INDIAN DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIO, 2025•

P.N. Mari Bhat

Population Research Centre
Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi

June 2001

•
This paper was prepared at the request of Centre for Policy Research, New
Delhi, in connection with the project, India 2025.
Introduction

India's population stood at about 350 million at the time of independence in 1947. Belying
Malthusian fears, it grew at an unprecedented rate to reach the one billion mark at the dawn of
the new millennium. The Census of 2001 has put the population figure provisionally at 1,027
million, even though it registered a significant reduction in the growth rate of population.
During the latter half of the twentieth century, India's population had grown by nearly 650
million. How much more will it grow in the first quarter of the twenty-first century? What will
be the geographical distribution of this growth? What changes are expected in the age and sex
structure of the population? Any serious attempt to paint a portrait of India around the year
2025 would have to confront these questions, and make a proper assessment of the country's
demographic prospectus.

With the emergence of 'the component method' of projection, the art of making
population forecasts has acquired the rigour of a science. The rationale of the component
method rests on the undisputable fact that the growth of population is determined by fertility,
mortality and migration rates. As each of these forces have distinct age and sex profiles, it
becomes possible to mathematically carry forward the base-year population by age to any
future date, by making assumptions about the three components of growth. The time-honoured
theory of demographic transition provides the necessary framework to make assumptions about
the future course of fertility and mortality rates with a fair degree of precision. Although
making assumptions about migration could prove difficult, in a many a case, this is an
inconsequential part of population change.

The accuracy of demographic projections can be gauged by examining how close they
have come in predicting the India's population at 2001. It is to be noted that demographers
generally make 'high', 'medium' and 'low' projections; but the high and low variants are often
presented for pedagogical purposes only, and are not to be treated as serious forecasts. Table 1
lists ten important forecasts of India's population at 2001 that were made before 1980 using the
component method. The table shows in each case, the forecasts corresponding to the medium
variant, or the median of the projected population figures.

Except for the first one that was made way back in 1954, all other nine population
projections have come within ten percent of the census estimate for 2001. Only three have
erred on a higher side, but two of them were so because they carried a correction for under
enumeration of population in the base-year census. Among the ten forecasts, the one made by
J.P. Ambannavar in 1975 had an error of only two percent, but allowing for some under
enumeration in the census count, the two projections of the United Nations made in 1973 and
1978 can also be regarded as falling within the bull's eye.

Several lessons can be learnt from this comparison. First, it appears not too hazardous
to make population projections using the component method, provided the time horizon for the
projection is within 25-30 years. Second, projected population totals generally have a
downward bias, perhaps because assumptions regarding levels and trends in fertility tend to be
too optimistic. Third, forecasting errors tend to reduce with time because of better information
on the nature and tempo of demographic transition.

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 Table 1: Comparison of provisional population estimate for India
from the Census of 2001 with some selected projections
made before 1980 using the component method

Population Percentage
Year projected deviation
Author/ of for 2001 from 1027
Organization projection (millions) million
Das Gupta and Majumdar 1954 667 - 35.1
United Nations 1963 922 - 10.2
World Bank 1972 1109 8.0
Frejka 1972 955 - 7.0
United Nations 1973 1078 5.0
Operations Research Group 1974 973 - 5.3
Raghavachari 1974 935 - 9.0
Ambannavar 1975 1003 - 2.3
Cassen and Dyson 1976 934 - 9.1
United Nations 1978 1056 2.8

Source: Natarajan (1982).

Note: In some cases, the estimate for the year 2000 has been brought forward by a year using the growth
rate internal to the projection. If more than one estimate was made, that based on the medium variant, or
the median of the estimates, has been taken as the most likely forecast. Some projections have adjusted
the base- year population for under enumeration, and some estimates are for July 1. These discrepancies
have been ignored while computing the percentage deviation from the census count for March 1, 2001.

Recent Demographic Trends

Any serious attempt to assess future prospectus must begin with a review of past trends. Such a
review would be critically important in formulating assumptions about future trends of each
component of growth. With this in mind, Table 2 shows some basic demographic indicators for
India since 1951. It is to be noted that fertility and mortality indicators that are shown in the
table are not the ones routinely found in statistical publications of the Government of India. The
official estimates, especially those for the period before the appearance of the Sample
Registration System (i.e., before 1971), are grossly deficient and do not accurately depict the
trends in vital rates. Although the estimates based on the SRS are more accurate, they too need
to be corrected for under enumeration of vital events in the system. Even the more carefully
derived estimates shown in Table 2 can show only an approximate range for the levels of
fertility and mortality that prevailed before the 1970s. The major source for the uncertainty is
the lack of reliable information on the levels of infant and child mortality prevailed during this
period. However, it is fairly certain that their levels were higher than those shown in the
official life tables of the period (for details, see Bhat 1998).

As per the estimates shown in Table 2, the crude death rate in India has declined from
about 30 per 1,000 in 1941-51 to 15 in 1971-81 and 10 in 1991-2001. In the meanwhile, the
expectation of life at birth has increased from about 33 years in 1941-51 to about 50 years in
1971-81 and 60 years in 1991-2001. Thus during the last 20 years, the expectation of life at
birth has increased roughly by half a year per annum. There also is an indication that the life
expectancy has increased somewhat faster among females than males.

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 The estimates presented in Table 2 show that the fertility level in India may have
increased before it began to fall. The crude birth rate may have increased from about 43 per
1,000 in 1941-51 to 47 in 1951-61, and then slowly began to fall to reach 29 during 1991-
2001. The total fertility rate (TFR) may have increased from a level lower than 6 births per
woman to around 6.5 births between 1941-51 and 1951-61. Subsequently, it has shown a
steady fall to reach 3.7 during 1991-2001. The early rise in fertility is attributable to declines
in the incidence of widowhood and diseases such as malaria that held levels of natural fertility
in check. The annual fall in TFR appears to be declining. Between 1961-71 and 1971-81 TFR
fell by 0.14 births per year, while during the last 20 years the TFR has fallen only by half of
this rate.

Table 2: Some Selected Demographic Indicators for India, 1951 to 2001

Census Enumerated Rates/measures for the ten- year period before the
year population in census
millions Percent Crude Crud Total Expectation of
change in birth e fertility life at birth
population rate death rate Male Female
rate
1951 361.1 13.3 40-44 28- 5.3- 32- 32-34
32 6.0 34
1961 439.2 21.6 46-48 26- 6.3- 37- 37-39
28 6.6 39
1971 548.2 24.8 43-44 21- 6.4- 43- 42-44
22 6.6 45
1981 683.3 24.6 37 15 5.1 50 49
1991 846.4 23.9 35 13 4.3 54 53
2001* 1027.0 21.3 29 10 3.7 59 60

Source: India, Registrar General (2001), Bhat (1998, 2000).

* Population estimates for 2001 and demographic indicators for 1991-2001 are provisional.

While making population projections, it is necessary to be as precise as possible about

the current levels of fertility and mortality. Their underestimation could result in significant
under assessment of future possibilities for growth and an overly optimistic date for population
stabilization. Some indirectly made estimates suggest that about 10 percent of deaths and 5-7
percent of births are omitted in the SRS (Bhat 2000). Therefore, levels of fertility and mortality
shown in Table 2 for the period 1991-2001 are somewhat higher than what is implied by the
SRS estimates available up to the year 1999. They are however broadly consistent with the
provisional results of the Census of 2001.

While assessing future prospects, it is also necessary to take into account the large
regional differences in demographic parameters (see Bhat 1999). Several states in south India
have already reached, or are about to attain, the replacement level of fertility (a TFR level of
about 2.2 - 2.1) that, if maintained, would ensure a zero growth rate of population in the long
run. On the other hand, TFR is over 4 births per woman in many states in north India, and it
would take several decades for them to reach the replacement-level fertility. There are also
similar differentials in levels of mortality, especially in infant and child mortality.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the population prospectus on a state-by-
state basis. But because they make telling contrasts, two broad regions - north and south - will
be considered for detailed treatment. The 'north' in our discussions comprises of Uttar
4
Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and newly-formed states of Uttaranchal,
Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh. The 'south' comprises of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka. During 1991-2001, the average population growth rate was 2.22 percent per annum
in the north while it was only 1.24 percent in the south.

Projection Assumptions

The base-year of our population projection is 2000 A.D. Based on the provisional results of
the 2001 Census, India's population on March 1, 2000 is estimated to be 1,010 million. The
age-sex distribution of the population on this date is estimated by projecting forward a
smoothed age-sex distribution of population from the 1991 Census. This projection used
slightly adjusted rates of fertility and mortality from the SRS so that the projection would give
a growth rate of 1.9 percent per annum during 1991-2001. This projection suggests that in the
year 2000, TFR was 3.4 and expectation of life at birth was 60 for males and 62 for females.
Table 3: Mortality and Fertility assumptions for India under two scenarios, 2000-2025

Expectation of life at birth

Males Females Total fertility rate
Year Optimistic Realistic Optimistic Realistic Optimistic Realistic
2000 60.0 60.0 62.0 62.0 3.40 3.40
2005 64.0 61.0 66.5 63.7 2.75 3.10
2010 68.0 62.0 71.0 65.3 2.10 2.80
2015 69.3 63.0 72.7 67.0 2.10 2.50
2020 70.7 65.0 74.3 69.0 2.10 2.30
2025 72.0 67.0 76.0 71.0 2.10 2.20

At the national level, two alternate scenarios of achieving population stabilization have
been considered (see Table 3). In the first scenario, it is assumed that India would able to
achieve the demographic goals of the National Population Policy 2000 (Government of India
2000). The NPP has set a target of achieving a TFR of 2.1 and an infant mortality rate of 30
per 1,000 by the year 2010. The mortality target implies an expectation of life at birth of 68 for
males and 71 for females (under the 'West' model life table system that has been assumed to
apply at the national level). After 2010, the TFR has been assumed to remain constant at 2.1.
But the life expectancy has been assumed to rise further, though at a reduced pace, to reach 72
for males and 76 for females by 2025.

Considering the pace at which fertility and mortality rates have fallen in the past, the
NPP goals appear to be highly optimistic. As noted above, TFR has fallen only by 0.07 births
per year during the last 20 years. As more and more states of India complete the transition to
low fertility, the average pace of decline is likely to slacken further. In the case of mortality,
diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis are becoming intractable and the threat of HIV/AIDS
is looming large on the horizon. The pace of decline in infant and child mortality, hitherto
largely driven by immunization, also seems to be slowing down.

Therefore, under the more realistic scenario, TFR has been assumed to fall from 3.4 in
2000 to 2.8 in 2010, and reach very close to the replacement level only by 2025. The life
expectancy at birth has been assumed to rise by only 4 years (3 years among males and 5 years
among females) during the next 15 years. By 2025, it has been assumed to reach 67 for males
5
and 71 for females, i.e., 5 year shorter for both the sexes than under the optimistic projection.

Under both the scenarios, net migration to India has been assumed to be negligible. In
the past, while some regions of India were indeed affected by emigration of labourers, there
were compensating inflows of illegal immigrants and refugees in other parts. In future, both
internal and external demographic and economic conditions may make India a net exporter of
labourers and technicians. However, immigration is unlikely to be of such proportions as to
make a significant dent on India's population size.

For north and south India, only one scenario that seemed realistic has been considered
(see Table 4). The provisional results of the 2001 Census suggest that in the year 2000 the
northern and southern regions had a population of 450 and 220 million, respectively. As with
all-India, the age-sex distribution of the population was carried forward from 1991 using
slightly adjusted estimates of fertility and mortality levels from the SRS. In the case of south
India, TFR has been assumed to fall progressively from 2.3 in 2000 to 1.9 in 2010 and then to
remain constant at 1.8 until 2025. In north India, TFR has been assumed to decline from 4.4 in
2000 to 3.6 in 2010 and further to 2.7 by 2025. Between 2000 and 2025, the expectation of life
at birth in south India has been assumed to rise from 64 to 70 for males and from 67 to 74 for
females. During the same period in north India, the expectation of life at birth has been assumed
to rise from 59 to 66 for males and 58 to 67 for females. As south India appears to be hit more
by the AIDS epidemic, a slower rate of increase in life expectancy has been assumed there.

Table 4: Mortality and Fertility assumptions for north and south India, 2000- 2025

Expectation of life at birth

Males Females Total fertility rate
Year North South North South North South
2000 59.0 64.0 58.0 67.0 4.40 2.30
2005 60.4 65.0 59.8 68.2 4.00 2.10
2010 61.8 66.0 61.6 69.3 3.60 1.90
2015 63.2 67.0 63.4 70.5 3.30 1.80
2020 64.6 68.5 65.2 72.3 3.00 1.80
2025 66.0 70.0 67.0 74.0 2.70 1.80

Note: Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and
Uttaranchal are included in the North, while Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala
are included in the South.

It is also appropriate to mention briefly here a couple of other assumptions made while
projecting the population to the year 2025. For converting the assumptions on life expectancies
to age-specific mortality rates, a model life table system is required. As India's mortality
patterns by age appear to be getting closer to Coale and Demeny's West model system (see
Bhat 1998), this model system has been assumed to be applicable to all-India during the entire
projection period. The same system has also been used in the projections for south India.
However, for north India the South model life table system has been preferred, as the region
has relatively higher levels of under-5 mortality for its level of life expectancy at birth. With
respect to age pattern of fertility, it has been assumed that child bearing would be increasingly
concentrated at ages under 30, especially in the age group 20-24.

Another assumption of some consequence is about the sex ratio at birth. A sex ratio at
6
birth of 105 males per 100 females is normally assumed. But the deteriorating juvenile sex
ratios suggest that the sex ratio at birth may have gone up by couple of percentage points owing
to sex-selective abortions in some parts of India. Accordingly, a sex ratio at birth of 107 has
been used in the case all-India, while it is assumed to be 108 in the north and 106 in the south.
It is possible that the sex ratio at birth would rise further, but it may partially be compensated
by improvements in sex-differentials in mortality in childhood ages. Therefore no further
change in this ratio has been assumed during the projection period.

Projection Results for All-India

Population projections were carried out using the DEMPROJ computer programme of the
Futures Group International. Tables 5 and 6 show the key results of population projections for
India under the optimistic and realistic scenarios. Interestingly, both the variants imply that
India's population would be about 1.4 billion in the year 2025 (1380 million under the
optimistic scenario and 1403 million under the realistic scenario). Indeed, though based on
very different assumptions on mortality and fertility, several recent projections made for India
have arrived at roughly the same population estimate for 2025:

Author/organisation Population in 2025

(millions)

World Bank 1994 1,370

United Nations 1998 1,330
Visaria and Bhat, 1999 1,393
Population Foundation, 1999 1,400
Dyson and Hanchate, 2000 1,381

Source: Bos et al (1994), United Nations (1999), Visaria and Bhat (1999),
Natarajan and Jayachandran (2001) and Dyson and Hanchate (2000).

Note: Estimates for the year 2026 are brought to 2025 using the growth rate
internal to the projection.

The main reason for this remarkable agreement on the likely size of India's population
in the year 2025 is that differences in the assumptions regarding mortality and fertility levels
tend to cancel themselves out in their effects on the growth rate of population. The optimists
assume both fertility and mortality levels to fall sharply while pessimists assume both to
decline slowly. However, when projected population totals for different age segments are
compared, differences would start to show up. For example, in our optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios, the projected population in the school-going age of 6-14 for the year 2025 is,
respectively, 197 and 222 million - a difference of over 12 percent as compared to less than 2
percent in the total population.

As per our projection results, the sex ratio of population (females per 1000 males)
would marginally increase from 932 in 2000 to 952-954 in 2025. Thus a reversal of the
historical trend of falling sex ratio is expected in the twenty-first century. The projected
improvement in the sex ratio is directly attributable to the assumption that by 2025, the
expectation of life at birth for females would be higher than for males by 4 years. While this
seems a fair assumption to make, it is not altogether clear what would happen to the sex ratio at
birth. There is some fragmentary evidence to suggest that son preference is actually falling in
7
India, but its manifestation in the sex ratios is on the rise because of the increased access to the
technology of sex-selective abortion. One could expect the effect of the diffusion of this
technology to be a temporary phenomenon.

Fig.1: Projected population of India under realistic scenario by broad age groups, 2000- 2025

1600

1400
Population in millions

1200

1000 Age 0-14

Age 15-64
800
Age 65 +
600 All ages

400

200

0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Year

We can be more certain of the changes in the age structure of the population. Under the
realistic scenario, between 2000 and 2025, the percentage of population under 15 years of age
is expected to fall from 36 to 27 percent. Actually, the population under 15 years is expected
to increase only marginally from 360 to 371 million in 25 years (see Fig.1). On the other hand,
the adult population in the age group 15-64 is expected rise from 604 million in 2000 to 942
million in 2025. i.e., from 60 percent to 67 percent of the total population. The elderly
population is also expected to rise sharply from 45 to 89 million, and their share in the total
population would rise from 4.5 to 6.4 percent. As a consequence of these age structural
changes, the age-dependency ratio (ratio of non-working age population to working age
population) is expected to fall from 67 percent in 2000 to 46 percent in 2025.

The age-structural changes are best studied through population pyramids. These are
horizontal bar charts showing the male and female population at different age groups, in
opposing direction. Fig. 2 shows the shape of India's population pyramid in 2000. As on this
date, older cohorts were invariably smaller than younger cohorts, the diagram truly has the
shape of a pyramid. Figures 3 and 4 show the population pyramid in 2025 as per the two
alternate scenarios. The population pyramid in 2025 is expected to assume a tower-like shape.
The base of the pyramid would narrow down while the middle would be broadened. The
pyramid under the optimistic scenario would show the 'scars' of the spectacular fall in fertility
assumed to take place during 2000-10. The implications of these dramatic changes in the age
structure of the population to the economy and society will be discussed after considering the
regional differences.

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Table 5: Key results of population projection for India under the optimistic scenario, 2000-2025

Demographic Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Total population (millions) 1010 1089 1159 1229 1305 1380
Population density (per sq. km) 307 331 353 374 397 420
Females per 1000 males 932 935 938 941 945 950
Growth rate for preceding 5-years
(%):
Total population 1.82 1.52 1.25 1.17 1.19 1.12
Population age 15-64 years 2.05 2.23 2.19 1.97 1.50 1.01
Percent 0- 14 years 35.7 33.3 29.9 26.7 25.0 24.5
Percent 15-64 years 59.8 62.0 65.0 67.7 68.7 68.3
Percent 65+ years 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.6 6.3 7.2
Median age 23 24 25 27 29 30
Dependency ratio (percent):
Child (0-14) 60 54 46 40 36 36
Elderly (65+) 8 8 8 8 9 10
Total 67 61 54 48 46 46
Population 6-14 years (millions) 210 220 218 201 190 197
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 26.5 22.1 17.9 18.5 18.4 17.2
Crude death rate (per 1000) 9.9 8.1 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.6
Crude growth rate (per 1000) 16.6 14.0 11.2 11.8 11.8 10.6
Net reproduction rate 1.42 1.21 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99

Table 6: Key results of population projection for India under the realistic scenario, 2000- 2025

Demographic Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Total population (millions) 1010 1093 1175 1256 1331 1403
Population density (per sq. km) 307 332 357 382 405 427
Females per 1000 males 932 935 940 945 950 954
Growth rate for preceding 5-years
(%):
Total population 1.82 1.58 1.45 1.33 1.17 1.05
Population age 15-64 years 2.05 2.17 2.07 1.82 1.51 1.32
Percent 0- 14 years 35.7 33.7 31.5 29.6 28.0 26.5
Percent 15-64 years 59.8 61.6 63.6 65.2 66.3 67.2
Percent 65+ years 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.7 6.4
Median age 23 23 24 26 27 29
Dependency ratio (percent):
Child (0-14) 60 55 50 45 42 39
Elderly (65+) 8 8 8 8 9 9
Total 67 62 57 53 51 49
Population 6-14 years (millions) 210 219 220 220 224 224
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 26.5 24.5 23.0 21.1 19.4 18.1
Crude death rate (per 1000) 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.3 8.0
Crude growth rate (per 1000) 16.7 15.1 13.9 12.3 11.1 10.1
Net reproduction rate 1.42 1.32 1.22 1.11 1.04 1.01

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 Fig. 2: Population pyramid of India, year 2000

INDIA : 2000

90
80
70
60
50
Age

40
30
20
10
0
-8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Male Percent Female

Fig. 3: Projected population pyramid of India under optimistic scenario, year 2025

INDIA : 2025
Optimistic Scenario

90
80
70
60
50
Age

40
30
20
10
0
-8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Male Percent Female

10
 Fig. 4: Projected population pyramid of India under realistic scenario, year 2025

INDIA : 2025
Realistic Scenario

90
80
70
60
50
Age

40
30
20
10
0
-8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Male Percent Female

Regional Scenario

The existence of two different demographic regimes in north and south India dictates that
regional differences be examined at some length. The main results of the regional projections
are presented in Tables 7 and 8. According to our projections, the population of the northern
region would rise from 450 million in 2000 to nearly 700 million in 2025, and its share of
India's population would go up from 45 percent to 50 percent. On the other hand, in the
southern region the population would increase only marginally from 220 million in 2000 to 265
million in 2025. In the meanwhile, its share of India's population would decline from 22
percent to 19 percent.

The average population density per square kilometre in the year 2000 was 319 in the
north and 346 in the south. While the former is expected to increase to 496 by 2025, the latter
is expected to increase only to 417 by this date. Also to be noted is that by the year 2025,
population of north India would still be growing at a rate of 1.4 percent per annum while the
growth rate in south India would have fallen to 0.5 percent. The advantages the south would
derive from its early demographic transition are thus obvious. But the regional demographic
imbalances may induce large population movements from the north to the south. It remains to be
seen whether this would develop into a serious regional conflict.

By the year 2025 the population of south India would have begun to 'grey'. The median
age of the population would have gone up from 26 years in 2000 to 34 years in 2025, and 9
percent of the population would be of age 65 years and over. On the other hand, the north India
would have a relatively young population with a median age of 26 and only 4 percent of the
population aged 65 and over. The population pyramids shown in Figures 5 and 6 bring out the
expected differences very clearly.
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 Table 7: Key results of population projection for north India, 2000-2025

Demographic Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Total population (millions ) 450 498 547 597 649 699
Population density (per sq. km) 319 353 388 424 461 496
Share of All- India population (%) 45 46 47 48 49 50
Females per 1000 males 924 920 918 917 918 919
Growth rate for preceding 5-years
(%):
Total population 2.17 2.02 1.88 1.78 1.66 1.47
Population age 15-64 years 2.23 2.45 2.39 2.24 2.04 1.82
Percent 0- 14 years 38.1 36.6 34.9 33.3 31.8 30.2
Percent 15-64 years 57.6 58.9 60.4 61.8 63.0 64.1
Percent 65+ years 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.7
Median age 21 22 23 24 25 26
Dependency ratio (percent):
Child (0-14) 66 62 58 54 50 47
Elderly (65+) 8 8 8 8 8 9
Total 74 70 66 62 59 56
Population 6-14 years (millions) 97 105 111 115 120 125
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 32.4 29.9 27.8 26.4 24.4 21.9
Crude death rate (per 1000) 11.3 10.5 9.7 9.2 8.6 8.1
Crude growth rate (per 1000) 21.1 19.4 18.1 17.2 15.8 13.8
Net reproduction rate 1.68 1.57 1.45 1.35 1.26 1.15

Table 8: Key results of population projection for south India, 2000-2025

Demographic Indicators 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Total population (millions) 220 232 242 251 258 265
Population density (per sq. km) 346 365 381 394 406 417
Share of All- India population (%) 22 21 21 20 19 19
Females per 1000 males 988 987 987 988 989 991
Growth rate for preceding 5-years
(%):
Total population 1.26 1.05 0.86 0.70 0.61 0.53
Population age 15-64 years 1.79 1.67 1.39 1.15 0.83 0.55
Percent 0- 14 years 30.0 27.5 25.3 23.2 21.7 20.5
Percent 15-64 years 64.4 66.4 68.2 69.8 70.5 70.6
Percent 65+ years 5.6 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.8 8.9
Median age 26 27 29 31 32 34
Dependency ratio (percent):
Child (0-14) 47 41 37 33 31 29
Elderly (65+) 9 9 9 10 11 13
Total 55 51 47 43 42 42
Population 6-14 years (millions) 40 39 38 36 34 33
Crude birth rate (per 1000) 20.7 18.3 16.4 15.1 14.5 13.7
Crude death rate (per 1000) 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8
Crude growth rate (per 1000) 12.1 9.7 7.8 6.4 5.8 4.9
Net reproduction rate 1.03 0.95 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.85

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 Fig. 5: Projected population pyramid of north India, year 2025

NORTH INDIA : 2025

90
80
70
60
50
Age

40
30
20
10
0
-8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Male Percent Female

Fig. 6: Projected population pyramid of south India, year 2025

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 SOUTH INDIA : 2025

90
80
70
60
50
Age

40
30
20
10
0
-8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
Male Percent Female

Demographic Bonus

Even though population has been estimated to increase by 400 million between 2000 and 2025,
according to the realistic scenario, as much as 86 percent of the total growth would be in the
age interval 15-64. This can have a far-reaching impact on the economy. Two Harvard
economists have recently revived an earlier thesis of Coale and Hoover (1958) that
demographic transition could contribute significantly to economic growth (Bloom and
Williamson 1998). In the context of East Asia's economic miracle, they have noted that the
working-age population there grew at a much faster rate than the dependent population during
1965-90, which provided an opportunity for raising the saving rate and expanding the
productive capacity of workers. Population projection can help to pinpoint when such a
demographic bonus period would occur during the transition.

Fig. 7: Demographic bonus implied by the difference between the growth rate of working-age
population (15-64) and growth rate of total population under optimistic and realistic
scenarios, India 1995- 2025

14
 1.2

Difference in percent growth

1.0

0.8

0.6 Optimistic

rate
0.4 Realistic
0.2

0.0

-0.2
1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 2020-25
Period

Fig. 7 shows the plot of the difference between the projected growth rate of the
working-age population and that of the total population under the two scenarios. From the
graphs, it is clear that during 2000-20 the growth rate of working age population would exceed
the growth rate of the total population. The demographic bonus would be larger in the case of
the optimistic scenario, but it would be of shorter duration than that of the more realistic
scenario where the pace of demographic change is slower. Fig. 8 shows a similar plot for
north and south India. As the figure shows, south India had already entered the demographic
bonus phase by the 1990s. Perhaps the economic buoyancy being currently seen in south India
is a reflection of its favourable demographic conditions. But it is expected to slip out of this
phase in 15-years time. On the other hand, the north will enter this phase in the next 10 years,
and remain in this phase until 2025.

Thus during the next 10-20 years demographic conditions would be favourable to
economic growth in India. However, as Bloom and Williamson note, their effect is by no
means inevitable. The one-time gift of the demographic transition would need the backing of
appropriate economic, social and political institutions and policies. Otherwise, it would only
lead to higher levels of unemployment.

Fig. 8. Demographic bonus implied by the difference between the growth rate of working-age
population (15-64) and growth rate of total population, north and south India 1995- 2025
Excess growth rate of working

0.70
0.60
0.50
population

0.40 North
0.30 South
0.20
0.10
0.00
1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 2010-15 2015-20 2020-25
Period

15
 A more permanent bonus has also been quietly accruing from the demographic
transition. Owing to fertility decline, the time spent by women in bearing and rearing children
is falling while mortality decline is lengthening the life span remaining after the cessation of
fertility. A woman’s reproductive period, which used to span over 20 years and take away the
better part of her working life, would be cut to half by the end of the demographic transition.
Also, an average woman could expect to live for about 45 years after the termination of
childbearing. It is unlikely that women would be content to spend an extended period of time
in leisure. Slowly, but surely, a revolution in sex roles would begin to occur. As Kingsley
Davis (1984) has put it so elegantly, it used to be that a woman would be asked what her
husband does for a living; but increasingly men would now be asked what their wives do,
provided they have one! However, the expected rapid expansion of the male labour force
during the next quarter of century may delay the entry of women to labour market in large
numbers.

Urbanization

Urban growth is likely to be one of the major concerns of the twenty-first century. Despite
rapidly increasing population pressure on arable land and planning for industrialization, only
26 percent of India's population was living in urban areas in 1991. The results of the 2001
Census on the rate of urbanization are yet to be known. The census data for the period 1961-91
suggest that the difference in the growth rates of urban and rural population has remained
constant at about 1.5 percent. If the same difference were to continue, 36 percent of India's
population would be living in urban area by 2025. However, if the growth difference rises to
2.0 percent in the coming years, 40 percent of the population would be urban by 2025.
Roughly, two-thirds of the total population growth between 2000 and 2025 would be in urban
areas.

The past trends indicate a continued process of concentration of the urban population in
cities with a population of 100,000 or more (65 percent by 1991). Such a trend is likely to
continue, and the pressure on urban amenities can be expected to accentuate. Owing to its
demographic advantage, and rapid strides made in levels of literacy and education, south India
is poised for faster rates of urbanization than north India. If this relieves the pressure on arable
land in south India, it may induce migration of labourers from north India to farmlands of the
south.

Conclusion

The population of India is expected to be around 1.4 billion in 2025. Interestingly, the
population size is expected to reach this mark whether India attains the goals of the National
Population Policy for 2010 or not. By 2025, India's population would almost be equal to that of
China's. But India's population would still be growing at a rate of one percent per annum, even
though the level of fertility required for long-run population stabilization would have been
achieved by then.

Even though population has been estimated to increase by 400 million between 2000
and 2025, as much as 86 percent of the total growth would be in the age interval 15-64 years.
The age interval of 65 years and over would account for another11 percent of the growth while
16
the share of the interval 0-14 would be just 3 percent of the total. This should have a far-
reaching impact on the Indian economy.

As much as 63 percent of India's population growth in the first quarter of twenty-first

century would be in the northern states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh and Uttaranchal. Consequently, their share in India's population
is expected to rise from 45 to 50 percent. The population in this region would still be growing
at about 1.4 percent per annum.

On the other hand, south India would have completed the demographic transition, and
the growth rate of the native population would be extremely moderate, at about 0.5 percent per
annum. The population there would have also begun to 'age', as nearly 10 percent of the
population would be aged 65 years or more. The demographic imbalances may have begun to
induce significant immigration flows from the north.

By 2025, India would have begun to come out of the 'demographic bonus' phase where
the growth rate of working-age population exceeds that of total population. India is expected to
go through this phase during 2000-20. This one-time gift of the demographic transition is
expected to provide a window of opportunities to raise the productivity of labour. If
appropriate policies were pursued to realize the demographic gift, India would be in a
comfortable position in the year 2025. Otherwise, higher levels of unemployment and its
associated social evils would be on the cards.

The demographic transition also accrues a more lasting bonus in the form of women
wanting to enter the labour force. The decline of fertility would reduce by half the time spent
by women in raising children while mortality decline would double the life span remaining
after the cessation of childbearing. Slowly, but surely, this would bring a revolution in sex
roles. However, the expected rapid expansion of the male labour force during the next quarter
century may delay the entry of women to the labour market in significant numbers.

By 2025, about 40 percent of India's population is expected to be urban. The urban

growth would account for over two-thirds of total population increase in the next quarter
century. This would certainly accentuate the already existing pressure on urban amenities. But,
if India finds a way of harnessing the demographic gift, urban centres would be full of
buoyancy rather than despair.

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