Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science

Positivism dominates research in U.S. political science. I will show that even though critical realism is virtually unknown in the discipline, realist concepts have found their way into debates among qualitative methodologists. The analysis begins with a juxtaposition of positivist and realist foundations. Next, I will trace the methodology debate that has unfolded in the U.S., examining in what ways it reflects these foundational assumptions. Over the last number of years, I demonstrate, qualitative methodologists have engaged in philosophical hybridity, because they have drawn on realist concepts while continuing to adhere to an empiricist ontology. This kind of cherrypicking is a perilous strategy, and I suggest that methodologists examine their ontological assumptions, especially their views on causation. To do so, they need to engage critical realism. This exercise would benefit political science, because it would provide scholars with exciting new research possibilities. Moreover, critical realism is well-suited to support the discipline’s central quest: gaining insight into the world by using few examined cases to draw inferences to larger sets of unexamined cases.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States, like many other funding agencies all over the globe, has made large investments in interdisciplinary research in the sciences and engineering, arguing that interdisciplinary research is an essential resource for addressing  emerging problems, resulting in important social benefits. Using NSF as a case study for problem that might be relevant in other contexts as well, I argue that the NSF itself poses a significant barrier to such research in not sufficiently appreciating the value of the humanities as significant interdisciplinary partners. This essay focuses on the practices of philosophy as a highly valuable but currently under-appreciated partner in achieving the goals of interdisciplinary research.  This essay advances a proposal for developing deeper and wider interdisciplinary research in the sciences through coupled ethical-epistemological research. I argue that this more robust model of interdisciplinary practice will lead to better science by providing resources for understanding the types of value decisions that are entrenched
in research models and methods, offering resources for identifying the ethical implications of research decisions, and providing a lens for identifying the questions that are ignored, under-examined, and rendered invisible through scientific habit or lack of interest. In this way, we will have better science both in the traditional sense of advancing knowledge by building on and adding to our current knowledge as well as
in the broader sense of science for the good of, namely, scientific research that better benefits society.

In Volume 177, Issue 3 of Synthese (eds. Plaisance & Fehr 2010), a group of authors call for a more socially relevant philosophy of science: for philosophers of science to become more engaged with scientists and the communities that scientific research stands to impact in order to contribute both to better scientific research and to the public good. While several authors make suggestions as to how philosophers of science might go about this, because of the emergent and highly pluralistic nature of the project, most suggestions are lacking in details. In medical institutions, issues arising from similar interactions between expert and lay communities have been increasingly addressed by consultations between the affected parties and clinical ethics committees. These committees are made up of medical professionals, administrators, ethicists, clerics, and community members. Using the structure of clinical ethics committees as a guide, I propose a model for similar committees made up of philosophers, scientists, and stakeholders, to use in beginning more socially relevant work. Drawing on the literature on clinical ethics consultation, I highlight challenges faced by clinical ethics committees that are expected to be faced by philosophy of science committees as well.

The aim of the paper is to discuss some possible connections between philosophical proposals about the social organisation of science and developments towards a greater democratisation of science policy. I suggest that there are important similarities between one approach to objectivity in philosophy of science—Helen Longino’s account of objectivity as freedom from individual biases achieved through interaction of a variety of perspectives—and some ideas about the epistemic benefits of wider representation of various groups’ perspectives in science policy, as analysed by Mark Brown. Given these similarities, I suggest that they allow one to approach developments in science policy as if one of their aims were epistemic improvement that can be recommended on the basis of the philosophical account; analyses of political developments inspired by these ideas about the benefits of inclusive dialogue can then be used for understanding the possibility to implement a philosophical proposal for improving the objectivity of science in practice. Outlining this suggestion, I also discuss the possibility of important differences between the developments in the two spheres and show how the concern about the possible divergence of politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes may be mitigated. In order to substantiate further the suggestion I make, I discuss one example of a development where politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes converge in practice—the development of professional ethics in American archaeology as analysed by Alison Wylie. I suggest that analysing such specific developments and getting involved with them can be one of the tasks for philosophy of science. In the concluding part of the paper I discuss how this approach to philosophy of science is related to a number of arguments about a more politically relevant philosophy of science.

When it comes to the public debate about the challenge of global climate change, moral questions are inextricably intertwined with epistemological ones. This manifests itself in at least two distinct ways. First, for a fixed set of epistemic standards, it may be irresponsible to delay policy-making until everyone agrees that such standards have been met. This has been extensively discussed in the literature on the precautionary principle. Second, key actors in the public debate may – for strategic reasons, or out of simple carelessness – engage in the selective variation of epistemic standards in response to evidence that would threaten to undermine their core beliefs, effectively leading to epistemic double standards that make rational agreement impossible. The latter scenario is aptly described as an instance of what Stephen Gardiner calls ‘epistemic corruption’. In the present paper, I aim to give an explanation of the cognitive basis of epistemic corruption and discuss its place within the moral landscape of the debate. In particular, I argue that epistemic corruption often reflects an agent’s attempt to reduce dissonance between incoming scientific evidence and the agent’s ideological core commitments. By selectively discounting the former, agents may attempt to preserve the coherence of the latter, yet in doing so they threaten to damage the integrity of evidence-based deliberation.

There is a movement afoot in philosophy of science to render our field more "socially relevant" and "politically engaged." At first glance, this would appear to be a revolutionary development; since the early days, philosophers of science have been concerned mostly with topics that seem socially irrelevant and politically disengaged: the logic of science, reductionism, realism vs. instrumentalism, theories of explanation, and so on. But recent work in history of philosophy of science by George Reisch, Thomas Uebel, and many others has shown us that the standard potted history misses much of the richness that existed in early philosophy of science, both in terms of projects that have been erased from the history and surprising social/political engagements *within* traditional topics like verificationism and the unity of science. In this paper, I will explore some provocative ideas found within the early Unity of Science movement that provide a politically engaged role for philosophy of science. In particular, I begin from the contributions of Otto Neurath and John Dewey to volume 1, issue 1 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, arguing that their approaches are very far from our stereotype of the unity of science and provide resources for rethinking the relation of science, politics, and philosophy. The unity of science called for is not theoretical, but pragmatic and social, and extends far beyond the bounds of science ordinarily conceived. These relatively underappreciated threads in the work of Dewey, Neurath, and the Unity of Science movement provide fertile soil for contemporary projects.

This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research in this area.

Abstract    This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contem- porary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research in this area.