compensation scheme
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Background: Mandatory vaccination has been mooted to combat falling childhood vaccine uptake rates in England. This study investigated parental preferences for a mandatory vaccination scheme. Methods: Discrete choice experiment. Six attributes were investigated: vaccine (MMR, 6-in-1), child age group (2 years and older, 5 years and older), incentive (130 GBP cash incentive for parent, 130 GBP voucher incentive for child, no incentive), penalty (450 GBP fine, parent not able to claim Child Benefits for an unvaccinated child, unvaccinated child not able to attend school or day care), ability to opt out (medical exemption only, medical and religious belief exemption), and compensation scheme (not offered, offered). Mixed effects conditional logit regression models were used to investigate parental preferences and relative importance of attributes. Findings: Participants were 1,001 parents of children aged 5 years and under (53% female, mean age=33.6 years, SD=7.1, 84% white British). Parental preferences were mostly based on incentives (slight preference for cash pay-out for the parent versus a voucher for the child) and penalties (preference for schemes that did not allow unvaccinated children to attend school or day care and those that withheld financial benefits for parents of unvaccinated children). Parents also preferred schemes that: offered a compensation scheme, mandated the 6-in-1 vaccine, mandated vaccination in children aged 2 years and older, and that offered only medical exemptions. Interpretation: Results can inform policymakers' decisions about how best to implement a mandatory childhood vaccination scheme in England. Funding: Data collection was funded by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grants (SRG1920\101118).

<p>Sufferers of primary chronic pain syndrome are not currently entitled to cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme. The Supreme Court decision in Allenby v H, which adopted a wider interpretation of the term "physical injury", presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider whether chronic pain syndrome should constitute an injury. Policy factors, particularly the need to uphold the integrity of the legislation enacted by Parliament, demand that the status quo exclusion of chronic pain syndrome is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies this position is recommended.</p>

<p>Sufferers of primary chronic pain syndrome are not currently entitled to cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme. The Supreme Court decision in Allenby v H, which adopted a wider interpretation of the term "physical injury", presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider whether chronic pain syndrome should constitute an injury. Policy factors, particularly the need to uphold the integrity of the legislation enacted by Parliament, demand that the status quo exclusion of chronic pain syndrome is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies this position is recommended.</p>

<p>New Zealand’s accident compensation system is ‘no-fault’, meaning that New Zealanders are compensated for their injuries whether or not they can find someone to blame for their misfortune. However, until 2005, claimants injured while receiving medical treatment had to show either that their injuries were caused by negligence, or that their injuries were both rare and severe. The negligence standard was taken from tort law, and required the claimant to show that the injury was a registered health professional’s fault. This fault requirement created many of the problems that tort law had in the past: it was inefficient, arbitrary, and created a blaming culture that bred hostility between the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), the injured, and health professionals. In 2004, ACC published a review of the medical misadventure provisions, calling for them to be replaced by no-fault compensation provisions in line with the spirit and content of the rest of the accident compensation scheme. In 2005, medical misadventure became treatment injury, and both application and acceptance rates rose for claims concerning injuries received during medical treatment. However, the treatment injury provisions still contained fault elements, despite the legislature’s claim that the provisions were no-fault. In this paper, I will address the role of fault in a compensation scheme for those injured during medical treatment. First, I will define fault in its tort law context and outline some strengths and weaknesses of fault as a legal concept. Then, I will provide a short overview of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, the medical misadventure provisions, the push for reform, and the structure of the treatment injury provisions. This will give background to an in-depth discussion of the treatment injury provisions’ incorporation of fault standards. Also relevant to this discussion is the accident compensation scheme’s reporting mechanism, which potentially complicates ACC’s role as purely an injury compensating, preventing and rehabilitating body. Finally, it is necessary to consider whether compensation itself is inherently fault-based, an argument raised by some commentators. My conclusion is that some aspects of the treatment injury provisions still use fault to determine cover in some situations. The provisions give particular weight to the fault of the claimant in causing her own injury. This use of fault standards can be removed from the treatment injury provisions with some minor amendments, which are set out at the end of this paper.</p>

<p>New Zealand’s accident compensation system is ‘no-fault’, meaning that New Zealanders are compensated for their injuries whether or not they can find someone to blame for their misfortune. However, until 2005, claimants injured while receiving medical treatment had to show either that their injuries were caused by negligence, or that their injuries were both rare and severe. The negligence standard was taken from tort law, and required the claimant to show that the injury was a registered health professional’s fault. This fault requirement created many of the problems that tort law had in the past: it was inefficient, arbitrary, and created a blaming culture that bred hostility between the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), the injured, and health professionals. In 2004, ACC published a review of the medical misadventure provisions, calling for them to be replaced by no-fault compensation provisions in line with the spirit and content of the rest of the accident compensation scheme. In 2005, medical misadventure became treatment injury, and both application and acceptance rates rose for claims concerning injuries received during medical treatment. However, the treatment injury provisions still contained fault elements, despite the legislature’s claim that the provisions were no-fault. In this paper, I will address the role of fault in a compensation scheme for those injured during medical treatment. First, I will define fault in its tort law context and outline some strengths and weaknesses of fault as a legal concept. Then, I will provide a short overview of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, the medical misadventure provisions, the push for reform, and the structure of the treatment injury provisions. This will give background to an in-depth discussion of the treatment injury provisions’ incorporation of fault standards. Also relevant to this discussion is the accident compensation scheme’s reporting mechanism, which potentially complicates ACC’s role as purely an injury compensating, preventing and rehabilitating body. Finally, it is necessary to consider whether compensation itself is inherently fault-based, an argument raised by some commentators. My conclusion is that some aspects of the treatment injury provisions still use fault to determine cover in some situations. The provisions give particular weight to the fault of the claimant in causing her own injury. This use of fault standards can be removed from the treatment injury provisions with some minor amendments, which are set out at the end of this paper.</p>

<p>This thesis argues that vindicatory damages should be available in the child welfare tort cases against public authorities. These are cases in which the plaintiffs sue public authorities either for not protecting them from harm when they were children, or where it is alleged that the authority’s employees abused the children while in its care. Vindicatory damages would be intended to mark the wrong to the plaintiff, rather than attempting to compensate the consequences. This thesis argues in support of the availability of a separate head of vindicatory damages in tort law, including negligence, and explores some of the liability issues which arise in these cases, including vicarious liability, liability for omissions and liability in negligence for the way in which a statutory power is exercised or for a breach of a statutory duty. New Zealand's accident compensation scheme is also discussed: it is argued that vindicatory damages in tort law should not be barred by the scheme.</p>