostile Russian influence have already been drafted. To downplay the importance of Europe by the US foreign policy would only exacerbate the security challenges, and would go against the vested security policy interests of the Unites States.
An article on how different media organisations provide contradictory presentations of the same events - depending on cultural, political or other influencers present in the societies in which they are based; or on the cultural or... more
An article on how different media organisations provide contradictory presentations of the same events - depending on cultural, political or other influencers present in the societies in which they are based; or on the cultural or political norms of their editorial staff.
