Emerging Trends in Administrative Law : Prof. S.S. Vishweshwaraiah
Emerging Trends in Administrative Law : Prof. S.S. Vishweshwaraiah
Emerging Trends in Administrative Law : Prof. S.S. Vishweshwaraiah
With the advent of LPG, we have often heard pleas for deregulation,
dereservation, abolition of permits and licences and the necessary freedom
and independence for enterpreneurs to engage effectively in their economic
activities in an open market economy. Do all these suggest or indicate that
administrative action would be minimal in nature in the future and market
forces would determine what shall be or shall not be done or undertaken. To
answer this question, we should advert to our Constitution and its commands.
Justice Krishna Iyer has averred that the signature tune or the ideological
signature of our constitution is Social Justice. Here, the Preamble to the
Constitution and Directive Principles, in Part IV, need be referred to.
According to Prof. Upendra Baxi, a Constitution cannot be a rigid, static
document. It has to look to the future and should not archive the dead past.
It should be a life-giving force and not a death-bestowing entity. Further, our
Apex Court has observed; A constitutional provision is never static, it is everevolving and ever-changing and therefore, does not admit of a narrow,
pedantic or syllogistic approach. Secretary Ministry of I & B v. Cricket
Association, Bengal, AIR 1995 S.C. 1236, at 1250.
With the fore-going preface, we may now take a look at the Emerging
Trends in Administrative Law.
Illustration :
Law enacted to revise pension for judges and the parent law leaving it
to the discretion of the states to fix the dates on which the revised pension
scheme becomes effective.
2.
India, AIR, 1970 S.C. 150. The Supreme Court has expanded the frontier
of Natural Justice by insisting that fair play in action must be manifest in
administrative action also. Thus, in Maneka Gandhi, AIR, 1978, the
Supreme Court has ruled that since the aim of both administrative and
quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural
justice is calculated to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of
justice it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial
inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must apply logically to both.
See Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) 7SCC 89,
at 99.
3.
have acted upon the assurance to their prejudice cannot be left in the
lurch. If the Court rules that the administrative is estopped from going
back on its assurances, the ultravires Doctrine is eclipsed, Motilal
Padampat Sugar Mills, AIR 1979, S.C. 621: Cf, Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v.
Haryana, AIR, 1980, S.C. 1285. It should, however, be pointed out that in
Jit Ram, the apex court has laid down, inter alia, the following principles:
i.
ii.
When the public servant acts outside its statutory authority, Estoppel
Plea would not be available.
iii.
However, if the public servant, while acting within its authority, enters
into an agreement, makes a representation, the Court can command
it to abide by the agreement when the party acting on the promise or
representation has got into a disadvantageous position.
iv.
4.
The locus-standi rule has been liberalised with the advent of Public
interest Litigation. The Supreme Court has reiterated that in the case of
Public Interest Litigation, it is not necessary that the petitioner should
himself have a personal interest in the matter E.g. M/s J. Mohapatra &
Co., v. Orissa, AIR, 1984, S.C. 1572.
5.
without the authority of law. See, Khatri v. Bihar, (the Bhagalpur Blinding
Case, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1068 ; Rudul Shaw v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 S.C.
1086 Sebstain Hangray v. India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1026.
6.
7.
8.
It is possible that our Courts may emulate the English Decisions and
award exemplary damages against public servants who have improperly
exercised their power to search or arrest without warrant or on account of
their arbitrary, outrageous and malafide exercise of public power or
malicious, deliberate, injurious wrong doing. See Lucknow Development
Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 (Judicial recognition of
misfeasance in public office as a part of the Law of Tort)