Accepted Papers
Omer Ben-Porat and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Multi-Unit Facility Location GamesVincent Conitzer.
Computing Equilibria with Partial CommitmentKira Goldner and Anna R. Karlin.
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive BiddersSwaprava Nath and Tuomas Sandholm.
Efficiency and Budget BalanceSusanne Albers and Dennis Kraft.
Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational ApproachRad Niazadeh and Christopher Wilkens.
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial AuctionsPiotr Skowron.
FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular FunctionsDimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourves and Jerome Monnot.
Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing PreferencesArtur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzinkski and Rahul Savani.
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate EquilibriaYuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett and Grant Schoenebeck.
Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-telling FocalMartin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim and Bojana Kodric.
Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with AdmissionBrandon Fain, Ashish Goel and Kamesh Munagala.
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting ProblemArtur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer.
Near-Efficient Allocation using Artificial Currency in Repeated SettingsMichal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan.
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item AuctionsIoannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Stiil Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen and Zihan Tan.
Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial DictatorshipXiaotie Deng, Zhe Feng and Christos Papadimitriou.
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-sided Market and Net NeutralityArgyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley and Rahul Savani.
Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash EquilibriaD. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan and Y Narahari.
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer having Uniformly Distributed ValuationsDarrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier.
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customersWeina Wang, Lei Ying and Junshan Zhang.
Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative PaymentsRiccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi and Qiang Zhang.
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with BudgetsTobias Brunsch, Michael Etscheid and Heiko Röglin.
Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling ProblemsSanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna and Jamie Morgenstern.
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and ImmunizationGeorgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis.
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism DesignElliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal WorldLiad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi.
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral TradingHau Chan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ruta Mehta.
Multilinear GamesVittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli.
Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social InfluencesElliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar.
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large MarketsChristos Tzamos and Christopher Wilkens.
Anonymous Auctions Maximizing RevenueAris Anagnostopoulos, Ruggiero Cavallo, Stefano Leonardi and Maxim Sviridenko.
Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports AuctionsGilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesus Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth and Pierre-Yves Strub.
Computer-aided Verification for Mechanism DesignSamuel Haney, Debmalya Panigrahi and Rupert Freeman.
On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast GamesItai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo and Jay Sethuraman.
The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat RedistributionGrant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu.
Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree Distribution