CHAPTER 8: #1: MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL: G.R. No.

L-42428 March 18, 1983 BERNARDINO MARCELINO, vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., et. Al. ESCOLIN, J.: *petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance Trial was conducted and the same was concluded on August 4, 1975, both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda o given thirty [30] days to submit their respective memoranda

Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the People. On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Meanwhile, counsel for the accused filed before the Supreme Court the present petition. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.

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ISSUE: W/N the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the case? RULING: Supreme Court - the petition is hereby dismissed on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five [851 days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No. 5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution the rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution o SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts. The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." "The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law." 2|Page

 "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. " Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict have been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated it." "the legal distinction between directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws." the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ... " And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure. declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such an absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law. the constitutional provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus, where the contrary construction) would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be followed. "

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 Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

CHAPTER 8: #2: MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL: LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS v. CA G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution? HELD: No. The legislatures intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must or shall. 4|Page

CHAPTER 8: #3: MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES IN GENERAL: G.R. No. L-24583 October 29, 1966

MAGDALENA SIBULO VDA. DE MESA, et. Al. vs. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS and/or Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAXIMINO A. ARGANA, et. Al. CASTRO, J.: *petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction FACTS: Opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal were Francisco De Mesa and Maximino A. Argana. The electorate's choice, as tallied by the local board of canvassers, was De Mesa. Elected vice-mayor with him was Demetrio R. Loresca. Duly, proclaimed elected, these two qualified and assumed their respective positions upon the commencement of their term of office. defeated candidate Argana, charging the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts, protested the election of De Mesa however, an assassin's bullet felled De Mesa, and, forthwith, vice-mayor Loresca was, by operation of law, duly installed as his successor In the election case, meanwhile, the protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. Expressly to hear protestee's view thereon and to afford him a chance to propose his commissioners, this motion was set for hearing but, quite understandably, no appearance was entered for the deceased protestee. Accordingly, on May 6, 1964, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They 5|Page

did not, however, comply. Taking no further action in the premises, the trial court left the matter at that. Then proceeding ex parte, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative as indeed none had thus far been named the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. the trial court - adjudged the protestant Maximino A. Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, and taxed the costs and expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased protestee Francisco De Mesa within the reglementary period for the finality of the decision aforesaid, a three-pronged move was taken by De Mesa's widow the court a quo - denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal Argana qualified as mayor and assumed office In the meantime, Demetrio R. Loresca made common cause with De Mesa's widow and the local Liberal Party Chapter, and moved for leave to be added to and/or substituted as partyprotestee, claiming a legal and continuing interest in the outcome of the election protest as successor to De Mesa. the trial court dictated twin order (1) granting the protestant's motion to strike out the notice of appeal heretofore adverted to; and (2) denying Loresca's motion to be substituted a party-protestee Court of Appeals - sustaining the validity of the proceedings had and taken by the Court of First Instance ISSUE:

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 is the determination of the legal effect of the proceedings taken by the trial court in the election contest before it subsequent to the demise of the protestee De Mesa RULING: Supreme Court the judgment under review is reversed the death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, and it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee o SEC. 17. Death of party.After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.) It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall." While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction. Thus, Black is authority for the rule that "Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or public officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty" The matter here involved not only concerns public interest but also goes into the jurisdiction of the trial court and is of the essence of the proceedings taken thereon. On this point, there 7|Page

is authority to the effect that in statutes relating to procedure, as is the one now under consideration, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the widow and children of the deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case. But when they failed to comply mainly because of the shock and agony that followed in the wake of the violent death of the protestee the trial court took no further steps in the premises and, instead, at the instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children non-suited, proceeded with the case ex parte, and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee. In these moves, the trial court did not only merit the unqualified sanction of the Court of Appeals but the latter, taking an even more radical of the matter, actually held that the rule relied upon has no application to election cases.

CHAPTER 9: #4: PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES IN GENERAL: Co v. CA G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: 8|Page

No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. CHAPTER 9: #5: PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES IN GENERAL: #9: STATUTES SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE: CHAPTER 10: #17: AMENDMENT: G.R. No. L-2671 August 30, 1950 ANICETA IBURAN, vs. MAGDALENO LABES, FACTS: an action of unlawful detainer Justice of the Peace's jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case as one of unlawful detainer It is the contention of the defendant and appellant that the allegations in the complaint bring the case within the provisions of Act No. 4054, known as Tenancy Law, and its amendments. It should be stated that section 29 of Act No. 4054, which was approved on February 27, 1933, provides "That this Act shall take effect only in the provinces where the majority of the municipal councils shall, by resolution, have petitioned for its application to the Governor-General, who thereupon shall, by proclamation, fix the date when this law shall take effect in said provinces," and that it was only on November 12, 1946, when that Act as amended was declared in full force and effect in Cebu by Executive Proclamation No. 14 of the President. It should be also stated that on the date of the proclamation, the present case had been decided by the Justice of the Peace against the defendant, the latter had appealed to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff had reproduced her complaint and the defendant had filed his answer in the latter court, and execution of the Justice of the Peace's judgment had been issued although the execution apparently had not been carried out. It thus only remained for the Court of First Instance to hear and decide the action. 9|Page

ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4054 should be given a retroactive effect? RULING: Supreme Court judgment is affirmed Statutes are presumed to be prospective only in their operation rather than retrospective or retroactive, unless the contrary clearly appears, or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied. by its terms, a statute is to apply "hereafter", or "thereafter", or is to take effect at a fixed future date, or immediately, or which contains, in the enacting clause, the phrase "from and after the passing of this Act," or contains the words "shall have been made," or "from and after," a designated date . . ., it is prospective only in operation The presumption is stronger against retroactivity of a statute with reference to pending actions or proceedings. It has been generally held that "no statute shall be so construed as to give it retroactive effect so as to affect pending litigation." "Statutes which affect or change a remedy are presumed intended to exempt pending cases and proceedings from their operation unless the contrary appears." Proclamation No. 14 declared "The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act to be in full force and effect from and after the date of this proclamation throughout the Philippines." These words clearly import an intent to make the proclamation prospective. The provision of Act No. 4045 that the date of its effectivity in a province was to be fixed by the Chief Executive depending upon the wishes of the majority of the municipal councils thereof, is the strongest argument against the theory that such proclamation when issued should cover previous cases. Obviously there was in the mind of the Legislature no pressing need for the application of this legislation, when it was passed, to all the provinces. Hand in hand with this idea was the notion that the conditions affecting the relations between

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landlords and tenants in a given province did not demand the operation of the law therein before Proclamation No. 14 was promulgated.

CHAPTER 9: #6: EX POST FACTO LAW: G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982 RUFINO V. NUEZ petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents FERNANDO, C.J.: *petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS: Petitioner was accused before the SB of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds o denied

petitioner claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution ISSUES: W/N PD# 1486 is unconstitutional for being violative of ex-post facto clause of the Constitution? RULING: Supreme Court petition is dismissed The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's 11 | P a g e

right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument. "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. "An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded o taking "from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the 12 | P a g e

members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. " Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied

CHAPTER 9: #7: WHEN LAWS APPLIED RETROACTIVELY: People v. Moran G.R. No. 17905 (January 27, 1923) FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no exception. Statutes are not construed to have 13 | P a g e

retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory.

CHAPTER 9: #8: WHEN LAWS APPLIED RETROACTIVELY: Laceste v. Santos G.R. No. 36886 (February 1, 1932) FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. However, Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art. 344 of the RPC. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect. HELD: Yes. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Conscience and good law justify this exception.

CHAPTER 9: #10: STATUTES AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS: G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, MELO, J.: FACTS: 14 | P a g e

 The accused-appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered finding them guilty and sentencing the accused to a death penalty and indemnification ISSUE: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? RULING: Supreme Court the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with modifications o In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua

At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed upon accused-appellants. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1, 1994. Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect. 15 | P a g e

 True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any executive action commuted There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them. Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used CHAPTER 9: #11: 16 | P a g e

STATUTES AFFECTING OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACT: People v. Zeta G.R. No. L-7140 (December 22, 1955)-FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. HELD: No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. CHAPTER 9: #12: REPEALING & AMENDATORY ACTS: CHAPTER 10: #16: AMENDMENT: #25: REPEAL:

G.R. No. L-14406 June 30, 1961 MARCELINO BUYCO, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, Iloilo City, FACTS: On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent

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 The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate payable in thirty (30) years
petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan with his said

backpay acknowledgment certificate but respondent answered petitioner that since respondent's motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, L-8782, (52 O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S.C.) respondent "cannot yet grant" petitioner's request Court had denied respondent's motion for reconsideration petitioner again wrote reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate respondent answered petitioner that in view of the amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956 by R.A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioner's certificate
Mandamus case

The Court of First Instance granted the petition and ordered the respondent bank "to give due course on the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of the petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings against respondent. ISSUE: W/N the petitioner bank should have accepted the offer made by the respondent? RULING:
Supreme Court mandamus is the proper remedy and the judgment appealed from

is hereby affirmed
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 "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment It is true that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity" (Art. 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled, however, that since the prohibitive amendment of the appellant's charter should not be given retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time appellee made his offer, allowed, in fact compelled, the respondent bank to accept the appellee's certificate, the above provision finds no application herein.

CHAPTER 9: #13: PROCEDURAL LAWS: Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-54305 (February 14, 1990) FACTS:

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Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal, CUENCOVELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D. 1281 prevails. HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application.

CHAPTER 9: #14: PROCEDURAL LAWS: G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, FACTS: herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan filed a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo allegations: o has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was 20 | P a g e

christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo o Chad had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff o The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss trial court: o o denied and the case as set for pre-trial resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance Court of Appeals o Granted the petition filed by the petitioner and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner CA - dismissing the petition ISSUE:

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 W/N Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect? RULING: Supreme Court the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively. Article 285 of the Civil Code o Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code: o Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 22 | P a g e

 Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

CHAPTER 10: #18: REVISION & CODIFICATION: CHAPTER 10: #19: REPEAL: Mecano v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 23 | P a g e

ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.

CHAPTER 10: #20: REPEAL: People v. Almuete G.R. No. L-26551 (February 27, 1976) FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed.

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HELD: Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine prethreshing. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenants act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.

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