Adoption

1. Cang vs Court of Appeals Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. N o t l o n g t h e r e a f t e r , h o w e v e r , A n n a M a r i e l e a r n e d o f h e r husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. M e a n w h i l e , t h e b r o t h e r a n d s i s t e r - i n - l a w o f A n n a Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court. Issue: C a n m i n o r c h i l d r e n b e l e g a l l y a d o p t e d w i t h o u t t h e written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: A r t i c l e 2 5 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r i t s retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d r i g h t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C i v i l C o d e o r o t h e r laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision o n c o n s e n t f o r a d o p t i o n n o w r e a d s : A r t . 1 8 8 . T h e w r i t t e n consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2) the parents by nature of th e child , the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. B a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g , i t i s t h u s e v i d e n t t h a t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e a m e n d m e n t s t o t h e l a w , t h e w r i t t e n consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of a doption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner s c o n d u c t d i d n o t m a n i f e s t a s e t t l e d p u r p o s e t o f o r e g o a l l p a r e n t a l d u t i e s a n d r e l i n q u i s h a l l p a r e n t a l c l a i m s o v e r h i s children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

2. Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA (Presumption of Marriage) Nature of the Case : This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioner s Motion for Reconsideration Facts

:Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported byan Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of thedeceased s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between Appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere thumb mark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentionedin the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Issues : 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid Held : Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid. Ratio : Pilapil s claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An affidavit executed by the appellant and the late D r. Jacob that they lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from themarriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).Also misplaced was Pilapil s argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offer or establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract. In the instant case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yolanda through their sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken during the ceremony. The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Lo cal Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded.

In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case , a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage was not likely rebutted. 3. Republic vs Hernandez 4. Republic vs CA 5. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005] IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

Issue:May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case. Ruling: Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.

6. SSS vs Aguas 7. FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006 LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner s brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children . Issue: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother? Ruling: No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

CHANGE of NAME
1. [G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents. Issue: Whether or not corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature? Ruling: Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. **** 2. Republic vs KHO 3. Kilos Bayan vs Ermita

G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings

FACTS:

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong s birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ declaring him to be such. ISSUE:
y

Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen

RULING: xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his naturalborn status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.

4. G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE Facts: Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote,Giovanni s guardian ad litem filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. Issue: Whether or not the change petition for change of name should be granted?

Ruling: The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. 5. [G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005] IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO Facts: Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. Issue: Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause mentioned? Ruling: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 6. Ceruila vs Delantar

7. Republic vs Bolante 8. Silverio vs Republic FACTS: On November 22, 2003, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name from Rommel Jacinto to Melly and sex of birth from male to female in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance with the principle of justice and equity. That grating the petitioner would bring much awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams. ON August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. ISSUE: Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of gender on the civil registrar and afterwards be legally capacitated to entered into marriage with another man. HELD: No. Sex reassignment is not a ground for change of gender. There is no law present that allows such in our country. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. As to contracting marriage, our law allows only male and female with the main reason of procreation. Sex reassignment scientifically has not yet made one completely into female, with the complete function for reproduction.

9. REPUBLIC V. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHANG.R. NO. 166676, September 12, 2008 On December 11, 2003, Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Laguna. She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Andrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).She then alleged that, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted Cagandahan s petition. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking a reversal of the ruling of the RTC.W/N THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OFENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF CAGANDAHAN TO CHANGEHER SEX OR GENDER FROM FEMALE TO MALE ON THE GROUND OF HERMEDICAL CONDITION KNOWN AS CAH, AND HER NAME FROM JENNIFER TO JEFF. No. To the person with Congenital Andrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent: and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent s position and his personal judgment of being a male. As for respondent s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court s grant of respondent s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that

respondent s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in respondent s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

10. COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION V.ATTY. FELINA S. DASIGG.R. NO. 172776; December 17, 2008 Respondent Felina Dasig was the Chief Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division of CHED. She had also served as the officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs Services of the CHED. Several complaints were filed against Dasig on the alleged anomalous activities during her stint as the officer-in-change of LAS. The complaints consisted of Rosa dela Torre, Rocella Eje and Jacqueline Ng, students who applied to have their names corrected in their scholastic records to conform with their birth certificates. The students alleged that Dasig tried to exact money from them under the pretense of attorney s fees in connection with their requests for correction of names in their academic records. Dasig denied all the charges against her. She alleged that it was not within the CHED s power to entertain the request for change of name so she advised the students to file petitions in court. The hearing committee of CHED concluded that there was substantial evidence on record to hold Dasig liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommended that she be dismissed. The Civil Service Commission upheld the decision of CHED and denied Dasig s motion for reconsideration. Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending, the Supreme Court came out with a Resolution dated April 1, 2003 which ordered the disbarment of Dasig charging her with gross misconduct in violation of the Attorney s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of CHED. Despite the Court s findings, the Court of Appeals, however, gave adifferent assessment of the evidence on record as it found that Dasig was only moon lighting when she offered her services to the students. It held Dasig administratively liable only for the less serious infraction of simple misconduct. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT DASIG HAD MERELY ATTEMPTED TO PRACTICE LAWWHEN SHE OFFERED HER SERVICES TO THE THREE STUDENTS FOR THECORRECTION OF THEIR NAMES THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGSUNDER RULE 108. No. The Court of Appeals erred when it found that Dasig had merely attempted to practice law while employed at the CHED in offering her services to the three student for the correction of their names through judicial proceedings under Rule 108.The procedure under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of correcting or canceling entries in the civil registry involving a) births; b) marriages; c) deaths; d) legal separations; e)judgments of annulments of marriage; f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; g) legitimations; h) adoptions; i) acknowledgments of natural children; j) naturalization; k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; l)civil interdiction; m) judicial determination of filiation; n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and o) changes of name. Hence, there is no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of attorney s fees and litigation expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either approve or disapprove the students request to change entries in the academics record o conform to their birth certificate.

Correction of entries

Habeas Corpus
1. Ilusorio vs Bildner Ilusorio vs. Bildner GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000 FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potenciano s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to

do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process. 2. Serapio vs Sandigan bayan 3. Lacson vs Perez 4. Pulido vs Abu Writ of Habeas Corpus: Not proper pending Special CivilAction for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7thDivision. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA:ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead andunder his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting inhis stead and under his authority, respondents. G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007 Facts:I n l i n e w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e O a k w o o d M u t i n y t h a t l e d t o P r e s . Gloria Macapagal Arroyo s issuance of Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a "state of rebellion and General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and thePNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion.", petitioners were taken into custody by their Service Commander. Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial w i t h v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A r t i c l e s o f W a r . T h e y w e r e , h o w e v e r , a m o n g t h e s o l d i e r s charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. T h e y w e r e c o n s e q u e n t l y d e t a i n e d i n F o r t B o n i f a c i o u n d e r t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e Philippine Marines. A petition for bail was filed by the accused soldiers which the RTC subsequently granted. Despite of the order and the service thereof, petitioner were not released. As a response, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. M o r e o v e r , since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a P e t i t i o n for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner Pulido on their b e h a l f . I n r e s p o n s e , Respondents prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is justified because o f the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 J u l y 2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th Division. Thus, we have this case. Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite o f t h e pending special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals 7th Division. Held:

No. That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower court s grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the orderg ranting bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement hrough a petition for habeas corpus the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this immediately raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court? W e believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e., the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, w e c l e a r l y h e a r d t h e petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales and Mesa s release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore footno ted, ordering the release on bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.XXX XXX XXX When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ o f H a b e a s C o r p u s w a s filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substan tial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that c o u r t s w i l l n o t determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

5. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ V.LUISA R. VILLANUEVA AND TERESITA R. PABELLO G.R. No. 169482; January 29, 2008 Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from apoor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. Since 2000, she was living with her nephew Veluz, who acted as her guardian. On January 11, 2005, respondents Villanueva and Pabello took Eufemia from Veluz house. Respondents are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased husband Maximo. They pointed out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as the petitioner claimed and that the latter paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs. They even filed a complaint for estafa against the petitioner for failure to present an

inventory and return the properties entrusted to him. Hence, and by reason of their mother s deteriorating health, they decided to take custody of Eufemia who willingly went with them. Veluz made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. WHETHER OR NOT EUFEMIA IS BEING RESTRAINED OF HER LIBERTY. No. The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb the findingof the Court of Appeals to wit: There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of herliberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia s adopted children, are taking care of her. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writof habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus , a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to b unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

6. THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V.RAYMOND and REYNALDO MANALOG.R. No. 180906; October 7, 2008 Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. They also sought ancillary remedies and all

other legal and equitable reliefs. The Court ordered the Secretary of DND and the Chief of Staff of the AFP,t heir agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the CAFGU to submit their comment; and enjoined them from causing the arrest of the respondents, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights. While the petition was pending, the rule on the writ of amparo took effect. Respondents filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat existing petition as amparo petition. The privilege of the writ of amparo was granted by the Court of Appeals on December 26, 2007.The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the Supreme Court seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO IS PROPER. Yes. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in anyway. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, more so now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo .Hence, the issuance of a writ of amparo was proper. 7. 8. 9. 10. Office of Court Administrator vs Puello Martinez vs Mendoza Salientes vs Abanilla In re: Ashruf Kunting