CRESPO vs MOGUL

FACTS:
The Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo. W h e n t h e c a s e w a s s e t f o r
arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
with t h e Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding
judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the
CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the
Office o f t h e P r o v i n c i a l F i s c a l a n d d i r e c t e d t h e
f i s c a l t o m o v e f o r immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. But the respondent
judge denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom
the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING:
YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that
the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The
Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control
of the criminal prosecution.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether
it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court,

the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion
or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for
the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see
that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to t h e c o n t r a r y, i t i s t h e d u t y o f
t h e f i s c a l t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should
not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of
the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to
the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal
should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although
he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this
is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or
that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation no r
upon
instructions
of
the
Secretary of
J u s t i c e w h o reviewed the records of the investigation.

ROBERTS vs CA
FACTS:
> Several thousand holdersof 349 Pepsi crowns in connection
with the Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.s (PEPSIs) Number
Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
complaints against the petitioners The complaints respectively
accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the
following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394,
otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines; (c)
violation of E.O. No. 913; and (d) violation of Act No. 2333,
entitled An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading
Advertisements, as amended by Act No. 3740.
> After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor,
recommended the filing of an information against the
petitioners and others for the violation of Article 3 18 of the
Revised Penal Code.
> Petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review.
> Acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State to inform the
DOJ whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and
if not, to move in court for the deferment of further proceedings
in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the
case.
> Presiding Judge of RTC, issued an order advising the
parties that his court would be guided by the doctrine in the
case of Crespo vs. Mogul, and not by the resolution of the
Department of Justice on the petition for review undertaken by
the accused.
> Trial Prosecutor in his Motion to Defer Arraignment averred
that there is a pending petition for review with the Department
of Justice filed by the accused and the Office of the City
Prosecutor was directed to cause for the deferment of further
proceedings pending final disposition by the Department of
Justice.
> The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor
hereby DENIED.
> The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order.
> The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
> Private complainants filed a Manifestation informing the
court that the petitioners petition for review filed with the DOJ
was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent Judge Asuncion
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and
hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved?
RULING:
YES. There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul, which
bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of
a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely
advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. More specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or
authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information
is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is
subject to the discretion of the court.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not
out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to
cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal Case.

DUNGOG vs CA
FACTS:
> Assistant Provincial Fiscal issued a resolution finding a
prima facie case for the filing of an information for estafa
against Pantaleon del Rosario.
> The case stemmed from an alleged misappropriation by
the private respondent, with grave abuse of confidence, of
the proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of Heifer cattle,
under a contract of agency;
> The same resolution was approved by the respondent
Provincial Fiscal and was filed in the RTC.
> After the information had already been filed in court, the
private respondent filed a Motion For Reinvestigation with
the public respondent Provincial Fiscal.
> The respondent Provincial Fiscal, reversing himself and
his First Assistant Fiscal this time found no prima facie
case against the same private respondent, then filed a
motion to withdraw of the said criminal case but was
denied by the trial judge.
> Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed by the respondent Provincial Fiscal
to CA setting aside the resolution of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the
petition for withdraw of the criminal case filed before it by the
Provincial Fiscal?
RULING:
NO. The rule is now well-settled that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any disposition
of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. For while it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court, once the case had already been brought to
court, whatever disposition the fiscal may deem proper
thereafter should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval.

In the case of Salcedo vs. Suarez, the Court, thru Justice

Teehankee, now Chief Justice, ruled that the Provincial
Fiscal has the power to conduct his own investigation or
reinvestigation of a case, and thereafter he may either
move to dismiss the case subject to the sound discretion
of the judge who usually grants, although he may deny
the same. Thus, recognition of the doctrine continues.
Generally, a judge allows the dismissal of a case for lack
of evidence, upon the fiscal's motion because the
prosecution of the case is under the direction and control
of the fiscal. When a fiscal files a motion to dismiss, 'it
rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to
accede to such motion or not. Ordinarily, of course, he will
dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an
experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the facts.

VELASQUEZ vs UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS:
> Petitioner Felix A. Velasquez, filed a complaint for estafa
against Avila in the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Assistant Fiscal
dismissed the complaint. However, upon review by the Chief,
Investigation Division of the City Fiscal's Office, the latter set
aside Assistant Fiscals resolution and ordered the filing of an
information for estafa against Avila in the Regional Trial Court.
> Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that resolution, but
both motions were denied by the City Fiscal.
> Before arraignment, Avila filed Department of Justice a
petition for review but Justice Undersecretary denied the
petition for review.
> Avila filed a second motion for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice which was granted.
> Hence, this petition for certiorari by the complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reinvestigation granted by the
UnderSecretary of Justice was proper?
RULING:
NO. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo
vs. Mogul, where we ruled that once the information is filed
in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A
motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and
to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State
Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's
disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court
their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the
accused, for the court is the sole judge of that.
The Undersecretary of Justice gravely abused his
discretion in ordering the re-investigation of the criminal
case against Avila after it had been filed in court. The
avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to give an opportunity
to the private respondent to present an authentic copy of the
board resolution of the offended party (Techtrade Management
International Corporation) which [allegedly] had authorized him
to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the corporation",
can also be achieved at the trial in the lower court where that
piece of evidence may be presented by the accused as part of
his defense.

PEOPLE vs BERIALES
FACTS:
> Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of

murder in an information filed by the City Fiscal in

killing SATURNINA PORCADILLA.
> Appellants' counsel moved for a reinvestigation.
> The trial court postponed the hearing in view of the City
Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the hearing or trial until
such time the REINVESTIGATION shall have been
terminated.
> The trial court, however, insisted in arraigning the
appellants. When arraigned, the three appellants declined
to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question
because the Fiscal is not yet around." Thereupon, the trial
court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them.
> Appellants counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal
was absent and that they could not go to trial without the
fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation conducted by
him. Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the presentation
of evidence by the private prosecutor since he had been
previously authorized by the City Fiscal to handle the case.
> Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case for the
prosecution and the court called for the evidence of the
defense.
> Appellants counsel manifested that the accused were not
in conformity with the promulgation of the decision on the
ground that they did not agree to the trial of the case.
Nonetheless, the trial court promulgated its judgment on
the same day.
> The appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal
ground that they were denied due process of law. The
Solicitor General agrees with such contention and
recommends that the judgment under review be set aside
and the case remanded to the lower court for another
arraignment and trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused have been denied of
the due process?
RULING:
YES. We sustain the appellants. After the trial court
granted the appellants' motion for reinvestigation, it

became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the

arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall
have conducted and made his report on the result of such
reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its part, not
only to be consistent with its own order but also to do
justice aid at the same time to avoid a possible
miscarriage of justice. It should be borne in mind, that the
appellants herein were charged with the serious crime of
murder, and considering that their motion for reinvestigation is
based upon the ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband
and father, respectively, of the two deceased, Saturnina
Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla) who was the aggressor for
having attacked and seriously wounded appellant Pablito
Custodio it was entirely possible for the City Fiscal to modify or
change his conclusion after conducting the reinvestigation.
When the trial court, therefore, ignored the appellants'
manifestations objecting to the arraignment and the trial
of the case, until after the City Fiscal shall have rendered
a resolution on his reinvestigation, but instead
considered such manifestations on their part as a plea of
not guilty and proceeded to try the case, received the
evidence for the prosecution, and then rendered judgment
against them on the basis thereof, it committed a serious
irregularity which nullifies the proceedings below
because such a procedure is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
"what is more deplorable and which renders patently irregular
all the proceedings taken in this case, was the total absence of
the City Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special counsel,
when the appellants were arraigned and when the private
prosecutor presented evidence and rested the case
supposedly for the People.

Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either

commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal." In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the
public prosecutor to appeal for the government. As stated
by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been entrusted
with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by
filing the necessary information in court he is by law in duty
bound to take charge thereof until its finally termination, for
under the law he assumes full responsibility for his failure
or success since he is the one more adequately prepared
to pursue it to its termination."

SOCRATES vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan
charged with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several
other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g)
of the same law.
> Petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on
the letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez
(OIC Governor who filed the case) requesting that an
amendment be effected on certain portions of the present
complaint.
> Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the respondent
Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, the first was for
violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law.
> Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed
an "Urgent Motion for Quashal of Information and/or
Reinvestigation but was denied.
> Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan
for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
> No temporary restraining order having been issued by this
Court, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of
herein petitioner wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for
him by the court after he refused to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts charged in the complaints
filed before the Tanodbayan are different from the charges
contained in the informations, another preliminary investigation
should have been conducted, in the absence of which there is
a denial of due process?
RULING:
NO. It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and
the informations are based on substantially the same factual
settings, except that the respective designations are different.
Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the
designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the

information nor from the specification of the provision of law

alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
It is not the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the
title of the information that determines the character of the
crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information.

Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation,

assuming that it is necessary to conduct a new one, affect
the validity of the informations filed against petitioner. It
has been consistently held that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the criminal
information or render it defective. Dismissal of the case is
not the remedy. It is not a ground for the quashal of a
complaint or information. The proper course of action that
should be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in
abeyance the proceedings upon such information and to
remand the case to the office of the Ombudsman for him
or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation if the accused actually makes out a case
justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule
and so hold that the informations filed against petitioner are
valid and legal.

PRIMICIAS vs PANGASINAN
FACTS:
> Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car within the

jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's

Municipal Police asked him to stop, that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance No. 3, and more particularly, for
overtaking a truck.
> Criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of
Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3.
Due to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff Primicias
initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants The writ was issued and
Judge was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal
case.
> After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the
questioned decision holding that the ordinance was null
and void and had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.
> Defendants herein alleged that the lower court erred in

issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to restrain the

proceedings in criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in issuing the
writ of injunction to restrain the proceedings in the criminal
case?
RULING:
NO. By this express repeal, and the general rule
that a later law prevails over an earlier law, appellants
are in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law
relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the
original law."
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among
others, that is "must not contravene . . . the statute," for it is
a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state."

Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict

between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance
"must give way.

GUINGONA Jr. vs CITY FISCAL

FACTS:

On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can

restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case, the general
rule is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction." Exceptions
however are allowed in the following instances:
1. For the orderly administration of justice;
2. To prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner;
3. To avoid multiplicity of actions;
4. To afford adequate
constitutional rights;

protection

to

5. In proper cases, because the statute

relied upon is unconstitutional or was held
invalid.
The local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the
exception just cited obtains in this case. Hence, the
lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction
against defendants. Moreover, considering that "our law
on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that
of the United States, " it would not be amiss for Us to
adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the
enforcement of a void ordinance, "injunction has frequently
been sustained in order to prevent a multiplicity of
prosecutions under it."

> Clement David and his sister Denise Kuhne invested dollars
in Nation Savings and Loan Association of which some of the
amount was deposited in the account of Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
with the Security Bank and Trust Company.
> At the time the deposits were made, Guingona was a
director.
> Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note
acknowledging a debt to be paid in installments within 180
days from said date with interest.
> The promissory note was novated by another note and
execution of mortgage followed to secure the obligation.
> Petitioner failed to deliver the difference when they assumed
in their personal capacities the obligation to pay him. He
argues that the petitioners committed estafa through
misappropriation.
> Petitioners contend that the decision had already become
final because the Solicitor General did not file any motion for
reconsideration; that his claim is clearly civil, not criminal; that
his claim has been novated, and that prohibition is proper to
stop a void proceeding, to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of lawful authority and to provide a just and orderly
administration of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of injunction is proper to stop
the preliminary investigation?
RULING:
NO. With the foregoing background, the prohibition
petition should be dismissed. The petitioners have no cause of
action for prohibition because the City Fiscal has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. It has
not been finished. The filing of this petition is premature. The
case does not fall within any of the exceptions when
prohibition lies to stop the preliminary investigation.
"As a general rule, an injunction will not be
restrain a criminal prosecution. With more
injunction not lie when the case is still at the
investigation stage. This Court should not

granted to
reason will
preliminary
usurp the

primary function of the City Fiscal to conduct the

preliminary investigation of the estafa charge and of the
petitioners countercharge for perjury, which was consolidated
with the estafa charge.
The City Fiscals office should be allowed to finish its
investigation and make its factual findings. This Court should
not conduct the preliminary investigation. It is not a trier of
facts.
The instant case is primarily a litigation between David and the
petitioners. The fact that the Solicitor General, as counsel of
the public respondents, did not file a motion for
reconsideration does not estop David from continuing with the
prosecution of the petitioners. In the present posture of the
case, the City Fiscal occupies the analogous position of judge.
He has to maintain an attitude of neutrality, not that of
partiality.

PEOPLE vs GREY
FACTS:
> Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph
Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son and others
before the Regional Trial Court.
> Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice which was denied. The Secretary of Justice ruled that
the evidence adduced against respondents was sufficient to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
> Trial judge proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the
existence of probable cause and he then issued warrants of
arrest against respondents and all but one of their co-accused.
> Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the CA, alleging that trial judge gravely abused his
discretion, and seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the
filing of the murder charges against them on the basis of
perjured statements coming from their political opponents
supporters smacks of political harassment at its foulest form.
> CA ruled in making the TRO permanent, ordering the
warrant of arrest be set aside and dismissing the criminal case
without prejudice.
> Petitioners filed a motion for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in reversing the decision of
the trial court?
RULING:
YES. The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule
we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because
public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court
have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;

c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;

BROCKA vs ENRILE

d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of

authority;

FACTS:

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance

or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied; and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners;

Respondents insisted that political persecution by their political

rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of criminal
charges against them, and used this as basis for asking the
appellate court to stop the proceedings in the trial court.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances,
political persecution or political motives may have impelled the
filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this
Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of the
charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of
a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support
the charges.
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have
adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived political
persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have
not shown any evidence of such a grand design. They have
not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that
could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and
even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the
way each of them did.
Whether the criminal prosecution was merely a tool for
harassment or whether the prosecutions evidence can pass
the strict standards set by the law and withstand the exacting
scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial of the case.

> Petitioners were arrested by elements of the Northern Police

District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a
demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike.
Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly with RTC.
> Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the
offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail.
> However, despite service of the order of release, they
remained in detention.
> Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged with Inciting to
Sedition, without prior notice to their counsel.
> Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith
and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second
offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on
one and the same act of attending and participating in the
ACTO jeepney strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is legality of enjoining the
criminal prosecution of the case?
RULING:
YES. We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin
their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to
sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may
not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused;
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;

"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;

"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance; and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.
"k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the
circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had
become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by
state officials in bad faith.
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public
official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however,
believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over
a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or
manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith
that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the
instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from
enjoying provisional release until such time that charges
were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation
was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result
should lawfully be enjoined.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial
court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any
manner with the cases subject of the petition.

LARRANAGA vs CA
FACTS:
> Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention pending before the RTC.
> Petitioner, represented by his mother, Margarita G.
Larranaga, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction.
> Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation and sought to annul the informations as well as
the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. In the
alternative, petitioner prayed that a preliminary investigation
be conducted and that he be released from detention pending
the investigation. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for
habeas corpus or bail.
> Solicitor General filed a manifestation petitioner should have
been given a regular preliminary investigation before the filing
of the informations and the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
> Petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu an urgent ex parte
motion praying for his immediate release.
> However, trial judge issued an order deferring the resolution
of petitioners motion. It stated that it would be premature to act
on the motion since the trial court has not yet received an
official copy of the resolution and that said resolution has not
yet attained finality.
> The Solicitor General modified its stance regarding the
validity of petitioners detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be released from
detention pending the investigation?
RULING:
NO. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner
was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993
against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was
nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we
find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over

the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused

objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may
move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as
in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to
quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to
have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
We hold, therefore, that petitioners detention at the Bagong
Buhay Rehabilitation Center is legal in view of the information
and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of a
preliminary investigation will not justify petitioners
release because such defect did not nullify the
information and the warrant of arrest against him.
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect
the courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations
and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead
of dismissing the information, should conduct it or
remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.

SANCHEZ vs DEMETRIOU
FACTS:
> Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
> Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
conducted a preliminary investigation but petitioner was not
present (only represented by his counsel)
> (August 13, 1993) PNP Commander issued an invitation
requesting him to appear for investigation where he was positively
indentified by Centeno and Malabanan, implicating him as the
principal of the killing and rape-slay. He was placed then into
arrest status.
> After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez
and for all of the accused.
> Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations because his
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was arrested on August 13,
1993?
RULING:
YES. "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, by virtue of a
letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander requesting him to
appear at the said camp for investigation.
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation
to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person

invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or

constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military
officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from
martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated
interrogation site is a military camp, the same can be easily taken,
not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril.
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military
official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a
military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously
a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly
he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation,"
he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only)
with the officers who had come to fetch him.
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when
the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing and rape-slay.
Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner
was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the
rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place forty-six days
before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense
had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was
arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be
sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find
that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused objects to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to
quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case,
the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is
deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of that court.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of
charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest,
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that

detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of

such defect.

PEOPLE vs SEQUINO
FACTS:

> An information was filed in the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor against the accused-appellants for the crime of
highway robbery with homicide.
> In connection with the same incident, a separate information
for illegal possession of firearms was filed against accused but
for reasons undisclosed, the said case and this case were not
consolidated for joint trial.
> During trial, police officer Elpidio Luna in the course of his
testimony stated that he arrested the accused to be
investigated for the belief that he was a suspect of the robbery.
He clarified that he merely invited him to come with him
without any assistance of a counsel nor any warrant of arrest.
> The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide.
> Accused appealed to us from the judgment by filing a notice
of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is proper?
RULING:
NO. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment of temporarily confined while his case is

pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one

confinement to another.
The first and last conditions enumerated above are not
applicable in this case; and under the facts herein, neither
does the second condition apply. Luna's basis for arresting
Melvida was the bio-data sheet with Melvida's name on it
found at the crime scene. By no means can this indicate
that Melvida committed the offense charged. It does not
even connote that Melvida was at the crime scene for the biodata sheet could have been obtained by anyone and left at the
crime scene long before or after the crime was committed.
Luna, therefore, had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable
suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.
After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial
investigation. The custodial investigation commenced when
the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the authors of the
crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof. This
brought into operation paragraph (1) of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution guaranteeing the accused's rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and his right to be informed of these
rights. The said paragraph provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed of
these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not
assisted by counsel during the investigation. Indisputably,
the police officers concerned flouted these constitutional rights
and deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an
investigator's duties prior to and during custodial interrogation
laid down in a catena of subsequent cases.

SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ
FACTS:
> An information was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
> An order of arrest was issued with bail for the release of the
accused.
> Petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond which was accepted by the court.
> Respondent Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared
in his office. She came and left unaided.
> Sandiganbayan issued a resolution setting the arraignment of
the accused.
> Petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she
be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She
contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an
intention she would like to prove as baseless.
> Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from
proceeding with Criminal Cases; her arraignment, originally set for
June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence
the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to
avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.
> Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring the arraignment of
petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court.
> Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order
previously issued.
> Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction
over her person considering that she has neither been arrested
nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court?

RULING:
YES. It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested,

the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the

accused. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion
to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction
of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the
bail bond she is posting be duly accepted" and that by said
motion "she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she
is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she
had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused
it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings
she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond
for her provisional release. This is further buttressed by the
fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the
cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her
provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With
the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should
accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted,
instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for
candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did
not personally appear before respondent court to file her cash
bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that
in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the
acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to
dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing
that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court
for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and

accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond

posted in her absence.