EC744 Lecture Note 8 Applications of Stochastic DP: Prof. Jianjun Miao
EC744 Lecture Note 8 Applications of Stochastic DP: Prof. Jianjun Miao
EC744 Lecture Note 8 Applications of Stochastic DP: Prof. Jianjun Miao
yt = yt1 + y + t, where t is iid with a standard normal distribution. The budget constraint is given by at+1 = (1 + r) at + yt ct, a0 given, The Bellman equation V (a, y) = max U (c) + E V subject to
h i 0, y 0 |y a
a0 = (1 + r) a + y c.
Conjecture 1 V (a, y) = exp (r (a + Ay + b)) , r where A and b are constants to be determined. By the envelope condition 1 V1 (a, y) . 1+r Thus, the consumption rule is given by U 0 (c) =
1 exp (r (a + Ay + b)) r !! 1 1 = exp r a + Ay + b + log (1 + r) r " !! 1 1 +E exp r a + (1 rA) y + (1 r) b log (1 + r) + Ay 0 r Note that y 0 = y + y + . Matching coecients yields A = 1 , 1+r " 2# (rA) A y 1 . b = 2 r log (1 + r) + log ( (1 + r)) + r r 2
Ht = Et
c (w, y) = r (w + H) + constant. Friedman (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis Optimal saving rule s (a, y) = ra + y c ! 1 y r 2 log ( (1 + r)) = y + + 1+r 1 r 2 (1 + r )2 Can be more general income process. See Wang (2004, AER).
subject to K 0 = (1 ) K + I
A0, K 0
Convex adjustment costs (q theory) C (I, A, K) = (I/K)2 K and p (I) = p. 2 Let Q be the Lagrange multiplier for the capital accumulation equation. FOC for I : K I= (Q p) FOC for K 0 :
h
Q = E V2
A0, K 0
Without shocks, there are two triggers of capital. When the current capital stock is too high, then disinvest to bring capital to a certain level. When the current capital stock is too low, then invest to bring capital to that level. When the current capital is within this region, no investment occurs and capital depreciates. With shocks, the two triggers are state dependent.
where
3.1
Independence Axiom: P P P + (1 ) Q P + (1 ) Q The Allais Paradox: a1 : ($1M, 1) versus a2 : ($5M, 0.10; $1M, 0.89; $0, 0.01) and a3 : ($1M, 0.11; $0, 0.89) versus a4 : ($5M, 0.10; $0, 0.90) EU: a1 () a2 a3 () a4 Experiments: a1 a2 but a4 a3
where P involves outcomes both greater and less than x and P stochastically dominates P . Experiments: b1 b2 but b4 b3 Allais Paradox: = 0.11, x = $1M, P = ($5M, 10/11; $0, 1/11) , P = ($0, 1) , P = ($1M, 1) .
Common ratio eect c1 : ($X, p; $0, 1 p) versus c2 : ($Y, q; $0, 1 q) and c3 : ($X, rp; $0, 1 rp) versus c4 : ($Y, rq; $0, 1 q) where p > q, X < Y, rp (0, 1) . EU: c1 () c2 c3 () c4 Experiments: c1 c2 but c4 c3
Disappointment Aversion
c1 : ($200, 1; $0, 0) versus c2 : ($300, 0.8; $0, 0.2) and c3 : ($200, 0.5; $0, 0.5) versus c4 : ($300, 0.4; $0, 0.6) Experiments: c1 c2 but c4 c3 Mixture: 0.5 (200, 1; 0, 0) + 0.5 0 versus 0.5 (300, 0.8; 0, 0.2) + 0.5 0
Ambiguity: the Ellsberg Paradox An urn contains 30 red balls and 60 white and black balls R B W 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 10
Chew-Dekel class: The certainty equivalent function for a set of payos and probailities {c (z) , p (z)} is dened implicitly by a risk aggregator M satisfying: = z p (z) M (c (z) , ) . M satises the following properties: a. M (m, m) = m. b. M (, ) is increasing. c. M (, ) is concave. d. M (kc, km) = kM (c, m) .
Expected utility. Let M (c, m) = cm1/ + m (1 1/) , 1 Then = (z p (z) c (z))1/ Weighted utility (Chew (1983)). Let M (c, m) = (c/m) cm1/ + m (1 (c/m) /) where either (i) 0 < < 1 and + < 0 or (ii) < 0 and 0 < + < 1. Then
P + z p (z) c (z) = P p (z) c (z) z
0. Then where
p (z) c (z) ,
!
p (z) =
Indierence Curves and Certainty Equivalents Two states c (1) = 1 , c (2) = 1 + . Taylor expansion: (EU ) ' 1 (1 ) 2/2 (W U ) ' 1 (1 2) 2/2 4 + 4 (1 ) 2 (DA) = 1 2 + 4 + 4 + 2 2 First-order risk aversion Homework: Derive these certainty equivalents
3.2
General recursive utility (Epstein and Zin (1989)): Vt (c) = W (ct, t (Vt+1 (c))) where t () is the generalized certainty equivalent
where 1/ (1 ) is EIS
Kreps-Porteus preferences: t (x) = (Et [x])1/ , where 1 is CRRA Expected utility: = . Weil (1993, ReStud): t (x) = log (Et [exp (x)]) /. where is CARA
inf Et [ (x)]
Let (x) = x/ and = . Then, we have (Epstein and Wang (1994)): Vt (c) = inf
QQ
i ] 1/ + E Q [V (1 ) ct t+1 (c) t
Recursive smooth ambiguity model (Klibano, Marinacci and Mukerjee (2006), Ju and Miao (2007)) Suppose there is an unknown parameter .
n o 1 E t() u1 E P [u (x)] t (x) = . t
u describes risk aversion, describes ambiguity aversion. If u1 is linear, then it reduces to the KP-EZ model
lim 0 (x) =
For (u, , ) ,
Entropic CE (Hansen and Sargent (2008)) (x) = x log x x + 1 Reduce to expected utility CE t (x) = ( u)1 Et [ u (x)] where u (u) = 1 exp
The entropic CE is the only divergence CE that is also an expected utility CE.
3.3
subject to
a0 = (a c) Let rp =
Pn i=1 wiri z, z h
0
i=1
n X
wiri
z, z 0
where b = c/a.
h i h i 0|z M L z 0 r z, z 0 , L z 0 r z, z 0 r z, z 0 = 0 p z p 1 i j
(1)
(2)
Solve for and substitute into the scaled Bellman equation, we obtain
0 r z, z 0 L z p = [(1 ) /]1/ [b/ (1 b)](1)/ , L (z) = (1 )1/ b(1)/.
(3) (4)
where we dene
L z0 0 = h (L (z 0) rp (z, z 0)) L z0 = [(1 ) /]1/ [b/ (1 b)](1)/ = [(1 ) /]1/ [b/ (1 b)](1)/
(1 )1/ b0 (1)/
So we obtain:
!1 1/ c0 0 h0rp z, z 0 = rp = 1.
(5)
(6)
In equilibrium, optimal portfolio is a claim to the stream of output. Let the price be q. Then
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 = q + y = Q y + y = g0 Q + 1 . rp
Qy
If rp is iid, and b are constants. Thus, we cannot identify and for a given risk parameter. Homework: Derive asset pricing implications for the KP-EZ specications. What is the bond return?