Suarez

Freedom in the sense of free will is a multiway power to do any one of a number of things, leaving it up to us which one of a range of options by way of action we perform. What are the ethical implications of our possession of such a power? The paper examines the pre-Hobbesian scholastic view of writers such as Peter Lombard and Francisco Suarez: freedom as a multiway power is linked to the right to liberty understood as a right to exercise that power, and to liberation as a desirable goal involving the perfection of that power. Freedom as a power, liberty as a right, and liberation as a desirable goal, are all linked within this scholastic view to a distinctive theory of law as constituting, in its primary form of natural law, the normative recognition of human freedom.
Hobbes's denial of the very existence of freedom as a power led him to a radical revision both of the theory of law and of the relation of law to liberty. Law and liberty were no longer harmonious phenomena, but were left in essential conflict.
One legacy of Hobbes is the attempt to base a theory of law and liberty not on freedom as a multiway power, but on rationality. Instead of an ethics of freedom, we have an ethics of reason as involving autonomy. The paper expresses some scepticism about the prospects for such an appeal to reason as a replacement for multiway freedom.

'Normativity and Reason' explores what might be involved in the claim that the normativity of moral standards is a normativity of reason. 

Taking the accounts of moral normativity given by a range of moral theorists, including Hume, Pufendorf, Locke, Sidgwick and Scanlon, and comparing these with medieval and early modern scholastic natural law theory, the paper argues that normative standards on action involve a variety of distinct kinds of justificatory force - and that standards of moral right and wrong or of moral obligation involve, in particular, a distinctive justificatory force of Demand.

Using this theory of obligation, the paper argues for a new account of moral rationality, and of the relation of moral and legal obligation.

RESUMEN A comienzos de la Edad Moderna, el teólogo Francisco Suárez admite la legitimidad de la fuga en el supuesto de durísimas condenas o si la cárcel fuese demasiado insalubre, porque el privilegio de la vida es máximo. Las leyes que castigan el quebrantamiento de condena son leyes puramente penales. La doctrina de las leyes pura o meramente penales no solo fue la versión embrionaria del tratamiento jurídico de la conciencia sino una manera de consolidar al poder soberano porque se está justificando que la legitimidad del mismo no depende en todos los casos de la efectividad de sus normas. Palabras clave: Suárez, leyes meramente penales, castigo, derecho de fuga, principio de humanidad, derechos humanos, estado de necesidad.

Rezime: Na osnovu analize relevantnih mesta iz Dekartovih spisa u članku se pokazuje da Dekartove ideje reprezentuju stvari u duhu, ali da on nije reprezentacionalista u malbranšovskom smislu: kod Dekarta se percipira reprezentovani
objekt a ne reprezentacija objekta. Nakon toga, analiziraju se tri smisla ideje kod njega, objektivni, formalni i materijalni, a potom i razumevanje pojmova conceptus formalis i conceptus objectivus kod Franciska Suareza što čini neposredan istorijskofilozofski izvor Dekartove teorije ideja. U zaključku se ističe centralnost pojma ideje uzete formalno i iznose se razlozi za tvrdnju da u okviru Dekatove teorije ideja reprezentacionalizam i direktni realizam jesu ekvivalentni. Na kraju se daje sumarni pregled uticaja i preobražaja razumevanja ideja u ranoj modernoj filozofiji.
Ključne reči: teorija ideja, direktni realizam, reprezentacionalizam, conceptus
formalis, conceptus objectivus, Francisko Suarez, rana moderna filozofija.