William Lane Criag
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Let ‘reality’ refer to the largest whole every eligible part of which is connected to our eligible part of reality under a privileged external relation (think: ‘a is causally related to b’). We suppose that this privileged external... more
Let ‘reality’ refer to the largest whole every eligible part of which is connected to our eligible part of reality under a privileged external relation (think: ‘a is causally related to b’). We suppose that this privileged external relation has an analogue that is directed, so that some eligible parts of reality are anterior to other eligible parts of reality under the analogue of the privileged relation (think: ‘a is causally anterior to b’). We do not suppose that this analogue relation is total: we allow that there are non-overlapping eligible parts of reality such that neither is anterior to the other under the analogue relation. However, as noted, we do suppose that any two non-overlapping eligible parts of reality are connected by a chain of non-overlapping eligible parts of reality under the relation itself. Moreover, we suppose that each eligible part of reality is such that none of its parts is anterior to any other of its parts under the analogue relation, and also such that there are no other eligible parts of reality to which it fails to be connected under the relation itself.
To illustrate this rather abstract account of reality—and to exhibit a justification for its complexity—we consider a concrete example. Pretend that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard general relativistic universe that originates in an initial singularity. Eligible parts of reality will be maximal sub-parts all of whose parts have only space-like connections to each other. These eligible parts will stand in causal—light-like and time-like—relations to one another. If, for example, the initial singularity is a singular surface, it may be that there are non-overlapping eligible parts of reality that are causally related to one another only in virtue of the fact that they trace back to non-overlapping regions of that initial singular surface. (Among the reasons why we can only pretend that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard general relativistic universe that originates in an initial singularity, perhaps the most important is that we should not immediately rule out the possibility that reality has parts ‘on the other side of the initial singularity’ from which our observable universe has arisen. We suppose only that, if reality does have parts ‘on the other side of the initial singularity’ from which our observable universe has arisen, then there are least analogues of causation and space-like relation that determine the extent of reality.)
There are many hypotheses that one can frame about the overall ‘shape’ taken by reality under our privileged external relation. We begin by distinguishing the following two very general competing hypotheses:
Infinite Regress: Under the external relation, each eligible part of reality which is posterior to some non-overlapping eligible part of reality belongs to a chain of non-overlapping eligible parts of reality which satisfies the following condition: for each member of the chain, there is an anterior (and not posterior) member of the chain that does not overlap with any other members of the chain.
Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any eligible part of reality.
In the subsequent discussion, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all of the many competing hypotheses that one might frame about the general shape of reality under the privileged external relation.
The Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses, depending upon the modal status of the initial boundary:
Contingent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality exists contingently.
Necessary Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality exists of necessity.
The Initial Boundary hypothesis also divides into two competing sub-hypotheses depending upon the ontological status of the initial boundary:
Immanent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality is continuous in nature with the rest of reality
Transcendent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality is radically different in nature from the rest of reality.
And the Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses depending upon the psychological status of the initial boundary:
Impersonal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality has no personal—mental, psychological—properties.
Personal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality has personal—mental, psychological—properties.
Given only the distinctions that we have drawn to this point, we now have eight competing versions of the Initial Boundary hypothesis, and we also have the competing Infinite Regress hypothesis. Are there reasons to prefer one of these nine hypotheses above all of the others?
Theists suppose that the answer to this question is affirmative: we should prefer Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary above the other eight hypotheses. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that naturalists suppose that the answer to the question is affirmative: it may well be that naturalists suppose that we have no reasons for preferring any one of Infinite Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary, and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary to the other two hypotheses in this group. However, naturalists will hold that at least one of Infinite Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary, and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary is preferable to all of the six remaining alternatives; and if naturalists are undecided between two or more of the hypotheses that are congenial to naturalism, then they will hold that all of the hypotheses between which they are undecided are preferable to the remaining six alternatives.
In the ensuing discussion, we shall restrict our attention to the dispute between theists and naturalists about the standing of the four hypotheses singled out in the preceding paragraph. As before, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all other disputes concerning the relative standing of the nine hypotheses that we have identified, and concerning the many hypotheses that we have not even attempted to frame. (It is, for example, an interesting question what pantheists should say about the relative standing of our nine hypotheses. But that is not a question properly taken up in the present context.)
One way of reading William Lane Craig’s voluminous writings on the kalām cosmological argument is as the construction of a case for the superiority of Necessary Initial Boundary to both Infinite Regress and Contingent Initial Boundary. While Craig’s writings focussed solely on the kalām cosmological argument offer no means of deciding between Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary and Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary, the success of the case developed in those writings would remove Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary from the contest, or, at any rate, would provide some non-negligible but defeasible reason to prefer Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary to Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. Consequently, naturalists have good reason to think carefully about the case that Craig develops: if his case is compelling, then naturalists are obliged to adopt Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. We shall start with the case that Craig develops against Infinite Regress.
To illustrate this rather abstract account of reality—and to exhibit a justification for its complexity—we consider a concrete example. Pretend that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard general relativistic universe that originates in an initial singularity. Eligible parts of reality will be maximal sub-parts all of whose parts have only space-like connections to each other. These eligible parts will stand in causal—light-like and time-like—relations to one another. If, for example, the initial singularity is a singular surface, it may be that there are non-overlapping eligible parts of reality that are causally related to one another only in virtue of the fact that they trace back to non-overlapping regions of that initial singular surface. (Among the reasons why we can only pretend that reality is exhausted by an instance of a standard general relativistic universe that originates in an initial singularity, perhaps the most important is that we should not immediately rule out the possibility that reality has parts ‘on the other side of the initial singularity’ from which our observable universe has arisen. We suppose only that, if reality does have parts ‘on the other side of the initial singularity’ from which our observable universe has arisen, then there are least analogues of causation and space-like relation that determine the extent of reality.)
There are many hypotheses that one can frame about the overall ‘shape’ taken by reality under our privileged external relation. We begin by distinguishing the following two very general competing hypotheses:
Infinite Regress: Under the external relation, each eligible part of reality which is posterior to some non-overlapping eligible part of reality belongs to a chain of non-overlapping eligible parts of reality which satisfies the following condition: for each member of the chain, there is an anterior (and not posterior) member of the chain that does not overlap with any other members of the chain.
Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any eligible part of reality.
In the subsequent discussion, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all of the many competing hypotheses that one might frame about the general shape of reality under the privileged external relation.
The Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses, depending upon the modal status of the initial boundary:
Contingent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality exists contingently.
Necessary Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality exists of necessity.
The Initial Boundary hypothesis also divides into two competing sub-hypotheses depending upon the ontological status of the initial boundary:
Immanent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality is continuous in nature with the rest of reality
Transcendent Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality is radically different in nature from the rest of reality.
And the Initial Boundary hypothesis divides into two competing sub-hypotheses depending upon the psychological status of the initial boundary:
Impersonal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality has no personal—mental, psychological—properties.
Personal Initial Boundary: Under the external relation, there is a smallest eligible part of reality that is anterior to every other non-overlapping eligible part of reality and not posterior to any non-overlapping eligible part of reality, and that smallest eligible part of reality has personal—mental, psychological—properties.
Given only the distinctions that we have drawn to this point, we now have eight competing versions of the Initial Boundary hypothesis, and we also have the competing Infinite Regress hypothesis. Are there reasons to prefer one of these nine hypotheses above all of the others?
Theists suppose that the answer to this question is affirmative: we should prefer Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary above the other eight hypotheses. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that naturalists suppose that the answer to the question is affirmative: it may well be that naturalists suppose that we have no reasons for preferring any one of Infinite Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary, and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary to the other two hypotheses in this group. However, naturalists will hold that at least one of Infinite Regress, Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary, and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary is preferable to all of the six remaining alternatives; and if naturalists are undecided between two or more of the hypotheses that are congenial to naturalism, then they will hold that all of the hypotheses between which they are undecided are preferable to the remaining six alternatives.
In the ensuing discussion, we shall restrict our attention to the dispute between theists and naturalists about the standing of the four hypotheses singled out in the preceding paragraph. As before, we simply—though perhaps improperly—ignore all other disputes concerning the relative standing of the nine hypotheses that we have identified, and concerning the many hypotheses that we have not even attempted to frame. (It is, for example, an interesting question what pantheists should say about the relative standing of our nine hypotheses. But that is not a question properly taken up in the present context.)
One way of reading William Lane Craig’s voluminous writings on the kalām cosmological argument is as the construction of a case for the superiority of Necessary Initial Boundary to both Infinite Regress and Contingent Initial Boundary. While Craig’s writings focussed solely on the kalām cosmological argument offer no means of deciding between Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary and Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary, the success of the case developed in those writings would remove Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary from the contest, or, at any rate, would provide some non-negligible but defeasible reason to prefer Necessary Transcendent Personal Initial Boundary to Infinite Regress and Contingent Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. Consequently, naturalists have good reason to think carefully about the case that Craig develops: if his case is compelling, then naturalists are obliged to adopt Necessary Immanent Impersonal Initial Boundary. We shall start with the case that Craig develops against Infinite Regress.
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