Knowability

A Topic-Sensitive Intentional Modal (TSIM) is a two-place, variably strict modal with an aboutness or topicality constraint, of the form ‘X^φψ’ (read: ‘Given φ, the agent X’s that ψ’, X being some mental state or act). TSIMs do nice things for mainstream and formal epistemology, belief revision theory, and mental simulation theory. I present a basic formal semantics for TSIMs and explore three readings of ‘X^φψ’ one gets by imposing different constraints on their truth conditions: (1) as expressing knowability relative to information (‘Given total information φ, one is in the position to know that ψ’), inspired by Dretske’s view that what one can know depends on the available (empirical) information; (2) as a mental simulation operator (‘In mental simulation starting with input φ, one imagines that ψ’) capturing features of mainstream mental simulation theories, like that of Nichols and Stich; (3) as a hyperintensional belief revision operator (‘After (statically) revising by φ, one believes that ψ’), reducing the idealization of cognitive agents one finds in standard doxastic logics and AGM. I close by mentioning developments of TSIM theory currently in progress.

This article examines Abraham Miguel Cardozo’s analysis of philosophy and Kabbalah as two systems of knowledge and the limits of their knowability. Cardozo argues that Kabbalah is a more precise and exalted system of knowledge since it is based on knowledge directly received from the God of Israel rather than from human figures, such as Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle. According to Cardozo, philosophy cannot correctly comprehend the highest planes of being and consequently conflates the First Cause and the God of Israel. Moreover, philosophy claims to know the First Cause, which Cardozo deems to be absolutely unknowable. However, upon closer examination, Cardozo’s position on unknowability is very close to that of Maimonides. Based on this position, he shows that the First Cause cannot be known even through revelation and Kabbalah. Therefore, Cardozo criticises both systems of knowledge: he criticises philosophy through Kabbalah, and Kabbalah through philosophy

1) We will begin by offering a short introduction to Epistemic Logic and presenting Fitch's paradox in an epistemic-modal logic. (2) Then, we will proceed to presenting three Epistemic Temporal logical frameworks created by Hoshi (2009) : TPAL (Temporal Public Announcement Logic), TAPAL (Temporal Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic) and TPAL+P ! (Temporal Public Announcement Logic with Labeled Past Operators). We will show how Hoshi stated the Verificationist Thesis in the language of TAPAL and analyze his argument on why this version of it is immune from paradox. (3) Edgington (1985) offered an interpretation of the Verificationist Thesis that blocks Fitch's paradox and we will propose a way to formulate it in a TAPAL-based language. The language we will use is a combination of TAPAL and TPAL+P ! with an Indefinite (Unlabeled) Past Operator (TAPAL+P !+P). Using indexed satisfiability relations (as introduced in (Wang 2010 ; 2011)) we will offer a prospective semantics for this language. We will investigate whether the tentative re-formulation of Edgington's Verificationist Thesis in TAPAL+P !+P is free from paradox and adequate to Edgington's ideas on how "all truths are knowable" should be interpreted.