Resumen El presente trabajo tiene por objeto principal reflexionar sobre la tutela de los accionistas minoritarios en los procedimientos de Ofertas Públicas de Adquisición (OPAs) en el mercado de valores. En particular, la investigación... more
Resumen El presente trabajo tiene por objeto principal reflexionar sobre la tutela de los accionistas minoritarios en los procedimientos de Ofertas Públicas de Adquisición (OPAs) en el mercado de valores. En particular, la investigación se centra en examinar si el régimen español vigente de protección de los minoritarios, en los supuestos de ofertas obligatorias de carácter hostil, es suficiente o realmente efectivo, o por el contrario pueden postularse algunas propuestas de reforma para flexibilizar el ordenamiento y conseguir de ese modo estimular el mercado de control en beneficio de los accionistas minoritarios. Para este fin, se examinarán críticamente tanto la configuración general de los requisitos de presentación de la OPA obligatoria, como la eficacia normativa de las medidas defensivas más habituales. Palabras clave: OPA, tutela de accionistas minoritarios, mercado de valores
Abstract The main purpose of this paper is to reflect on the protection of minority shareholders in the hostile takeover bids. In particular, the research focuses on examining whether the current Spanish regime for the protection of minority shareholder, in the cases of hostile takeover bids, is sufficient or really effective, or on the contrary, some reform proposals may be postulated to make the law more flexible and thereby succeed in stimulating the control market for the benefit of minority shareholders. To this end, both the general configuration of the requirements for the mandatory takeover bid and the regulatory effectiveness of the most common defensive mechanisms will be critically examined. Keywords: takeover bid, minority shareholder protection, stock market
This paper examines factors influencing voluntary forecast disclosure by target companies, whether good/bad news forecasts are disclosed and the influence of forecasts on the outcome of hostile bids. Disclosure was significantly more... more
This paper examines factors influencing voluntary forecast disclosure by target companies, whether good/bad news forecasts are disclosed and the influence of forecasts on the outcome of hostile bids. Disclosure was significantly more likely during contested bids. In agreed bids, probability of forecast disclosure was greater the shorter the bid horizon. In contested bids, forecasts were more likely where there were large block shareholdings, for larger targets and for targets in the capital goods industry. There was a clear tendency to disclose good news forecasts. A significant positive association between forecast disclosure and increase in offer price was found.
