lntegrative Case

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

After firmly attaining leadership within Sweden, where it
of the overall market, IKEA has
succeeded over the last 25 years in doing what no furniture
distributor has ever attempted: to become a global player in
an industry formerly considered by nature to be local.

its business in Western Europe which still represents nearly

80 percent of its annual volume (see Exhibit 1).

holds more than 20 percent

Today

Ingvar Kamprad's stubborn insistence that people

would buy more furniture if the price was low enough and
the furniture was of decent quality, with no delays in delivery has gradually revolutionized the conservative national
furniture markets in Europe and beyond. Kamprad intuitively anticipated the rise of consumerism in the 1950s
and 1960s and virtually invented the practices of cash and
carry, self-service, and volume buying in Europe.
IKEA was to invent many other concepts and new ways
of dealing with logistics sourcing and retailing. Many of
these innovations have become industry standards: knockdown furniture that can be stored and shipped in flat boxes;
the involvement of customers in the value-adding process
of handling the transportation and doing home-assembly
themselves; and turning shopping into a family event by
creating attractive open store environments that contain
IKEA trademarks like the children's areas with brightly
colored plastic balls and the buffet style restaurants where
you can eat Swedish meatballs.

IKEA delivers low-priced quality furniture to

throughout the world. It is the only distributor

field to have successfully established itself in all parts
of Europe, including southern and eastern Europe, and
more notably in North America, including the USA. It has
stores today in the Middle East, Singapore, and Hong
Kong and is preparing to enter the Chinese market some
time in the early part of the next century. Recently Ingvar
Kamprad, the company's founder, secured his position in
Europe with the acquisition of British-based Habitat,
IKEA s chief rival in the UK and France.
To provide some idea of its worldwide presence, IKEA
key markets
in its

receives annually

over 120 million visitors in its 125

million catalogs. Its sales rev-

stores, and distributes 35

enues increased
age

of

steadily over the last 10 years by an averin spite of the flattening out of

12 percent annually,

t
ll(EA's Sales b1z
Region, 1995-1996

North America

Exhibit

Asia and Pacific

12%

Eurooe and Scandinavia

85.2o/o

Number of active articles: 1 1,400

Number of suppliers: 2,353 in 65 countries
Number of distribution centers: 14
The IKEA Case was written by P. Grol and C. Schoch under the supervision of the CPA (Centre
de Perfectionnement aux Affaires), Paris, France (Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
Not to be used or reproduced without written permission from the CPA. Copyright @ 1997
CPA. Reprinted by permission.

223

224

Part 2

The Role of Culture

IKEA has affected the way furniture is sold and distributed in every country where it is doing business, inspiring
imitation and drawing respect, sometimes begrudgingly,
from traditional furniture dealers.
One aspect of IKEA s success has been the development

of unique product design capabilities, based on an almost

religious dedication to the simple yet graceful design of
contemporary Swedish furniture. In so doing, it has introduced millions of households around the world to the
Swedish style that it, more than others, has come to typiff.
IKEA s strength today comes from its mastery of three
key aspects of the value chain: unique design capabilities,

unique sourcing, and tightly controlled logistics. This

means the company is able to produce products that are
distinctive enough to provide market recognition, secure
sourcing for long runs at profitable levels, and reduce
inventory costs through regional warehouses which work
very closely with stores. In this way it has been able to
buck industry trends and steadily increase its share of slow
growth, sometimes shrinking, markets.
IKEA has become a household name as much in Warsaw as in Los Angeles, attracting customers who just want
to come to a store, look around, and have some fun. Something universally irresistible about IKEA makes it very difficult for people to come away from one of its stores without making a purchase and instills unprecedented loyalty
among its customers and employees.
IKEA s successful development, particular organizational capacities, and the bold and inspired leadership of its
entrepreneur-founder have all been largely written up and
commented. Its organization, communication, marketing,
product range, and store layouts, all tell the same storythe story of the "IKEA Way." A way strongly rooted in the
personality of founder Ingvar Kamprad and the Swedish
(regional) culture that he grew up in.

The "II(EA Ulfay":

Doing Tlrings Differentllr

What is it that makes IKEA so different? Is it just a matter

of "quality goods at affordable prices"? Or is there

deeper explanation? When asked these questions, IKEA

managers and personnel become mystical and somewhat
vague. "It is really a winning combination of price and
merry feeling, a feeling of delight," a Dutch marketing
manager answers. This feeling and a conscious awareness
that, in addition to the competitive advantage, there is
something stong and intangible at IKEA that drives and
motivates its success, is shared by Ikeans throughout the
organization. Could it be that the "IKEA Way's" combination of vision, charismatic leadership, sound business principles is subtly reinforced by the influence of Swedish culture? Could it be that Swedish, or Scandinavian, culture
contains elements that facilitate international expansion?
Can a company's national culture in this case be a competitive advantage? Tbroughout our investigation of IKEA

we have kept these questions in the back of our minds, and

we invite you to consider them as we explore the "IKEA

Way" more closely.

How ltAllStarted
IKEAs name is derived from the initials of the company's
founder, architect, and driving force, Ingvar Kamprad, those
of the farm where he was raised, Elmtaryd, and those of his
native village Agunnaryd, located in Smaland, a poor farming region in the south-east of Sweden. Coming from a modest background, Kamprad began as a trader in everything
from matches to Christmas cards. He got into the furniture
business almost accidentally after buying out a furniture
plant which had to close down in the early 1950s. He demon-

strated from the very beginning a combination of strong

salesmanship, practical business acumen, thrift, an identity
with ordinary people, and an unconventional perseverance in
the face of adversity. Always modest he was nonetheless a
true enffepreneur and, more significantly, a nonconformist
who was not the least bit restrained by the conventions and
traditions of the contemporary Swedish furniture frade.
His habit of staying close to his customers and his
reluctance to own manufacturing furniture plants gave him
the freedom to focus and innovate on all the facets of distribution. With nearby furniture producers he codesigned
furniture to meet very specific requirements for quality
products that average customers could afford, and then
printed them up in catalogs, which he had discovered as an
economical and effective way of marketing to a growing
customer base in his early days as a trader.
In 1953 he opened his first showroom at the furniture
plant he had bought earlier in Almhult which has become
the heart of his furniture empire. The only transportation
link to the factory was by road but, at a time when more
and more working class Swedes were purchasing their fust
automobiles, what was originally a problem would become
a solution.
Kamprad was obsessed with low prices and the only
way to offer them was to keep costs as low as possiblethis conviction became a driving force of his business
development. He would constantly seek new ways to lower
prices. For example, he bought fabrics for his furniture
directly from textile mills, placing large orders and then
supplying the material himself to his network of small furniture manufacturers. In this way at the same time he was
able to cut costs a bit more, and ensure that his customers
would have a wider selection of upholstery to choose from
in the catalog. Unwittingly he had introduced the notion of
vertical integration, which provided IKEA even then with
a strong competitive advantage compared to traditional
distributors who only displayed and sold furniture.
Such practices enabled him to maintain close contact
with his suppliers, and eventually to learn intimately the
parameters of furniture production. The relationship
between Kamprad and his suppliers was so good that to

lntegratirre Gase 2

225

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

obtain their commitment he needed only to draw rough

sketches of the furniture he wanted and discuss with them
how to adapt production to their capabilities. In so doing,
he established over the years another cornerstone of his
business philosophy: marrying the customers'need for low
prices with the suppliers'need for profit through efficiency
and long production runs. This was a strong departure
from the kind of relationship that distributors traditionally
maintained with their suppliers, buying furniture as it was
ordered piece by piece at high prices with long waiting
periods for delivery.
Balancing customers' requirements and producers'
needs, which enabled him to sell furniture at prices 30 to
50 percent below traditional distributors, is now the foundation of the "IKEA Way." This notion is so basic and
imperative that a store manager in Germany told me, when
walking through the accessories department where some
Chinese gadgets were displayed, that this balancing of
optimal product design with the supplier with the needs of
the customer is the "Yin andYang" of the IKEA strategy. It
was already present in the way Ingvar Kamprad developed
his business through the 1950s when his innovative ways
provoked stubborn counterattacks from his more established Swedish competitors.
A legendary showdown took place at the Sankt Erik's
Fair in Stockholm where, for the first time, IKEA introduced its products. Feeling threatened by Kamprad's unexpected success and many new customers, the Swedish furniture cartel tried to block IKEA s entry at the fair. They
failed, but soon thereafter managed a successful boycott of
IKEA by Swedish furniture manufacturers, accusing Kam-

prad of unfair practices. Undaunted by this seemingly

insurmountable obstacle, Kamprad looked for and found
new suppliers in Poland at the height of the Cold War.
Although Polish manufacturers were willing to sell at
prices well below their counterparts in Sweden, the cost of
transportation offset this advantage. This new obstacle was
at the origin of yet another IKEA invention, as Kamprad
discovered that by "knocking down" furniture into disassembled parts it could be packed and shipped in flat cardboard cartons, reducing by more than 80 percent the cost of
transportation. To further save on costs, the furniture could
be sold directly to customers in these same flat boxes. To
help customers participate in the distribution cycle, IKEA
offered to rent roof racks and invented the simple assembly
tool which has become another of its trademarks.

To reach the largest possible market and benefit fully

in 1964 IKEA opened Europe's first

from volume sales,

large "warehouse scale" store in Stockholm. Unexpectedly

large crowds of people attended the grand opening causing
yet another problem. Seemingly endless queues formed at
the checkout stands as employees scurried to the storage
areas to fetch the purchased fumiture. Instead of hiring more
employees, Kamprad simply opened the storage area to customers and invited them to fetch the furniture themselves.
Such practices were unheard of then, but understanding that

this would lead to lower prices, customers willingly complied. Injust a few years IKEA had invented the concept of
"prosumers," whereby customers actively participate in the
distribution cycle.
Suddenly the whole system was in place: Customers
were able to purchase attractive quality furniture at low
prices; furniture suppliers benefited from long production
runs; and IKEA, through volume sales, was able to make a
considerable profit from small margins.
IKEA s business strategy did not evolve from "strategic
planning," which is still scorned today in the company as
"too sophisticated." It evolved from creative responses to
difficult problems, turning them into solutions pragmatically and often with considerable risk. Not going by the
book, or adopting conventional solutions, and learning by
doing appears to be a distinguishing trait of Ingvar Kamprad's and IKEA s intuitive way of doing business.

The IKEA Mission

As IKEA grew, Ingvar Kamprad found ways to explain his

unique way of doing business, always using simple language and metaphors He has consistently maintained that
IKEA s mission is to offer "a wide range of home furnishing items of good design and function, at prices so low that
the majority of people can afford to buy them." This state-

ment is at the heart of the IKEA s philosophy and has

shaped all the phases of its business, particularly product
range. The concept is protected through numerous guidelines and special legal entities. Changes in the criteria for
product range can only be made by joint decisions of
INGKA Holding BV and Inter IKEA Systems BV both of
which are outside the sphere of management.
The essential guidelines appear in a 1976 publication,
Testament of a Furniture Dealer in which Kamprad emphasizes the company's ambition to cover the furnishing and
decorative needs of the total home area with a distinctive
style that reflects "our thoughts and is as simple and
straightforward as ourselves." The guidelines also express
such modern ideals as furniture that is durable and easy to
live with, reflects a natural and free life style, and appeals to
youthfulness with color and joy. Most of IKEA s products
are designed by Swedes in Almhult, who consciously repro:
duce designs that reflect these values-values which are
very consistent with Swedish culture. At the same time
there is something in that specific design which has universal appeal throughout the markets of the world.

Business Principles
IKEA

has developed unique competencies and an ability to

deliver products which are distinctly Swedish, attractively
presented in warm value-adding environments, and at prices
consistently lower than its competitors.
What has made IKEA so different from other distributors is the balanced focus it has maintained on product
range, sourcing, vertical integration, mass marketing, cost

Patt 2

Integ

The Role of Culture

leadership, and a distinctive image. As such, the company

is not market driven, and tends to react rather slowly to

writing investments in new technology. Together they

actively contribute to both cost reduction and quality

trainin
not ap

enhancement, which in turn optimizes the marketing mix.

are tht
them f

new consumer trends, studying them to see how they can

be fitted into its operating systems and what value IKEA
can add within its proven framework before adopting them
into the company's range. The issue of range is vital for
IKEA as, when it introduces new products, it must insure
that the volumes it produces are leveraged from within:

Through such partnerships IKEA has virtually integrated production into its value-added chain without the
heavy investments of actually owning and running its own
furniture plants.

sourcing-logistics-store layouts.

Management Style and Practices

throug

The Yin/Yang metaphor, mentioned earlier, illustrates the

imperative balance of strategic sourcing and marketing mix.

IKEA s management style is described by non-Swedish

has be,

In the area of strategic sourcing, IKEA has established

a long-standing competitive advantage. The durable partnerships that it has developed with furniture producers and
other suppliers is based on the producers' capacity to provide long runs of parts, and their willingness to comply
with IKEA s quality standards, and IKEA s guaranteed
purchase of all parts produced. IKEA considers its producers as key stakeholders and provides them with technical
assistance to increase their productivity, sometimes underThe balance and complementariness of:

Strategic Sourcing and the Marketing Mix

members as informal, open, and caring. Hierarchy is not

emphasized and in a typical store there are only three levels
of responsibility between the store manager and coworkers
(which is what employees are called, see Exhibit 2 for the
worldwide distribution).
A pragmatic approach to problem solving and consensusbased decision making are also strongly imbedded in IKEA
management practice.

Coworkers at all levels are encouraged to take initiatives, and making mistakes is considered a necessary part
of "learning by doing." Managers are expected not only to
share information with coworkers but also their knowledge
and skills. IKEA wants its coworkers to feel important:
They can express their ideas, and should feel responsible
for improving the way things are done.
An entrepreneuial zeal for getting the job done in the
most direct way and a distaste for bureaucratic procedures
are basic managerial attitudes that have long been promoted within IKEA. Managers are expected to be close to
their coworkers, with few if any status barriers, and not to
take themselves seriously. This egalitarian approach to
management has also made it easy for motivated employees to work their way up the organization with little formal

Rat

detaile

ture,

and

el

self

ex

based
step," i
nerstol

spirit a
of belc
porate

Way is
agers I

throug
and se
are.

Tt

the

ex

intema

direct

of

doir

agers '

Way"

IKEA

l|(E'
E:<pi

Esta

Patter

IKEAI

Exhibit 2
Sweden

Distrilrution of

5,1

IKEA'S Goworkers

00

United
Kingdom
2,400

North
America

sively,

4,400

Scandi

USA
2,800
Poland
2.800
Canada
1,600

Rest of World
900

Germany
6.1 00

France
2,400

Rest of Europe
9,300

growtt

Integratirre Gase

v
v

h
)t
.S

i-

\
L-

1
o
e
t:

e
e
S

t-

o
o
o

tl

training.

It is significant that Swedish managers' titles do

on their business cards, and that company cars

are the same economy models for all of those who need
them for work or business regardless of their position.
Rather than establish extensive training programs and
detailed rules and procedures to propagate its unique culture, IKEA prefers a softer approach through discussion
and explanation. The IKEA way has been spelled out
through wide distribution of Kamprad's Testament which
has been translated into a dozen languages. Kamprad himself explains that IKEA has "a strong and living culture"
based on doing things differently. "It has grown step by
step," and together with its business principles is the "cornerstone of our operations . . . which helps us retain the
spirit and vitality ofthe early years . . . and create a feeling
ofbelonging in a large international organization. Our corporate culture binds us together." To ensure that the IKEA
Way is understood, the organization relies heavily on mano'missionaries" carrying all that it embodies
agers to act as
through their example and willingness to explain to new
and senior employees why things are done the way they
are. This, as much as anything else, provides the reason for
the extensive presence of Swedish managers in IKEA s
intemational units, as their knowledge stems from their
direct exposure to Ingvar Kamprad and IKEA s subtle way
of doing business and managing people. For those managers who do not have this exposure, week-long "IKEA
Way" seminars are organized periodically in Almhult, the
IKEA equivalent of Mecca and the heart of its culture.
not appear

IKEA's Strategy of lnternational

Expansion: Fler<ibility rarithin
Establishrnent Pararneters
Pafterns of International Expansion

IKEAs international expansion has taken place progressively over years with a focus on markets in countries with
growth potential (see Exhibit 3). Expansion outside of
Scandinavia was driven by Ingvar Kamprad's intuitive

Exhibit

227

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

quest

for new opportunities and his previous

successful
search for suppliers outside of Sweden more than any formal development strategy. Some insights are provided by
one of IKEA s Swedish executives, an early companion of
Ingvar Kamprad. "When we opened our frst store outside

in Switzerland, people asked why there? It

was a difftcult market. Ingvar said that if we could succeed
Scandinavia,

there, we should succeed anywhere. He had intuitions, he

spoke to people on the streets to learn what they were looking for." Such an empirical experiential approach goes
against the orthodox rules of international retailing, which
preach extensive market studies before entering a new
market, catering to local tastes, and gaining expertise
through acquisitions and joint ventures.
When IKEA expanded into Germany, competition was
strong and German distributors didn't take them seriously.
"They called us 'those crazy Swedes,'but we didn't mind;
we even used this label in our advertising. It took them five
years to really react, but by then we had eight stores and
were setting the standards."
Charting its own course, IKEA has developed internationally by finding cheap land for stores, checking sourcing
possibilities and proximity to central warehouses, or lowering marketing costs. When, in the late 1970s, the company
decided to go into Belgium because it was cost effective to
serve that country from its central warehouse in Germany, it
ran into problems with building permits and so decided to
develop in France instead. The preference has been for
leveraging market costs by concenffating several stores in
the same area. This explains why IKEA opened four stores
in the Philadelphia/Washington DCA.{ew Jersey area, sometimes in locations that were rather isolated. Similarly, the
company also preferred to concenffate four stores in the
Paris area, even if this could dilute individual store sales
and create potential competition between stores.
Typically development has been done on a store-bystore basis. IKEA opens a beachhead in a given country
with a group of ffusted and experienced Swedish "Missionaries." Together they form a tighrknit group which can

3 rne lr<EA Er<pansion

No. of
Outlets

No. of
Countries

No. of
Govvorkers

954

15

964

250

1974

10

1.500

984

66

17

8,300

994

120(1251

996

29(

36")

25 Q6al
27 (281

26.600b
33,400b

Nofe.''lncluding stores opening after September 1, 1996.

of coworkers are part time.
"Corresponding to net sales of the IKEA Group of companies.
dThe holding company is in the Netherlands which explains the use of NLG.
b20%o

Turnover
(NLG)d

2,200,000
55.500,000
372,900,000
2,678,700,000
8,350,000.000
9,626,000,000"

Pan1t

The Role of Culture

solve problems and make decisions quickly. They supervise

the building work, lead operational teams who open the

store, and run the store until local management has learned
how the system works. After a short time, store management is turned over to local managers, while most of the
key national positions remain in the hands of Swedes until
the operation and market have reached maturity.

Adapting to new markets in western Europe throughout the

1970s and early 1980s was fairly simple. Catalog offerings
were virtually the same. However, concessions had to be
made, particularly in bedroom furnishings since bedding
could be substantially different from country to country.
"When we entered a new country we did things our way.
The idea was to be IKEA everywhere: After all, our furniture is a cultural statement. But as the years went by we
learned to be more flexible, particularly when demand in
Sweden declined and we became more dependent on our
non-Scandinavian markets," recalls one IKEA manager.
Adapting to the U.S. market was a real learning experience for IKEA, since many standards were different. Few
product managers from IKEA of Sweden had traveled to
North America because the price of air travel was prohibi-

tive in terms of IKEA s cost-conscious policies. They

expected their European range to sell just as easily in the
United States, but this did not turn out to be the case. As a
former U.S. country manager explains: "IKEA ran into
problems in the United States so we had to ask ourselves

Tlre Organization
of the ll(EA Grorrp

an outsider."

Development of the range is now closely monitored by

IKEA of Sweden (IOS) and the board of directors of

INGKA Holding. The issue of range is vital for them as,

Adapting to National Markets

Exhibit 4

what we could offer to Americans. Should we become an

American company, or merely adapt our merchandising to
American customers? We finally decided on a solution:
merchandising to the American customer by speaking English with a Swedish accent; capitalizing on our strengths as

when they introduce new products, they must insure that the
volumes they produce are balanced from within (sourcing-

logistics-store layout).

ing concessions from product managers to take into

account specific national preferences was a consensual
process that required many negotiation skills. "Some room
is allowed for national considerations in our catalog range.
But, since changes mean that it will be more expensive for
the country manager, only limited numbers are allowed.
Still, 90 percent of our range is the same all over the world:
only 5 to l0 percent is country specific. The product manager has the final word, but he usually listens to the country manager. There is a healthy tension between the two
and this enables us to adapt but not to over-adapt and
weaken our cost effectiveness."

Although IKEA s stated mission is to provide home

furnishing for the "greatest number" and its business is

Supervisory Board,
lngka Holding B.V.
lngvar Kamprad,

Group
Management
Anders Moberg,
Group President

Chairman

Jan l. Carlsson
Jan Ekman
Per Lindblad
Steffan Persson
Hans-Goran Stennert

It took IKEA of Sweden several

years to introduce "futons" in Europe, and American store

managers had to work hard to convince the company that a
"Home Entertainment" line was feasible in North America.
As a former French country manager described, obtain-

Stichtingy lngka

Lars BrAberg
Goran Carstedt
Hans Gydell
Mikael Ohlsson

Foundation
The Netherlands

Ingka Holding B.V.

The Netherlands

IKEA of Sweden AB
and Trading Companies

Retail
Companies

Wholesale
Companies

Other
Companies

Integratirre Case 2

229

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

conducted on a volume basis, outside of Scandinavia it is

in reality a niche player, appealing to the educated population with mid- to upper-level incomes. This segment is
looking for nontraditional lines of furniture, and finds the
Swedish style of IKEA suited to its modern taste.
"In spite of our image as the 'common man's store,' the
majority of our customers have a university degree,"
admits a French store manager. This may appear paradoxical considering IKEA s avowed mission statement, but the
paradox has proven successful as it keeps IKEA, at the
same time, close to its roots and still makes it highly distinctive in foreign marketplaces. It also plays neatly into its
strengths of sourcing, volume, long runs, and cost-efiicient

distribution.
Human Resource Management
Management of international operations has largely followed the IKEA Way and its strong Swedish flavor. The
belief of those in IKEA is that their way of managing people has universal appeal. "People like to participate in
making decisions. They like to feel respected, and that they
can take responsibility,' one Swedish expatriate states.
When recruiting, IKEA looks for people who have good
communication skills, open minds, positive work attitudes,
and good potential without necessarily having diplomas. It
attracts people with its pleasant working environment, job
security, and the caring attitude it shows towards the individual. IKEA employees, regardless of nationality, are more
than likely to have strong preferences for cooperative informal relations, with a high degree of independence, and have
tolerant approach to others. "We look for people who know
how to listen, and who are able to transmit their knowledge
to others. They should not feel they are better than others
and be curious about what is going on around them."
Being an IKEA manager overseas isn't solely about running the stores and distribution systems smoothly. He or she
must be able to explain to employees and managers why
things are done in the way they are and win people's hearts
and minds to the "[KEA Way." They are expected to be
ambassadors and must educate their non-Swedish coworkers through patience, common understanding, and example.

It is not always easy to trarismit IKEA s egalitarian management style. While it goes down easily in the Netherlands, it is less acceptable in Germany or France, and for
different reasons. In the United States, long-term employees generally feel more comfortable with Scandinavian
managers than with Americans-younger American mano'equalness."
agers don't seem to know how to show

The challenge IKEA may be facing is that, with its

extended international network, it is becoming more diffrcult to find enough Swedish IKEA managers who are willing to work overseas for long periods. IKEA has had to hire
Swedes from outside the company. Also in the past the company has not systematically searched out and developed at

an early stage its international "high potentials," although it

does send its most loyal and successful foreign managers to

week-long seminars in Sweden and encourage its coworkers to learn something about the culture.
It is still very difficult for non-Scandinavians to work
their way up the corporate ladder. To do so they need to
have learned all of IKEAs key trades: retailing, logistics,
product design, and purchasing. Non-Swedes can work
their way up in retailing through the national organizations
and sometimes in the logistical organizations which are
run regionally, but very few have gone into product management because this function is part of IKEA of Sweden
in Almhult, where IKE,{s product managers and furniture
schools are located. It is a very remote area and only
Swedish is spoken. So, speaking the language as well and
knowing the culture become prerequisites that very few
managers from foreign branches have been able to fulfill.

There are no formal career paths, as a long-term

Swedish expatriate executive admits. "To get ahead in
IKEA you first have to know the range intimately, then you
have to know and use the informal internal network, and
then you have to understand the subtleties of the 'IKEA
Way,'its cultural roots. It is really difficult for outsiders to
know their way around. In reality it is a difficult company
to understand. Humbleness is not a sign of weakness. It
comes from Ingvar. People are expected to learn from their
experience, and this takes time and patience. You can't be
in a hurry to move up the ladder."
Dealing with the Europeans

Germany Germany is the largest national organization

in the IKEA group, accounting for t30 percent of the total
group sales through more than 20 stores, including the
newly opened stores in former East Germany.
Although IKEA has been established in Germany for
more than two decades (its first store was opened in Munich
in

1974), Swedish management is still perceived by German

as peculiar. As described by Thomas Larson, the store manager in Cologne: "Some senior coworkers

IKEA members

still have problems addressing me by my first name, or

using the German du (the informal equivalent for you, like
ra in French). "Dutzen," using the informal you, is often felt
as undermining the respect and prestige of the boss. As
Heike Oestreich, the personnel manager said: "There are
two different du's, the IKEA du and the du which is used
between friends."
The Germans are very disciplined and precise. They do
exactly what the boss asks them to do and what is agreed
or put down in writing. A problem is that the Swedish
notion of "taking on responsibilities for yourself," the cornerstone of their work policy, is not perceived in the same
way by the Germans, who have a tendency to adhere very
closely to precisely defined rules and instructions. When
IKEA translated the corporate brochure The IKEA Way

Pant 2

The Role of Culture

into German, a need was felt to sharpen and make more

explicit the original Swedish text which presented key
IKEA concepts in sometimes vague terms in order to give
freedom to people to adapt them and take personal responsibility for carrying them out. Once, Anders Moberg, Kamprad's successor, suggested in a letter that certain merchandising displays could be used in a variety ofplaces. In

Germany, department managers interpreted this as an

order, and systematically set up the displays in every part
of their stores.
In general, German employees feel that the Swedes are
more result-oriented and treat every problem as a challenge that should be met. However, they believe that
Swedish management does not sufficiently assess risks
before taking action. According to Heike Oestreich: "The
Swedes, to reduce bureaucracy, would like to dump all our
offrce desks in the back yard." The lack of formality is also
dismaying to Germans. To implement a decision "some
notes on the back of a cigarette packet are often sufficient"
for the Swedes. In contrast, Germans are more comfortable
adhering to formal procedures: "We need procedures and
forms. Germans love administration because it provides us
with security."
France Development in France, which has fewer than
half the number of stores in Germany, was always considered problematic because of the numerous administrative
regulations on the retail trade, and a hostile attitude
towards discounters that prevailed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. By carefully avoiding too much public atten-

tion and with only a limited number of store openings

IKEA managed to secure a safe place for itself in the market and develop an 8 percent share.
The main challenge for IKEA management in France is
the French tendency to judge informality as a sign of weakness, or indecisiveness. French people are accustomed to
formal rules and strong hierarchy. In the words of a former
Swedish country manager, when IKEA first stafied in
France: "Some French managers felt that the Swedish
informality meant they could do whatever they wanted.
When we told them that they should inform their subordinates they did not take us seriously." Some aspects of the
informality can even be irritating to the French, such as the
lack of formal job descriptions and written procedures.
Whereas Swedish managers will justify this by saying that
they don't like to limit responsibility, and that they get more
out of people with an informal approach, the French tend to
be suspicious of informality for the same reasons.
In the view of IKEA s French human resource manager:

"Working here isn't for everyone. It is particularly difftcult

for people over 35 because IKEA is different from all other
workplaces in France. When you join IKEA, you enter
another world-we do not behave like a normal French
company. Status is not recognized, which can cause an
identity problem: Everyone is put on the same level-no
one stands out. and vou can set lost in the crowd. It is hard

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to explain what IKEA is, everyone will give a different
answer. One shouldn'tfreeze the system, it is flexible, and
it should stay that way."
Two of the main reasons given for IKEA s appeal to
French candidates are:

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To make things clearer to employees, a formal communication platform has been developed in France to spell things
out in facts and figures by comparing IKEA s benefits with
those of competitors. Also, more formal training programs
are being developed because in France "learning by doing"
is not perceived as a credible way of developing competency. Typically, a boss would not be ffusted to develop one's

skills in France, and more faith is placed in "off-site programs." In France tolerance has its limits and when IKEA
hired "too many" people of non-French origin, the company
received complaints from customers, so now it makes a
point of keeping non-French workers to a minimum.
Some years ago, relations with unions were hostile.
There was a bitter strike and widespread discontent.
French labor unions did not trust or understand IKEA s
Swedish management style, with its tendency to seek consensus. More recently, IKEA s management has taken a
more affirmative attitude, and relations have improved
notably. They may continue to improve now that IKEA
France is run by a Frenchman, Jean Louis Baillot, whose
wife is Swedish and who has worked in Almhult.

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Doing Things Differently in the United States

Expanding into the U.S. market was certainly the boldest
developmental decision that IKEA had made up to that
time. From an historical perspective the venture seemed
unlikely to succeed. First, the culturally specific requirements for home furnishing in the United States are considerably different than the European markets, particularly in
terms of the size and functions of furniture. Second, the
American market had come to be known as the "graveyard" of European retailers with a long list of unfortunate
ventures by such successful firms as Casino, Carrefour,
and Marks & Spencer. But somehow, IKEA seemed confident that going about it in their own way would prove an
exception to the laws of failure that seemed to doom European entrants to the U.S. market.
Initially, development in the United States was quite consistent with IKEAs pattern in Europe: Identify prime markets with volume potential; purchase cheap land on the
periphery of big cities; use mass advertising with a unique
message emphasizing IKEAs Swedishness; focus on range
and price through the catalog, establishing a beachhead
from which to launch and develop the organization. Also, its

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lntgratlve Gase 2

take the

approach was empirical and pragmatic. It did not set out to

United States by storm, but merely to test its existing formula and learn through experience how success could
be achieved. In fact, from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s

A courageous decision was then made by Anders

Moberg and a new management team was brought in to
head the organization. Faced with the alternatives of hold-

IKEA opened a series offranchised stores in Canada, developing during this time its logistics capabilities and demonstrating that its European range could sell in America's

fighting back, the latter course of action was chosen. In

1990, the American retail management group, under the
leadership of G6ran Carstedt, recently hired from Volvo,

backyard, before it finally entered the U.S. market in 1985.

Its first stage of development in the United States began
on the East Coast with the opening of Plymouth Meeting in
Philadelphia's northwest suburbs, followed by a cluster of

convinced the product managers at IKEA of Sweden that

the IKEA European range had to be adapted andAmericanbased sourcing stepped up. At the same time, he reassured
them that IKEA would not prostitute itself. In the words of
Carstedt: "The IKEA strategy in NorthAmerica will still be
blue and yellow, but we will put more stars and stripes and

four other stores. "Development was initially based on the

potato field approach. Find some place where there is

cheap land, build, and the people will follow." This

approach ignored the rule of American retailing based on
fine-tuned segmentation and targeting. The choice of locations, driven by cost-consciousness, led IKEA to establish
its stores in shopping centers that had no prestige "anchor
stores" to draw the high-income customers that IKEA
appeals to. This should have been a relative disadvantage,
since competitors like Home Depot locate their stores in
prime centers with "anchor stores" like Nordstroms and
Macy's. But by maintaining the profile of a "different kind
of store," very Swedish, with a wide range of products, it
apparently has overcome this obstacle. Here, the catalog
has served them well, as people can plan their purchases
before they come and thus optimize their time investment.
Up until the late 1980s IKEA enjoyed a honeymoon of
sorts. The American public was attracted by the novelty of
Scandinavian style and IKEA s unique merchandising,
which resembles in many ways a European village marketplace. Its advertising was a success. People drove six to eight
hours to come to the stores and they initially came in large
numbers. Riding on a high dollar, IKEA had appeared to
have gotten off to as fast a start as they had in Germany and
other European markets. The honeymoon ended suddenly
when the dollar went down, revealing multiple weaknesses.
First and foremost, even though Americans were initially attracted by IKEA s advertising and novelty, the
company's range of furniture was unsuited to American
standards and sold poorly. One often told anecdote illustrates just how far from those standards they really were:
Customers would purchase flower vases thinking they
were American-size drinking glasses. Americans furnish

their master bedrooms with king size beds, whereas

IKEA s largest beds were five inches narrower. Also,
Americans are harder on sitting room furniture, and
IKEA s sofa and armchair offerings proved too lightly
designed Additionally, IKEA did not offer furniture suitable for the "home entertainment centers" that blossomed
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s in American
households with the proliferation of widescreen televisions, VCRs, and hi-fi equipment. With declining sales
revenues and shrinking profits, by 1989 the "graveyard
effect" seemed to have caught up with IKEA.

291

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

ing on and waiting for better times, withdrawing humbly, or

more maple leaves in it."

It

was not easy but they succeeded in changing the

of many household products. To make the point,
one U.S. manager brought a plastic American-size turkey
with him to Almhult and before a surprised group of product managers placed it on one of the best-selling dining
tables in the European range. Given the size of the bird
there was only room for two table settings instead of the
design

normal six. He had made his point.

However there was a condition attached to adapting the
range, and that condition was volume. Lines of fumiture
specifically designed for the American market would have to
be produced in long enough runs to meet IKElt's commitment to suppliers and be priced at the lowest levels possible.
A combination of luck and bold counterattacking led to
an unexpected expansion on the West Coast that was to
ease pressure on its pricing and provide much needed
growth in its retail business. An imitator, "Stor," inspired
by IKEA s success, had illicitly acquired intimate knowledge of IKEA s floor plan and merchandising schemes
and successfully opened four stores primarily around
Los Angeles, far from IKEA s base on the East Coast.
Responding as much to the threat to the company's image
as to the opportunity to capitalize on Stor's advertising of
Swedish style furniture, IKEA decided to counterattack. It
opened a store in Los Angeles and eventually, through its
price and sourcing advantage, drove Stor to the brink of
bankruptcy. It then bought out its imitator at a bargain
price and established a solid base in a prime market on the
West Coast. If IKEA s low-profile stance stressed its humble origins and culture, it definitely did not mean that the
company was a weakling. IKEA showed that it could be
tough and decisive in that toughest of tough markets, The
current U.S. country manager, Jan Kjellman, in comparing
the U.S. market to his previous European experience used
the following words: "The biggest difference is competition. Competitors are everywhere, and they are strong. The
market is crowded, but still there always seem to be new
competitors. Even with a million and a half customers, we
are small. It is a total struggle for us, and it is tough to survive." Could IKEA adapt to such competition and still
remain faithful to the "IKEA Way"?

23.2

Pant 2

The Role of Culture

Swedish managers are impressed with the professionalism of American salesmanship. "Over here, retailing is a
profession. Salespersons are subjected to a lot of pressure
for short-term results because large retailers are publicly
owned and shareholders measure quarterly results. So they
are very time-efficient and masters of the hard sell," relates
Kjellman. IKEA has always maintained a soft approach
believing that people know what they want, so that sales
personnel are there to help them find it. Moreover, the
strategy is that most of the selling is done by the catalog so
that people arrive with specific purchases in mind. Impulse
buying takes place for smaller items like candle holders, or
accessories which are sought for as bargains. On this point
IKEA has stood firm, and sales personnel from competitors such as Macy's or Bloomingdale's have to unlearn the
hard sell approach.
Americans are always looking for convenience, which
means more space, more information, anything that reduces
effort and saves time. To respond to these demands, IKEA
had to redesign its store layouts, providing more directions,

and short cuts for people who don't want to just wander
through the store. "Customers were screaming 'let us out'
before we remodeled our layout," reported one store manager. "They couldn't find their way out of our maze of displays, there were no windows or signs, they felt lost and
panicky." While making these adjustments in store layout,
which have been criticized by IKEA International headquarters, IKEA has maintained its policy of minimal service. Customers who want home delivery or someone to
assemble their furniture must pay the full add-on cost. In
fact, IKEA stores carefully outsource these services to local
providers and they never promote such services in their
advertising. Instead, they encourage their customers to do it
the "IKEA Way," which means renting a roof rack and
assembling it yourself.
Adapting IKEA s floor plans and furniture to American
dimensions paid off, and sales increased by 25 to 30 percent in comparison with the late 1980s. By 1994IKEA had
turned around the situation in the United States. Through
its acquisition of Stor and by adapting its range to U.S.
requirements, sales have increased steadily by about 10
percent annually, providing IKEA with the volume base
necessary to sustain long production run and to keep prices
low. Whereas at frst only 15 percent of the furniture in
American stores was produced locally, the figure is now
about 50 percent.

In the view of several IKEA senior U.S. managers, the

key to this successful turnaround was the granting of more
autonomy to the American country management than their
European counterparts had enjoyed. "You can't steer
America from Europe," admitted Anders Moberg in 1994.
"When we went in we hadn't planned a clear strategy of
how to supply the American market at a low cost." Learning how to succeed in the United States through its own
painful expense took more than five years. Although its

U.S. operation showed a profit over the subsequent three

years it still has not recovered its initial investment. With
flat growth in Europe, and heavy investment in longer term
expansion into eastern Europe and China putting pressure
on IKEA s capital reseryes, the focus in the United States
is now on developing sales and profit from its existing
stores before expanding into new regions. Following its
bold actions in the early 1990s, IKEA has entered a more
conservative phase of consolidation. Perhaps it has also
learned that the price of being different means that you
also have to be more careful about where vou invest.

Unresolved lssues: Management and Human

Resource Development
From an American perspective, Swedish managers don't
show emotion in the workplace. "Praise is given for looking calm in all situations. They do not feel comfortable in
conflictual situations. Also, they tend not to set themselves
apart, and self-promotion is frowned upon. They don't like
drum beating or cheerleading in a culture where both are
common ways of motivating workers."
"The biggest conflicts here stem from the Americans
who need to know who's in charge. People expect their
managers to tell them what to do here." However, at IKEA
the manager's role is more subtle and they tend to have a
long-term approach to management. "It takes longer to do
things our way but we want to train people to know how to
do things the right way." Since there are few written procedures, the golden rule for managers is to help people
understand why things are done in a particular way. This
can be viewed as indecision by American employees new
to IKEA who are more used to rules and procedures
spelled out clearly and managers who take responsibility
for quick decision making.
American employees perceive IKEA as being more
employee-oriented than average American employers.
IKEA attracts and selects people who value security, job
enrichment, and benefits which are more generous than
typical American employers (like five weeks of paid holiday) more than career advancement. However, with full
employment in the United States it is becoming more difficult to find candidates, particularly for management positions, who have the necessary job qualifications and whose
values match IKEA s.

Although IKEA has recently initiated an American

style performance review procedure, which requires documenting employees' individual performance strengths and
weaknesses, Swedish managers feel uncomfortable with
the formality of the system and the need to provide negative feedback. Since they hold the more senior positions,
their ambivalence has resulted in little real discrimination
in pay increases which are directly linked to the reviews.
Although turnover at IKEA is lower than the industry average, and coworkers generally appreciate IKEAs caring

lntegratiwe Gase 2

environment, there is some latent discontent with the way

pay increases are distributed, even among long-term
employees who feel that their individual achievements are
not always rewarded.
In the opinion of one American manager, 'A lot of peop1e have left IKEA because they can't move up fast enough

here. Some left the store to go to the Service Center

(IKEA s national headquarters) then left because it was too
hard for them to adjust, there was no clear frame of reference in terms of policies and procedures. We have lost
some key American managers because they didn't have a
clear idea of their role or future in the organization."
Acknowledging that there are not enough American
managers in senior positions, IKEA is trying to attract
management trainees through presentations at business
schools. However, its low-key image and lack of structured
career paths are not easy to sell to "high potentials" more
attuned to the packages offered by retailers such as Home
Depot which forcefully push rapid promotion and individualize pay incentives. There is a general consensus that
IKEA needs to develop young American managers who
can play a bigger role in the organization than at present.
However, there is no agreement yet on how critical the
need is, nor on how to solve the problem.
Two differing views that could be overheard in a fictitious debate between two long-term Ikeans illustrate the
unresolved issues facing IKEA USA at the end of 1996.

The View of a Young American Manager "There is a

glass ceiling here. I am at a level at which my growth will

I'm not Swedish. IKEA should be made less

complicated for Americans, easier for us to adapt to, and
stop because

develop in. Our management needs to be much more professional in managing human resources. We need to bring
new people into the organization, and reward individual
accountability for results. This requires a better balance

between the

IKEA Way and American

management.

Becoming a successful manager at IKEA requires a lot of

time and effort to understand how everything fits together.
Yet not everyone can go to Sweden or learn Swedish, and
today too many talented Americans choose to go to competitors. Competition is catching up on us in terms of benefits, and with full employment we should be much more
competitive than we are on the American job market."
The Swedish Yiew "Being the underdog, not doing
things the traditional way over here is vital to IKEA s success in the United States. We must keep a unique image
and work better at getting our message across to employees and customers so that they understand why we are successful. Pride in being a part of IKEA must be built locally
and since our system is unique, this takes time. The real

danger

233

IKEA: Managing Cultural Diversity

is assimilation. We are becoming too American.

Giving people bonuses and pay incentives doesn't make

them more intelligent; people are motivated by learning
and improving in an organization that provides them with
room to grow. Rewards should be more on a give and take

basis-when the company makes more, it can give morebut we must remain flexible. Although we must seek a balance between adapting and sticking to our proven ways,

we must protect our unique concepts and way of doing

things. This means that we will always need a strong
Swedish presence in the United States. They are our 'onsite missionaries' who can develop loyalty to an understanding of our uniqueness."

Glorrds on the llorizon

By the mid-1990s, in spite of its undisputed international
success and expansion over the past 25 years. signs
appeared that the pattern of growth and steady profit was
slowing down. Costs were rising, complaints on quality
were more frequent, and unaccustomed delays appeared in
product delivery. External factors had changed from the
early times in Europe. Economic growth slowed as baby
boomers moved into middle age, with new tastes and
demands, and fewer new homes were being sold. Competitors had also learned from IKEA s pioneering distribution
and were offering better furniture at lower prices, seeking
low-cost furniture suppliers in eastern Europe, which put
pressure on IKEA's unique sourcing.

IKEA had become a large international organization

and, in an effort to adapt to the requirements of its many
domestic markets,

its product range had grown from

10,000 to 14,000 items, thus weakening returns from long

production runs and overburdening logistic supply lines.

Increasingly greater attention had to be given to bringing

costs down, often through productivity gains which put
unprecedented pressure on retail staffs to improve sales to
staff ratios. During the years of rapid growth, many
recruits were brought in from outside the company, and
were therefore not steeped in IKEA culture. Its extended
network made it difficult to provide employees and midlevel managers with a clear perception of how their local
business impacted on the corporation as a whole. Local
initiatives were taken without regard to their impact on the
whole system. Was this the price of diversity or was IKEA
suffering in many ways from too much decentralization?
In 1993, to cope with this situation, Andreas Mober and
IKEA s senior management launched a company-wide operation "Nyx kige" (New Situation), with the formation of
task forces and project teams to suggest ways of improving
communication and eliminating snags in distribution. Many
suggestions were implemented, including the creation of
new regional divisions in Europe for closer coordination of
country operations and the hiring of more professionals at
headquarters to provide guidelines and more efficient corporate control systems. Although the Nytt kige program met
with a lot of enthusiasm and did achieve improvements in
some areas it soon became clear to Ingvar Kamprad that a
more radical change in the organization was needed.
In early 1996, a major organizational change was introduced to "shorten the value chain" between customers and

Part 2

234

The Role of Culture

the majority of people. Our product range expanded in

every direction and could not be handled in a reasonable
way on our sales floors. Our price advantage compared to
competitors began to shrink. Even IKEA s soul, our fine
colporate culture, was in danger. Have we forgotten to
explain to our new workers about the IKEA Way? Have
our desks prevented us from being involved enough in the
commercial activity? Have we lost our way?

suppliers. Regional organizations were eliminated to bring

stores in more direct contact with IKEA of Sweden. New
emphasis was given to the importance of a living corporate
culture based on the IKBA values of simplicity and selfdiscipline, rather than relying on formal policies and pro-

cedures. At the same time, IKEA s expansion plans in

Europe and the United States were delayed. The fear at
corporate headquarters was that IKEA had drifted too far
away from the basic principles that were behind its legendary success.

Back to the Roots

In May, Ingvar Kamprad gathered IKEA s 250 worldwide
store managers and senior managers at an important meet-

ing in Poland to plan IKEA s need to refocus and redirect

its efforts. He actually used the word rejuvenate.
Our product range and purchasing people often have an
unequal battle with retailers and their far too many interests. Many of our suppliers got stuck in the middle. Our
IKEA idea as one of the world's few production-oriented
companies is under threat.
Perhaps we were blinded by the booming years of the
1980s which increased the geographical spread ofour operations to new markets, both on the retail and trading sides.
Internal communication also became difficult, our administration expanded and our overheads became increasingly
heavy. Our costs rose, and our customers and suppliers felt
lost many of them got in touch with me directly.
Decision making took longer and longer, and endless
discussions took place. It became more difficult to see the
company as a whole. Far too much of our product development had too little to do with the tastes and wallets of

The managers who attended that meeting felt galvanized by the founder's strong message, and their confidence and belief in the IKEA Way had been doubtlessly
reinforced. In an increasingly complex world environment,
simplicity indeed appeared to be a true virtue that had
guided the company in the past. Several wondered, as they
left, how Kamprad's intuitive ability to see through the
complexity of a worldwide organization and reignite the
dynamics of IKEA s success could be transmitted throughout the organization? Others wondered if they would have

as much autonomy as they had previously enjoyed in

adapting to very different markets. Some wondered if the
company could regain its developmental thrust through the

late 1990s?

1.

What type of organizational culture is most representative of IKEA: family, Eiffel Tower, guided missile,
or incubator? Explain.

2.

In what way has international culture proved to be a

challenge for IKEA?
What are three things that IKEA had to learn in order
to do business effectively in the United States?
How well has the company been able to deal with the

3.
4.

diversity issue? What else does it still need to do?