SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

INTERPLEADER Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005 An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

RCBC vs. Metro, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001 It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."

DECLARATORY RELIEF Republic vs. Orbecibo III October 5, 2005 The requisites of action for declaratory relief are (1) The subject matter must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance; (2) The terms of said document or the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) There must have been no breach of said document; (4) There must be actual justiciable controversy or the ripening seeds of one( there is threatened litigation the immediate future); there must be allegation of any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation of petitioners right sought to be prevented by the declaratory relief sought; (5) The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (6) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination e.g. administrative remedies already exhausted; (7) The party seeking the relief has legal interest in the controversy; and (8) Adequate relief is not available thru other means. (9) Stated otherwise, the requisites are: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) The

controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) The party seeking the relief must have legal interest in the controversy; and (d) The issue is ripe for judicial determination.

Mejia vs. Gabayan, G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005 The petitioner ought to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse. Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of actions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies and should be used with caution. Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is equitable. The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies. It may be reiterated that the action for declaratory relief which originated in the classical Roman law, had been used in Scotland for four centuries and adopted in England and other European countries. The remedy is purely statutory in nature and origin. The remedy is an extension of the ancient quia timet. A declaratory judgment does not create or change substantial rights or modify any relationship or alter the character of controversies.

Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004 The essential requisites of the action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. It merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. 30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised. Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS New Frontier Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, GR 165001, Jan. 31, 2007 Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, sine the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment.

Chua vs. CA G.R. No. 121438, 23 October 2000 Exceptions to the rule that certiorari is not available when the period for appeal has lapsed and certiorari may still be invoked when appeal is lost are the following: (a) Appeal was lost without the appellants negligence; (b) When public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (c) When the broader interest of justice so requires; (d) When the writs issued are null and void; and (e) When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

Paradero vs. Abragan, et al., G.R. No. 158917, March 1, 2004 The Court is aware of the doctrine that the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Indeed, it is the inadequacy not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, reiterated in the subsequent cases of Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 18 Echauz v. Court of Appeals, and International School v. Court of Appeals. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there can be no forumshopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced. [International School v. Court of Appeals] Moreover, even assuming that petitioners recourse to certiorari is correct, the same is still dismissible for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed to show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.

Asian Transmission Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March 15, 2004 For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.

Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allieid Workers Union vs. CA, GR 165486, May 31, 2006 Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. Hence, if there was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision and what was being questioned was merely the findings in the decision of whether or not the practice of the other party constitutes a violation of the agreement, the matter is a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003 At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.

People vs. Almendras, G.R. L-145915 April 24, 2003

Filing of petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved in the proceeding, unless an application for a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate court is granted (Sec. 7). Neither does it interrupt the reglementary period for the filing of an answer nor the course of the case where there is no writ of injunction

PCGG vs. Desierto, January 19, 2001 As regards the manifestation of the Office of the Ombudsman of its willingness to have the case remanded for preliminary investigation, in PCGG vs. Desierto, the Court has also enunciated the rule that when the merits of the complaint have evidently and thoroughly been examined by the Ombudsman, it would not be right to yet subject respondents to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish. The Court finds no cogent reason to divert in the instant case from making that same pronouncement.

ELPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001 The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."

Bugarin vs. Palisoc, GR 157985, Dec. 5, 2005 Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. The remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the lower court is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion. The existence and availability of the right to appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for certiorari is that there is no appeal.

Santos, v. CA, GR 141947, July 5, 2001 The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED, G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001 We hold that respondent's Petition for Certiorari was seasonably filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered was not the Order of August 14, 1998, but the date when respondent received the December 9, 1998 Order declaring it in default. Since it received this Order only on January 13, 1999, and filed its Petition for Certiorari on February 23, 1999, it obviously complied with the sixty-day reglementary period stated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Moreover, the August 14, 1998 Order was not a proper subject of certiorari or appeal, since it was merely an interlocutory order. Petitioner also contends that certiorari cannot prosper in this case, because respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing its Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Respondent counters that reconsideration should be dispensed with, because the December 9, 1998 Order is a patent nullity. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that a petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that the regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Hence, the haste with

which the solicitor general raised these issues before the appellate court is understandable. For the reason mentioned, we rule that respondent's Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration.

Olan vs. CA, G.R. No. 116109, September 14, 1999 Finally, it must be pointed out that the writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence". Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

Liga v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004 Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . . required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.

DBP vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 145908, January 22, 2004 Basic is the doctrine that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be the subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered. But this rule is not absolute. Indeed, where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.

Perez vs. Ombudsman, May 27, 2004 As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman and MendozaArce vs. Ombudsman, requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman's orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule. But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court, we would have dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ombudsman resolution. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

La Bugal-B'laan vs. Ramos, January 27, 2004 We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, it is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now.

Lopez vs. Ombudsman, September 6, 2001 This Court has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority."

G & S Transport vs. CA, May 28, 2002 It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations. Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA will enter into a contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the international airport is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does not involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus this Court cannot direct the exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determination of the winning bidders should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA

which is the agency in the best position to evaluate the proposals and to decide which bid would most complement the NAIA's services.

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE Prudential Bank vs. Alviar, July 28 2005 A mortgage contract may have a provision in which the mortgage is a security for past, present and future indebtedness. This clause known as a dragnet clause orblanket mortgage clause has its origins in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruled that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts.

Hubert Nuez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010. Elements of cause of action; The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTCs acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTCs jurisdiction, our perusal of the record shows that respondents 9 January 2004 amended complaint was able to make out a cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers. Considering that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of

the plaintiff, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Element of prior possession; Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, respondents claim of prior possession is clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioners position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Because possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession. In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of 27 February 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the land since 1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had been effected by means of stealth.

DBP vs. Aguirre, September 7, 2001 However, although the notice of foreclosure sale was duly published, the sale did not take place as scheduled on September 25, 1985. Instead, it was held more than two months after the published date of the sale or on January 7, 1986. This renders the sale void. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by

the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. Although the lack of republication of the notice of sale has not been raised in this case, this Court is possessed of ample power to look into a relevant issue, such as the lack of jurisdiction to hold the foreclosure sale. National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010. Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the issuance of the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit: Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the

corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyers name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge issuing the writ following these express provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. As such, the court granting the writ cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. To accentuate the writs ministerial character, the Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

Metrobank v. Wong, June 26, 2001 It is bad enough that the mortgagor has no choice but to yield his property in a foreclosure proceeding. It is infinitely worse, if prior thereto, he was denied of his basic right to be informed of the impending loss of his property. This is another instance when law and morals echo the same sentiment. The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. Precisely, the purpose of a stipulation in the contract for an additional requirement is to apprise respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void. Unlike in Olizon where there was a valid publication of the notice of foreclosure sale, the publication in the case at bar was defective. Not only did it fail to conform with the requirement that the notice must be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but also, there were substantial errors in the notice of sale published in the Pagadian Times as found by the

scrutinizing eyes of the trial court. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 170241, April 19, 2010. Once again, the Court stresses the importance of the notice requirement, as enunciated in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Peafiel, thus: The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice [sale] of the property. The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a reasonably wide publicity of the auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the far-reaching effects of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation. In addition, the Court reminds mortgagees of their duty to comply faithfully with the statutory requirements of foreclosure. In Metropolitan Bank v. Wong, the Court declared: While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to pay his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others. In sum, petitioner failed to establish its compliance with the publication requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135. Consequently, the questioned extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and sale are void.

PARTITION Figuracion-Gerilla vs. Vda. De Figuracion, August 22, 2006 There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached,

under Sections 3 to 6. Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Varona vs. CA, May 20, 2004 It is settled that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Lopez vs. David, March 30, 2004 Under Section 1 of Rule 70, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioners Complaint was filed beyond one year from the time that respondents possession allegedly became unlawful. We have ruled that forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus,

we have nullified proceedings in the MeTC when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.

Del Rosario vs. Sps. Manuel, January 16, 2004 As found by the trial court, petitioner's possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the respondents. We have held in a number of cases that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required to leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a contract, that he will vacate upon demand.

Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs. CA, September 3, 2003 It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a colessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

Sps. Tirona v. Alejo, October 10, 2001 A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners' action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his

right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable. Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners' actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.

Uy v. Santiago, July 31, 2000 Private respondents' argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them of their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We must stress that what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and shall not have any effect on the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it must be remembered that ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.

Cansino vs. CA, August 21, 2003 It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and prove that they had prior physical possession of the property before they were unlawfully deprived thereof by defendants. Respondents, being the complainants before the lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of prior possession.

Lariosa vs. Bandala, August 15, 2003 Ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be addressed as promptly as possible. Respondent Judge has acted within the bounds of his authority in issuing the orders for the alias writ of execution and the alias writ of demolition.

Bustos vs. CA, January 24, 2001 Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)." In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Laurora vs. Sterling, April 9, 2003 We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership. Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror not even by the owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves prior possession in this case, petitioners can recover possession even from the owners themselves. Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom. The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain possession. The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.

CONTEMPT

Macrohon vs. Ibay, November 30, 2006 Those who don the judicial robe have been reminded time and again that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. It has repeatedly been stressed that the role of a

judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of Justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010 Respondents filed a case for indirect contempt against Augusto L. Canlas, Atty. Francisco A. Abella, Jr., and Atty. Rizal V. Katalbas, Jr. for allegedly defying the TRO issued by the RTC in connection with the complaint for injunction and damages previously filed by respondents. Contempt constitutes disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Bugaring vs. Espaol, January 19, 2001 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.

De Leon vs. CA, February 5, 2004 The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.

Espinosa vs. CA, May 28, 2004 Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine, a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing. The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt. In cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errant's bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed.

Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003 Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Alan Sheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker, December 13, 2007 The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court because such calls also for practicability for it to apply other than the absence of special provisions.The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. On the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's residence and the respondent court is very far. Petition granted. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005 Art. 41 of the Family Code provides that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage where one of the spouses has been absent for the periods and under the circumstances therein, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in said Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee. Such summary proceeding is not a special proceeding under the Rules of Court, hence, the filling of only a notice of appeal from the trial courts order suffices to perfect the appeal therefrom. Venue Jao vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002 Residence means his personal or place of abode and not his permanent legal residence or domicile. Summary Settlement of Estate Portugal vs. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005 It is settled doctrine that if special proceedings are pending or there is a need to file one, for the determination of heirship, that issue should be determined in said special proceedings. Where those special proceedings had been finally terminated and the putative heir had lost his right to be declared therein as a co-heir, an ordinary civil action can be timely filed for his declaration as an heir.

Where under the circumstances of the case there is no compelling reason to still subject the decedents estate to administration proceedings, since a determination of clamants status as heir could be achieved in the civil case he filed for the annulment of the titles awarded to the others in a prior extrajudicial or summary settlement of the estate, the trial court should proceed with the civil case and determine the status and claims of the plaintiff therein. Letters Testamentary and of Administration Tan vs Gedorio, March 14 2008 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference, they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated theappointment of a special administrator. Uy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006 In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration is the interest in the said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which sec. 6 Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator. The underlying assumption for this rule is that those who will reap the benefits of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the higher interest and most influential motive to administer estate correctly. However, the order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators and the same may be resorted to by the probate court in the exercise of sound discretion. Claims against the Estate Pasco vs. de Guzman, July 26 2010 Filomenas estate has a different juridical personality than that of the heirs. Nonetheless, her heirs certainly have an interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties, for at the moment of Filomenas death, the heirs start to own the property; subject to the decedents liabilities. Art. 777 of the Civil Code provide that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Unfortunately, the records before the court do not show the status of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Filomena. The Supreme Court further

explained that to allow the release of the funds directly to the distribution and delivery should be made only after, not before, the payment of all the debts charges, expenses, and taxes of the estate have been paid. The Supreme Court, thus, decree that the amount received from the petitioners should be deposited with the MTC and in turn, the MTC should hold in abeyance the release of the amount to Filomenas heir until after showing that the proper procedure for the settlement of Filomenas estate has been followed. Inventory and Appraisal Lim vs. Court of Appeals January 24, 2000 Generally, in order to determine whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Nonetheless, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in t he absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Lim over the properties. The real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased are in the possession of and are registered in the name of the private respondent corporations, which possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders. The presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of the private respondent should stand undisturbed.