Foundation University

COLLEGE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE

Remedial Law Review I

Milcah Inggo
Activity No. 2

1. Define the following:

1.1. Cause of action – a cause of action is the act of omission by which a party violates
a right of another. (Sec 1, Rule 2)
1.2. Ordinary civil action. Give an example – one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
(Sec 3a, Rule 1)
1.3. Special civil action. Give an example -
1.4 Criminal action – one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act of
omission punishable by law. (Sec 3b, Rule 1)
1.5. Special proceedings – a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. (Sec 3c, Rule 1)
1.6. Real action – one which affects title to or possession of real property or interest
therein. (Sec 1, Rule 4)
1.7. Personal action - one which does not affect title to or possession of real property
or interest therein. (Sec 2, Rule 4)

2. Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides,

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

3. The determination shall be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint, and the
court cannot consider other matters aliunde. (Manaloto vs Veloso III, G.R. No. 171635,
2010)
The test to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are:
(a) Whether the same evidence would support and sustain both causes of action (Same
evidence test); (b) Whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the
complaint in the other; and (c) Whether the cause of action the second case existed at the
time of filing of the first complaint. (Umale vs Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No.
167246, 2011)

4. Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. (Sec 1, Rule 3)

5. Consent to be sued
A. Express consent:
The law expressly grants the authority to sue the State or any of its agencies.
Examples:
 a) A law creating a government body expressly providing that such body “may sue or
be sued.”
b) Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the State when it acts
through a special agent.
B. Implied consent:
1). The State enters into a private contract.
a). The contract must be entered into by the proper officer and within the scope of
his authority.
b). UNLESS:  The contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental
function.
2). The State enters into an operation that is essentially a business operation.
a). UNLESS:  The operation is incidental to the performance of a governmental       
function (e.g. arrastre services)
b). Thus, when the State conducts business operations through a GOCC, the latter can
generally be sued, even if its charter contains no express “sue or be sued” clause.
3). Suit against an incorporated government agency.
a) This is because they generally conduct propriety business operations and have
charters which grant them a separate juridical personality.
4). The State files suit against a private party.
UNLESS:  The suit is entered into only to resist a claim.

6. Jurisdiction is the authority and power of the court to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceeding in question belongs while venue refers to the
possible or proper place or places for the trial of a suit, as among several places where
jurisdiction could be established.

7. Real actions shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (Sec 1
Rule 4)

8. Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides at the election of the plaintiff. (Sec 2 Rule 4)

9. A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the
pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action. An affirmative defense
is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material
allegations in the claimants pleading, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him.
(Sec 5 Rule 6)

10. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment,
illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any
other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (Sec 5 Rule 6)

11. a. as to whom directed. A counterclaim is directed against the opposing party while a
cross-clain is directed against a co-party.
b. as to connection with the main action. A counterclaim may or may not arise out of
the transaction constituting the subject matter of thje opposing party’s claim while a
cross-claim always arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein
c. as to compulsoriness. A counterclaim may or may not be compulsory while a cross-
claim is always compulsory.
 d. as for need to answer. A counterclaim need not be answered if the counterclaim is
compulsory, while a cross-claim must be answered, otherwise the party against whom it is
pleaded may be declared in default upon motion.

12. A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim
and complies with the other requirements set forth in Sec 7 Rule 6. A permissive
counterclaim is one which is not a compulsory counterclaim.

13. Qualify. To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Supreme

Court has devised the following tests:
a. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?
b. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counter claim?
c. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as
the defendant’s counterclaim?
d. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory
(GSIS v Caballero, 2010)
Test of opposition or consistency: would the grant of the counterclaim necessarily defeat
or negate the complaint? If the answer is yes, then the counter claim is compulsory.

14. A compulsory counterclaim is termed compulsory because there is an element of

compulsion to set it up. The rule is designed to achieve resolution of the whole
controversy at one time and in one action to and to avoid multiplicity of suits. (Baclayon v
CA, 182 SCRA 761)

15. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading
and document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
a) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay. Or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
b) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing jurisprudence;
c) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of discovery under these
rules; and
d) the denials of factual contentions are warranted in the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information (Sec 3(b) Rule 7)

16. A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said

verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the
form of a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the
pleading, and shall allege the following attestations:
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his or her personal
knowledge, or based on authentic documents;
(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation; and
 (c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery.
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the
allegations in the pleading. (Sec 4, Rule 7)

17. No. The Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping
is intended to cover an initiatory pleading, meaning an incipient application of a party
asserting a claim for relief. (Carpio and Orendain vs. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Inc., 2006)
It is a certification under oath by the plaintiff stating that:
a. he has not therefore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency;
b. to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and
c. if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within 5 days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint of initiatory pleading has been filed.

Case Digest

1. Republic vs Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996

Re: Joinder of causes of action
Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and also the
prayer for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph to complement
the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two
special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not
related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy
of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper name of
the minor adoptee embodies in the petition for adoption.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5,
Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint
conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract,
transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the
same nature and character.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.

2. Navarro vs Hon. Escobido, G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009

Re: Parties to a civil action
Facts:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs
of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. In his
Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated
no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option
to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) — the actionable documents on which
the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the
presumption that Glenn Go’s (husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus
ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule
4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be
converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
CA denied petition.
Issue: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
Ruling: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as
the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case.
Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is
legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her
name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties
registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to
the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-
joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as
per Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.

3. Regner vs Logarta, G.R. NO. 168747, October 19, 2007

Re: Indispensable party
Facts:
Luis executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his daughters, Cynthia and Teresa covering
the Proprietary Ownership No. 0272 of the Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Victoria Regner [petitioner], the second wife of Luis, filed a complaint for the Declaration
of nullity of the Deed of Donation alleging that the siblings conspired to fraudulently make
a deed of donation in their favor.
The Sheriff served summons on Cynthia and Teresa at the Borja Family Clinic wherein their
other sister Melinda worked, however, the latter refused to receive the summons for her
sisters. Teresa arrived in the Philippines and she was personally served the summons.
Victoria filed a motion to set case for trial. Teresa filed her rejoinder on the ground that
their sister, Cynthia, is an indispensable party and had not been served a summon and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, as the case would not proceed without the
presence of Cynthia.
Issue:
Whether a co-donee is an indispensible party in an action to declare the nullity of the
deed of donation.
Ruling:
Yes. (1) Rule 3 Sec. 7 defines indispensible parties as parties-in-interest without whom
there can be no final determination of action. As such, they must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the
joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine quo non for the exercise of
judicial powers.
Cynthia and Teresa both derived their rights by way of donation from their father. Thus,
based on the Deed of Donation, the siblings are co-owners of the subject property. Such
property is undivided and it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property belongs to either of them. Hence, both Cynthia and Teresa are indispensable
parties.

4. Borlasa vs Polistico, G.R. No. L-22909, January 28, 1925

Re: Necessary party
Facts:
Plaintiffs and defendants, together with several hundred other persons, formed an
association under the name of Turuhan Polistico & Co.
An action was instituted by Victoriano Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and
others, chiefly for the purpose of securing the dissolution of the voluntary association, and
to compel the defendants to account for and surrender the money and property of the
association in order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets applied according to
law.
The trial judge dismissed the action for lack of necessary parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial erred in dismissing the action for lack of necessary parties
Ruling:
Yes. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of
course, the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those latter being
a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. In a class suit, however, representation of
a class interest which will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is not
indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party.

5. Imson vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106436, December 3, 1994

Re: Necessary party
Facts:
The case at bench arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Toyota Corolla and
a Hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents FNCB Finance
Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation. The collision seriously
injured petitioner and totally wrecked his car. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Damages against private respondents as registered owners of the truck; truck driver; the
beneficial owners and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corporation.
Defendants driver and beneficial owners failed to answer and were declared in default.
however, petitioner and defendant insurer, entered into a compromise agreement
In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial court dismissed the Complaint for
Damages against Western Guaranty Corporation. A copy of the Order of dismissal was
received by private respondent Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation. Nearly
eighteen (18) months later, said private respondent moved to dismiss the case against all
the other defendants. It argued that since they are all indispensable parties under a
common cause of action, the dismissal of the case against
defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them. The trial
court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, as it ruled: that in a common cause of action
where all the defendants are indispensable parties, the court's power to act is integral and
cannot be split, such that it cannot relieve any of them and at the same time render
judgment against the rest.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the case against defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of
the suit against all of them.
Ruling:
NO. In sum, Lim Tanhu states that where a complaint alleges a common cause of action
against
defendants who are all indispensable parties to the case, its dismissal against any of them
by virtue of a compromise agreement with the plaintiff necessarily results in the dismissal
of the case against the other defendants, including those in default. The ruling is rooted
on the rationale that the court's power to act in a case involving a common cause of action
against indispensable parties "is integral and cannot be split such that it cannot relieve any
of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest.
For Lim Tanhu to apply to the case at bench, it must be established that: (1) petitioner has
common cause of action against private respondents and the other; and (2) all the
defendants are indispensable parties to the case.
In the case at bench, it is clear that petitioner has different and separate causes of action
against the defendants in the case. The allegations in the Complaint show that petitioner
seeks to recover from the truck driver for his wrong which caused injury to petitioner and
his car. The cause of action against him is based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code. Quasi-delict, too, is the basis of the cause of action against defendants
beneficial and registered owners. But in their case, it is Article 2180
of the same Code which governs the rights of the parties.
However, with respect to defendant Western Guaranty Corporation, petitioner's cause of
action is based on contract. He seeks to recover from the insurer on the basis of the third
party liability clause of its insurance contract with the owners of the truck. Quite clearly
then, Lim Tanhu will not apply to the case at bench for there is no showing that petitioner
has a common cause of action against the defendants.
Defendants, except for the truck driver, are but proper parties is interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties
and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the
parties in court.
 6. Banda vs Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010
Re: Class suit
Facts:
The present controversy arose out of a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging
the constitutionality of Executive Order 378.
The National Printing Office (NPO) was formed during the term of former President Cory
Aquino by virtue of E.O 285 which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from
the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed E.O, amending Section 6 of E.O. 285 by
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and instrumentalities.
Perceiving E.O as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners
challenged its constitutionality.
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf
of all their co-employees at the NPO.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition constitutes a class suit
Ruling:
No. The requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned. (Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court)
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by
the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners.

7. The Heirs of Haberer vs CA, G.R. Nos. L-42699 to L-42709, May 26, 1981
Re: Death of party; Duty of counsel
Facts:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the late Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer as the duly registered owner filed in 1964 and 1965 (11)
complaints for recovery of possession of the parcel of land evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in her name, situated
at Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleging that private respondents had surreptitiously entered the
land and built their houses thereon. The lower court dismissed 11 complaints for recovery
of parcel of land. Upon pending of the appeal the Plaintiff, in the person of Florentina
died. The counsel then notified the court of the appellant’s death, and prayed for the
suspension of the period for filing of the appellant’s brief pending appointment of an
executor of the estate left by their client. The Court of Appeals denied the extension and
dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the death of a client terminates the attorney-client relationship
b. Whether or not the death of one of the parties in a pending case is a proper
recourse in dismissing the same
Ruling:
a. Respondent court therefore erred in ruling that since upon the demise of the
party-appellant, the attorney-client relationship between her and her counsels
"was automatically severed and terminated," whatever pleadings filed by said
counsel with it after the death of said appellant "are mere scraps of paper." If at
all, due to said death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the attorney-client
relationship, further proceedings and specifically the running of the original 45-day
 period for filing the appellnt's brief should be legally deemed as having been
automatically suspended, until the proper substitution of the deceased appellant
by her executor or administrator or her heirs shall have been effected within the
time set by respondent court pursuant to the cited Rule.
b. The Rules of Court requires the appearance of the deceased’s legal representatives
instead of dismissing the case. Dismissal of an appeal on the ground of failure to
file appellant’s brief must be in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play.
The extension should have been granted. Presiding from the foregoing, justice and
equity dictate under the circumstances of the case at bar that the rules, while
necessary for the speedy and orderly administration of justice should not be
applied with the rigidity and inflexibility of respondent court's resolutions. What
should guide judicial action is the principle that a party litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.  A liberal, rather
than a strict and inflexible adherence to the Rules, is justified not only because
appellant (in this case, her estate and/or heirs) should be given every opportunity
to be heard but also because no substantial injury or prejudice can well be caused
to the adverse parties principally, since they are in actual possession of the
disputed land.  The better and certainly the more prudent course of action in every
judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than
dispose of a case on technicalities,  especially where no substantial prejudice is
caused to the adverse party. 

8. Bautista vs De Borja, G.R. No. L-20600, October 28, 1966

Re: Stipulation as to venue
Petitioner Bautista now contends that respondent judge (De Borja) acted with grave abuse
of discretion in denying his original and supplemental motions to dismiss private
respondent’s (G. A. Machineries, Inc.) complaint and in allowing it to proceed ex parte
with the trial. It is insisted that when G. A. Machineries, Inc., filed its complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, venue was improperly laid, since Bautista and G.A.
Machineries expressly stipulated in the sales and chattel mortgage contracts that any
action arising between them in connection therewith should be instituted in the City of
Manila, and this express stipulation amounts to a clear, valid and effective waiver on the
part of plaintiff to invoke the right of election granted it, as plaintiff, under the Rules of
Court, to choose the venue; and that this stipulation was embodied in their contracts for
his (Bautista’s) benefit and advantage because he has his principal office, and conducts
principally his business, in the City of Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge (De Borja) erroneously denied a motion to
dismiss based on the ground of improper venue
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent judge (De Borja) acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
Bautista’s motion to dismiss based on the ground of improper venue.
‘By written agreement of the parties the venue of action may be changed or transferred
from one province to another.’ (Section 3, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court)
It appearing that the action was brought in a place other than that fixed by the parties in
their valid written contracts; that the ground of improper venue is clear and patent on the
record of the case, the written contracts having been attached and made an integral part
of the complaint; that the impropriety of the venue was properly and timely raised in a
motion to dismiss.