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People vs. Compil Facts Accused Compil and his cohorts were charged with robbery with homicide for the forcibly taking cash and jewelries owned by the deceased Manuel Jay, who was stabbed to death inside his house and furniture store, MJ Furniture in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Only accused Marlo Compil was apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon after being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the deceased. 1. 2. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures and that he only acted as lookout since he did not go inside the furniture shop since he would be recognized. The day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz and two other witnesses, executed a sworn statement admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. accused were both from Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the shop. on the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. they were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. robbers forcibly entered MJ Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. some 2 hours after the commission of the crime, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves and their five (5) other companions the money and jewelry taken they all failed to show up for work the following day. accused Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless when apprehended

6. 7.

3.

Though the arrest was made without a warrant, Compil is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court and by entering a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. Likewise is the contention that he should be considered only as an accomplice. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy, hence, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the others. AFFIRMED. People v. Wong Chuen Ming FACTS The accused along with his co-accused (all aliens) were charged with unlawfully transporting shabu into the country. They were caught during the baggage inspection in the airport when the immigration officer noticed that they all had boxes of Alpen Cereal in their baggages. When the officer got suspicious he opened one of the boxes and found a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. A total of thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. As the officer pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, he conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed "shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, 4 were brought to Camp Crame.

On trial, assisted by a counsel de oficio, Compil, entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. The demurrer filed by the accused was denied, Court found him guilty. Issue W/N the extra-judicial confessions made by the accused admissible as evidence Ruling No. In all three instances, he was not assisted by counsel, when he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. However, the Court find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial evidence. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused via their witnesses and through the following circumstances:

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At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. They claimed that they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by police authorities who were present during the examination inside the collector's office. The RTC found them guilty. Only Wong Chuen Ming and another co-accused appealed. ISSUE: Whether the signatures of the accused are admissible in evidence HELD: NO A careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional 18 rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. People vs. Ramiro Alegre, et. al. (1979) Facts: The accused were arrested for the killing of Adelina Sajo, who died of strangulation after her house was robbed. Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adelina Sajo. He also implicated the others who were later charged on the basis of his extrajudicial confession. However, during the trial, Cudillan denied his sworn statements claiming that those were extracted from him through duress and that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Accused-appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (died during the pendency of the case) as evidence against them. Issue: WON Cudillans extrajudicial confession may be used against his co-accused Held: No. The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudilla, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. G.R. No. 120959 November 14, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YIP WAI MING, accused-appellant. FACTS - Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married. A day after, Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights. -an Information was lodged against Yip Wai Ming on July 19, 1991. Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding that Yip Wai Ming killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. - There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial. The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt is summarized in the Solicitor-General's brief as follows:

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- Appellant and his fiancee Lam Po Chun who are both Hongkong nationals, checked in at Park Hotel and they were billeted at Room 210. After staying for about an hour inside Room 210, the couple went down to the lobby of the hotel. Appellant asked the front desk receptionist on duty to call a certain Gwen delos Santos and to instruct her to pick them up the following day, July 11, 1993, a Sunday at 10 o' clock in the morning. - At about past 8 o'clock in the same evening of July 10, 1993, Cariza Destresa, occupant of Room 211 which is adjacent to Room 210, heard a noise which sounds like a heated argument between a man and a woman coming from the room occupied by appellant and Lam Po Chun. The heated discussions lasted for thirty (30) minutes and thereafter subsided. She again heard a banging which sounds like somebody was thrown and stomped on the floor inside Room 210. Cariza, who became curious, went near the wall dividing her room and Room 210. She heard a cry of a woman as if she cannot breathe. - At about 10 o'clock a.m., Gwen delos Santos, together with two lady companions, arrived at the lobby of the Park Hotel. The receptionist informed appellant by telephone of her arrival. In response, appellant came down without his fiancee Lam Po Chun. After a while, he together with Gwen delos Santos and the latter's companions, left the hotel. Before leaving, he gave instruction to the front desk receptionist not to disturb his fiancee at Room 210. He also ordered not to accept any telephone calls, no room cleaning and no room service. -When appellant left, the front desk receptionist, Enriquieta Patria, noticed him to be in a hurry, perspiring and looking very scared. - During the whole morning of July 11, 1993, after appellant left the hotel until his return at 11 o'clock in the evening, he did not call his fiancee Lam Po Chun to verify her physical condition. - When appellant arrived at 11 o'clock p.m. on that day, he asked the receptionist for the key of his room. Then together with Fortunato Villa, the roomboy, proceeded to Room 210. When the lock was opened and the door was pushed, Lam Po Chun was found dead lying face down on the bed covered with a blanket. Appellant removed the blanket and pretended to exclaim "My God, she is dead" but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, appellant asked the room boy to go down the hotel to inform the front desk, the security guard and other hotel employees to call the police. - The police that conducted an examination of the condition of the doors and windows of the room as well as the body of the victim and the other surroundings found no signs of forcible entry and they observed that no one can enter from the outside except the one who has the key. The police also saw the victim wrapped in a colored blanket lying face down and was already in state of rigor mortis, which indicates that the victim has been dead for ten (10) to twelve (12) hours and must have died between 9 to 10 in the morning of July 11, 1993. Autopsy of the body of the victim revealed that the cause of death was "asphyxia by strangulation." -Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured with the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong, with appellant as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hongkong. ISSUE W/N the court made unwarranted and unfounded conclusions on the basis of selfcontradictory and conflicting evidence. HELD - Accused-appellant was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on "series of circumstantial evidence." He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accusedappellant stated that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face. When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged. participated in a reenactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime. - The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shell be compelled to be a witness against himself." Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. - The accused-appellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police officers who allegedly tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a serious crime, finding himself in strange surroundings. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.

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-We simply cannot state that the circumstantial evidence is in its entirety credible and unbroken and that the finding of guilt excludes any other possibility that the accusedappellant may be innocent. - The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accusedappellant Yip Wai Ming is acquitted of the charge of murder on grounds of reasonable doubt and his immediate release from custody is ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds. People vs Maqueda Facts: At around 6:00am, August 27, 1991,Teresita and William Horace Barker, residents of Tuba, Benguet, by reason of robbery were repeatedly struck with lead pipes by the accused (Hector Maqueda and Rene Salvamante) on the different parts of their body, leading to the death of William and inflicting various physical injuries on Teresita. The acts were witnessed by their househelp Norie and Julieta. At 7:00am, both the accused were seen by Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio at a waiting shed near the house of the Barkers before riding a jeep to Baguio city. Salvamente could not be found. Maqueda on the other hand was arrested and had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27 August 1991. While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial. In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe providedhim by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry. Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. He said he was in Sucat, Muntinlupa at the time of the crime. Held: The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads: (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may 28 not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restriction on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the 29 doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. They are the fundamental 30 safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of 31 the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of 32 Court. In Aballe vs; People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused

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expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. DECEASED. Alciso was unable to talk to ENCIPIDO and MANATAD. Before Alciso, there was another prosecution witness presented, Armando Bagacay, whose testimony turned out to be hearsay but which nevertheless is reproduced here to complete the evidence for the prosecution. He testified that while he was massaging one of the accused, Rudy Lamarda, on March 10, 1982, the latter told him that his ailment was caused by witchcraft of the victim, Jose Lacumbes, and that he would seek the aid of the rebels to cut Lacumbes' head.

PEOPLE VS ENCIPIDO

Two other prosecution witnesses supported the testimony of Alciso. Jorge Ortega, INP Station Commander and Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of Loreto, testified that in the evening of that same day of May 1, 1982, Station Commander Jorge Ortega informed him that "Commander Tanga" and his men wanted to pay him a courtesy call. "Commander Tanga" then confided to the Mayor his mission to cooperate with his administration as they had heard that he was a good Mayor. He also informed the Mayor that he had been a member of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that he had already killed many people, including the DECEASED, so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA PEA brought out a sharp-pointed knife and tried to test its sharpness, admitted having cut the neck of the DECEASED, and even showed the latter's ear, dried by that time. In their defense, ENCIPIDO and MANATAD denied having killed the victim and interposed the defense of alibi.

FACTS RTC: Guilty On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (hereinafter referred to as the DECEASED) was found killed by his wife and children near the hut in their farm. A review of the prosecution evidence presented in the CASE BELOW can begin with the testimony of Felicisimo Alciso: There were three persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others stayed at a distance. Then, somebody struck the DECEASED with the butt of a gun causing the latter to fall to the ground. He described that the hands of the DECEASED were tied at the back, ENCIPIDO was behind the DECEASED, while MANATAD and DE LA PEA were on the sides.

ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty?

HELD: YES

Alciso went to the jail to find out for himself if they were among the group responsible for the death of the DECEASED. When he asked DE LA PEA why he was in jail, the latter answered that it was because they were the ones who had beheaded the

1. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively identified APPELLANTS as among the group who led the DECEASED out of his hut, with his hands tied behind his back, and thereafter mauled him and hacked his neck in the afternoon of March 30, 1982. The autopsy findings confirm his description of what he had witnessed. 2. CONFESSIONS

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ENCIPIDO and DE LA PEA verbally acknowledged their guilt before Static Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina when they individually boasted that they had killed the DECEASED so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. They admitted that they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PEA even showed the Mayor the DECEASED's dried ear which he had severed. Further, while in jail, DE LA PEA also admitted to Alciso, when the latter asked him the reason for their confinement, that it was because they were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED. These oral confessions indicating complicity in the commission of the crime with which they are charged are admissible in evidence against the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PENA pursuant to Sections 22 and 29 of the Rules of Court. It is the fact that admissions were made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary value. It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved.They are what is commonly known as interlocking confessions and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof. And while it may be, that ENCIPIDO's written statement before the PC on May 6, 1982 confessing to the killing of the DECEASED was not presented at the trial, no presumption of wilful suppression of evidence may be levelled against the prosecution on account of its non-production. Apparently, for the prosecution, it was not important or necessary to bolster up its case. "Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused.' [13] (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551)." ENCIPIDO's and DE LA PEA's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to the Municipal Mayor and the INP Station Commander are not necessarily incredible for, in their minds, they were not "confessing" but bragging of their exploits in the belief that they were saving the community from the witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of sonic people. There is no proof whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in question were coerced or concocted by those officials, who are responsible public officers and presumed to have regularly performed their functions and against whose impartiality nothing has been proven. The fact that no arrests were made by them immediately after the disclosures do not necessarily belie their testimonies since the spirit of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the encounters. Arrests were made, however, the day after, or on May 2, 1982. APPELLANTS had the opportunity during the trial to refute their Verbal admissions as in fact, they denied having made them, but their denials do not ring with truth in the face of other inculpating evidence. 3. The additional incriminating evidence was furnished by DE LA PEA who, in open Court, under oath, testified that he belonged to "Commander Tanga's" group, was with them since two days before the incident, and that he was with ENCIPIDO and MANATAD when they killed the DECEASED. DE LA PEA's declaration confirms the existence of the group, their responsibility for the killing and, at the very least, his presence during the commission of the crime.

In fine, the threads of evidence woven together establish APPELLANTS' guilt to a moral certainty.

People vs. Endino and Galgarin (2001) Facts: Galgarin, uncle of Endino stabbed Dennis, repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agasgas pleaded for Galarin to stop. Dennis ran to Midtown Sales but out of knowwhere Endino appeared and fired at Dennis --- he didnt die yet hehe. He sought refuge inside Elohim Store, then he died. An information was filed, but Galgarin and Endino remained at large. Galgarin was arrested in Rizal and was taken to Palawan (where the crime occurred). HOWEVER, before the was brought to the airport, they stopped by ABS-CBN, where Galgarin was interviewed. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for

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Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. His admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Galgarins admission, which was recorded and shown on air is admissible? Held: Yes. Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers assertion that it was even accusedappellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward to surrender. Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. Because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused

PEOPLE v. ABULENCIA 363 SCRA 496 (2001) Facts: Ten-year old Rebelyn Garcias naked body was found floating in a creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with marks of bruises, burns and injuries manifesting that she was defiled and later drowned to death. Rebelyn was last seen with Rolly Abulencia before she was found dead. Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San Manuel, Pangasinan. PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer who was then in the mayors house, was informed by Abulencia that he had a small girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge and who might have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast. Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on August 6, 1998, Abulencia admitted to him in a taped interview made at the Municipal Jail having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge. Abulencia was charged with rape with homicide.

In his defense, Abulencia denied the charge. He claimed that on August 4, 1998, he noticed Rebelyn folowing him as he was going to the market to buy dilis, but he just ignored her. However, upon reaching the market, he decided not to buy dilis anymore, and instead proceeded towards San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to follow him closely. Annoyed, he told her he was going to San Manuel, but she insisted on following him because she wanted to go to his house. They then took the

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provincial road, but upon reaching the Aburido bridge, he distanced himself from the girl. However, she ran towards him. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got nervous and proceeded to the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and asked her to accompany him to the authorities so he could surrender. Thereafter, accused-appellant confessed to the Barangay Chairman. On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila, charging the accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the Court of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. SC = She is guilty with simple arson only *Evidence: Confessions Abulencia was found guilty of the charges and convicted. Edna questions the admissibility of her uncounselled e xt r a j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n g i ve n t o p r o s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s , n a m e l y R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o , Me r c e d i t a Me n d o za , a n d t o t h e m e d i a ( A B S CBN). Accused-appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled e xt r a j u d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n , h e r a d m i s s i o n s t o h a vi n g c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d s h o u l d h a ve b e e n e xc l u d e d i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r f o r b e i n g vi o l a t i ve o f A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 ) o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . S h e t a k e s e xc e p t i o n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f p r o s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s e s R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o a n d Me r c e d i t a Me n d o za f o r b e i n g hearsay and in the nature of an uncounselled admis sion. W/N the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in t h e m a i n o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e vi d e n c e , i s i n a d e q u a t e t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b e yo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . SC = We partl y disagree. A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i n p a r t p r o vi d e s : (1) A n y p e r s o n u n d e r i n ve s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n o f f e n s e s h a l l h a ve t h e r i g h t t o b e i n f o r m e d o f h i s r i g h t t o r e m a i n s i l e n t a n d t o h a ve competent and independent counsel preferably of his o wn c h o i c e . I f t h e p e r s o n c a n n o t a f f o r d t h e s e r vi c e s o f c o u n s e l , h e m u s t b e p r o vi d e d w i t h o n e . Th e s e r i g h t s c a n n o t b e w a i ve d e xc e p t i n wr i t i n g a n d i n t h e presence of counsel. x x x x (3) Any confession or admission obtained in vi o l a t i o n o f t h i s S e c t i o n o r S e c t i o n 1 7 h e r e o f s h a l l b e i n a d m i s s i b l e i n e vi d e n c e . W e h a ve h e l d t h a t t h e a b o ve q u o t e d p r o vi s i o n a p p l i e s t o t h e s t a g e o f c u s t o d i a l i n ve s t i g a t i o n w h e n t h e i n ve s t i g a t i o n i s n o l o n g e r a g e n e r a l i n q u i r y i n t o a n u n s o l ve d c r i m e b u t s t a r t s t o f o c u s o n a particular person as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has a l s o b e e n e xt e n d e d t o s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a n i n d i vi d u a l h a s n o t b e e n f o r m a l l y a r r e s t e d b u t h a s m e r e l y b e e n i n vi t e d f o r q u e s t i o n i n g . To b e a d m i s s i b l e i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t a n a c c u s e d , t h e e xt r a j u d i c i a l confessions made must satisfy the followin g requirements:

Issue: Was the confession made to the radio commentator admissible in evidence against Abulencia?

Held: Yes. Abulencia admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares testimony lends support to the finding of guilty. It has been held that a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.

Doctrine: A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.

People vs Malngan 2006

On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of his employers house and the death of six persons including her employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven adjoining residential houses, were also razed by fire. She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the Barangay Hall. She was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was also burned, as the housemaid of the Separas and upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellants bag.

9
(1) (2) (3) (4) i t m u s t b e vo l u n t a r y; i t m u s t b e m a d e wi t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e competent and independent counsel; i t m u s t b e e xp r e s s ; a n d it must be in writing. a p p e l l a n t s u n c o u n s e l l e d e xt r a j u d i c i a l was properly admitted by the RTC. of People v. Lauga (2010) confession to said witness

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay C h a i r m a n , i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , ma y b e d e e m e d a s l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p l yi n g A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . W h e n a c cu s e d - a p p e l l a n t w a s brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that d e s t r o ye d s e ve r a l h o u s e s a s w e l l a s k i l l e d t h e wh o l e f a m i l y o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r . S h e wa s , t h e r e f o r e , a l r e a d y u n d e r c u s t o d i a l i n ve s t i g a t i o n a n d t h e r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d b y A r t i c l e I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 ) , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d h a ve a l r e a d y b e e n o b s e r ve d o r a p p l i e d t o her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accu sedappellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissibl e in e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a s s u c h we r e o b t a i n e d i n vi o l a t i o n o f h e r constitutional rights. B e t h a t a s i t m a y, t h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter a s e vi d e n c e d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y l e a d t o h e r a c q u i t t a l . I t s h o u l d well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial i n ve s t i g a t i o n s d o n o t a p p l y t o t h o s e n o t e l i c i t e d t h r o u g h q u e s t i o n i n g b y t h e p o l i c e o r t h e i r a g e n t s b u t g i ve n i n a n o r d i n a r y m a n n e r w h e r e b y t h e a c c u s e d ve r b a l l y a d m i t s t o h a vi n g c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r wh e n a c c u s e d a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d t o M e r c e d i t a Me n d o za , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o r s o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r . , t o h a vi n g s t a r t e d t h e f i r e i n t h e S e p a r a s house. Th e t e s t i m o n y o f Me r c e d i t a Me n d o za r e c o u n t i n g s a i d a d m i s s i o n i s a d m i s s i b l e i n e vi d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a n d i s n o t c o ve r e d by the constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the B i l l o f R i g h t s , s o l e l y g o ve r n s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t we e n t h e i n d i vi d u a l on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t we e n a p r i va t e i n d i vi d u a l a n d a n o t h e r p r i va t e i n d i vi d u a l a s b o t h a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a n d p r o s e c u t i o n wi t n e s s Me r c e d i t a Me n d o za u n d o u b t e d l y a r e . H e r e , t h e r e i s n o e vi d e n c e o n r e c o r d t o s h o w t h a t s a i d wi t n e s s wa s a c t i n g under police authority, so appropriately, accused -

Facts:

The appellant was accused of qualified rape against his 13-year old minor daughter, AAA. Witnesses' testimonies revealed the following:

At around 10pm, appellant woke AAA up and proceeded to threaten her not to shout for help while appellant raped her. Soon after, BBB, brother of AAA, found her sister crying and decided to take her to their maternal grandmother, where AAA then recounted her harrowing experience. They then sought the help of Moises Banting, a bantay-bayan in the barangay.

Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which the appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.

RTC found appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority. The CA affirmed the decision of the trisl court. Hence, this petition. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting his alleged extrajudicial confession because it was made without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

W/N appellant's extrajudicial confession is admissible | NO

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Held: THE UNITED STATES vs. SANTIAGO PINEDA 1918 case Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. Facts This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and owner of a drug store in Calle Santo Cristo, Manila. One Feliciano Santos, presented a medical prescription before the drug store for the purchase of potassium chlorate that will be used to treat his sick horses. The purchase was supervised by Pineda himself. However, the horses instantly died after the medicine was administered to them. At the instance of Santos, he brought the chemists from the Bureau of Science to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate, a poisonous substance. According to Pineda, the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at his drug store, which substance proved on analysis to be barium chlorate and that it erred in finding that the substance sold by the him to Feliciano Santos, was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate. Lastly, the Court allegedly erredin finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Issue W/ N appellant was correct Ruling This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. No. On the testimony of the two chemists, what the appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alios act which is inadmissible. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. On the other hand, the sale of drug to Santos was not rebutted by evidence.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

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On the issue of reasonable doubt, the care and skill which are expected of druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. People v. Irang FACTS Between 7 and 8 pm, seven individuals with white stripes on their faces went to the house of spouses Perfecto and Maximiniana. Perfecto was killed while Maximiniana was hit on the face with the butt of a gun and lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness one of the assailants ordered her to bring out the money and jewelry. While handing over the money and the jewelry, she looked at the mans face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of Juana dela Cruz was also robbed. She also noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. Maximinia informed Lt. Alejandre that the person who attacked her was a man of regular stature, with a lean body and pockmarked face. With this description the Lt. went in search of this individual. After presenting 3 groups to Maximinia, she finally identified the accused-appelant, Irang as the one who struck her with the butt of a gun. Juana also recognized him because of his pockmarks and scars. Once arrested, Irang made an affidavit in tagalog narrating what had happened that day. Before affixing his thumbmark and before taking an oath, the deputy clerk of court asked him if he understood tagalog and when he answered in the affirmative the deputy clerk read the contents of the document to him and asked if he had something to add there to. He said no. The accused said that he was maltreated by the Lt. and when he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed to sign the affidavit. ISSUE: WON Irang was identified as one of those who assaulted and killed V and robbed M. HELD: YES Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face with the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry scrutinized the latters face and notice that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who might have maltreated the latter and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said that the man who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first group. Said lieutenant later presented another group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein accused-appellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, the appellant became silent. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maongcolored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicentes testimony that the man of the same description was the open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y PAZ alias POLONIO Facts: While Ernesto Basa and Ernesto Balaktaw were sleeping in a pushcart along a sidewalk, the two accused assaulted Basa. Palin held Basa down and Soliman stabbed Basa 7 times with a balisong. Thereafter, the two assailants ran away. Balaktaw brought Basa to the police station and then to a hospital but Basa later died. In his defense, Soliman stated that on several occasions Basa had assaulted him, once he was punched and in another with a lead pipe, and on the occasion in question, Basa was extorting money from him. Soliman claimed that he only stabbed Basa when the latter, along with three of his companions, attacked him. Palin corroborated that statement of Soliman. But on the basis of the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Balaktaw, the trial court convicted both accused and sentenced them to suffer death penalty. Case went up to SC for automatic review. Issue: Was the evidence sufficient to convict the accused?

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Held: Yes. The fact that a person has been previously convicted for a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one. The defense claims that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to prove that the deceased had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character. While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary." This rule does not apply in cases of murder. G.R. No. 28871 September 19, 1928 plow himself. Fermin Bruces informed Severino Haro of the incident, and in answer the latter only told him not to mind it, but to go on plowing. Another occasion while Fermin Bruces was transplanting rice on the same lands, Clemente Babiera and Rosendo Paycol arrived and told him that if he continued working they would pull out someone's intestines. Fermin Bruces also informed Severino Haro of these threats, who as before, told him not to mind them, but to go on sowing. - Severino Haro, in his usual visit to his land, Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores were passing by. Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of his cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo Paycol's house, Severino was attacked by Clemente Babiera by suddenly springing from the cogon grass, striking him with his bolo in the back, another bolo blow in the forehead near the right eyebrow and in trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. - On the same morning and in the same hospital, Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal, Edmundo S. Piccio, relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery. ISSUE Whether the offended party's quarrelsome disposition can be proved in the trial to determine who began the attack? HELD - Interested intervention on Severino Haro's part without doubt must have vexed Justo Babiera, for in the month of May 1927, he went with his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, to where Fermin Bruces, Severino Haro's copartner, was plowing, and asked him who had ordered him there, and when Fermin Bruces answered that it was Severino Haro, Justo asked him whether he would commit suicide if told to do so by said Severino Haro, and then told him to tell his master to go and plow himself. Later on, Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera's son, accompanied by his copartner Rosendo Paycol, seeing that Fermin Bruces went on working the land, told him that if he continued plowing, Clemente would pull out someone's intestines. If all these threats are true, as we believe they are, then Justo Babiera and Clemente Babiera must have borne Severino Haro deep resentment, doubtless believing that it was due to him that they could not recover their two parcels of land, and this was sufficient and adequate to move them, upon the failure of lawful means, to resort to violence. - It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA BORES, defendantsappellants. FACTS - Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo. He executed a contract of sale with the right of repurchase in favor of Basilio Copreros whereby he sold the two parcels of land to the latter with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable. The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros took possession of said two parcels of land, and made application for the registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. Basilio Copreros leased said parcels to Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton. - Justo Babiera filed a complaint against Basilio Copreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of the possession of said two parcels of land. The complaint having been dismissed on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Justo Babiera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Justo Babiera asked for the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer and filed another one for the recovery of property. Severino Haro was already in possession of the aforesaid two parcels of land as lessee, he bore all the expenses in the case of unlawful detainer as well as in that for recovery of the property. Fermin Bruces was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands. - Fermin Bruces, Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands, was asked by Justo Babiera on Who told him to plow. Fermin Bruces replied: "Severino Haro." Then Justo Babiera asked him: "If this Severino tells you to kill yourself, will you do it?" "Of course not," answered Fermin Bruces. After this interchange of words Justo Babiera told Fermin Bruces to stop plowing and to tell his master, Severino Haro, to come and

13
that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him. - Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable. defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery. Held: We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of the question prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. Then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. PEOPLE VS BARING FACTS Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl. On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmarias, Cavite. She learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughters accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin state physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9 oclock position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners smallest finger."

US vs Mercado Facts: These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the justice of the peace of Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial. During trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause, the following question: How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons? To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying: I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in various causes for assault. Upon the question and the objection, Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. The objection is overruled." To that ruling of the court the defendant duly accepted. Said exception is assigned here as the first assignment of error. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the

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On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. RTC: Guilty ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly held the conviction on the basis of the victims clear, trustworthy and positive testimony that she was raped several times by accused-appellant? HELD: YES A review of the transcript of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness. A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. Besides, testimonies of rape victims 24 who are of tender age are credible, and the testimonies of child-victims are given full 25 weight and credit. Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of 26 the complainant nor can it be taken against her. The following realities justified the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1) the victim was merely six years old when she was sexually abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and was left under her grandmothers care; and, (3) the victims sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather. The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare denial and defense of being framed-up interposed by accused-appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the person who sexually ravaged her. Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto 30 make the information defective on its face. When all the essential elements of the crime of rape are stated in the information, an accused is sufficiently apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the precise time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of rape. In a plethora of cases have consistently upheld the full weight of a young victims 45 unwavering testimony. Also, there is Section 22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which categorically states: Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases. GUILTY. CSC vs. Belagan (2004) Facts: This case stemmed from 2 separate complaints filed by Magdalena Gapuz and Ligaya Annawi against Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of DECS, they are all from Baguio City. UH OH, Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances. Magdalena is the founder and directress of some school, so she filed an application with DECS Office in Baguio City to operate the preschool. Belagan, who was inspecting the school suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her check then Magdalena said, Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values?" Magdalena followed up the application but Belagan said, date muna daw sila. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was Belagan. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria. On October 4, 1994, Belagan was placed under suspension. Ligaya alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back. Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations. DECS Secretary found Belagan guilty of the charges, dismissing Belagan from government service and forfeiting all his retirement benefits in favor of the government. Belagan appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), wherein it held that Belagans transgression constitutes grave misconduct and was dismissed (but this was only with respect to Magdalenas case). Belagan filed a MR, contending that in his 37 years of service he was never charged of any offense whereas Magdalena was charged with several offenses with MTC Baguio City (Light oral defamation, slight physical injuries, grave threats, malicious mischief, light threats, unjust vexation, grave oral defamation, etc). There were also several complaints against Magdalena on the Brgy. Level. Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility. Belagans MR was denied.

15
KULIT NG MUKHA NI BELAGAN!! He filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Issues: 1. 2. Whether or not Magdalena Gapuz is a credible witness? Whether or not Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? "SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense." Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation. 2. No. Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity. Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:

Held: 1. Yes.

AS A RULE, this question of fact is no subject to SCs review. It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions, however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein. Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This applies only to criminal cases and not to administrative offenses. Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty. In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful. In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.

First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform. Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified by respondent. But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during

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summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus: "Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on the first floor and the second floor? A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family, background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was all, sir. Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds? A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice, sir. Q Why? A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir, I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already started paying the place so I said, Sir, I have some transients with me in the evening and he said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, Sir, I think for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I dont want you to be here but people might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit, sir. ASEC R. CAPINPIN: Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went up with him or the second time? A No, sir, on the second time, sir. Q Is that room used for transients? Q Second time? A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir. Q And you were going down? A Yes, sir. A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some transients. Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms? A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza. Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged kissing? A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs. Q Before you went down? A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and it has 16 steps. Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost? A Yes sir. Q Part of the floor of the building? A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir? ASEC R. CAPINPIN: Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time? A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last, the biggest room that I had, he said, No. Never mind, I am not going to see that anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir. Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms? A Yes, sir, as a boarder.

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Q At that time, there were no transients yet. A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there." A Yes, she did sir. The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a "date." "Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information That the Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir, kumusta yung application ko and he said, mag date muna tayo but I refused and explained that I am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division Office. Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular day? A Yes, sir. Q What time was that? A I cannot remember, sir. Q Was it morning, afternoon? A I think it was in the morning, sir. Q Morning. A Yes, sir. PEOPLE v. JUAN BRIOSO, ET AL. Q Early morning? A About noon, sir. Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office? A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application. Facts: On December 23, 1966, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house when Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor, was alarmed by the barking of the dogs. When she peeped through a crack in the wall of her house she saw Juan Brioso, who was carrying a long gun, and Mariano Taeza walking in the direction of the Darias house. Bernal saw them point the gun at the bamboo wall of the house. Two detonations followed and Bernal heard Silvino moaning and his wife crying for 37 SCRA 336 (1971) Q What was that incident all about? A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she left." With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact 31 believe the testimony of a witness of bad character and refuse to believe one of good character. As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner. At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment 34 and manner of testifying. In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there is ample evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive" in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her honor. Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any incident?

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help. Bernal went to the house and found Silvino prostrate, wounded, and unable to speak. Susana, however, right after being shot, rushed to her husbands side and he told her that he was shot by Brioso and Taeza. Silvino died one hour later. A few days later, Susana and Bernal executed affidavits pointing to the Brioso and Taeza as the killers. Antonio Daria, the son of Silvino, meanwhile, executed an affidavit clearing Taeza. The court, however, disregarded said affidavit. hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The Judge allowed the witness to answer the question but without mentioning the name of those persons who objected.

Issue: Did the court err in not allowing the witness to mention the names of Puescas co-conspirators on the ground of hearsay?

Issues: Was Antonios affidavit clearing Taeza hearsay? Held: Yes. The affidavit of Antonio, which was presented to corroborate the testimony of Taeza, was hearsay. Said affidavit was never identified by Antonio, the supposed affiant, and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine him. Affidavits are generally not prepared by affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are place on the witness stand to testify thereon. Antonio Darias affidavit, therefore, has no probative value.

SC: Yes. It is true that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.

Doctrine: For the reasons that affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves and that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are place on the witness stand to testify thereon. PEOPLE v. CUSI 14 SCRA 944 (1965)

Here, the purpose of the prosecuting officer in asking Sgt. Bao to mention the names of Puescas alleged co-conspirators is nothing more than to establish the fact that Puesca had pointed to said persons as said co-conspirators, without claiming that Puescas statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really and actually conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

Doctrine: The testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if merely intended to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement, is not hearsay evidence.

Facts: Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were all charged with robbery in band with homicide. Prosecution witness Sgt. Lucio Bao of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, testified that an extrajudicial confession was made to him by Puesca wherein the latter admitted his participation in the commission of the crime and revealed the name of other persons who conspired with him. Bao was asked to mention in court the names of Puescas alleged co-conspirators. The counsel for Macalinao, Gustilo, and Dairo objected to this upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001] ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO [G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001] ESTRADA vs. GLORIA ARROYO

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1. Statement of the Case This case answers the March 2, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration from the decision of SC declaring the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic DISMISSED. Issues raised by petitioner in both cases consist the following; disregard of Sec. 3 (7) Art. XI of the Constitution, double jeopardy, immunity from suit, trial by publicity, incapacity of Ombudsman to render decision due to bias, evidentiary issues, unfair trial. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached on the Memorandum of private respondent, Capulong et. al. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also attached in the Comment of private respondents. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second and third part of the diary. It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. This statements belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which arecircumstantial evidence of the facts in issue which includes Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions. Thus, admissibility, in such cases, is for example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or statements of such person. The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.

Facts Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted. 2.

3.

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. Issue Whether the angara diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions and res inter alios acta Whether reliance on newspaper acounts is violative of the hearsay rule Ruling No.

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4. Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130 the requirement of original document as best evidence and its exceptions. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer but in doing so, however, it did not violate the best evidence rule. The Court rationated that Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document if he has been given an opportunity and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. In regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, that before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence. In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to objectto the admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed several memorandum. It is already too late in the day to raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof. *(For puposes of class discussion, i just focused on evidentiary issues only) People v. Bernardo Quidato jr. FACTS Bernardo Quidato Jr. was found guilty of parricide for killing his father, Bernardo Sr. His case was tried jointly with his co-accused who withdrew their plea of not guilty. Only bernardo jrs case was tried on the merits. According to Gina, while her husband and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their home, she overheard them talking about going to her father in laws house to get money. She didnt know what transpired after bec she fell asleep. Quidato objected on the ground of marital disqualification but used the testimony against the Malita brothers. As stated earlier, the brothers withdrew their plea of not guilty and executed affidavits on their version of the story that it was Bernardo Jr who proposed to kill Bernardo Sr. and that they in fact killed the man. The accused denied the allegations of the brothers. On the strength of the affidavits executed, the trial court found Bernardo Jr. guilty. ISSUE: Whether the affidavits are admissible in evidence HELD: NO In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being 10 inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been 11 given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

5.