Religious Diplomacy

L’étude retrace les difficultés d’accès au concile Vatican II (1959-1965) pour les interlocuteurs juifs, qui contactent le Vatican au sujet du schéma De Judaeis. 
Ces difficultés s'expliquent par la forte asymétrie des relations, les juifs étant en position d'entrants. Vu les effets de segmentation dans ces réseaux, l’apport du moment conciliaire réside in fine moins dans les transferts d’idées entre représentants de groupes religieux distincts, que dans de nouvelles pratiques d’échange. Les relations entre représentants juifs et ecclésiastiques s'autonomisent des voies d'accès et des modes de discussion diplomatiques, pour donner naissance à une diplomatie interreligieuse. L'article se concentre ici sur les voies d'accès dont disposent ces interlocuteurs (mémorandums et discussions avec le Secrétariat pour l'Unité des Chrétiens, dont les théologiens chargés de la "question juive" étaient principalement des convertis) et revient sur les difficultés inhérentes à ce type d'échanges.

Cet article a été approuvé et publié par le comité de lecture des Éditions du CTHS dans le cadre des actes du 140e Congrès national des sociétés historiques et scientifiques tenu à Reims en 2015.

Le vendredi 27 mars 2015, le souverain du Maroc inaugurait l'Institut Mohammed-VI pour la formation des imams, morchidines et morchi-dates. Ce complexe est destiné à former non seulement les imams du royaume chérifien, mais aussi ceux de nombreux pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne et sahélienne, à la recherche d'un encadrement religieux pondéré ; celui d'un islam du « juste milieu » (al wasatiyya) dont le Maroc a voulu faire sa ligne directrice. Cet article se propose d'étudier les (re)présentations officielles de cet « islam du juste milieu » et les objectifs auxquels il répond dans le contexte politique et religieux africain actuel, avant de donner la parole à des personnes qui gravitent autour ou à l'intérieur de cet institut.

Tom, który oddajemy do rąk Czytelnika jest pokłosiem konferencji z zakresu prawa wyznaniowego, jak miała miejsce jesienią 2021 r. na Wydziale Prawa i Administracji UAM z inicjatywy Koła Naukowego Prawa Wyznaniowego. Liczba tekstów a także ich niewątpliwy poziom naukowy świadczą o ogromnym zainteresowaniu jakim cieszą się zagadnienia relacji państwo – religia.

Wydaje się bowiem, że koncepcje Huntingtona, starcia cywilizacyjnego, którego podglebiem będą/są poglądy religijne, we współczesnym świecie nabiera szczególnej ostrości. I co ciekawe, konflikty takie nie mają charakteru wyłącznie międzynarodowego ale mają wymiar wewnątrzkrajowy.

Ostatnie dwudziestolecie to z jednej strony zmagania pomiędzy wahabicką, wojowniczą wersją islamu, a światem szeroko pojmowanego Zachodu, utożsamianego z kulturą chrześcijańską. Z drugiej, to kryzys Kościoła katolickiego i innych historycznych kościołów protestanckich, które ustępują zarówno pod naporem nowych ruchów religijnych w charakterze ewangelikalnym, pentakostalnym jak i laicyzacji czy wręcz postępującego zobojętnienia religijnego w bogatych państwach Europy czy krajach anglosaskich.

Jednocześnie w odpowiedzi na ten proces rosną w siłę, choć często bywają przeceniano i demonizowane, ruchy integrystyczne, głównie w obrębie katolicyzmu takich jak Ordo Iuris czy Opus Dei. Stawiają sobie one za cel maksymalizację swoich wpływów politycznych i gospodarczych, a w konsekwencji opóźnianie czy wręcz udaremnianie procesów modernizacyjnych. Na tym tle nowym zjawiskiem jest również proces „zbaltowania” władzy autorytarnej z lokalnym kościołem czy religią. Zjawisko takie nabrało na znaczeniu w ostatniej dekadzie, a przykładem jest tutaj instrumentalne wykorzystywanie Kościoła katolickiego przez PiS w Polsce, hasło „chrześcijańskiego odrodzenia Europy” Orbana czy ostentacyjna religijność Putina i Erdogana.

Te wszystkie zjawiska i nie tylko, starają się uchwycić Autorzy zaprezentowanych tekstów, młodzi pracownicy naukowi i studenci z wielu ośrodków krajowych. Ich wysiłki zostały uporządkowane według kryteriów merytorycznych, zgodnie z podjętą tematyką. Są to zatem opracowania dotyczące zarówno relacji państwowo-kościelnych jak i historii kościołów/wyznań czy wreszcie konkretnych zagadnień prawnych dotyczących styku państwa, prawa i religii.

Oddając do rąk czytelników niniejszy zbiór zarówno Autorzy jak i Redaktorzy wyrażają nadzieję, że znajdzie on łaskawy odbiór.

Almost 30 years after withdrawing from Afghanistan, Moscow hosted an international peace conference earlier this month, and 12 nations attended — including a delegation from the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani's government did not represent Afghanistan, though Kabul did send an official from the High Peace Council, the body that facilitates negotiations with jihadist rebels. Russia has been taking on a greater role in peace processes and mediation efforts in the wider Middle East, from Libya to Afghanistan, seeking to protect its own interests and knowing well that the global powers' " great game " has opened several doors for Moscow. Russia Rising Russia has been expending diplomatic energy to increase cooperation with the political office of the Taliban based in Doha, Qatar, to position itself as the great power capable of effectively mediating between the insurgent movement and Kabul. Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, a top Taliban political official, said, " We do not recognize the incumbent government as legitimate and we demand the withdrawal of foreign troops. " The Taliban's goal of seeking broad international recognition as a legitimate Afghan national movement is what the Russians are trying to leverage to their advantage. Meanwhile, the United States conceding significant political space is not the only cause of Russia's ascent as a definitive geopolitical player in key regions of the core of the Muslim world, i.e., North Africa, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, the northern rim from Turkey to Iran, and beyond to South Asia. Russia's increasing prominence has also come about because of President Vladimir Putin's efforts to geopolitically rehabilitate Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union, especially and the Kremlin's concern its own Muslim population of 22 million. But what exactly is driving Putin's aggressive policies toward Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority countries?

On Friday, 27 March 2015, Morocco’s ruler inaugurated the Mohammed VI Institute, an academy for the training of imams, morchidins and morchidates. The educational complex will train students from the Cherifian Monarchy as well as countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa who are looking for a moderate religious framework—that of a ’middle path’ Islam (al wasatiyya) that Morocco has chosen as the academy’s guiding principle. This article first examines official representations of this “moderate Islam” and the goals it may achieve in the current African political and religious context. The authors then give voice to individuals drawn to or enrolled in the academy.

This study explores public diplomacy and image repair strategies at the Arab embassies in the United States. The analysis of data, consisting of 16 interviews and 84 hard copy and electronic documents, revealed that Arab embassies focus predominantly on media relations and reflect an old public diplomacy structure. Relationship management in public diplomacy may be complicated by political, cultural, and logistical constraints. In addition, the study suggests that religious diplomacy may offer new opportunities for government communication. Analysis of image repair strategies revealed that Arab embassies used three out of five strategies. Mortification and evading responsibility strategies were not used by the embassies.

From the end of the 1970s religion has dramatically re-emerged as a factor in international relations (IR). States and international organizations have struggled to come to terms with the ideational and normative logic of religious actors and issues, an approach that collides with a diplomacy based on realist and shifting conceptions of national interests and sovereignties. In this context, the European External Action Service (EEAS), formally established in 2010, has committed itself to developing a global approach to religion as an issue and a resource for foreign policy. In this endeavour, the EEAS must comply with specific requirements due to its status as an external body of the European Union (EU). It must combine the different diplomatic traditions, worldviews, geopolitical statuses, and histories of relationships between religion and politics in the Member States. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the triggers, modalities, and effects of the EASS's approach to religion and to question its autonomy and distinctiveness regarding the practices of other diplomacies. The text is organized as follows. The first section documents the 'return' of religion in IR and the reluctance of intellectual and political discourses to acknowledge the renewed salience of the religious issue. The second section compares the policy of the EEAS regarding religion to what Member States, third countries, and international * This work has greatly benefited from the help of Merete Bilde (EEAS) both in the empirical phases and in the final editing, as well as of other EEAS officials. Interpretations and conclusions, however, are the sole responsibility of the author. Parts of the text were published as a working paper focusing on the EEAS and FoRB in François Foret,

As Moroccan foreign policy undertakes a political and economic “shift to Africa,” the transnational heritage of Sufism has been actively employed as a tool of “religious diplomacy.” The Moroccan monarchy is tapping into Sufi networks connecting Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa not only to promote its formula of “moderate Islam,” but also to establish Mohammed VI’s authority both at home and abroad. European policymakers, seeking sustainable security measures in Sub-Saharan Africa, should support this engagement of the Moroccan government, but remain cautious of the authoritarian side-effects.

This paper aims at arguing that the Commander of the Faithful is the main source of the Moroccan religious policy and not the public opinion- if exists. The king is supported by many official actors such as the official religious scholars and non-officials’ actors like the Sufi brotherhood. Mohamed VI religious policy was launched after the 2003 Casablanca bombings. This new strategy is mainly concerned by security, control, the status and the role of the Commander of the Faithful in Morocco and abroad, and the promotion of one Islamic model.

Among the greatest threats today is one including the religious extremism combined with access to weapons. There are several important steps for religion to be used in positive sense: decreasing religion's role in conflict; greater role of religious clergy and laypersons in conflict resolutions; religion's capacity as peacemaker; acknowledgment by politicians, army officials, and diplomats. This paper examines a case-study of application of Islamic Law in conflict resolution in Sudan. The flexibility of Islamic Law makes possible implementation for conflict resolution that may be interpreted and understood differently in various societies and in various generations. Although the conflict between Arab Islamic north and Christian African south in the end made two separate states, Sudan case is very important as it points to possibility of approaching Islamic Law from different positions and different schools. Islamic formulations in Sudan are politically oriented and Western educated, containing pragmatism and compromise. Sudanese experience points to reopening religious interpretation, care for time and place, and formulate flexible Islamic standpoint to changing conditions. The paper gives also a call for thinking how to bring back traditional Islamic heterogeneity that helped to sustain and develop a grand Islamic tradition.