Global challenges:

accountability and
eectiveness
David Held
Policy Network
Third oor
11 Tufton Street
London SW1P 3QB
United Kingdom
t: +44 (0)20 7340 2200
f: +44 (0)20 7340 2211
e: info@policy-network.net
www.policy-network.net
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Global challenges:
accountablllty and
eectlveness
David Held
DAv|D HLLD is the co-director of The Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the
London School of Economics. He has held numerous visiting appointments in the United
States, Australia, Canada andSpain, amongother places. He is cofounder of the social sciences
and humanities publishing house, Polity. His latest book, Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation,
co-authored with Anthony McGrew, is published by Polity Press.
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Global challenges: accountability andeffectiveness
|ntroductlon
The paradox of our times can be stated simply: the collective issues we must grapple with are
of growing cross-border extensity and intensity and, yet, the means for addressing these are
weak and incomplete. Three pressing global issues highlight the urgency of nding a way
forward.
First, insucient progress has been made in creating a sustainable framework for the
management of climate change, illustrating the serious problems facing the multilateral order.
Second, progress towards achieving the MillenniumDevelopment Goals has been slow, and in
many places lamentably so. Underlying this fact, is, of course, the material vulnerability of over
half the worlds population. Each year, some 18 million people die prematurely from
poverty-related causes. This is one-third of all human deaths50,000 every day, including
29,000 children under the age of ve. And, yet, the gap between rich and poor countries
continues to rise and there is evidence that the bottom 10% of the worlds population has
become even poorer since the beginning of the 1990s. Third, the threat of nuclear catastrophe
may seem to have diminished, as a result of the end of the cold war, but it is only in abeyance.
Huge nuclear stockpiles remain, nuclear proliferation among states is continuing, new
generations of tactical and nuclear weapons are being built and nuclear terrorism is a serious
threat.
These global challenges are indicative of
three core sets of problems we face: those
concerned with sharing our planet (global
warming, biodiversity and ecosystem losses,
water deficits), sustaining our life chances
(poverty, conflict prevention, global infectious diseases) and managing our rulebooks
(nuclear proliferation, toxic waste disposal, intellectual property rights, genetic research
rules, trade rules, finance and tax rules) (cf Rischard 2002). In our increasingly interconnected
world, these global problems cannot be solved by any one nation-state acting alone. They
call for collective and collaborative actionsomething that the nations of the world have
not been good at, and which they need to be better at if these pressing issues are to be
adequately tackled.
The llmlts of current global governance arrangements
While complex global processes, from the financial to the ecological, connect the fate of
communities to each other across the world, global governance capacity is under pressure.
Problem-solving capacities at the global and regional level are weak because of a number
of structural difficulties, which compound the problems of generating and implementing
urgent policy with respect to global goods and bads. These difficulties are rooted in the
post-war settlement and the subsequent development of the multilateral order itself.
In our increasingly interconnected world, these global
problems cannot be solved by any one nation-state
acting alone
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Amongthespectrumof international organisations arethosewhoseprimary concerns aretechnical:
theUniversal Postal Union, theInternational Civil AviationOrganisationandtheWorldMeteorological
Organisation, for example. Theseagencies havetendedtowork eectively, oftenprovidingextensions
to the services oered by individual nation-states (Burnheim 1986, p. 222). To the extent that their
tasks have been sharply focused, they have usually been politically uncontroversial. At the opposite
pole lie organisations like theWorldBank, the International Monetary Fund(IMF), the UNEducation,
the Scientic and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) and, of course, the UN itself. Preoccupied with
central questions of war and peace, and of resource allocation, these bodies have been highly
politicised and controversial. Unlike the smaller, technically based agencies, these organisations are
at the centre of continual conict over aspects of their nature and form, and over the policy that
they generate or fail to develop.
The diculties facedby these more contestedagencies andorganisations stemfrommany sources,
including the tension between universal values and state sovereignty built into them from their
beginning. Many global political and legal developments since 1945 do not just curtail sovereignty,
but support it in many ways. From the UN Charter to the Rio Declaration on the Environment,
international agreements often serve to entrench the international power structure. The division of
the globe into powerful nation-states, with distinctive sets of geopolitical interests, was embedded
in the articles and statutes of leading IGOs (see Held 1995, chs. 5, 6). Thus, the sovereign rights of
states are frequently armed alongside more universal principles. Moreover, while the case can be
made that universal principles are part of the working creedof ocials in some UNagencies, such
as the United Nations Childrens Fund (Unicef ), Unesco and the World Health Organisation (WHO),
andNGOs suchas Amnesty International, Save the ChildrenandOxfam, they canscarcely be saidto
be constitutive of the conceptual world and working practices of many politicians, democratic or
otherwise (Barry 1999, pp. 345).
Second, thereachof contemporary regional andinternational lawrarely comes witha commitment
to establish institutions with the resources and clout to make declared universal rules, values and
objectives eective. The susceptibility of the UN to the agendas of the most powerful states, the
partiality of many of its enforcement operations (or lack of themaltogether), the underfundingof its
organisations, the continueddependency of its programmes onnancial support froma fewmajor
states andthe weaknesses of the policingof many environmental regimes (regional andglobal) are
all indicative of the disjuncture between universal principles (and aspirations) and their partial and
one-sided application. Four deep-rooted problems need highlighting (Held 2004, ch. 6).
Arst set of problems emerges as a result of thedevelopment of globalisationitself, whichgenerates
public policy problems that spanthedomesticandtheforeign, andtheinterstateorder withits clear
political boundaries and lines of responsibility. A growing number of issues can be characterised as
intermesticthat is, issues which cross the international and domestic (Rosenau 2002). These are
often insuciently understood or acted upon. There is a fundamental lack of ownership of many
problems at the global level. It is far fromclear which global public issuessuch as global warming
or the loss of biodiversityare the responsibilities of whichinternational agencies, andwhichissues
ought tobeaddressedby whichparticular agencies. Theinstitutional fragmentationandcompetition
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leads not just to the problemof overlapping jurisdictions among agencies, but also to the problem
of issues fallingbetweenagencies. This latter problemis also manifest betweenthe global level and
national governments.
Asecond set of diculties relates to the inertia found in the systemof international agencies, or the
inability of these agencies to mount collective problem-solving solutions faced with uncertainty
about lines of responsibility andfrequent disagreement over objectives, means andcosts. This often
leads to the situation where the cost of inaction is greater than the cost of taking action. Bill Gates
recently referredtothedevelopedworlds eorts intacklingmalaria asa disgrace; malaria causes an
estimated 500 million bouts of illness a year, kills an African child every 30 seconds, and costs an
estimated$12bna year inlost income, and, yet, investment ininsecticide-treatedbednets andother
forms of protective treatment would be a fraction of this (Meikle 2005, p. 22). The failure to act
decisively inthefaceof urgent global problems not only compounds thecosts of dealingwiththese
problems in the long-run, but it can also reinforce a widespread perception that these agencies are
not just ineective but unaccountable and unjust.
A third set of problems arise because there is no
clear division of labour among the myriad of
international governmental agencies: functions
often overlap, mandates frequently conict and
aims and objectives too often get blurred. There are a number of competing and overlapping
organisations and institutions, all of which have some stake in shaping dierent sectors of global
public policy. This is true, for example, in the area of health and social policy where the World
Bank, the IMF and the WHOoften have dierent or competing priorities (Deacon 2003); or, more
specically, in the area of Aids/HIV treatment, where the WHO, Global Fund, UNAIDS and many
other interests vie to shape reproductive healthcare and sexual practices.
A fourth set of diculties relates to an accountability decit, itself linked to two interconnected
problems: the power imbalances among states as well as those between state and non-state
actors in the shaping and making of global public policy (Held 2004). Multilateral bodies need
to be fully representative of the states involved in them, and they rarely are. The main problem
can be qualitative, how well various stakeholders are represented (Karl et al. 2003, p. 30).
Having a seat at the negotiating table in a major IGOor at a major conference does not ensure
eective representation. For even if there is parity of formal representation (a condition often
lacking), it is generally the case that developed countries have large delegations equipped
with extensive negotiating and technical expertise, while poorer developing countries
frequently depend on one person delegations, or have even to rely on the sharing of a
delegate. In addition, where there is a clear case for dialogue and consultation between state
and non-state actors, conditions to make it happen are often only partially met in multilateral
decision-making bodies.
Underlying these institutional diculties is the breakdown of symmetry and congruence
between decision-makers and decision-takers (Held 1995, part I). The point has been well
There is no clear division of labour among the myriad of
international governmental agencies
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articulated recently by Kaul and her associates in their work on global public goods. They speak
about the forgotten equivalence principle (Kaul et al. 2003, pp. 2728). At its simplest, the
principle suggests that those who are signicantly aected by a global good, or bad, should
have a say in its provision or regulation, ie, the span of a goods benets and costs should be
matched with the span of the jurisdiction in which decisions are taken about that good (Held
2004, pp. 97101). Yet, all too often, there is a breakdown of equivalence between
decision-makers and decision-takers, between decision-makers and stakeholders, and between
the inputs and outputs of the decision-making process. To take some topical examples: a
decision to permit the harvesting of rain forests may contribute to ecological damage far
beyond the borders which formally limit the responsibility of a given set of decision-makers. A
decision to build nuclear plants near the frontiers of a neighbouring country is a decision likely
to be taken without consulting those in the nearby country (or countries), despite the many risks
for them.
Anumber of signicant governanceinnovations havebeenmadeinrecent decades toaddress such
issues, yet the global governance system remains too often weak and/or fragmented. Moreover,
therehas beena complexunbundlingof sovereignty, territoriality andpolitical forces (Ruggie 1993).
This unbundling involves a plurality of actors, a variety of political processes, and diverse levels of
co-ordination and operation, with complex and uneven implications for accountability and
eectiveness. Specically, it includes:
Dierent forms of intergovernmental arrangementseg in the World Bank, IMF and WTO
embodyingvarious levels of legalisation, types of instruments utilisedandresponsiveness
to stakeholders;
Anincreasingnumber of public agenciesegcentral bankersmaintaininglinks withsimilar
agencies in other countries and, thus, forming trans-governmental networks for the
management of various global issues;
Diverse business actorsie rms, their associations and organisations such as international
chambers of commerceestablishing their own transnational regulatory mechanisms to
manage issues of common concern;
Non-governmental organisations andtransnational advocacy networksie leadingactors in
global civil societyplaying a role in various domains of global governance and at various
stages of the global public policy making process;
Public bodies, business actors andNGOs collaborating, egona range of development issues,
inorder toprovidenovel approaches tosocial problems throughmulti-stakeholder networks.
There is evidence that the politicisation, bureaucratisation and capacity limits of multilateral
institutions havebeenimportant factors indrivingtheexpansionof newforms of global governance,
sincepowerful governments havesought toavoideither expandingtheremit of existingmultilateral
agencies or creating new ones. Another factor that has been signicant has been the normative
shift towardsself-regulation, as the private sector has sought to pre-empt or prevent international
public regulation while governments have sought to share the regulatory burden with non-state
actors.
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Key polltlcal challenges
The postwar multilateral order is threatened by the intersection and combination of political,
economic and environmental crises. Moreover, the very nature and form of globalisation creates a
delicate and complex system of structural global vulnerability. As is evident, the world we are in is
highly interconnected. The interconnectedness of countriesor the process of globalisation as it
is often calledcan be measured by mapping the ways in which trade, nance, communication,
pollutants and violence, among many other factors, ow across borders and lock the wellbeing of
countries into common patterns (Heldet al. 1999). The deepdrivers of this process will be operative
for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the exact political form globalisation takes. Among these
drivers are:
The changinginfrastructure of global communications linkedtothe informationtechnology
revolution;
Thedevelopment of global markets ingoods andservices, connectedtothenewworldwide
distribution of information;
The pressure of migration and the movement of peoples, linked to shifts in patterns of
economic demand, demography and environmental degradation;
The end of the cold war and the diusion of democratic and consumer values across many
of the worlds regions, alongside some marked reactions to this;
The emergence of a new type and form of global civil society, with the crystallisation of
elements of a global public opinion.
Despite the fractures and conicts of our age, societies are becoming more interconnected and
interdependent. As a result, developments at the local levelwhether economic, political or
socialcan acquire almost instantaneous global consequences and vice versa. If we link to this the
advances inscienceacross many elds, oftennowinstantly diusedthroughglobal communication
networks, it is clear that the global arena has become both an extraordinary potential space for
human development as well as for disruption and destruction by individuals, groups or states (all of
whom can, in principle, learn the lessons of nuclear energy, genetics, bacteriology and computer
networking, among other things).
There are many reasons to be concerned about this. From the point of view of accountable and
eective global governance, four distinct reasons are worth stressing: solidarity, social justice,
democracy and policy eectiveness. It is important to clarify each of these because they provide a
map of the dimensions we need to keep in mind for thinking about the nature and adequacy of
governance at the global level. By solidarity, I mean not just empathetic recognition of anothers
plight, but the willingness to stand side by side with others in the creation of solutions to pressing
collectiveproblems. Without solidarity betweenrichandpoor, developedanddevelopingcountries,
the MDGs will not be met and, as the former secretary-general of the United Nations, Ko Annan,
simply put it, millions of people will die, prematurely and unnecessarily. These deaths are all the
more poignant because solutions are withinour grasp. As far as challenges like global warmingand
nuclear proliferationareconcerned, weneedtoaddtothedenitionof solidarity a focus onour own
sustainability, never mind that of citizens of the future. Contemporary global challenges require
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recognition of, and active participation in, the forces that shape our overlapping communities of
fate.
A second reason to focus on global challenges is social justice. Standards of social justice are, of
course, controversial. Tomakemy argument as accessibleas possible, I will, followingThomas Pogge,
take social justice to mean the fulllment of human rights in an institutional order to the extent that
it is reasonably possible (Pogge 2006). Of course, most argue that social justice requires more, and
so it can be claimed with some condence that an institutional order which fails to meet these
standards cannot bejust. Accordingly, it canbereasonedthat insofar as our existingsocioeconomic
arrangements fail tomeet the MDGs, andthe broader challenges of global warmingandthe risks of
nuclear proliferation, they are unjust, or, simply, beyond justice.
The third reason is democracy. Democracy presupposes a non-coercive political process in and
through which people can pursue and negotiate the terms of their interconnectedness,
interdependence anddierence. Indemocratic thinking, consentconstitutes thebasis of collective
agreement and governance; for people to be free and equal there must be mechanisms in place
throughwhichconsent canbe registeredinthe determinationof the government of public life. Yet,
whenmillions die unnecessarily andbillions are threatenedunnecessarily, it canclearly be heldthat
serious harmcanbeinictedonpeople without their consent andagainst their will. Therecognition
of this reveals fundamental decits in our governance arrangements which go to the heart of both
justice and democracy.
Finally, the failure to act sooner rather than later on pressing global issues generally escalates the
costs of dealing with them. For instance, it has been estimated that the costs of inaction in
dealing with communicable diseases in Africa are about 10 times greater than the costs of
corrective action (Conceio 2003). Similar calculations have also been undertaken in areas of
international nancial stability, the multilateral trade regime and peace and security, all of which
show that the costs of decient provisions of global public goods are extremely large, and
outweigh by signicant margins the costs of corrective policies. And yet we too often stand
paralysed in the face of urgent collective challenges, or actively engage in the reproduction of
political and social arrangements that fail to meet the minimumstandards that solidarity, justice
and democracy require.
Global economlc governance: problems and opportunltles
Thesepoints arewell illustratedby reectingonkey elements of global economic priorities andtheir
impact on governance arrangements. For the last two to three decades, the agenda of economic
liberalisationandglobal market integrationor theWashingtonconsensus as it is sometimes called
has been the mantra of many leading economic powers and international nancial institutions.
The standardviewof economic development has maintainedthat the pathtoeconomic andsocial
wellbeing is economic liberalisation and international market integration. As Martin Wolf put it, all
else is commentary (2004, p.144). But is this true? There are strong grounds for doubting that the
standardliberal economic approachdelivers onpromisedgoods andthat global market integration
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is theindispensableconditionof development. Moreover, their forceful implementationby theWorld
Bank, IMF andleadingeconomic powers has oftenledtocounter-productive results, at national and
global levels.
Countries that have beneted most from globalisation are those that have not played by the rules
of thestandardliberal market approach, includingChina, India andVietnam(Rodrik 2005). Inaddition,
those that have, for example the Latin American and the Caribbean countries, have done worse
judged by the standards of east Asia and their own past. In other words, the link between growth,
economic openness and liberalisation is weaker than the standard liberal argument suggests. The
widespreadshift amongdevelopingcountries togreater openness has coincidedwitha slowdown
in the rate of world economic growth compared to earlier in the post-war period, from 2.7% in
196078 to 1.5%from19792000 (Milanovic 2005).
The link between growth and poverty reduction is also not as close as the liberal argument would
predict. Accounts of this type generally assume a catch up or convergence story whereby poorer
countries, opening their markets and liberalising, are expected to grow faster and richer so that
incomedierentials narrowover time. However, theevidencetosupport this is controversial, at best.
In the rst instance, outside the phenomenal development of China and to some extent (urban)
India, thereportednumber of peoplelivingbelowtheWorldBank poverty lineof $1a day has actually
risen in the two decades since 1981 (Wade 2006). In addition, there is a near perfect correlation
between a groups relative standing at the beginning of the 1990s and its real cumulative income
gains in the years that followed (Pogge 2006). The evidence shows that the gains at the bottom of
the global income hierarchy were minimal or even negative, as the rst, that is to say bottom,
percentile, lost 7.3%, andthesecondgainedonly 1%. Moreover, theWorldBanks measureof absolute
poverty, based on $1 a day, is to a large extent arbitrary. If you take the gure of $2 a day you can
actually showthe reverse trend (Held & Kaya 2006).
Whenexaminingandevaluatingtrends inincomeinequality betweencountries, it is clear that much
depends againonhow, inparticular, Chinas economic success andsubsequent reductioninpoverty
is treated. If China is excludedfromconsideration, inequality betweencountries canbeshowntohave
increasedsince 1980. 1980is animportant date because it is oftenclaimedtobe the moment when
income inequality between countries reached its peak. Of course, there is much to be said for
includingChina intheaccount but thenit has tobeborneinmindthat Chinas success has depended
signicantly on a host of factors, not all of which t neatly into the liberal argument. For example,
China has staggered and regulated its entry into the global market; taris have been cut, but after
economic take-o, particularly heavily in the last 10 to 12 years; capital movements have remained
tightly regulated; and FDI is locked into partnerships often with signicant political controls.
Noneof this is toarguethat trade andinternational capital ows donot provideimportant potential
gains to many countries. The question, rather, is: under what conditions are trade and capital ows
(andwhat kinds of tradeandcapital ows) introducedtomaximisebenet. Thinkingof globalisation
as either aninextricably positiveforceor theoppositeis likely tomiss thecoreconditions for successful
development and political change. The choice is not between globalisation in its liberal free market
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form and no globalisation. Rather, what is at issue is the proper form globalisation should take, ie
howit should be governed.
This critical issue cannot be resolved within the terms of the Washington consensus because its
thrust is to enhance economic liberalisation and to adapt public policy and the public domain to
market-leading institutions and processes. It thus bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the
commonpolitical resistanceor unwillingness toaddress signicant areas of market failure, including:
The problemof externalities, such as environmental degradation;
The inadequate development of non-market social factors, which alone can provide an
eective balance betweencompetitionandcooperationand thus ensure an adequate
supply of essential public goods such as education, eective transportation and sound
health;
The under-employment of productive resources (eg in the pharmaceutical industry) in the
context of the demonstrable existence of urgent and unmet need (eg the provision of
anti-virals for the treatment of Aids/HIV).
The Washington consensus has weakened
condence in public authority and in that
authoritys abilitylocally, nationally and
globallyto govern and provide urgent public
goods. Economic freedom is championed at the
expense of social justice and environmental sustainability, with damage to both. It has, moreover,
confused economic freedomand economic eectiveness. The question is (and it is, of course, a big
question): how can markets, democratic choices about public goods and a concern with basic
universal standards such as human rights and environmental protection be pursued systematically
and simultaneously? What follows constitutes some rst steps in addressing this question.
To begin with, bridges have to be built between international economic lawandhuman rights law;
commercial lawandenvironmental law; andstatesovereignty andtransnational law(Chinkin1998).
It is as if all these things refer to separate domains and do not speak to each other, with the
consequence that entrenched interests trump social and environmental considerations, among
other urgent matters. What is required is not only the rmenactment of existing human rights and
environmental agreements, and the clear linking of these with the ethical codes of particular
industries, but also the introduction of newterms of reference into the groundrules or basic laws of
thefreemarket system. Precedents exist inthesocial chapter of theMaastricht Agreement andinthe
attempt to attach labour and environmental conditions to the NAFTA regime, which are helpful in
this regard.
At stake, ultimately, are three interrelated transformations. The rst would involve engaging
companies in the promotion of core universal principles, as the UNs Global Compact does at
present. To the extent that this led to the entrenchment of human rights and environmental
standards in corporate practices, this would be a signicant step forward. But if this is to be
Economic freedom is championed at the expense of
social justice and environmental sustainability, with
damage to both
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something other than voluntary, and therefore vulnerable to being ignored, then it needs to be
elaborated in due course into a set of more codied and mandatory rules. Thus the second set
of transformations would involve the entrenchment of revised rules and codes on health, child
labour, trade union activity, environmental protection, stakeholder consultation and corporate
governance in the articles of association of economic organisations and trading agencies. The
key groups and associations of the economic domain would have to adopt in their very modus
operandi a structure of rules and procedures compatible with universal social requirement, and
be held accountable for them. Now, of course, it can be countered that poorly designed
regulatory structures can harm employment levels but Scandinavian countries show that it is
possible to be both business-friendly and welfare-orientated.
There are several possible objections to the scheme set out. However, most of these are misplaced
(Held 2004). The framework of human rights, democratic standards and environmental values is
sound because it is preoccupied with the equal liberty and equal development possibilities of all
humanbeings, andis consistent withtheuniversal principles enshrinedinthepost-1945multilateral
order. But it has to be conceded that without a third set of changes the advocacy of such standards
descends into high-mindedness because it fails to pursue the socio-economic changes that are a
necessary part of such a commitment.
At a minimum, this means that development policies must be linked to:
Promoting the development space necessary for national trade and industrial incentives,
includinginfant industry protection(andrecognisingthatone sizeineconomic policy does
not t all);
Building robust public sectors, capable of nurturing political and legal reform;
Ensuring long-terminvestment in health care, human capital and physical infrastructure;
Challengingtheasymmetries of access totheglobal market whichareoftenhypocritical and
indefensible;
Ensuring the sequencing of global market integration into a framework of fair rules for trade
and nance;
Taking steps to match the movement of labour to the movement of capitalincluding
creating a system of temporary work permit schemes of three to ve years to allow for
economic migration within an agreed multilateral framework;
Increasing developing country participation in the running of the IFIs;
Moving the headquarters of the IMF and the World Bank, on a rotating basis, to developing
countries.
In addition, if such measures were combined with a turnover tax on nancial markets, and/or a
consumptiontax oncarbonemissions, and/or a shift of the priorities frommilitary expenditure, now
runningat $1,000bnper annumglobally, towards thealleviationof severeneeddirect aidamounts
only tosome$50bnper annumgloballythenthedevelopment context of thewesternnations and
northern nation-states could begin to be accommodated more adequately to those nations
struggling for survival and minimumwelfare.
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The UN budget is $3.8bn per annum plus
peacekeeping, but the US and Europe each
spend vastly more annually on chocolate and
bubblegum, alcohol, cars, pet foodandsoon. The
expenditure on each of these items dwarfs the
amounts available for direct poverty alleviation
and for dealing with urgent diseases. The US and
its allies went towar after 9/11; 9/11 was a serious
matter, a crime against the United States and a
crimeagainst humanity. But every day 10times as
many people die as were lost on 9/11 of poverty,
malnutrition and poverty-related diseases and,
yet, there is no war or, better still, decisive social
change in relation to these life and death issues.
The resources are available, but the question is
political will andchoice. Figures 1 to5 andTable 1
disclose some interesting detail in this regard.
The polltlcs of global
governance change
There are many pressing questions that need
addressingfurther, andthe time has come, tosay
the least, to address them. Surprisingly perhaps,
it is an opportune moment to rethink the nature
and form of global governance and the
dominant policies of the last decade or so. The
policy packages that have largely set the global
agendain economics and securityare
failing. The Washington consensus and
Washington security doctrines have dug their
own graves. The most successful developing
countries in the world, as already noted, are
successful because they have not followed the
Washington consensus agenda, and the
conicts that have most successfully been
diused (the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
among others) are ones that have beneted
from concentrated multilateral support and a
human security agenda (Human Security
Center 2006). Here are clear clues as to how to
proceed in the future. We need to follow these
clues and learn from the mistakes of the past if
Figure 1: UN core budget, 199697 to 200607
Source: 19962005 data drawn from UN press release, General assembly adopts 2006-2007 budget of $3.79bn, as main part
of sixtieth session concludes, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10442.doc.htm. 20062007 data drawn
from UN factsheet, Growing share of UN resources in eld operations, available at: http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/factsheet.pdf.
All gures exclude peacekeeping budgets and extra-budgetary UN expenses.
5.0 -
4.5 -
4.0 -
3.5 -
3.0 -
2.5 -
2.0 -
1.5 -
1.0 -
0.5 -
0.0 -
1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07
Figure 2: International aid as a percentage of
gross national income (world)
Source: Based on data drawn fromWorld Development Indicators 2006, WDI Database, Washington D.C., World Bank.
1.0 -
0.9 -
0.8 -
0.7 -
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Figure 3: Amount world ODA as a percentage of GNI
would have to be multiplied to equal world military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 19892004
Source: Calculations based on data drawn fromWorld Development Indicators 2006, WDI Database, Washington D.C.,
World Bank, 2006.
18 -
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According to data from the World Bank, in 2004, world ODA as a percentage of
GNI would have to be multiplied by 11.58 times to equal military expenditure as
a percentage of world GNP.
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solidarity, democracy, social justice and the
multilateral order are to be advanced.
In addition, the political tectonic plates
appear to be shifting. With the faltering of
unilateralism and US foreign policy,
uncertainty over the role of Europe in global
aairs, the crisis of global trade talks, the
emergence of powerful authoritarian
capitalist states (Russia, China), the growing
condence of leading emerging countries in
the world economy (China, India and Brazil),
and the unsettled relations between
elements of Islam and the west, business as
usual seems unlikely at the global level inthe
decades ahead. It is highly dubious that the
multilateral order can survive for very much
longer in its current form.
The political space for the development of
more eective and accountable global
governance has to be made, and advances
are being achieved, by the activities of all
those forces that are engaged in the pursuit
of greater coordinationandaccountability of
the leading processes of globalisation; the
opening up of IGOs to key stakeholders and
participants; the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms; sustainable
development across generations; and peaceful dispute settlement in leading geopolitical conicts.
This is not a political project that starts fromnowhere. It is, infact, deeply rootedinthe political world
shapedandformedafter theHolocaust andthesecondworldwar. Moreover, it canbebuilt onmany
of the achievements of multilateralism(fromthe foundingof the UNsystemto the development of
the EU), international law (from the human rights regime to the establishment of the International
Criminal Court) and multilayered governance (fromthe development of local government in cities
and sub-national regions to the dense web of international policy-making forums).
The story of our increasingly global order is not a singular one. Globalisation is not, and has never
been, a one-dimensional phenomenon. Whiletherehas beena massiveexpansionof global markets
which has altered the political terrain, the story of globalisation is far from simply economic. Since
1945 there has been a signicant entrenchment of universal values concerning the equal dignity
and worth of all human beings in international rules and regulations; the reconnection of
international law and morality, as sovereignty is no longer merely cast as eective power but
Figure 4: Ratio of military expenditure to ocial
development assistance, selected countries 2004
Source: Data and chart adapted fromWorldwatch 2006, Vital signs 20062007, Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute.
Figures are extracted from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2005, SIPRI Yearbook 2005, NewYork,
Oxford University Press, and from OECD, Aid rising sharply, according to latest OECD gures, available at www.oecd.org/dac
25 -
20 -
15 -
10 -
10 -
5 -
0 -
In 2004 the US spent 23.7 times the amount spent on ODA
on military expenditurethis gure dwarfs comparable gures
for the rest of the world.
United States Japan UK, France
Germany and
Italy combined
Nordic
countries
combined
OECD
countries
Figure 5: Global consumption priorities
(billions of US dollars)
Sources: 2004 UN core budget, 1.804, based on UN core budget gure for 20042005, divided by two. See UN press release,
General assembly adopts 20062007 budget of $3.79bn, as main part of sixtieth session concludes, available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10442.doc.htm; Makeup, 18, FromTable 1-6 in World Watch Institute 2004,
State of the world 2004: consumption by the numbers, Worldwatch Institute, January 8. Available at:
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1783; Pet food in Europe and US, 17, FromTable 1-6 in Worldwatch Institute 2004,
State of the world 2004: consumption by the numbers, Worldwatch Institute, January 8. Available at:
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1783; Ocean cruises, 14, FromTable 1-6 in Worldwatch Institute 2004, State of the world 2004:
consumption by the numbers, Worldwatch Institute, January 8. Available at: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1783;
Cigarettes consumed in Europe, 50, From Anup Shah, Behind consumption and consumerism, available at:
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Consumption.asp. This report is based on data from the UNDP World Development
Report 1998; World aid expenditure 2004, 8.731, Figure of 8,730,715,297, which is based on WDI indicators for World GNI and Aid
as a Percentage of World GNI 2004. See World Development Indicators 2006, WDI database, Washington D.C., World Bank; World
military expenditure 2004, 1024, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2004, SIPRI yearbook, NewYork, Oxford
University Press.
1200 -
1000 -
800 -
600 -
400 -
200 -
0 -
2004 UN
core budget
Makeup Pet food
in Europe
and US
Ocean
Cruises
Cigarettes
consumed
in Europe
World aid
expenditure
2004
World
military
expenditure
2004
1.808 18 17
14
50
8.731
1024
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increasingly as legitimate authority, dened in terms of the maintenance of human rights and
democratic values; the establishment of new forms of governance systems, regional and global
(however weak and incomplete); and the growing recognition that the public goodwhether
conceived as nancial stability, environmental protection, or global egalitarianismrequires
coordinated multilateral action if it is to be achieved in the long term (Held 2004). These
developments need to be, and can be, built upon.
A coalition of political groupings could emerge to push these achievements further, comprising
Europeancountries withstrongliberal andsocial democratic traditions; liberal groups intheUS polity
which support multilateralism and the rule of law in international aairs; developing countries
struggling for freer and fairer trade rules in the world economic order; non-governmental
organisations, from Amnesty International to Oxfam, campaigning for a more just, democratic and
equitable world order; transnational social movements contesting the nature and form of
contemporary globalisation; and those economic forces that desire a more stable and managed
global economic order. Tothe extent that the 2007 Bali discussions ona comprehensive global deal
onclimate change were a success, it is attributable toanincreasingly eective EU, positive actionby
key developing countries, and continuing pressures by leading environmental INGOs.
Europe could have a special role in advancing the cause of more eective and accountable global
governance (McGrew2001, 2002). As the home of bothsocial democracy anda historic experiment
ingovernancebeyondthestate, Europehas direct experienceinconsideringtheappropriatedesigns
for more eective and accountable supra-state governance. It oers novel ways of thinking about
governancebeyondthestatewhichencouragea (relatively) moredemocraticas opposedtomore
neoliberalvisionof global governance. Moreover, Europeis ina strategic position(withstronglinks
west and east, north and south) to build global constituencies for reform of the architecture and
functioning of global governance. Through interregional dialogues, it has the potential to mobilise
new cross-regional coalitions as a countervailing inuence to those constituencies that oppose
reform, including unilateralist forces in the US.
Of course, this is not to suggest that the EU should broker an anti-US coalition of transnational and
international forces. On the contrary, it is crucial to recognise the complexity of US domestic politics
Table l: Comparlsons of annual expendlture on luxury ltems compared to estlmated fundlng needed
to meet selected baslc needs
Product Annual expendlture Soclal or economlc goal Addltlonal annual lnvestment
needed to achleve goal
Makeup $l8bn Peproductlve health care for all women $l2bn
Pet food ln Lurope and Unlted States $l7bn Lllmlnatlon of hunger and malnutrltlon $l9bn
Perfumes $l5bn Unlversal llteracy $5bn
Ocean crulses $l4bn Clean drlnklng water for all $l0bn
|ce cream ln Lurope $llbn |mmunlslng every chlld $l.3bn
Source: Table l-6 ln world watch |nstltute 2004, State of the world 2004: consumption by the numbers, worldwatch |nstltute, 1anuary 8. Avallable at:
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/l783. The worldwatch gures are drawn from the UNDP Human Development Peport l998.
www.pollcy-network.net l4 | Global challenges: accountablllty and eectlveness | David Held | April 2008
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and the existence of progressive social, political and economic forces seeking to advance a rather
dierent kindof worldorder fromthat championedby theRepublicanright of thepolitical spectrum
(Nye 2002). Despite its unilateralist inclinations, it is worth recalling that public opinion in the US
(especially among the younger generation) has been quite consistently in favour of the UN and
multilateralism, and slightly more so than European publics (Norris 2000). The 2008 US presidential
campaign has drawn upon some of these cultural resources. Any European political strategy to
promote a broad-basedcoalition for a newglobal governance arrangement must seek to enlist the
support of these progressive forces withinthe US polity, while it must resist withinits owncampthe
siren voices nowcalling with renewed energy for the exclusive re-emergence of national identities,
ethnic purity and protectionism.
Although some of the interests of those groupings which might coalesce around a movement for
such change would inevitably diverge on a wide range of issues, there is potentially an important
overlapping sphere of concern among themfor the strengthening of multilateralism, building new
institutions for providing global public goods, regulating global markets, deepening accountability,
protecting the environment and ameliorating urgently social injustices that kill thousands of men,
women and children daily. Of course, how far they can unite around these concernsand can
overcome erce opposition from well-entrenched geopolitical and geo-economic
interestsremains tobe seen. Thestakes arevery high, but sotooare the potential gains for human
security and development if the aspirations for global democracy and social justice can be realised.
Concluslon
The post-war multilateral order is in trouble. Clear, eective and accountable decision-making is
needed across a range of urgent global challenges; and yet, the collective capacity for addressing
thesematters is indoubt. Thedominant policy packages of thepast several years have not delivered
the goods, anda learningopportunity beckons. We needto buildonthe universal steps of the 20th
century anddeepentheinstitutional holdof this agenda. Further steps inthis directionremainwithin
our grasp, however bleak the rst fewyears of the 21st centurypost 9/11have been. A change
of directioninthe governance of the worldeconomy, linkedtoa newdirectioninthe management
of human security, would both buttress international law and multilateral institutions and ensure
that the wisdomembedded in the universal principles and institutional advances of the post-1945
era is safe-guarded, nurtured and advanced for future generations.
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Global challenges:
accountability and
eectiveness
David Held
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