The Game Theory Quiz 3
The Game Theory Quiz 3
The Game Theory Quiz 3
Question 1
5 out of 5 points
A football team has the chance of scoring the game-winning touchdown on the last play of the game. It can either run or pass. The defense can play for the run or play for the pass. The following normal form lists the payoffs from the game made up by this last play. The payoffs are probabilities of winning the game.
Defense Defend Defend Pass Run Offense Pass 0, 1 1, 0
Run
1, 0
0, 1
Question 2
5 out of 5 points
When a game has multiple equilibria, a useful method to sort out which one would be the best prediction is to
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all of these.
Correct Answer:
all of these.
y
Question 3
0 out of 5 points
Two games that differ only in the timing of movesone simultaneous, the other sequential movecan sometimes have completely different subgame-perfect equilibria. Why?
Answer Selected Answer: Correct Answer:
The first mover can choose an action that it would deviate from if its action were secret.
y
Question 4
5 out of 5 points
If the Prisoners Dilemma is repeated over and over again with the same two players having an indefinite time horizon,
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Question 5
0 out of 5 points
A teacher curves the final exam such that the top half of students get an A and the bottom half an F (so their grade depends only on relative and not absolute performance). Suppose that there are equal numbers of two groups, the Brainiacs and the Numbskulls. If they both study or they both party, the Brainiacs will get the As but if the Brainiacs party and the Numbskulls study, the Numbskulls will get the As. Suppose further that they both dislike studying and both like good grades. Suppose all students of a type choose the same action (so we can view it as a two-player game). The payoff matrix is
Numbskulls Study Party Brainiacs Study 5, 0 5, 2
Party
2, 5
7, 2
There are two: in one, the Brainiacs study and the Numbskulls party, and in the other they do the reverse. There is only one equilibrium, in mixed strategies.
y
Correct Answer:
Question 6
5 out of 5 points
Question 7
0 out of 5 points
players end up earning a lighter sentence than the prosecutor would like.
Correct Answer:
the Nash equilibrium is one of the worst outcomes for the players.
y
Question 8
0 out of 5 points
Question 9
0 out of 5 points
Question 10
0 out of 5 points
Teens A and B are smitten with each other but neither knows of the others feelings. Suppose the teachers at their school organize a dance. The payoff is based on whether their advances are rebuffed or accepted. If they both Declare, they get positive utility but if they are Rebuffed they face humiliation (significantly negative payoff). Rebuffing an advance slightly elevates the teens standing with peers.
Teen A Teen B
1, -10
0, 0
Declare.
Correct Answer:
No dominant strategy.
y
Question 11
5 out of 5 points
With a quadratic production with fixed capital Q = A + BL +CL2 and the shape shown above, B is
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positive.
Correct Answer:
positive.
y
Question 12
0 out of 5 points
As a result of doubling all its inputs, if a firm can more than double its output, its production function exhibits
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Question 13
5 out of 5 points
Suppose Q = K L , if
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Question 14
0 out of 5 points
constant
Correct Answer:
diminishing
y
Question 15
5 out of 5 points
Question 16
5 out of 5 points
exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal productivities for K and L. exhibits constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal productivities for K and L.
y
Correct Answer:
Question 17
5 out of 5 points
If more and more labor is employed while keeping all other inputs constant, the marginal physical productivity of labor
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Question 18
5 out of 5 points
Question 19
0 out of 5 points
A technical innovation in the production of automobiles by Ford Motor Companys for 1 million cars per year would necessarily
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Question 20
5 out of 5 points
Suppose Q = K L , if
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