hyperintensional logic
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The present paper offers the rule of existential generalization (EG) that is uniformly applicable within extensional, intensional and hyperintensional contexts. In contradistinction to Quine and his followers, quantification into various modal contexts and some belief attitudes is possible without obstacles. The hyperintensional logic deployed in this paper incorporates explicit substitution and so the rule (EG) is fully specified inside the logic. The logic is equipped with a natural deduction system within which (EG) is derived from its rules for the existential quantifier, substitution and functional application. This shows that (EG) is not primitive, as often assumed even in advanced writings on natural deduction. Arguments involving existential generalisation are shown to be valid if the sequents containing their premises and conclusions are derivable using the rule (EG). The invalidity of arguments seemingly employing (EG) is explained with recourse to the definition of substitution.

The success of automated reasoning techniques over large natural-language texts heavily relies on a fine-grained analysis of natural language assumptions. While there is a common agreement that the analysis should be hyperintensional, most of the automatic reasoning systems are still based on an intensional logic, at the best. In this paper, we introduce the system of reasoning based on a fine-grained, hyperintensional analysis. To this end we apply Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) with its procedural semantics. TIL is a higher-order, hyperintensional logic of partial functions, in particular apt for a fine-grained natural-language analysis. Within TIL we recognise three kinds of context, namely extensional, intensional and hyperintensional, in which a particular natural-language term, or rather its meaning, can occur. Having defined the three kinds of context and implemented an algorithm of context recognition, we are in a position to develop and implement an extensional logic of hyperintensions with the inference machine that should neither over-infer nor under-infer.

Abstract In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: (i) an argument from the nature of reasons, (ii) an argument from substitutivity and (iii) an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a hyperintensional logic of reasons based on justification logics. Eventually we discuss the philosophical import of this proposal and highlight some limitations and possible developments.