Speilvogel CH 26
Speilvogel CH 26
Speilvogel CH 26
26
750-58
Chapter 26: The Futile Search for Stability: Europe Between the Wars, 1919-1939
An Uncertain Peace: The Search for Security
I. The peace treaties at the end of WWI had tried to fulfill the 19thc dream of nationalism by
redrawing boundaries and creating new states. However, this peace settlement had left
nations unhappy.
A. Conflicts over disputed border regions poisoned mutual relations in eastern Europe
for years, and many Germans viewed the Peace of Versailles as a dictated peace and
vowed to seek its revision.
II. Woodrow Wilson placed many of his hopes for the future in the League of Nations.
A. The League, however was not effective in maintaining the peace.
B. The failure of the United States to join the League and the subsequent American
determination to be less involved in European affairs undermined the effectiveness
of the League from its beginning.
C. The League’s sole weapon for halting aggression was economic sanctions.
III. The weakness of the League of Nations and the failure of both US and GB to honor their
promises to form defensive military alliances w/France left France embittered and alone.
A. B/f WWI, France’s alliance w/Russia had served to threaten Germany w/the
possibility of a 2 front war. But Communist Russia was now a hostile power.
B. To compensate, France built a network of alliances in eastern Europe w/Poland and
the members of the so-called Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia).
This alliance overlooked the fundamental military weaknesses of those nations.
The French Policy of Coercion (1919-1924)
I. France’s search for security b/w 1919 and 1924 was founded primarily on a strict
enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles.
A. The strict policy towards Germany began w/the issue of reparations, the payments
that the Germans were supposed to make.
B. In April 1921, the Allied Reparations Commission settled on a sum of 132 billion
marks for German reparations.
C. Allied threats of occupy the Ruhr valley, Germany’s chief industrial and mining
center, led the new German republic to accept the reparations settlement and make its
1st payment in 1921.
D. By the following year, however, facing financial problems, the German government
announced that it was unable to pay any more. The French then sent troops to occupy
the Ruhr valley. B/c the Germans would not pay reparations, the French would
collect reparations in kind by operating and using the Ruhr mines and factories.
II. Both Germany and France suffered from the French occupation of the Ruhr. The German
government adopted a policy of passive resistance that was largely financed by printing
more paper money, but that only intensified the inflationary pressures that had appeared
in Germany by the end of the war.
A. The German mark soon became worthless.
B. Economic disaster fueled political upheavals as Communists staged uprisings in
October 1923, and Adolf Hitler’s band of Nazis attempted to seize power in Munich
in November.
C. The cost of the French occupation was not offset by the gains.
D. Pressure from the US and GB against the French policy forced the French to agree to
a new conference of experts to reassess the reparations problem.
E. By the time the conference did its work in 1924, both France and Germany were
opting to pursue a more conciliatory approach toward each other.
The Hopeful Years (1924-1929)
I. The formation of new governments in both GB and France opened the door to
conciliatory approaches to Germany and the reparations problem.
A. At the same time, a new German government led by Gustav Stresemann ended the
policy of passive resistance and committed Germany to carry out most of the
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles while seeking a new settlement of the
reparations question.
B. At the same time, the German government stabilized the currency and ended the
extreme inflation by issuing a new temporary currency, the Rentenmark.
II. In August 1924, an internal commission produced a new plan for reparations.
A. Named the Dawes Plan, it reduced reparations and stabilized Germany’s payments
on the basis of its ability to pay.
B. The Dawes Plan also granted an initial $200 million loan for German recovery,
which opened the door to heavy American investments in Europe that helped usher
in a new era of European prosperity b/w 1924-29.
The Spirit of Locarno
I. W/prosperity came new efforts at European diplomacy. A spirit of international
cooperation was fostered by the foreign ministers of Germany and France, Gustav
Stresemann and Aristide Briand, who concluded the Treaty of Locarno in 1925.
A. This guaranteed Germany’s new western borders w/France and Belgium.
B. Although Germany’s new eastern borders w/Poland were conspicuously absent from
the agreement, a clear indication that Germany did not accept those borders as
permanent, the Locarno pact was viewed by many as the beginning of a new era of
European peace.
II. Germany’s entry into the League of Nations in March 1926 soon reinforced the new spirit
of conciliation engendered at Locarno.
A. 2 years later, similar optimistic attitudes prevailed in the Kellogg-Briand pact,
drafted by the American secretary of state Frank B. Kellogg and the French foreign
minister Aristide Briand.
B. 63 nations eventually agreed to the pact.
III. The spirit of Locarno was based on little real substance.
A. Germany lacked the military power to alter its western borders even if it wanted.
B. The issue of disarmament soon proved that even the spirit of Locarno could not
induce nations to cut back on their weapons.
C. Numerous disarmament conferences failed to achieve anything substantial as states
proved unwilling to trust their security to anyone but their own military forces.
Coexistence with Soviet Russia
I. One other hopeful sign in the years b/w 1924-29 was the new coexistence of the West
w/Soviet Russia.
A. By the beginning of 1924, Soviet hopes for communist revolutions in Western states
had largely dissipated.
B. In turn, these states had realized by then that the Bolshevik regime could not be
ousted.
C. By 1924, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy, as well as several smaller European
countries, had established full diplomatic relations w/Soviet Russia.
The Great Depression
I. After WWI, most European states hoped to return to the liberal ideal of a market
economy based on private enterprise and largely free of state intervention.
A. The war had strengthened business cartels and labor unions, making some
government regulation of these powerful organizations appear necessary.
B. Then, too, the economic integration of Europe b/f 1914 that had been based on free
trade was soon undermined by a wave of protectionism and trade barriers, and
reparations and war debts had further damaged the postwar international economy.
C. Consequently, the prosperity that did occur b/w 1924-29 was uncommonly fragile,
and the dream of returning to a self-regulating market economy was mere illusion.
Causes
I. 2 great factors played an important role in bringing on the Great Depression: a downturn
in domestic economies and an international financial crisis caused by the collapse of the
American stock market in 1929.
A. Already in the mid 1920s, prices for agricultural goods were beginning to decline
rapidly due to overprotection of basic commodities.
B. In 1925, states in central and eastern Europe began to impose tariffs to close their
markets to other countries’ goods.
II. Much of Europe’s prosperity b/w 1924-29 had been built on American bank loans to
Germany. Already in 1928-29, American investors had begun to pull money out of
Germany in order to invest in the booming NY stock market.
A. The crash of the American stock market in October 1929 led panicky American
investors to w/d even more of their funds from Germany and other European
markets.
B. The withdrawal of funds seriously weakened the banks of Germany and other central
European powers.
Unemployment
I. Economic depression was by no means a new phenomenon in European history. But the
depth of the economic downturn after 1929 fully justifies the “Great Depression” title.
A. During 1932, the worst year of the depression, ¼ of British workers were
unemployed and 40% of the German work force were unemployed.
B. B/w 1929-32, industrial production plummeted almost 50% in the US and nearly as
much in Germany. The unemployed and homeless filled the streets throughout the
advanced industrial countries.
Social and Political Repercussions
I. The economic crisis also had unexpected social repercussions.
A. Women were often able to secure low-paying jobs as servants, housecleaners, or
laundresses while many men remained unemployed, either begging in the streets or
staying at home to do household tasks.
B. Many unemployed men, resenting this reversal of traditional gender roles, were open
to the shrill cries of demagogues w/simple solutions to the economic crisis.
C. High unemployment rates among young males often led them to join gangs that
gathered in parks or other public places, arousing fear among local residents.
II. Governments seemed powerless to deal w/the crisis. The classical liberal remedy for
depression, a deflationary policy of balanced budgets, which involved cutting costs by
lowering wages and raising tariffs to exclude other countries’ goods from home markets,
only served to worsen the economic crisis and create even greater mass discontent.
A. This is turn led to political repercussions.
B. Increased government activity in the economy was one reaction, even in countries
like the US that had a strong laissez-faire tradition.
C. Another effect was a renewed interest in Marxist doctrines, since Marx had predicted
that capitalism would destroy itself through overpopulation.
D. Communism took on new popularity, especially among workers and intellectuals.
E. The Great Depression increased the attractiveness of simplistic dictatorial solutions,
especially from a new authoritarian movement known as fascism.