Grammar of Ascent

Grammar Of Assent

By

John Henry Newman

Philosopher’s Palate

Vol. 9

Revelation Insight Publishing Co.

2017’

Dear Reader

1 Corinthians 2: 7-15. We speak the hidden mystical wisdom of God, which God ordained before the world unto our Glory, Which none of the princes of this world knew, for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory. Nevertheless, as it is written, eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the Heart of man to conceive the things, which God has prepared for them that Love him. However, God has revealed them unto us by His Spirit, for the Spirit searches all things, yes, and the deep things of God. For what man knows the things of a man, save the spirit of a man, which is in him?  Even so, the thing of God knows no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit, which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given us of God. Which things also we speak, not in your words which man's wisdom teaches, but which the Holy Spirit teaches, comparing spiritual things with Spiritual. However, the natural man receives not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. Nevertheless, he that is spiritual judges or discerns all things.

Behold I stand at the door and knock, if anyone hears my voice and opens the door; I will come in and dine with him, and he with Me. He who overcomes, I will grant to sit down with Me on My throne, as I also overcame and with My Father on His throne. Rev. 3: 20 21

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Philosopher’s Palate Series

A fine library of the Philosophical Writers who were able to place the pen to paper providing us with a legacy in the pursuit of union with God.

The focus of this series is to provide today's reader with the essential philosophical writings that are a part of our Christian heritage. The selected written works are a culmination of screening the best of this genre from the numerous documents, which are available. We selected these works based on a number of factors. The greatest impact upon the body of Christ is their insight of the genre, the related impact on other writers, and the feasibility of this text to be used as a guide, in a stand-alone application. They are the primary indicators used, coupled with other factors in making our selection. Thus, each text within this series is a premier stand-alone text in this genre. The intended corpus of works pooled together make for a reference library rivaling that of some great monastery or university library on this subject. These are re-edited for today’s reader. These writings are not abridged, they are the complete text, completely redone in grammar, syntax, verbiage, and other literary components to ensure the spirit of these works are not lost in these important changes.

For many of these texts, this is the first time they are available in this format and to these standards. These are not scholarly reference work editions. For that purpose, there are other publications available. This series is intended for those who have a fundamental familiarity with the subject, and some of the writers. The intent is to address the needs of the readers who are journeying forward on their quest in union with God. There are other selections to be added as certain texts are processed. Please look forward to these great works in print, audio, and E-book formats at your local bookstore, though us directly.

This is a Re-Edited Edition

Publisher's Preface

Revelation-Insight presents this work, as Volume 9, in a series entitled; Philosopher’s Palate. The purpose is to ensure these philosophical writings facilitate the needs of today’s believers. There is a great need in the church today to reintroduce Christ’s followers to these essential writings. We need to allow the Holy Spirit to transform us into the desired state of being. Our intention, is to bring together some of the best and well-known writings to the Church in a portable format.

The transcription and editing of this document was done as a labor of love, one keystroke at a time by a group of modern pilgrims in their quest seeking God. The difficulty in editing is always to keep the spirit and substance intact, while providing a readable flow and structure to the work.

Defining philosophy is much like playing a balled sport, such as basketball, golf, or tennis. The reason for this is quite simple and straightforward, and yet, keeping in with philosophy, there are maneuvers and counters techniques, which will both, facilitate your efforts and counter your opponent. In golf, the outsider may perceive the games as playing hide and seek. By hitting a small ball, as far as you can, then go and search for it, amidst an extremely large playing field. In philosophy, we take a topic, and make an assertion, and then try and built support for it leading the inquisitor to where it is at in large steps and then whittling the steps down to a few rhetorical comments, and then down to a few potent comments and statements.

In basketball, we are now in the specifics of the game. The boundaries are defined, they are well within close visual perspectives, and everyone knows their place and the motions of deliverance. Fundamentally, you bounce around a subject back and forth, with moves, and counter moves, dodging opponent’s maneuvers and antics while employing your own, all the while keeping your eye on the ring. 

Quite often, you may attempt long shots, all in the hopes of making your points without too much effort, other times you must run the course and dodge and parry along the way, and make a potent and quick jump closer to the goal. Occasionally, the game will appear more like tennis, simply bantering the ball back and forth, all in an attempt to merely catch your opponent off guard. You will be with pleasantries in a respectable manner; you will serve with a strong but yet a deliberate volley to the other side. This coupled with an occasional double-handed backhand stroke, thereby assailing your opponent.

In whatever game you play or prefer there are fundamental rules of engagement and sportsmanship. There are those predetermined maneuvers and proper etiquette, which must be adhered to. Philosophy is no different. In whatever school of thought you wish to participate in, you must adhere to the founder's concepts and bi-laws. Each school has their respective founder’s precepts, these you should be familiar with prior to your entry and acceptance, otherwise, you are sure to fumble and be ostracized.

Philosophers tend to appear to ramble on, perhaps much like I am doing. However, what is truly taking place is an attempt to facilitate not only their intended agenda, defined by their objects but also their ultimate end. Unlike mystics who speak and utter under unctions, and attempting to express glimpses of images, much like Moses did as God covered his eyes as He passed by, grasping only a glimpse of His back side. Philosophers express what is truly effable; philosophers address what is possible all in an attempt to express what is comprehendible.

To this end, we present this series; 'Philosopher's Palate' as a means not only to present and articulate in a methodical manner, but also to engage, facilitate and foster a renewed interest in not only our intellectual heritage, but also our philosophical arenas. There you may indulge either your interest or passion while being exercised, trained, and tutored by some of the greatest minds God has bestowed upon us for His edification. 

Among living things, what has understanding is better than what lacks intelligence.

Duns Scotus    First Principle; 4:21.

Editor's Notes 

This book is not meant for the scholar. Instead, it is for the pilgrim who does not have access, to the original works. It is for these individuals, that this edition has been prepared. My aim has been to make this author's meaning clear to the modern reader with as little alteration of the available texts as possible. I have modernized the spelling, have simplified long and involved constructions, and tried to illuminate the meaning by careful punctuation. I have dealt sparingly with the vocabulary, striving to keep some of the words likely to be understood.

It has been, and very probably may again be contended, that a better result would have been obtained by translating straight from an original. However, there is a certain charm in this early work/translation, which no modern one, however excellent, could have embodied and preserved for us the simple faith and enthusiastic love of the individual, which it was written. I am aware that by my modernization, I have laid myself open to criticism in many directions. I strove after consistency and tried solely to retain as far as possible the simplicity and charm of the original spirit and intent. 

I have attempted to keep the author's style intact, in doing so, there are a number of issues to resolve, what to edit, snip, tuck, and rollover. The flavor of this era and regional grammar remain as seasoning to this text. Ultimately, it comes down to perception when simple rules do not apply. I trust you will acknowledge these errors in prayers and allow the Holy Spirit to move you beyond these nuances and enjoy the feel the spirit and intent of this great author.

This text is presented in its entirety. It remains unabridged.

What changes I have made are as follows:

 1.    Broken down with the numerical segments to help the reader digest the potent portions he served to his audience. The intent is to allow the material to be clearly understood and ensure continuity with the previously mentioned topics, correctly coupled with what is the next course in this meal he is serving. All in edible portions.

2.    Update the language, kept the Queen’s and dismissed the King’s English while ensuring proper alliance with the spiritual intent and purpose; italicized all Latin verbiage.

3.    Some editorials are verbiage choices and syntax issues that have been made I have not always annotated.

4.  Inserted additional footnotes.

Part 1 Ascent and Apprehension

Chapter 1— Modes Of Holding And Apprehending Propositions

§1. Modes Of Holding Propositions

A. Propositions (consisting of a subject and predicate united by the copula) may take a categorical, conditional, or interrogative form.

(1) An interrogative, when they ask a Question, (e.g. Does Free trade benefit the poorer classes?) and imply that possibly, it does, and possibly, it does not.

(2) A conditional, when they express a Conclusion (e.g. Free trade therefore benefits the poorer classes), and both imply, and imply their dependence on, other propositions.

(3) A categorical, when they simply make an Assertion (e.g. Free trade does benefit), and imply the absence of any condition or reservation of any kind, looking neither before nor behind, as resting in themselves and being intrinsically complete.

These three modes of shaping a proposition, distinct as they are from each other, follow each other in natural sequence. A proposition, which starts with being a ‘Question’, may become a ‘Conclusion’, and then be changed into an ‘Assertion’; but it has, of course, ceased to be a question, so far as it has become a conclusion, and has rid itself of its argumentative form that is, has ceased to be a conclusion, so far as it has become an assertion. A question has not yet gone so far as to be a conclusion, although it is the necessary preliminary of a conclusion; and an assertion has got beyond being a mere conclusion, although it is the natural issue of a conclusion. Their correlation is the measure of their distinction one from another.

No one is likely to deny that a question is distinct both from a conclusion and from an assertion; an assertion will be found to be equally distinct from a conclusion. For, if we rest our affirmation on arguments, this shows that we are not asserting; and, when we assert, we do not argue. An assertion is as distinct from a conclusion, as a word of command is from a persuasion or recommendation. Command and assertion, as such, both of them, in their different ways, dispense with, discard, ignore antecedents of any kind, although antecedents may have been a sine qua non condition of their being elicited. They both carry with them the pretension of being personal acts.

In insisting on the intrinsic distinctness of these three modes of putting a proposition, I am not maintaining that they may not co-exist as regards one and the same subject. For what we have already concluded, we may, if we will, make a question of; and what we are asserting, we may, of course, conclude over again. We may assert to one man, and conclude to another, and ask of a third; still, when we assert, we do not conclude, and, when we assert or conclude, we do not question.

2. The internal act of holding propositions is for the most part analogous to the external act of enunciating them; as there are three ways of enunciating, so are there three ways of holding them, each corresponding to each. These three mental acts are Doubt, Inference, and Assent. A question is the expression of a doubt; a conclusion is the expression of an act of inference; and an assertion is the expression of an act of assent. To doubt, for instance, is not to see one's way to hold that Free Trade is or is not a benefit; to infer is to hold on sufficient grounds that Free Trade may, must, or should be a benefit; to assent to the proposition, is to hold that Free Trade is a benefit.

Moreover, propositions, while they are the material of these three enunciations, are the objects of the three corresponding mental acts; and as without a proposition, there cannot be a question, conclusion, or assertion, so without a proposition, there is nothing to doubt about, nothing to infer, nothing to assent to. Mental acts of whatever kind presuppose their objects.

Moreover, since the three enunciations are distinct from each other, therefore the three mental acts also, Doubt, Inference, and Assent are, with reference to one and the same proposition, distinct from each other; otherwise, why should their several enunciations be distinct? Indeed, it is very evident, that, so far forth as we infer, we do not doubt, and that, when we assent, we are not inferring, and, when we doubt, we cannot assent.

In fact, these three modes of entertaining propositions, doubting them, inferring them, assenting to them, are so distinct in their action, that, when they are separately carried out into the intellectual habits of an individual, they become the principles and notes of three distinct states or characters of mind. For instance, in the case of Revealed Religion, according as one or other of these is paramount within him, a man is a skeptic regarding it; or a philosopher, thinking it more or less probable considered as a conclusion of reason; or he has an unhesitating faith in it, and is recognized as a believer. If he simply disbelieves, or dissents, he is assenting to the contradictory of the thesis, viz. that there is no Revelation.

There are of course numerous minds, which are not under the predominant influence of any one of the three. Thus, men are to be found of ir-reflective, impulsive, unsettled, or again of acute minds, who do not know what they believe and what they do not, and who may be by turns skeptics, inquirers, believers who doubt, assent, infer, and doubt again, according to the circumstances of the season. No further, in all minds there is a certain co-existence of these distinct acts; that is, of two of them, for we can at once infer and assent, although we cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt. Indeed, in a multitude of cases, we infer truths, or apparent truths, before, while, and after we assent to them.

Lastly, it cannot be denied that these three acts are all natural to the mind; I mean that, in exercising them, we are not violating the laws of our nature, as if they were in themselves an extravagance or weakness, but are acting according to it, according to its legitimate constitution. Undoubtedly, it is possible, it is common, in the particular case, to err in the exercise of Doubt, of Inference, and of Assent; that is, we may be withholding a judgment about propositions on which we have the means of coming to some conclusion; or we may be assenting to propositions, which we should receive only on the credit of their premises, or again to keep ourselves in suspense about; but such errors of the individual belong to the individual, not to his nature, and cannot avail to forfeit for him his natural right, under proper circumstances, to doubt, or to infer, or to assent. We do but fulfill our nature in doubting, inferring, and assenting; and our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right indeed.

3. So far in general: in this Essay I have treated concerning propositions only in their bearing upon concrete matter, and I am mainly concerned with Assent; with Inference, in its relation to Assent, and only such inference as is not demonstration; with Doubt hardly at all. I dismiss Doubt with one observation. Here, I have spoken of it simply as a suspense of mind, in which sense of the word; to have no doubt about a thesis is equivalent to one or other of the two remaining acts, either to inferring it or else assenting to it. However, the word is often taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being uncertain; in this sense, Doubt is nothing else than an assent, viz. an assent to a proposition inconsistent with the thesis, as I have already noticed in the case of Disbelief.

Confining myself to the subject of Assent and Inference, I observe two points of contrast between them, considered as modes of holding propositions.

The first I have already noted. Assent is unconditional; otherwise, it is not really represented by assertion. Inference is conditional because a conclusion at least implies the assumption of premises, and still more, because in concrete matter, on which I am engaged, demonstration is impossible.

The second has regard to the apprehension necessary for holding a proposition. We cannot assent to a proposition, without some intelligent apprehension of it; whereas we do not need to understand it at all in order to infer it. We cannot give our assent to the proposition that x is z until we are told something about one or other of the terms; but we can infer, if x is y, and y is z, that x is z, whether we know the meaning of x and z or not.

These points of contrast and their results will come before us in due course: here, for a time leaving the consideration of the modes of holding propositions, I proceed to inquire into what is to be understood by apprehending them.

§2. Modes Of Apprehending Propositions

By our apprehension of propositions, I mean our imposition of a sense on the terms of which they are composed. Now what do the terms of a proposition, the subject and predicate, stand for? Sometimes they stand for certain ideas existing in our own minds, and not outside of them; sometimes for things simply external to us, brought home to us through the experiences and information we have of them. All things in the exterior world are unit and individual, and are nothing else; but the mind not only contemplates those unit realities, as they exist but has the gift, by an act of creation, to bring before it abstractions and generalizations, which have no existence, no counterpart, out of it.

Now there are propositions, in which one or both of the terms are common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existent, such as  "Man is an animal, some men are learned, an Apostle is a creation of Christianity, a line is length without breadth, to err is human, to forgive divine". These I shall call notional propositions, and the apprehension with which we infer or assent to them, notional.

There are other propositions, which are composed of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and individual, as "Philip was the father of Alexander, the earth goes round the sun", "the Apostles first preached to the Jews", and these I shall call real propositions, and their apprehension real.

There are then two apprehensions or interpretations of propositions, notional and real.

Next, I observe, that the same proposition may admit both of these interpretations at once, having a notional sense as used by one man, and a real as used by another. Thus a schoolboy may perfectly apprehend, and construe with spirit, the poet's words, "Dum Capitolium scandet cum tacita Virgine Pontifex; he has seen steep hills, flights of steps, and processions; he knows what enforced silence is; also he knows all about the Pontifex Maximus and the Vestal Virgins; he has an abstract hold upon every word of the description, yet without the words, therefore, bringing before him at all the living image which they would light up in the mind of a contemporary of the poet, who had seen the fact described, or of a modern historian who had duly informed himself in the religious phenomena, and by meditation had realized the Roman ceremonial, of the age of Augustus. Again, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori", is a mere commonplace, a terse expression of abstractions in the mind of the poet himself, if Philippi is to be the index of his patriotism, whereas it would be the record of experiences, a sovereign dogma, a grand aspiration, inflaming the imagination, piercing the heart, of a Wallace or a Tell.

As the multitude of common nouns have originally been singular, it is not surprising that many of them should so remain still in the apprehension of particular individuals. In the proposition, Sugar is sweet, the predicate is a common noun as used by those who have compared sugar in their thoughts with honey or glycerin; but it may be the only distinctively sweet thing in the experience of a child, and may be used by him as a noun singularly. The first time that he tastes sugar, if his nurse says, Sugar is sweet in a notional sense, meaning by sugar, lump-sugar, powdered, brown, and candied, and by sweet, a specific flavor or scent which is found in many articles of food and many flowers, he may answer in a real sense, and in an individual proposition, Sugar is sweet, meaning this sugar is this sweet thing.

Thirdly, in the same mind and at the same time, the same proposition may express both what is notional and what is real. When a lecturer in mechanics or chemistry shows to his class by experiment some physical fact, he and his hearers at once enunciate it as an individual thing before their eyes, and also as generalized by their minds into a law of nature. When Virgil says, "Varium et mutabile semper fcemina", he both sets before his readers what he means to be a general truth and at the same time applies it individually to the instance of Dido. He expresses at once a notion and a fact.

Regarding these two modes of apprehending propositions, notional and real, real is the stronger; I mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible. It is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is real or is taken for real; for intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts. Various proverbs and maxims sanction me in so speaking, such as, Facts are stubborn things,  Experientia docet,  Seeing is believing; and the popular contrast between theory and practice, reason and sight, philosophy and faith. Not that real apprehension, as such, impels to action, any more than notional; but it excites and stimulates the affections and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive causes. Thus, it indirectly brings about what the apprehension of large principles, of general laws, or of moral obligations, never could affect.

Reverting to the two modes of holding propositions, conditional and unconditional, which was the subject of the former Section, that is, inferences and assents, I observe that inferences, which are conditional acts, are especially cognate to notional apprehension, and assents, which are unconditional, to real. This distinction, too, will come before us in the course of the following chapters.

Now I have stated the main subjects of which I propose to treat; viz. the distinctions in the use of propositions, which I have been drawing, and the questions, which those distinctions involve.

Chapter 2— Assent Considered As Apprehensive

I have already said concerning an Act of Assent, first, that it is in itself the absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition; and next that it presupposes, in order to its being made, the condition, not only of some previous inference in favor of the proposition, but especially of some concomitant apprehension of its terms. I proceed to the latter of these two subjects; that is, of Assent considered as apprehensive, leaving- the discussion of Assent as unconditional for a later place in this Essay. By apprehension of a proposition, I mean, as I have already said, our interpretation of the terms of which it is composed. When we infer, we consider a proposition in relation to other propositions; when we assent to it, we consider it for its own sake and in its intrinsic sense. That sense must be in some degree known to us; else, we do but assert the proposition, we in no wise assent to it. Assent I have described to be a mental assertion; in its very nature then it is of the mind, and not of the lips. We can assert without assenting; assent is more than assertion just by this much, that it is accompanied by some apprehension of the matter asserted. This is plain; and the only question is, what measure of apprehension is sufficient?

Furthermore, the answer to this question is equally plain: it is the predicate of the proposition, which must be apprehended. In a proposition, one term is predicated of another; the subject is referred to the predicate, and the predicate gives us information about the subject; therefore, to apprehend the proposition is to have that information, and to assent to it is to acquiesce in it as true. Therefore, I apprehend a proposition, when I apprehend its predicate. The subject itself need not be apprehended per se in order to a genuine assent: for it is the very thing which the predicate has to elucidate, and therefore by its formal place in the proposition, so far as it is the subject, it is something unknown, something which the predicate makes known; but the predicate cannot make it known, unless it is known itself. Let the question be, What is Trade? here is a distinct profession of ignorance about Trade, and let the answer be, Trade is an interchange of goods, trade then need not be known, as a condition of assent to the proposition, except so far as the account of it which is given in answer, the interchange of goods, makes it known; and that must be apprehended in order to make it known. The very drift of the proposition is to tell us something about the subject; but there is no reason why our knowledge of the subject, whatever it is, should go beyond what the predicate tells us about it. Further than this, the subject need not be apprehended: as far as this, it must; it will not be apprehended thus far unless we apprehend the predicate.

If a child asks, What is lucern? and is answered, Lucern is medicago sativa, of the class Diadelphia and order Decandria; and henceforth says obediently, Lucern is medicago sativa, etc., he makes no act of assent to the proposition which he enunciates, but speaks like a parrot. Yet, if he is told, Lucern is food for cattle, and is shown cows grazing in a meadow, then although he never saw lucern, and knows nothing at all about it, besides what he has learned from the predicate, he is in a position to make as genuine an assent to the proposition Lucern is food for cattle, on the word of his informant, as if he knew ever so much more about lucern. As soon as he has got as far as this, he may go further. He now knows enough about lucern, to enable him to apprehend propositions, which have lucern for their predicate, should they come before him for assent, as, That field is sown with lucern, or Clover is not

Lucern".

Yet there is a way in which the child can give an indirect assent even to a proposition, in which he understood neither subject nor predicate. He cannot indeed in that case assent to the proposition itself, but he can assent to its truth. He cannot do more than assert that Lucern is medicago sativa, but he can assent to the proposition, That lucern is medicago sativa is true. For here is a predicate which he sufficiently apprehends, what is inapprehensible in the proposition being confined to the subject. Thus the child's mother might teach him to repeat a passage of Shakespeare, and when he asked the meaning of a particular line, such as The quality of mercy is not strained, or Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied, she might answer him that he was too young to understand it yet, but that it had a beautiful meaning, as he would one day know: and he, in faith on her word, might give his assent to such a proposition, not, that is, to the line itself which he had -got by heart, and which would be beyond him, but to its being true, beautiful, and good.

Notably, of course. I am speaking of assent itself, and its intrinsic conditions, not of the ground or motive of it. Whether there is an obligation upon the child to trust his mother, or whether there are cases where such trust is impossible, are irrelevant questions; and I notice them in order to put them aside. I am examining the act of assent itself, not its preliminaries, and I have specified three directions, which among others the assent may take, viz. assent immediately to a proposition, assent to its truth, and assent both to its truth and to the ground of its being true together, Lucern is food for cattle, That lucern is medicago sativa is true and My mother's word, that lucern is medicago sativa, and is food for cattle, is the truth. Now in each of these, there is one and the same absolute adhesion of the mind to the proposition, on the part of the child; he assents to the apprehensible proposition, and to the truth of the inapprehensible, and to the veracity of his mother in her assertion of the inapprehensible. I say the same absolute adhesion, because, unless he did assent without any reserve to the proposition that lucern was food for cattle, or to the accuracy of the botanical name and description of it, he would not be giving an unreserved assent to his mother's word: yet, although these assents are all unreserved, still they certainly differ in strength, and this is the next point to which I wish to draw attention. It is indeed plain, that, although the child assents to his mother's veracity, without perhaps being conscious of his own act, nevertheless that particular assent of his has a force and life in it which the other assents have not, in proportion as he apprehends the proposition, which is the subject of it, with greater keenness and energy than belongs to his apprehension of the others. Her veracity and authority is to him no abstract truth or item of general knowledge but is bound up with that image and love of her person which is part of himself and makes a direct claim on him for his summary assent to her general teachings.

Accordingly, he would not hesitate to say, did his years admit of it, that he would lay down his life in defense of his mother's veracity. On the other hand, he would not make such a profession in the case of the propositions, Lucern is food for cattle, or That lucern is medicago sativa is true; and yet it is clear too, that, if he did in truth assent to these propositions, he would have to die for them also, rather than deny them, when it came to the point unless he made up his mind to tell a falsehood. That he would have to die for all three propositions severally rather than deny them, shows the completeness and absoluteness of assent in its very nature; that he would not spontaneously challenge so severe a trial in the case of two out of three particular acts of assent, illustrates in what sense one assent may be stronger than another.

It appears then, that, in assenting to propositions, an apprehension of their terms is not only necessary to assent, as such, but also gives a distinct character to its acts. If therefore we would know more about Assent, we must know more about the apprehension, which accompanies it. Accordingly to the subject of Apprehension, I proceed.

Chapter 3— The Apprehension Of Propositions

I said in my ‘Introductory Chapter’ that there can be no assent to a proposition, without some sort of apprehension of its terms; next, that there are two modes of apprehension, notional and real; thirdly, that, while assent may be given to a proposition on either apprehension of it, still its acts are elicited more heartily and forcibly, when they are made upon real apprehension which has things for its objects, than when they are made in favor of notions and with a notional apprehension. The first of these three points I have just been discussing; now I will proceed to the second, viz. the two modes of apprehending propositions, leaving the third for the chapters that follow.

I have used the word apprehension, and not understanding, because the latter word is of uncertain meaning, standing sometimes for the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition, sometimes for that of comprehending it, neither of which come into the sense of apprehension. It is possible to apprehend without understanding. I apprehend what is meant by saying that John is Richard's wife's father's aunt's husband, but, if I am unable so to take in these successive relationships as to understand the upshot of the whole, viz. that John is great-uncle-in-law to Richard, I cannot be said to comprehend the proposition. In like manner, I may take a just view of a man’s conduct, and therefore apprehend it, and yet may profess that I cannot understand it; that is, I do not have the key to it, and do not see its consistency in detail: I have no just conception of it. Apprehension then is simply an understanding of the idea or fact, which a proposition enunciates. Pride will have a fall; Napoleon died at St. Helena; I have no difficulty in understanding the sentiment contained in the former of these, or the fact declared in the latter; that is, I apprehend them both.

Now apprehension, as I have said, has two subject- matters: according as language expresses things external to us, or our own thoughts, so is apprehension real or notional. It is notional in the grammarian; it is real in the experimentalist. The grammarian has to determine the force of words and phrases; he has to master the structure of sentences and the composition of paragraphs; he has to compare language with language, to ascertain the common ideas expressed under different idiomatic forms, and to achieve the difficult work of recasting the mind of an original author in the mold of a translation. On the other hand, the philosopher or experimentalist aims at investigating, questioning, and ascertaining facts, causes, effects, actions, qualities: these are things, and he makes his words distinctly subordinate to these, as means to an end. The primary duty of a literary man is to have clear conceptions, and to be exact and intelligible in expressing them; but in a philosopher, it is even a merit to be not altogether vague, inchoate, and obscure in his teaching, and if he fails even of this low standard of language, we remind ourselves that his obscurity perhaps is owing to his depth. No power of words in a lecturer would be sufficient to make psychology easy to his hearers; if they are to profit by him, they must throw their minds into the matters in discussion, must accompany his treatment of them with an active, personal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds, the dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects, which he has a right to presuppose as images existing in their apprehension as well as in his own.

In something of a parallel way, it is the least pardonable fault in an Orator to fail in clearness of style, and the most pardonable fault of a Poet.

So again, an Economist is dealing with facts; whatever there is of theory in his work professes to be founded on facts, by facts alone must his sense be interpreted, and to those only who are well furnished with the necessary facts does he address himself; yet a clever schoolboy, from a thorough grammatical knowledge of both languages, might turn into English a French treatise on national wealth, produce, consumption, labor, profits, measures of value, public debt, and the circulating medium, with a sufficient apprehension of what it was that his author was stating for the use of an English reader, while he had not the faintest conception what the treatise, which he was translating, really determined. The man uses language as the vehicle of things, and the boy of abstractions. Hence, in literary examinations, it is a test of good scholarship to be able to construe correctly, without the aid of understanding the sentiment, action, or historical occurrence conveyed in the passage thus accurately rendered, let it be a battle in Livy or some subtle train of thought in Virgil or Pindar. And those who have acquitted themselves best in the trial will often be disposed to think they have most notably failed, for the very reason that they have been too busy with the grammar of each sentence, as it came, to have been able, as they construed on, to enter into the facts or the feelings, which, unknown to themselves, they were bringing out of it.

To take a very different instance of this contrast between notions and facts; pathology and medicine, in the interests of science, and as a protection to the practitioner, veil the shocking realities of disease and physical suffering under a notional phraseology, under the abstract terms of debility, distress, irritability, paroxysm, and a host of Greek and Latin words. The arts of medicine and surgery are necessarily experimental; but for writing and conversing on these subjects, they require to be stripped of the association of the facts from which they are derived.

Such are the two modes of apprehension. The terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things. If they do, then they are singular terms, for all things that are, are units. Now if they do not stand for things they must stand for notions, and are common terms. Singular nouns come from experience, common from abstraction. The apprehension of the former I call real, and of the latter notional. Now let us look at this difference between them more narrowly.

§1. Real Apprehension

Is, as I have said, in the first instance an experience or information about the concrete. Now, when these types of information are in fact presented to us, that is, when they are directly subjected to our bodily senses or our mental sensations, as when we say,  The sun shines, or  "The prospect is