The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz famously asked: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” His answer was that God Himself is a necessary being that could not have failed to exist. Every physical object exists because of some... more
The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz famously asked: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” His answer was that God Himself is a necessary being that could not have failed to exist. Every physical object exists because of some external explanation, but God is necessarily existent and He has no explanation for his existence other than the fact that He must exist in order for anything else to possibly exist. Why we have a world that is seemingly contingent or unnecessary (since it could have not existed) is explained by God’s just decree. For Leibniz, the world had an explanation of its existence, and because of this he advocated a principle of sufficient reason for any fact whatsoever. In this paper I examine Leibniz’s account of the principle of sufficient reason in relation to his understanding of divine and human free will and I will particularly examine an objection that accuses Leibniz’s system of being essentially fatalistic. I will concede this objection and I will argue against Leibniz’s account of the principle of sufficient reason, arguing that a weaker principle is essential for one not to devolve into theological fatalism. As a result, I will describe an account of free will as given by philosophers that is not bound by the stricter principle but by the weaker principle and I will describe the theological benefits that such a view of free will shall bestow upon the philosophical theologian who, like Leibniz, desires to know more about God’s necessary and contingent properties.
According to Tim O’Connor, ‘once one sees that unreduced modality is unavoidable for ordinary explanatory purposes, a modalised response to the question of contingent existence is both natural and prima facie viable, and there is much to... more
According to Tim O’Connor, ‘once one sees that unreduced modality is unavoidable for ordinary explanatory purposes, a modalised response to the question of contingent existence is both natural and prima facie viable, and there is much to commend classical monotheism as the framework best suited to providing an outline of a comprehensive and non-arbitrary ultimate explanation’ (2). I disagree. Even if we grant—at least for the sake of argument—that unreduced modality is unavoidable for ordinary explanatory purposes, it seems to me that naturalism is the framework best suited to providing an outline of a comprehensive and non-arbitrary ultimate explanation.
