bad faith
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Limited Liability Company (Ltd.) or Perseroan Terbatas (PT) is a legal entity in Indonesia that constitutes a capital alliance formed by an agreement that features a limited liability principle. Limited liability is a principle that limits the responsibility of shareholders to the risk of the Company. However, the principle of limited liability is frequently misapplied, as shareholders look for ways to protect themselves from the risk of more significant losses, to take advantage of all company profits for personal gain. Shareholders who abuse the principle of limited liability for personal gain, on the other hand, will be subject to the Piercing the Corporate Veil doctrine. This doctrine imposes the transfer of liability for personal losses to shareholders who cause harm to the company in bad faith. Based on this understanding, this paper seeks to comprehend the application of the Piercing the Corporate Veil doctrine by analyzing Medan District Court Decision Number: 656/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Mdn. The research method used in this study was normative legal research reviewed with a statute approach and a conceptual approach. The conclusion drawn from the problem is as follows: the regulation regarding the Piercing the Corporate Veil doctrine is borne not only by shareholders but also by the Board of Directors and the Board of Commissioners who fail to implement the principles of fiduciary duty of skill and care. Furthermore, in the case of 656/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Mdn, the judge considered the provisions of Article 3 paragraph (2) of the UUPT in implementing the Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine by punishing the Defendants jointly and severally to indemnify the Plaintiff.

The cases of trademark infringement on substantial similarity still relatively common in Indonesia. This article aims to analyze the basis for the judge's consideration in the decision Number 1146 K / Pdt.Sus-HKI / 2020. This is based on the disparity of Decision Number 69 / Pdt.Sus / Mark / 2019 / PN with Decision Number 1146 K / Pdt.Sus-HKI / 2020. This research uses doctrinal research using statute, case, and conceptual approaches. The results showed that the judges' basic considerations were not in accordance with regulations and several legal concepts. First, that the trademark protection system based on territorial territory and the first to file system principle should not be used as a basis for consideration. Second, that the two brands are basically similar because of the similarities in the dominant element and the similarity in sound or speech with the addition of the same class of goods. Third, the word "predator" cannot be categorized as a generic word, because the word predator has been added with a logo as a condition for a research, excluding generic brands. As a recommendation in deciding this matter, regarding the existence of bad faith, due to bad faith, a cancellation of a registered mark can be submitted indefinitely.

Tisza

This article explores the concept of bad faith as conceptualized by Sartre within the context of the existential lived experiences of those Fanon (1965) refers to as the condemned, the racialized, and the dehumanized subjects of the world. I explore the logic of authenticity as a liberatory intervention in relation to decolonial interventions and anti-racist movements such as Black Lives Matter in the USA and across the globe and recently, the #EndSars movement in Nigeria. I will therefore argue that the repudiation of the entrenched universal logic of Euro-American modernity requires one to be authentic in their praxis in order to escape bad faith.

Abstract In May 2021 Jewish Voice for Labour (“JVL”) published a combative document entitled How the EHRC Got It So Wrong-Antisemitism and the Labour Party. The document criti­cises the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s October 2020 Report of its investiga­tion into antisemitism in the Labour Party. The Commission found the Labour Party responsible for antisemitic conduct giving rise to several unlawful acts in breach of the Equality Act 2010. In addition to its legal findings, it also made critical factual findings, identifying a culture of acceptance of antisemitism in the Labour Party, which suffered from serious failings in leadership, where the failure to tackle antisemitism more effectively was probably a matter of choice. The essence of JVL’s attack on the Commission’s Report is as follows. First, it is said that the Commission did not and could not lawfully investigate antisemitism as such; to the extent that it purported to do so, its findings of unlawfulness are purportedly meaningless. Secondly, JVL claims that the Commission made no finding of institutional antisemitism. Thirdly, by failing to require production of evidence referred to in a certain leaked report, probably prepared by Labour Party officials loyal to Jeremy Corbyn, the Commission is accused of nullifying at a stroke the value of its own Report as a factual account. Fourthly, JVL claims the Commission’s Report is not just legally unten­able, but purportedly a threat to democracy. Finally, JVL claims the Commission’s analysis was not just wrong, but that it exercised its statutory powers in bad faith. This article offers a response to each of the five pillars of JVL’s attack, all of which collapse under scrutiny. As to the first pillar, the article identifies the disappearing of antisemitism as the linchpin of JVL’s argument and shows how JVL’s criticism is underpinned by a political epistemology of antisemitism denialism. As to the second pillar, it shows that the absence of the term “institutional antisemitism” in the Commission’s Report is a semantic quibble. In sub­stance, the Commission found that the conduct under investigation amounted to institu­tional antisemitism. As to the third, the article demonstrates that JVL’s complaint about the Commission’s failure to call for production of the leaked report is perverse because that report constitutes an admission of the correctness of the complaints put before it. More­over, the Corbyn-led Labour Party itself decided that it did not want the Commission to consider that material. As to the fourth pillar, the article shows that far from being a threat to democracy, the Commission’s Report grasps the nettle of antisemitism denial. It con­cludes that continuing to assume and assert that Jews raising concerns about antisemitism are lying for nefarious ends may itself be, and in at least two cases was, a form of unlawful anti-Jewish harassment. As to the fifth, the article rebuts the extraordinary charge that the Commission exercised its powers in bad faith. Rather strikingly, neither JVL nor Jeremy Corbyn was willing to take the Commission on judicial review. The article concludes by considering how the poverty of JVL’s reasoning, coupled with the extravagance of its accu­sations, invites a symptomatic reading of Antisemitism and the Labour Party as a disap­pointing illustration of left-wing melancholia.

There is an ambiguity in Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Imaginary (1940). On the one hand, Sartre describes mental images as impoverished in contrast to the fullness and depth of the world of perception. On the other hand, Sartre identifies the imagination with human freedom, and in this sense the imaginary can be seen as an enrichment of the real. This paper explores this ambiguity and its import for understanding both racist and antiracist ways of relating to others. Part One explores Sartre’s argument for the “essential poverty” of the image through examples of racist images. Part Two discusses the enriching power of the imaginary for cultivating more just social and political arrangements in the context of racial oppression. Part Three argues that bad faith can take the form either of fleeing from reality into the impoverished world of the imaginary, or of failing to see the imaginary possibilities implicitly enriching the real.

Résumé: Cet article propose de comprendre la lutte contre le racisme dans laquelle Sartre s’est inlassablement engagé à partir des concepts clés de son existentialisme. Dès les premières formulations de la pensée de Sartre, la notion de liberté est à mettre en rapport avec la formule même qui résume l’existentialisme : l’existence précède l’essence. Je démontre dans cet article qu’à l’instar de son combat contre l’antisémitisme et contre la mauvaise foi de la pensée raciste, le combat de Sartre contre le racisme est construit sur l’idée que l’homme est libre de se définir et que sa race même ne saurait être un déterminisme contraignant cette liberté.Abstract: This article will examine Sartre’s fight against racism in the light of the most basic concepts of existentialism. From its very first articulations, the notion of freedom is connected to existentialism’s founding tenet: existence precedes essence. My article demonstrates that just as in his fight against anti-Semitism and the Bad Faith of racist thinking, Sartre holds that every human being is free to determine herself and that race must never be constructed as a determinism constraining that freedom.

COVID-19 pandemic is a phenomenon that has made all economic sectors down, and thats including the banking sector. This pandemic makes credit risk will increase, therefore the problem in this research its about causes of bad credit in People's Business Credit (KUR), and how are the efforts of BRI Rungkut Surabaya Unit in resolving and minimizing bad loans during the Covid-19 pandemic. This study using qualitative research with a descriptive approach, informed by informants from BRI KUR Rungkut officers and KUR debtors as well as data on bad credit financial reports. The results showed that bad loans at BRI Unit Rungkut Surabaya were caused by external factors in the form of business risks, natural and non-natural disasters, and bad faith from customers. Internal factors in the form of overcrediting, analysis errors, and feelings of pity. The steps to resolve and minimize bad loans carried out by BRI Unit Rungkut Surabaya are in accordance with the regulations given by the government during the Covid-19 pandemic.

<p>The existence of climate change remains an unjustifiably vexed issue worldwide. In New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd, sceptics’ attempts to challenge NIWA’s temperature records allowed the Court to extend its reach into the heart of the scientific research process. Whilst this paper supports Venning J’s determination that NIWA’s decisions were within the Court’s jurisdiction for review, his finding that individuals might suffer harm as a result of them is shown to be unjustified. Furthermore, the Court’s inherent unsuitability to addressing matters with high scientific contents, due to its adversarial nature and judges’ lack of scientific training, supports a finding of non- or partial justiciability. Non-justiciability is here rejected for allowing scientists behaving fraudulently to escape rebuke. The standard of deference Venning J attempts to introduce is similarly flawed as it allows unwary judges to unintentionally judge matters of science. Concerns are also raised that research might stagnate if scientists must worry about judicial scrutiny of their work. Thus, a standard of flagrant impropriety, or “fraud, corruption or bad faith”, is argued to be the ideal threshold for permitting judicial review of scientific research.</p>

<p>The existence of climate change remains an unjustifiably vexed issue worldwide. In New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd, sceptics’ attempts to challenge NIWA’s temperature records allowed the Court to extend its reach into the heart of the scientific research process. Whilst this paper supports Venning J’s determination that NIWA’s decisions were within the Court’s jurisdiction for review, his finding that individuals might suffer harm as a result of them is shown to be unjustified. Furthermore, the Court’s inherent unsuitability to addressing matters with high scientific contents, due to its adversarial nature and judges’ lack of scientific training, supports a finding of non- or partial justiciability. Non-justiciability is here rejected for allowing scientists behaving fraudulently to escape rebuke. The standard of deference Venning J attempts to introduce is similarly flawed as it allows unwary judges to unintentionally judge matters of science. Concerns are also raised that research might stagnate if scientists must worry about judicial scrutiny of their work. Thus, a standard of flagrant impropriety, or “fraud, corruption or bad faith”, is argued to be the ideal threshold for permitting judicial review of scientific research.</p>