Crespo Vs Mogul Roberts Vs Ca: Facts
Crespo Vs Mogul Roberts Vs Ca: Facts
FACTS:
The Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo. W h e n t h e c a s e w a s s e t f o r
arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
with t h e Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding
judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the
CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the
Office o f t h e P r o v i n c i a l F i s c a l a n d d i r e c t e d t h e
f i s c a l t o m o v e f o r immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. But the respondent
judge denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom
the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
RULING:
YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that
the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The
Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control
of the criminal prosecution.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether
it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion
or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for
the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see
that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to t h e c o n t r a r y, i t i s t h e d u t y o f
t h e f i s c a l t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should
not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of
the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to
the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal
should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although
he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this
is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or
that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation no r
upon
instructions
of
the
Secretary of
J u s t i c e w h o reviewed the records of the investigation.
ROBERTS vs CA
FACTS:
> Several thousand holdersof 349 Pepsi crowns in connection
with the Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.s (PEPSIs) Number
Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
complaints against the petitioners The complaints respectively
accuse the petitioners and the other PEPSI officials of the
following crimes: (a) estafa; (b) violation of R.A. No. 7394,
otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines; (c)
violation of E.O. No. 913; and (d) violation of Act No. 2333,
entitled An Act Relative to Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading
Advertisements, as amended by Act No. 3740.
> After appropriate proceedings, the investigating prosecutor,
recommended the filing of an information against the
petitioners and others for the violation of Article 3 18 of the
Revised Penal Code.
> Petitioners filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review.
> Acting on the Petition for Review, Chief State to inform the
DOJ whether the petitioners have already been arraigned, and
if not, to move in court for the deferment of further proceedings
in the case and to elevate to the DOJ the entire records of the
case.
> Presiding Judge of RTC, issued an order advising the
parties that his court would be guided by the doctrine in the
case of Crespo vs. Mogul, and not by the resolution of the
Department of Justice on the petition for review undertaken by
the accused.
> Trial Prosecutor in his Motion to Defer Arraignment averred
that there is a pending petition for review with the Department
of Justice filed by the accused and the Office of the City
Prosecutor was directed to cause for the deferment of further
proceedings pending final disposition by the Department of
Justice.
> The motions filed by the accused and the Trial Prosecutor
hereby DENIED.
> The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order.
> The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
> Private complainants filed a Manifestation informing the
court that the petitioners petition for review filed with the DOJ
was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent Judge Asuncion
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and
hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with
the DOJ shall have been resolved?
RULING:
YES. There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul, which
bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of
a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely
advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. More specifically, it stated:
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary
of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been
filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or
authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information
is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to
dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is
subject to the discretion of the court.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not
out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to
cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal Case.
DUNGOG vs CA
FACTS:
> Assistant Provincial Fiscal issued a resolution finding a
prima facie case for the filing of an information for estafa
against Pantaleon del Rosario.
> The case stemmed from an alleged misappropriation by
the private respondent, with grave abuse of confidence, of
the proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of Heifer cattle,
under a contract of agency;
> The same resolution was approved by the respondent
Provincial Fiscal and was filed in the RTC.
> After the information had already been filed in court, the
private respondent filed a Motion For Reinvestigation with
the public respondent Provincial Fiscal.
> The respondent Provincial Fiscal, reversing himself and
his First Assistant Fiscal this time found no prima facie
case against the same private respondent, then filed a
motion to withdraw of the said criminal case but was
denied by the trial judge.
> Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed by the respondent Provincial Fiscal
to CA setting aside the resolution of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the
petition for withdraw of the criminal case filed before it by the
Provincial Fiscal?
RULING:
NO. The rule is now well-settled that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any disposition
of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. For while it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court, once the case had already been brought to
court, whatever disposition the fiscal may deem proper
thereafter should be addressed to the court for its
consideration and approval.
PEOPLE vs BERIALES
FACTS:
> Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of
SOCRATES vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan
charged with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several
other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g)
of the same law.
> Petitioner was directed by the Ombudsman to comment on
the letter-manifestation dated April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez
(OIC Governor who filed the case) requesting that an
amendment be effected on certain portions of the present
complaint.
> Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the respondent
Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, the first was for
violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the
second for violation of Section 3(e) of the same law.
> Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed
an "Urgent Motion for Quashal of Information and/or
Reinvestigation but was denied.
> Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the aforementioned orders of the Sandiganbayan
for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
> No temporary restraining order having been issued by this
Court, respondent court proceeded with the arraignment of
herein petitioner wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for
him by the court after he refused to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts charged in the complaints
filed before the Tanodbayan are different from the charges
contained in the informations, another preliminary investigation
should have been conducted, in the absence of which there is
a denial of due process?
RULING:
NO. It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and
the informations are based on substantially the same factual
settings, except that the respective designations are different.
Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the
designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
PRIMICIAS vs PANGASINAN
FACTS:
> Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car within the
protection
to
> Clement David and his sister Denise Kuhne invested dollars
in Nation Savings and Loan Association of which some of the
amount was deposited in the account of Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
with the Security Bank and Trust Company.
> At the time the deposits were made, Guingona was a
director.
> Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note
acknowledging a debt to be paid in installments within 180
days from said date with interest.
> The promissory note was novated by another note and
execution of mortgage followed to secure the obligation.
> Petitioner failed to deliver the difference when they assumed
in their personal capacities the obligation to pay him. He
argues that the petitioners committed estafa through
misappropriation.
> Petitioners contend that the decision had already become
final because the Solicitor General did not file any motion for
reconsideration; that his claim is clearly civil, not criminal; that
his claim has been novated, and that prohibition is proper to
stop a void proceeding, to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of lawful authority and to provide a just and orderly
administration of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of injunction is proper to stop
the preliminary investigation?
RULING:
NO. With the foregoing background, the prohibition
petition should be dismissed. The petitioners have no cause of
action for prohibition because the City Fiscal has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. It has
not been finished. The filing of this petition is premature. The
case does not fall within any of the exceptions when
prohibition lies to stop the preliminary investigation.
"As a general rule, an injunction will not be
restrain a criminal prosecution. With more
injunction not lie when the case is still at the
investigation stage. This Court should not
granted to
reason will
preliminary
usurp the
PEOPLE vs GREY
FACTS:
> Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph
Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son and others
before the Regional Trial Court.
> Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice which was denied. The Secretary of Justice ruled that
the evidence adduced against respondents was sufficient to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
> Trial judge proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the
existence of probable cause and he then issued warrants of
arrest against respondents and all but one of their co-accused.
> Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the CA, alleging that trial judge gravely abused his
discretion, and seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the
filing of the murder charges against them on the basis of
perjured statements coming from their political opponents
supporters smacks of political harassment at its foulest form.
> CA ruled in making the TRO permanent, ordering the
warrant of arrest be set aside and dismissing the criminal case
without prejudice.
> Petitioners filed a motion for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in reversing the decision of
the trial court?
RULING:
YES. The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule
we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine that
injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because
public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court
have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
BROCKA vs ENRILE
FACTS:
LARRANAGA vs CA
FACTS:
> Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention pending before the RTC.
> Petitioner, represented by his mother, Margarita G.
Larranaga, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction.
> Petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary
investigation and sought to annul the informations as well as
the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. In the
alternative, petitioner prayed that a preliminary investigation
be conducted and that he be released from detention pending
the investigation. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for
habeas corpus or bail.
> Solicitor General filed a manifestation petitioner should have
been given a regular preliminary investigation before the filing
of the informations and the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
> Petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu an urgent ex parte
motion praying for his immediate release.
> However, trial judge issued an order deferring the resolution
of petitioners motion. It stated that it would be premature to act
on the motion since the trial court has not yet received an
official copy of the resolution and that said resolution has not
yet attained finality.
> The Solicitor General modified its stance regarding the
validity of petitioners detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be released from
detention pending the investigation?
RULING:
NO. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner
was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993
against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was
nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we
find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
SANCHEZ vs DEMETRIOU
FACTS:
> Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
> Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
conducted a preliminary investigation but petitioner was not
present (only represented by his counsel)
> (August 13, 1993) PNP Commander issued an invitation
requesting him to appear for investigation where he was positively
indentified by Centeno and Malabanan, implicating him as the
principal of the killing and rape-slay. He was placed then into
arrest status.
> After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez
and for all of the accused.
> Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations because his
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was arrested on August 13,
1993?
RULING:
YES. "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, by virtue of a
letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander requesting him to
appear at the said camp for investigation.
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation
to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person
PEOPLE vs SEQUINO
FACTS:
SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ
FACTS:
> An information was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
> An order of arrest was issued with bail for the release of the
accused.
> Petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond which was accepted by the court.
> Respondent Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared
in his office. She came and left unaided.
> Sandiganbayan issued a resolution setting the arraignment of
the accused.
> Petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she
be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She
contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an
intention she would like to prove as baseless.
> Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from
proceeding with Criminal Cases; her arraignment, originally set for
June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence
the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to
avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.
> Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring the arraignment of
petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court.
> Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order
previously issued.
> Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction
over her person considering that she has neither been arrested
nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court?
RULING:
YES. It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested,