Chap 011

Chapter 11: Answers to Questions and Problems
1.
E
1.5
a. Since E = EF = EM, P =
MC =
$75 = ( 3) $75 = $225 .
1+ E
1 1.5
2 ( 1.5)
EF
NEM
b. P =
$75 = (1.5) $75 = $112.50 .
MC =
$75 =
1
1
1
2
1.5
E
NE
+
+
+
(
)
F
M
EF
c. P =
1 + EF
NEM
MC =
1 + NEM
20 ( 1.5)
30
$75 = $75 = $77.59 .
$75 =
29
1 + 20 ( 1.5)
2.
a. P = $60, Q = 4, and profits = 4($60 $20) = $160.
b. Charge the maximum price on the demand curve starting at $100 down to $20 for
each infinitesimal unit up to Q = 8 units. Profits are 8($100 $20)(.5) = $320.
c. Charge a fixed fee of $320 and a per-unit charge of $20 per unit to earn total
profits of $320.
d. Create a package of 8 units and sell the package for $480. Total profits are $320.
3.
a. Second-degree price discrimination.
b. $8 + 2($4) = $16.
c. Total profits under perfect price discrimination are 5($18 8)(.5) = $25, so this
strategy would lead to an extra $9.
4.
E
2
a. P1 = 1 MC =
$10 = ( 2 ) $10 = $20.00 and
+
E
1
1
2
E2
6
6
P2 =
MC =
$10 = $10 = $12.00 .
1 6
5
1 + E2
b. Here, there are two different groups with different (and identifiable) elasticities of
demand. In addition, we must be able to prevent resale between the groups.
5.
a. Charge a fixed fee of $160, plus a per-unit charge of $20 per unit.
b. The optimal per-unit price is determined where MR = MC, or 100 - 40Q = 20.
Solving yields Q = 2 units and P = $60. The profits at this output and price are
$120 - $40 = $80. Thus, you earn $80 more by two-part pricing.
Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 7e
Page 1
6.
a. The inverse demand function is P = 200 4Q. Marginal cost is $120. The optimal
number of units in a package is that output where price equals marginal cost. Thus
we set 200 4Q = 120 and solve to get the optimal number of units in a package,
Q = 20 units.
b. The total value to a consumer of the 20 units, which is $3,200 (computed as
(.5)(20)($200 - $120) + ($120)(20) = $3,200).
7.
a. $225,000 (since all consumers purchase each product, you earn $75,000 on sales
of good X and $150,000 on sales of good Y).
b. $200,000 (since only the highest valuation type purchases each product, you earn
$60,000 on sales of good X and $140,000 on sales of good Y).
c. Since all consumers receive at least $110 in value from the bundle, all types buy
the bundle. Profits are thus $330,000.
d. Type 2 consumers will purchase the bundle. Type 1 consumers will purchase good
X only, and type 3 consumers will purchase product Y only. Total profits are thus
$175,000 + $60,000 + $140,000 = $375,000.
8.
No. This would provide managers an incentive to maximize divisional profits, which
would lead to double marginalization.
9.
No. A profit-maximizing firm might use dice or a roulette wheel to engage in

randomized pricing.
10.
The presence of online auction sites makes price discrimination easier.
11.
Page 2
E
4.5
P=
MC =
$11, 000 = $14,143 . Note that the markup formula for
1+ E
1 4.5
homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly is not relevant since were given the
elasticity of demand for Saturn automobiles instead of the market demand and our
product is different than our two rivals.
Michael R. Baye
12.
With a simple per-unit pricing strategy, the optimal per-unit price is determined by
MR = MC. Here, the inverse demand function is P = 1, 000 10Q , so
MR = 1, 000 20Q . Also, MC = $500 and fixed costs are $10,000. Equating MR and
MC yields 1, 000 20Q = $500 . Solving, Q = 25 and P = 1,000 10(25) = $750.
Profits at this price are ($750 - $500)(25) $10,000 = -$3,750. Under the seconddegree price discrimination strategy, 10 units (computed as 100 0.1($900) = 10)
are purchased at $900 and an additional 20 units are purchased at a price of $700
(total quantity demanded at a price of $700 is 30 units, but 10 of these will be sold at
$900). Profits from the second-degree price discrimination scheme are thus ($900
$500)(10) + ($700 $500)(20) $10,000 = -$2,000. A profitable and feasible
recommendation would be two-part pricing. Under this proposal, the client would
pay a fixed license fee plus a per-unit fee for each unit of the software installed and
maintained. The optimal two-part price sets the per-unit fee at $500 per unit (marginal
cost). At this price, the client will purchase 50 units of the software. The optimal
fixed fee is $12,500 (computed as (.5)($1000 - $500)(50) = $12,500). Profits under
two-part pricing are $12,500 - $10,000 = $2,500.
13.
Charge $500 for a bundle containing skis and bindings. All consumers will purchase a
bundle at this price, so your total profits from this strategy are ($500)(60) - $30,000 =
$0.
14.
Yes. It is consistent with cross subsidization. Phones and services are complements in
demand. In addition, there may be cost complementarities and economies of scope
since it is cheaper for providers to train employees to activate in-house phones rather
than other brands purchased elsewhere. This strategy is also consistent with bundling.
In this case, the company may say that the phone is free, but in actuality it is part of
a bundle that cannot be broken apart. For the reasons identified in the text, both cross
subsidization and bundling can be used to enhance profits.
15.
Set P = MC to obtain 3 - .5Q = 1 and solve to obtain the optimal package size, Q = 4
units. The total value to a consumer of package of 4 muffins is $8 (computed as
(.5)($3 $1)(4) + ($1)(4) = $8).
16.
For reasons identified in the text, peak-load pricing is probably optimal in this
situation. Under this plan, a higher price should be charged during peak winter
months and a lower price charged during off-peak summer months.
17.
Since the company manufacturers single engine planes, Qu = Qd = Q. Here, MRd =

610,000 4,000Q; MCd = 10,000; and MCu = 8,000Q. Thus, NMRd = MRd - MCd =
610,000 4,000Q 10,000 = 600,000 4,000Q. The optimal output equates NMRd
and MCu: 600,000 4,000Q = 8,000Q. Solving yields Q = 50. The optimal transfer
price is thus the upstream marginal cost of producing this level of output: PT = MCu
= 8,000(50) = $400,000 per engine.
Page 3
18.
Probably the best you can do in this instance is charge different per-unit prices on
weekends and weekdays. The optimal decision on weekends is determined by
15 .002Q = 2 (MR = MC). Solving yields Q = 6,500. The optimal price on
weekends is thus P = 15 .001(6500) = $8.50. The optimal decision for weekdays is
determined by 10 .002Q = 2 . Solving yields Q = 4,000. The optimal weekday price
is thus P = 10 .001(4000) = $6.
19.
No, exactly the opposite. They reduce the incentive for price undercutting, thereby
permitting firms to sustain higher prices and profits.
20.
Profits are enhanced under peak-load pricing instead of the current uniform pricing
scheme. During low-demand periods, BAA should charge airlines 1,350 each time
the runway is used. The runway will be used 50 times per day at this price. These
figures are found by solving MR2 = 1750-16Q = 950 = MC for quantity and
substituting back into the equation for low demand to find price. During high-demand
periods, BAA has zero excess capacity (MR1 = 2250-10Q = 950 = MC implies that Q
= 130, which is greater than BAAs current capacity of 70 airplanes). Thus, the
runway is used 70 times per day. BAA should charge a price equal to 1900 per
runway use.
21.
The profit-maximizing price when three firms compete is

3( 1.2)
(15.40) = $21.32 per liter. If two of the three firms were
P=
1 + 3( 1.2)
unconditionally permitted to merge, then the profit-maximizing price is
2( 1.2)
(15.40) = $26.40 per liter. Given the circumstances, it is not
P=
1 + 2( 1.2)
surprising that the EU raised concerns about a proposed merger since price in the
market for premium Scotch liquor would increase by almost 24 percent.
22.
The only relevant costs in this problem are the costs associated with potatoes, peanut
oil and bags. All other costs are fixed costs and irrelevant for decision making
purposes. The average unit cost of these items is $0.50 per bag, which is found by
dividing the $2.5 million in relevant costs by 5 million bags of chips. This
approximates FoodMaxs relevant marginal cost. Since the own-price elasticity of
demand for FoodMaxs chips is -3.2, the profit-maximizing price for a bag of chips is
3.2
P=
($0.50 ) = $0.72727 , or about $0.73 per bag. This estimate does not
1 3.2
adjust the elasticity to account for the existence of rivals, since the elasticity of
demand estimate is for the firm; not of the market.
Page 4
Michael R. Baye
23.
%Q d 22
= 2.2 . Since there are five

%P 10
firms in the industry, the individual firms elasticity of demand is
E f = 5( 2.2) = 11 . The profit-maximizing price is, therefore,
The market elasticity of demand is E M =
11
P=
MC = 1.10 MC . Thus, a 100 cent increase in marginal cost would lead to
1 11
a $0.10 increase in the optimal price.
Page 5

Chap 011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chap 011

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chap 011

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter 11: Answers to Questions and Problems

Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 7e

No. A profit-maximizing firm might use dice or a roulette wheel to engage in

The presence of online auction sites makes price discrimination easier.

Since the company manufacturers single engine planes, Qu = Qd = Q. Here, MRd =

Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 7e

The profit-maximizing price when three firms compete is

= 2.2 . Since there are five

Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 7e

You might also like