Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150732

August 31, 2004

TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the School Superintendent, DECS Division of Abra;
MARIETTA BERSALONA, Chairperson, DECS Fact Finding Committee; EDUARDO RUPERTO, JOAQUIN
PILIEN and LUZ CURBI, Members, DECS Fact Finding Committee, petitioners
vs.
HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 151095

August 31, 2004

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Subject of the consolidated petitions is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61081, entitled Helen B.
Hernandez v. Tomas G. Velasquez, promulgated on 07 November 2001.1 The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the
twin resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC for brevity), in Administrative Case No. 97-45 filed
against respondent Hernandez. The CSC, in its Resolution No. 00-1375 dated 13 June 2000, found respondent Hernandez
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and ordered her dismissal from the service, with all the accessory penalties
including her perpetual disqualification from holding public office. In Resolution No. 00-2064 dated 07 September 2000,
the CSC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 00-1375.
Stripped of non-essentials, the following are the factual antecedents:
In a letter dated 25 September 1996, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS-CAR, (Cordillera
Administrative Region) sent a letter to petitioner (in G.R. No. 150732) Tomas G. Velasquez, informing him of the alleged
infractions committed by respondent, Helen B. Hernandez, such as soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in
exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers. Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a factfinding committee to determine the veracity of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a formal report and
recommendation.
On 26 September 1996, the Committee composed of members assigned at the DECS-Division of Abra, summoned to a
meeting the teachers who have grievances against respondent. Based on the sworn statements of the teachers, namely:
Elena Princena, Myrna Bayabos, Mildred Millare, Ofrina Benabese, Emilia Beralde, Ruby Bringas, Regina Potolin,
spouses Ernesto Callena, Jr. and Ma. Louisa Callena, Irene Bermudez, Francisco Castillo, Elizabeth Castillo, Maribel
Medrano, Benigna Bulda, Irenea Viado, Cecilia Turqueza, Catherine Badere, Rosalinda Bilgera, Nardita Tuscano, Henry
Bisquera, Melba Linggayo, and Maritess Navarro, it appears that respondent demanded and/or received money in various
amounts from the teachers in consideration of their appointment, promotion, and transfer from one school to another.

On 15 November 1996, the Committee issued an Investigation Report recommending the filing of administrative and
criminal complaints against respondent. On 14 March 1997, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Abuse of Authority, and Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and other related laws was filed against respondent.
On 24 March 1997, respondent filed her Answer to the charges. In the main, she contended that the charges are brazen
fabrications and falsehoods made by parties with ulterior motives which are designed to harass her in a systematic
campaign to discredit her. Respondent likewise alleged that the preparation and taking of the statements of the supposed
23 counts of irregularity leveled against her were attended by coercion and fraud.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 97-003 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Helen Hernandez, et.al." This Resolution, which arose from the sworn complaints filed by the complaining
teachers, indicted respondent and a certain Luzviminda de la Cruz for violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed
with modification by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in its Review Action dated 6 November 1997. Under
the modified indictment, respondent and dela Cruz were charged with direct bribery. However, upon motion filed by
respondent and her co-accused, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in its Order dated 24 February 1998, reconsidered
and set aside its Review Action dated 6 November 1997, and ordered the withdrawal of Informations for direct bribery
filed against respondent and de la Cruz.
After due proceedings, the CSC issued Resolution No. 00-1375, dated 13 June 2000, finding respondent guilty of the
charges against her and ordering her dismissal from the service. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent was
denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 00-2064 dated 7 September 2000.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not the CSC erred in assuming jurisdiction and/or in rendering judgment adverse to her;
2) Whether or not the CSC erred in rendering judgment against her in violation of her right to due process in
administrative proceedings;
3) Whether or not the CSC erred in its appreciation of the evidence on record and;
4) Whether or not the CSC erred in imposing the penalty of dismissal. 2
The appellate court, in its now assailed Decision, reversed the resolutions of the CSC. It opined that when petitioners filed
a formal charge against respondent, it was incumbent upon them to inform the Civil Service Commission that another case
was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon considering that the facts and circumstances from which
both complaints stem are the same. Citing Section 13 (1) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 19 and 21 of
Republic Act No. 6770, the appellate court added that the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman have concurrent original
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against any government employee. Thus, it ruled that the effects of res judicata
or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties, changing the form of the action, or
adopting a different mode of presenting one's case.
Anent the issue of violation of respondent's right to due process, the appellate court stressed that it is not enough that the
twin requisites of notice and hearing be present. It is important that the tribunal hearing the case must be unbiased; indeed,
if the government official or employee under investigation is not afforded the opportunity to present his case before a fair,
independent, and impartial tribunal, the hearing would be futile. Considering that the composition of the fact-finding
Committee is in question, the appellate court concluded that it cannot properly be said that there was a fair and impartial
hearing of the petitioner's case.
The appellate court also ruled that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
averments of the complaint because it appears that some affiants who executed sworn statements to support the charges
against respondent later retracted their statements and executed new statements, alleging that they were merely induced to
testify against respondent. It also noted that some of the complaining teachers even failed to appear in the investigation to

confirm their respective sworn statements. The appellate court, therefore, annulled and set aside the Resolutions of the
CSC and ordered the payment of backwages to respondent.
Separate appeals via petition for review were filed before this Court by petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as Officer-in
Charge, Office of the School Superintendent, DECS-Division of Abra (G.R. No.150732) and the Civil Service
Commission (G.R. No. 151095), assailing the decision of the appellate court. The two petitions were ordered consolidated
in a Resolution of this Court dated 25 June 2002. G.R. No. 150732, assigned to the Third Division of this Court, was
ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 151095, an En Banc case even if the first mentioned petition has a lower docket
number considering that both cases involve resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.
The issues in both petitions are substantially the same.
In G.R. No. 150732, petitioner raised the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE WHICH
WAS FILED BY THE CSC AGAINST THE RESPONDENT SHOULD CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION OF
NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT WAS INSUFFICIENT.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
RESPONDENT AND THE PAYMENT OF HER BACKWAGES.3
On the other hand, the following issues were raised by the CSC in G.R. No. 151095:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FORMAL CHARGE SHOULD CONTAIN A CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CSC ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST RESPONDENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE LATTER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CSC ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND
FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED.4
In both cases, petitioners asseverate that under Section 21 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Investigations (CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated 31 August 1999), it is the complaint and the not the

formal charge which should contain a certification of non-forum shopping. The Office of the Solicitor General strongly
argues that the formal charge was filed, not by the complaining teachers or the DECS Fact-Finding Committee, but by the
CSC-CAR and it would thus be unnecessary to require a certification of non-forum shopping considering that the CSC is
the sole arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil Service and it would be absurd for the CSC-CAR to file the same
administrative case against respondent in another forum. The OSG adds that there was no need for the CSC-CAR to
inform the CSC about the criminal action for Direct Bribery in OMB-1-96-2757 because the said action was not filed by
the CSC-CAR.
The CSC on the other hand, argues that what was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman is a criminal case and while the
facts therein may be similar to the pending administrative case, the Office of the Ombudsman and the CSC will not rule
on the same cause of action or grant the same relief. According to the CSC, there is no possibility of having conflicting
decisions as the two cases are distinct from each other.
Petitioners dispute the Court of Appeals' finding that respondent's right to administrative due process was violated.
Respondent can hardly be said to have been deprived of due process as she was given the chance to answer the charges, to
submit countervailing evidence, and to cross-examine the witnesses against her. The mere fact that respondent questioned
the impartiality of the fact finding committee will not automatically result in a denial of due process because what matters
is that respondent had actively participated in the proceedings against her. Petitioners add that respondent's culpability was
not based solely on the report of the fact-finding committee, but also on the evidence submitted by the respondent which,
unfortunately, was found wanting.
Succinctly, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in holding that the evidence they presented to establish the
culpability of the respondent is insufficient. The finding is based merely on the retraction of the sworn statements of some
three teachers and the failure of three others to appear during the formal investigation. Petitioners stress that a majority of
the complainant teachers remained consistent in their claim that respondent actually and directly received from them
various amounts of money in exchange for their appointment, promotion, or transfer. They add that the dismissal of the
criminal action against respondent in OMB-1-96-2757 cannot be treated as a bar to the administrative case primarily
because administrative liability is distinct from penal liability. In conclusion, petitioners fault the appellate court for
reversing the factual findings of the CSC, ordering the reinstatement of respondent, and awarding backwages in her favor.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have the Court sustain the Decision of the appellate court exonerating her of all
the charges in the administrative case. Citing CSC Resolution No. 95-3099, respondent argues that even on the assumption
that a certificate of non-forum shopping is not necessary in the formal charge, petitioners nevertheless failed to show that
the complaint filed by the teachers contained the required certification of non-forum shopping. She theorizes that since it
is the CSC-CAR which filed the formal charge against her, it would be difficult to imagine that the CSC will make a turn
around and take a position contrary to its earlier findings that a prima facie case against her exists. Respondent insists that
to allow the CSC to exercise jurisdiction over the case would be similar to allowing one person to act as prosecutor and
judge at the same time.
In support of the appellate court's Decision, respondent maintains that it correctly ruled that there was no fair and
impartial hearing of her case before the fact-finding committee. She contends that the integrity of the fact-finding
committee is questionable considering that the chairperson of the committee is a relative of one of the complainant
teachers, Ms. Immaculada Bringas, who incidentally would be the next in rank if she is ousted from her position. Finally,
she adds that petitioners are urging this Court to review the factual findings of the appellate court which cannot be done in
the instant petition which must raise only questions of law.
The Court rules for the petitioners.
CSC Resolution No. 95-3099 dated 9 May 1995 (Further Amended by CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated 31 August
1999), amending Section 4 of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, Series of 1994, provides:
"Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath - No complaint against a civil servant shall be given due course,
unless the same is in writing and under oath.

The complaint should be written in a clear, simple and concise language and in a systematic manner as to apprise
the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to enable him to intelligently
prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
(a) xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same party involving the same
acts or omissions and issues, has been filed before another agency or administrative tribunal. In the
absence of any one of the requirements therein stated, the complaint shall be dismissed. (Underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court placed much reliance on the above-quoted provision of CSC Resolution No. 95-3099 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when it ruled that it was incumbent upon petitioner (in G.R. No.
150732) to inform that another case was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Strikingly, the
appellate court failed to state in its Decision the person or entity which petitioner must notify of the pending case with the
Ombudsman. The appellate court then cited a litany of cases on forum shopping and concluded that petitioner's failure to
state in the formal charge that there is no other action or complaint pending against herein respondent constitutes a
violation of the rule against forum shopping that merited the dismissal of the complaint. It ratiocinated that since the facts
and circumstances from which both complaints stem from are the same, petitioners should have attached in their
complaint the certificate of non-forum shopping. Inconsistently, however, the appellate court was quick to add that the
cause of action in the CSC and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman are distinct; nevertheless, it said that in order to
obviate the risk of violating the rule, petitioners should have attached the certification against non-forum shopping.
The Court finds the above disquisition unsound.
Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. 5 It may also consist in a party against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another
forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari. 6
The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and partieslitigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs. A party, however, cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the
courts.7
In not a few cases, this Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.8 Stated differently, there must be between the two cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) that the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration.9
It is significant to note that the action filed before the CSC-CAR is administrative in nature, dealing as it does with the
proper administrative liability, if any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the commission of the acts
complained of. In stark contrast, the case filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which incidentally
was not initiated by herein petitioners but by the complainant teachers, deals with the criminal accountability of the
respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would
find no proper application since the two cases although based on the same essential facts and circumstances do not raise

identical causes of action and issues.10 It would, therefore, be absurd to require the certification of forum shopping to be
attached to the formal charge filed before the CSC, for the evil sought to be curbed by the proscription against forum
shopping is simply not extant in the instant case.
On the issue of her having been denied administrative due process, the Court likewise finds respondent's claim untenable.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he
may have in support of his defense or simply an opportunity to be heard; 11 or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action of ruling complained of. 12 One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably than oral argument, through pleadings. Technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not even strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 13
In fact in Pefianco v. Moral,14 the Court had the occasion to rule that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled
to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him he is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearing of the investigation
committee. It is the administrative resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any further
remedies that the losing party in an administrative case might wish to pursue.
Respondent had been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. She was required to answer the formal charge against
her and given the chance to present evidence in her behalf. She actively participated in the proceedings and even crossexamined the witnesses against her. Clearly, based on the above jurisprudential pronouncements the appellate court's
finding that respondent was denied due process is utterly without basis.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." 15 A finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the
acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 16 This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal
proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering
the withdrawal of the criminal complaints against respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence sufficient to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of the
criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against respondent.
In the instant case, this Court is of the view that the sworn complaints of the twenty remaining complainants coupled with
their positive testimonies in the proceedings below, more than adequately complies with the standard of proof required in
administrative cases. The desistance executed by three (3) out of the twenty-three(23) original complainants is of no
moment since administrative actions cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. 17
All told, the Court holds that respondent's guilt in the administrative case has been sufficiently established and pursuant to
existing Civil Service Rules and Regulations,18 her dismissal from the service is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.