methodological problem
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The article is devoted to a little-studied methodological problem – the study of epics about Dobryna Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich at the lessons of Russian literature in a secondary school. The urgency of this problem lies in the fact that the considered epic stories about Dobryna Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich are still not sufficiently comprehended taking into account the achievements of modern methodological science, the advanced experience of teachers of Russian literature. As you know, epic epics are usually divided into two main cycles: Kiev and Novgorod. For the Kiev cycle of epics, images of three heroes are characteristic - Ilya Muromets, Dobrynya Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich. The named heroes are inseparable in the popular perception. In many epic plots, all three heroes, in difficult battles with the enemies of the Russian land, act together, help each other out. Possessing many similar features, at the same time, each of them is endowed with its own individual and personal qualities, in many respects complement and enrich each other. However, the program on Russian literature for general secondary schools for textual study from the Kiev cycle recommended only epics about Ilya Muromets. As for the epics about Dobryna Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, they are not provided for by the program for textual study. In this regard, teachers of literature do not consider the study of these epics or limit themselves to a brief retelling of their content. But in the epics about Dobryna Nikitich and Alyosha Popovich, no less vivid and expressive images of heroes are created – the defenders of the Russian land. Acquaintance of schoolchildren with their images, plots and motives will significantly expand the schoolchildren’s ideas about the Kiev cycle of epics, about their differences from Novgorod ones. Based on the foregoing, the author of the article, using the example of studying the epics “Dobryna and the Serpent”, “Alyosha Popovich and Tugarin”, gives the teacher of literature scientifically substantiated, experimentally verified methodological recommendations for their effective study.

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions.  I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”.  I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa.  I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions.  I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”.  I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa.  I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

AbstractFear conditioning is one of the most frequently used laboratory procedures for modeling learning and memory generally, and anxiety disorders in particular. The conditional response (CR) used in the majority of fear conditioning studies in rodents is freezing. Recently, it has been reported that under certain conditions, running, jumping or darting replaces freezing as the dominant CR. These findings raise both a critical methodological problem and an important theoretical issue. If only freezing is measured but rodents express their learning with a different response, then significant instances of learning, memory, or fear may be missed. In terms of theory, whatever conditions lead to these different behaviors may be a key to how animals transition between different defensive responses and different emotional states. We replicated these past results but along with several novel control conditions. Contrary to the prior conclusions, running and darting were entirely a result of nonassociative processes and were actually suppressed by associative learning. Darting and flight were taken to be analogous to nonassociative startle or alpha responses that are potentiated by fear. On the other hand, freezing was the purest reflection of associative learning. We also uncovered a rule that describes when these movements replace freezing: When afraid, freeze until there is a sudden novel change in stimulation, then burst into vigorous flight attempts. This rule may also govern the change from fear to panic.

The practice and theory of modern management associates the assessment of efficiency with the results of the company's work or changes in the level of use of individual resources. The criteria are results such as profit, profitability, labor productivity, the level of financial independence and others. We judge about the effectiveness of management by changes in these criteria. The number of criteria varies, and the results often show opposite conclusions about the level of effectiveness. This approach is not relevant in market conditions since the external environment, in which the company operates, remains beyond the assessment zone: with a shrinking market, profit may decrease but this is not evidence of deterioration in management. The second methodological problem is the lack of assessment of the management process itself as a set of certain actions. The purpose of the study was to develop a scientific approach to assessing the effectiveness of management in a competitive environment. The article presents a methodology for assessing efficiency not only in terms of results (management efficiency) but also actions (process efficiency). The research methodology is based on critical analysis and synthesis of theoretical and practical approaches to management assessment. The unity of the assessment of the management process and its results is the scientific novelty of the proposed methodology. The methodology was illustrated by the example of the Irkutsk Oil Company.

В статье проблематизируется кластерно-сетевой подход (М. Портер, М. Энрайт, Дж. Даннинг, Р. Мартин) в связи с его недостаточной представленностью в политических исследованиях и актуальностью его применения в политических науках для анализа современной социально-политической реальности, которая приобретает все более ярко выраженный сетевой полиархический характер. Автор обосновывает правомерность и эффективность применения кластерно-сетевого подхода к современным феноменам политической власти, политической партии, гражданского общества, политической группы, политической социализации и т.д., поскольку они принципиально отличаются от традиционных феноменов индустриальной эпохи, а также критику данного подхода с позиций современного политологического знания, необходимость взаимодополнительности существующих в политических науках подходов.

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn resorts to concepts from several disciplines in order to describe the general patterns of scientific development. This blend of disciplines can be explained in part by Kuhn's intellectual path, from physics to history and then to philosophy of science; but it also points to a deeper methodological problem, which is the question of what is the real unity of analysis in his model of science. The primary intention of this article is, thus, to give a solution to this difficulty. The answer, I believe, rests on identifying three fundamental units present in Kuhn's theory of scientific development. They are, respectively, the individual, responsible for producing evidence, spreading information, and choosing theories; the community, a set of scientists investigating a series of phenomena; and the groups, individuals with similar behavior but with looser institutional or social ties — a usually neglected category in Kuhnian literature, but equally fundamental for the final outcome of scientific debates. After investigating these categories in detail, I propose a way of integrating them into a general model for explaining the resolution of scientific controversies. Finally, I try to resolve the apparent conflict among disciplinary vocabularies by offering an account of the function of sociological, psychological, and epistemological concepts for describing controversies, and some of the methodologies appropriate for each of these tasks.

Abstract Habermas on genealogy, metaphysics and religion Habermas’s impressive history of philosophy presents itself both as a comprehensive account of the history of Western philosophy from its beginning to the 19th century and as a genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking. In this paper I argue that this twofold goal creates a serious methodological problem. I also find Habermas’s understanding of metaphysics unclear and partly misguided. If that is correct it has consequences not only for the very notion of post-metaphysical thinking but also for the understanding of the dialogue between philosophy, religion, and modern secular society that Habermas advocates.