Tailships: The Hunt for Soviet Submarines in the Mediterranean, 1970-1973

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Text © John Rodgaard 2023

Photographs © as individually credited

Colour artwork © Anderson Subtil 2023

Maps © Paul Hewitt and Tom Cooper 2023

Cover design Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www.battlefield-design.co.uk)

Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright material. The author and publisher apologise for any errors or omissions in this work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book.

ISBN 978-1-914377-09-9

ePub ISBN 978 1 80451 522 8

Mobi ISBN 978 1 80451 522 8

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CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Author’s Introduction

1The Cold War At Sea

2The Unseen Struggle Takes a Turn

3Out of Newport

4The Bear and the Eagle: A Mediterranean Confrontation

5Arrival: Sorting Things Out

6Operational Planning Considerations

7Special Hydrographic Operations: October–December 1970

81971: The First Full Year of ITASS Operations

91972–1973: From Zenith to Nadir

10 Continued Development

11 Legacy

Bibliography

Notes

About the Author

Plates

Note: In order to simplify the use of this book, all names, locations and geographic designations are as provided in The Times World Atlas, or other traditionally accepted major sources of reference, as of the time of described events.

Dedication

to

Claire and Erin

who waited on the Neapolitan shore for my return.

ABBREVIATIONS

AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION

The story of three US Navy destroyer escorts (DEs) and their crews, comprising Escort Squadron 8, is a tale that took place at the height of the Cold War – specifically the Cold War below, on and above the Mediterranean Sea. Obsolete, except for the experimental anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sensor that each ship carried, the USS Hammerberg (DE-1015), USS Courtney (DE-1021) and USS Lester (DE-1022) were ordered to the Mediterranean Sea to demonstrate the potential of a sensor – a technology relying on a passive towed array detection sensor system of microphones or hydrophones that the Navy officially designated as the Interim Towed Array Surveillance System, or ITASS. However, the crews of the ships simply called them ‘Noodles’ or ‘Tails’.

These ‘tailships’ entered Mare Nostrum in the autumn of 1970, and it was during this period in the long maritime history of the inland sea that the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies saw a naval operational environment characterised by the most intense concentration of Soviet submarines and surface ships outside of Soviet home waters. In fact, the years between 1970 and 1973 saw the tailships and the ships of the Sixth Fleet operating against the largest Soviet naval presence outside of its home waters in the history of the Soviet Navy or its tsarist predecessor, whose navy periodically operated in the Mediterranean during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Mediterranean became the focal point in the great naval rivalry of the United States and its NATO allies against the Soviet Union’s Voyenno-morskoi flot.

From the standpoint of modernity, the tailships, built in the 1950s, were already considered obsolete by the time they deployed to the Mediterranean. Configured as convoy escorts for warfare at sea in the 1950s, these ships were not competitive with their Soviet counterparts, or with many of their contemporaries in the NATO navies. The Dealey/Courtney-class DEs did not have the electronic sensors, speed or weapons of their antagonists in the Mediterranean, such as the Soviet Navy’s Mirka and Petya-class light frigates, or what the Soviet Navy classified as Storezhevoy Korabl (SKR) types - escort ships.

Nevertheless, the tailships of Escort Squadron 8 would often go head-to-head with these frigates or other superior classes of Soviet warships while conducting ‘bystander’ or shadowing operations against them. When Sixth Fleet destroyers and DEs routinely conducted these intelligence-gathering operations, the Courtney, Hammerberg and Lester were frequently taken from their primary ASW mission and directed to conduct these operations, with all three reporting numerous near collisions, while their Soviet antagonists would attempt to block or ‘shoulder’ them away from larger Soviet warships or surfaced submarines. Indeed, the Courtney was involved in a violation of the ‘Incident at Sea Agreement’ shortly after that agreement was signed between the US and Soviet Union.¹

These tailships proved so successful in detecting, classifying and identifying Soviet submarines that the US Navy committed resources to refining the capability of passive towed array sensors. The navy developed and sent to sea the AN/SQR-15 Towed Array Surveillance System (TASS) and the AN/SQR-18 Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System (SURTASS).

The tailships also ushered in two new designs of ocean surveillance ships. The mono-hulled Stalwart-class and the twin-hulled (catamaran) Victorious-class were built specifically to operate SURTASS.² Also, in the 1980s, the AN/SQR-19 TACTAS (Tactical Towed Array System) was developed and carried aboard US Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates as well as Canadian, Japanese and Spanish destroyers and frigates.³ The legacy that the three tailships left continues through the twenty-first century.

Additionally, the squadron operated in a sea surrounded by increasing tensions in the Middle East. Along the North African shore, the revolutionary governments of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt were hostile to US and NATO ships operating off their coasts. Libya and Egypt hosted elements of the Soviet Naval Air Force and provided ‘fair weather anchorages’ and logistic support for the ships and submarines of the Soviet Navy’s 5th Eskadra (Squadron). Syria provided port and yard facilities for the Eskadra, as well as airfields for its supporting naval air arm. Arab-Israeli tensions were still running extremely high as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Jordanian Crisis of 1970; a crisis that greeted the tailships when they entered the Mediterranean.⁴ The effects of these crises would ripple across the waters of the Mediterranean and through Europe in general.

While the squadron was stationed in the southern Italian port of Naples, the Palestinian Black September Organization created terror across Europe during the summer of 1972, including the massacre of the Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich, West Germany. That summer would see sailors of the squadron spending many a night in their Neapolitan homeport standing anti-terrorist watches with loaded weapons, whilst the pinging of an active sonar system from one of the ships would echo throughout the hulls of the moored ships, which, it was hoped, would discourage would-be swimmers wanting to plant explosive devices on ship hulls.

For many of the junior sailors aboard the three ships of Escort Squadron 8, it was their first time overseas. However, the more senior enlisted and officer personnel had made at least one six-month deployment to the Mediterranean. A few were even Vietnam veterans. For all, it was the first time to call a foreign port their own homeport. Many of the married officers and mid-level and senior petty officers took advantage of US Navy policy, the Forward Deployment Programme (FDP), and brought their families to set up house in Naples.⁵ The FDP also allowed the many bachelor sailors, both officers and enlisted, to rent apartments in the city or out in Naples’ suburbs.

The objective of this book is simply to tell the story of these three ships and their men within the context of the greater events of the Cold War at Sea in the Mediterranean; the successes and failures of operating the first generation of passive towed array sonar – hunting the Soviets with a microphone.

As a young sailor aboard the USS Courtney, DE-1021, I wasn’t thinking of anything more than trying to improve my professional skills as a Radarman/Operations Specialist and apply what I learned whilst aboard to be a better sailor.

Being a husband and father, I took advantage of the Navy’s Forward Deployment Programme, and arranged to have my wife and baby daughter accompany me on this tour of duty. As there was no government housing, we rented an apartment from a local landlord through the Naval Support Activity (NSA) Naples housing office. We could only afford an apartment in a rundown northern suburb of Naples, which was conveniently adjacent to the Navy’s commissary and exchange. It was our first time overseas together. Looking back after 50 years, I think we had a great adventure. Therefore, the story that unfolds in the ensuing pages is not only a story about tailships’ operations, it is about the men – many with families – who set up home life, living among the population in one of the great cities of Europe.

I knew that my ship and its sisters, the Hammerberg and the Lester, were doing important work. The reason that three engineeringly challenged, obsolescent DEs were brought back into commission was to conduct an extensive operational test of a state-of-the-art passive underwater sensor system – ITASS. As a Radarman Third Class working as one of two watch supervisors within Courtney’s Combat Information Center (CIC), I had a front-row seat for viewing the system’s operational and tactical capabilities during the time when the Soviet Union had nearly a dozen submarines operating in the Mediterranean on any given day.

Courtney and its sisters would often sortie out of Naples to operate their tails in the Ionian or Tyrrhenian Seas. At times, they would operate between Crete and Colonel Mu’ammar Al-Quadhdhãfi’s Libya, or west into the Balearic Sea toward the dictatorship of Franco’s Spain.

The length of time away from port depended upon the operational intelligence provided by the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) Rota, Spain and Sixth Fleet tactical assets. Working with Sixth Fleet’s ASW planning staff at Naples, Escort Squadron 8 staff would determine the best areas in which to stream the ITASS arrays against Soviet submarines.

Additionally, the little tailships were tasked to conduct ‘special hydrographic’ missions; one conducted in August 1972 would see them operating in the Atlantic off the Iberian Peninsula. They collected acoustic data that would support the installation of a fixed underwater passive sonar system array, Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and its land-based facility in the Eastern Atlantic.⁶

Sixth Fleet would also have a say as to where the ships would operate during the many exercises it conducted throughout the year. Sixth Fleet would send them ahead to an area in the Mediterranean prior to the arrival of its carrier battle groups (CVBGs). Their mission was to detect and track US submarines playing the role of Soviet submarines during the course of the exercise. In these exercises, as well as when directly operating against Soviet submarines, my ship, Courtney, would operate with one of its sisters and with P-3 Orion ASW aircraft.

As a small part of the Cold War at Sea, Escort Squadron 8, its men and their tailships participated in an unseen underwater struggle between superpowers. This struggle evolved technologically in response to the maturation of the submarine as the primary threat at sea. It is my hope that you, the reader, will come away after reading this story with a greater appreciation of the day-to-day service of the men who served on three little ships on a sea that saw daily encounters between naval forces of the world’s two superpowers; encounters that could threaten to turn the Cold War at Sea into a hot one.

1

THE COLD WAR AT SEA

The Cold War that dominated world political, economic, and military activities for almost half of the 20th century was, in many respects, ‘fought’ at sea.¹

The first five decades of the post-Second World War world were dominated by the Cold War, pitching the Soviet Union and its client states against the US and its allies. There were many facets to this Cold War. Economically, it was free market capitalism versus centralised government control of the economy. Another aspect was that two large military/political alliance blocs of countries were created. One was NATO, which the US and its Second World War Western allies created to counter Soviet expansionism. The second was the Warsaw Pact, which the Soviet Union formed in response to West Germany becoming a member of NATO.

Each alliance waged massive propaganda and psychological campaigns against one another. Each bloc conducted extensive espionage and intelligence-gathering operations to determine each other’s strengths and weaknesses. The competition even went into space. The ‘space race’, as it was known, would lead to the orbiting of astronauts and cosmonauts, communication, reconnaissance and scientific research satellites, and to the US landing men on the moon. The competition between the two blocs even extended to sports – the Olympic Games come to mind. However, the most prominent facet of the Cold War was the colossal military buildup of nuclear and conventional forces wielding weapons of mass destruction previously unknown in human history.

The Cold War propelled former wartime allies, who had fought against Fascism/Nazism, into a relationship characterised by intense distrust and hostility; hostility that saw outright regional conflicts, or proxy wars, across the globe. One facet of this Cold War was the Cold War at Sea.

The Cold War at Sea constituted part of the United States’ grand strategic vision and its corresponding military strategy, which was encapsulated in what became known as the Containment Strategy. The renowned US diplomat and Russian expert, George Kennan, first articulated this strategic approach toward the Soviet Union. Believing there could not be a way of working with each other