Foreward by Captain Dale A. Dye, USMC (Ret.

)


History Behind the Story
The Pacific in World War II: Volume 1




PRINTING HISTORY
Warriors Publishing Group Edition March 2010

THE TURNING POINT: GUADALCANAL
Foreward by: Capt. Dale A. Dye, USMC (Ret.)

Warriors Publishing Group
16129 Tupper Street
North Hills, California 91343

From: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
Volume I
by
Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, USMCR
Major Verle E. Ludwig, USMC
Henry I. Shaw, Jr.
Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps


All derivative (i.e. change in media; by compilation) work from this underlying
U.S. Government public domain/public release data is COPYRIGHT GOVPUBS
Contains the following key public domain (not copyrighted) U.S. Government publications:
TITLE: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
Volume I
Originally published by the United States Marine Corps.

The name Warriors Publishing Group and the logo and trademarks belong to Warriors Publishing Group

PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

FOREWORD
THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN
By Captain Dale Dye USMC (Ret)
No military outfit serving American colors teaches its history as well, completely or
consistently as the United States Marine Corps. Theres a reason for that beyond the obvious
esprit de corps factor and it stems from a firm belief that the past shapes the future. Over
decades of service in peace and war, Marines have used history to persuade young men and
women who pass muster that they are the living legacy of all those who served before and
thus imparted a mystical, visceral and extremely potent aspect to service in the Corps.
If you doubt that, try calling some old Leatherneck an ex-Marine. Society shrugs collec-
tive shoulders at the mention of an ex-GI or a former sailor but a Marine is a Marine in or out
of uniform; once and for always. That sense of intimacy and personal connection with long
past campaigns and battles begins in recruit training and continues with unstinting emphasis
throughout a Marines career no matter how long or short it might be. For personal, profes-
sional and patriotic reasons, Im a big fan of this emphasis on military history.
Along the varied course of my active duty career I have both absorbed and taught les-
sons on Marine Corps history and the traditions of service it engendered. Ive spun the Tun
Tavern tales of Marines in the Revolution, re-fought the Banana Wars in Nicaragua and Haiti
and chalk-talked the great World War I battle of Belleau Wood countless times, but theres
always been a reverent spell cast over me and millions of other Marines when it comes to
Guadalcanal, the first American offensive action in World War II. One of the first real Marines
I ever met, sitting at my Dads elbow in Johnny Baskets bar in North St. Louis, was a veteran
of that campaign. That big, rawboned guy told some of the most fascinating stories I have
ever heard and I believe to this day his claim that the tremors in the hand that lifted his beer
glass were residual effects of the malaria he picked up in the Solomon Islands.
Whats different about the Guadalcanal Campaign of World War II and what makes it
such a quintessential Marine story is the way it was fought from the surprisingly unopposed
landings on 7 August 1942 to the relief of the exhausted 1
st
Marine Division in December of
that year. Guadalcanal was a dollar job done on a dime budget. No one involved in this initial
post-Pearl Harbor counter-punch knew what to expect from the Japanese enemy but all hands
understood the importance of success. America was new to worldwide war and reeling both
physically and emotionally from a crippling blow to the U.S. Pacific fleet. America wanted
vengeance; a signal that we could strike back and give as good or better than we got at Pearl
Harbor, Wake and in the Philippines. America needed a victory in the Pacific and she needed
it in a hurry whether the forces involved were ready or not.
And the newly formed 1
st
Marine Division, which had not even existed before the brass
pencil-whipped it into being aboard the USS Texas in February 1941, was decidedly not ready.
Infantry regiments and support troops were scattered all over the South Pacific area or steam-
ing aboard transports trying to link-up with their commands for a slap-dash assault on the
southern Solomons. Over some very understandable objections from Major General A.A.
Vandegrift, commanding the scattered division and the admirals tasked with supporting it
during the landings, Vice Admiral Chester Nimitz pulled the trigger on Operation Watchtow-
er, simultaneous assaults on Guadalcanal as well as Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in the
adjacent Florida Island group.

The Florida Islands landings were flank security objectives for the most part, although
they were costly and initially involved more Japanese resistance than the landings on the main
island of Guadalcanal across the Sealark Channel. The real objective of Operation Watchtower
beyond a demonstration of U.S. Marine Corps prowess in their forte of amphibious assault
was the airfield that the Japanese were in the process of constructing on Guadalcanal. It didnt
take much map study for American military planners to realize war in the Pacific was bound
to be primarily about the capture of useful airfields or taking strategic spits of land dotted
throughout vast stretches of water on which airfields could be built and deep-water anchorag-
es secured. War in the Pacific was a classic naval campaign and conducting it would involve
intimate cooperation between the Navy, landing forces of the Marine Corps and what U.S.
Army units could be spared from land campaigns elsewhere in a world at war.
One of the most under-appreciated aspects of war planning is that the bad guy gets a
vote and the Japanese, firmly entrenched in the Solomons with strong naval and air forces
based out of Rabaul to the north of Guadalcanal were not about to tolerate an offensive with-
out stiff and forceful reaction. Despite the relatively meek resistance from Japanese defenders
as the 1
st
Marine Division struggled to get its men and materiel ashore on Guadalcanal, the
admirals commanding the ships of the amphibious force and the covering force of surface
combatants were more than a little concerned about the danger to the fleet sitting like ducks in
the waters off Guadalcanal. After the devastation at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific Fleet could
hardly afford more significant losses, especially among the three surviving aircraft carriers that
were providing initial air support for the Watchtower operations.
In one of the most contentious and heatedly-argued moves of the war, the Navy re-
sponded to initial Japanese forays against the landing forces in the southern Solomons by
sending the aircraft carriers to safer waters out of reach of Japanese planes. The vital carriers
naturally required a screening force of surface combatants to survive so the battleships, cruis-
ers and destroyers vital to naval gunfire support of operations ashore, also departed. Most
significantly to the Marines still laboring to offload their equipment and supplies, the amphi-
bious transports were also forced to withdraw for lack of defense against the inevitable Japa-
nese reaction. And with those transport vessels went a major portion of the 1
st
Marine
Divisions supplies that had yet to be landed.
What followed the Navy departure from Guadalcanal was an epic battle against consis-
tent enemy counter-landings and strong effort to push the Marines off the islands while they
were hanging on by their bloody fingernails to crucial defensive positions around that vital
airstrip, known to history as Henderson Field. The Marines survived on captured rations and
sheer guts against consistent and brutal Japanese attack, fighting mud, mosquitoes, malaria
and dengue fever with little support beyond the make-shift Cactus Air Force that tried to
counter regular and devastating enemy air attacks. Its the stuff of which legends were made
and from which legendary names like Mitch Paige and Manila John Basilone became touch-
stones of American wartime tenacity. And its inspirational reading for all of us these days
when a new generation of American heroes is building legends on modern battlefields.
The Marine Corps has got it right: The past shapes the future. We ignore that at our
national peril. With this first Warriors Publishing Group re-printing of detailed accounts of
these historic battles of the past, we offer you a chance to appreciate that and take note of our
American military legacy. Enjoy itand more importantly learn from it.


Table of Contents
The Turning Point: Guadalcanal ........................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1: Background and Preparations
1
........................................................................ 1
Japanese Situation ................................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Preparations ..................................................................................................................... 4
Plans for Battle ......................................................................................................................... 5
Accumulation of Intelligence ................................................................................................. 7
Planning and Mounting Out ................................................................................................ 10
Rehearsals and Movement to the Objective ........................................................................ 12
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Chapter 2: Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942 ....................................................................... 18
The Landing ........................................................................................................................... 18
The Japanese Retaliate .......................................................................................................... 22
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 26
Chapter 3: Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo .................................................................... 27
Tulagi: The First Day ............................................................................................................. 27
Tulagi--The First Night and Succeeding Day ..................................................................... 29
The Landings on Gavutu-Tanambogo................................................................................. 30
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 36
Chapter 4: The Battle of the Tenaru ................................................................................. 37
Ground Action ....................................................................................................................... 43
Battle of the Tenaru
15
............................................................................................................. 46
Battle of the Eastern Solomons ............................................................................................. 50
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 52
Chapter 5: The Battle of the Ridge ................................................................................... 53
The Battle of the Ridge .......................................................................................................... 59
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 65
Chapter 6: Action Along the Matanikau.......................................................................... 66
Action of 7-9 October ............................................................................................................ 72
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 75
Chapter 7: Japanese Counteroffensive ............................................................................. 76
The Battle of Cape Esperance ............................................................................................... 78
Preparation for Battle ............................................................................................................ 79
The Ground Action ............................................................................................................... 82
The Battle of Santa Cruz ....................................................................................................... 89
Notes ....................................................................................................................................... 91
Chapter 8: Critical November ........................................................................................... 92
Brief Renewal of Western Attack ....................................................................................... 100
Decision at Sea ..................................................................................................................... 100
Back Toward Kokumbona .................................................................................................. 106

Notes ..................................................................................................................................... 107
Chapter 9: Final Period, 9 December 1942 to 9 February 1943 .................................... 109
Change of Command .......................................................................................................... 109
General Situation ................................................................................................................. 112
The Corps Offensive ............................................................................................................ 115
Drive to the West ................................................................................................................. 117
Final Pursuit ......................................................................................................................... 118
Epilogue ............................................................................................................................... 120
Notes ..................................................................................................................................... 123




P a g e | 1
The Turning Point: Guadalcanal

Chapter 1: Background and Preparations
1

Scarcely had Admiral Yamamoto pulled his Combined Fleet away from its defeat at
Midway before the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff began reconsidering basic Pacific policy. They
wanted an offensive which would aid containment of the Japanese advances toward Australia
and safeguard the U.S. communication lines to the Anzac area. As early as 18 February, Ad-
miral Ernest J. King., Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations,
told Chief of Staff George C. Marshall that he considered it necessary to garrison certain South
and Southwest pacific islands with Army troops
2
in preparation for launching U.S. Marines on
an early offensive against the enemy.
3
And shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea, General
MacArthur advanced plans for an attack against the Japanese at Rabaul. For this move he
requested aircraft carriers, additional troops, and more planes.
4
But Nimitz rejected this plan.
His carriers were too precious for commitment in waters so restricted as the Solomon Sea, he
told the general. Besides, the admiral had a plan of his own. He wanted to capture Tulagi with
one Marine raider battalion.
5
Admiral King's reaction to this plan was initially favorable, but
on 1 June he sided with Marshall and MacArthur that the job could not be done by one batta-
lion.
But now time and the victory at Midway had improved the U.S. position in the Pacific,
and on 25 June Admiral King advised Nimitz and Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Com-
P a g e | 2
mander of South Pacific Forces,
6
to prepare for an offensive against the Lower Solomons. Santa
Cruz Island, Tulagi, and adjacent areas would be seized and occupied by Marines under
CinCPac, and Army troops from Australia then would form the permanent occupation garri-
son.
7
D-Day would be about 1 August.
The task seemed almost impossible. Ghormley had just taken over his Pacific job after a
hurried trip from London where he had been Special Naval Observer and Commander of U.S.
Naval Forces in Europe; the 1st Marine Division, slated for the Solomon landing, was making
an administrative move from the United States to New Zealand; and Marshall and King
continued to debate matters of command. The general contested the Navy's right to command
the operation. The area lay in the Southwest Pacific, Marshall pointed out, and so MacArthur
ought to be in charge.
8

Never mind arbitrary geography, King's reply seemed to say. The forces involved
would not come from MacArthur, but from the South Pacific; and King doubted that MacAr-
thur could help the operation much even if he wanted to. The Southwest Pacific's nearest land-
based bomber field was 975 miles from Tulagi. The command setup must be made with a view
toward success, King said, but the primary consideration was that the operation be begun at
once. He stated unequivocally that it must be under Nimitz, and that it could not be conducted
in any other way.
9

The Joint Chiefs resolved this conflict on 2 July with issuance of the "Joint Directive for
Offensive Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area Agreed on by the United States Chiefs of
Staff." The directive set the seizure of the New Britain-New Ireland-New Guinea area as the
objective of these operations, but it broke this goal down into three phases designed to resolve
the dispute between MacArthur and Nimitz. Phase One would be the seizure of the island of
Santa Cruz and Tulagi, along with positions on adjacent islands. Nimitz would command this
operation, with MacArthur concentrating on interdiction of enemy air and naval activity to the
west. And to remove MacArthur's geographic claim on the Phase One target area, the Joint
Chiefs shifted the boundary between the general and Admiral Nimitz to place the Lower
Solomons in the admiral's South Pacific area. MacArthur then would take command of Phase
Two, seizure of other Solomon Islands plus positions on New Guinea, and of Phase Three, the
capture of Rabaul and adjacent bases in New Britain and New Ireland. Questions of timing,
establishment of task organizations, and arrangements for command changes from one area to
another would be governed by the Joint Chiefs.
Preparation of this directive in Washington had prompted King's warning order which
Ghormley received on 25 June; and when the directive arrived in the South Pacific the force
commander there already was making his plans for Phase One, which Washington labeled
Operation WATCHTOWER. But, valid as was the Chiefs' of Staff determination to lose no time
in launching this first offensive, problems facing Ghormley and Nimitz were so grim that the
pseudo code name for the undertaking soon became "Operation Shoestring."
Japanese Situation
Since Pearl Harbor the Japanese had expanded through East Asia, the Indies, and much
of Melanesia to a gigantic line of departure which menaced Australia from the Indian Ocean to
the Coral Sea. Lae, Salamaua, and Finschafen on New Guinea's north coast had been occupied,
and a force for the capture of port Moresby--a New Guinea town just across the north tip of the
Coral Sea from Australia's Cape York Peninsula--stood poised at Rabaul in the Bismarcks, a
position taken by the Japanese on 23 January 1942.
P a g e | 3
A month later the Japanese took Bougainville Island in the Northern Solomons, and on
4 May they took a 300-mile step down this island chain to capture Tulagi, which lay between
the larger islands of Florida and Guadalcanal. This started the Japanese encirclement of the
Coral Sea, a move that was thwarted by Admiral Fletcher in the naval battle that preceded the
fight at Midway.
Defeat of their fleet at Midway forced the Japanese to alter many of their ambitious
plans, and on 11 July they gave up the idea of taking New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. But if
Admiral Yamamoto realized that the failure of his fleet at Midway spelled the doom of Japa-
nese ambitions in the Pacific, U.S. fighting men were to meet a number of his countrymen who
did not get the word, or who were bent on convincing Yamamoto that he was wrong. Rabaul
and Solomons positions grew stronger after the Battle of Midway, and reduction of Fortress
Rabaul would occupy efforts of the Allied South Pacific forces for nearly two years. Operation
WATCHTOWER, which turned out to be the landing against Tulagi and Guadalcanal, was the
first Allied step toward Rabaul.
In 1942 the Australian garrison at Tulagi consisted of a few riflemen of the Australian
Imperial Force, some members of the Royal Australian Air Force, a member of the Australian
Naval Intelligence, and Resident Commissioner, the civil staff, and a few planters and missio-
naries. Most of these people evacuated the area after a heavy Japanese air raid of 1 May, and
the subsequent sighting by coastwatchers of enemy ships en route toward the Southern Solo-
mons. Among those who remained in the Solomon area were the coastwatchers, courageous
old island hands who now retired into the bush and hills from which they would observe
Japanese movements and report regularly by radio to their intelligence center in Australia.
11

The 3d Kure Special Landing Force made the Tulagi landing from the cruiser-mine
layer Okinoshima which flew the flag of Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima. One group of these
Japanese "marines"--a machine gun company, two antitank gun platoons, and some laborers-
occupied Tulagi while a similar task organization from the 3d Kure Force went ashore on
Gavutu, a smaller island nearby. They met no opposition, except that from Admiral Fletcher's
planes in the action ancillary to the Battle of the Coral Sea, and defensive installations were set
up immediately to protect the base construction and improvement work which soon got under
way. The Japanese set up coastwatcher stations on Savo Island at the northwest end of the
channel between Florida and Guadalcanal, and on both tips as well as the south coast of
Guadalcanal.
Tulagi has an excellent harbor,
12
and initial efforts of the Japanese landing force im-
proved this and developed a seaplane base there. The enemy took no immediate steps to
develop airfields, and a full month passed before surveying parties and patrols crossed the
20mile channel to Guadalcanal where they staked out an air strip site on the plains of the
Lunga River. They finished this survey late in June and began to grade a runway early in July.
With a scrapping of the plans to occupy Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and with the
importance of Rabaul thus increased, Japanese holding in the Lower Solomons had gained in
value. Tulagi with its excellent harbor, and Guadalcanal with its broad plains suitable for
airstrips, would be an important outwork to Rabaul. A new offensive likewise could be
mounted from the Bismarck-Solomon positions, to erase the Coral Sea and Midway setbacks.
Japan still had her eye on Port Moresby. The troops slated for that occupation already waited
at Rabaul, and now a new fleet, the Eighth, under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, was created
to help look after this southern end of the Japanese conquest string. This fleet, with the help of
aircraft from Rabaul and the Lower Solomons, would protect the ferrying of troops to Buna,
P a g e | 4
and the subsequent overland march of these troops across New Guinea's Owen Stanley Moun-
tains to capture Port Moresby. The Australia would be well blocked if not complete isolated;
and maybe if the Japanese did not think about the defeat at Midway the sting would just go
away and everything would be all right again.
13

U.S. Preparations
After reinforcing the Anzac lifeline, the U.S. began edging toward its Solomon Islands
target area. Near the end of March some 500 Army troops from Major General Alexander M.
Patch's Americal Division in New Caledonia went up to garrison Efate in the lower New
Hebrides. On 29 March the 4th Marine Defense Battalion and Marine Fighter Squadron 212,
diverted from their deployment from Hawaii to Tongatabu, also landed on this island. These
Marines and Army personnel built an airstrip for the fighter squadron. Naval forces also
began to arrive during this time, and in April other elements of Marine Air Group 23, parent
organization of Squadron 212, came to the island. The prewar seaplane base at Vila, Efate's
largest town, was improved, and another such base was built in Havannah Harbor on the
island's northwest coast.
This was a hazardous and rather unnerving extension of defensive lines for the meager
American force of that period. The Japanese were just 700 miles to the north in the Lower
Solomons, and this fact gave these New Hebrides islands and waters that same hostile, "cree-
py" feeling that members of the unsuccessful Wake relief expedition had sensed while on that
venture deep into the enemy zone. The Japanese made a few air raids into this area, but the
greatest opposition came from the anopheles mosquito.
In the New Hebrides American troops of World War II had their first wholesale en-
counter with this carrier of malaria, and the field medical units were not prepared to cope with
the disease in such proportions. Atabrine tables were not yet available, and even quinine was
in short supply. By the end of April there were 133 cases of malaria among the 947 officers and
men of the 4th Defense Battalion, and by the time of the Guadalcanal landing early in August
the entire New Hebrides force reported the disease in even greater proportions. Medical units
were dispatching requests for "an enormous amount of quinine."
14

In May both General Patch and Admiral Ghormley recommended that a force be sent
even farther north, to Espiritu Santo. An airfield there would put the Allied planes 150 miles
closer to the Solomons, and the force there would be a protective outwork for Efate until that
first offensive started. Admiral Ghormley also recommended that the Ellice Islands, between
the Samoan group and the Gilberts, be occupied as an additional outpost of the communica-
tion lines to Australia. This move was postponed, however, and it was not until October that
Marines landed at Funafuti in the Ellice group. Espiritu Santo was immediately important to
the Solomons operations, however, and on 28 May a force of about 500 Army troops moved
from Efate to the larger New Hebrides island farther north. The first attempt of these troops to
build an airfield there bogged down in a stretch of swamp and new outbreaks of malaria.
By this time, plans for the WATCHTOWER landings were firming up, and the effort at
Espiritu Santo was reinforced so that the airfield would be completed in time. On 15 July a
detachment from the 4th Marine Defense Battalion went up to Santo with a heavy antiaircraft
battery and an automatic weapons battery. The airfield was completed in time, but the Army
troops and Marines were mostly walking cases of malaria by then. However, important isl-
ands had been reinforced, new garrisons formed to protect the communication lines, and these
P a g e | 5
displacements toward enemy bases had been accomplished. The time had come to strike back
at the Japanese.
Plans for Battle
When Admiral Ghormley received the WATCHTOWER warning order on 25 June, the
1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift, was en
route from the United States to Wellington, New Zealand. The advance echelon had arrived on
14 June, and the rear was at sea. It would land on 11 July. Until 26 June when information of
the operation reached the division staff, Vandegrift had planned to continue training his
division in New Zealand.
15
The division, the Marine Corps' major unit available for employ-
ment on such short notice, was understrength by about one third because of detachment of the
reinforced 7th Marines to Samoan duty.
Army troops in the area, originally under Ghormley's command, could provide little
more than moral support to the landings. This shoestring venture would not remove the need
for garrison forces elsewhere in the South Pacific. Besides, Ghormley lost his direct control of
these troops on 1 July when Major General Millard F. Harmon, USA, became Commanding
General, South Pacific Area, to head all Army forces in the theater. Even though Harmon
would be under Ghormley's command, the admiral at first disliked this command setup. But
he later came to regard Harmon as one of the finest administrators and coordinators he had
ever met.
16

Admiral Ghormley's job in the South Pacific seemed almost to resemble that of a traffic
director more than it did the role of a commander. According to plans, Nimitz would order
task force commanders, with their missions already assigned them, to report to Ghormley
when they were going to carry out missions in his area. Ghormley then would direct these
commanders to execute the missions Nimitz had assigned them, and he could not interfere in
these missions except when tasks were opposed by circumstances of which Nimitz was not
aware.
17

To complete the picture of command for WATCHTOWER, Rear Admiral Richmond K.
Turner arrived from Washington on 18 July and reported to Ghormley as commander of the
amphibious force. Ghormley, under Nimitz, was in over-all strategic command, but he would
remain at his headquarters in Noumea. Admiral Fletcher would command the joint expeditio-
nary force. But in practice Fletcher confined himself almost completely to providing air cover
from his carriers, and this left Turner, in addition to commanding Vandegrift and his division,
in charge of almost everything else as well.
This command setup which placed Vandegrift under the Navy's amphibious force
commander rankled until nearly the time of the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from
Guadalcanal fighting. It was not a case of small jealousy about control or any sort of petty
peevishness on the part of either Vandegrift or Turner. Rather it was a clash of serious oppos-
ing convictions about how such an operation should be conducted. Turner and many other
Naval authorities looked upon the landing force as just a detachment from the force afloat, and
still connected to the Navy's amphibious force by firm command lines. That was a traditional
view from an earlier age.
But this was the beginning of a big new war, and Marines had experience and thinking
time enough in amphibious matters to have definite studied opinions about how these intri-
cate over-the-beach operations should be conducted when they reached the proportions which
would be necessary in the Pacific. Vandegrift, faced with the task of putting these studied
P a g e | 6
opinions and experiments into practice, wanted a clear-cut command right, free from any
vestige of divided responsibility shared with the commander afloat. Once firmly established
ashore, Marine opinion held, the landing force commander should command his own land
operation. His training and position on the battleground made him more qualified for this job
than was the amphibious force commander. It took some arguing, and this matter finally had
to be taken to the top of military hierarchy, but the Navy eventually saw the point and agreed
with it.
Turner's second in command was Rear Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley, RN, whose covering
force would include eight cruisers (three Australian and five U.S.) and fifteen destroyers (all
U.S.). These ships were to provide naval gunfire support and antiaircraft protection. In all, the
naval contingent included three aircraft carriers with a strength of 250 planes; a number of
light and heavy cruisers; two new battleships; and the available screening vessels and aux-
iliary craft. Transports and cargo vessels were at a premium, and would continue so for some
time.
In addition to the approximately 250 carrier aircraft, Ghormley could muster only 166
Navy and Marine Corps planes (including two Marine squadrons--VMF-212 and VMO-251),
95 Army planes, and 30 planes from the Royal New Zealand Air Force. These 291 aircraft--all
unfortunately based beyond striking range of the target area--were under the command of
Rear Admiral John S. McCain whose title was Commander Aircraft South Pacific. He was
instrumental in bringing about the construction of the Espiritu Santo airfield and seeing that it
was available for aircraft of 28 July, in spite of all the troubles which befell the force in the New
Hebrides.
VMO-251 came in to Noumea on 12 July on board the USS Heywood. The outfit barely
had time to set up camp at Tontouta and uncrate its aircraft before it got the word to go up to
that new field at Santo and back up the landing. On 2 August the unit began to arrive at this
northern New Hebrides field, and within nine days Lieutenant Colonel John N. Hart had his
squadron installed there with its sixteen FGF-3P long-range photographic planes. Hart still
was short his wing tanks for long-range flying, however, These were finally flown out from
Pearl Harbor and arrived on 20 August.
MacArthur's contribution to the Guadalcanal operation consisted of about sixteen B-17s
which flew reconnaissance over the area west of the 158th meridian east (the boundary be-
tween the South and Southwest Pacific Areas for air search) and attempted to put a stopper on
the enemy air from Rabaul.
Thus Ghormley could rely only on the services of a small, highly trained striking force
of fluctuating but never overwhelming power. He had no assurances of reserve ground troops,
although plans were under way to release both the 7th and 8th Marines from their Samoan
defense missions,
18
and he had been advised that garrison forces would have to come from the
troops already within his area on base defense duty.
19
The 1st Base Depot had set up an ad-
vance echelon in Wellington on 21 June, and other supply bases were to be established later at
Noumea and Espiritu Santo.
The general structure organized to employ these resources against the Japanese was
laid down in Nimitz's order to Ghormley of 9 July, and Ghormley's Operation Plan 1-42 of 17
July 1942.
20

Ghormley, exercising strategic command, set up his organization in three main groups:
Carrier Forces (Task Force 61.1), commanded by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, was com-
posed of elements of three task forces from Nimitz's area--11, 16, and 18. It would include
P a g e | 7
three carriers, Saratoga, Enterprise, and Wasp, the fast new battleship North Carolina, five heavy
cruisers, one so-called antiaircraft cruiser, and 16 destroyers.
Amphibious Force (Task Force 61.2), commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turn-
er, included the Marine landing force carried in 13 attack transports, four destroyer transports,
and six cargo ships; a fire support group of one antiaircraft and three heavy cruisers plus six
destroyers; a screening group of one light and three heavy cruisers as well as nine destroyers;
and a small mine-sweeping group.
Shore-Based Aircraft (Task Force 63), under Rear Admiral J.S. McCain (ComAirSoPac),
included all aircraft in the area except those on carriers.
Complicating this symmetrical structure was the tactical command role played by Vice
Admiral Fletcher. He was in over-al command of TF 61 which included the forces of Noyes
and Turner.
Ghormley called for a rehearsal in the Fiji area and directed that all task force com-
manders arrange to hold a conference near the rehearsal area. He himself would move from
Auckland to Noumea about 1 August in order to comply with his orders to exercise strategic
command within the operating area.
21

By this time the planes and orders were formed, the target selected, the forces orga-
nized, and the Navy given leeway to operate without poaching in the territory of the South-
west Pacific. Only the detail of a landing date remained unsettled. Vandegrift pointed out to
Ghormley that the late arrival of his second echelon, and a stretch of bad weather, had so
complicated his loading problem as to make it impossible to meet the date of 1 August.
Ghormley and Nimitz agreed that an additional week was needed, and King consented to
postpone the landing until 7 August. King warned, however, that this was the latest date
permissible and that every effort should be made to advance it.
Accumulation of Intelligence
From an intelligence point of view, the Guadalcanal-Tulagi landings can hardly be de-
scribed as more than a stab in the dark. When General Vandegrift received his initial warning
order on 26 June 1942 neither his staff nor the local New Zealand authorities had more than
the most general and sketchy knowledge of the objective area or the enemy's strength and
disposition, and there was but a mont available before the scheduled date of mounting out, 22
July.
As in the case with most tropical backwaters, the charting and hydrographic informa-
tion was scanty and out of date. Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, Intelligence Officer of
the 1st Marine Division, therefore set out to locate traders, planters, shipmasters, and a few
miners who had visited or lived at Guadalcanal or Tulagi. A number of likely sources resided
in Australia, and while his subordinates tabulated the formal data available, Goettge left for
Australia on 2 July. He returned to New Zealand on the 13th.
Long after the conclusion of the campaign, it was learned that Colonel Goettge's efforts
deserved better success than they had enjoyed. During his hurried trip to Australia, he ar-
ranged with the Southwest Pacific Area for maps to be made from a strip of aerial photographs
and to be delivered prior to the sortie of the 1st Marine Division. The maps were made, but
were not received because of certain oversights and confusion in mounting out the division.
From Buka and Bougainville in the north, the Solomons form a double column of isl-
ands streaming southeast between latitudes five and twelve degrees south. Looking northwest
toward Bougainville, the large islands on the right are Choiseul, Santa Isabel, and Malaita. In
P a g e | 8
the column to the left are the islands of the New Georgia group, the Russells, Guadalcanal, and
San Cristobal. Buka and Bougainville at the outbreak of the war were part of the Australian
Mandated Territory of New Guinea; the remainder of the double chain formed the British
Solomon Islands Protectorate. In all, the islands number several hundred, with some 18,600
square miles of land area.
Florida, the largest island of the Nggela Group, lies between Malaita and Guadalcanal;
and between the northern tips of Guadalcanal and Florida is the small, nearly-conical island of
Savo. Indispensable Strait separates Florida from neighboring Malaita to the east, and the
twenty-mile-wide strait between Florida and Guadalcanal to the south is known generally as
Sealark Channel.
Nestled into the northwest rim of a jagged bight in Florida's south coast lies Tulagi, seat
of the British Resident Commissioner. Tulagi Harbor, the water between the two islands, is the
best anchorage in the Southern Solomons.
In the middle of Florida's bight, generally east southeast of Tulagi, lie the smaller cau-
seway-connected islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo. Gavutu was the local headquarters of
Lever Brothers which operated coconut plantations in the area, and this island, as well as
Tanambogo and Tulagi, possessed some docks, jetties, and other developments for shipping,
management, and copra processing.
Mostly volcanic in origin and lying within the world's wettest area, the Solomons are
jagged, jungle-covered, and steamy with humid tropical heat. Lofty peaks and ridges cross-
faulted by volcanic action and dramatic erosion cuts from swift rivers chop the islands into
conflicting terrain that became a nightmare for military operations.
Guadalcanal, some 90 miles in length and about 25 miles wide, presents a varied topo-
graphy ranging from plains and foothills along the north coast to a mountain backbone drop-
ping rapidly to the south coast. Rainfall is extremely heavy, and changes in season are marked
only by changes in intensity of precipitation. This, together with an average temperature in the
high 80s, results in an unhealthy climate. Malaria, dengue, and other fevers, as well as fungus
infections, afflict the population.
Rivers are numerous and from the military point of view may be divided arbitrarily in-
to two classes. The first of these is the long, swift, relatively shallow river that may be forded at
numerous points. Generally deep only for a short distance from its mouth, it presents few
problems in the matter of crossing. Examples of this type on Guadalcanal are the Tenaru, the
Lunga, and the Balesuna. The second type is that of the slow and deep lagoon. Such streams
are sometimes short, as in the case of the Ilu River, and some lagoons are merely the delta
streams of rivers of considerable size, as in the case of the Matanikau. This type, because of
depth and marshy banks, became a military obstacle.
Although such accumulation of data afforded much enlightenment beyond the little
previously known, it included corresponding minor misinformation and many aggravating
gaps, for detailed information in a form suitable for military operations was mainly lacking.
In spite of the number of years which had elapsed since initiation of the systematic eco-
nomic development of the islands by the British, not a single accurate or complete map of
Guadalcanal or Tulagi existed in the summer of 1942. The hydrographic charts, containing just
sufficient data to enable trading schooners to keep from grounding, were little better, although
these did locate a few outstanding terrain features of some use for making a landfall or con-
ducting triangulation. Such locations were not always accurate. Mount Austen, for example,
was assigned as an early landing objective, but the landing force discovered that instead of
P a g e | 9
being but a few hundred yards away from the beaches, the mountain actually lay several miles
across almost impassable jungle.
22

Aerial photographs would have been a profitable source of up-to-date information, but
the shortage of long-range aircraft and suitably located bases, and the short period available
for planning, combined to restrict availability of aerial photos in the quantity and quality
normally considered necessary.


CRUDE SKETCH MAP used
in the planning and early operational
phases of the Guadalcanal campaign
by units of the 5th Combat Team; it is
an adaptation of a map prepared by
the D-2 Section and typifies the
scarcity of reliable terrain information
available to the 1st Marine Division
when it left New Zealand.

Perhaps the most useful
photographic sortie carried out
prior to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi
landings was that undertaken on
17 July by an Army B-17 aircraft in
which Lieutenant Colonel Merrill
B. Twining, assistant operations
officer of the 1st Marine Division,
and Major William B. McKean,
member of the staff of Transport
Squadron 26, conducted a personal
reconnaissance of the landing
areas. They assured General Vandegrift that the Lunga beaches appeared suitable for the
landing.
23

The coastal map of Guadalcanal finally adopted by the 1st Marine Division (and em-
ployed, with such corrections as could later be developed, through the entire campaign) was
traced from an aerial strip-map obtained by Colonel Goettge on his mission to Australia. It was
reasonably accurate in general outline, but contained no usable indications of ground forms or
elevations. The Goettge map was supplemented by aerial photos of Tulagi, Gavutu, and
Tanambogo Islands, and these constituted the sum of the Marines' knowledge of Tulagi and
Guadalcanal prior to the landings.
24

Information concerning the enemy's strength, dispositions, and activities was collected
by the U.S. planners from coastwatcher reports.
25
Strength figures were by non means as
definite or convincing as were the factual accounts of the defenses. Various intelligence esti-
mates, prepared during July, gave figures as high as 8,400. Admiral Turner's Operation Plan
A3-42, issued at the Koro Island rehearsals in the Fijis on 30 July, estimated that 1,850 enemy
would be found on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo, and 5,275 on Guadalcanal. Both figures
P a g e | 10
were high. A count of enemy dead in the Tulagi and Gavutu area placed the number of de-
fenders at about 1,500 (including 600 laborers), while study of positions, interrogation of
prisoners, and translation of enemy documents on Guadalcanal proper indicated that about
2,230 troops and laborers had been in the Lunga area at the time of the Marines' landing.
Close and determined combat was anticipated with these forces; and on 17 July, Admir-
al Nimitz notified Admiral King that it would be unsafe to assume that the enemy would not
attempt to retake the area to be attacked, and that, if insufficient forces were assigned, the
Marines might not be able to hold on.
26

Planning and Mounting Out

Guadalcanal and Florida Islands

For the dual landing opera-
tion, General Vandegrift divided
his organization into two forces.
The units landing on the Florida
side of Sealark Channel (Group
Yoke) were to be commanded by
Brigadier General William H.
Rupertus, the assistant division
commander (ADC), while Vande-
grift himself would exercise
command over Group X-Ray
landing at Lunga Point.
It was expected that the
Florida-side landings would be
more severely contested by the
Japanese, and to that landing group the general assigned his best-trained units: the 1st Marine
Raider Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson; the 1st Parachute
Battalion of Major Robert H. Williams; and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines under Lieutenant
Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans, all with their reinforcing units attached. Edson would be the
commander of the Tulagi landing force; Williams the commander at Gavutu-Tanambogo. The
Guadalcanal group included Colonel Clifton B. Cates' 1st Marines and Colonel Leroy P. Hunt's
5th Marines (less 2/5), both reinforced, plus the balance of the division special and service
troops.
27

The Tulagi plan called for the 1st Raider Battalion and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines to land
in column on the island's south coast, turn east, and attack down the long axis of the island.
This would be followed by 1st Parachute Battalion landings on Gavutu and Tanambogo, and a
two-company sweep along Florida Island's cost line fronting Tulagi Bay.
The Guadalcanal scheme envisaged landing the 5th Marines (less 2d Bn) across a beach
some few hundred yards east of the Lunga Point area where the Japanese were expected to be
concentrated, and there to establish a beachhead. The 1st Marines then would come ashore in a
column of battalions and pass through this perimeter to take Mount Austen. The primary goal
was to establish a beachhead in an area not strongly defended.
28

P a g e | 11
To make up for the division's manpower shortage caused by the detached duty of the
7th Marines in Samoa, Admiral King on 27 June had proposed that Vandegrift be allotted the
2d Marines of the 2d Marine Division. Accordingly this unit (reinforced) sailed combat loaded
from San Diego on 1 July.
29
The regiment would be the landing force reserve.
30

While staff planners contemplated a target area nearly as unfamiliar to them as the back
side of the moon, other members of the landing force wrestled the monumental chore of
preparing for the movement to combat. "Seldom," General Vandegrift said later, "has an
operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstance."
31

When the decision to land on enemy beaches reached the 1st Marine Division, the
command post and the 5th Marine Regiment were in Wellington, New Zealand; the 1st Ma-
rines and the 11th Marines, less two of its battalions, were at sea en route to New Zealand;
service and special troops were split between the forward and rear chelons; the 2d Regiment
was on the way from San Diego to the South Pacific; the 1st Raider Battalion was in Samoa,
and the 3d Defense Battalion was in Hawaii. Preliminary plans and moves had to assemble
these widely scattered units into a fighting force which could make an amphibious landing,
one of the most intricate of military maneuvers. From the understanding that it would be the
nucleus for the buildup of a force which would be trained for operations which might come
late in 1942, the 1st Marine Division had to shift at once into hurried preparations to mount out
for action.
Most of the ships transporting units of the division had been loaded organizationally
for the voyage to New Zealand, but for the proposed amphibious assault the supplies had to
be reshuffled and ships combat loaded so that items first needed in the fighting would be
readily at hand in the holds. The reloading and re-embarking of Combat Group A (5th Ma-
rines, reinforced) went smoothly, uncomplicated by the necessity for simultaneous unloading
and reloading which plagued the rear echelon. THe group began embarkation on 2 July and
remained on board its transport to await the arrival of the rear echelon.
The second echelon arrived on 11 July, and had eleven days to empty and reload its
ships. No troops were disembarked except those who were to remain in New Zealand as rear
echelon personnel. All others, who already had been cramped quarters during the long trip
across the Pacific, were put to work in eight-hour shifts, and parties of 300 men were assigned
to each ship.
32

Aotea Quay at Wellington was the scene of this squaring away. It was inadequate in all
ways save that it could accommodate five ships at a time. Labor difficulties with the highly
unionized stevedores resulted in the entire task being undertaken and carried through by
Marines. Because of security regulations, no appeal to patriotism could be made to the regular
dock workers since care was taken to have civilians believe that all the flurry was merely
preparation for a training exercise. Dockside equipment was meager, and there was no shelter
close at hand.
As the gear began to be juggled from ship to dock and back again, a cold, wet "souther-
ly" settled down to lash New Zealand. But in spite of the weather, work had to continue
around the clock. Carton-packed food and other supplies "deteriorated rapidly," the division
later reported by way of an understatement, and the morale of troops followed the direction of
the down-slanting rain.
On the dock, cereal, sugar, and other rations mushed together with globs of brown pulp
that once had been cardboard boxes. A great number of wet cartons that were rushed to the
hopeful safety of wool warehouses later gave way under the weight of stacking. Lieutenant
P a g e | 12
Colonel Randolph McC. Pate and his logistics section had a herculean task in managing this
unloading and reloading. Transport quartermaster of the various ships supervised work on
board while a relay of officers from the division took charge of the eight-hour shifts dockside.
The New Zealand Army furnished 30 flatbed lorries and 18 ten-wheelers to transfer fuel,
small-arms ammunition and explosives to dumps several miles away.
There was not enough hold space for all the division motor transport. Most of the quar-
ter- and one-ton trucks were put on board, but 75 percent of the heavier rolling stock was set
aside to stay with the rear echelon that would be left behind when the division sailed for the
Solomons.
Engineers loaded what little dirt-moving equipment they owned, but it was so meager
that they hoped the Japanese would have most of the airfield built by the time it was captured.
The engineer battalion also loaded bridging material, demolitions, and all available water
supply equipment. No major construction was contemplated in early phases of the operation,
however, and equipment and supplies for such work were not taken.
With the D-4 or an assistant in constant touch with the dockmaster, order began to ap-
pear from the chaos of strewn gear, swelling cereal, wilting cardboard cartons, and frayed
tempers. But there were still serious problems. Supplies and equipment piled on docks often
made it difficult for trucks to negotiate the narrow passages to reach all areas of the stacked
gear, and during this mounting out certain modifications of the logistical plan became neces-
sary. As finally loaded, the Marines carried 60 days supplies, 10 units of fire for all weapons,
the minimum individual baggage actually required to live and fight, and less than half the
organic motor transport authorized.
Regardless of the difficulties, however, the force sailed as scheduled on 0900 on 22 July,
under escort of cruisers of Admiral Turner's Task Force 62.
33
General Vandegrift, despite his
request for a vessel better suited in communications and accommodations, had been directed
to embark his command post in the USS McCawley.
Rehearsals and Movement to the Objective
In accordance with orders received from Nimitz on 1 July,
34
Ghormley had directed that
all forces involved in the assault make rendezvous at a position south of Fiji, out of sight of
land so that there would be no chance of observation by enemy agents and no chance that an
inadvertent tip-off would be made by friendly observers.
35
At that point there would be a
conference between the commanding officers who had not as yet been able to discuss in
person the various aspects of the operation.
The components of the assault force not previously in New Zealand with the division
were converging upon the rendezvous point from many directions. Colonel John M. Arthur's
2d Marines (reinforced), embarked in the Crescent City, President Adams, President
Hayes, President Jackson, and Alhena, steamed south under escort of the carrier Wasp and a
destroyer screen.
36
The 1st Raider Battalion, in the four destroyer transports of Transport
Division 12, had been picked up at Noumea.

P a g e | 13


EQUIPMENT FOR THE 1ST MA-
RINE DIVISION, including tanks and amphi-
bian tractors, is unloaded in New Zealand
preparatory to the Guadalcanal operation. (USN
11526)






MARINE RAIDERS and the crew of
the submarine Argonaut line the deck of the
vessel as it returns to Pearl Harbor after the
Makin Island raid. (USN 13859)


The 3d Defense Battalion (Colonel
Robert H. Pepper) on board the USS
Betelgeuse and Zeilin was en route from
Pearl Harbor where it had been sta-
tioned since the outbreak of the war. It
would meet the remainder of the force on 2 August. The Carrier Force, built around
the Saratoga and the Enterprise, with Fletcher flying his flag in the former, likewise was on its
way from Pearl Harbor. Rendezvous was made as planned, at 1400 on 26 July, some 400 miles
south of Fiji. The conference convened at once on board the Saratoga. Ghormley, unable to
attend, was represented by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan and his Com-
munications Officer, Lieutenant Commander L.M. LeHardy.
The conference pointed up several serious problems. General Vandegrift learned he
would not have adequate air and surface support for the completion of the unloading phase of
the operation. Fletcher wanted to retire within two days after the landing, and this meant that
transport shipping would have to clear out within an unreasonably short period. The Marine
general also learned that the 2d Marines, counted as his reserve, actually would be used for the
proposed operation at Ndeni in the Santa Cruz islands. Admiral Callaghan reported Fletcher's
retirement plans to Ghormley: "This sounds too sanguine to me," Callaghan reported, "but
they believe it can be done. ... AKs [cargo ships] may not be unloaded for three or four
days."
37
Ghormley, too, believed that the ships could not be pulled out that soon.
Landing rehearsals at the island of Koro in the Fijis were conducted from 28 through 30
July, but Vandegrift labeled them a waste of time and effort. "A complete bust," he observed
later.
38
Necessity for conserving landing craft made it impossible to conduct the practice land-
ings in a realistic way, although the men involved were given additional training in debarka-
tions,
39
and attack force ships were able to practice their gunfire support.
P a g e | 14
On 31 July, as night was falling, the ships weighed anchor and departed from Koro. The
carrier task force proceeded north and west while the transports and their screen plodded
steadily toward the Solomons. Almost 19,000 Marines were embarked in the 19 transports and
four destroyer-transports.
40

All circumstances favored the advancing convoy. Weather conditions during the final
two days were extremely favorable: sky topped by a low ceiling and winds gusty with inter-
mittent rain squalls. There was no sign of enemy aircraft or submarines, and no indication that
the approach was observed. In fact, enemy patrol planes were ground at Rabaul on 5 and 6
August because of bad weather.
41

The convoy headed generally west from Fiji and well to the south of the Solomons
chain. The course gradually shifted to the northward, and the night of 6-7 August found the
entire group of ships due west of the western extremity of Guadalcanal.
Task Force 62, commanded by Admiral Turner, was divided into two Transport
Groups. Transport Group X-Ray (62.1) commanded by Captain Lawrence F. Reifsnider, with
the Guadalcanal forces embarked, consisted of four subgroups, as follows:

Transdiv A: Fuller, American Legion, Bellatrix.
Transdiv B: McCawley, Barnett, Elliot, Libra.
Transdiv C: Hunter Liggett, Alchiba, Fomalhaut, Betelgeuse.
Transdiv D: Crescent City, President Hayes, President Adams, Alhena.

Transport Group Yoke (62,2) commanded by Captain George B. Ashe, and carrying the
assault troops for the Tulagi landing, consisted of the following subgroups:
Trasdiv E: Neville, Zeilin, Heywood, President Jackson.
Transdiv 12: Calhoun, Gregory, Little, McKean. (The destroyer-transport group.)
At 0310, 7 August, the force was directly west of Cape Esperance with an interval of six
miles between groups and a speed of 12 knots. Transport Group X-Ray steamed in two parallel
columns of eight and seven ships each with a distance of 750 yards between ships and an
interval of 1,000 yards between columns. The rugged outline of the Guadalcanal hills was just
visible to starboard when the course was shifted to 040, and a few minutes later the two
groups separated for the completion of their missions. X-Ray, shifting still further to starboard,
settled on course 075, which took it along the Guadalcanal coast, while Yoke, on course 058,
crossed outside Savo Island, toward Florida. The final approach to the transport area was
made without incident, and there was no sound until, at 0614, the supporting ships opened
fire on the island.
43

There are some indications that the Guadalcanal operation on D-Day morning was
something of a minor Pearl Harbor in reverse for the Japanese. A recent study of Japanese
wartime messages indicates the enemy was aware that a U.S. force had sortied from Hawaii.
Warnings were issued to Central Pacific outposts; Rabaul and points south were to be notified
for information only. Commander of the Japanese Twenty-Fourth Air Flotilla (Marshall-Gilbert-
Wake area) relayed his warning message south the next morning--at 0430 on 7 August. It was
too late. Less than an hour later he received Tulagi's report that the U.S. striking force had
been sighted in Sealark Channel at 0425.
44

P a g e | 15
Notes
[1] Unless otherwise noted the material used is derived from 1st MarDiv FinalRept on
the Guadalcanal Operation, Phases I through V, issued June-August 1943, hereinafter cited
as FinalRept (with Phase No); action reports, war diaries, and journals of the various units
which served with or as part of the 1st MarDiv; Marine Air History; Strategic Planning; W.F.
Craven and J.L. Cate (eds.), The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan--The Army Air Forces in World War
II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); J. Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive--
United States Army in World War II (Washington: HistDiv, DA 1949), hereinafter cited as Miller,
Guadalcanal; S.E. Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal--History of United States Naval Operations
in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), herinafter cited as Struggle for
Guadalcanal; Capt H.L. Merillat, The Island (Boston: Hoghton Mifflin Company, 1944), hereinaf-
ter cited as This Island; Maj J.L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Operation (Washington: HistDiv,
HQMC, 1949); VAdm R. Tanaka with R. Pineau, "Japan's Losing Struggle for Guadalcanal,"
two parts, USNI Proceedings, July and August 1956, Copyright 1956 by the U.S. Naval Institute,
hereinafter cited as Tanaka Article. Specific citations of material, in addition to direct quota-
tions, taken from FinalRept have been noted where the information presented may be of special
interest.
[2] CominCh ltr to CofSA, 18Feb42 (located at NHD).
[3] Specific mention of Marines for assault work came after Marshall questioned King's
plans and asked why these FMF troops could not perform the garrison duty. CofSA ltr to
CominCh, 24Feb42; CominCh ltr to CofSA, 2Mar42 (located at NHD).
[4] CinCSWPA msg to CofSA, 8May42 (located at OCMH).
[5] CinCPac ltr to CinCSWPA, 28May42 (located at NHD).
[6] Two days earlier a message from Nimitz gave Ghormley the Midway victory tally
and suggested that the carriers now might be made available for support of an operation
against the Solomon Islands. ComSoPac War Diary, June 1942 (located at NHD)
[7] CominCh disp to CinCPac and ComSoWestPacFor, 25Jun42 (located at NHD).
[8] CofSA ltr to CominCh, 26Jun42 (located at NHD).
[9] CominCh ltr to SofSA, 26Jun42 (located at NHD).
[10]
[11] For an exccellent account of the work of these men see Cdr E.A. Feldt, RAN, The
Coastwatchers (New York and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1946), hereinafter cited
as Coastwatchers.
[12] Earl Jellicoe, the British admiral who commanded at Jutland, recommended after a
South pacific inspection trip following World War I that the Tulagi harbor be developed as a
major fleet base.
[13] For an idea of the pains taken by official Japan to the facts of the Midway defeat,
see the preface of Mitsuo Fuchida in Battle That Doomed Japan, xii-xv.
[14] MedRept, 4thDefBn, March-August 1942.
[15] Gen Vandegrift was under the impression that his division would not be called for
combat duty prior to early 1943.
[16] Adm R.L. Ghormley personal notes, n.d., hereinafter cited as Ghormley MS; Maj J.L.
Zimmerman interview with Adm R.L. Ghormley, January 1949.
[17] ComSoPac War Diary, 9May42 (located at NHD).
P a g e | 16
[18] Relief for 7th Mar. was to leave the U.S. on 20 July and that for the 8th Mar on 1
September. ComSoPac War Diary, June 1942 (located at NHD).
[19] Adm King's effort to secure quick release for the assault troops was not successful.
The Army's commitments to the European Theater were such that no units were available for
such missions. Initially assured that air support and air replacements would be avaialbe, King
was advised on 27 July but LtGen Joseph C. McNarney, acting Chief of Staff, that commit-
ments in other areas would not permit further air reinforcements of the South Pacific--a dic-
tum which King protested strongly. CominCh memo to CofSA, 1Aug42 (located at NHD).
[20] Ghormley MS, 54, 58.
[21] Ibid., 59.
[22] This was the so-called "Grassy Knoll" assigned to he 1st Marines. Guadalcanal resi-
dents described it as lying virtually within the perimeter area ultimately occupied and de-
fended by Gen Vandegrift, whereas its true location was six miles to the southwest. This
discrepancy, unexplained for years, has given much cause for speculation to historians of the
Guadalcanal campaign, some of whom have raised the question whether Mount Austen was
really the "Grassy Knoll" which Goettge's informants had in mind. This school of thought
suggests that a feature within the described limits which might answer that description would
have been the high ground later to become known as Edson's Ridge.
[23] HistSec, HQMC, interview with Col W.B. McKean, 18Feb48.
[24] Two aerial photos, taken on 2 August by a ComAirSoPac B-17 and developed
aboard the USS Enterprise, were forwarded to Division Headquarters. They showed Tulagi
defensive positions in sharp detail, and verified the reports of coastwatchers about the rapidly
approaching completion of the airstrip in the Lunga plains.
[25] "The invaluable service of the Solomon Islands coastwatching system ... cannot be
too highly commended." FinalRept, Phase I, Annex E, 2.
[26] CinCPac disp to ComonCh, 17Jul42 (located at NHD).
[27] At this time, the later-used phrase "regimental combat team" (RCT) had not come
into uniform use. This we would currently style a "regimental landing team" (RLT). What
Guadalcanal Marines labeled a "combat group" included a rifle regiment with its direct-
support artillery battalion, engineers, signal, medical, and other supporting elements. Within
the so-called combat groups, similar battalion-sized aggregations were designated combat
teams. This usage will be followed throughout this narrative.
[28] 1st MarDiv OpOrd 7-42, 20Jul42. See Appendix E.
[29] Original plans called for this unit to carry out projected landings at Ndeni in the
Santa Cruz Islands. Needless to say, these were never made, although occupation plans for
that island, always involving Marine forces, continue to appear in Adm Turner's record until
October 1942.
[30] "It is most desirable that 2d Marines be reinforced and combat unit loaded and
ready upon arrival this area for employment in landing operations as a reinforced regimental
combat team." ComSoPac War Diary, 27Jun42 (located at NHD).
[31] FinalRept, Phase V, 1.
[32] The passage from the United States to New Zealand had been particularly trying
for the officers and men on board the Ericsson, a commercial ship under charter. Lack of proper
food, and use of oil substitutes for shortening, resulted in loss of weight of as high as 23
pounds per man. Two meals only were served during the greater part of the passage, and one
of these often consisted of soup or soup and bread. Medical officers estimated the daily calorie
P a g e | 17
content of meals at less than 1,500. The ship's personnel enjoyed a full and well balanced diet
during the same period. Ibid., Phase I, Annex M, 1.
[33] Adm Turner assumed the title of Commander, Amphibious Force South Pacific on
his arrival in the South Pacific on 24 July.
[34] CinCPac OpOrd 34-42, cited in CinCPac War Diary, July 1942. By terms of this or-
der also, Fletcher, CTF 11, had been ordered to assume command of the combined task forces
at the rendezvous, and Ghormley had been put in command of the operation.
[35] Ghormley MS, 64.
[36] The regiment had been on board since 1 June, lying in the harbor of San Diego.
[37] Ghormley MS, 67.
[38] Statement at Princeton, N.J., 12Mar48.
[39] Gen Vandegrift noted at the time that the precious landing craft were not in the
best of condition in any event--12 of them were inoperative on one ship alone. Gen A.A.
Vandegrift ltr to CMC, 4Feb49.
[40] A seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy of figures between those of the Amphibious
Force, South Pacific, and the 1st Marine Division prevents a wholly accurate statement as to
the number of troops embarked then or landed subsequently. The amphibious force lists a
figure of 18,722, while the division records list, variously, 19,546 or 19,105.
[41] Cdr J. Shaw ltr to Maj J.L. Zimmerman, February 1949.
[42] CTF 62 OPlan A3-42, 30Jul42
[43] CTG 62.1 ActRept 7-9Aug42, 3.
[44] Capt. E.T. Layton, USN, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, June 1955.

P a g e | 18
Chapter 2: Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942
The Landing
When Task Groups X-Ray and Yoke separated northwest of Cape Esperance at 0240, the
former group made for the Red Beach transport area off Guadalcanal in a double column at 12
knots. No enemy activity was observed, and the preliminary naval bombardment of the
coastal area, which began at 0513, aroused no response. The X-Ray shipping reached its trans-
port area at 0645 and began to lower the landing craft. Across the channel, Group Yoke like-
wise arrived at its assigned area off Tulagi without incident at 0630 and straightaway got the
word from Captain Ashe that H-hour would be 0800. The units slated for Florida Island would
hit their beaches first, as will be described in the next chapter.
The division's command post in the McCawley broke radio silence on 0519, and eight
minutes later General Vandegrift set the H-hour for his side of the landing at 0910. The bom-
bardment ships worked through their fire plans, and then as news of the successful landings
on Florida and Tulagi reached Vandegrift, the first waves of assault troops moved toward the
beach.

Initial Dispositions,
7 August 1942



















Three planes from the Astoria flew liaison missions in the Guadalcanal area while three
from the Vincennes performed the same duty above Tulagi. An additional three aircraft, from
the Quincy, were available for artillery spotting over Guadalcanal. During the ship to shore
phase, these aircraft marked the beach flanks with smoke to assist naval gunfire and to guide
the landing boats. Vandegrift and his division air officer held this use to be unwarranted and
unnecessary.
P a g e | 19
But Admiral Turner considered it necessary to "accurately mark the extremities of the
landing beaches" as directed by the operation order, and he marked them for twenty minutes.
The planes made eight runs at extremely low altitudes, four runs on each beach extremity.
Vandegrift pointed out that this would result in a serious if not complete loss of planes if the
beaches were defended--this loss at a time when aircraft are critically needed as "eyes" to gain
information about the progress of a landing.
Actually the liaison planes over Guadalcanal's random clouds and splotchy jungle fur-
nished Vandegrift precious little information. It was not the fault of the pilots, however, since
there was very little to see anyway. In the tense period of this first landing on a hostile beach,
the sins were more often those of commission rather than omission. One pilot reported "many
enemy troops" only to admit, under questioning for more explicit information, that his
"troops" were, in fact, cows.
Other than the cows there still were no signs of activity around Lunga at 0859, 11 mi-
nutes before H-hour, when an observation plane from the Astoriareported that no Japanese
could be seen in that area. But 14 minutes later the same pilot spotted some trucks moving on
the Lunga airfield several thousand yards west of the landing beach.




THE ORIGINAL
HENDERSON
FIELD, target of the 1st
Marine Division's
assault at Guadalcanal,
as it appeared shortly
after its capture.
(USMC 108547)







TRANSPORTS AND
CARGO SHIPS STAND
OFFSHORE as vitally
needed supplies for the 1st
Marine Division are
manhandled by members
of the Shore Party. (USMC
51369)


P a g e | 20
Meanwhile the 5th Marines (less 2d Battalion) had crossed its line of departure and
moved into the 5.000-yard approach to the beach. Naval gunfire lifted inland as the craft
neared the shore, and minutes later, at 0910, the assault wave hit the beach on a 1,600 yard
front and pushed into the sparse jungle growth beyond. With Lieutenant Colonel William E.
Maxwell's 1st Battalion on the right (west) and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Biebush's 3d
Battalion on the left, the beachhead expanded rapidly against no opposition. A perimeter some
600 yards inland soon established a hasty defense. The line anchored on the west at the Tenaru
River, and on the east at the Tenavatu River, and reached on the south an east-west branch of
the Tenaru.
1

Regimental headquarters came ashore at 0938 to be followed two minutes later by
heavy weapons troops. Landing of the reserve regiment, Colonel Cates' reinforced 1st Marines,
already was underway. Beginning at 0930, this regiment came ashore in a column of battalions
with 2/1 in the van followed by the 3d and 1st Battalions in that order.
Artillery came next, and the units partially bogged down. The howitzer men admitted
later that they had taken too much gear ashore with them. Prime movers for the 105mm
howitzers did not get ashore initially because there were not enough ramp boats for this work,
and one-ton trucks proved too light to handle the field pieces. Needed were two-and-a-half-
ton six by sixes and ramp boats to put these vehicles on the beach simultaneously with the
howitzers. Such prime movers were authorized, but so were a lot of other things the Marines
did not have.
In spite of these troubles, the artillery units reached their assigned firing positions by
making overland prime movers out of amphibian tractors that began to wallow ashore heavy
with cargo.
2
One in position, however, the gunners found the amphibian was a creature of
mixed virtues: tracked vehicles tore up the communications wire, creating early the pattern of
combat events that became too familiar to plagued wiremen.
Meanwhile the light 75mm pack howitzers had made it ashore with little trouble, and
the advance toward the airfield got underway. At 1115 the 1st Marines moved through the
hasty perimeter of the 5th Marines and struck out southwest toward Mount Austen, the
"Grassy Knoll." Cates put his regiment across the Tenaru at an engineer bridge supported by
an amphibian tractor, and the 1st Marines progressed slowly into the thickening jungle. Be-
hind, to extend the beachhead, 1/5 crossed the mouth of the Tenaru at 1330 and moved toward
the Ilu. Neither advance encountered enemy resistance.
Colonel Cates realized almost at once that it would be impossible to reach Mount Aus-
ten as his day's objective. The so-called Grassy Knoll, visible from the ships, could not be seen
from the beach. It commanded the Lunga area, but it lay much farther inland than reports of
former planters and schooner pilots had indicated.
Under heavy packs, sometimes excessive loads of ammunition, and with insufficient
water and salt tablets,
3
the 1st Marines by late afternoon had struggled but a mile when Gener-
al Vandegrift ordered the regiment to halt, reorient, and establish internal contact. The men
dug in a perimeter in the jungle, some 3,500 yards south of the Ilu's mouth where 1/5 had
ended its advance, to set up for the night.
In spite of the breakneck pace with which the shoestring operation had mounted out
and thrown itself in the path of the Japanese advance along the Solomon chain, the landing
was a success. Although the lack of opposition (on the Guadalcanal side only) gave it some-
what the characteristics of a training maneuver, the need for additional training that Vande-
P a g e | 21
grift had hoped to give his men in New Zealand became apparent. The general criticized the
"uniform and lamentable,"
4
failure of all units to patrol properly their fronts and flanks.
Logistical difficulties were worse. movements of supplies from the landing craft to the
beaches and then to supply dumps soon began to snarl. Admiral Turner blamed this on the
Marines' failure to understand the number of troops required for such work, failure to extend
the beach limits promptly enough and, to some extent, a lack of control and direction over
troops in the beach area. But the trouble and its causes were neither as clear-cut nor a damning
as that. Marine planners had foreseen a dangerous shortage of manpower at this critical point,
but under the uncertain circumstances on this hostile beach they felt they could allot no more
men to the job than the 500 from Colonel George R. Rowan's 1st Pioneer Battalion. Vandegrift
did not want working parties to cut the strength of his fighting units to a level which might
risk getting them defeated.
Hindsight now makes it clear that the supplies mounting up as a juicy beach target jeo-
pardized the operation more than a call for additional working parties would have done.
There were hardly enough Japanese fighting men ashore on the island to bother the Vandegrift
forces, but if enemy planes from Rabaul had concentrated on hitting the congested beach they
would have played havoc with this whole venture. Marines were aware of this risk, but they
also expected to run into a sizable Japanese force somewhere in the thickening jungle. The
people in the shore party would just have to work harder.
Sailors joined the pioneers but the beach remained cluttered in spite of this help.
Needed, division officers reported later, were "additional personnel in the proportion of at
least 100 men for each vessel discharging cargo across the beach."
5
It was not that this problem
had never been thought out and planned for in fleet exercises over the years. It was just that
this was "Operation Shoestring." The situation became so bad during the night of 7-8 August
that the landing force had to ask the ships to stop unloading. There had been air attacks that
afternoon, and more were expected on the 8th. The exhausted workers needed time to clear the
beaches and spread out the gear so it would be less of a target.
Fortunately the air attacks during the day had concentrated on the shipping. At about
1100 on the 7th a coastwatcher in the Upper Solomons passed the word on the watchers'
network that about 18 bombers were on the way to Guadalcanal. This warning was relayed to
Guadalcanal through Brisbane within 25 minutes, and the planes arrived at 1320. The destroy-
er Mugford suffered 20 casualties under a 250-pound bomb hit, but it was the only ship struck
by the attack. Antiaircraft fire downed two of the twin-engined Type 97s. Later in the after-
noon, at about 1500, 10 Aichi dive bombers had no luck at all, but fire from the ships scratched
another two Japanese planes. Other planes from both these attacks were downed by Fletcher's
carrier aircraft.
At 2200 on 7 August, Vandegrift issued his attack order for the following day. Plans had
been changed. Since Mount Austen was out of reach, and because only 10,000 troops were
available in the Lunga area, he ordered an occupation of the airfield and establishment of a
defensive line along the Lunga River. Positions east and southeast of Red Beach would be
maintained temporarily to protect supplies and unloading until shore party activities could be
established within the new perimeter.
At 0930 on 8 August the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and Company A, 1st Tank Battalion
crossed the Ilu River at its mouth and advanced cautiously westward along the beach toward
the Lunga. At the same time the 1st Marines moved from its night perimeter. Contact between
units within this regiment was faulty, but by nightfall Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cress-
P a g e | 22
well's 1st Battalion had overrun the field and reached the Lunga. The other two battalions,
slowed by difficult terrain, advanced about 500 yards an hour and bivouacked for the night
south of the airfield.
Along the beach, 1/5 and the tanks met the first scattered resistance as they passed
through the area in which the main Japanese force had been located. A few prisoners were
taken, and intelligence indicated that the enemy was in no position to attack the superior
Marine landing force. Continued lack of resistance elsewhere seemed to confirm this, and at
1430 the Marines contracted their front, crossed the Lunga by a bridge immediately north of
the airfield, and advanced more rapidly toward the Kukum River, a stream in the western fan
of the Lunga delta.
With Company D leading, this advance came upon the main Japanese encampment
area at 1500. The enemy force, obviously smaller than anticipated, had retreated in evident
haste and confusion. Large quantities of undamaged food, ammunition, engineering material,
electrical gear, and radio equipment had been left behind. Although some improperly indoc-
trinated Marines began to destroy this gear, that tendency soon was halted, and in the next few
weeks these men would lose their contempt for this windfall of material.
Except for token resistance from some of the straggling Japanese attempting to flee
west, air action constituted the enemy's only effort to hamper the Marines. At about 1100
Coastwatcher Cecil John Mason, Pilot Officer, RAAF, warned from his Bougainville hide-out
that a large number of planes were winging toward Guadalcanal. In another hour some 40
twin-engine torpedo planes appeared over the area to find the task force, alerted by the warn-
ing, maneuvering at top speed while employing evasive tactics.
A torpedo sent the destroyer Jarvis limping southeast for the New Hebrides. She was
sunk next day by an enemy air attack. The transport Elliot, set afire when an enemy plane
crashed aboard, had to be beached and destroyed by her sister ships. Survivors went on board
the Hunter Liggett.
Ship antiaircraft fire and fighter planes from Admiral Noyes' carriers shot down 12 Jap-
anese planes, and shore-based antiaircraft accounted for two more. Still others were splashed
by carrier-based fighters west of the transport area. A total of seven American planes were
lost.
6

The Japanese Retaliate
These early attacks hampered Marine operations and unloading, but the beachhead
continued to grow. The Japanese had no intentions of giving up their positions in the Southern
Solomons without a fierce fight, however, and early on 8 August a task force of five heavy and
two light cruisers and a destroyer made ready to strike American shipping in Sealark Channel.
After rendezvousing at St. George's Channel off Rabaul, this force steamed south along
Bougainville's east coast until it sighted an Allied patrol plane observing its course. Reversing,
the ships made back up the island coast until the plane departed. Then turning again, they
sailed between Bougainville and Choiseul northeast of the Shortlands and set course down
"The Slot" toward Guadalcanal.
World of this approaching force reached Admiral Turner at 1800, and, when Admiral
Fletcher notified him shortly thereafter that the carrier force was to be withdrawn, Turner
called Vandegrift to the flagship McCawley and informed the general that, deprived of carrier
protection, the transports must leave at 0600 the next day.
P a g e | 23
As early as 2 August Admiral Ghormley had known of Fletcher's intentions to retire the
carriers before D-Day plus three.
7
At 1807 on 8 August Fletcher cited fuel shortage and plane
losses that had reduced his fighter craft from 99 to 78 and again requested permission to
withdraw until sufficient land-based aircraft and fuel were available to support shipping.
8
It
seems that Ghormley had not really expected this problem to come up, in spite of Fletcher's
announcement about this matter at the Fiji rehearsals. But now that Fletcher was making the
request, Ghormley gave his approval. Ghormley explained later:
When Fletcher, the man on the spot, informed me he had to withdraw for fuel, I ap-
proved. He knew the situation in detail; I did not. This resulted in my directing Turner to
withdraw his surface forces to prevent their destruction. I was without detailed information as
to Turner's situation, but I knew that his forces had landed and that our major problem would
become one of giving every support possible to Vandegrift.
9
Vandegrift held that retirement of the ships would heave him in a "most alarming" posi-
tion.
10
Division plans assumed the ships would remain in the target area four days, and even
than all available supplies would prove scanty enough, such was the haste with which the
assault mounted out with less than the normal minimum in basic allowances. But a withdraw-
al early on 9 August would take much of the supplies and equipment away in the holds of
ships and leave beach dumps in a state of chaos. The "shoestring" of this first Allied offensive
seemed to be pulling apart. This was the first of the operation's many dark hours.
While Vandegrift conferred with Turner, the Japanese ships, elements of the ene-
my's Eighth Fleet, approached Savo Island undetected by destroyers Ralph Talbot and Blue on
picket duty northwest of that small island. They slipped past these ships toward the two
Allied cruisers, HMAS Canberra and the USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Bag-
ley and Patterson which patrolled the waters between Savo and Cape Esperance. Farther north
cruisers USS Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy and destroyers Helm and Wilson patrolled between
Savo and Florida. Down the channel two cruisers with screening destroyers covered the
transports.
With seaplanes up from his cruisers to scout for the Allied ships, Eighth
Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Gunichi Mikawa steamed southeast until he sighted his
enemy at about the same time Allied ships in Sealark Channel received reports of one or more
unidentified planes. But Admiral Mikawa's surface force still was undetected at 2313 when
these reports came in. Admiral Turner had estimated that the Japanese ships would hole up in
Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island and strike at the amphibious force with torpedo-carrying
floatplanes.
At 0316 Mikawa ordered independent firing, and torpedoes leaped from their tubes two
minutes later. Japanese floatplanes illuminated briefly. TheCanberra caught two torpedoes in
her starboard side, the Chicago lost part of her bow, and then the Japanese turned toward the
Allied ships between Savo and Florida.
The resulting melee was one of the worst defeats ever suffered by the U.S. Navy.
The Vincennes and the Quincy were lost; the Australian Canberraburned all night and had to be
abandoned and sunk; destroyer Ralph Talbot was damaged, and Astoria went down at noon the
next day. Fortunately Mikawa retired without pressing his advantage in an attack on the
amphibious shipping farther down the channel, and Admiral Turner, delaying his departure,
ordered unloading to continue. Late in the afternoon the transports got underway for Nou-
mea, leaving the Marines on their own with four units of fire and 37 days' supply of food.
P a g e | 24
Even when loaded in Wellington the level of supplies and ammunition had been consi-
dered slim. That original loading of 60 days' supplies and 10 units of fire was respectively 33
and 50 per cent below the 90-day and 20-unit levels then considered normal for operations of
this kind.
11
Now the ships had taken part of these loads away, leaving a most inadequate
fraction behind. And with air support so sketchy, there was no way to know when the trans-
ports could come back again. The stacks of captured Japanese rations began to gain in impor-
tance if not in palatability.
According to the war diary of the Commander, Task Force 62, the following troops
were left in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area when the transports and supply ships withdrew:

At Guadalcanal:
Division Headquarters Company (less detachments)
Division Signal Company (less detachments)
5th Marines (less 2d Battalion)
1st Marines
11th Marines (less Battery E, 1st and 4th Battalions)
1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)
1st Engineer Battalion (less detachments)
1st Pioneer Battalion (less detachments)
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less detachments)
1st Service Battalion (less detachments)
1st Medical Battalion (less detachments)
1st Military Police Company
2d Platoon, 1st Scout Company
Units, 3d Defense Battalion
Local Naval Defense Force
Total on Guadalcanal: about 10,000

At Tulagi:
1st Raider Battalion
1st Parachute Battalion
2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Pioneers attached)
1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 2d Marines
Batteries H and I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
Detachment, Division Headquarters Company
Detachment, 2d Signal Company
3d Defense Battalion (less detachments)
Company A, 1st Medical Battalion)
Company A, 2d Engineer Battalion (2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Batta-
lion attached)
Company C, 2d Tank Battalion
Company A, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion (2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Am-
phibian Tractor Battalion attached) Company D, 2d Medical Battalion
Company A, 2d Pioneer Battalion (2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Pioneer Battalion
attached)
Battery E, 11th Marines
P a g e | 25
Company C, 2d Service Battalion
Local Naval Defense Force
Total on Tulagi: 6,075

Total personnel left in area: about 16,075

The 2d Marines under Colonel John M. Arthur had formed the division reserve and was
originally slated for the occupation of Ndeni, but all its battalions now were in action in the
Tulagi area. The regimental headquarters remained afloat, however, as did working parties
from all companies, most of the Headquarters and Service Company, Regimental Weapons
Company, administrative units from the various battalions, and G and Headquarters and
Service Batteries of 3/10.
The sudden withdrawal of the transports carried these units, which totaled about 1,400
officers and men, back to Espiritu Santo where they were used to "reinforce the garrison there,"
according to the reports of Admiral Turner. On 14 August, Turner ordered Colonel Arthur to
report for duty with the Commanding General, Espiritu Santo. But a few days later Colonel
Arthur and a small number of his officers and men got back up to Tulagi.
12

There seemed no question in Turner's mind about his unrestricted claim of "possession"
of the Marines in his area. If his handling of Colonel Arthur was a rather ungenerous bypass of
General Vandegrift's command territory, the admiral's plan for those Marines who remained
at Espiritu Santo was an even more glaring example of his theory of personal command pos-
session. He ordered those "idle" 2d Marines to form a "2d Provisional Raider Battalion." Then
he wrote to Admiral Ghormley recommending an overhaul of all Marine regiments in the
Amphibious Force, South Pacific. All regiments then would contain raider battalions which
could be sent out on special missions. Turner said he did not think Marine regiments would be
suited to operations in the Pacific. "The employment of a division seems less likely," the ad-
miral added. He would use raider battalions like building blocks, and fit the landing force to
the special problem. Obviously, he expected the Pacific war to be small and tidy.
Admiral Ghormley answered that Turner ought to hold up such reorganization until he
found out what the Commandant of the Marine Corps thought of all this. Admiral Ghormley
then sent this letter and his endorsement to the Commandant via Admiral Nimitz at Pearl
Harbor. Nimitz agreed with Ghormley, and he stressed the "extemporized organization of
Marine Forces should be made only in case of dire necessity." Nimitz then forwarded this
correspondence on to Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, Marine Commandant.
General Holcomb responded to Nimitz that the latter's objections had surely stopped
Turner's plan without the need for the Commandant to add other objections, but Holcomb
noted "with regret" that Turner had not seen fit to ask General Vandegrift about this plan to
reorganize his troops.
This reaction from Nimitz, and the arrival at about that time in the New Hebrides of the
"authentic" 2d Raider Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson, caused Turner to halt
his plan to turn all Amphibious Force Marines into raiders. But it took the admiral much
longer than this to abandon his theory that these Marines were direct "possessions" of his.
13



P a g e | 26

Notes
[1] In early maps the names of the Tenaru and Ilu Rivers were incorrectly transposed. In
this account the names will be applied to the correct rivers, but the name, "Battle of the Tena-
ru," will be retained to identify the August battle at the mouth of the Ilu.
[2] The amphibian, later to be used to transport assault troops from ship to shore,
started its war career here in a modest manner. Its "usefulness exceeded all expectations," the
Marines reported, but at the time nobody considered the strange craft capable of much more
than amphibious drayage. The following day (D-plus one) on Gavutu an amphibian would
create rather dramatic history by attacking a hostile cave, but such bravery was never recom-
mended, even later when these craft entered the heyday of their more important role.
[3] Medically speaking, the weight of individual equipment was excessive in most cases
for men who had been cooped so long in steamy holds of ships and fed short, and sometimes
inferior, rations. FinalRept, Phase II, 6.
[4] Ibid., 10.
[5] Ibid., Phase V, 7.
[6] CinCPac, "Preliminary Report, Solomon Islands Operation," August 1942, 4.
[7] ComSoPac War Diary, 2Aug42 (located at NHD).
[8] Ibid., 9Aug42. For a detailed discussion of Adm Fletcher's withdrawal of his carriers
see also Struggle for Guadalcanal, 27-28, 117.
[9] Ghormley MS, 93.
[10] Final Rept, Phase II, 13.
[11] Division staff officers admitted later that supplies for 60 days represented more
gear than their slim fighting outfit could handle logistically at the beach. They recommended
that levels should be pegged at 30 days for general supplies, 50 days for rations. The lower
level of 10 units of fire was just right, they added; no attempt should be made to carry 20 units
into future landings. FinalRept, Phase II, 17.
[12] CTF 62 War Diary, September and October 1942.
[13] ComPhibForSoPac ltr to ComSoPacFor, 29Aug42; ComSoPacFor ltr to CinCPOA,
6Sep42; CinCPOA ltr to CMC, 24Sep42; CMC ltr to CinCPOA, 3Oct42.

P a g e | 27
Chapter 3: Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo
Tulagi: The First Day
After Task Group Yoke separated from the larger body of ships at 0240 on D-Day, its
approach to Tulagi was accomplished without incident. All elements of the group arrived in
position at about 0630
1
and made ready for the landing.
As the ships approached the transport area, 15 fighters and 15 dive bombers
from Wasp strafed and bombed the target area,
2
setting fire to seaplanes that were caught in
the harbor.
3

Five-inch naval gunfire from the destroyer Monssen, opened up at a promontory of Flor-
ida Island, west of Tulagi, and 60 rounds were expended on the target between 0727 and 0732.
In the meantime, both the Buchanan and San Juan (an antiaircraft cruiser) pumped 100 rounds
each into nearby targets. Buchanan concentrated on a point of land east of Haleta, on Florida,
while the San Juan blasted a small island south of the same point of land.
4

At 0740, 20 minutes before H-hour, Company B (reinforced) of the 1st Battalion, 2d Ma-
rines, under command of Captain Edward J. Crane, landed on Florida near Haleta to protect
the left flank of the Tulagi Force. The landing was unopposed, although enemy troops had
been reported in position there on 25 July.
5
Crane, his company reinforced by the 4th platoon
of Company D and 21 men from Headquarters Company, reached his objective within 40
minutes. The 252 officers and men went ashore in eight landing boats and were guided to their
objective by one of the several Australians on duty with the division.
6

While this covering force deployed inland from its Florida beach, the remainder of the
1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Hill) made a similar security landing at
Florida's Halavo Peninsula near Gavutu and Tanambogo. The craft drew some fire from
Gavutu but there were no casualties, and no enemy forces were encountered on the peninsula.
These Marines later returned to their ships.
At Tulagi not a single landing craft of the first wave was able to set its passengers di-
rectly ashore. All of them hung up on coral formations at distances varying from 30 to well
over 100 yards from the beach line, and the assault personnel of raider Companies, B and D
waded ashore against no opposition, through water initially from waist to armpit deep.
7



Landings in Tulagi
Area, 7 August
1942








P a g e | 28
Meanwhile the enemy defense forces, concentrated in the southeastern third of the isl-
and, realized that an all-out assault was underway. Between 0725 and 0749, the Tulagi Commu-
nication Base notified the Commanding Officer of the Twenty-Fifth Air Flotilla at Rabaul that
Tulagi was under bombardment, that the landings had begun, and that the senders were
destroying all equipment immediately. At 0800 the Japanese messages said shells were falling
near the radio installation. Ten minutes later, the final message went out: "Enemy troop
strength is overwhelming. We will defend to the last man."
8

Companies B and D had reached the beach, and the landing craft carrying raider Com-
panies A and C now began to hang upon the coral. The Weapons Company (Captain George
W. Herring) of the raider battalion, whose 60mm mortars had been attached to the assault
companies,
9
headed ashore to assume responsibility for beachhead security.
Assaulting Marines crossed the beach and moved up the face of a steep, heavily
wooded coral slope, the southwestern portion of the 350-foot ridge that forms an almost
unbroken wall along the island's entire length. Major Lloyd Nickerson's Company B pushed
on to the far coast of the island where it captured, without opposition, the native village of
Assapi. This company then swung to the right and, trying in with Major Justice Chambers'
Company D which had gained the high ground, began moving southeast. The advance of
these two companies was steady and without opposition until Company B reached Carpen-
ter's Wharf, halfway down the east shore of the island, where it encountered a series of enemy
outposts.
Meanwhile additional raiders had landed. Captain Lewis W. Walt's Company A, land-
ing to follow the leading companies, swung right atop the ridge spine, and tied in on the left
with Company D. Major Kenneth Bailey's Company C also swung right, tied its left flank to
Company A, and echeloned itself to the right rear to the beach. Spread out across the island,
the raiders swept southeast against little opposition until Phase Line A, from the high ground
northwest of Hill 281 to Carpenter's Wharf, was reached at 1120. Here Major Chambers was
wounded by mortar fire, and Captain William E. Sperling assumed command of Company D.
By this time Colonel Edson, commanding the 1st Raider Battalion, was ashore and
ready to begin a coordinated attack to the southeast. Confronting him was the more thickly
settled portion of the island where the British governmental activities had centered. This area
is a saddle between the ridge first swept by the raiders and a smaller hill mass at the island's
southeastern end.
10

After directing a preparatory fire of infantry weapons into the area to their front, the
raiders moved out toward the high ground beyond the saddle. Company C, on the right flank
of the attack, drew fire almost immediately from Hill 208, a knob forward of the ridge that had
just been cleared. The bulk of the Japanese resistance concentrated in the seaward face of the
high ground, and Company C was caught by fire from enemy infantry weapons as it tried to
pass between the hill and the beach. The raider company then turned its attack toward the hill
and fought for nearly an hour before the Japanese positions were silenced.
Radio communications between Edson and General Rupertus deteriorated rapidly after
this attack was launched, but the raider commander remained in contact with his fire support
ships. Operation orders called for the various fire support sections to provide the landing force
with naval gunfire liaison parties, and two of these were in Edson's CP with their ra-
dios.
11
When the other raider companies came under fire from Hill 281 while Company C
fought against Hill 208, Edson put these naval gunfire teams to work. The San Juan fired a
P a g e | 29
seven-minute, 280-round concentration of 6-inch shells onto Hill 281. When it lifted the raiders
advanced with a steady pressure against the enemy.
Four hours later, at 1625, Edson notified Rupertus that 500 enemy had broken contact
with his force and had withdrawn into the southeastern ridge.
The advance continued slowly until dusk. At that time Company E (raiders), relieved of
the beach defense mission by 2/5 which had landed at 0916, reported to its parent organiza-
tion. Company D, now on the extreme left flank, had met little opposition since midmorning,
when the first enemy encountered were flushed near Carpenter's Wharf by Company B. After
this contact Company D pushed south along the eastern beach and at dusk reached the crest of
Hill 281. Meanwhile Company B moved up again, now on the right of Company D, and
gained high ground overlooking the cut of a cross-island roadway through the saddle between
Hills 281 and 230. Company D, on the far side of the road and to the left of B, took up night
defensive positions with its right flank resting on the southern brink of the cut. Company B,
augmented by elements of Headquarters Company, rested it left flank on the cut and extended
its lines generally westward along the brink.
12
Both companies put listening posts forward of
the lines.
Companies A and C (less one platoon) meanwhile encountered the terrain feature
which harbored the island's most serious resistance. In the forward slope of Hill 281, a deep
ravine lay almost parallel to the raider advance and debouched several hundred yards south-
east of Hill 208. Its sides were precipitous, and within it the enemy held strong positions which
made assault hazardous. Maps which had been captured and translated during the day con-
firmed that this ravine would contain the core of enemy resistance.
With further action against the pocket impossible at the time, all battalion elements
went into position for the night. Company E was placed on Company B's right, while Compa-
nies A and C (less one platoon) respectively tied in from the right of Company E. The positions
extended along high ground facing the ravine's long axis, and listening posts were estab-
lished.13
During Edson's sweep down the island, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rosecrans), had
landed 1,085 officers and men and committed its units to various tasks. Company F scouted
the northwest section of the island but met no opposition. At 1000 Company E was ordered to
operate generally in support of Company B (Raiders), and one hour later the 3d Platoon of
Company H (weapons) went forward to assist Company C (raiders) in the latter's attack
against Hill 208. By 1300, when the raider battalion began its attack from Phase Line A, Com-
pany G moved down the trail along the ridge line and supported the raider battalion. Rose-
crans' command post later displaced southeast from near Beach Blue toward the scene of this
action.
Tulagi--The First Night and Succeeding Day
The first night on Tulagi set the pattern for many future nights in the Pacific war. Dur-
ing darkness, four separate attacks struck the raider lines, and, although minor penetrations
occurred, the enemy made no attempt to consolidate or exploit his gains. The first attack,
which met with some initial success, hit between Companies C and A. Outposts fell back to the
main line of resistance (MLR), and the two companies were forced apart. The attack isolated
Company C from the rest of the battalion, but the company was not molested again. Company
A refused its right flank and awaited developments.
P a g e | 30
They were not long in coming. Shifting the direction of his attack toward his right front,
the enemy attempted to roll back Walt's men from the refused flank. But the flank held, killing
26 Japanese within 20 yards of the MLR.
That ended the concerted attacks of the night. Thereafter, enemy efforts consisted en-
tirely of attempts at quiet infiltration of the Marine positions. Individuals and small groups
worked from the ravine through the raider lines and launched five separate small-scale attacks
against the command post between 0030 and 0530. These were repulsed, and efforts of the part
of two other enemy groups to skirt the beach flanks of Companies D and C likewise were
turned back.
On the morning of 8 August, two companies of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved up
to assist in the sweep of the southeastern part of the island. Companies E and F, 5th Marines,
passed through Company D raiders, attacked down the forward slope of Hill 281, and swung
right toward the enemy pocket in the ravine.
No w flanking this troublesome terrain feature on three sides, Marines laid down a
heavy mortar concentration from the 60mm weapons of the raiders and 2/5's 81s. By midafter-
noon the preparation was complete, and at 1500 the raiders and Company G, 5th marines,
pushed through the ravine to wipe out remaining resistance. This ended organized opposition
on the island, and by nightfall of 8 August Tulagi was labeled secure. For several days, how-
ever, individual Japanese and small groups continued to be flushed from hiding places and
hunted down by patrolling Marines.
The Landings on Gavutu-Tanambogo
These islets, each dominated by a low, precipitous central hill of coral, are joined by a
500-yard causeway. Gavutu's hill, 148 feet in height, stands some 25 to 30 feet higher than
Tanambogo's highest point, and Gavutu thus became the main objective of the landing which
aimed at the higher ground.
The plans
14
called for the landing to strike the northeast coast after an approach from
the east, and since Tanambogo lies approximately northwest of Gavutu the assault force faced
the possibility of flanking fire from that island as well as frontal resistance from the main
objective. Opposition from both islands was expected from the terrain dominating the flat
beach.
Naval gunfire and close air support by SBDs from the Wasp were expected to neutralize
most enemy emplacements on these hills, but the fire plan did not reckon with the coral cave.
Caves of this type began to appear as serious obstacles for the parachute battalion of Gavutu at
about the same time the raiders began to encounter them on Tulagi.
Surprise was impossible. There were not sufficient craft for simultaneous landings, and
the hour of assault was established in General Vandegrift's Operation Order Number 7-42 as
H-plus four hours. So four hours after the raider landing on Tulagi, the parachute battalion
made its frontal assault in the face of fire from an alerted garrison which was supported by
fires from a flanking position.
The battalion went ashore in three waves, one company per wave. The thoroughness
with which the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan had carried out her fire support mission--280
rounds of 6-inch fire against Gavutu in four minutes
15
--and the intensity of the Wasp's dive-
bombers' preparation caused heavy damage to the enemy installations, but this destruction
actually worked to the disadvantage of the parachute battalion in one instance. The unit
intended to land on a seaplane ramp from which the beach could be easily reached, but the
P a g e | 31
ramp had been reduced to an unusable mass of rubble. Observing this, the landing wave
commanders altered course slightly to the north where craft became even more vulnerable to
flanking fire. part of the troops, scrambling over a concrete pier that jutted four feet out of the
water, were exposed to fire from both islands. General Vandegrift estimated that troops land-
ing in this area suffered ten per cent casualties.
Company A, the first wave, got ashore without casualties to work inland against no se-
rious opposition. The four boats carrying Company B and the final wave, with Company C
and miscellaneous attachments, came under fire as they neared the island. The landing suc-
ceeded, however, and Company B, moving left and working toward Gavutu's southern end,
gained some protection from enemy fire and continued to attack.
Pinned down on the beach under heavy fire, the other companies made no advances
until Company B gained high ground from which its fire assisted in getting the attack off the
beach. Hill 148, Gavutu's high ground, was plastered by naval guns and assaulted on the east
and southeast. By 1430, Major Charles A. Miller, who had succeeded the wounded Major
Robert H. Williams in command, controlled most of the island. Partially defiladed positions on
Hill 148's west-southwestern slopes, however, still were active, and enemy emplacements
there and on Tanambogo threatened further advance. Miller requested reinforcements to
complete the capture of both islands.
In anticipation of their arrival, Miller also requested an air strike and naval gunfire on
Tanambogo, and Wasp planes furnished a 10-minute strike whileBuchanan and Monssen, in
position south of Gavutu, fired over that island and subjected the exposed faces of the hill on
Tanambogo to an intense concentration of 5-inch shells.
By this time all forces available to General Rupertus had been committed, but since
Captain Edward Crane's Company B (1/2) had met no opposition on Florida near Tulagi, this
unit was ordered to report to Miller. The message reached the company just as landing craft
arrived to withdraw the Marines from their Florida beach.
16

Embarked in six landing craft, the company arrived at Gavutu at about 1800, and Miller
directed Crane to land on Tanambogo and seize that island. Told that only a few snipers held
the island, Crane guided his overcrowded craft around the east shore of Tanambogo according
to directions provided by Flight Lieutenant Spencer, RAAF, and under cover of darkness
attempted a landing on a small pier on the northeastern tip of the island. (One boat, containing
the 2d Platoon, hung up on a coral reef at Gavutu and took no part in the Tanambogo assault.)
The first boat landed without incident, and the men deployed along the beach; but as
the second boat discharged its men, a shell from one of the fire support ships ignited a nearby
fuel dump, and the resulting glare lighted the landing area and exposed the Marines. The
enemy opened up immediately, taking all boats under rifle and machine-gun fire. Casualties
mounted among the Marines ashore and still afloat, but the boat crews, being exposed, suf-
fered most heavily. One crew was completely wiped out and a Marine assumed control of the
craft.
The reinforcing machine-gun platoon (4th Platoon, Company D) in the second boat ma-
naged to set up two of its weapons on the pier, but intense enemy fire forced a withdrawal.
In the meantime, Crane and about 30 men had gone ashore. The intensity of resistance,
however, made withdrawal inevitable, and Crane succeeded in reembarking all wounded and
all but 12 of the able survivors. The boats withdrew, some to Gavutu where they reported the
event, and others direct to ships where the wounded were put aboard. Two of the men left
ashore managed to return to Gavutu at about 2200 in a rowboat, while Crane and Lieutenant
P a g e | 32
John J. Smith, leader of the 2d Platoon, and the remainder of the dozen men made their way
around the beach and over the causeway to arrive at Miller's Gavutu command post about
midnight.
At 2200, having been informed of the abortive attack on Tanambogo, General Rupertus
requested the release of an additional combat team. This request reached Vandegrift during
his conference with Admiral Turner on board the USS McCawley, and Vandegrift, Turner
concurring, released the remaining two battalions of the Division Reserve. At 0330, 8 August,
the USS President Hayes and President Adams, with the 1st and 3d Battalions, 2d Marines (rein-
forced) embarked, were ordered to cross from the transport area off Guadalcanal's Beach Red
to the Tulagi transport area. Simultaneously battalion commanders received orders to land
their troops at Beach Blue on Tulagi and report to General Rupertus.
17

Upon arrival at the transport area off Beach Blue at 0730, the 3d Battalion was directed
to pass to Gavutu, reinforce the troops engaged there, and seize Tanambogo. Orders for the 1st
Battalion were canceled and this unit did not land.
The 3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Hunt, landed on Gavutu in a suc-
cession of boat waves, with companies in the following order: Company L, with 5th Platoon,
Company M attached, at 1000; Company K, with 4th Platoon, Company M attached, at 1025;
Company I, with 3d Platoon, Company M attached, at 1050; Company M, less 3d, 4th, and 5th
Platoons, with Headquarters Company, at 1120.
Troops deployed initially to eliminate Gavutu opposition and to take Tanambogo under
fire. Company L, for example, assumed positions generally around the base of Hill 148 facing
Tanambogo, while Company K moved up the hill to relieve parachute battalion elements in
positions there. At 1330 Company K had just accomplished its mission when as SBD pilot
dropped a bomb within company positions on the northwest nose of the hill. Three men were
killed and nine wounded. Eight of the casualties were men of the supporting platoon of Com-
pany M.
At 1225, Captain W.B. Tinsley, commanding Company I, was ordered to prepare for a
landing on Tanambogo. He would have the support of two tanks from Company C of the 2d
Tank Battalion (one of the reinforcing units of the 2d Marines), and his attack would be pre-
ceded by a 10-minute naval gunfire preparation by the Buchanan. The company would not be
accompanied by its supporting machine-gun platoon, which was to stay in position on Gavu-
tu, and lay down supporting fires from there.
At 1315 the tanks landed on Gavutu. Lieutenant E.J. Sweeney, commanding them, was
ordered to land at 1615 on Tanambogo, using one tank to cover the south side of the hill on
that island and the other to cover the eastern slope.
The naval gunfire preparation began at 1600. Twenty minutes later the assault compa-
ny, following the tanks, made its landing. Lieutenant Sweeney was killed, but his tank ren-
dered valuable support to the riflemen. The other tank, getting to far ahead of the assault
troops, was disabled by an iron bar and set afire by oil-soaked rags employed by Japanese
riflemen. The entire enemy group was wiped out; 42 bodies were piled up around the disabled
tank.
At 1620 Company I landed and formed two attack groups. One worked up the southern
slope of the Tanambogo hill while the other, moving to the right and then inland, attacked up
the eastern slope. Japanese fought fiercely from caves and dugouts, and the eastern group
drew fire from a few enemy riflemen and machine gunners on Gaomi, a tiny islet a few hun-
dred yards east of Tanambogo. Naval gunfire from USS Gridley was directed upon Gaomi at
P a g e | 33
1700 and positions on the small island were silenced. At this time the 1st platoon of Company
K attacked across the causeway from Gavutu, secured the Tanambogo end of the causeway,
and took up positions for the night.
By 2100, the southeastern two-thirds of the island had been secured, and at 2300 a light
machine-gun platoon from Company M reported to Company I for support against enemy
counterattacks. Considerable close-ion fighting took place during the night between the Ma-
rines and Japanese who sallied from foxholes and dugouts. No change in position occurred,
however, and by late the next day continued attacks had secured the island.
While Gavutu and Tanambogo were mopped up, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines
unloaded at Tulagi. The 1st Battalion, unengaged since its 7 August landing on Florida, went
ashore at Beach Blue at 0900 on 9 August. The 2d Battalion (Major Orin K. Pressley) followed
an hour later.
Here, as at Guadalcanal, the amphibian tractor emerged as a versatile piece of equip-
ment whose importance and utility could hardly be overestimated. From noon of 8 August
throughout the following night, five of these vehicles of the 3d Platoon, Company A, 2d Am-
phibian Tractor Battalion (one of the reinforcing elements of the d Marines) operated between
Gavutu and the President Adams. They carried water, supplies, ammunition, and personnel to
shore and evacuated wounded on the return trips. On one occasion a tractor moved some
distance inland to attack a Japanese position that had pinned down and wounded a number of
Marines. Using their two machine guns, one .30 and one .50 caliber, the tractor's crew neutra-
lized the enemy fire and then evacuated the wounded Marines.
18
The five tractors of the pla-
toon were taken back on board the Adams before sundown on 9 August.
With the fall of Tanambogo, the last effective resistance in the Ngella island group
ceased. Subsequent operations consisted of mopping up, consolidating defenses, and occupy-
ing several small peripheral islands including Makambo, Mbangai, Kokomtambu, and Songo-
nangona.
19

The mission of clearing out these small islands fell to various units of the 2d Battalion,
2d Marines. Makambo was taken by Company E, Mbangai by Company F, and Kokomtambu
and Songonangona, by Company G. Occupation of all these smaller islands was completed
during the morning of 9 August. In all cases, opposition was slight.
Occupation of the entire island group and destruction of the Japanese garrison had been
accomplished in three days. The few prisoners taken were questioned and sent to rear areas.
Most of them finally were placed in a prisoner of war camp near Featherstone, New Zealand.
Comparatively, the American losses were not excessive. An early report by Rupertus to
the effect that the parachute battalion had suffered 50-60 per cent casualties can only be ex-
plained in terms of inadequate communications between him and his troops ashore.
The exact number of Japanese casualties will never be known. An estimated 750-800
enemy were present in the Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo area at the time of the landings. Twen-
ty-three prisoners were taken, and an intelligence summary gives 70 as the approximate
number of survivors who escaped to Florida.
Immediately after organized resistance ceased and the isolated defending groups were
rounded up or wiped out, Tulagi and its satellite islands were organized for defense against
counterattack. The 1st Parachute Battalion, depleted by its experience on Gavutu, moved from
that island at 1700 on 9 August to Tulagi where it went into position in the Government build-
ing area. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines occupied the southeastern sector of the island, while
two battalions of the 2d Marines took over the defensive mission in the northwest. The 1st
P a g e | 34
Battalion occupied the extreme end of the island while the 2d Battalion established positions at
Sasapi. Third Battalion, 2d Marines, took over the occupation and defense of Gavutu, Tanam-
bogo, and Makambo.
20

The logistic problem on Tulagi was a miniature of that encountered on Guadalcanal. Al-
though certain details were peculiar to Tulagi. The beachhead, for instance, was severely
restricted by the abrupt ridge, and there were no roads. Only after noon of the second day was
it possible to move supplies ashore at the piers on the eastern coast. Both Gavutu and Tanam-
bogo were so small that only ammunition and water were landed until the islands were se-
cured.
Naval gunfire on this side of the Solomon Islands operation had more of a work-out
than it had received across the channel at Guadalcanal where opposition was at first light, but
it was not an unqualified success. As a matter of fact it was "very poor," according to naval
headquarters in Washington.
21
But this failing was caused mostly by lack of intelligence and
time for planning and coordinated training. Improper ordnance made for another failing. Only
armor-piercing shells could have blasted the Japanese from their caves, but the ships repeated-
ly fired high-capacity bombardment projectiles. Although many naval officers were still of the
opinion that a ship was a "fool to fight a fort," some began to agree with the Marine Corps that
naval gunfire properly employed could be a big help in an amphibious assault. It was a case of
the gunfire ships needing to move in closer for their fire missions. The commander of one ship
reported:
It was observed that the enemy had not been driven from the beach at Gavutu by the
shelling and bombing preceding the landing. Furthermore Tanambogo withstood two days of
intermittent bombing and strafing and was not taken until a destroyer closed in to point blank
range and shelled it for several minutes. It was evident that this fire was necessary to insure
the capture of Tanambogo without further heavy casualties.
22


TULAGI ISLAND, framed
against the background of
the larger Florida Island, is
fire-swept from the hits
scored by American carrier
dive-bombers. (USN 11649)











P a g e | 35
TANAMBOGO AND
TU ISLANDS photographed imme-
diately after a pre-landing strike by
USS Enterprise planes; Gavutu is at
the left across the causeway. (USN
11034)







Taking into account the indications that these shortcomings would be corrected in later
operations, the Marine Corps was generally satisfied with the ships' fire. "The operation did
not involve a real test ... [but] nothing developed during the operation to indicate the need for
any fundamental change in doctrine."
23

After these three days of fighting in the Tulagi area, this side of the operation remained
quiet. Enemy planes bypassed it to strike at the more tempting Guadalcanal airfield and
perimeter. Surface craft shelled Tulagi occasionally, but never was it subjected to the kind of
bombardment that struck Guadalcanal in October. There is no record that enemy reinforce-
ments landed either on Tulagi or on Florida Island. With this sharp fighting out of the way, the
division could give all its attention to things on the larger island of Guadalcanal. There the
picture was not a bright one.

P a g e | 36
Notes
[1] At 0625, Tulagi sent its message to Japanese stations to the north that an enemy sur-
face force had entered the channel. Tulagi CommB msg of 7Aug42 in 25th AirFlot War Diary,
August-September 1942, hereinafter cited as 25th Air Flot Diary.
[2] ComWaspAirGru Rept to CO Wasp, 10Aug42. In general, during the first
day Wasp planes operated over the Tulagi area while Saratoga planes gave comparable support
to the main landing off Beach Red at Guadalcanal. Enterprise planes gave protection to the
carriers and flew patrol missions.
[3] "0630--All flying boats have been set afire by the bombardment." CTF 18 ActRept, 6-
10Aug42, 1, hereinafter cited as CTF 18 AR.
[4] Ibid., 2.
[5] ComSoPac War Diary, 25Jul42 (located at NHD).
[6] LtCol H.R. Thorpe ltr to CMC, 19Jan49.
[7] Maj J.C. Erskine interview in HistDiv, HQMC, 15Mar49.
[8] 25th AirFlot Diary.
[9] Majs J.B. Sweeney, H. Stiff, W.E. Sperling interview in HistDiv, HQMC, 4Feb49, he-
reinafter cited as Sweeney Interview.
[10] The raiders had been well briefed on the terrain of the island by Lt H.E. Josselyn,
RANR, a former resident of the area who had intimate knowledge of it. Ibid.
[11] CTF 18 AR; 2; Lt A.L. Moon ltr to LtCol R.D. Heinl, Jr., 13Feb49.
[12] Sweeney Interview.
[13] Ibid.
[14] 1st Mar Div OpOrd No. 7-42, 20Jul42. See FinalRept, Phase II, Annex E, 2. Gavutu's
importance stemmed from the islet's numerous installations which included machine shops,
jetties, and a radio stations. USN ND Hydro, Vol. I--Sailing Directions For the Pacific Isl-
ands,(Washington: GPO, 1938, 4th ed.), 323.
[15] CTF 18 AR, 2.
[16] LtCol W.B. Kyle ltr to CMC, 10Feb49.
[17] CWO T.W. Huston ltr to CMC, 28Dec48. Orders to report to Rupertus did not go
through Col J.M. Arthur, CO 2dMar. Each battalion commander was notified direct, and it was
not until he reached Espiritu Santo that Arthur knew which of his troops had been committed.
Col R.E. Hill interview at HistDiv, 18Apr49.
[18] "... this was an emergency undertaking only as it is not considered that the tractor is
a tactical combat vehicle." FinalRept, Phase II, 16.
[19] Spelling of place names are those which appear in Sailing Directions for the Pacific
Islands, op.cit. The versions given there differ in numerous cases from those used in official
reports of the campaign. Kokomtambu, for instance, appears in at least three different guises,
while Songonangona surrendered its musical name to emerge as "Singsong" Island.
[20] Col C.P. Van Ness ltr to CMC, 12Jan49. Defense intially was oriented against an an-
ticipated attack from Florida and artillery positions were selected with this, as well as the
possibility of a sea-borne attack, in view. LtCol M.L. Curry interview at HistDiv, 28Jan49.
[21] ComonCh, "Battle Experiences, Solomons Island Action," Information Bulletin No.
2 (located at NHD), Chap X, 10.
[22] USS Heywood Rept, 12Aug42, 3.
[23] Final Rept, Phase V, 6
P a g e | 37
Chapter 4: The Battle of the Tenaru
With naval support gone, about the only hope was the airfield. Shipping would need air
cover before regular runs could bolster the Marines' slim supply levels, and time was of the
essence. If the Japanese struck hard while the landing force was abandoned and without air
support, the precarious first step toward Rabaul might well have to be taken all over again.
Vandegrift centered his defense at the field and gave completion of the strip top priority equal
to the task of building the perimeter's MLR.
On 8 August, almost as soon as the field was captured, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Gera-
ci, the Division Engineer Officer, and Major Kenneth H. Weir, Division Air Officer, had made
an inspection of the Japanese project and estimated the work still needed. They told Admiral
Turner that 2,600 feet of the strip would be ready in two days, that the remaining 1,178 feet
would be operational in about two weeks. Turner said he would have aircraft sent in on 11
August. But the engineer officer had made his estimate before the transports took off with this
bulldozers, power shovels, and dump trucks.
1

Again, however, the Marines gained from the Japanese failure to destroy their equip-
ment before fleeing into the jungle. Already the U.S. forces were indebted to the enemy for
part of their daily two meals, and now they would finish the airfield largely through the use of
enemy tools. This equipment included nine road rollers (only six of which would work), two
gas locomotives with hopper cars on a narrow-gauge railroad, six small generators (two were
damaged beyond repair), one winch with a gasoline engine, about 50 hand carts for dirt, some
75 hand shovels. and 280 pieces of explosives.
In spite of this unintentional assistance from the Japanese, the Marine engineers did not
waste any affection on the previous owners of the equipment. The machinery evidently had
been used continuously for some time with no thought of maintenance. Keeping it running
proved almost as big a job as finishing the airfield, and one of the tasks had to be done practi-
cally by hand, anyway. The Japanese had started at each end of the airstrip to work toward the
middle, and the landing had interrupted these efforts some 180 to 200 feet short of a meeting.
Assisted by a few trucks and the narrow gauge hopper cars (which had to be loaded by hand),
engineers, pioneers, and others who could be spared moved some 100,000 cubic feet of fill and
spread it on this low spot at midfield. A steel girder the Japanese had intended to use in a
hangar served as a drag, and a Japanese road roller flattened and packed the fill after it had
been spread.
Problems facing the infantry troops were just as great. There had been no impressive
ground action on Guadalcanal since the landing, but intelligence in the immediate vicinity as
well as in the South Pacific in general was not yet able to indicate when, how, and where
Japanese reaction would strike. Estimating a counterlanding to be the most probable course of
Japanese action, General Vandegrift placed his MLR at the beach. There the Marines built a
9,600-yard defense from the mouth of the Ilu River west around Lunga Point to the village of
Kukum. The Ilu flank was refused 600 yards inland on the river's west bank, and at Kukum
the left flank turned inland across the flat land between the beach and the first high ground of
the coastal hills. The 5th Marines (less one battalion) held the left sector of the line from Ku-
kum to the west bank of the Lunga, and the remainder of the line (inclusive of the Lunga) was
held by the 1st Marines.


P a g e | 38






















The line was thin. The bulk of the combat forces remained in assembly areas inland as a
ready reserve to check attacks or penetrations from any sector. Inland (south) of the airfield, a
9,000-yard stretch of rugged jungle terrain was outposted by men from the artillery, pioneer,
engineer, and amphibian tractor battalions. These men worked during the day and stood
watch on the lines at night.
The workers on the airfield as well as those on the thin perimeter were under almost
constant enemy observation. Submarines and destroyers shelled the area at will day or night.
Large flights of high-level bombers attacked the airfield daily, and observation planes were
continually intruding with light bombs and strafing attacks. At night the enemy patrols be-
came increasingly bold, and troops on the MLR mounted a continuous alert during the hours
of darkness. South of the airfield the outpost line had to be supplemented by roving patrols.
In spite of this harassment, the perimeter shaped up. The 1st Special Weapons Battalion
dug in its 75mm tank destroyers (half-tracks) in positions inland from the beach, but kept them
ready to move into prepared positions near the water. Howitzers of the 11th Marines were
situated to deliver fire in all sectors. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the artillery regiment had
75mm pack howitzers and the 5th Battalion had 105mm howitzers. There were no 155mm
howitzers or guns for counterbattery, there was no sound-flash equipment for the location of
enemy batteries, and the 3d Defense Battalion had not had a chance to unload its 5-inch sea-
coast guns or radar units prior to the departure of the amphibious shipping. Air defense
within the perimeter also was inadequate. There were 90mm antiaircraft guns ashore, but the
restricted size of the perimeter kept them too close to the field for best employment.
It was a hazardous and remote toe-hold which the Marines occupied, and within the
Pacific high command there were some grave doubts whether they could hang on. Major
General Millard F. Harmon said to General Marshall in a letter on 11 August:
P a g e | 39
The thing that impresses me more than anything else in connection with the Solomon
action is that we are not prepared to follow up... We have seized a strategic position from
which future operations in the Bismarcks can be strongly supported. Can the Marines hold it?
There is considerable room for doubt.
2

Admiral Ghormley, also concerned about the precarious Marine position,
3
on 12 August
ordered Admiral McCain's F 63 to employ all available transport shipping to take aviation
gasoline, lubricants, ammunition, bombs, and ground crews to Guadalcanal. To avoid Japa-
nese air attacks, the ships were to leave Espiritu Santo in time to reach Sealark Channel late in
the day, unload under cover of darkness, and depart early the following day.
For the "blockade run" to Guadalcanal, Admiral McCain readied four destroyer trans-
ports of TransDiv 12. They were loaded with 400 drums of aviation gasoline, 32 drums of
lubricant, 282 bombs from 100- to 500-pounders, belted ammunition, tools, and spare parts.
Also on board were five officers and 118 Navy enlisted men from a Navy construction base
(Seabee) unit, Cub-1. Under the command of Major C.H. Hayes, executive officer of VMO-251,
this unit was to aid the Marine engineers in work at the field and to serve as ground crews for
fighters and dive bombers scheduled to arrive within a few days.
McCain's ships arrived off Guadalcanal during the night of 15 August, and the equip-
ment and men were taken ashore. By this time the Marine engineers had filled the gap in the
center of the landing strip and now labored to increase the length of the field from 2,600 feet to
nearly 4,000 feet. Work quickened after the Seabees landed, but there was no steel matting and
the field's surface turned to sticky mud after each of the frequent tropical rains.
General Harmon blamed a faulty planning concept for the serious shortages of tools,
equipment, and supplies. The campaign, he said, "... had been viewed by its planners as [an]
amphibious operation supported by air, not as a means of establishing strong land based air
action."
4

But in spite of these shortages at the airfield and elsewhere, the Lunga Point perimeter
was taking on an orderly routine of improvement and defense. Motor transport personnel had
put their meager pool of trucks into operation shortly after the landing, and they had added
some 35 Japanese trucks to he available list. Pioneers had built a road from the airfield to the
Lunga River where they erected a bridge to the far side of the perimeter. Supply dumps also
had been put in order. The pioneers cleared the landing beach, moving gear west to the Lun-
ga-Kukum area, and sorted and moved Japanese supplies. The old Japanese beach at Kukum
was cleaned up and reconditioned to receive U.S. material.
Most of the work of moving the beach dumps to permanent sites was completed in four
days. There was a great amount of tonnage to handle in spite of the fact that only a small
portion of the supplies had been landed. Amphibian tractors and all available trucks, includ-
ing the Japanese, were used. The Government Track (the coastal road to Lunga) was improved
and streams and rivers bridged to speed truck traffic. The amphibians carried their loads just
offshore through shallow surf, and farther out to sea the lighters moved from old beach to new
and back again. The amount of supplies at each of the new classified dumps was kept low to
avoid excessive loss from bombardment.
Captured material included almost every type item used by a military force--arms,
ammunition, equipment, food, clothing, fuel, tools, and building materials:
As the division was acutely short of everything needed for its operation, the captured
material represented an important if unforeseen factor in the development of the airfield and
beach defenses and the subsistence of the garrison.
5

P a g e | 40
The landing force was particularly short of fuel, but in this case the supply left behind
by the Japanese garrison was not as helpful as it might have been. Marines found some 800 to
900 drums of Japanese aviation gasoline on Guadalcanal, but this 90-octane fuel was not quite
good enough for our aircraft, and it was too "hot" and produced too much carbon in trucks
and Higgins boats unless mixed evenly with U.S. 72-octane motor fuel. Likewise some 150,000
gallons of Japanese motor fuel of 60 or 65 octane proved unreliable in our vehicles although
some of it was mixed with our fuel and used in emergency in noncombat vehicles.
So critical was the supply of gasoline and diesel fuel that the division soon adopted an
elaborate routine of "official scrounging" from ships that came into the channel. Rows of
drums were lined bung up on old artillery lighters, and these craft would wallow alongside
ships where Marines would ask that a hose from the ships' bulk stores be passed over so they
could fill the drums one at a time. This method helped the Marines' fuel supply, but not rela-
tions with the Navy. Small boats taking off supplies had difficulty negotiating their passes
alongside with the unwieldy lighters in the way, and ships officers quite frequently took a dim
view of dragging along such bulky parasites when they had to take evasive action during the
sudden air raids. But the system often worked well when early preparations were made with
particularly friendly ships.
This over-water work in Sealark Channel, maintaining contact between Tulagi and
Guadalcanal as well as meeting the supply ships which began to sneak in more frequently,
pointed to another serious deficiency: there was no organized boat pool available to the divi-
sion. more often than not the personnel and craft that the division used in those early days had
merely been abandoned when the attack force departed, and there was no semblance of organ-
ization among them. Even the creation of order did not solve all the problems. A high percen-
tage of the boats were damaged and crewmen had no repair facilities. The situation was
gradually improved but was never satisfactory.
At last, on 18 August, the engineers and Seabees had a chance to stand back and admire
their work. The airfield was completed. On 12 August it had been declared fit for fighters and
dive bombers, but none were immediately available to send up. A Navy PBY had landed
briefly on the strip on that date., but this was before Admiral McCain made his initial blockade
run, and there was very little fuel for other planes anyway. But by the 18th the fill in the
middle had been well packed, a grove of banyan trees at the end of the strip had been blasted
away to make the approach less steep, and newly arrived gasoline and ordnance were ready
and waiting for the first customers. In the South Pacific during that period of shoestring
existence, however, "readiness" was a comparative thing. There were no bomb handling
trucks, carts or hoist, no gas trucks, and no power pumps.
The state of readiness had a way of fluctuating rapidly, too, and the breathing spell for
the workers did not last long. With most sadistic timing, a large flight of Japanese planes came
over and scored 17 hits on the runway. One engineer was killed, nine were wounded, and the
field "was a mess."
6







P a g e | 41

















MARINE COMMANDERS ON GUADALCANAL appear in a picture taken four days after
the landing which includes almost all the senior officers who led the 1st Marine Division ashore.
Left to right, front row: Col George R. Rowan, Col Pedro A. del Valle, Col William C. James, MajGen
Alexander A. Vandegrift, Col Gerald C. Thomas, Col Clifton B. Cates, LtCol Randolph McC. Pate, and
Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN.

Second row: Col William J. Whaling, Col Frank B. Goettge, Col LeRoy P. Hunt, LtCol Frederick C.
Biebush, LtCol Edwin A. Pollock , LtCol Edmund J. Buckley, LtCol Walter W. Barr, and LtCol Ray-
mond P. Coffman.

Third row: LtCol Francis R. Geraci, LtCol William E. Maxwell, Col Edward G. Hagen, LtCol William
N. McKelvy, LtCol Julian N. Frisbee, Maj Milton V. O'Connell, Maj William Chalfont, III, Capt
Horace W. Fuller, and Maj Forest C. Thompson.

Fourth row: Maj Robert G. Ballance, Maj Henry W. Buse, Jr., Maj James G. Frazer, Maj Henry H.
Crockett, LtCol Leonard B. Cresswell, LtCol John A. Bemis, Maj Robert B. Luckey, LtCol Samual G.
Taxis, and LtCol Eugene H. Price.

Last row: Maj Robert O. Bowen, LtCol Merrill B. Twining, Maj Kenneth W. Benner (behind Bemis),
LtCol Walker A. Reeves, LtCol John DeW. Macklin, LtCol Hawley C. Waterman, and Maj James C.
Murray.

Many of these men went on to become general officers and three of them (Vandegrift, Cates, and Pate)
later became Commandants of the Marine Corps. (USMC 50509)


P a g e | 42
Two days later Henderson Field, named after Major Lofton Henderson, a Marine avia-
tor killed at Midway, was again ready. And this time the planes arrived. The forward echelon
of Marine Aircraft Group 23, the first arrivals, numbered 19 F4Fs and 12 SBD-3s. The units
were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Fike, executive officer of the air
group. The F4Fs, a part of Marine Fighter Squadron 223, were commanded by Major John L.
Smith, and the 12 Douglas dive bombers from Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 232 were led
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Mangrum.
Arrival of planes ended an era for the Guadalcanal defenders--the hazardous period
from 9 to 210 August when the landing force operated entirely without air or surface support.
During this period lines of communications were most uncertain. Nothing was known of the
general naval situation or the extent of losses at sea, and little information was received from
aerial reconnaissance from rear areas. Ashore, patrolling was constant, but the terrain was
such that much could be missed. Short rations, continuous hard work, and lack of sleep re-
flected in the physical condition of the troops. Morale, however, remained high.
Formed in March of 1942 at Ewa, Oahu, MAG-23 remained in training there, with much
shifting of personnel and units, until this two-squadron forward echelon sailed to the South
Pacific on 2 August on board the escort carrier Long Island. Smith's men had just been issued
new F4Fs with two-stage superchargers, and Mangrum's unit had turned in its old SBD-2s for
the newer 3s with self-sealing gasoline tanks and armor plate. The remaining two squadrons of
the group, Captain Robert E. Galer's VMF-224 and Major Leo R. Smith's VMSB-231, would sail
from the Hawaiian area on 15 August.
John Smith's VMF-223 and Mangrum's VMSB-232 came down by way of Suva in the Fi-
jis and Efate in the New Hebrides. At Efate, Smith traded some of his young, less-experienced
pilots to Major Harold W. Bauer's VMF-212 for some fliers with more experience. On the
afternoon of 20 August, the Long Island stood 200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal and launched
the planes.
Two days later, on 22 August, the first Army Air Force planes, five P-400s
7
of the 67th
Fighter Squadron, landed on the island. On 24 August, 11 Navy dive bombers from the battle-
damaged Enterprise moved to Henderson Field to operate for three months, and on 27 August
nine more Army P-400s came in. Performance of these Army planes was disappointing. Their
ceiling was 12,000 feet because they had no equipment for the British high-pressure oxygen
system with which they were fitted, and they could not reach the high-flying enemy planes.
Along with the Marine SBDs, the P-400s spent their time during Japanese air raids off strafing
and bombing ground targets, and they returned to Henderson after the hostile planes de-
parted.
A short while later--early in September--supply and evacuation flights were initiated by
two-engined R4Ds (C-47s) of Marine Aircraft Group 25. Flying daily from Espiritu Santo and
Efate, the cargo planes each brought in some 3,000 pounds of supplies and were capable of
evacuating 16 stretcher patients.
Although this increased air activity at Henderson Field was of great importance to the
operation in general and the combat Marines in particular, the field still was not capable of
supporting bombers which could carry attacks to Japanese positions farther to the north. On 20
August General Harmon voiced the opinion that it would be too risky to base B-17s at Hen-
derson until more fighter and antiaircraft protection were available.
8

Early in September he suggested that heavy bombers stage through the Guadalcanal
field from the New Hebrides and thus strike Rabaul and other Japanese bases,
9
but a closer
P a g e | 43
investigation pointed up the impracticality of this plan. It would have meant hand-pumping
more the 3,500 gallons of gasoline into each bomber landing at Guadalcanal on the 1,800-mile
round trip from the New Hebrides to the Northern Solomons; and although this manual labor
was not too great a price to pay for an opportunity to strike at the Japanese, it was impossible
to maintain a fuel stock of that proportion at Henderson Field.
Ground Action
Combat troops meanwhile probed the jungles with patrols, and early reconnaissance
indicated that the bulk of Japanese troops was somewhere between the Matanikau River,
about 7,000 yards west of the Lunga, and Kokumbona, a native village some 7,500 yards west
of the Matanikau. General Vandegrift wanted to pursue the enemy and destroy him before the
Japanese could reinforce this small, disorganized garrison, but no substantial force could be
spared from the work of building the MLR and the airfield.
Minor patrol clashes occurred almost daily, but many of these meeting engagements
were with wandering bands of uniformed laborers who only confused attempts to locate the
main enemy force. This patrolling gradually revealed that the area between the Matanikau and
Kokumbona was the main stronghold, however, Stiff resistance continued there with each
attempt to probe the area, and this pattern had started as early as 9 August when one officer
and several enlisted men were wounded while trying to cross the river. This patrol had re-
ported the west bank of the river well organized for defense. The enemy kept shifting his
position, though, to maneuver for an advantage against the patrols which came to seek him
out. Final confirmation of the enemy location came on 12 August when a Japanese warrant
officer captured behind the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines said that his unit was between the
Matanikau and Kokumbona.
Under questioning, the prisoner admitted that possibly some of his fellow garrison
mates were wandering aimlessly through the jungle without food and that some of them
might surrender. First Sergeant Stephen A. Custer of the division intelligence section made
plans to lead an amphibious patrol to the area. Meanwhile, a Marine patrol reported seeing
what it took to be a white flag west of the river. Hearing these reports, Lieutenant Colonel
Frank Goettge, division intelligence officer, decided to lead the patrol himself.
The original plan had called for an early start so that a daylight landing could be made.
The patrol then would work inland along the west bank of the Matanikau and bivouac for the
night far back in the hills. The second day was to be spent in a cross-country return to the
perimeter. The primary mission of the patrol would be that of reconnaissance, but it was to be
strong enough for combat if it ran into a fight.
Colonel Goettge' new plans delayed departure of the patrol about 12 hours and cut
down its combat potential by including among its 25-man strength Lieutenant Commander
Malcolm L. Pratt, assistant division surgeon, Lieutenant Ralph Cory, a Japanese linguist, and
several members of the 5th Marines intelligence section. The boat got away from the perimeter
at about 1800 and landed after dark at 2200 at an undetermined point west of the Matanikau.
The Japanese, instead of surrendering, attacked the patrol and cut off from the beach all but
three men who escaped back into the surf to swim and wade to safety.
One of these men, Sergeant Charles C. Armdt, arrived in the perimeter at about 0530 on
13 August to report that the patrol had encountered enemy resistance. Company A, 5th Ma-
rines set off immediately as a relief patrol to be reinforced later by two platoons of Company L
and a light machine-gun section. Meanwhile, the other two escaped patrol members, Corporal
P a g e | 44
Joseph Spaulding and Platoon Sergeant Frank L. Few, came back at 0725 and 0800 respectively
and revealed that the remainder of the Goettge patrol had been wiped out.
The relief patrol landed west of Point Cruz, a coastal projection a short distance west of
the Matanikau's mouth. Company A moved east along the coastal road back toward the
perimeter while the reinforced platoons of Company L traveled over the difficult terrain
inland from the beach. Company A met brief Japanese resistance near the mouth of the river,
but neither force found a trace of the Goettge patrol.
This action was followed a week later by a planned double envelopment against the vil-
lage of Matanikau. Companies B and L of the 5th Marines would carry out this attack while
Company I of the same regiment made an amphibious raid farther west, at Kokumbona,
where it was hoped that any Japanese retreating from Matanikau could be cut off. On 18
August Company L moved inland, crossed the Matanikau some 1,000 yards from the coast,
and prepared to attack north into the village the next day. Company B, to attack west, moved
along the coastal road to me east bank of the river.
Next day, after preparation fire was laid down by the 2d, 3d, and 5th Battalions of the
11th Marines, Company L launched its attack. Shortly after jumping off, scouts discovered a
line emplacements along a ridge some 1,000 yards to he left flank of the company front. The
platoon on this flank engaged the small enemy force in these emplacements while the re-
mainder of the company moved on toward the village. In this action off the left flank, Sergeant
John H. Branic, the acting platoon leader was killed. The company executive officer, Lieute-
nant George H. Mead, Jr. next took command. When he was killed a short time later Marine
Gunner Edward S. Rust, a liaison officer from the 5th Marines headquarters took command.
This platoon continued to cover the advance of the remainder of the company.
Company B, thwarted in its attempt to cross the river because of intense Japanese fire
from the west bank, could only support the attack of its sister company by fire. Company L
managed to reach the outskirts of the native village at about 1400, however, and one platoon
entered the settlement. This platoon lost contact with the remainder of the company, and when
the other platoons attempted to enter the village they were met by a strong Japanese counterat-
tack which caused the separated platoon to withdraw to company lines. The Marines were
nearly enveloped and succeeded in repulsing the attack only after close-range fighting. De-
fending in depth, the Japanese drew up on a line which extended from the river some 200
yards west through the village. While the Marines maneuvered for an attack, the Japanese fire
became more sporadic, and an assault at about 1600 revealed that the enemy pocket had
dispersed.
Meanwhile the amphibious raid of Company I also aroused opposition. Two enemy de-
stroyers and a cruiser lobbed shells at the landing craft while they swung from the Marine
perimeter to Kokumbona, and the raiding party escaped this threat only to be met at the beach
by Japanese machine-gun fire. The landing succeeded, however, and the enemy resistance
began to melt. By the time a Marine attack swept through the village, the defenders had retired
into the jungle to avoid a conclusive engagement. The three companies killed 65 Japanese
while suffering the loss of four Marines killed and 11 wounded.
Although these actions served only to located the general area into which the original
Japanese garrison of Guadalcanal had withdrawn in the face of the Marine landing, another
patrol on 19 August indicated the pattern of things to come on the island.
The patrol and reconnaissance area assigned to the 1st Marines lay east and southeast of
the perimeter where the plains of the Lunga fan into a grassy tableland which is nearly eight
P a g e | 45
miles wide near the coastal village of Tetere. Some thought had been given to the construction
of an airfield there, and on 12 August a survey party went out with a platoon-sized security
force under Second Lieutenant John J. Jachym. Passing through a native village on 13 August,
this group encountered Father Arthur C. Duhamel, a young Catholic priest from Metheun,
Massachusetts,
11
who related native rumors of an enemy force along the coast to the east.


Two days later a partial verification of the priest's information was made by Captain (of
the British Solomons Islands Defense Force) W.F.M. (Martin) Clemens, the district officer who
had withdrawn into the hills to become a coastwatcher when the Japanese entered his island.
On 14 August Clemens left his watching station near Aola Bay with his 60 native scouts
12
and
entered the Marine perimeter. Clemens and his scouts reported seeing signs of a new Japanese
force. And on the heels of Clemens' reports came word from Admiral Turner that naval intelli-
gence indicated a Japanese attack in force.
To investigate, Captain Charles H. Brush, Jr. took a part of his Company A of the 1st
Marines and at 0700 on 19 August began a patrol eastward along the coastal track toward Koli
Point and Tetere. At about noon near Koli Point the patrols spotted a group of four Japanese
officers and 30 men moving, with no security to front or flanks, between the road and the
beach. Captain Brush struck frontally with a part of his unit while Lieutenant Jachum led and
envelopment around the enemy left flank. In 55 minutes of fighting, 31 of the Japanese were
killed. The remaining three escaped into the jungle. Three Marines were killed and three
wounded.
It was clear that these troops were not wandering laborers or even members of the orig-
inal garrison. Helmets of the dead soldiers bore the Japanese Army star rather than the anchor
P a g e | 46
and chrysanthemum device of the special landing force. A code for ship-to-shore communica-
tions to be used for a landing operation also was found among the effects, and the appearance
of the uniforms indicated that the troops were recent arrivals to Guadalcanal. There appeared
little doubt that the Japanese were preparing an attempt to recapture their lost airfield. And
Brush found they had already completed some excellent advance work:
With a complete lack of knowledge of Japanese on my part, the maps the Japanese had
of our positions were so clear as to startle me. They showed our weak spots all too clearly.
13

While these patrols searched for the enemy on Guadalcanal, another force of approx-
imately 200 Marines moved into enemy waters farther north and raided a Japanese atoll in the
Gilbert Islands. Companies A and B of Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson's 2d Raider Batta-
lion went from Oahu to Makin atoll on board submarines Argonaut and Nautilus and landed
on the hostile beach early on 17 August. The raid was planned to destroy enemy installations,
gather intelligence data, test raiding tactics, boost home front morale, and possibly to divert
some Japanese attention from Guadalcanal. It was partially successful on all of these counts,
but its greatest asset was to home-front morale. At a cost to themselves of 30 men lost, the
raiders wiped out the Japanese garrison of about 85 men, destroyed radio stations, fuel, and
other supplies and installations, and went back on board their submarines on 18 August for
the return to Pearl Harbor. This raid attracted much attention in the stateside press but its
military significance was negligible. Guadalcanal still held the center of the stage in the Pacific
and attention quickly turned back to that theater.
14

Battle of the Tenaru
15

The picture that began to take shape as these bits of intelligence fitted together provided
an early warning of Japanese plans that already were well underway. On 13 August, Tokyo
ordered Lieutenant General Haruyoshi Hyakutake's Seventeenth Army at Rabaul to take over
the ground action of Guadalcanal and salvage the situation. The naval side of this reinforce-
ment effort would be conducted by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, a wily Imperial sea dog who
was a veteran of early landings in the Philippines and Indonesia and of the battles of Coral Sea
and Midway. With no clear picture of his opponent's strength, Hyakutake decided to retake
the Lunga airfield immediately with a force of about 6,000 men. On the evening of the 15th of
August, while Tanaka's ships of the reinforcement force were loading supplies at Truk, the
admiral got orders to hurry down to Rabaul and take 900 officers and men to Guadalcanal at
once. Hyakutake had decided that the attack would begin with a part of the 7th Division's 28th
Infantry Regimentand the Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force. These units would be followed
by the 35th Brigade.
Admiral Tanaka thought he was being pressed a little too hard, considering that
the Eighth Fleet under which he operated had just been formed at Rabaul on 14 July, and that
the admiral himself had hardly been given time to catch his breath after hurrying away from
Yokosuka for his new job on 11 August. The admiral reported later:
With no regard for my opinionthis order called for the most difficult operation in
war--landing in the face of the enemy--to be carried out by mixed units which had no oppor-
tunity for rehearsal or even preliminary studyIn military strategy expedience sometimes
takes precedence over prudence, but this order was utterly unreasonable.
I could see that there must be great confusion in the headquarters of Eight Fleet. Yet the
operation was ordained and underway, and so there was no time to argue about it.
16

P a g e | 47
Backbone of the initial effort would consist of the reinforced 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, a
2,000-man force of infantry, artillery, and engineers under the command of Colonel Kiyono
Ichiki. This force had been en route to Midway when the defeat of the Japanese carriers caused
a change to Guam.
17
Later the Ichiki Force was en route back to the home islands when the
Marine landing in the Solomons brought another change of Japanese plans. The unit was
diverted to Truk where it landed on 12 August and was attached to the 35th Brigade which
then garrisoned the Palau Islands. The brigade's commander was major General Kiyotake
Kawaguchi. The 900 or 1,000 men which Admiral Tanaka loaded for his first reinforcement run
to Guadalcanal were from this Ichiki unit.
The reinforcement ships landed Colonel Ichiki and this forward echelon at Taivu Point
on Guadalcanal during the night of 18 August. While this force landed at this point some 22 air
miles east of the Lunga, some 500 men of the Yokosuka Fifth Special Naval Landing Force arrived
at Kokumbona. This was the first of many runs of the Tokyo Express, as Marines called the
Japanese destroyers and cruisers which shuttled supplies and reinforcements up and down
The Slot in high-speed night runs. Brush's patrol had encountered part of Ichiki's forward
echelon, and the Japanese commander, shaken by the fact that he had been discovered, de-
cided to attack at once.
At that time the Marines had five infantry battalions available for defense of Lunga
Point. Four battalions were committed to beach defense, one was withheld in division reserve.
On 15 August work had begun on a new extension of the right flank by refusing it inland
along the west bank of the Ilu River (then called the Tenaru) for a distance of 3,200 yards. This
plan involved road and bridge construction as well as extensive clearing before field fortifica-
tions could be built. As of 18 August little progress had been made.
In the face of the threats pointed out by intelligence sources, the division considered
two courses of action: first, to send the division reserve across the Ilu to locate and destroy the
enemy, or second, to continue work on defensive positions while limiting actions to the east to
strong patrols and outposts. The first course, General Vandegrift realized, involved accepting
the premise that the main Japanese force had landed to the east and that it could be dealt with
by one Marine battalion. But if Brush's patrol had encountered only a small part of the new
enemy unit while the bulk of the force stood posed to strike from another direction, or from
the sea, absence of the reserve battalion would become a serious manpower shortage in the
perimeter. The intelligence Vandegrift had gleaned form all sources was good, but there
wasn't enough of it. So the division sat tight to await developments. Work continued on field
fortifications, native scouts worked far to the east, and Marines maintained a strong watch on
the perimeter each night.
The Marines did not have long to wait. Colonel Ichiki had wasted no time preparing his
attack, and during the night of 20-21 August Marine listening posts on the east bank of the Ilu
detected enemy troops moving through the jungle to their front. A light rattle of rifle fire was
exchanged, both sides sent up flares, and the Marines withdrew across the river mouth to the
lines of their battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. They
reported that a strong enemy force appeared to be building up across the river.
18





P a g e | 48














By this time Ichiki had assembled his force on the brush-covered point of land on the
east bank of the river, and all was quiet until 0310 on 21 August when a column of some 200
Japanese rushed the exposed sandspit at the river mouth. Most of them were stopped by
Marine small-arms fire and by a canister-firing 37mm antitank gun of the 1st Special Weapons
Battalion. But the Marine position was not wired in, and the weight of the rushing attack got a
few enemy soldiers into Pollock's lines where they captured some of his emplacements. The
remainder of the line held, however, and fire from these secure positions kept the penetration
in check until the battalion reserve could get up to the fight. This reserve, Company G,
launched a counterattack that wiped out the Japanese or drove them back across the river.
Ichiki was ready with another blow. Although his force on the east bank had not direct-
ly supported this first attack, it now opened up with a barrage of mortar and 70mm fire, and
this was followed by another assault. A second enemy company had circled the river's mouth
by wading beyond the breakers, and when the fire lifted it charged splashing through the surf
against the 2d Battalion's beach positions a little west of the river mouth.
The Marines opened up with everything they had. Machine-gun fire sliced along the
beach as the enemy sloshed ashore, canister from the 37mm ripped gaping holes in the attack,
and 75mm pack howitzers of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines chewed into the enemy. Again the
attack broke up, and daylight revealed a sandy battlefield littered with the bodies of the
Japanese troops who had launched Guadalcanal's first important ground action.
Although outnumbered at the actual point of contact, Pollock assessed the situation at
daybreak and reported that he could hold. His battalion had fire superiority because of the
excellent artillery support and because the course of the river gave part of his line enfilade fire
P a g e | 49
against the enemy concentration in the point of ground funneling into the sandspit. In view of
this, General Vandegrift ordered Pollock to hold at the river mouth while the division reserve,
the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines enveloped Ichiki. While this battalion prepared for its attack,
Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion went forward to Pollock's command to help bolster
defensive positions. During the morning the engineers built antitank obstacles, laid a mine
field across the sandspit, and helped the 2/1 Marines string tactical wire and improve field
fortifications. They were under intermittent rifle fire during most of this work.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell's division reserve battalion had re-
verted to parent control and reported to Colonel Cates to receive the attack plan for the enve-
lopment. Before 0700, Cresswell crossed the Ilu upstream, posted elements of his Company D
(weapons) to cover a possible Japanese escape route to the south, and then turned north
toward the Ichiki Force. By 0900 his companies crossed their lines of departure in the attack
against the Japanese left and rear.
Company C on the right along the coast met one platoon of the enemy near the village
at the mouth of the Block Four River, and the Marines moved to encircle this force and isolate
it from the remainder of Ichiki's unit farther west. The other companies moved north with little
opposition, A on the right and B on the left. As the advance continued, the enemy was forced
into the point of land on the Ilu's east bank. By 1400 the enemy was confined completely by the
river, the beach, and the envelopment from the left and rear. Some of the Japanese made
unsuccessful attempts to escape through the surf and along the beach; another group burst out
temporarily to the east but ran head-on into Company C moving up from its battle at the
mouth of the Block Four.
The fight continued, with Cresswell tightening his encirclement, and more of the Japa-
nese attempted to strike through to the east. These breakout attempts gave the Guadalcanal
fliers, on the island less than 24 hours, a chance to fire their first shots in anger, and the F4F
pilots from VMF-223 gave Cresswell's Marines a hand with strafing attacks that destroyed the
Japanese or turned them back into the infantry trap.
To conclude the action by nightfall, Vandegrift ordered a tank attack across the sandspit
and into what now had become the rear of the Ichiki Force.The platoon of light tanks struck at
1500, firing at the enemy with canister and machine guns. Two tanks were disabled, one by an
antitank mine, but the crews were rescued by the close supporting action of other tanks and
the attack rolled on into the Japanese positions. It was over by 1700. Nearly 800 Japanese had
been killed and 15 were taken prisoner while only a few escaped into the jungle. Disgraced by
the debacle, Colonel Ichiki committed suicide.
The action cost the Marines 34 dead and 75 wounded. A policing of the Japanese battle-
field gleaned the division ten heavy and 20 light machine guns, 20 grenade throwers, 700
rifles, 20 pistols, and undetermined number of sabers and grenades, three 70mm guns, large
quantities of explosive charges, and 12 flame throwers. The flame throwers were not used in
the action.
Admiral Tanaka later had this to say about the disaster:
I knew Colonel Ichiki from the Midway operation and was well aware of his magnifi-
cent leadership and indomitable fighting spirit. But this episode made it abundantly clear that
infantry-men armed with rifles and bayonets had no chance against an enemy equipped with
modern heavy arms. This tragedy should have taught us the hopelessness of 'bamboo-spear'
tactics.
19

P a g e | 50
Battle of the Eastern Solomons
While Colonel Ichiki prepared for his ill-fated attack, Rear Admiral Tanaka and Vice
Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, the Eighth Fleet commander, worked to get the colonel's second
echelon ashore for what they hoped would be an orderly, well-coordinated effort against the
Marines. These troops were on board the Kinryu Maru and four destroyer transports, and they
were escorted by the seaplane carrier Chitose with her 22 floatplanes and by Tanaka'sDestroyer
Squadron 2, which Tanaka led in light cruiser Jintsu. A larger naval force operated farther to the
east outside the Solomons chain. In all, the Japanese task forces included three aircraft carriers,
eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 22 destroyers in addition to the
five transport vessels.
At this time Admiral Fletcher's force of two carriers, one battleship, four cruisers, and
ten destroyers operated to the southeast of the Lower Solomons conducting routine searches to
the northwest. Fletcher believed the area to be temporarily safe from Japanese naval trespass,
and he had sent the carrier Wasp off to refuel. This left him only the Enterprise and
the Saratoga for his air support.
On 23 August, two days after the Battle of the Tenaru, American patrol planes first
sighted the Japanese transports and the Tanaka escort some 350 miles north of Guadalcanal.
marine planes from Henderson Field attempted to attack the troop carriers, but a heavy over-
cast forced them back to Lunga. The fliers had a better day on the 24th, however. At 1420 the
F4F pilots intercepted 15 Japanese bombers being escorted toward Guadalcanal by 12 fighters
from the carrier Ryujo. Marines broke this raid up before it got close. They downed six of the
Zeros and ten bombers in what was VMF-223's first big success of the war. Captain Marion
Carl splashed two bombers and a Zero, and two planes each were downed by Lieutenants
Zennith A. Pond and Kenneth D. Frazier, and Marine Gunner Henry B. Hamilton:
This was a good day's work by the fighter pilots of VMF-223. It is necessary to remem-
ber that the Japanese Zero at this stage of the war was regarded with some of the awe in which
the atomic bomb came to be held later... The Cactus [Guadalcanal] fighters made a great
contribution to the war by exploding the theory that the Zero was invincible; the Marines
started the explosion on 24 August.
20

Three Marine pilots did not return from the action, and a fourth was shot down but
managed to save himself by getting ashore at Tulagi. In plane strength, however, the Cactus
Air Force (as the Guadalcanal fliers called their composite outfit) gained. This was the day, as
mentioned earlier in this chapter, that the 11 SBDs came in from the damaged Enterprise. At
the time the ship was struck, Lieutenant Turner Caldwell, USN, was up with his "Flight 300,"
and, low on gas, he led his fliers to Guadalcanal where they more than paid for their keep until
27 September.
Meanwhile Admiral Fletcher's carrier planes located the enemy task force in the Eastern
Solomons at about the same time Japanese planes spotted Fletcher. Like the Battle of Midway,
the resulting action was an air-surface and air-air contest. Surface vessels neither sighted nor
fired at each other.
The Ryujo, whose Zeros had fared so poorly with John Smith's F4F pilots, took repeated
hits that finally put her out of control and left her hopelessly aflame. One enemy cruiser was
damaged; the Chitose sustained severe wounds but managed to limp away; and 90 Japanese
planes were shot down. On the American side, 20 planes were lost and the dam-
aged Enterprise lurched away to seek repair.
P a g e | 51
This action turned back the larger Japanese attack force, and Fletcher likewise with-
drew. He expected to return next day and resume the attack, but by then the Japanese had
moved out of range. The escorted transports with reinforcements for the late Colonel Ichiki
continued to close the range, however, and early on 25 August SBDs form VMSB-232 and
the Enterprise Flight 300 went up to find them. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons had post-
poned Tanaka's delivery of these reinforcements, but after that carrier battle was over the
admiral headed his ships south again late on 24 August.
At 0600 on 25 August, Tanaka's force was some 150 miles north of Guadalcanal, and
there the SBDs from Henderson Field found him. The Jintsu shook under an exploding bomb
that Lieutenant Lawrence Baldinus dropped just forward of her bridge, and Ensign Christian
Fink of the Enterprise scored a hit on the transport Kinryu Maru amidships. Admiral Tanaka
was knocked unconscious by the explosion on his flagship, and a number of crewmen were
killed or injured. The ship did not list under the bow damage, however, and she still was
seaworthy. When Tanaka recovered he transferred his flag to the destroyer Kagero and sent
the Jintsu to Truk alone.
21

Flames broke out on the Kinryu Maru which carried approximately 1,000 troops of
the Yokosuka 5th SNLF, and the destroyer Muzuki went alongside to rescue survivors. At just
that moment this ship became "one of the first Japanese warships to be hit by a B-17 since the
war began"
22
when these big planes from the 11th Bombardment Group at Espiritu Santo
arrived to lend a hand to the Cactus fliers. The Muzuki sank at once. Another ship then moved
in to rescue the survivors from this destroyer while two destroyer transports went to the
rescue of the men from the Kinryu Maru.These men were picked up just as the Maru also went
to the bottom. Meanwhile another pass at the ships had resulted in light damage to the de-
stroyerUzuki, and Admiral Tanaka turned back for Rabaul. Many of the SNLF men had been
lost, and his force was badly shaken and disordered:
My worst fear for this operation had come to be realized. Without the main combat
unit, the Yokosuka 5th Special naval Landing Force, it was clear that the remaining auxiliary
unit of about 300 men would be of no use even if it did reach Guadalcanal without further
mishap.
23

Thus had the 1st Marine Division gained some valuable time to prepare for the next
Japanese attempt to dislodge its Lunga defense. With air support on Henderson Field and with
a tenuous supply route established to the New Hebrides, the division's grip on Guadalcanal
was much improved at month's end. But it still was a long way from being completely secure,
especially now that Ichiki's act of harakiri had pointed up for the Japanese the impropriety of
trying to dislodge the landing force with only 900 or 1,000 men.


P a g e | 52
Notes
[1] "The failure to land engineer equipment and machinery severely handicapped our
efforts to complete the airfield and its defenses. Construction equipment and personnel are not
a luxury but an absolute necessity in modern warfare." Final Rept, Phase III, 12-13.
[2] CGSoPac ltr to CofSA, 11Aug42 (located at OCMH).
[3] He warned Adms King and Nimitz that Guadalcanal might again fall to the Japa-
nese if carrier support and reinforcements were not made available. ComSoPac msgs to CinC-
Pac and CominCh, 16 and 17AUg42, in SoPac War Diary (located at NHD).
[4] CGSoPac ltr to CGAAF, 25Aug42 (located at OCMH).
[5] Final Rept, Phase III, 4.
[6] Ibid., Annex C, 2.
[7] Early P-39 "klunkers" converted for export to the British. They could carry one bomb,
were armed with a 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber, and four .30 caliber machine guns.
[8] CGSoPac Summary of Situation, 20Aug42 (located at NHD).
[9] CGSoPac ltr to CofSA, 9Sep42 (located at NHD).
[10] Goettge's position as Division G-2 was filled on 14 August by LtCol E.J. Buckley,
formerly of the 11th Marines. Final Rept, Phase III, Annes F, 5.
[11] Father Duhamel, as well as Father Henry Oude-Engberink and Sister Sylvia of
France, and Sister Odilia of Italy, were later tortured and killed by the Japanese.
[12] Including Vouza, a retired sergeant major of police and native of the Tetere area
who previously had volunteered additional service to the Crown and Capt Clemens. A veteran
of 25 years in the native constabulary, the "reactivated" Vouza provided valuable assistance to
the coastwatchers and to the Marines.
[13] Maj C.H. Brush, Jr., ltr to CMC, 15Jan49.
[14] CTF 7.15 Rept, 24Aug42; 2dRdrBn Rept of Ops on Jakin Is, 19Aug42; WDC Japa-
nese Documents No. 161,013, 161,110, and NA 12053, "Records of Various Base Forces" and
"Base Force Guard Units and Defense Unit Records," 16-22-Aug42 (located at NHD).
[15] Actually the Ilu. But as previously explained, Marines of the division identified
these rivers incorrectly throughout the campaign and the action to be described has this be-
come known historically and to the participants as the Battle of the Tenaru.
[16] Tanaka Article, I, 690. Exceprts from this account are quoted in this volume with the
permission of the U.S. Naval Institute.
[Ichiki] The same Ichiki who commanded the Japanese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge
in 1937 at the beginning of the "China Incident" which led directly to the Second World War.
[17] See Part V of this volume.
[18] At about the same time the native scout Vouza entered the command post of 2/1 to
warn LtCol Pollock about the Japanese buildup. Badly wounded, Vouza had been captured by
the Ichiki Force, knifed about the face, throat, and chest when he wouldn't talk, and then left
for dead by the Japanese. This report to Pollock was one of the many services for which Vouza
later was cited by the American and British.
[19] Tanaka Article, I, 691.
[20] Marine Air History, 81.
[21] Tanaka Article, I, 693.
[22] Marine Air History, 81. See also Tanaka Article, I, 694; Struggle for Guadalcanal, 105
[23] Tanaka Article, I, 694.
P a g e | 53

Chapter 5: The Battle of the Ridge
General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that the defeat of the Ichiki Force left the di-
vision's position on the island only temporarily improved. Obviously the Japanese could be
expected to mount larger and better planned attacks against the small Marine perimeter; air
and naval activity at Guadalcanal indicated no waning enemy interest in the South Solomons
area. A noon-hour visit from Rabaul bombers was an almost daily occurrence, and enemy
warships and submarines entered Sealark Channel nearly every night to shell Henderson
Field.
Although the Battle of the Eastern Solomons gave Allied shipping from Espiritu Santo
an opportunity to increase the flow of supplies to the beleaguered Marines, the Lunga defend-
ers still operated on a hand-to-mouth basis.
The Cactus Air Force performed beyond all proportion to its facilities and equipment,
and the 3d Defense Battalion finally was able late in August to bring in the 5-inch guns of its
two seacoast batteries; but there were not enough marines on the island to enlarge the perime-
ter for an adequate defense. General Vandegrift believed that positions along 45 miles of
Guadalcanal's north coast would have to be held before the Japanese could be restrained from
landing and attacking Henderson Field and before air defenses would have sufficient room for
deployment. The general did not have that kind of manpower.
Since Major John Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum arrived with their F4Fs and
SBDs on 20 August, the airfield had taken on a more proficient and permanent look. By the
end of August a daily routine of scheduled patrol flights had been initiated. Four-plane fighter
patrols flew from 0545 to 0830 each morning and from 1400 to 1830 each afternoon, and mixed
fighter-bomber squadrons frequently made night searches for enemy shipping to the north-
west. Cactus aviators flew cover for the Allied shipping to the island, and went up on intercept
during the Japanese raids.
The U.S. fighters did well against the enemy bombers, but their only chance against the
highly maneuverable Zero was to pair up in mutual support. In this way they could protect
themselves when the Zeros came down to drive them away from the bombers. They found
that the Grumman did have certain advantages over the Zero, however. It had great fire
power, and it could stay in the air with more holes in it than the more flimsy Japanese fighter
could endure. During the first ten days of Cactus operations, U.S. fliers shot down 56 Japanese
planes at a cost of 11 of their own craft.
Marine engineers rigged a system of lights from captured Japanese equipment to out-
line the field for emergency night landings. and, when dump trucks and pneumatic tampers
came in later, workers could fill a 500-kilogram-bomb crater in 30 minutes. Dump trucks were
kept loaded with gravel and sand, and "flying squads" of engineers rushed out to repair any
damage immediately after the departure of Japanese bombers.
But not even counting enemy action, Henderson personnel still had plenty of problems.
An early method of fueling employed drums strung up in the rafters of partially built Japanese
hangars, and even when gasoline trucks arrived later the fuel had to be hand pumped from
drums to the trucks. There was no steel matting. and the field was completely at the mercy of
the whimsical tropical weather:
P a g e | 54
Henderson Field was a bowl of black dust which fouled airplane engines or it was a
quagmire of black mud which made the take-off resemble nothing more than a fly trying to
rise from a runway of molasses.
1

When engineers and Seabees had no bomb craters to patch, they still had to fix up the
field in the wake of the early SBDs which had hard-rubber tail wheels designed for landing on
the sturdy decks of carriers. On the Henderson earth these wheels "... chewed up the runway
like a plowshare."
2
The sorry condition of the field added serious operational losses to the
troubles of the small Cactus force which was nearly always outnumbered in the air. Occasio-
nally a plane was gripped so persistently by the mud that it failed to take off and crashed at
the end of the runway; ruts and the beginnings of potholes were hazards on dry days, and on
one foggy wet afternoon in early September a landing F4F crashed into a bulldozer.
But in spite of everything the installation grew and slowly improved, and this was a pe-
riod when American fighting men were thankful for small favors. On 20 August the trans-
port William Ward Burrows came up from the New Hebrides with the forward echelon of
MAG-23. All the men and some of the gear were put ashore, but then the ship scurried across
Sealark Channel for Tulagi when the word came in that a Japanese cruiser force was expected
that night. Near Tulagi the transport went aground and much of the equipment still on board
had to be jettisoned to float her free.
Next day Colonel William J. Wallace, group commander, came up to Henderson with
more planes; 19 F4Fs of Major Robert E. Galer's VMF-224, and 12 SBD-3s of VMSB-231 com-
manded by Major Leo R. Smith. That brought the Cactus strength to 86 pilots and 64 planes, 10
of them Navy and three Army.
On 1 September the ground crews got more help. Five officers and 387 men of the 6th
Naval Construction Battalion {Seabees) landed with two bulldozers. They would "... help make
an airfield out of Henderson and ... clear a short grassy strip a mile to the east called Fighter
1."
3
But next day came one of the infamous Henderson disasters that always loomed as a threat
to much of the backbreaking effort that had gone before.
With the frequent raids, fire was always a dangerous possibility, and a field fire brigade
had been organized around tow Japanese trucks which had been repaired by the 1st Marines.
They got their baptism on 2 September when a bomb from a heavy Japanese raid hit an armed
SBD parked at the edge of a coconut grove where ammunition was stored. The bomb could
not be removed from the burning SBD. and when it exploded it spewed flaming gasoline in all
directions. One 90mm shell dump was ignited, and the fire brigade could not do its best work
with all the explosions that resulted. Several of the fire-fighters were injured, and the trucks
seemed to be making little headway since they had to take turns dashing off to the Lunga
River, the closest supply of water. If the fire expanded much more it would set off a chain
reaction and all the ammunition in the area would be lost.
Had not the situation been so grim, some old hands might have been reminded of the
Chinese fire drill of ancient Marine legend. The blaze was eventually brought under control,
however, and the loss was serious but not critical. After this, large water tanks from coconut
plantations were spotted around the ammunition dumps; but this fire proved to be the most
serious of the campaign. Subsequent losses occurred in division dumps as a result of naval
shelling at night. These losses were negligible since the ammunition by that time had been
buried.


P a g e | 55




90MM ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS of the 3d Defense Battalion point skyward at Henderson Field
on alert against the attacks of Japanese bombers. (USMC 61608)




105MM HOWITZER of the 11th Marines nestles beneath the slope of a protecting ridge on
Guadalcanal ready to go into action against the Japanese. (USMC 51832)


This bombing raid had arrived at 1135, and while the fire department below worked to
save the ammunition dumps, Cactus fliers were up among the bombers. They shot down three
of the twin-engined craft and four Zeros without a single loss of their own.
On 3 September the command echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing arrived. This
group included Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, commanding general of the wing; his chief of
staff, Colonel Louis E. Woods; and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Munn, wing intelligence officer.
Using the MAG-23 staff as his wing staff, Geiger established his command post near that of
General Vandegrift. Liaison in the form of daily conferences between the two generals was
established, and Kenneth H. Weir, now a lieutenant colonel, at last had a well-organized air
headquarters with which to deal as division air officer.
4

Fueling and arming of the planes continued in a make-shift manner for some time, and
as late as November bombs had to be manhandled. Radio communications likewise posed
problems. Army and Navy receiving channels did not mesh, and the Army planes of the
Cactus Force could not receive Navy traffic. Operations resolved this by employing the radio
from a grounded Army P-400 alongside the Navy set and thereafter making simultaneous
P a g e | 56
broadcasts over twin microphones. This was a big help, but communications still were far
from satisfactory. Beyond 20 miles the planes could not depend on receiving the field, but the
field could normally read the planes' messages from as far as 100 miles.
Since the fight against Ichiki, there had been little opportunity for close air support of
ground troops, but Marines continued to plan for this sort of air-ground teamwork. Commu-
nications was the big problem here, too. At that stage of operations only visual signals were
used, consisting mainly of colored panels which the ground troops had, but they left much to
be desired. Planes now flew higher and faster than they had in the banana wars and maneuv-
ers, and this made it more difficult for pilots to read the panel messages, even if they could
catch a glimpse of the colored markings. And more often than not in Guadalcanal's thick
jungle and tall grass, they could not even see them. Guadalcanal Marines had heard about
colored smoke grenades which were being tested back in the States, and they thought these
might be helpful for air-ground signals. But what they really had their eyes out for were some
radio sets. That seemed to be the only promising solution for air-ground coordination. Radios
initially available to the division would not serve the purpose, and it would not be until Octo-
ber that Vandegrift could detail an officer and suitable radio equipment and personnel to train
as "air forward observers" from each infantry regiment and thereby pioneer in what later
became an important phase of Marine combat operations.
While Geiger built up his air arm, Vandegrift likewise added strength to the Lunga pe-
rimeter. With Tulagi quiet, he brought some of General Rupertus' troops across the channel to
Guadalcanal. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines made the move on 21 August, and the 1st Raider
Battalion and the 1st Parachute Battalion crossed to he Guadalcanal side on 31 August. In early
September, when a detachment of the 5th Defense Battalion came ashore at Tulagi, a 90mm
battery of the 3d Defense Battalion joined it parent organization in the Henderson Field area.
From all indications these additional troops would be needed. Aerial observation and
native scouts piled up reports of Japanese landings on both sides of the perimeter, and staff
officers estimated a build-up of some 200 or 300 well-equipped enemy troops near the village
of Tasimboko some 18 miles east of Lunga Point. Native scouts placed the enemy strength
much higher, but Marines suspected such counts to be exaggerated.
Patrolling continued in all sectors, and on 27 August the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines un-
der Lieutenant Colonel William E. Maxwell met a strong body of troops near the village of
Kokumbona, west of the perimeter. The battalion had made an amphibious landing without
incident at about 09730, but later ran into the Japanese force dug into positions throughout a
narrow coastal gorge. Maxwell was beyond artillery range of the perimeter, and although the
2d and 5th Battalions of the 11 Marines fired diversionary missions east of him in Matanikau
village, the Japanese facing the infantry Marines seemed inclined for once to make a strong
stand rather than to slink off into the brush as they had frequently done in other such engage-
ment.
Faulty communications and other difficulties bogged the Marine attack, and Lieutenant
Colonel Maxwell withdrew his force to comply with a portion of his patrol order which re-
quired him to return to the perimeter by nightfall. But the regimental commander, Colonel
Hunt, ordered the battalion back into the fight, relieved Maxwell of command, and soon
thereafter arrived on the scene himself. Major Milton V. O'Connell succeeded to command of
the battalion, but the attack was not resumed until the predawn hours of the following morn-
ing. A few Japanese were killed, but most of them had withdrawn. The Marines retired to
Matanikau village and later returned by water to the perimeter.
P a g e | 57
On 2 September two companies of the raider battalion patrolled Savo Island but found
no enemy. Following this the raiders and parachutists, consolidated into a provisional batta-
lion, moved into defensive positions on the south rim of the perimeter, inland from the air-
field, While they dug in, Colonel Edson and his staff made plans for an amphibious raid to the
east where the enemy build-up was reported around the Tasimboko area.
The landing was made just east of Tasimboko before dawn on 8 September, and the
raiders
5
advanced west into the rear of the reported Japanese positions. At about 0630 planes
of MAG-23 bombed and strafed the suspected strong point, and two destroyer trans-
ports, Manley and McKean, opened up on the area. At 0830 Edson made contact against light
resistance, and his advance overran two artillery pieces. He still could not determine the
strength of the enemy, but the force appeared to be withdrawing toward the village, and he
requested that supporting drive bombers remain on station in the event that the enemy pocket
could be localized for an air strike. General Vandegrift ordered ten planes to remain in conti-
nuous support and placed another squadron to call to Edson.
By 1045 to resistance had stiffened, and the raiders requested that more troops land to
the west of the village and support their attack. Not wanting to weaken the perimeter, division
replied that such a move was not feasible. Vandegrift suggested that the raiding force reem-
bark and return to the perimeter if the Japanese proved too strong to handle. Edson remained,
however, and 45 minutes later had overrun more artillery pieces as the battalion advanced
slowly against a heavy volume of fire. The colonel estimated the enemy as about 1,000 well-
armed and well-equipped troops, and the force now seemed inclined to make a stand. Portions
of Edson's advance drew fire from field artillery at point-blank range.
Some of the raider units had lost internal contact during the stiffening battle, but these
faults were corrected at about 1100, approximately the same time that the parachute battalion
reported to Edson, and the commander decided to make a coordinated attack against the firm
opposition. The colonel called in a P-400 strafing attack and then followed this with an enve-
lopment inland by his raiders while the parachutists protected his flank and rear. The assault
carried the village, but again the Japanese had elected to break contact and prepare for an
attack at a time and place of their own choosing.
The village was deserted, but the appearance of the abandoned encampment indicated
that reports of native scouts had been most accurate. Edson estimated that some 4,000 Japa-
nese had been in the vicinity until shortly before his attack, that his force had met only out-
posts and rear guards of a newly arrived unit which obviously was preparing a strong attack
on Henderson Field. Twenty-seven Japanese had been killed. Marine casualties numbered two
dead and six wounded.
Edson's estimate of the Japanese strength was a little low, but he was right about the
enemy's intentions. Just as the 1st Marines had previously scouted elements of the Ichiki
Force it later met at the mouth of the Ilu River, so Colonel Edson had located the gather-
ing Kawaguchi Force his men would meet later in a bitter stand before the airfield.
Rabaul had kept Admiral Tanaka's reinforcement ships busy. The admiral had taken
over the cruiser Kinugasa to replace his damaged Jintsu, and early on 29 August Admiral
Mikawa had ordered Tanaka to begin transporting reinforcements by destroyer. The remnants
of Ichiki's rear echelon would be taken down to Guadalcanal as would the Kawaguchi
Force, due to arrive later that day from Truk on board the transport Sado Maru.Tanaka loaded
supplies on board the ships of Destroyer Division 24, and put the troops of Ichiki's rear echelon
on board two destroyer transports. Then he stood by for the arrival of Kawaguchi.
P a g e | 58
























Kawaguchi's 35th Brigade, a part of the 18th Division in China, was built around Colonel
Akinosuka Oka's 124th Infantry Regiment. From China the unit had moved in December 1941 to
Borneo. In March 1942 it moved to Cebu in the Philippines, and April to Mindanao. and in
June to Palau. Alerted for a New Guinea operation that never came off, the force remained in
the Palau Islands until late in August when it began to stage in echelons through Truk for the
Rabaul area. When it arrived for this new mission it was formed up to include the rear echelon
of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry (Ichiki Force), the 124th Infantry, the 2d Battalion, 4th Infan-
try, and units of artillery, engineer, signal, and antitank troops. In that form theKawaguchi
Force numbered more than 6,000 men.
6

Admiral Tanaka had his destroyers all ready when Kawaguchi arrived. The admiral
met immediately with the general to hurry things along, but he ran into difficulty at once.
Kawaguchi was a barge man, and he did not care much for this idea of going down to Guadal-
canal in destroyers. He had once moved his unit 500 miles by barges to make a distinguished
landing on Borneo. Now he wanted to know how it would be if he went on down to Gizo
Harbor just north of New Georgia on board his Sado Maru, and then transferred to barges for
the remainder of the trip and for the landing at Guadalcanal. Kawaguchi's subordinate officers
nodded agreement to this idea. They were barge men, too. The impatient Tanaka referred this
dispute to Mikawa of the Eighth Fleet and Hyakutake of the Seventeenth Army. These officers
prevailed upon Kawaguchi to temporarily curb his warm regard for barges. He would make
all of the trip on Tanaka's destroyers, and land on Guadalcanal from them, besides.
7

For the build-up on Guadalcanal, Kawaguchi split his command. The general would
land in the Tasimboko area with the Ichiki rear echelon and the 1stand 3d Battalions, 124th
P a g e | 59
Infantry Regiment. Colonel Oka would land with the remainder of the force--the 2d Battalion,
124th Infantry--west of Lunga Point near Kokumbona. Each of the two forces was reinforced by
a share of the artillery, engineers, and other special troops. There was only one hitch in the
reinforcement efforts, even if Kawaguchi might have been uneasy without a barge under him,
but this bobble had no serious over-all results. Captain Yonosuke Marakami, command-
ing Destroyer Squadron 24, was to clear the way for the landings by going down The Slot on the
night of 29 August to attack a U.S. task force which was reported to be off Lunga Point. In-
stead, Murakami came steaming back up The Slot for the comfort of the Shortlands. The night
sky around Guadalcanal, he explained, was too full of a bright moon and U.S. aircraft. "He was
transferred shortly to the homeland," Tanaka reported later.
8
The elements of the Kawaguchi
Force landed during the nights of 30 and 31 August, at about midnight in both cases.
In spite of the fact that the commanders were separated by a distance of some 30 miles,
Kawaguchi planned a difficult maneuver that proposed to strike the Lunga perimeter in a
three-jawed envelopment from the west, south, and southeast, It was to be a coordinated
attack with air and naval support. To the normal problems inherent in such an involved plan,
Kawaguchi imposed upon his force the additional task of cutting a trail over the steep jungle-
covered ridges and gorges from the Tasimboko area to a point south of Henderson Field. The
jungle trail, planned as a route which would enable the Japanese to escape observation, was
begun about 2 September by Kawaguchi's engineers. Infantry, artillery, and other units fol-
lowed the engineers along this hand-hewn jungle route toward their lines of departure for the
attack against the Marines.
The Battle of the Ridge
Kawaguchi's fade-out into the jungle was successful. He was not spotted by marines
again until he was ready to attack, but it soon became apparent to the Lunga defenders that he
would have imposing support from Rabaul. Far-ranging intelligence sources reported a Japa-
nese naval build-up in the Truk and Palau areas and greatly increased air activity around the
Bismarck Archipelago.
"The situation as I view it is very critical," Admiral Ghormley messaged Nimitz.
9
"Our
transportation problem increases steadily as Japs perfect their blockade methods." Japanese
pounding of Guadalcanal picked up; the defenders clearly were being softened up for a big
attack, and while the South Pacific scurried to get them more planes the men at Lunga hoped
that the field would stay dry for the important day.
On 11 September, the pace of the attacks quickened. Twenty-six bombers and eight Ze-
ros came over at 1210 to pock the field, kill 11 Marines, and wound 17 others, and destroy one
O-400 parked beside the strip; and a heavy cruiser and two destroyers were spotted steaming
south about 100 miles to the northeast. But on the same day the Cactus Air Force added to its
strength. At 1620 a flight of 24 F4Fs that had been idle since their carrierSaratoga had been
torpedoed on 31 August came up to Henderson from Espiritu Santo under the command of
Lieutenant Commander Leroy C. Simpler. Before noon the next day (12 September) Simpler's
men got their chance to learn Cactus operations. Twenty-one of them went up with 11 "old"
Cactus fliers to shoot down 12 bombers and three fighters out of a 42-plane Japanese strike
that came over at 1100.
Meanwhile patrols from the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines began to encounter frequent op-
position east and southeast of the perimeter. Native scouts brought word of large bodies of
troops that clearly were not wandering remnants of Ichiki's action. The troops had an air of
P a g e | 60
purpose and direction apparent even to the local natives who began to flee from their villages
to the Marine perimeter. By 10 September native reports indicated that the enemy was less
than five miles east of the perimeter and that he was cutting a road to the south.
The perimeter by this time had been improved and strengthened. The 1st Marines right
(east) flank was refused for some 4,000 yards inland from the mouth of the Ilu, and on the west
the 5th Marines, with a strong reserve in the form of its 2d Battalion just over from Tulagi,
refused its flank inland for approximately half that distance. The space inland between these
flanks still posed a serious problem, but it had been partially solved by the establishment of
well-prepared strong points and outposts.
Troops from the 1st Amphibian Tractor and Pioneer Battalions maintained positions
south (inland) of the 5th Marines sector west of the Lunga, while east of the Lunga a 4,000-
yard outpost line was maintained by the 1st Marines, artillerymen, the engineer battalion, the
bulk of the pioneer battalion, and the raider-parachute battalion. General Vandegrift had
ordered the raiders and parachutists out of division reserve to augment this line by preparing
positions on a long low ridge that extended south of Henderson Field and parallel to the
Lunga River. The thousand-yard-long ridge was but a mile south of the airfield and, unless
well defended, offered the Japanese an inviting avenue of approach to the field.;
The pioneer battalion (minus its company west of the Lunga) held positions just south
of Henderson Field between the Lunga and the north spur of the ridge occupied by Edson's
force. Father to the east--and across the ridge spur from the pioneers--was the area of the
engineer battalion. Between the two positions was the division command post which recently
had been moved from its former, bomb-pocked position near the airfield.
On the 12th, the same day the Saratoga fliers went into business with the Cactus circus,
Edson and his executive officers walked out on their ridge to decide on a location for defenses.
The officers drew small-arms fire from the jungles to the south, and Edson called up his troops
to dig in across the southernmost knoll on the ridge. This was forward of the flanks of the
engineers on his left (east) and the pioneers on his right, but Edson wanted to hold all the
ground he could and to launch an attack against the enemy the next day.
At about 2100 that night a Japanese light cruiser and three destroyers entered Sealark
Channel to shell the airfield, and at about the same time the enemy ground force probed
lightly at the raider-parachute force on the ridge. Fighting was sporadic all along the line, and
although one desultory Japanese attack actually made a slight penetration of the Marine line,
the enemy made no attempt to consolidate or expand this gain.
Early the next morning (the 13th) Edson launched his counteroffensive, but he found
the enemy too strong and well-prepared to be thrown back. In the afternoon the Marine officer
withdrew his exhausted men north of the positions they had held the previous night and
established a stronger line on a higher portion of the ridge closer to the engineers and pioneers
to his left and right rear. On the right, in the jungle between the ridge and the Lunga, a sketchy
contact was made with the pioneer battalion; on the left (east) the raider-parachute flank
dangled open.
While Edson's force sweated under the hot sun on the grassy ridge, Henderson Field
was having more than its share of action. The Japanese raids started at 0950, came back at 1300
and again at 1730. The mixed Guadalcanal force shot down 11 of the enemy planes during the
day while losing five of their own number. But again the U.S. air strength grew.


P a g e | 61
























Navy pilots from the Hornet and Wasp brought in 18 F4Fs, and in the afternoon
more Saratoga fliers and planes came up from Espiritu Santo. Nimitz and Ghormley were
doing all they could to bolster the Solomons toe hold against the Japanese attack that was
coming. Later in the day Lieutenant Commander Louis J. Kirn brought in a flight of 12 SBDs of
VS-3 and the field also got its first torpedo planes when Lieutenant Harold H. Larsen, USN,
flew in leading six TBFs of VT-8.
10
But while the Henderson flying force gained by 60 planes
during the period of 11-13 September, Rabaul's air power jumped an additional 140 planes on
12 September along.
Taking periodic cover from sniping and bombing raids, Edson's men continued to dig
in for one more night on the ridge; on the morning of the 14th they were to be relieved by the
2d Battalion, 5th Marines. But it looked as if the night would be the worst they had seen yet;
P a g e | 62
scouting planes spotted seven destroyers coming down The Slot, evidently to add their bom-
bardment to the ground attack that appeared shaping up in the jungle to the south.
During the afternoon the reserve battalion (2/5) moved to an assembly area east of the
Lunga and between the airfield and Edson's Ridge, and officers of this battalion had gone
forward to Edson's lines to look over the area they would control the following day. The
105mm howitzers of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines lay in direct support of the Edson force,
and elements of the special weapons battalion had an observation post on the ridge. It Guadal-
canal defense was as ready as it could get.
Edson's disposition placed his two parachute companies n the exposed left flank and
tied them in on the right with raider Company B which held the ridge knoll in the center of the
Marine line. Company A of the raiders extended down the west slope of the ridge toward the
Lunga and to the makeshift contact with the pioneers. Raider Company C, on a high knoll to
the north (rear) of Company B, was Edson's reserve.
At sunset units were organized in small combat groups of about platoon strength dis-
posed at intervals along the main line of resistance. There were open fields of fire only in the
center of the position where the MLR crossed the grassy ridge, but even here the abrupt slopes
and broken ground made coordination of fires difficult. In the last hours of daylight the troops
improved their foxholes and the fields of fire, but the resulting positions were neither conti-
nuous nor complete.
In the first hours of darkness, Louis the Louse, or Washing-Machine Charley,
11
chugged
over to drop his inconsistent scattering of bombs, and about 2100 he let go a flare that hung
over the field as a registration point for the destroyer task force that now opened up from
Sealark Channel.
As if in answer, a flare went up from the troops south of Edson, and without artillery
preparation Kawaguchi drove a two-battalion attack against the center and right of the raider-
parachute line. Company B's central sector on the high knoll caught most of this first assault
and turned it back, but the other attack column found an opening to the west and came
through to cut off and envelop Company B's right platoon. While the Japanese drove through
this gap between Companies A and B, the isolated platoon fought its way back along 250 yards
of the ridge to join Company C on the knoll to the north. Still engaged and nearly overpo-
wered, Company B refused its right flank along the ridge's west slopes.
Edson had been calling in fire from 5/11's howitzers since the beginning of the attack,
and as the Japanese continued to hammer at his men the colonel directed the artillery closer
and closer until it was falling within 200 yards of the Company B lines. But still the Japanese
came on, and by 2200 Edson estimated that the two understrength parachute companies and
Company B (less the withdrawn platoon) were opposed by at least two enemy battalions
attacking in full force.
Japanese infiltration parties were taking over some of the Company B foxholes, com-
munication lines were cut throughout the area, and the Japanese now began to drum the ridge
with heavy mortar fire. Following a violent barrage at 2230, the Japanese attack shifted to the
east where it struck the thin flank held by the parachute troops. Screaming in English, "Gas
attack! Gas attack!", the Japanese came out of the jungle through a smoke screen and drove the
parachutists back along the ridge to expose the left flank of Company B.
This left the B Company raiders, now cut to approximately 60 men, exposed on both
flanks as well as their front, and Edson called for them to pull back to a last-ditch stand with
P a g e | 63
Company C. Company A would join the force there, and Edson ordered his men to hold at all
costs. It was the last dominating terrain feature south of the airfield.
Screening the withdrawal of the two companies with artillery fire, Edson collected his
men as they filtered back and built them up in what he hoped would be a line strong enough
to make the final stand. The colonel and his officers ironed out the confusion of setting in the
new defense in darkness and under fire while holding off repeated Japanese assaults. In all,
the enemy struck more than a dozen times throughout the night, the Kawaguchi men grinding
themselves into the fire from Marine artillery, mortars, machine guns, and rifles in vain at-
tempts to dislodge Edson from his final knoll of Bloody Ridge.
12
Japanese flares "telegraphed"
each attack, providing the 11th Marines gunners with reference points for their all-night firing
in which they expended 1,992 rounds of 105mm projectiles, some at ranges as short at 1,600
yards.
At 0400, with the Japanese attacks still in progress, companies of reserve battalion 2/5
began to move singly through the darkness and into positions on the raider-parachute left
flank. Darkness and uncertainty about Edson's new location brought confusion to this rein-
forcement effort, but the companies succeeded in gaining positions from which they aided in
standing off the final Japanese attacks.
While the action on the ridge was in progress, another Japanese unit (possibly the Ichiki
rear echelon) struck farther to the east where the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines lay
exposed near the Ilu River inland. Striking with a force of about two reinforced companies, the
Japanese engaged the Marines in a night-long fire fight but failed to penetrate the line.
In another, lesser action of the night a patrol of some 30 Japanese, evidently from the
force that penetrated Edson, wandered into a thin line of Company C, 1st Engineers in the area
east of the division CP and near 5/11's Headquarters and Service Battery south of the airfield.
The line had been thinned earlier in the night when Company A of the engineers had been
called back to aid the CP defense, and the Japanese patrol which struck at 0530 succeeded in
taking two left flank machine-gun positions before headquarters and service artillerymen
came up to bolster the line and help evacuate wounded. The Japanese heckled the line for the
short time remaining until daylight, then retired into the jungle. Four engineers were killed
and 14 were wounded. Ten Japanese bodies were buried in the area.
Also by daylight (14 September) the attacks on Edson's Ridge and the 3/1 line had
dwindled to sporadic sniping, and in the Edson Ridge sector the disorganized Japanese were
bombed and strafed into retreat by three P-400s from Henderson Field. Survivors remaining
near the ridge were hunted down and killed.
After this the only enemy still in action was a force of about battalion strength which
fired across the Ilu plain some distance east of Bloody Ridge and harassed the Marines of 3/1
(Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy, Jr.) who held that portion of the Marine line. Tanks
were called up against this enemy force, and after a hasty reconnaissance six of these vehicle
moved forward without infantry support toward the Japanese line in the fringe of jungle by
the Tenaru. Two tanks were hit almost at once by a Japanese antitank gun. Another tank
charged across the plain and over a grass hut only to plunge down a 30-foot bank into the
Tenaru; all four crew members were killed. A fourth tank was hit by this antitank gun shortly
after this, the fifth tank returned to the infantry lines, and the sixth tank was stopped by a
wrecked track 50 yards in front of the Japanese gun. The men in this tank bailed out and
returned to the infantry position. The tank attack had to be chalked off as a costly failure, but
P a g e | 64
the Japanese caused little trouble in the area after this. A desultory fire fight continued across
the plain until 16 September when the enemy withdrew.
Tactically the entire Kawaguchi Force could be scratched. About 400 of the Ichiki rear
echelon subsequently reached Koli Point as did some troops of the 2d Battalion, 4th Infan-
try, but these were hardly more than stragglers. The remainder of the force--the larger element
which had struck Edson's Ridge--reduced itself to a rabble while cutting a tortuous jungle trail
over the southern slopes of Mount Austen, across the up-country Matanikau territory, and
finally to Kokumbona. Wounded died along the route and equipment was abandoned by the
weakened, exhausted survivors.
The Marines had turned back a serious threat to their precarious Guadalcanal position,
but again a part of the thanks could go to Japanese bungling--on the battlefield as well as in
planning at higher echelons. Although Kawaguchi salvaged enough pride to spare himself
the hara-kiri fate of Colonel Ichiki, he still was only a slightly stronger boy whom Tokyo and
Rabaul hopefully had sent away on a man's job.


P a g e | 65
Notes
[1] Marine Air History, 82.
[2] Ibid., 83.
[3] Ibid., 84.
[4] As mentioned in the previous chapter, Weir's first look at the field had come on 8
August when he and the division engineer officer had estimated how much work they would
have to add to the early Japanese efforts to make the strip usable.
[5] There was a shortage of landing craft and the parachute battalion would not leave
the perimeter until shortly after 0800.
[6] 17th Army Ops, I, cited in Miller, Guadalcanal, 114.
[7] Tanaka Article, I, 695, 697.
[8] Ibid., 696.
[9] Quoted in Marine Air History, 88-89.
[10] After this day account-keeping pretty well broke down. Records defy determina-
tion of who flew from Cactus on any given day. In the press of fighting, often with "staff"
officers in the air as much as anybody else, administration and office work were marked by
extreme casualness.
[11] Familiar but unaffectionate names by which Guadalcanal defenders identified the
nuisance raiders that droned around almost nightly. Technically, "Charlie" was a twin-engine
night bomber from Rabaul, "Louie" a cruiser float plane who signalled to the bombardment
ships. But the harassed Marines used the names interchangeably.
[12] The name, used interchangeably with "Edson's Ridge," was employed after the bat-
tle, to identify this terrain feature.


P a g e | 66

Chapter 6: Action Along the Matanikau
Retreat of the Kawaguchi Force promised the Marines of the Lunga perimeter another
breathing spell from ground attacks, but there was not time for relaxation or relief from con-
cern about the future. Air and naval strikes continued to pound the Henderson Field defend-
ers, and aerial reports of a continued Japanese build-up at Rabaul forecast additional attempts
to retake the Guadalcanal area. patrolling schedules were stepped up; it was disquieting to
know that both the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Forces had landed on the island and moved into attack
positions without the Marines once being completely sure of their exact locations.
At the conclusion of the Battle of the Ridge on 14 September, the Marines had been
ashore for 38 days without receiving either reinforcements or additional ammunition. For most
of this period the men could be fed only two meals a day, and part of this food came from
captured Japanese supplies. Malaria was beginning to add its toll to battle casualties, and
although defensive emplacements were continually improved, the Marine force was wearing
itself down while the Japanese ground strength continued to mount in staging areas in the
Bismarcks.
In these lean early days in the Pacific, the problem of new strength for the Guadalcanal
effort was a thorny one. The Solomon Islands position was merely a salient, and still not a
strong one, which made a questionable contribution to the safety of other Allied positions
farther to the south. So these areas could not be stripped of defenders, and even if some spare
troops could be found there still was another operation slated. From the first, the plan for this
initial Allied offensive in the Pacific had included an occupation of Ndeni Island in the Santa
Cruz group southeast of the Solomons.
The 2d Marines first had been scheduled for this job, but Vandegrift had been allowed
to keep this regiment when the opposition became so bitter on Tulagi. Later the general re-
quested that his division's third organic infantry regiment, the 7th Marines, come over from its
Samoan garrison duty with its supporting artillery, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. But Admir-
al Turner demurred; he still saw a need fro the Ndeni operation, and the reinforced 7th Ma-
rines was the only amphibious force readily available for such an undertaking. On 20 August
the admiral published his Ndeni plan, and on 4 September the 7th Marines with its artillery
and part of the 5th Defense Battalion sailed from Samoa for Espiritu Santo.
1

But by 9 September, with the 7th Marines' convoy still en route, Turner agreed with
Vandegrift's August request for control of this infantry regiment, and he requested Admiral
Ghormley's permission to divert the regiment from the Ndeni operation. The issue still was
not won for the Marine general, however. Turner believed this fresh unit should set up coastal
strong points outside the Lunga perimeter, while Vandegrift held that a reinforcement of his
perimeter was the more pressing need. Turner relayed this question to Ghormley on 12 Sep-
tember, the same day the 7th Marines arrived in the New Hebrides, and Ghormley next day
ordered the reinforced regiment to move as soon as possible to the Guadalcanal perimeter.
After unloading the 5th Defense Battalion units at Espiritu Santo, the ships bearing the
infantry regiment and the artillery battalion departed for Guadalcanal on 14 September, the
same day that the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines was brought across Sealark Channel from Tulagi.
Operating with three cruisers plus the destroyers and mine sweepers of the newly-formed
Task Force 65, the transports spent four days at sea skirting enemy naval forces in the Solo-
mons waters. The convoy finally anchored off Kukum early in the morning of 18 September.
P a g e | 67
The trip cost the Navy dearly. Carriers Hornet and Wasp, then the only flattops opera-
tional in the entire South Pacific (both the Saratoga and theEnterprise were under repair)
ranged southeast of the Solomons with other escort support for the convoy, and the Japanese
had just sown the area with a division of submarines. The Wasp caught two torpedoes, burned
and sank; the battleship North Carolina was damaged as the destroyerO'Brien, which later
broke in two and went down while heading back to the U.S. following temporary repairs.
But for Henderson Field there was advantage even from such grim disasters as this; pi-
lots and planes that otherwise would have been flying from their carriers could now come up
to give the Cactus Force and hand. On 18 September six Navy TBFs arrived in the Lunga area,
and on 28 September 10 more planes, some SBDs and the other TBFs, flew in. Although enemy
raids dropped off somewhat after the defeat of the Kawaguchi Force,operational losses still
drained Geiger's air power, and such reinforcement managed only to keep the Cactus Force at
a 50-to-70-plane level, but for this Lunga was most thankful.
September 18th was a red-letter day for the Guadalcanal defenders. While the rein-
forced 7th Marines unloaded its 4,262 men, three other transports which were not part of TF 65
entered the channel with an emergency shipment of aviation gasoline. In all, this shipping put
ashore 3,823 drums of fuel, 147 vehicles, 1,012 tons of rations, 90 per cent of the 7th Marines
supplies of engineering equipment, 82.5 per cent of the organizational equipment, and nearly
all of the ammunition.
2
Turner's force then took on board the 1st Parachute Battalion, 162
American wounded, and eight Japanese prisoners and departed for Espiritu Santo at 1800.


THE PAGODA AT HENDERSON
FIELD, headquarters of Cactus Air
Force flyers throughout the first
months of operations from the captured
airfield. (USMC 50921)








CACTUS AIR
FORCE spreads in all its
variety across Henderson
Field during a lull in the
battle; in the foreground are
Marine scout-bombers.
(USMC 108580)




P a g e | 68
After this successful unloading, men on Guadalcanal began to draw more adequate ra-
tions, and General Vandegrift was able to adopt new defensive concepts for his force of some
19,200 men now at Lunga. Local air power made a counterlanding less likely, and the attack
pattern set by Ichiki and Kawaguchi indicated that more attention should be given to the
inland rim of the perimeter. On 19 September, Vandegrift's Operational Plan 11-42 provided
for the new concept by dividing the defenses into new sectors with increased all-around
strength.
Relieving special troops such as the engineers and pioneers, infantry battalions filled
the yawning gaps that previously had existed south of the airfield and along the southern
portions of the new inland sectors. The pioneers ,engineers, and the amphibian tractor person-
nel now were able to perform their normal functions during the daylight hours and at night
bolster the beach defenses where fewer men were needed. Each infantry regiment maintained
a one-battalion reserve, one or all of which could be made available as a division reserve if
necessary.
3

Gaps still existed in the perimeter. Generally the lines followed the high ground of the
ridges, but intervening stretches of low jungle often could not be occupied in mutually sup-
porting positions. Barbed wire had become available in increasing quantity, and in most
sectors double apron fences stretched across the ground in front of infantry positions of fox-
holes and logged and sand-bagged machine-gun emplacements. Colonel Robert H. Pepper's
3d Defense Battalion, with the 1st Special Weapons Battalion attached, retained responsibility
for antiaircraft and beach defense, and Colonel Pedro A. del Valle's 11th Marines, bolstered by
its 1st Battalion, remained in a central position supporting all sectors.
The 1st Marines retained responsibility for the east side of the perimeter, from an area
near the mouth of the Ilu River inland to a point beyond the former right flank where
McKelvy's battalion had fought the Japanese across the grassy plain. The fresh troops of the
7th Marines joined the 1st Marines at that point and extended across Edson's Ridge to the
Lunga River. Beyond that river the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines built up a line that tied in on the
right to the positions of the 5th Marines, and this latter regiment closed the perimeter with its
right flank which connected with the left flank of the 3d Defense Battalion at the beach.
Tentative plans in the reorganization also included extending the perimeter with strong
points of one- or two-battalion strength to he mouth of the Matanikau on the west and the
Tenaru on the east. Such positions would take advantage of the natural defensive potential of
the two rivers and aid the Marines in blocking Japanese movements in strength toward the
main battle positions. These strong outposts were not established at this time, however.
The first order of business seemed to require aggressive attention to the west.
Patrol actions had confirmed intelligence estimates that a strong enemy force was oper-
ating from the Matanikau village area on the west bank of the river, but that from the south-
east or east there seemed little danger of an attack. With the Henderson Field side of the Lunga
perimeter thus reasonably safe from an attack in force, the division planned a series of actions
to clear the Matanikau sector. Japanese troops there included elements from the 4th Infantry
Regiment of the 2d Division, and other personnel of the Kawaguchi Force. The 4th Infantry had
been reinforced by new Japanese landings of mid-September.




P a g e | 69




The first action against this enemy force sent Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller's 1st
Battalion, 7th Marines into he Mount Austen area on 23 September. The Marines were to cross
the Matanikau upstream and patrol between that river and the village of Kokumbona. The
action was to be completed by 26 September at which time the 1st Raider Battalion
4
was to
advance along the coast to Kokumbona where a permanent patrol base was to be established.
After passing through the perimeter on 23 September, Puller's battalion next day sur-
prised a Japanese force bivouacked on the Mount Austen slopes, and scattered the enemy in a
brief clash that ended shortly after nightfall. The action cost Puller 7 killed and 25 wounded,
and the commander requested air support for a continuation of his attack the next day (25
September) and stretchers for 18 of his wounded men.
Realizing that a prompt evacuation of 18 stretcher cases over the rugged terrain would
take at least 100 able-bodied men, General Vandegrift sent Lieutenant Colonel Rosecrans' 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines out to reinforce Puller. With this new strength to back him up, Puller
sent a two-company carrying and security force back with the wounded and pushed on to-
ward the Matanikau.
The general's 24 September communications with Puller also gave the colonel the pre-
rogative of altering the original patrol plan so that he could conform to the termination date of
P a g e | 70
26 September. Accordingly, when 1/7 and 2/5 reached the Matanikau on 26 September they
did not cross but patrolled northward along the east bank toward the coast.
At about 1400 the two battalions reached the mouth of the river and there began to
draw fire from strong Japanese positions in ridges on the west bank. Companies E and G of 2/5
attempted to force a crossing but were repulsed, and soon were pinned down by fire from
automatic weapons. Puller called in artillery and air, but the enemy positions remained active.
By 1600 the combined forces of Puller and Rosecrans had sustained 25 casualties, and the
action was broken off while the Marines strengthened their positions for the night.
Meanwhile the raider battalion, on its way to establish the patrol base at Kokumbona,
had reached the vicinity of the fire fight, and division directed Griffith to join with 1/7 and 2/5
and to prepare for a renewal of the attack next day. With this large provisional group now
formed, Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson up to take command. Puller would act as executive
officer. Edson's plan for the coordinated attack next day (27 September) called for the raiders
to move some 2,000 yards inland, cross the Matanikau, and envelop the enemy right and rear
while 1/7 supported by fire and 2/5 struck frontally across the river near its mouth.
The attack began early on 27 September, but failed to gain. Marines of 2/5 could not
force a crossing, and the raiders' inland maneuver stopped short when Griffith's battalion
encountered a Japanese force which had crossed the river during the night to set up strong
positions on high ground some 1,500 yards south of the beach. First fire from mortars and
automatic weapons wounded Griffith and killed his executive officer, Major Kenneth D.
Bailey, one of the heroes of the Battle of the Ridge.
A raider message reporting this action unfortunately was confusing, and from it Edson
concluded that the battalion had succeeded in gaining the enemy right flank beyond the river
and that the fight was in progress there. Thus misinformed, the colonel ordered the raider
battalion and 2/5 to resume their attacks at 1330 while the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (less
Company C) made an amphibious envelopment west of Point Cruz to strike the Japanese
Matanikau line from the rear.
Under the command of Major Otho Rogers, the 1/7 troops left Kukum in landing craft
just as a strong bombing raid came over from Rabaul. The division command post took heavy
hits which wrecked communications, and the destroyer Ballard, supporting the landing, had
to slight her mission while taking evasive action. The landing at 1300 was unopposed, howev-
er, and the companies pushed rapidly inland toward a high grassy ridge about 500 yards from
the beach.
But as the leading elements reached the top of this ridge, they were taken under mortar
and small-arms fire. Major Rogers was killed by a mortar round and Captain Zach D. Cox,
Company B commander, was wounded. Captain Charles W. Kelly, Jr., acting second in com-
mand, took charge of the battalion just as the enemy cut the Marines off from the beach. Kelly
found that he could not communicate with the perimeter, and the close-in fight with the
surrounding enemy grew rapidly more desperate. The Company D mortar platoon had only
one of it weapons and about 50 rounds of ammunition, and to bring this weapon to bear on the
pressing Japanese a mortarman had to lie on his back with his feet supporting the nearly
perpendicular tube from the rear while Master Sergeant Roy Fowel called the range down to
200 yards.
Fortunately, Second Lieutenant Dale M. Leslie flew over at about that time in his SBD.
As pilot of a plane incapable of dogfighting in the bomber pack. Leslie was hunting likely
targets while staying clear of the field and air engagements. As he circled overhead, the Ma-
P a g e | 71
rines below spelled out the world "Help" in white undershirts laid on the hillside, and Leslie
managed to make radio contact with Edson at the mouth of the Matanikau and relay this
distress signal.
That was summons aplenty for Puller, chafing in Edson's provisional command post
while his battalion went off to battle without him. The combined attack at the river mouth and
inland clearly had miscarried, and his men in 1/7 stood exposed to me full wrath of the Japa-
nese west of the river. With characteristic directness, the lieutenant colonel collected the land-
ing craft and churned out to board the Ballard. The ship and her skipper, soon under the Puller
spell, steamed to the rescue close ashore, the landing craft in the wake ready to be used for a
withdrawal.
It was a day for heroic action. When the force trapped ashore saw the ship coming
down the coast, Sergeant Robert D. Raysbrook stood out on a hillock of the ridge and sema-
phored for attention. From the bridge of the Ballard Puller ordered his men to pull out to the
beach. Raysbrook still exposed to the enemy fire, flagged back the information that their
withdrawal had been cut off. The ship then asked for fire orders, and with Captain Kelly
relaying his signals through the sergeant, batteries on the Ballard began to blast out a path to
the beach.
Supporting fire from the ship was a deciding factor in the action, but the companies still
had a fight ahead of them. Japanese artillery began to take casualties as the Marines withdrew
fighting through the enemy infantry still pressing from the flanks and rear. Platoon Sergeant
Anthony P. Malanowski, Jr. took a Browning automatic rifle from a man dropped in action
and covered the withdrawal of Company A until he himself was overrun and killed by the
Japanese. But by then his company had reached the beach where it set up a hasty defense into
which Company B and elements of Company D drew shortly thereafter.
With the Marines fighting off the enemy at their rear, the landing craft now moved
shoreward to begin their evacuation, and thereby exposed themselves to heavy Japanese fire
from the high ground above the Marines on the beach and from the projecting terrain of Point
Cruz to the east. The Japanese were determined not to allow a thwarting of their trap, and the
stiffening crossfire drove the craft back offshore where they bobbed in ground swells and
indecision.
This was observed by Lieutenant Leslie, still keeping a watchful eye on the action from
his SBD, and he came down again to lend a hand. The pilot strafed the Japanese positions and
then turned to make a few swooping passes over the landing craft to herd them on they way.
Thus heartened and hurried along, the coxswains went back in to the beach.
The fire from the beach, although dampened by the strafing SBD, still was heavy, but
Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro of the Coast Guard, coxswain of the craft, led the
other coxswains through it and maneuvered his Higgins boat to shield the others. The Marines
loaded on board with their wounded while Munro covered them with the light machine guns
on his boat. He ordered his boat away when the other craft were clear, and still firing, was
making his own withdrawal when he was killed by fire from the beach.
The miniature flotilla, returned to the perimeter landing site at Kukum by nightfall. The
action had cost this battalion 24 killed and 23 wounded. The raiders and 2/5 likewise withdrew
after 1/7 go safely clear of the Point Cruz area, and their casualties added another 36 dead and
77 wounded to the tally for the operation.
P a g e | 72
Action of 7-9 October
Costly as this action at the Matanikau had been, it confirmed the data being collected by
intelligence agencies, and these over-all were as important as they were disquieting. Japanese
ships still entered Guadalcanal waters nearly every night, barges beached along the coast
indicated many new landings, air attacks had picked up again since a comparative lull follow-
ing the Battle of the Ridge, and now it was clear that the Japanese troops assembling on the
island were concentrating just beyond the Matanikau. Another and a stronger Japanese coun-
teroffensive loomed, and although defeat of the Ichikiand Kawaguchi Forces gave the Marines a
new confidence in their ability to hold the perimeter, there was yet another factor. Late in
September the Japanese began to land 150mm howitzers, and these weapons would be capable
of firing on Henderson Field from the Kokumbona area.
Cactus fliers continued to hold their own against enemy air attacks of the field; Japanese
gunfire ships had to come late and leave early to avoid the U.S. planes in daylight encounter,
and the frequent night raids of Washing-Machine Charlie were more damned than damaging.
But big howitzers were something else. The Marines had no weapon that could reach a 150mm
in counterbattery, and they had no sound-flash equipment to locate such firing positions,
anyway. If the Japanese could add the effective fires of these weapons to air raids and naval
shelling, it might be just enough tip of balance in their favor to hold down the Cactus fliers
while a large force mounted to dislodge the Americans from the Lunga.
Accordingly, an attack
was scheduled to trap the
enemy force and drive
survivors beyond artillery
range, and a success in this
would be followed by estab-
lishment of a permanent
patrol base at Kokumbona
which could make sure the
long-range field pieces
stayed out of range. The plan
of attack was similar to that
of the operation which had
just failed, but this new effort
would be made in greater
strength. The 5th Marines
(less one battalion) would
engage the enemy at the river
mouth while the 7th Marines
(also less one battalion) and
the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
reinforced by the division
scout-sniper detachment,
would cross the river inland and then attack north toward Point Cruz and Matanikau Village.
Colonel William J. Whaling,
5
who commanded 3/2 and the scout-snipers on this special
mission, was to lead the envelopment by crossing the Matanikau some 2,000 yards upstream
P a g e | 73
and then attacking north into the village on the first ridge west of the river. Whaling would be
followed by the 7th Marines battalions which would also attack north abreast and to me left of
the Whaling group.
The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with its composite Cactus Force, was to provide planes
for infantry liaison, close air support, and artillery spotting. In the artillery plan, 1/11 would
support the 7th Marines; 2/11, the 5th Marines; 5/11, the Whaling Group; and 3/11 would be in
general support of the Lunga perimeter. If all went well, Whaling's assault of Japanese posi-
tions near the coast would be followed by a 5th Marines river crossing, a passage of Whaling's
lines, and a pursuit of the enemy toward Point Cruz where the 7th Marines on Whaling's left
would close the trap in front to the withdrawing enemy. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines pro-
vided the division reserve for the operation,
6
and Vandegrift's command post would coordi-
nate the entire operation. Movements of the forces were to get underway on 7 October, and the
coordinated attack would jump off on 8 October.
From recent experience with this growing Japanese force, the Marines expected a stiff
fight with all the usual and unusual obstacles encountered in battle. But in this case there was
to be one large factor they had no reason to suspect. By an unfortunate coincidence the Japa-
nese also had set 8 October as the date for an attack of their own, and their scheme could
hardly have been a better counter against the Marines had they been looking over the shoul-
ders of Vandegrift's staff. Rabaul had ordered Colonel Tadamasu Nakaguma to cross the
Matanikau on 8 October with his 4th Infantryand establish artillery positions which could
support the new counterattack then in planning. To accomplish this mission, Nakaguma sent
an enveloping force inland across the Matanikau on 6 October while he slipped the cautious
first echelon of a bridgehead across the river near the coast. There the Japanese forces met the
Marines who moved from the Lunga perimeter at 0700 on 7 October.
Whaling's Group scrapped for several hours with the inland Japanese force which con-
fined its opposition to sniping and harassment, but by the middle of the afternoon Whaling
decided to bypass the enemy. At nightfall the envelopment force bivouacked on high ground
south of the Matanikau's fork, the designated assembly area for the 8 October attack, and the
Japanese did not pursue. Meanwhile the 5th Marines met with greater difficulty from Naka-
guma's men near the river mouth.
The advance guard of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines came under fire from this enemy at
about 1000, and the battalion deployed forward in an attack while the 2d Battalion swung to
the left around the action and reached the river without opposition. The Japanese gave ground
to previously prepared positions, but 3/5 was unable to push them beyond this line in spite of
flanking assistance from 2/5. Vandegrift reinforced Edson with an understrength raider com-
pany, but the Japanese continued to hold their confined bridgehead some 400 yards inland
from the beach, and the Marines drew up for the night. They held a 1.500-yard front which
extended inland from the coast and bowed around the Japanese pocket on the river's east
bank. During the night the 5th Marines and some amphibian tractors simulated noisy prepara-
tions for a tank-supported river crossing to divert Japanese attention from the Whaling-7th
Marines envelopment force.
Heavy rains which began that night, and continued into the 8th, made trails and hills
slick, muddy, and treacherous, and grounded the Cactus fliers. The attack had to be post-
poned, but the 5th Marines and raiders continued to reduce the Japanese positions on the east
bank. At about 1830 the Japanese, under pressure all day from the Marines, made a final effort
to break out of their nearly surrounded bridgehead and retreat across the river mouth. Run-
P a g e | 74
ning abreast, the enemy troops charged from their foxholes against the thinly-held Marine
right flank where the raiders faced them. Front rank attackers engaged the Marines with small-
arms fire while succeeding ranks pitched hand grenades into the raider positions. Some hand-
to-hand fighting resulted, and casualties were high on both sides. Twelve raiders were killed
and 22 wounded, while counted enemy dead numbered 59. Some of the surviving Japanese
managed to escape across the river, and the bridgehead was completely reduced.
While the coordinated Marine attack waited out the rain, division was warned by high-
er intelligence sources that the expected strong Japanese counteroffensive appeared close at
hand; aerial observers and coastwatchers to the north reported increased troop activity and a
shipping concentration around Rabaul. General Vandegrift accordingly scaled down his
planned attack to merely a raid in force so that no major troop strength would be beyond a
day's march of the perimeter.
This decision did not alter the basic envelopment maneuver, however, and on 9 October
Whaling and the 7th Marines moved across the Matanikau and attacked rapidly northward to
raid the Point Cruz and Matanikau village areas. Whaling's Group moved along the first high
ground west of the river; lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken's 2/7 moved north on a
ridge some 1,000 yards off Whaling's left flank, and Puller with 1/7 attacked along another
ridge west of Hanneken.
Whaling and Hanneken reached the coast without serious opposition while 1/7 on the
extreme left encountered a strong force of Japanese in a deep ravine about 1,500 yards inland
from Point Cruz. Puller brought artillery and mortar fire down on the Japanese, and his men
picked off the enemy with rifle and machine-gun fire as they climbed the far side of the ravine
to escape the indirect fire. A few enemy escaped up the steep slope, but most of them were
either killed by small-arms fire or driven back down the hill into the mortar and artillery
concentration.
It was a most effective arrangement for methodical extermination, and Puller and his
men kept it up until mortar ammunition ran low. Then they withdrew to join the Whaling
Group and Hanneken, and by 1400 the combined raiding force had retired east of the Matani-
kau through the covering positions of the 5th Marines and the raiders.
7
The three-day opera-
tion had cost the Marines 65 dead and 125 wounded. A Japanese diary found later by Marines
placed the 4th Infantry losses at 700 men.
Rain and the threat of a new counter-offensive had thwarted the Marines' attack plans,
but the action could still go down in the gain column. The raid had tripped up the attack
Colonel Nakaguma had planned for the same period, and it had done away with a great
number of his men. And in the short time that men of the 7th Marines had been ashore on the
island, they had earned a right to identification as veteran troops. So with a completely com-
bat-wise division on hand--and Army reinforcements on the way--Vandegrift and his staff
now made plans to meet the strong Japanese attack that was bearing down upon them.


P a g e | 75
Notes
[1] Turner and Vandegrift often disagreed on conduct of the Guadalcanal operation
shore and on preogress of the Solomon Islands action in general. Turner found fault with
Vandegrift's perimeter concept of defense. His idea was to disperse the Marines along the
Guadalcanal coast and set them upon the task of mopping up the remaining Japanese.
[2] This was the first ammunition Marines had received since the landing. It included
about 10 units of fire with additional hand grenades and 81mm mortar shells. Final Rept, Phase
V, Annex Z, 10.
[3] All large trucks were called in to a division pool each night to stand by in case a di-
vision reserve had to be trucked quickly into action. Although many additional vehicles had
been landed on the day the 7th Marines arrived, the division still was critically short of motor
transport. The supply of large trucks never topped a bare 30 per cent of the allowance. In rear
areas there was a mistaken idea that one-and-a-half ton and larger trucks could not be used on
Guadalcanal. Ibid., 1.
[4] Now commanded by LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II. Edson, the former commander,
had recently advanced to the rank of colonel to take over the 5th Marines on 21 September.
Edson succeeded Col Leroy P. Hunt who had departed for the U.S.
[5] Whaling had been promoted to the rank of colonel shortly after the Guadalcanal
landing, and although there was no billet for an additional colonel in the division, he stayed on
to train scouts and snipers in practical, combat skills. Graduates of the course returned to their
outfits to pass on their knowledge and thus increase the division's general proficiency in
patrolling; other replaced these graduates and Whaling's schooling continued. As a unit, the
scout-snipers normally operated independently, but sometimes, as in this case, joined other
commands during a special mission.
[6] There was in indication that this unit might be employed in an amphibious enve-
lopment. Arrangements had been made for a boat group, and McKelvy's battalion was on a 30-
minute standby. Final Rept, Phase V, Annex D.
[7] Positions at the river mouth were retained to guard against a new Japanese crossing.

P a g e | 76


Chapter 7: Japanese Counteroffensive
In spite of the miscarriage of Nakaguma's effort to establish a bridgehead across the
Matanikau, the Japanese Seventeenth Army continued preparations for its big push. On 9
October, the same day that Lieutenant Colonel Puller caught a major portion of Nakagu-
ma's 4th Infantry between the devil of small-arms and the deep sea of artillery and mortar
concentrations, Seventeenth Army General Haruyoshi Hyakutake landed on Guadalcanal to
take personal charge of the Japanese campaign.
Things were serious but not desperate. Although Ichiki and Kawaguchi had allowed
unfounded optimism and overconfidence to swamp their missions against the Marines, Hya-
kutake still had a strong force and a proud confidence that he could wipe out the Lunga
positions in one blow. And with Guadalcanal safely back in Japanese hands, Imperial troops
then would retake Tulagi and occupy Rennell and San Cristobal. At the same timeSeventeenth
Army reserves and the Japanese Navy could renew attacks in New Guinea and take Port
Moresby by late November. The Bushido spirit would be back at full strength.
By early October the Japanese had brought troops in from the Philippines, the East In-
dies, China, and Truk to place within the Seventeenth Armycommand in Rabaul and the Solo-
mons two divisions, a brigade, and a reinforced battalion. Support forces included six
antiaircraft battalions plus one other AAA battery; a heavy regiment and an independent tank
company; one regiment and one battalion of mountain artillery; an engineer regiment, and
other troops including a mortar battalion and a unit of reconnaissance aircraft. Included in this
general listing were the Kawaguchi brigade, the Ichiki reinforced battalion and other battalions of
the 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments (Nakaguma) already defeated or weakened by the Lunga
defenders.
By reason of the odd impasse in which both the Japanese and the Allied navies chose to
avoid decisive battle to conserve their fleets, the Solomons waters changed hands every twelve
hours, and thus each side kept an important trickle of aid going to its small combat force
which represented a single oint of ground contact between the belligerent powers. In daylight
when Cactus could fly cover, the Allied ships came in from Espiritu Santo and other southern
areas with reinforcements and supplies for the Marines. Barges, landing craft, and YPs shut-
tled errands across Sealark Channel. By nightfall the larger ships departed, and most of the
others still in the Sealark area withdrew to safety in the Tulagi anchorage. Until dawn the
Japanese took over.
The destroyers and cruisers of the Tokyo Express habitually lurked in the Shortlands
below Bougainville Island until the afternoon when they would start steaming south to be
within 200 miles of Guadalcanal by about 1800. This was just inside the range of SBDs and
TBFs from Henderson Field, but the maneuvering ships made poor targets, and the late hour
gave the American planes time for only one crack at them before turning back for Lunga. After
that the Express had an open line all the way to Sealark.
While transport destroyers unloaded on either side of the Marine perimeter, Japanese
warships stood close in at Lunga and went to work with their guns. Louie the Louse dropped
flares to aid the naval gunners, and Washing-Machine Charlie lurked overhead to fritter out
his bombs during lulls in surface firing. Under such attacks there was little the Marines could
do but crouch in their foxholes and pray--or swear. Lunga defenders could estimate 150 new
P a g e | 77
enemy ground soldiers for every destroyer transport--often five or six a night--that made the
Express run, and by early October these troops began to land insultingly close, just across the
Matanikau eight to ten miles from Henderson Field. The Allied turn to use the waters came at
daylight, but U.S. forces did not have the man power to match the Japanese rate of reinforce-
ment.
Fortunately, the Japanese started slowly. Still thinking in terms of their operation
against New Guinea, and miscalculating Allied strength in the Solomons, Imperial planners
only dribbled reinforcements to Guadalcanal in August when the Marine position was particu-
larly vulnerable. Not until after the Ichiki and Kawaguchi defeats did Japan begin to take
serious stock of Vandegrift and his Marines.
But not the Tokyo Express had stepped up its schedule, and by mid-October Hyakutake
had landed his 2d Division, two battalions of the 38th Division, one regiment and three batteries
of heavy artillery, a battalion and a battery of mountain artillery, a mortar battalion, a tank
company, and three rapid-fire gun battalions. Special troops including engineers and medical
personnel, and remnants of earlier attacks brought the Japanese force to about 20,000 men.
Facing this mounting Japanese strength was a Marine force of about the same size. Ar-
rival of the 7th marines and the transfer of other troops from Tulagi bolstered General Vande-
grift's Lunga positions, but until 7 October there was little hope that more reinforcements
would be forthcoming. Rear areas in the South Pacific had gained little strength since Vande-
grift had argued for control of his 7th Marines, and the plan for the occupation of Ndeni still
was in the pending basket. Marine strength thus promised to deteriorate while Japanese
strength continued to mount. More than 800 Marine battle casualties had been evacuated by
early October, and malaria continued to take its toll.
1

The Cactus fliers were not doing much more than holding their own, either. By 1 Octo-
ber, Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum's original VMSB-232 and Lieutenant Commander Cald-
well's Flight 300 were done for,
2
Army pilots from the 67th Fighter Squadron had only about
six or eight of their P-400s in shape to fly, John Smith's VMF-223 had lost an even dozen pilots-
-six killed and six wounded--and other units, although stronger, still piled up their share of
losses. On the first day of October General Geiger had 58 planes; two days later the count
stood at 49.
If the Japanese had failed to win, place, or show with Ichiki, Kawaguchi, and Nakagu-
ma, the Allies likewise had been unable to improve their odds by any comfortable margin. To
General Harmon the situation looked about as grim as it had on 11 August when he expressed
doubt that the Marines could hold their perimeter. and on 6 October he wrote to Admiral
Ghormley that the Ndeni operation should be quashed until the situation improved. He
questioned the logic of holding troops idle for a new operation when things were going so
poorly in a battle already joined. He admitted certain factors favoring the Ndeni occupation,
but he added that, "...in the final analysis they are individually or cumulatively vital to the
success of main offensive operation ormaintaining security of South Pacific bases and lines
of communications."
3

Specifically, Harmon recommended abandoning the Ndeni operation until the Guadal-
canal situation improved; reinforcement of Cactus (Guadalcanal) by at least one regimental
combat team; the maximum possible intensification of naval surface action in South Solomons
waters; and the prompt buildup of airdrome facilities and supplies at Henderson Field.
Ghormley agreed that Vandegrift needed another regiment and that Henderson Field needed
facilities and supplies, but the admiral retained for the time his plan to occupy Ndeni and
P a g e | 78
build an airfield there. For the Guadalcanal reinforcement, Ghormley ordered Harmon to
prepare a regiment of the New Caledonia garrison, and on 8 October he ordered Admiral
Turner to embark the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division, Harmon's choice for the job, and
depart Noumea for Guadalcanal on 9 October.
It was to be a blockade run in force. Transports Zeilin and McCawley, carrying sup-
plies, 210 men of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and 85 Marine casuals as well as the 2,850 men
of the Army regiment, sailed under escort of three destroyers and three mine layers while a
larger force of four cruisers and five destroyers steamed off the convoy's left flank. These
cruisers, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Helena, and Boise and destroyers Buchanan, Dun-
can, Farenholt, Laffey, and McCalla were commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott. Other
U.S. Naval forces in the surrounding waters included Rear Admiral George D. Mur-
ray's Hornet carrier group some 180 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, and Rear Admiral Willis
Augustus Lee's battleship Washington group about 50 miles east of Maliata. Scott's screening
station for the unloading was near Rennell Island.
The Battle of Cape Esperance
On 11 October, while the Zeilin and the McCawley made for their 13 October anchorage
schedule in Lunga Roads, Admiral Scott learned from aerial observers that two Japanese
cruisers and six destroyers were bearing down The Slot. It was the night's Tokyo Express, Scott
decided, and at 1600 he started toward Guadalcanal at 29 knots to intercept the run. His orders
charged him to protect the transports, and to search for and destroy enemy ships and landing
craft; he rushed eagerly to work.
Actually Scott headed to intercept a force stronger than reports had indicated. Observ-
ers failed to spot three heavy cruisers, two seaplane carriers, and eight destroyers steaming
some distance away outside of The Slot. Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, commander
of the Eighth Fleet and the Outer Sea Forces, and Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Eleventh Air
Fleet commander, had teamed up to strike the strongest blow yet against the bothersome
Cactus fliers. In the afternoon of the 11th, Kusaka had 30 fighters and 35 bombers up to occupy
Henderson fliers while Mikawa's bombardment and reinforcing groups steamed south outside
the normal Japanese transport route. Heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasa, and Furutaka with de-
stroyers Hatsuyuki and Fubuki made up the bombardment group while the reinforcing fleet
included seaplane carriers Chitose and Nisshin, and destroyers Akizuki, Asagumo, Natsugumo,
Yamagumo, Murakumo, and Shirayuki.
By about 2200, while Scott maneuvered in the waters of Iron Bottom Sound between
Savo Island and Cape Esperance, the Japanese bombardment group came into The Slot and
steamed south in a double column at 26 knots. At 2330 a spotting plane from USS San Francis-
co reported Japanese ships 16 miles from Savo and off Cape Esperance,
4
but Scott's ships still
were unaware of the serious trouble facing them. Gunnery radar failed to pick up the enemy
then approximately 35 degrees forward of the port beam, and although theHelena earlier had
spotted a Japanese ship bearing 315 degrees and at a distance of 27,700 yards, she didn't report
this contact for 15 minutes.
Flagship San Francisco, with rudimentary radar of that early period, had no contacts,
and Scott continued to steam toward Savo with his ships in column. He counted this the best
area for intercepting the Express he hoped to derail, and at about 2340 he had reversed course
to head back toward the Cape when the Helena, at last confident about the blips from her
better radar equipment, announced her fix of a target six miles away. Fortunately, since the
P a g e | 79
U.S. fleet was having "eye" trouble, the Japanese ships were completely blind, and even
though certain communications misunderstandings
5
further delayed American fire, first salvos
from the Helena at 2346 caught the enemy by complete surprise. Scott's ships had usurped
Tokyo's turn in Sealark Channel.
The Salt Lake City, Boise, and Farenholt quickly added their fire to that of the Helena, and
shortly thereafter the U.S. fleet crossed the Japanese "T" (sailed ahead of the Japanese column
and at right angles to it) so that a majority of the American guns could bear on each Japanese
ships as it came forward. The Japanese destroyer Fubuki sank almost at once, the cruis-
er Furutaka sank almost at once, the cruiser Furutaka took such a mauling that she limped
away to sink later, and the Aoba caught fire. The only sound survivors, cruiser Kinugasa and
destroyer Hatsuyuki, withdrew. On the American side, the Boise, Salt Lake City, Faren-
holt, and Duncan suffered damage, and the Duncan sank the following day.
8

Scott could count the engagement a victory, but it did not resolve the seesawing for
power in the Solomons waters or skies. The Japanese only stepped up their air attacks on
Henderson field and continued preparations for the big push.
Preparation for Battle
Transports McCawley and Zeilin arrived at Kukum with the Army reinforcements early
on 13 October, but this was one of the few bright spots of the day. Both radar and the Northern
Solomons coastwatchers missed an air attack that came over at 1202, and the F4Fs couldn't get
up in time to hamper the 22 fighter-escorted bombers that rained down their bombs from
30,000 feet. Both Henderson Field and Fighter 1 were damaged, and fires from the attack
burned 5,000 gallons of aviation fuel.
Between 1330 and 1400 a second strike of 15 Japanese bombers caught most of the
American planes back on their fields refueling. Some planes were damaged, and the strike
undid the repair work that had been started by the 6th Seabees following the earlier raid. A
few Cactus planes got up to pursue the Japanese, but the only American kill was scored by
Captain Joseph J. Foss who had arrived on 9 October with Major Leonard K. Davis' VMF-121
of MAG-14. The field was not completely out of action, but big bombers were advised to avoid
it except for emergencies.
In spite of these interruptions, Colonel Bryant E. Moore managed to get his 164th Infan-
try ashore, along with other men and supplies from the transports, but trouble for the perime-
ter was not over. As the second bomber strike droned away, the 150mm howitzers near
Kokumbona were finally heard from. Safely beyond counterbattery range, these weapons
began a slow methodical registration on the field and the perimeter. The fire was a brand of
damage and destruction the men at Lunga had to live with, and so to have a pinpoint target
for their anger if not their weapons they named this new entrant in their war Pistol Pete.
Pete, as was most often the case with Louie the Louse and Washing-Machine Charlie,
was plural. Hyakutake had landed 15 of these howitzers. But for the Marines and soldiers it
was difficult to imagine batteries getting that personal, and Pete's particular brand of hell was
a most personal and singular thing. So Pete became one enemy, the devil himself--the devil
and one big gun acting as Tojo's personal Nimrod.
And after he thumped away at the perimeter all that day, an enemy task force built
around battleships Haruna and Kongo came into Sealark Channel after nightfall to launch an
80-minute bombardment.
7
This was the Japanese Combat Division 3, commanded by Vice
Admiral Takeo Kurita, and it also included light cruiser Isuzu and three ships of Destroyer
P a g e | 80
Division 31 as a screen, plus a rear guard of four ships from Destroyer Division 15. The battle-
ships had on board some new bombardment shells which had just arrived from the home
islands. These had a greater bursting radius than former Japanese bombardment shells, and
there were enough of them for battleships Haruna and Kongo to have 500 each.
This was the first time that battleships had been used to bombard Henderson Field, and
the Japanese hoped these big guns and the improved ammunition would completely knock
out the Marine air and clear the way for a coordinated infantry attack. Louis the Louse illumi-
nated the field, and the big guns cut loose. Coconut trees splintered, buildings and huts ripped
open and crashed down, fragments and wreckage tore into planes and men, and more gasoline
went up in bright fires which helped Japanese gunners stay on target for their systematic
coverage of the field with more than 900 rounds of the high explosive shells.
As Admiral Tanaka described it later:
The scene was topped off by flare bombs from our observation planes flying over the
field, the whole spectacle making the Ryogoku fireworks display seem like mere child's play.
The night's pitch dark was transformed by fire into the brightness of day. Spontaneous cries
and shouts of excitement ran throughout our ships.
8

Then, as the ships became silent and withdrew east of Savo Island, the planes came
back. Night bombers continued their strikes intermittently until daybreak, and by dawn of 14
October the Cactus Air Force could fly only 42 of the 90 planes that had been operational 24
hours earlier. Forth-one men had been killed and many more wounded, and the airfield was a
complete shambles. Among the dead were Major Gordon A. Bell, whose VMSB-141 had finally
built up to 21 planes and fliers on 6 October, and four of his pilots: Captains Edward F. Miller
and Robert A. Abbott and Lieutenants Henry F. Chaney, Jr. and George L. Haley.
Operations, sorely restricted by the loss of gasoline in the fire, moved to Fighter 1 which
was left in better condition than Henderson; and a few B-17s which had been operating tempo-
rarily from Guadalcanal managed to bounce aloft from a 2,000-yard stretch of Henderson that
still was usable and fly back to Espiritu Santo. The Japanese "Pagoda," air headquarters since
the early days, had been partially wrecked, and General Geiger had it bulldozed away. It had
proved too good a registration point for bombers, anyway.
For the rest of the day the Japanese ships maintained their control of the waters around
Guadalcanal, and the planes continued to press their advantage in the air. Between the bomb-
ings and the shellings, Pistol Pete's effective interdiction prevented repair or use of the main
airstrip, and by midafternoon Henderson had to chalked off as completely unfit for use. By
late afternoon fliers of the Army's 67th Fighter Squadron and 13 dive bomber pilots used
Fighter 1--and nearly all of Henderson's remaining supply of fuel--to strike back finally at the
Japanese by attacking an early run of the Tokyo Express then only 70 miles north of Guadalca-
nal. One ship was sunk and another damaged, but the Express did not turn back.
That night (14 October) the Japanese cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa moved down the
channel to bombard Henderson Field while the express brought the six transports carrying
General Maruyama's 2d Division on down to Tassafaronga. The cruisers fired 752 eight-inch
shells at the men around Lunga, and by dawn on 15 October five of the enemy transports were
clearly visible from the perimeter as they lay off Tassafaronga smugly unloading troops,
supplies, and ammunition.
Cactus fliers, smarting from the two-day hammering, drained gasoline from wrecked
planes, searched the surrounding jungle for undamaged drums, and finally collected enough
aviation fuel to mount an attack with the three SBDs that could still fly. But one of these planes
P a g e | 81
had to be scratched when it tumbled into a crater on the way to the strip, and Lieutenant
Robert M. Patterson lost SBD number two when the plane hit a shell hole while he raced for
his takeoff. Patterson tried it again with the last dive bomber, and this time he made it. His
single-plane attack did not hamper the Japanese much, but while he was flying, the ground
crews quickly patched other planes. It resembled and informal neighborhood boxkite club,
with members hardly able to wait for work to be completed before they tested their craftsman-
ship. One at a time the first four planes were taken up to have a chance at the cocky Japanese
transports. Two minor hits were scored, but General Geiger stopped the assembly line combat
action until he could muster more strength.
9

At 1000 Cactus was ready with 12 SBDs, and they went up to drop 500- and 1,000-
pound bombs on the transports and then strafe their decks. That attack sank one of the trans-
ports. Next came attacks from P-39s and the relic P-400s, and fires broke out on two of the
ships. After that, fliers from Espiritu Santo began to show up, and B-17s and SBDs from the
south sank another transport. The Tokyo Express was in most serious trouble, in spite of 30
Zeros overhead to provide cover, and General Hyakutake might well have considered that the
admirals and senior pilots in Rabaul had been somewhat overconfident in this daring daylight
delivery of his reinforcements.
Even General Geiger's own pilot, Major Jack Cram, had his turn during that day of des-
peration when he made a run on the transports with two torpedoes slung under the wings of
the general's Blue Goose, a bulbous and gouty PBY-5A. Cram got the torpedoes off, but then he
was chased back to Fighter 1 by a clutch of Zeros, like sparrows around a ponderous hawk,
and one determined enemy fighter had to be shot away from the smokingGoose as Cram came
in for his landing.
By day's end three bombed transports of 7,000 to 8,000 tons each were beached and
burning off Tassafaronga, and the other two had fled back up Sealark Channel and The Slot.
But in spite of this, the Japanese had managed to unload 3,000 to 4,000 men of the 230th and
16th Infantry Regiments as well as 80 per cent of the ships' cargo. These troops, the last the
Japanese were able to land prior to their concentrated effort against the airfield, brought
General Hyakutake's strength on the island to about 20,000 men.
General Vandegrift now had approximately 23,000 men, but the Marine force suffered
severely from malnutrition, malaria, the exhaustive defensive actions, patrols, and field engi-
neering work they had accomplished. Most of them were veterans, but in the unhealthy trop-
ics that fact did not necessarily mean an advantage in the long run. Only the 164th Infantry of
the Americal Division contained fresh troops.
With this additional regiment ashore, the division again reorganized the perimeter, this
time into five new defensive sectors, Clockwise from the Kukum area they were:

Sector One--The 3d Defense Battalion with elements of the 1st Special Weapons
Battalion, amphibian tractormen, pioneers, and engineers who held 7,100 yards
of beach that straddled the Lunga River.
Sector Two--The 164th Infantry and elements of special weapons units with con-
trol of a 6,600-yard line from the beach inland along the Ilu River and then west
to a point near the east slope of Bloody Ridge.
Sector Three--The 7th Marines (less 3d Battalion), a 2,500-yard front of inland
jungle from Bloody Ridge west to he Lunga River.
P a g e | 82
Sector Four--The 1st Marines (less 3d Battalion), 3,500 yards of jungle from the
Lunga west to the inland flank of the final sector.
Sector Five--The 5th Marines holding the northwest curve of the main perimeter
from the flank of the 1st Marines north to the sea and then east along the beach to
the west flank of the 3d Defense Battalion.

Since the Japanese attack was expected from the west across the Matanikau, the greatest
strength was concentrated on that side of the perimeter. Forward of the 5th Marines' lines, the
3d Battalions of both the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost line from the beach at the
mouth of the river inland to Hill 67. This line was supported by a battalion of the 11th Marines
and elements of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines and 1st Tank
Battalion units constituted the division reserve, and each regimental sector commander was
directed to keep a third of his infantry strength in reserve also.
Against these Marine and Army positions, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his
attack for the recapture of the airfield. On 15 October in Kokumbona he issued his attack order
to Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama's 2d Division. Date for the assault was set tentatively
for 18 October. The 2d Division would swing far inland to hit the Marines from the south with
a night attack in two columns of battalions while the Seventeenth Armyartillery commander,
General Sumiyoshi, would shell the perimeter and then launch a diversionary strike with
infantry units near the mouth of the Matanikau. For this coastal attack Sumiyoshi had a force
of some 2,900 men comprising the battalions of the 4th Infantry plus a tank company, seven
light field artillery pieces, fifteen of the 150mm howitzers, and three 100mm guns.
For his inland attack, Maruyama had some eight or nine infantry battalions totaling
5,600 men, plus artillery and supporting troops. General Kawaguchi, who had tried his hand
in the same area before, would command the right arm of the assault with two battalions of
the 230th Infantry, one battalion of the124th Infantry, and elements of the 3d Light Trench
Mortar Battalion, 6th and 7th Independent Rapid Gun Battalions, the 20th Independent Mountain
Artillery, engineers, and medical troops. The left attacking column would be under command
of Major General Yumio Nasu and would include the 29th Infantry, the remainder of the 3d
Light Trench Mortar Battalion, a rapid fire gun battalion, a mountain artillery battalion, and
engineers. The 16th Infantry and some engineers--a part of Nasu's command--would be in
reserve behind the 29th Infantry.
General Hyakutake was confident of success. He had left the bulk of his 38th Division at
Rabaul. Banzai was to be Maruyama's signal of victory at the airfield and his attack from the
south was ordered to press unrelenting destruction upon the enemy until General Vandegrift
himself came forth to surrender.
Thus charged, General Maruyama struck out through the jungle wilderness on 16 Octo-
ber.
The Ground Action
Transportation was pedestrian, cargo moved on bended backs, and hand power drove
the engineering tools. Thus the column of enveloping Japanese inched single file across the
tortuous Guadalcanal back country like a segmented serpent crawling through the perpetual
wet shadows of the tropical forest.
The so-called Maruyama Trail, begun by engineers in September, scratched its thin scar
along the floor of the jungle southward from Kokumbona, east across the Matanikau and the
P a g e | 83
Lunga inland from Mount Austen, and then north to an assembly area south of Bloody Ridge.
Safely beyond range of Marine patrols and hidden from aerial view by the vine-laced tops of
giant hardwoods, the Japanese soldier moved with an artillery or mortar shell lashed to his
already heavy load of normal equipment, frequently used ropes to scale the rough ridges and
steep valleys, and by turns tugged a line or hunched his shoulder to he common effort of
manhandling artillery, mortars, and machine guns.
Heavy rain fell almost every day. The van of the single-file advance often had com-
pleted its day's march and bivouacked for the night before the rear elements were able to
move. Troops weakened on their half ration of rice. Heavy artillery pieces had to be aban-
doned along the route, and mortars also became too burdensome to manage. Frequently
unsure of their exact location in the jungle, the Japanese by 19 October still had not crossed the
upper Lunga, and Maruyama postponed his assault until the 22d. Meanwhile, General Su-
miyoshi's fifteen Pistol Petes pounded the Lunga perimeter, air attacks continued, and Imperi-
al warships steamed brazenly into Sealark Channel nearly every night to shell the airfield,
beaches, and Marine positions.
The tempo of action obviously was building up for the counteroffensive, and Marines
and soldiers worked constantly to improve their field fortifications and keep up an aggressive
patrol schedule. Patrols did not go far enough afield, however, to discover Maruyama's wide-
swinging enveloping force, and reconnaissance to the east found no indications of a Japanese
build-up on that flank. Thus General Vandegrift and his staff were aware only of Sumiyoshi's
threat along the coast from the west.
There the first probe came on 20 October. A Japanese combat patrol, augmented by two
tanks, ventured into view on the west bank of the Matanikau but turned back after one tank
was knocked out by 37mm fire from the lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Sporadic artil-
lery fire was the only Japanese answer to this checkmate, and it continued until sunset the next
day. Then the artillery fire intensified briefly, and nine infantry-supported tanks debouched
from the west bank jungle and drove eastward for the sandspit at the mouth of the river. But
again the fire from a 37mm stopped one of the tanks, and the attack turned back without
seriously threatening the river-mouth positions of Company I, 3/1. The Marine battalion had
taken a few casualties from artillery and mortar fire, but neither of these first two attacks had
posed a serious threat.
P a g e | 84


FIVE BLASTED JAPA-
NESE TANKS knocked
out by marine 37mm guns
during the abortive attempt
to force the perimeter along
the mouth of the Matani-
kau. (USMC 54898)







MARINE LIGHT TANKS, mounting
machine guns and 37mm cannon, were
severely hampered in their operations by
the jungle terrain of Guadalcanal. (USN
18525)



At the Matanikau positions on 22 October Sumiyoshi continued firing his mortars and
artillery but mounted no new assault. Inland, General Maruyama struggled with the jungle
some distance from his lines of departure, and he was forced to postpone his proposed assault
to 23 October. But on that day he still was unprepared to attack and again he set back his plans
another 24 hours.
At about 1800 on the 23d, however, Sumiyoshi once more intensified his artillery and
mortar fire to lay down an orthodox preparation pattern on the Marine east bank positions
and along the coastal route from the Lunga Perimeter. Near the end of evening nautical twi-
light the artillery fire ceased, and a column of nine 18-tom medium tanks churned across the
sandspit in an attempt to force a penetration. In assembly areas to the rear infantry troops
stood by to assault in the wake of the tanks.
Slim-barreled 37s again blasted at the Japanese tanks while infantry mortars and ho-
witzers of the 11th Marines dumped prearranged concentrations farther west to break up the
pending infantry assault. The enemy ground troops never got started, and the tank charge
miscarried when eight of the vehicles were hammered to a standstill by the 37s. One tank
managed to crossing but staggered out of control when a Marine pitched a grenade in its track
as it lumbered by his foxhole. Pursued by a half-track 75, the beset machine wallowed into the
surf where it stalled to form a sitting duck target for the tank destroyer.
The other eight hulks remained strewn along the sand bar across the river mouth, and
artillery fire knocked out three more tanks that never got to attack. Hundreds of the enemy
soldiers who had been waiting to follow the tanks were killed. The action was over by 2200,
P a g e | 85
although at about midnight the Japanese made a half-hearted attempt to cross the river farther
upstream. This thrust was turned back with little trouble.
From his study of interrogations of the Japanese generals involved, Dr. John Miller, Jr.,
sums up:
Sumiyoshi had sent one tank company and one infantry regiment forward to attack a
prepared position over an obvious approach route while the Americans were otherwise unen-
gaged. The Maruyama force, still moving inland, had not reached its line of departure. In 1946,
the responsible commanders gave different reasons for the lack of co-ordination and blamed
each other. According to Hyakutake, this piecemeal attack had been a mistake. The coastal
attack was to have been delivered at the same time as Maruyama's forces struck against the
southern perimeter line. Maruyama, according to Hyakutake, was to have notified the 4th
Infantry when he reached his line of departure on 23 October, and he so notified the 4th Infan-
try. The regiment then proceeded with its attack.
Maruyama disclaimed responsibility for the blunder, and blamed 17th Army Headquar-
ters. His forces, delayed in their difficult march, had not reached their line of departure on 23
October. The 17th Army, he asserted, overestimated the rate of progress of the south flank and
ordered the coast forces to attack on 23 October to guarantee success on the south flank.
Sumiyoshi was vague. He claimed that throughout the counteroffensive he had been so
weakened by malaria that he found it difficult to make decision. Despite an earlier statement
that he did not know why the attack of 23 October had been ordered, he declared that he had
attacked ahead of Maruyama to divert the Americans. Communication between the two
forces, he claimed, had been very poor. Radio sets gave off too much light, and thus had been
used only in daylight hours. Telephone communication had been frequently disrupted. As a
result the coast force had been one day behind in its knowledge of Maruyama's movement.
10

Meanwhile the Marine division
11
had started a shift of manpower within the perimeter.
In the face of Sumiyoshi's attacks, and with no patrol contacts to the south or east, the 2d
Battalion, 7th Marines on 23 October pulled out of its southern lines east of the Lunga and
moved west to relieve the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines at the mouth of the Matanikau. This left
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Puller) with a responsibility for the defense of all of Sector Five,
the 2,500-yard defense line from the inland flank of the 164th Infantry west across the southern
slopes of Bloody Ridge to he Lunga River. Puller's extended lines were thin, but there ap-
peared very little danger from the south.
Hanneken's 2/7 did not effect its intended relief, however, because of the heavy Japa-
nese artillery fire that engaged 3/1 on the 23d, and on the following day a new assignment was
given to the 7th Marines battalion. On the 24th the Marines of 3/7 on Hill 67 south of the
Matanikau mouth had spotted a Japanese column, obviously a flanking force,
12
moving east
across Mount Austen's foothills. Artillery and air was called in on this enemy movement, but
the Japanese disappeared into jungle ravines about 1,000 yards south of Hill 67 before they
could be engaged. In the face of this threat apparently headed for the 4,000-yard gap between
the Matanikau outpost and the Lunga perimeter, 2/7 was assigned to plug this hole, and the 3d
Battalion, 1st Marines retained its positions overlooking the beach and the Matanikau.
Later the same day came other indications that the Sumiyoshi action would not be the
only Japanese effort against the perimeter. Late in the afternoon of 24 October an observer in
the 1/7 lines south of the airfield saw a Japanese officer studying Bloody Ridge through field
glasses, and a scout-sniper patrol reported seeing the smoke from "many rice fires" in the
Lunga valley about two miles south of Puller's positions on the Ridge. By this time twilight
P a g e | 86
was settling over Guadalcanal, and there was little the Marines could do but wait out devel-
opments from existing positions. The only troops not in front lines were those in reserve in the
various defensive sectors and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, the division reserve, then bi-
vouacked north of Henderson Field.
The rice fires and the officer with field glasses undoubtedly were signs--and the first the
Marines had--of the reinforced 2d Division that finally had negotiated the grueling advance
from Kokumbona over the Maruyama Trail. With all his artillery and mortars strewn along the
route behind him, Maruyama at last had crossed the Lunga into his assembly areas south of
Bloody Ridge. There the force stood at twilight on 24 October ready to attack with only infan-
try weapons against the dug-in Marines who were backed up by artillery and mortars.
Hoping for bright moonlight to aid coordination (the night actually went black with
heavy rain), the Japanese general ordered a narrow attack over the ground Kawaguchi's force
had assaulted in mid-September. The main effort was assigned to the 29th Infantry, with
the 16th Infantry in reserve, while farther to the east the Kawaguchi command--now led by
Colonel Toshinari Shoji
13
--was to make a parallel assault. At about 2130 a Japanese unit clashed
briefly with a 46-man outpost Puller had stationed forward of his tactical wire, but after a short
fire fight the enemy bypassed the position, and the battlefield was quiet. Platoon Sergeant
Ralph Briggs, Jr., in charge of the outpost, notified Puller that a large force of Japanese were
moving about the outpost hill toward the battalion lines, but Puller ordered his men to hold
fire so that Briggs could infiltrate to safety. But the outpost already was flanked by the Japa-
nese moving around the hill, and Briggs led his men to the east while the enemy moved closer
to Puller's battalion and began to cut the tactical wire in front of the 1/7 positions.
14

While Puller's men strained to hear the approaching enemy above the sound of drum-
ming rain which lashed the night, the Japanese prepared their routes through the Marine
barbed wire and formed up for their attack. Then at 0030 on 25 October, Nasu's men came out
of the jungle screaming theirbanzais, throwing grenades, and firing rifles and machine guns to
strike the left center of 1/7's line with an assault in depth on a narrow front. Puller called in
mortar and artillery concentrations, his riflemen took up a steady fire, and the machine guns
rattled almost endless bursts down their final protective lines.
From Puller's left, troops of the 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry added their fire to that of
the Marines, but still the Japanese assaulted, trying to rush across the fields of fire toward the
Ridge. The attack kept up for 10 or 15 minutes, but finally ground itself to a halt against the
combined arms of the U.S. Force. Then there was a lull while the Japanese regrouped and
came back again, trying to clear a penetration with their grenades and small arms. The Marine
commander assessed correctly that his men were standing off the main attack of Rabaul's big
counteroffensive, and that the force in the jungle to his front obviously was strong enough to
keep such attacks going most of the night. He called for reinforcements, and division head-
quarters ordered Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall to take his 3d Battalion of the 164th Infan-
try down the Ridge to bolster Puller's thin line.
But the reinforcements had a mile of muddy ridge to cover before they could be of any
help, and in the meantime the Japanese continued to assault out of the jungle and up the
slopes. A small group forced a salient in the Marine line to fall upon a mortar position, and
farther to the front Nasu's soldiers worked close to a water-cooled machine gun and knocked
out all but two of its crew. Marines near the mortar position won back the tube from the
enemy, and in the machine-gun section Sergeant John Basilone took rescue matters into his
P a g e | 87
own hands. For this action and later heroism in braving Japanese fire to bring up ammunition,
Basilone became the first enlisted marine of World War II to win the Medal of Honor.
15

As these attacks continued, Colonel Hall's soldiers began to arrive in small detach-
ments. Puller made no attempt to give this battalion a line of its own on his threatened front,
but instead had his men lead these fresh troops into his line where they were most needed at
the moment. The fighting was too brisk and the night too rainy for any major reshuffling of
lines. By 0330 the reinforcement was complete, and the Japanese attacks were becoming less
intense. Infantry and supporting fires had cut down the Nasu force so that each new assault
was made with fewer and fewer men.
Fortunately, all had not gone well for the Japanese plans. Nasu bore the burnt of the ef-
fort without assistance to his right where the second assaulting column was to have struck.
Colonel Shoji, with Kawaguchi's former command, had strayed out of position in the difficult
terrain and poor weather and got in behind General Nasu's 29th Infantry. Shoji was unable to
correct this error in time for his battalions to participate in the action.
But Maruyama was true to his orders to press unrelenting attacks upon the Americans.
With characteristic resolution, the Japanese struck at the Marines again and again throughout
the night. The Bushido was unswerving, but the flesh could not endure the concentrated fire
from the combined U.S. infantry battalions, the artillery, and 37mms from the neighboring 2d
Battalion, 164th Infantry. By dawn Maruyama called back his men to regroup for later attacks,
and Puller and Hall began to reorganize their intermingled battalions and readjust their lines.
The first strong effort of the counteroffensive had been turned back, but the remainder of 25
October, Sunday in the Solomons, was not a restful day.
Heavy rains on the 23d and 24th had turned Fighter 1 into a mud bog, and at 0800 Pistol
Pete opened up again on Henderson to fire at ten-minute intervals until 1100. With Cactus
fliers thus effectively grounded, enemy planes from Rabaul took advantage of this, and the
first fair weather in three days, by attempting to give the Japanese counteroffensive some
semblance of the coordination that Generals Sumiyoshi and Maruyama had muffed. likewise
strong enemy naval forces, to be engaged next day in the Battle of Santa Cruz, were known to
be approaching, and early in the morning three Japanese destroyers, as bold as the Zeros
overhead, cavorted into Sealark Channel to chase off two American destroyer-transports, sink
a tug, set fire to two harbor patrol craft, and harass the beach positions of the 3d Defense
Battalion. Finally venturing too close to shore, one of the enemy destroyers was chastised by
three hits from 5-inch guns of the defense battalion, and the Japanese ships then withdrew. In
all, the day earned its name of "Dugout Sunday."
But the name "was a misnomer in a sense."
16
Although the lurking Zeros kept "Condi-
tion Red" alerts in effect most of the day, bombing raids came over only twice,
17
and Lunga
defenders not connected with Cactus operations climbed out of their foxholes to watch the
dogfights which began after Fighter 1 dried enough to support takeoffs. These American
planes were able to go up at 1430 to meet a 16-bomber strike from Rabaul and hamper this
attack; and a nine-plane bombing raid at 1500 dumped its explosives on General Geiger's
boneyard of discarded wrecks. It was 1730 before Condition Red lifted, but after getting
airborne the Cactus fliers had given a good account of themselves.
For the second time in three days Captain Foss shot down four Japanese fighters, and
all other members of the Guadalcanal flying force worked so well to make up for time lost
during the wet morning that 22 enemy planes had been downed by late afternoon. Three
American planes, but no fliers, were lost in the actions. And while the F4Fs were battling the
P a g e | 88
Zeros, SBDs and P-39s went off to the north to attack a lurking Japanese naval force. They sank
a destroyer and put a cruiser out of action.
Meanwhile, in the reorganization of lines south of Bloody Ridge, Lieutenant Colonel
Puller's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines hel ground from the Lunga east across the southern slopes
of the ridge, and Lieutenant Colonel Hall's 3/164 tied in at that point around four 37mm guns
and extended across low jungle country to the right flank of the 2d Battalion, 164th. In the
sector west of the Lunga the 5th marines swung a line into the jungle about a half mile in from
the beach and made visual contact with the left (east) flank of Colonel Hanneken's 2d Batta-
lion, 7th Marines which extended from 3/7's dangling flank near the Matanikau back toward
the Lunga perimeter. It was clear that Maruyama waited in the jungle to launch another attack
in the big counteroffensive, and the Lunga defenders were determined to have stronger posi-
tions ready to meet him this time.
In spite of his losses the previous night, Maruyama still had manpower sufficient to
build a better attack against the Marines and soldiers, but he somehow gained some faulty
intelligence which kept the Shoji (Kawaguchi) Force idle for a second night. The intelligence
caused Maruyama to expect a U.S. counterattack on his right (east) flank, and he sent Shoji,
who had gotten lost in the wet darkness of the first assault, to screen the flank while Na-
su's 29th Infantry and the 16th Infantry (previously the Maruyama reserve) made ready to carry
the new assault.
After dark (on 25 October), the Japanese repeated the pattern of attack used the pre-
vious night. With only machine guns to augment their hand-carried weapons, groups of from
20 to 200 soldiers shouted out of the darkness to assault the entire length of the Puller-Hall
line. The strongest of these attacks sent two machine-gun companies with supporting riflemen
against the junction of the Marine and Army battalions where a jungle trail led north to the
airfield. Artillery, mortars, small arms, and the four canister-firing 37s cut down the repeated
Japanese assaults. A company from the 1st Marine Division reserve, as well as an Army pla-
toon, came forward to reinforce, and the lines held.
Taking staggering losses, the Japanese continued hammering against the American
lines, throughout the night while farther to the west Colonel Oka (whose troops probably had
been those spotted on Mount Austen's slopes on 23 October) sent his force against the thin line
of 2/7. This Marine battalion had been under artillery fire (from the Kokumbona area)
throughout the day, snipers also had scored some American casualties, and now from 2130 to
2300 it was jarred by three strong attacks which Oka made in battalion strength. The weight of
the attacks fell most heavily on Company F on the left flank of Hanneken's line.
Until midnight these thrusts were thrown back, but at 0300 an assault swept over the
Marine company. Enfilading fire from nearby foxholes of Company G failed to dislodge the
Japanese, and they took over Company F's high ground. In the haze of morning some 150
Japanese could be observed in F/2/7 foxholes firing American machine guns at adjacent Marine
emplacements.
Major Odell M. Conoley, 2/7 executive officer, led a jury-rigged counterattack force of
headquarters troops against these Japanese, and he was joined by a platoon from Company C,
5th Marines and by personnel from the 7th Marines regimental CP. Surprising the Japanese,
this force killed and drove off the enemy penetration, while a mortar barrage prevented Oka's
soldiers from reinforcing.
L This was the end of the Japanese October counteroffensive. The Marines, this time
with the valuable assistance of the Army regiment, had driven off the 17th Army's strongest
P a g e | 89
attempt to recapture the Henderson Field area. And again part of the Japanese failure could be
laid to faulty intelligence, combined with an over-optimistic evaluation of their own capabili-
ties, and a contemptuous evaluation of the American fighting man. had the enveloping Japa-
nese successfully negotiated the Maruyama Trail with their mortars and artillery, and had the
Japanese managed over-all coordination, the battle might well have had a different outcome.
At least the Japanese would have taken a heavier toll of Americans and might well have
effected serious penetration of the perimeter. But these errors formed the foundation of a
grisly monument of failure: some 3,500 Japanese soldiers dead, including General Nasu and
his regimental commanders--Colonel Furumiya (29th Infantry) and Colonel Hiroyasu (16th
Infantry). It was a beaten and disorganized Japanese force which began withdrawing inland
during the morning of 26 October.
18

By contrast, although records are sketchy or nonexistent, American losses were far less:
probably around 300 dead and wounded, including those hit by shelling and bombing. The
164th Infantry sustained 26 killed and 52 wounded (during all of October), and the 2d Batta-
lion, 7th Marines lost 30 dead in its action against Oka's Japanese. No figures are available on
losses of 1/7, but evidence indicates that these probably did not much exceed 100 dead and
wounded.
19

The Battle of Santa Cruz
As Maruyama's assaults were weakening on the south slopes of Bloody Ridge and
while Colonel Oka's brief penetration of 2/7's line still was two hours away, an American
patrol plane southeast of Guadalcanal reported sighting elements of a large Japanese fleet in
the water near the Santa Cruz Islands. These ships comprised another part of the "coordinated"
Japanese counteroffensive. Admiral Kondo of the Second Fleet and Admiral Nagumo of
the Third Fleet had teamed up with four carriers and four battleships, eight cruisers, 28 de-
stroyers, and supporting vessels; and they were standing by to steam into Sealark Channel
when they got the "Banzai" signal that Henderson Field had been recaptured.
20
Meanwhile
they guarded against American reinforcements or countermeasures from the south.
Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, then northeast of the New Hebrides with
the Enterprise and Hornet carrier groups, moved to attack. At 0650 on 26 October two more
observation planes spotted Japanese carriers 200 miles northeast of the American force at
about the same time Japanese planes were sighting the U.S. ships.
Air action began almost at once. Japanese carrier Zuiho was hit in her stern by two of
the scouting U.S. dive bombers. A hole in Zuiho's flight deck prevented flight operations, but
the undamaged carriers Junyo, Shokaku, and Zuikaku mounted air strikes against the American
ships.
Twenty minutes later the Hornet sent up 15 SBDs, six Avenger torpedo planes, and
eight Wildcats, and a short time after that the Enterprise got her first 19 planes into the air. BY
0830, 73 American planes were airborne to meet the approximately 125 Japanese aircraft. Other
flights followed from both forces.
Like some of the previous Pacific naval battles, it was an air-air and air-surface affair.
The opposing ships did not close for surface fighting. Twenty U.S. planes were lost to enemy
action and 54 to other causes. The Japanese lost 100 planes.
The fate of the USS Hornet is an example of the desperate fighting which took place dur-
ing the Santa Cruz battle. Lamed by a starboard bomb hit, the carrier next caught a spectacular
suicide crash as the Japanese squadron leader's wounded plane glanced off her stack and burst
P a g e | 90
through the flight deck where two of the plane's bombs exploded. Japanese "Kates" then bore
in on the carrier to launch their torpedoes from low astern. Two exploded in engineering
spaces, and the ship, clouded by thick smoke and steam, lurched to starboard. Dead in the
water, she then took three more bomb hits. One exploded on the flight deck, another at the
fourth deck, and the third below the fourth deck in a forward messing compartment.
As if that were not enough, a blazing "Kate" deliberately crashed through the port for-
ward gun gallery and exploded near the forward elevator shaft. Salvage and towing opera-
tions got underway almost at once and continued, amid repeated Japanese attacks, until dark
when the ship was abandoned and later sunk. The Hornet lost 111 killed and another 108
wounded.
Meanwhile the destroyer Porter had sustained fatal damage, and the Enterprise, South
Dakota, light antiaircraft cruiser San Juan, and destroyerSmith were damaged but not sunk.
The Japanese lost no ships, but three carriers and two destroyers were damaged. One carrier,
the Shokaku, was so badly mauled that she saw no more action for nine months.
Not defeated, but hearing of the Army's failure on Guadalcanal, the Japanese naval
force withdrew at the end of the day. Although control of South Pacific waters still had not
been resolved, the loss of planes was a serious blow to Japan, and one that was to aid the
Allied fleet within a few weeks. A bigger naval battle was brewing.

P a g e | 91
Notes
[1] In October 1,960 malaria patients were hospitalized.
[2] Mangrum was the only member of his outfit able to leave Henderson Field under his
own power. He was evacuated on 12 October. Caldwell, who arrived at Lunga from the carri-
er Saratoga as a lieutenant, had been promoted.
[3] CGSoPac ltr to ComSoPac, 6Oct42 (located at OCMH).
[4] These ships were from the reinforcement group.
[5] For an account of these misunderstandings and for other descriptions of the Cape
Esperance Battle see Struggle for Guadalcanal, Chap VIII.
[6] Also on 12 October Cactus fliers found the Japanese destroy-
ers Murakumo and Natsugumo north of the Russell Islands, and sank both of these ships.
[7] The unloaded American transports had departed late in the afternoon.
[8] Tanaka Article, II, 815.
[9] While this action was in progress, Army and Marine C-47s (R4Ds) flew in with avia-
tion gasoline, and seaplane tender MacFarland brought in additional supplies of the much-
needed fuel. Japanese planes next day (16 October) damaged the tender, but she was repaired
by here crew in an inlet of Florida Island.
[10] Miller, Guadalcanal, 157-159, quoted by permission of the author.
[11] BriGen Rupertus, ADC, became acting CG of the 1st MarDiv on 23October. MajGen
Vandegrift left a dawn that day for conferences at Noumea, flying out with LtGen Thomas
Holcomb, Marine Corps Commandant, whose Pacific tour had brought him to Guadalcanal on
21 October.
[12] This force, never positively identified in reconstructions of battle events, is thought
to have been that of Col Oka which appears later in night attacks of 25-26 October. Final
Rept, Phase V, 22.
[13] Gen Kawagushi, possibly with a justifiable dislike for this ridge terrain, had advo-
cated an attack farther to the southeast, had thereby fallen from favor and had been relieved
by Maruyama. Miller, Guadalcanal, citing Sumiyoshi and Tamaki (2d Div CofS), 160.
[14] Thirty-three members of this outpost managed to reach the lines of the 164th Inf
the next day, but 13 men remained lost and hunted by the Japanese. Nine of these finally
returned to safety after many harrowing adventures with the jungle and enemy, although one
of the nine was gone for two weeks. Four of the wanderers were killed by the Japanese.
[15] Basilone was killed in 1945 during the Marine assault of Kwo Jima.
[16] The Island, 178.
[17] Ibid. The final action reports of the 3d DefBn mention seven attacks, but these in-
cluded also strafing attacks from fighters. The Final Rept, Phase V, 25-26, mentions only that
enemy fighters were overhead "at irregular intervals throughout the daylight hours."
[18] A general withdrawal of the force began about 29 October, but there were no more
attacks after the morning of 26 October when Maruyama broke contact with U.S. troops and
pulled back into the jungle.
[19] Another source lists 7th Marine dead as 182, and total casualties for the 164 Infan-
try as 166 killed and wounded. Struggle for Guadalcanal,198. Adm Morison's total apparently
are too high, and he lists no sources.
[20] For an account of an over-optimistic Japanese "banzai" in this connection
see Struggle for Guadalcanal, 201.
P a g e | 92
Chapter 8: Critical November
If Tokyo by now realized that one of her long tentacles of conquest had been all but
permanently pinched off unless the Solomons invaders were at last taken in all seriousness,
the critical Guadalcanal situation likewise was getting more active attention in Washington.
On 18 October Admiral Ghormley had been relieved of South Pacific Area command by the
aggressive Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and almost immediately the new command was
allotted more fighting muscle to back his aggressiveness.
1

Ten days after Halsey assumed his new command, the Marine Corps established a su-
pra-echelon staff for coordination of all Fleet Marine Force units in the South Pacific. Major
General Clayton B. Vogel headed this newly organized I Marine Amphibious Corps with
headquarters at Noumea. He exercised no tactical control over the Guadalcanal operation; his
staff was concerned only with administrative matters. And it would not be until later that the
amphibious corps would have many troops with which to augment divisions for landing
operations.
At a Noumea conference on 23-25 October, General Vandegrift assured Admiral Halsey
that Guadalcanal could be held if reinforcements and support were stepped up. Some thought
also had to be given to relief of the reinforced 1st Marine Division, weakened by strenuous
combat and the unhealthy tropics. Halsey promised Vandegrift all the support he could mus-
ter in his area, and the admiral also requested additional help from Nimitz and from Washing-
ton.
Shortly after this conference the Marine Commandant, General Holcomb, who had con-
cluded his observations of the Marine units in action on Guadalcanal, south to clear up the
command controversy between General Vandegrift and Admiral Turner. Holcomb prepared
for Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, a dispatch in which he set forth the principle
that the landing force commander should be on the same command level as the naval task
force commander and should have unrestricted authority over operations ashore. Holcomb
then used his good offices to get Admiral Halsey to sign this dispatch. The Marine Comman-
dant then started back to me States, and at Nimitz' office in Pearl Harbor he again crossed the
path of the dispatch he had prepared for Halsey's signature. Holcomb assured Nimitz that he
concurred with this message, and the admiral endorsed it on its way to King. It was waiting
when Holcomb returned to Washington, and King asked the Commandant whether he agreed
with this suggestion for clearing up the question of how a landing operation should be com-
manded. Holcomb said he did agree with it, and this led eventually to the establishment of
firm lines of command for future operations in the Pacific. Holcomb had shepherded Marine
Corps thinking on this important matter across the Pacific to its first serious consideration by
the top military hierarchy.
2

Aside from the general policy that directed America's major war effort toward Nazi
Germany during this period, the South Pacific was not intentionally slighted. But as Rear
Admiral Samuel E. Morison points out, Washington at this time had its hands full:
Our predicament in the Solomons was more than matched by that caused by the Ger-
man submarines, which, during the month of October, sank 88 ships and 585,510 tons in the
Atlantic. The North African venture was already at sea; British forces in Egypt still had to be
supplied by the Cape of Good hope and Suez route. Guadalcanal had to be fitted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff into a worldwide strategic panorama, but Guadalcanal could be reinforced only
by drawing on forces originally committed to the build-up in the United Kingdom (Operation
P a g e | 93
"Bolero") for a cross-channel operation in 1943. General Arnold wished to concentrate air
forces in Europe for the strategic bombing of Germany; Admiral King and General MacArthur
argued against risking disaster in the Solomons and New Guinea in order to provide for the
eventuality of a future operation in Europe. President Roosevelt broke the deadlock on 24
October by sending a strong message to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisting that
Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and quickly.
3

Immediate results of the Roosevelt order were particularly cheering to Halsey and Van-
degrift. Admiral Nimitz ordered the new battleship Indiana and her task group to the South
Pacific; the 25th Army Division in the Hawaiian area was alerted for a move south; the re-
paired USS Enterprise, damaged in the August Battle of the Eastern Solomons, headed back
into the fighting. The Ndeni operation, much dog-eared from perpetual shuffling in the pend-
ing file, finally was scrapped by Halsey, and the 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry, the latest outfit
to start the Ndeni job, was called off its course to the Santa Cruz Islands and diverted to
Guadalcanal. Other battalions of the 147th regiment followed.
Also scheduled to reinforce the general Guadalcanal effort were Colonel Richard H.
Jeschke's 8th Marines from American Samoa, two companies (C and E) of Colonel Evans F.
Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion,
4
a detachment of the 5th Defense Battalion, Provisional Battery
K (with British 25-pounders) of the Americal Division's 246th Field Artillery Battalion, 500
Seabees, two batteries of 155mm guns, additional Army artillery units, and detachments of the
9th Defense Battalion. The old Guadalcanal shoestring from which the operation had dangled
for three critical months was being braided into a strong cord.
The two 155mm gun batteries--one Marine and the other Army
5
--landed in the Lunga
perimeter on 2 November to provide the first effective weapons for answering the Japanese
150mm howitzers. On 4 and 5 November the 8th Marines landed with its supporting 1st
Battalion of the 10th Marines (75mm pack howitzers), but the other reinforcements com-
menced a distinctly separate operation on the island. These units included the 1st Battalion of
the 147th Infantry, Carlson's Raiders, the 246th Field Artillery's Provisional Battery K, and the
Seabees. Joined under the command of Colonel W.B. Tuttle, commander of the 147th Infantry,
this force landed on 4 November at Aola Bay about 40 miles east of the Lunga. There, over the
objections of Vandegrift and others, Tuttle's command was to construct a new airfield.
6

Geiger's Cactus Air Force also grew while Vandegrift added to his man power on the
ground. Japanese pounding under the October counteroffensive had all but put the Guadalca-
nal fliers out of action; on 26 October, after Dugout Sunday, Cactus had only 30 planes capable
of getting into the air.
7
But in the lull of action following the defeat of General Hyakutake and
the withdrawal of the Japanese naval force from the Battle of Santa Cruz, Cactus ground crews
had a chance to do some repairs, and more planes began to arrive at Henderson Field.
Lieutenant Colonel William O. Brice brought his MAG-11 to New Caledonia on 30 Oc-
tober, and in the next two days parts of Major Joseph Sailer, Jr.'s. VMSB-132 and Major Paul
Fontana's VMF-211 reported up to Guadalcanal. On 7 November Brigadier General Louis E.
Woods assumed command at Cactus, and General Geiger went down to his wing headquar-
ters at Espiritu Santo. By 12 November MAG-11 completed a move to Espiritu Santo where it
would be close to Henderson, and more of the units were able to operate from the Solomons
field. "In mid-November there were 1,748 men in Guadalcanal's aviation units, 1,557 of them
Marines."
8

As these fresh troops and fliers came ashore, the veterans of Guadalcanal's dark early
days were off on an expedition to the west. With the Japanese reeling back from their defeat of
P a g e | 94
late October, the Marines sought to dislodge the enemy completely from the Kokumbona-Poha
River area some five and a half miles west of the Matanikau. Once cleared from this area,
where the island's north coast bends sharply northwest toward Cape Esperance, the Japanese
Pistol Petes would be beyond range of Henderson Field, and the Marines and soldiers could
possibly meet Japanese reinforcements from the Tokyo Express before another buildup could
muster strength for a new major effort against the perimeter. Under Colonel Edson, the force
on this operation included the colonel's 5th Marines, the 2d Marines (less 3/2), and a new
Whaling Group consisting of the scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The 11th
marines and Army artillery battalions, Cactus fliers, engineers, and bombardment ships were
in support.
The plan: At 0630 on 1 November attack west across the Matanikau on engineer foot-
bridges; move on a 1,500-yard front along the coast behind supporting artillery and naval
shelling; assault the Japanese with the 5th Marines in the van, the 2d Marines in reserve, and
with the Whaling Group screening the inland flank. By 31 October preliminary deployment
had taken place. The 5th Marines had relieved battalions of the 7th west of the Lunga; the 1st
and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines had come across from Tulagi;
9
and the engineers were ready
with their fuel-drum floats and other bridging material for the crossing sites. Companies A, C,
and D of the 1st Engineer Battalion constructed the bridges during the night of 31 October, and
by dawn of 1 November, Company E of 2/5 had crossed the river in rubber boats to cover the
crossing of the other units on the bridges. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines reached
their assembly areas on the Matanikau's west bank by 0700 and moved out in the attack with
1/5 on the right along the coast and 2/5 on high ground farther inland. The 3d Battalion was
Edson's regimental reserve, and battalions of the 2d Marines followed as force reserve. The
area around Point Cruz was shelled by cruisers San Francisco and Helena and destroy-
er Sterett while P-39s and SBDs from Henderson Field and B-17s from Espiritu Santo strafed
and bombed Japanese positions around Kokumbona.



P a g e | 95
Marines of 2/5 advanced against little opposition along the high ground to reach their
first phase line by 1000 and their second phase line by 1440. But near the coast 1/5 met strong
resistance, and as it help up to attack Japanese dug in along a deep ravine near the base of
Point Cruz, the two 5th Marines battalions lost contact. Farther inland, Whaling screened the
flank with no significant enemy contacts. It seemed clear that 1/5 had located the major Japa-
nese force in the area.
While Companies A and C of 1/5 (Major William K. Enright) engaged the enemy, Com-
pany B was ordered up to fill a gap which opened between these attacking companies. The
opposition held firm, however, and Company C, hardest hit in the first clash with the en-
trenched Japanese, had to withdraw. The Company B commander, trying to flank positions
which had plagued the withdrawn unit, led a 10-man patrol in an enveloping maneuver which
skirted behind Company C, but this patrol also suffered heavy casualties and it, too, was
forced to withdraw. Edson then committed his reserve, and Companies I and K of 3/5 (Major
Robert. O. Bowen) came up to the base of Point Cruz on a line between 1/5 and the coast. This
put a Marine front to the east and south of the Japanese pocket; but the enemy held, and the
Marines halted for the night.
Next morning (2 November) Edson's 2d Battalion (Major Lewis W. Walt) came to the
assistance of the regiment's other two battalions, and the enemy was thus backed to the beach
just west of Point Cruz and engaged on the east, west, and south. The Marines pounded the
Japanese with a heavy artillery and mortar preparation, and late in the afternoon launched an
attack to compress the enemy pocket. Companies I and K stopped short against an isolated
enemy force distinct from the main Japanese position, but this resistance broke up under the
campaign's only authenticated bayonet charge, an assault led by Captain Erskine Wells, Com-
pany I commander.
Elsewhere the going also was slow, and advances less spectacular. A Marine attempt to
use 75mm half-tracks failed when rough terrain stopped the vehicles. The 3/5 attack gained
approximately 1,500 yards but the main pocket of resistance held, and the regiment halted for
another night.
Final reduction of the Japanese stronghold began at 0800 on 3 November. Companies E
and G of 2/5 first assaulted to compress the enemy into the northeast corner of the pocket, and
this attack was followed by advances of Company F o2/5 and Companies I and K of 3/5.
Japanese resistance ended shortly after noon. At least 300 enemy were killed; 12 anti-tank
37mms, a filed piece, and 34 machine guns were captured.
It seemed that this success should at last help pave the way for pushing on to Kokum-
bona, the constant thorn in the side of Lunga defenders and long a military objective of the
perimeter-restricted Marines. From there the enemy would be driven across the Poha River,
Henderson Field would be beyond reach of Pistol Pete, and the Japanese would have one less
weapon able to bear on their efforts to ground the Cactus fliers. But the frustrating Tokyo
Express again quashed Marine ambitions. The Express had shifted its terminal back to the east
of the perimeter, and another buildup was taking place around Koli Point.
The 8th Marines was not due in Sealark Channel until the next day (and there was al-
ways a chance that Japanese surface action would delay this arrival) so Vandegrift again
pulled in his western attack to keep the perimeter strong. Division decided to hold its gain,
however, and it left Colonel Arthur's 2d Marines (less 3d Battalion) and the 1st Battalion, 164th
Infantry on the defense near Point Cruz while Edson and Whaling led their forces back to
Lunga.
P a g e | 96



With their October counteroffensive completely wrecked, the Japanese faced an impor-
tant decision, and on 26 October Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, Chief of Staff of the Southeastern
Fleet, came down to Guadalcanal from Rabaul to see what General Hyakutake proposed to do
about it. And while Hyakutake had been proud and confident when he reached Guadalcanal
on 9 October, Ohmae reflected Rabaul's current mood which had been much dampened
during the month. The counteroffensive had failed, Ohmae believed, because Hyakutake
bungled by not carrying out attacks according to schedule and because the Army did not
understand problems facing the fleet. "The Navy lost ships, airplanes and pilots while trying to
give support to the land assault which was continually delayed," Ohmae said later in response
to interrogations.
10

On 9 October Hyakutake's appetite had been set for Port Moresby; Guadalcanal was but
a bothersome bit of foliage to be brushed aside along the way, and the general had the bulk of
his 38th Division and other reserves, plus quantities of supplies, in Rabaul and the Shortlands
ready to plunge south when the airfield at Lunga was plucked from the Solomons vine like a
ripe grape. But now "the situation was becoming very serious,"
11
Ohmae was here to point out,
and either Guadalcanal or Port Moresby had to be scratched off the conquest list, at least
temporarily. In the conference with the naval captain, Hyakutake agreed that the U.S. advance
in the Solomons was more serious than the one through New Guinea,
12
and he agreed to divert
his reserves to a new assault against Vandegrift and the Henderson fliers on the banks of the
Lunga.
This time, though, things would be conducted differently. Rather than lurking in wait
of successes ashore, the Imperial Fleet would run the show. Ohmae's chief, Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, wanted Hyakutake's uncommitted troops of
the 38th Division
12
to land at Koli Point so the Americans would be worried and split by forces
on both sides of them. High-speed army vessels would transport these Japanese troops down
The Slot under escort of the Tokyo Express. Then Yamamoto's bombardment ships and Japa-
nese fliers would knock out Henderson Field once and for all, and Hyakutake could land more
troops and finish off a battered defensive garrison which would have no air support.
P a g e | 97
It was a bold plan, but there were some Japanese officers who thought that it was not
particularly wise. Admiral Tanaka, that veteran of many distressing hours in The Slot, was one
of these. He had suggested after the October defeat that defenses should be pulled back closer
to Rabaul so that they would have a better chance to stand off the Allies while Japan gained
more strength in the Solomons. "To our regret," he reported later, "the Supreme Command
stuck persistently to reinforcing Guadalcanal and never modified this goal until the time came
when the island had to be abandoned."
14

Colonel Shoji already was at Koli Point with his veterans of the October assault against
Bloody Ridge, and other Japanese troops now made ready to join him there. Hyakutake
planned to build an airfield there so Japanese planes could be more effective during the No-
vember attacks. But while Edson and Whaling fought their action to the west around Point
Cruz, a Marine battalion marched out to the east and stepped into the middle of Hyakutake's
plans there.
On 1 November, the same day Edson and Whaling crossed their foot bridges westward
over the Matanikau, division sent Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken's 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines out to investigate reports of Japanese activities to the east. Hanneken trucked his men
to the Tenaru River that day, and on 2 November the battalion made a forced march across the
base of Koli Point to the Metapona River, about 13 miles east of the perimeter. Intelligence had
it that the Japanese had not yet been able to build up much strength here, and Hanneken's
mission was to keep things that way. On the night of 2 November he deployed his battalion
along the coast east of the Metapona and dug in for the night.
While 2/7 Marines strained to see and hear into the black rainy night, six Japanese ships
came down Sealark Channel, lay to offshore about a mile east of the American battalion, and
began to unload troops. This force was made up of about 1,500 men from the 230th Infan-
try,
15
and they were carrying out initial plans of the Imperial Army and Navy for the buildup
to the east.
Rain had put Colonel Hanneken's radio out of commission, and he could not contact
division with information of this landing. The Marines held their positions that night but
moved to attack next morning after an eight-man Japanese patrol approached their line by the
Metapona. Marines killed four members of this patrol, and the battalion then moved up to fire
81mm mortars into the enemy's landing site. This brought no immediate response, but as
Hanneken's infantrymen prepared to follow this mortar preparation a large force of Imperial
soldiers maneuvered to flank the Marines who began also to draw mortar and artillery fire. In
the face of this coordinated attack by the Japanese, 2/7 withdrew, fighting a rear guard action
as it pulled back to take up stronger positions on the west bank of the Nalumbiu River, some
5,000 yards west of the Metapona.
During the withdrawal, Hanneken managed to make radio contact with the CP at Lun-
ga. He reported his situation, and called for air attacks against the enemy and for landing craft
to meet him at Koli Point and evacuate his wounded. This message reached division at 1445,
and Vandegrift immediately dispatched the requested air support and also relayed the situa-
tion to gunfire ships which had supported the Koli Point operation.
Cruisers San Francisco and Helena and destroyers Sterett and Landsdowne shelled
likely target areas east of the Marine battalion, and planes ranged overhead in vain searches
for signs of the enemy. Communications still were none too good, however, and elements of
2/7 were accidentally strafed and bombed by some of the first planes that came out from
Cactus.
P a g e | 98
Meanwhile, division had made the decision to concentrate more force against the evi-
dent buildup to he east. The western attack then in progress would be called back while
General Rupertus, due to come across Sealark Channel from Tulagi, went to Koli Point with
Colonel Sims of the 7th Marines, and Sims' 1st Battalion (Puller). And to the efforts of this
regiments (less its 3d Battalion), Vandegrift added the 164th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) which
would march overland to envelop the Koli Point enemy from the south. Artillery batteries of
the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines would be in general support.
By dusk of 3 November the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines reached the west bank of the Na-
limbiu River near the beach at Koli Point, and there General Rupertus met Hanneken next
morning with Colonel Sims and Puller's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. At 0600 on 4 November
Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, Americal Division ADC who had just arrived on the
island to prepare for the arrival of other Americal troops (which included the 132d and 182d
Infantry regiments, in addition to the 164th Infantry already in the Solomons actions), marched
out of the perimeter in command of the 164th Infantry. Thus General Vandegrift, with two
field forces command by general officers, operated his CP like a small corps headquar-
ters.
16
And to add even more troops to this concentration of effort to the east, Vandegrift
obtained release of Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion from Colonel Tuttle's command at Aola Bay,
and ordered it to march overland toward Kili Point and cut off any Japanese who might flee
east from the envelopment of the 7th Marines and the 164th Infantry.
On 4 November the Japanese on the east bank of the Nalimbiu did not seriously threat-
en the Marines on the west, but General Rupertus held defensive positions while awaiting the
arrival of the 164th Infantry. The soldiers, weighted down by their heavy packs, weapons, and
ammunition, reached their first assembly area on the west bank of the Nalimbiu inland at
about noon. There the regimental CP bivouacked for the night with the 3d Battalion while the
2d Battalion pushed on some 2,000 yards downstream toward Koli Point.
Next day the 3d Battalion, 164th crossed the river about 3,500 yards upstream and ad-
vanced along the east bank toward the Japanese. The 2d Battalion likewise crossed the river
and followed its sister battalion to cover the right rear of the advance. As the soldiers neared
the Japanese force they began to draw scattered small-arms fire, and two platoons of Company
G were halted temporarily by automatic weapons fire. This opposition was silenced by U.S.
artillery and mortars, however, and when the Army units halted for the night there still was
no firm contact with the enemy.
Action on 6 November likewise failed to fix the Japanese in solid opposition, although
the 7th Marines crossed the Nalimbiu and moved eastward along the coast, and the 164th
Infantry found an abandoned enemy bivouac farther inland. Meanwhile, Company B of the
8th Marines, just ashore on the island, moved east to join the attacking forces as did regimental
headquarters and the Antitank and C Companies of the 164th Infantry. The combined force
then advanced to positions a mile west of the Metapona River and there dug in for the night,
the Marines near the beach to guard against an expected Japanese landing that did not mate-
rialize.
Unknown to Marines and Army commanders, the situation was shifting because of new
changes in the Japanese plans. During the night of 5-6 November the enemy began to retire
eastward from positions facing the Marines across the Nalumbiu, and when the U.S. force
stopped west of the Metapona the Japanese were east of the river preparing rear guard defen-
sive positions that would aid a general withdrawal. General Hyakutake and Admiral Yama-
moto on 3 or 4 November had changed their plans about hitting the Lunga perimeter from two
P a g e | 99
sides, and the idea of an airfield at Koli Point was abandoned. Shoji was to return overland to
Kokumbona where he would join the main elements of the Seventeenth Army's buildup on the
west.
17

After remaining in positions to guard against the expected landing throughout 7 No-
vember, the U.S. forces under Generals Rupertus and Sebree advanced eastward again on the
8th. Patrols had located the Japanese near the coast just east of Gavaga Creek, a stream some
2,000 yards east of the Metapona River. The 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry was attached to the
7th Marines as regimental reserve, and the combined forces moved rapidly to surround the
Japanese. During the advance General Rupertus retired from the action with an attack of
dengue fever, and Vandegrift placed General Sebree in command of the entire operation. The
1st Battalion, 7th Marines met stiff resistance, and four Marines were killed while 31, including
Lieutenant Colonel Puller, were wounded. Major John E. Weber next day succeeded to com-
mand of this battalion.
Hanneken's 2/7 moved around the Japanese to take up positions east of the creek with
its right flank on the beach. The 2d Battalion of the 164th Infantry, committed from reserve,
tied in on 2/7's left (inland) flank, straddled Gavaga Creek south of the Japanese, and tied in
with the right flank of the 1st Battalion 7th Marines. From this point 1/7 extended north to the
beach along the west side of the Japanese positions, and the ring was closed on the enemy.
With this action to the east thus stabilized, division called for the return of the 164th Infantry
(less 2d Battalion) and Company B of the 8th Marines. Vandegrift planned to resume the
western action toward Kokumbona.
On 9 November the 7th Marines and 2/164 began attacks to reduce the Gavaga Creek
pocket. Supported by 155mm guns, two pack howitzer batteries, and aircraft, the two Marine
battalions closed in from east and west while the soldiers of the Army battalion moved north
to compress the Japanese into the beach area. The Japanese fought bitterly to break out of the
trap, especially to the south through a gap where Companies E (on the right) and F of the
164th Infantry were unable to make contact across the swampy creek. This action continued
through 10 November, with repeated orders by General Sebree for 2/164 to close the gap
across the creek. This was not done, however, and the commander of 2/164 was relieved on 10
November.
During the night of 11-12 November most of the enemy escaped along the creek to the
south. On 12 November the three battalions swept through the area where the Japanese had
been trapped, met little opposition, and withdrew that afternoon across the Metapona River.
Marines estimated that the action had cost the enemy approximately 450 dead. About 40
American were killed and 120 wounded.
Meanwhile, Colonel Carlson and his raiders, traveling cross-country to Koli Point, en-
countered the rear elements of the retiring Japanese. Joined by his Companies B and F, as well
as elements of Company D, Carlson concentrated his battalion inland near the native village of
Binu and patrolled the surrounding area. During the afternoon of 12 November the raiders
beat off five attacks by two Japanese companies. Scattered actions took place for the next five
days, and on 17 November the main Japanese force began withdrawing into the inland hills to
skirt south of Henderson Field to Kokumbona. Carlson pursued, was augmented by the arrival
of his Company A and by native bearers, and remained in the jungle and ridges until 4 De-
cember. His combat and reconnaissance patrol covered 150 miles, fought more than a dozen
actions and killed nearly 500 enemy soldiers. Raiders lost 16 killed and 18 wounded.
P a g e | 100
Admiral Tanaka had now been placed in charge of a larger Japanese reinforcement
fleet, and Admiral Mikawa of the Eighth Fleet had stepped up his plans for the buildup on the
west side of the Marine perimeter. On the night of 7 November Tanaka sent Captain Torajiro
Sato and his Destroyer Division 15 down The Slot with an advance unit of some 1,300 troops.
After evading a U.S. bomber attack in the afternoon, these ships landed the troops as Tassafa-
ronga shortly after midnight and then sped back north to the safety of the Shortlands. While
these ships came north, the second shuttle went south from Rabaul to the Shortlands with the
main body of the 38th Division. Two days later (on 10 November) 600 of these troops under
Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano made the move from the Shortlands to Guadalcanal. The
convoy was heckled by U.S. planes and PT boats, but the troops were landed safely, and the
ships made it back to the Shortlands on 11 November.
18

Brief Renewal of Western Attack
Meanwhile Colonel Arthur's 2d Marines (less 3/2), augmented by the 8th Marines and
the 164th Infantry (less 2/164), pushed west from Point Cruz toward Kokumbona on 10 No-
vember. The force advanced against ragged opposition from infantry weapons and by 11
November had regained most of the ground that had been given up when Vandegrift shifted
his attacks to the east earlier in the month.
General Hyakutake, to thwart this thrust at his Guadalcanal command post, assigned
Major General Takeo Ito (formerly CO of the 228th Infantry and now infantry group com-
mander of the 38
th
Division) to maneuver inland and flank the American advance.
But before Ito could strike--and before the Americans were aware of his threat--General
Vandegrift again had to call off the western attack. On 11 November the troops pulled back
avcross the Matanikau, destroyed their bridges, and resumed positions around the Lunga
perimeter. Intelligence sources had become aware of the plans of Hyakutake and Yamamoto to
mount another strong counteroffensive, and Vandegrift wanted all hands available.
Decision at Sea
It did indeed appear that the Lunga perimeter would need all the strength it could mus-
ter. Rabaul was nearly ready for a showdown, winner take all, and the time was now or never.
The Japanese were losing their best pilots in this Solomons action, and shipping casualties
likewise were beginning to tell. At the same time Allied strength in the South Pacific was
slowly growing. It was becoming an awkward battle, and Japan was spending altogether too
much time and material on this minor outpost which never had borne much intrinsic value.
This needless loss had to be stopped, and Admiral Yamamoto was determined that the new
counteroffensive would not be botched.
At 1800 on 12 November Admiral Tanaka's flagship, the destroyer Hayashio, headed out
of the Shortlands leading the convoy which carried the main body of the 38th Divi-
sion.
19
Elsewhere in these Solomon waters two Japanese bombardment forces also made for
Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto had ordered them to hammer Henderson Field while Tana-
ka landed the soldiers. Yet a third Japanese flotilla ranged the Solomons in general support.
Nothing was to prevent the 38th Division from landing with its heavy equipment and wea-
pons. The troops would be put ashore between Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga.
20

On 23 November the 8th Marines passed through the 164th Infantry to attack the Japa-
nese positions steadily throughout the day. Again there was no gain, and the American force
dug in to hold the line confronting the strong Japanese positions. There the action halted for
P a g e | 101
the time with the forces facing each other at close quarters. The 1st Marine Division was due
for relief from the Guadalcanal area, and more troops could be allotted for the western action.
On 29 November Admiral King approved the relief of Vandegrift's division by the 25th
Infantry Division then en route from Hawaii to Australia. This division was to be short-
stopped at Guadalcanal and the Marines would go to Australia.
During the period that preceded the withdrawal of the 1st Division, the last naval action
of the campaign was fought off Tassafaronga. Shortly after midnight on 29 November the
Japanese attempted to supply their troops in that area, and an American task force of five
cruisers and six destroyers moved to block the attempt.
The American force, under the command of Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, sur-
prised the Japanese force of eight destroyers, but the enemy ships loosed a spread of torpedoes
before retiring. One Japanese destroyer was sunk, but the U.S. lost the cruiser Northampton,
and three others, the Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Pensacola, were seriously damaged.
But Japan's day of smooth sailing in the Slot was over. With a reinforced submarine
fleet of 24 boats, Admiral Halsey's command had been prowling the route of the Tokyo Ex-
press to destroy or damage several enemy transports. The Japanese edge in fighting ships also
was becoming less impressive. In addition to the carrier Enterprise, Halsey had available two
battleships, three heavy and one light cruisers, a light antiaircraft cruiser, and 22 destroyers
organized in two task forces.
The strength of the Lunga perimeter was likewise much improved since the Japanese at-
tacks of late October. Arrival of fresh troops enabled an extension of defensive positions west
to the Matanikau and the establishment of a stronger line along the southern (inland) portions
of the infantry ring around Henderson Field. These new positions plus the shooting by the
155mm guns kept Pistol Pete from carefree hammering at the airfield and beach areas.
And the perimeter was to grow even stronger. More planes were becoming available to
Henderson fliers, bombers from the south were able to provide more support for the Solomons
area, and another regiment from the Americal Division was ready to move in from New
Caledonia. Colonel Daniel W. Hogan's 182 Infantry (less 3d Battalion) sailed from Noumea in
the afternoon of 8 November on board Admiral Turner's four transports. Admiral Kinkaid
with the Enterprise, two battleships, two cruisers, and eight destroyers would protect the
transports, and all available aircraft in the area would cover the troop movement. A day later
(9 November) Admiral Scott sailed from Espiritu Santo with a supply run for Guadalcanal,
and a day after that Admiral Callaghan followed with his five cruisers and ten destroyers.
Early on 11 November (the day Vandegrift called off his western advance) Scott's trans-
ports arrived off Lunga Road to begin unloading. Enemy bombers twice interrupted the
operations, and damaged the Betelgeuse, Libra, and Zeilin. Damage to the latter ship was
serious, and she was mothered back to Espiritu Santo by a destroyer. The other two transports
retired at 1800 to Indispensable Strait between Guadalcanal and Malaita, and later joined
Turner's transports. During the night Admiral Callaghan patrolled the waters of Sealark
Channel.
Turner's transports with the 182d Infantry arrived at dawn on 12 November to begin
unloading troops and cargo. During the morning the Betelgeuseand Libra drew fire from near
Kokumbona. The two ships escaped damage, however, and American counterbattery and
naval gunfire silenced the Japanese. Unloading ceased in the afternoon, and the ships were
flushed into dispersion by an attack of about 31 torpedo bombers. The transports escaped
unscathed, but Callaghan's flagship San Francisco and the destroyer Buchanan were dam-
P a g e | 102
aged. Only one Japanese bomber survived the American antiaircraft fire and air action, and
unloading resumed two hours later.
Meanwhile, intelligence reports plotted the Japanese fleet closing in on the Guadalcanal
area. During the morning American patrol planes north of Malaita had spotted a Japanese
force of two battleships, one cruiser, and six destroyers. Later five destroyers were observed
200 miles north-northwest. By midafternoon another sighting placed two carriers and a brace
of destroyers some 250 miles to the west.
21
Coastwatchers in the upper Solomons logged other
sightings. Turner appraised the various reports at two battleships, two to four heavy cruisers,
and ten to twelve destroyers. Callaghan was heavily outweighed. But Halsey's orders were to
get the naval support of Guadalcanal out of the dark back alleys of the South Pacific; and after
he shepherded the unloaded transports south to open water, Callaghan turned back to engage
the enemy.
Japanese battleships Hiei and Kirishima, light cruiser Nagara, and 15 destroyers steamed
south to deliver Admiral Yamamoto's first blow of the new counteroffensive. This bombard-
ment group was to enter Sealark Channel and hammer Henderson Field and the fighter strip
to uselessness so that Cactus air could not bother General Hyakutake's reinforcements en
route. This Japanese mission gave Callaghan one slight advantage. For shore bombardment,
the Imperial battleships carried high explosive projectiles for their 14-inch guns, not armor-
piercing shells which would have been much more effective against the hulls of U.S. cruisers.
Near Savo Island at 0124 on 13 November, cruiser Helena raised the Japanese in radar
blips at a range of 27,000 yards, and she warned the flagship that the enemy was approaching
between Savo and Cape Esperance. But radar on the San Francisco was inadequate, and
Callaghan could not determine the exact positions of his own or the enemy ships. The admiral
therefore delayed action until he was sure of the situation. By that time the range had closed to
about 2,500 yards, and the van destroyer of the American force was nearly within the Japanese
formation. When they maneuvered to launch torpedoes, the American ships disorganized
their formation, and they took up independent firing. Some swerved off course to avoid
collision, and in the melee both American and Japanese ships fired at their sister craft.
The San Francisco caught 15 solid hits from big Japanese guns and was forced to with-
draw with Admiral Callaghan killed and others, including Captain Cassin Young, her skipper,
dead or fatally wounded. A cruiser hit on the Atlanta killed Admiral Scott and set fire to the
ship. But the small American force held in spite of heavy losses, and by 0300 the Japanese
group retired without being able to attempt its bombardment mission. The Imperial bom-
bardment force had lost two destroyers and four others were damaged by more than 80 Amer-
ican hits.
For the American ships it was a costly victory. Henderson Field had been protected, but
the antiaircraft cruisers Atlanta and Juneau sank in the channel along with destroy-
ers Barton, Cushing, Monssen, and Laffey. In addition to Callaghan's flagship, heavy
cruiser Portland also was seriously damaged as were destroyers Sterett and Aaron
Ward. Destroyer O'Bannon sustained minor concussion to her sound gear. These ships
struggled back to the New Hebrides after daybreak on 13 November. Of the 13 American ships
in the action only destroyer Fletcher escaped damage.
Planes from Henderson Field took off at first light on 13 November to nip the heels of
the retiring Japanese ships. They found the crippled battleships Hiei afire near Savo, and
bombed and strafed her throughout the day. The Japanese fought a losing battle to salvage
their hapless ships, but they had to scuttle her next day (14 November).
P a g e | 103
During the night battle off Guadalcanal, Admiral Tanaka had been ordered to lead his
convoy back to the Shortlands. He headed south again from there during the afternoon of 13
November at about the same time that Admiral Halsey ordered Kinkaid to withdraw the
carrier Enterprise south with the remnants of Callaghan's force. Halsey wanted this carrier--
the South Pacific's sole operational flattop--safely out of Japanese aircraft range. To guard
Henderson Field, Admiral Lee would steam on north with his battle-
ships Washington and South Dakota and four destroyers from Kinkaid's task force. The
distance was too great for Lee to make that night, however, and only the Tulagi PT boats were
available to protect Sealark Channel. Shortly after midnight Japanese cruisers and destroyers
entered the channel and shelled the Cactus airfield for about half an hour. There was no
serious damage, however. At dawn on 14 November the Henderson fliers found their field still
operational.
Early search flights found Admiral Tanaka's convoy heading down The Slot some 150
miles away and the bombardment cruisers and destroyers retiring north. In spite of the fact
that the shelling of Henderson Field had been ineffective, Tanaka was coming on down to
Guadalcanal with the 10,000 troops of the 38th Division's 229th and 230th Regiments, artillery
personnel, engineers, other replacements, and some 10,000 tons of supplies.
First Cactus attacks struck the retiring warships which had shelled Henderson during
the night. Ground crews on the field hand-loaded their planes and visiting craft from
the Enterprise with fuel and ordnance, and the planes mounted from the muddy runways in
attack. They damaged Japanese heavy cruiser Kinugasa and the light Isuzu. Planes still on
the Enterprise, now 200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, also attacked the Japanese warships,
They added to the troubles of the Kinugasa and Isuzu, and also damaged heavy cruis-
ers Chokai and Maya and destroyer Michishio.
Meanwhile, the 11 troop transports steamed on down The Slot until by about 1130 they
were north of the Russells and near Savo. A previous light attack by Enterprise fliers had
inflicted little damage to this convoy, but at 1150 seven torpedo bombers and 18 dove bombers
from Henderson were refueled, rearmed, and boring in for an attack. This strike hulled several
of the transports. About an hour later 17 fighter-escorted dive bombers delivered the second
concentrated American attack on the transports and sank one of them. Next turn went to 15 B-
17s that had left Espiritu Santo at 1018. They struck at 1430 from an altitude of 16,000 feet and
scored one hit and several near misses with their 15 tons of explosives.
These attacks continued all day as the Henderson fliers scurried back and forth from
their field. Nine transports were hit, and seven of them sunk. But from these sinking ships,
some 5.000 men were rescued by destroyers. As Admiral Tanaka described the day:
The toll of my force was extremely heavy. Steaming at high speed the destroyers had
laid smoke screens almost continuously and delivered a tremendous volume of antiaircraft
fire. Crews were near exhaustion. The remaining transports had spent most of the day in
evasive action, zigzagging at high speed, and were now scattered in all directions.
In detail the picture is now vague, but the general effect is indelible in my mind of
bombs wobbling down from high-flying B-17s, of carrier bombers roaring toward targets as
though to plunge full into the water, releasing bombs and pulling out barely in time; each miss
sending up towering columns of mist and spray; every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire as
transports burst into flame and take the sickening list that spells their doom. Attacks depart,
smoke screens lift and reveal the tragic scene of men jumping overboard from burning, sinking
P a g e | 104
ships. Ships regrouped each time the enemy withdrew, but precious time was wasted and the
advance delayed.
22

In spite of this disastrous day, Tanaka steamed on south in his flagship, doggedly lead-
ing transports Kinugawa Maru, Yamatsuki Maru, Hirokawa Maru, and Yamaura Maru on toward
Guadalcanal. These ships and three destroyers from Destroyer Division 15 which continued to
escort him were the only sound vessels Tanaka had at sundown that day--"... a sorry remnant
of the force that had sortied from Shortland."
22
But what was worse, Tanaka then got the word
that a strong U.S. task force appeared to be waiting for him at Guadalcanal, but Japanese
intelligence reported these ships to Tanaka as four cruisers and four destroyers. To counter
this threat, headquarters at Rabaul ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo to hurry down and
run interference for Tanaka with a fighting force which included the battle-
ships Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atoga and Takao, light cruisers Sendai andNagara, and an entire
destroyer squadron. Kondo was to complete the Henderson Field knockout which Admiral
Callaghan's force had thwarted two nights earlier.
Throughout the day Admiral Lee likewise sifted intelligence reports which funneled in-
to his flagship, the battleship Washington. Then he moved against this powerful Tokyo Ex-
press which was headed his way.
23
Lee entered Sealark Channel at about 2100 on 14 November
and patrolled the waters around Savo. An hour before midnight, radar indicated a Japanese
ship (the cruiser Sendai) nine miles to the north. About 12 minutes later the target was visible
by main battery director telescopes and Lee ordered captains of the Washington and the South
Dakota to fire when ready. Their first salvos prompted the Sendai to turn out of range.
Shortly before this Admiral Tanaka, still leading his four transports south toward Gua-
dalcanal, had been much relieved to see Admiral Kondo's Second Fleet in front of him in The
Slot. But when the cruiser Sendai scurried back from this first brief brush with the American
ships, the Japanese officers found that for the first time in the Pacific war they were up against
U.S. battleships, and not just cruisers as they had expected.
Tanaka immediately ordered his three escorting destroyers--the Destroyer Division
15 ships commanded by Captain Torajiro Sato--into the fight, and the admiral then turned his
transports north and shepherded them beyond range of the impending action. Meanwhile
Admiral Kondo's fleet closed for the fight, and soon the American destroyers leading Admiral
Lee's formation came within visual range of some of these ships. The U.S. destroyers got the
worst of the bargain. By 2330 all four of them were out of action: the Walke afire and sinking,
the Benham limping away, the Preston gutted by fire that caused her abandonment later, and
the Gwin damaged by a shell in her engine room. Only one Japanese destroyer,
the Ayarami, had been damaged.
The two U.S. battleships continued northwest between Savo and Cape Esperance.
The South Dakota, turning to avoid the burning destroyer Preston, came within range of the
Japanese ships which had just scuffled with the American destroyers, and the word passed by
these Japanese ships brought their "big brothers" out from the shelter of Savo's northwest
coast.
Admiral Kondo steamed into the fight with destroyers Asagumo and Teruzuki in the van
followed by heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the battleship Kirishima in the wake.
The South Dakota, partially blind because of a power failure that hampered her radar,
soon came within 5,000 yards of the Japanese who illuminated her with their searchlights and
opened fire. Almost at once the Washington blasted her 16-inch main batteries at the enemy
battleship about 8,000 yards away.
P a g e | 105
The Kirishima took nine 16-inch hits and nearly half a hundred 5-inch wounds in less
than ten minutes, and she staggered away in flames. Japanese cruis-
ers Agate and Takao, revealed by their own searchlights, also were damaged. But the original
Japanese onslaught had caused enough serious damage to the South Dakota to force her to
retire, also.
Admiral Lee continued on a northwesterly course to divert the Japanese, then bore
away to me southwest near the Russells, and finally retired from the area when he noted the
Japanese likewise withdrawing. The enemy battleship Kirishima was abandoned as was the
destroyer Ayanami. American destroyer Benham likewise had to be abandoned later.
With his escorting destroyers dispersed by this battle and its aftermath, Admiral Tana-
ka now was alone in his flagship Hayashio with the four transports. He made full speed for
Tassafaronga, but it was clear to him that the transports would not be able to unload before
daylight. After that the U.S. planes would attack them like they had those six transports which
tried to unload during daylight in October. But these men were critically needed on Guadalca-
nal, Tanaka knew. He sent a message to Admiral Mikawa at Eighth Fleet headquarters and
asked if he could run the transports aground on the beach to insure prompt unloading. Ad-
miral Mikawa said "No." But Admiral Kondo, disengaging his Second Fleet from the battle with
Lee's battleships, contacted Tanaka and told him to go ahead with this plan.
By now the early light of dawn was turning Sealark Channel a slick gray, and Tanaka
followed Admiral Kondo's message of approval. He ordered the four transports to run
aground off the landing beaches, and after he watched them head for shore the admiral turned
north, gathered up his destroyers again and sailed through the waters east of Savo Island.
24

The admiral wrote later:
Daylight brought the expected aerial assaults on our grounded transports which were
soon in flames from direct bomb hits. I later learned that all troops, light arms, ammunition,
and part of the provisions were landed successfully.
25

Two guns of the 244th Coast Artillery Battalion and the 5-inch guns of the 3d Defense
Battalion also contributed to the damage of the grounded transports. This fire hit two of the
ships, and then the American destroyer Meade came over from Tulagi to enter the fight.
Planes from Henderson Field and Espiritu Santo soon joined this grisly "Buzzard Patrol," and
the Japanese transports were reduced to useless hulks engulfed in flames. Japanese plans for a
big November counteroffensive had met disaster, and Imperial headquarters now began to
think seriously about the more cautious plan to pull the line back closer to Rabaul. There now
were some 10,000 new Japanese troops on Guadalcanal, but these recent sea and air actions
made it clear to he Japanese that these troops could not be supplied or reinforced on a regular
basis. The shipping score against the Japanese scratched two battleships, a cruiser, three
destroyers, and 11 transports. Nine other ships had been damaged.
American losses numbered one light cruiser, two light antiaircraft cruisers, and seven
destroyers. Seven other U.S. ships were damaged. But the Tokyo Express had been derailed.
Never again was Japan able to reinforce significantly with night runs from Rabaul. From this
point the Imperial force on the island began to dwindle
26
while the American command con-
tinued to grow. Critical November had turned into decisive November, in the Pacific War as
well as the Guadalcanal Battle. The Japanese never again advanced and the Allies never
stopped.
Admiral Tanaka, whose skillful conduct of the convoy and aggressiveness in throwing
his four escorting destroyers into the battle against Admiral Lee's force near Savo had contri-
P a g e | 106
buted most to what limited success the Japanese had had during this harrowing month,
summed it up this way:
The last large-scale effort to reinforce Guadalcanal had ended. My concern and trepida-
tion about the entire venture had been proven well founded. As convoy commander I felt a
heavy responsibility.
27

Back Toward Kokumbona
With this Japanese attempt to reinforce General Hyakutake decisively stopped, the
American ground advance to the west was resumed. General Sebree, western sector com-
mander, would be in command. With the troops of his sector--the 164th Infantry, the 8th
Marines, and two battalions of the 182d Infantry--the general planned to secure a line of
departure extending from Point Cruz inland for about 1,700 yards. From this line the attack
would press on to Kokumbona and the Poha River where the main Japanese force was concen-
trated.
The 2d Battalion of the 182 Infantry crossed the Matanikau on 18 November and took
up positions on the south (inland) flank of the proposed line of departure. On the following
day the 1st Battalion of the same regiment moved west to take up the right flank position at
the base of Point Cruz. Company B of the 8th Marines screened the left flank of 1/182's ad-
vance, and these two units met sporadic infantry opposition. About noon the Army battalion
halted, dug in, and refused its inland flank. The screening Marine company withdrew to rejoin
its regiment east of the Matanikau. A gap of more than 1,000 yards separated the two batta-
lions of the 182 Infantry.
Meanwhile, the Japanese deployed for a local offensive action of their own. With
the 38th Division troops who had been on the island, plus those few brought ashore from the
ill-fated transports, the Japanese moved east to force a Matanikau bridgehead from which a
new attack at the Lunga perimeter could be launched. Other elements of the 38th Divi-
sion moved inland to occupy the Mount Austen area. Remnants of the battered 2d Divi-
sion were held in Kokumbona.
On the night of 19-20 November, the Japanese took up positions facing the two Army
battalions west of the river and engaged the Americans with artillery and mortar fire. At dawn
(20 November) the Japanese struck the inland flank of 1/182. The Army troops gave ground for
approximately 400 yards, but this was regained later in the morning with air and artillery
support. This U.S. attack continued to the beach just west of Point Cruz, but halted there in the
face of increased enemy artillery and mortar fire.
During the night the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 164th Infantry moved into the gap be-
tween the two battalions of the 182d, and a general American attack jumped off on the morn-
ing on 21 November. Strong Japanese positions fronting the 164th held the attempt to no gain,
however, and a second attack on the morning of 22 November likewise was halted.

P a g e | 107
Notes
[1] For a discussion of this command change see Struggle For Guadalcanal, 182-183.
[2] LtCol R.D. Heinl, Jr., interview with Gen. T. Holcomb, 12Apr49.
[3] Struggle for Guadalcanal, 184-185.
[4] Elements of this battalion conducted the Makin Island raid.
[5] Btry A of the Marine 5th DefBn and Btry F of the Army 244th CA Bn.
[6] Vandegrift's objection to the Aola Bay airfield harked back to the old dispute be-
tween him and Adm Turner. Turner continually wanted to spread out along the Guadalcanal
coast; Vandegrift objected to the establishment of additional perimeters before the first one
became strong.
[7] These included 12 F4Fs, 11 SBDs, 3 P-400s, 3 P-39s, and one F4F-7 photographic
plane.
[8] Marine Air History, 111.
[9] The 3e Bn, 2d Mar, long the division's mobile reserve, was sent to rest on Tulagi.
[10] Combined statements of Capt Ohmae and Cdr Tadashi Yanamoto, USSBS Interro-
gations, II, 468, hereinafter cited separately as Ohmae Interrogation and Yamamoto Interrogation.
[11] Ohmae Interrogation, 468.
[12] Ibid. By autumn of 1942 the Japanese garrisons on New Guinea, all but abandoned
because of the press of things at Guadalcanal, had been handed their first setback by Australi-
an troops who were beginning to take the offensive against them.
[13] Two battalions of this division already were ashore on Guadalcanal.
[14] Tanaka Article, II, 818.
[15] CG 1st MarDiv msg to ComSoPac, 17Nov42, in SoPac War Diary (located at NHD).
Another source says no Japanese troops landed that night; only supplies were put ashore, and
the force Hanneken's battalion met next day was only Shoji and his veterans of the October
counteroffensive. Miller,Guadalcanal, citing interrogation of MagGen Takeo Ito, former CG of
the 38th Division, 196n. Dr Miller's text recognizes the landing, however, and lists the above
message from the SoPac War Diary as the source. Ibid., 196.
[16] On 4 Nov the Lunga perimeter had been reorganized, this time in two sectors. Gen
Rupertus took the sector east of the Lunga, Gen Sebree the sector west of the river.
[17] Yamamoto Interrogation, 470.
[18] Tanaka Article, II, 820.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Yamamoto Interrogation, 470.
[21] A faulty report. Carriers were not in the area. Struggle for Guadalcanal, 235.
[22] Tanaka Article, II, 822.
[23] Ibid.
[23] The American admiral also moved against some powerful naval thinking. Many of-
ficers at ComSoPac headquarters "doubted the wisdom of committing two new 16-inch battle-
ships to waters so restricted as those around Savo Island, but Admiral Halsey felt he must
throw in everything at this crisis. And he granted Lee complete freedom of action upon reach-
ing Guadalcanal." Struggle for Guadalcanal, 272.
[24] Tanaka Article, II, 823-824.
[25] Ibid., 824.
P a g e | 108
[26] Capt Ohmae said later: "following the [naval] battle, it was decided to do as much
as we could by reinforcing the Guadalcanal Garrison by destroyers, while a sufficient support-
ing force of aircraft was built up in Rabaul. This plan was not too successful." Ohmae Interroga-
tion, 471.
[27] Tanaka Article, II, 824.

P a g e | 109
Chapter 9: Final Period, 9 December 1942 to 9 February 1943
Change of Command
At the Noumea conference with Admiral Halsey in October, General Vandegrift
stressed the need for getting the 1st Marine Division to a healthier climate. But at that time the
Japanese counteroffensive was underway, and another enemy effort against the Lunga perime-
ter began shortly after this October attack was turned back. Troops could not be spared from
Guadalcanal during that period, and sea lanes to the area were too hazardous for a rapid
buildup of the island garrison. It was not until after the important naval actions of November
that sufficient reinforcements could be brought in to relieve the 1st Marine Division. By that
time it was clear to all that these veterans needed to be taken out of the jungle.
Compared to later actions in the Pacific, casualties in the division had not been exces-
sive. From the landing early in August 1942 until relief in December, the division lost 605
officers and men killed in action, 45 who died of wounds, 31 listed as missing and presumed
dead, and 1,278 wounded in action. But unhealthy conditions in the jungle were, statistically, a
greater hazard than the enemy. While 1,959 Marines of the division became casualties to
enemy action, 8,580 fell prey at one time or another to malaria and other tropical diseases.
Records make it impossible to separate these two totals. Many men with malaria were
hospitalized more than once and thus added to he total as cases rather than as individuals.
Some of these later were killed or wounded in action. But on the other hand many suffered
from a milder form of malaria or other illness and did not turn in at the hospital at all. It
became a rule of thumb in front-line units that unless one had a temperature of more than 103
degrees there would be no light duty or excuse from a patrol mission. The tropics weakened
nearly everyone. Food had been in short supply during the early weeks of the campaign, much
of the fare had been substandard, and most of the long-time veterans of the fighting suffered
some form of malnutrition.
On 7 and 8 December, men in one of the division's regiments were examined by Navy
doctors who thus sought to assess the physical condition of the division. The doctors con-
cluded that 34 per cent of the regiment was unfit for any duty which might involve combat.
This percentage would have been higher but for the recent inclusion with the regiment of 400
replacements.
Plans for the operation called for the Marines to be relieved early and reorganized for a
new assault mission elsewhere.
This could not be, however, and the Marines who held out in the Lunga perimeter dur-
ing the dark early days deserved a break. They had taken America's first offensive step against
long odds, and they had held out against strong Japanese attacks when Guadalcanal was all
but cut off from Allied support. For this they were awarded a Presidential Unit Citation and--
what was to be immediately more satisfying to the survivors--a rehabilitation and training
period in Australia. The 2d Marines, also on hand for the original landing, was to be sent to
New Zealand.
On 9 December 1942, command of the troops ashore passed from General Vandegrift to
Major General Alexander M. Patch, commanding general of the Americal Division and senior
Army officer present. On the same day the 1st Marine Division began to embark for Australia.
The 5th Marines sailed that day, followed at intervals of a few days by division headquarters
personnel, the 1st Marines and, after a longer interval, by the 7th Marines. The command of
P a g e | 110
General Patch included Henderson Field, the fighter strip, the Tulagi area and seaplane base
there, as well as the Guadalcanal perimeter. Although withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division
meant that strong actions against the Japanese had to be temporarily suspended, reinforce-
ments began to arrive concurrently with the departure of the Marines.
The third infantry regiment of General Patch's division, the 132d Regimental Combat
Team (less 1st Battalion and Battery A, 247th Field Artillery Battalion) arrived on 8 Decem-
ber.
2
With this arrival the Army division numbered 13,169 men--more than 3,000 short of full
strength. The 164th Infantry, in action since the October fighting on Bloody Ridge, was in little
better shape than the 1st Marine Division regiments. Both this regiment and the 182d Infantry
were each understrength by about 860 men.
Major General J. Lawton Collins' 25th Division, bound from Hawaii to New Caledonia,
was diverted directly to Guadalcanal where its 35th Infantry Regiment landed on 17 Decem-
ber, the 27th Infantry on 1 January, and the 161st Infantry on 4 January. Also on 4 January, the
6th Marines (Colonel Gilder T. Jackson) and division headquarters of the 2d Marine Division
landed from New Zealand to join their other regiments, and 2d and 8th Marines. Brigadier
General Alphonse De Carre, the ADC, acted as division commander while this division was on
Guadalcanal, and also served as commander of all other Marine ground units. Major General
John Marston, commanding general of the 2d Marine Division, remained in New Zealand
because he was senior to General Patch, the Army officer who now was in command at Gua-
dalcanal.
3




37MM GUNS of Americal
Division antitank units are
landed on the beach at
Guadalcanal as Army
troops arrive to relieve 1st
Division Marines. (SC
164902)




SHOVING OFF as relieving troops
arrive, weary men of the 1st Marine
Division file on board landing carft
and leave the Guadalcanal battle
behind. (USMC 52978)







P a g e | 111
By 7 January arrival of additional replacements had placed Guadalcanal's combined air,
ground, and naval forces at about 50,000. The 2d Marine Division now had a strength of
14,783; the Americal Division, 16,000; the 25th Division, 12,629. This was a manpower level
beyond even the dreams of the early Lunga defenders, and, with the South Pacific air and
naval power also growing, the Allies at last were able to lay plans for attacks that would defeat
the Japanese on the island and keep reinforcement landing to a minimum.
With Guadalcanal clearly out of the shoestring category at last, General Harmon on 2
January designated the Guadalcanal-Tulagi command as XIV Corps. General Patch became
corps commander and General Sebree, former Americal ADC, assumed command of that
division.
4

A month and a half earlier than this, on 15 November, installations of the Cactus Air
Force also had gained a more dignified title. On that date Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, who
had relieved Admiral McCain as ComAirSoPac, designated Henderson Field and Fighter 1 a
Marine Corps Air Base, and Colonel William J. Fox became base commander. On 1 December
and 30 January two new engineering units came in to improve the air facilities on Guadalca-
nal. On the earlier date, Major Thomas F. Riley's 1st Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion
relieved the 6th Seabees, and on the January date Major Chester Clark's 2d Marine Aviation
Engineer Battalion arrived. These were the only units of their kind within the Marine Corps,
and, together with the remaining Seabees plus the organic engineer battalions of the 1st and 2d
Marine Divisions, they kept the airfields in shape.
Part of this work included construction of a new strip, Fighter 2, closer to the beach near
Kukum. Fighter 1, always unusually slow to dry adequately after tropical rains, was aban-
doned when this new strip became operational, about the middle of December. Both Hender-
son and Fighter 2 then were built up with coral for better drainage, and steel Marston mats,
now becoming available, also were laid on the runways. Tools still were scarce, however, and
the old Japanese road rollers, for example, continued to be used.
Brigadier General Louis E. Woods, who had relieved General Geiger at Cactus on 7 No-
vember so the wing commander could return to his headquarters at Espiritu Santo, stayed on
as Commander Aircraft, Cactus Air Force until 26 December when he in turn was relieved by
Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, commanding general of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.
Colonel William O. Brice succeeded Colonel Albert D. Cooley as strike commander, and
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Jack became fighter commander after Lieutenant Colonel Harold
W. Bauer was lost to enemy action on 15 November.
By 20 November there were 100 planes on the Guadalcanal fields. This figure included
35 F4F-4s, 24 SBDs, 17 P-38s, 16 P-39s, 8 TBFs, and one lone and battle-scarred P-400. At about
this time also, B-17s from two merged Army Air Force Bomber Groups (the 11th and the 5th)
began to operate through Guadalcanal on long-range reconnaissance missions. On 23 Novem-
ber six OS2Us came in to run antisubmarine patrols; on 26 November the 3d Reconnaissance
Squadron of the Royal New Zealand Air Force arrived with its Lockheed Hudsons, and during
the period 15 to 25 December night patrolling PBYs of VP-12 arrived. Also during December
the Army sent in the 12th, 68th, and 70th Fighter Squadrons and the 69th Bombardment
Squadron of B-26s.
This additional air strength enabled the Allies to maintain the upper hand they had
gained over the Tokyo Express and Rabaul fliers. Japanese commanders pointed up their loss
of pilots as the most serious trouble resulting from the fighting around Guadalcanal, and
P a g e | 112
several Japanese officers, including Captain Ohmae, list this loss as the turning point at Gua-
dalcanal and therefore the turning point in the Pacific war.
5
Ohmae said later:
We were able to land a number of troops and supplies [on Guadalcanal], but our air
losses were too great. Almost all of the Navy's first class pilots and a few of the Army's were
lost in the Solomon Operations. The greatest portion of these were lost against Guadalcanal. At
one time, we had three or four squadrons at Rabaul, but they were sent down one at a time.
The constant attrition was very expensive. The 21st, 24th, 25th and 26th Air Groups were lost.
This loss was keenly felt in the defense of the empire during the Marshall-Gilbert campaign.
In 1943, our training program began to be restricted, so we were never able to replace
these losses, although we still had a number of carriers. In January 1943, due to your increased
strength and our difficulty in supplying Guadalcanal, it was necessary for us to withdraw.
6

General Situation
The U.S. forces had not been idle during December. The perimeter now extended west
along the beach to Point Cruz, south to Hill 66 (nearly 2,000 yards inland from the beach at
Point Cruz) where it was refused east to the Matanikau to join the former Lunga perimeter
outpost line east of that river. There was little expansion to the east, but a separate American
force held Koli Point outside the main perimeter.
The Aola Bay force, finally giving up airfield construction there because of swampy,
unsuitable terrain, moved early in December to Koli Point where a filed later was built. This
force, still under the command of Colonel Tuttle, now included the colonel's 147th Infantry,
the 9th Marine Defense Battalion, the 18th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees), and ele-
ments of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion.
The limited offensive toward Kokumbona was halted late in November when the Japa-
nese tried to mount a second strong counteroffensive against the perimeter, and at that time a
Japanese movement to build up forces in the Mount Austen area was noted. Now, early in
December, it seemed advisable to concentrate on this important piece of terrain as a prelude to
a general corps offensive which would be launched when more troops became available.
7
This
high ground just to the south above Henderson Field had to be cleared before many troops
went west along the north coast to drive the Japanese beyond Kokumbona. The enemy line
from Point Cruz inland was dug in for a determined stand, and Japanese strength was again
mounting in the Bismarcks.
On 2 December, General Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the Japanese Eighth Area Ar-
my, arrived in Rabaul to assume command of the enemy's South Pacific area and what was left
of General Hyakutake's Seventeenth Army. Imamura had been ordered down from Japan to
retake Guadalcanal, and for this job he brought along 50,000 men for his Eighth Area Ar-
my. Hyakutake remained on Guadalcanal where his troops were disposed generally from
Point Cruz inland to Mount Austen, facing the American line west of the Matanikau. The rear
areas, and the bulk of Hyakutake's support troops, extended from the Point Cruz line west to
Cape Esperance. This Japanese force included remnants of the 2d Division (General Maruya-
ma),38th Division (General Sano), and the Kawaguchi and Ichiki Forces.





P a g e | 113


Confronting the Americans on his left flank from Point Cruz inland to Hill 66, General
Hyakutake had troops of Maruyama's 2d Division composed of the 4th, 16th, and 29th Regi-
ments. From this division's right (inland) flank were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 228th
Infantry on high ground west of the Matanikau. The 124th Infantry and other units extended
from the Matanikau to Mount Austen. Remaining elements of the 38th Division(including
the 230th, 228th, and 229th Regiments) plus detachments of the 124th Infantry were deployed in
the Mount Austen area.
At this time the total Japanese strength on the island stood at about 25,000 men. But
they were incapable of concentrated offensive action, and they had dug in for a defensive
stand while awaiting General Imamura's Eighth Area Army reinforcements. Rations were low,
malaria now was more prevalent in Japanese ranks than in American, ammunition stocks were
nearly exhausted, preventive and corrective medical capabilities were practically nonexistent,
and the Tokyo Express was hard pressed to maintain even a starvation-level of supplies.
Admiral Tanaka still was in charge of this supply operation down The Slot, and the measures
now being taken were desperate ones. Destroyers tried to supply these Imperial troops by
making high-speed runs to Guadalcanal and dropping off strings of lashed-together drums
into which supplies had been sealed. Barges from the island then were to tow these drums
ashore. This procedure was not too successful, however, and the troops managed to retrieve
only about 30 per cent of these supplies that Tanaka's destroyers cast upon the water.
Tanaka's first run with the drums occurred on the night of 29 November, and his force
was the one engaged by American ships in the Battle of Tassafaronga. With the same sort of
aggressive naval action which had characterized the sending of his four destroyers into me
fight against Admiral Lee's battleship force earlier in the month, Admiral Tanaka made a
creditable show in this action. But this did not get the troops supplied, and that was still the
big problem.
With new action shaping up, the Japanese attempts to supply their force by floating
drums continued. The force dug in to face the Americans could not even hold defensive
positions unless they could be fed and cared for. Tanaka's destroyers raced down The Slot on 3
P a g e | 114
December and dropped strings of 1,500 drums. But the island troops managed to haul in only
about 300 of these from the waters off Tassafaronga and Segilau. "Our troubles," Tanaka said,
"were still with us."
8

On 7 December Captain Sato led 10 destroyers to Guadalcanal for the third Japanese at-
tempt to supply the troops. Fourteen U.S. bomber and fighter planes located this force in The
Slot at about nightfall, however, and one Japanese ship was hit and had to start back north
under tow by another destroyer. Two other ships escorted this aided cripple. Admiral Tanaka
went south to the scene in his new flagship, the newly-built destroyer Teruzuki,an improved
2,500-ton model capable of 39 knots. The other destroyers which had been on the drum run
went on south toward Guadalcanal but had to turn back when they encountered PT boats and
U.S. planes. Thus the third supply run failed completely.
The fourth of these supply runs came in 11 December, and Tanaka himself led this one
in his speedy Teruzuki. A flight of 21 U.S. bombers attacked these ships at about sunset but
scored no hits. Tanaka's destroyers managed to shoot down two of six fighters which were
covering for the bombers, and the Japanese steamed on south. The Teruzuki patrolled beyond
Savo Island while the other destroyers dropped some 1,200 drums of supplies off Cape Esper-
ance and then headed north again. Admiral Tanaka sighted some U.S. PT boats, and his new
destroyer went to the attack. The Japanese ship chased the PT boats away but in the process
got hit in its port side aft by a torpedo. The ship caught fire and became unnavigable almost at
once, and the destroyer Naganami hurried alongside to rescue survivors. Tanaka, who had
been wounded and knocked unconscious, plus others from the officers and crew were trans-
ferred to this other destroyer, and the destroyer Arashi also came up to help. But the heartened
U.S. PT boats chased these sound ships away from the sinking Teruzuki, and the Japanese
could only drop life rafts to crew members who were still in the water. Some of the drums
were recovered by the troops ashore, but with the loss of such ships as the Teruzuki, this sort of
supply operation was becoming very costly. And now the moon was entering a phase which
caused other such attempts to be temporarily postponed. Japanese defenses had received very
little help for the actions which now shaped up against them.
The 132d Infantry of the Americal Division began the offensive against Mount Austen
on 17 December, and by early January troops of this regiment had the major Japanese force in
the area surrounded in a strong point called the Gifu. Although this pocket was not completely
reduced until 23 January, the enemy was sufficiently restricted to preclude any threat to the
perimeter of the rear of the general corps attack.
Meanwhile, in other preliminaries of the corps offensive, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines
had taken Hills 65 and 55 west of the Matanikau, and the Americal Division Reconnaissance
Squadron had seized Hill 56. These positions which were southeast of the southern anchor of
the line extending inland from Point Cruz served to extend the American positions farther into
Japanese territory west of Mount Austen.
P a g e | 115





















The Corps Offensive
With the Japanese in the Mount Austen area localized in the Gifu, the drive to the west
could get underway. General Patch planned to extend his Point Cruz-Hill 66 line farther
inland and then to push west, destroying the Japanese or driving them from the island. Gener-
al Collins' 25th Division (with 3/182, Marines of 1/2 and the Americal Reconnaissance Squa-
dron attached) would advance west of Mount Austen on the extended flank inland, and at the
same time assume responsibility for the Gifu Pocket which now would be behind the XIV
Corps line.
The 2d Marine Divison (less 1/2) would provide the corps' right element from the 25th
Division's north flank to the beach. The Americal Division (minus the 182d Infantry, division
artillery, and 2/132) would hold the main perimeter.
Since the 25th Division apparently would have some fighting to do before it could come
abreast of the Point Cruz-Hill 66 line, its phase of the offensive was the first ordered into
action. Colonel Robert B. McClure's 35th Infantry, with the Division Reconnaissance Troop
and 3/182 attached, was ordered to relieve the 132d Infantry at the Gifu and then advance to
the west on the division's inland flank. The 27th Infantry (Colonel William A. McCulloch)
would capture the high ground south of Hill 66 between the northwest and southwest forks of
the Matanikau. The 161st Infantry (Colonel Clarence A. Orndorff) would be the division
reserve.
The ground thus assigned to the 27th Infantry consisted of a jumble of hills (dubbed the
Galloping Horse because of their appearance on aerial photographs) which lie some 1,500
yards south of Hill 66. Army units began their attacks against this terrain on 10 January, and,
P a g e | 116
during the final actions here three days later, Marines on the right flank of the corps line began
their forward movement.
Launching its attack with the 8th Marines on the right and the 2d on the left, the 2d Di-
vision immediately encountered a series of cross compartments in which the Japanese had
established very effective defensive positions. Using a minimum of men and weapons, the
enemy fired down the long axis of these valleys which were perpendicular to the Marine
advance, and thus engaged the attackers in a cross fire in each terrain compartment.
Enemy positions of this type held up the 8th Marines throughout the day, but two bat-
talions of the 2d Marines advanced about 1,000 yards on the inland flank. The 6th Marines
then moved up to relieve the 2d Marines which was long overdue for withdrawal from the
Guadalcanal area. Lines were adjusted at this time. The 8th Marines now was on the left and
the 6th along the coast. This relief was completed by 15 January, and the 2d Marines sailed for
New Zealand.
The 8th Marines hammered at the ravine defenses of the Japanese, and operations along
the coast during this phase of the campaign as well as during actions later in January provided
the first opportunity for Marines to test, in a rudimentary way, their principles of naval gun-
fire in support of a continuing attack against an enemy.
9
The four destroyers in action fired
only deep support missions in this phase of the advance, however, and close-in fighting of the
Japanese held the 8th Marines to insignificant gains until the afternoon of 15 January when
flame throwers were put in action for the first time on this front. Three Japanese emplacements
were burned out that day, and the attack, supported by tanks, began to move forward. By the
end of 17 January the 8th Marines had advanced to positions abreast the 6th Marines.
The naval gunfire during this period indicated that both Marines and ships had much
to learn. The Navy's peacetime training had not stressed this type of support, and likewise the
Marine division had no naval gunfire organization or practice. There was no JASCO (Joint
Assault Signal Company) such as appeared later, and no organic shore fire control parties or
naval gunfire liaison teams in the infantry battalions and regiments.
But here along Guadalcanal's coast, Marines and ships took advantage of their new
freedom from air and surface attacks to develop some gunfire procedures. Each direct support
artillery battalion had two naval officers trained in naval gunfire principles, and these officers
were sent out with FO (forward observer) teams to train them in shore fire control party
(SFCP) duties. And while the naval officers ashore schooled Marine forward observers, artil-
lery officers from the division went on board the support ships to inform commanders and
gunnery officers of the missions desired by the division.
10

In addition to establishing some sound naval gunfire practices which would be most
helpful in later Pacific assaults, the Marine action since 13 January had gained approximately
1,500 yards, killed over 600 Japanese, and captured two prisoners and a variety of enemy
weapons and ammunition.
While the Marines fought along the coast, the 35th Infantry (reinforced) battled about
3,000 yards through the twisted ridges of an area southeast of the 25th Division's inland flank
to take the Sea Horse complex (so-called because it looked like one on an aerial photograph),
and finally cleared Colonel Oka's defenders out of the Gifu Pocket.
The western line of XIV Corps now extended from Hill 53, the head of the Galloping
Horse, north to a coastal flank some 1,500 yards west to Point Cruz. With elements of the 35th
Infantry south of the Galloping Horse to guard against a flanking attack from that direction,
P a g e | 117
the Americans at last were poised on a line of departure from which an attack could be
launched to Kokumbona and beyond.




















Drive to the West
Hoping to trap the Japanese at Kokumbona, General Patch in early January had sent a
reinforced company (I) of the 147th Infantry around Cape Esperance in LCTs to Beaufort Bay
on the island's southwest coast, and from there the force advanced up the overland trail to-
ward Kokumbona to block the mountain passes against a possible Japanese escape to the
south.
11
With this unit in place, the XIV Corps attack jumped off with the 25th Division on the
left to envelop the enemy south flank, and the CAM Division (Composite Army-Marine) to
advance west along the coast. The CAM Division consisted of the 6th Marines, the 182d and
147th Infantry regiments, and artillery of the Americal and 2d Marine Division.
12

The 25th Division began its flanking movement on 20 January, swinging in toward Ko-
kumbona and taking Hills 90 and 98 by 21 January. This high ground, immediately south of
Kokumbona, was in front of the CAM Division and dominated the coastal area around the
Japanese base. The enemy troops facing the CAM Division thus were outflanked and partially
surrounded by the two forces. The attack continued on 23 January when the 27th Infantry
occupied Kokumbona, but by this time most of the enemy already had slipped away along the
coast.
Meanwhile, the CAM Division on 22 January had opened a full-scale attack with the 6th
Marines on the right by the beach, the 147th Infantry in the center, and the 182d Infantry on
the left. Again the Marines had called on naval gunfire, and this time four destroyers provided
close support to CAM troops who faced more cross compartments forward of Kokumbona.
A radio spotting frequency was assigned the four SFCPs serving with the assault batta-
lions of the 6th marines and the 182d Infantry, and on this frequency the shore spotters called
P a g e | 118
in fire missions from the destroyers. Another frequency was established between the Division
Naval Gunfire Officer (NGFO) and all four of the destroyers, and forward spotters also could
use this net if the need arose.
In this phase of the corps advance, Marines in the CAM Division ran into the strongest
opposition, and they were stopped the first day by about 200 Japanese in a ravine west of Hill
94. With the help of the close-in naval gunfire adding its weight to artillery, air, and infantry
weapons, this opposition was overcome by noon of 24 January when the CAM Division made
contact with the 25th Division on the high ground above Kokumbona. Although some of the
fighting had been most difficult, the Japanese were pulling back slowly. It appeared that they
would probably establish strong defenses farther west.
Actually there would be more stiff fighting on the island, but no all-out stand of Japa-
nese on a strong line of defense, and no more Japanese reinforcements to face. Tokyo and
Rabaul had called new signals, and General Hyakutake was withdrawing his troops. The
situation now was reversing itself. The U.S. operation, starting as a shoestring, had slowly
added other cords in a warp and woof of fabric with a definite pattern. But the Japanese
conquest string had ended in the Solomons and New Guinea, and never had a firm knot tied
in the end of it.
Affairs in New Guinea suffered when Hyakutake's reserves were diverted from a
planned reinforcement there to the November attempt to retake Guadalcanal. Now a small
force of Japanese had met with disaster trying to recapture Port Moresby from across the
Owen Stanley Mountains, and the 50,000 troops General Imamura brought down from Java to
reinforce Hyakutake would have to be used in New Guinea. Around 15 December the Japa-
nese decided to evacuate Guadalcanal and build up new defenses farther north in the Solomon
chain. The starving troops on the island would fight delaying actions toward Cape Esperance,
and they would be evacuated in detachments from that point by fast destroyers. Commanding
these destroyers would be Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former chief of staff of the Second
Fleet. He had replaced the wounded and exhausted Admiral Tanaka, who now was on his way
to the home islands were he would serve on the Naval General Staff.
XIV Corps maintained the momentum of its western advance by resupplying its attack-
ing division over the beach at Kokumbona, where the Tokyo Express had often unloaded, and
ordering the attack to push on toward the Poha River, a stream some 2,500 yards beyond
Hyakutake's former headquarters village. The 2d Battalion, 278th Infantry met opposition in
the high ground south and west of Kokumbona, but this was overcome in attacks of 24 and 25
January, and units of the regiment reached the Poha before dark on the 25th. (See Map 28)
Final Pursuit
After the corps advance reached the Poha River, intelligence sources began reporting a
new buildup of Japanese ships at Rabaul and in the Shortlands, and the Allied command
concluded that the enemy was ready for still another attempt to retake Guadalcanal. Admiral
Halsey deployed six task forces south of Guadalcanal, and General Patch recalled the 25th
Division from the western advance to bolster the perimeter. It was the same problem General
Vandegrift had faced so many times in the past, but now there were more troops and the
western attack did not have to be completely stopped. Pursuit of the Japanese was assigned to
the CAM Division.
This estimate of Japanese intentions slowed pursuit of the enemy and probably aided
their escape, but the mistake was an honest one. Actually the Japanese strength at Rabaul had
P a g e | 119
been mounting, and the basic intelligence was good. But this time the activity in the Bismarcks
and the Shortlands was the result of Japanese plans to complete the evacuation of Guadalcanal
and to start new defensive installations closer to Rabaul.
By this time the Japanese had nearly completed their withdrawal to evacuation areas
around Cape Esperance, and when regiments of the CAM Division launched their new attacks
early on 26 January they advanced rapidly along the narrow coastal corridor against slight
opposition. Naval gunfire again was employed, but once more it fired in deep support at
targets of opportunity and to interdict the coastal trail forward of the advancing troops.
The Marines and soldiers gained 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 yards the second.
Opposition now was such that General Patch on 29 January brought the 182 Infantry back to
the perimeter and ordered the 147th Infantry to continue the pursuit while the 6th Marines
covered the rear of the Army regiment. The advance resumed on 30 January, and the soldiers
ran into resistance near the mouth of the Bonegi River about 2,000 yards northwest of the
Poha. There the units fought until 2 February when the Japanese withdrew. The U.S. force
advanced again next day, and on 5 February the 147th held up 1.000 yards short of the Uma-
sami River, a stream some 2,500 yards northwest of Tassafaronga Point.


Meanwhile, to form a new trap for the retreating Japanese, General Patch on 31 January
dispatched the reinforced 2d Battalion, 132d Infantry around Cape Esperance to land near the
western tip of the island. From that point the battalion was to advance to Cape Esperance and
cut off the Japanese line of retreat. After landing early on 1 February at Verahue, the force
advanced to me village of Titi, nearly a third of the way to the cape. By 7 February this force
was ready to push on from that village, and the north coast attack was prepared to advance
beyond the Umasami River.
P a g e | 120
By this time the 147th Infantry had been relieved at the Umasami by the 161st Infantry
of the 25th Division, and on 8 February this regiment reached Doma Cove some eight miles
from Esperance. On the same date 2/132 arrived at Kamimbo Bay a short distance from the tip
of the island, and on 9 February the two units met at the village of Tenaru on the coast below
the high ground of the cape. Only token resistance had been met in these final days. Evacua-
tion of the Japanese from the island had been completed on the night of 7-8 February.
The Guadalcanal campaign was over. When the two units met at Tenaru village, Gener-
al Patch sent to Admiral Halsey a message announcing "Total and complete defeat of Japanese
forces on Guadalcanal..."
13
From a hazardous early step up the long island path toward Tokyo,
the Allies had gained a solid footing which would become an all-important base until after the
mounting of the final offensive against Okinawa two years later.
Happy to hear the news that Guadalcanal was at last secured--but hardly disappointed
that they had not been there for the final chase--were the veterans of the 1st Marine Division in
Australia, the 2d and 8th Marines in New Zealand, and the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute
Battalions in New Caledonia. These old island hands were resting, fighting off recurring
attacks of malaria, getting the jungle out of their blood, and already training for their next
campaign.
Epilogue
Guadalcanal was the primer of ocean and jungle war. It was everything the United
States could do at that moment against everything the Japanese could manage at that place.
From this the Americans learned that they could beat the enemy, and they never stopped
doing it. The headlines from Guadalcanal did more for home front morale than did the fast
carrier raids of 1942's winter and early spring, for at last Americans had come to grips with the
enemy; and the outcome of this fighting added in the bargain a boost to the spirit of the Pacific
fighting man. The benefits from official and unofficial circulation of lessons learned there by
the Army, Navy, and Marines ere many and far--reaching.
Veterans of all ranks from all branches of the service came home to teach and spread the
word while many more stayed on to temper the replacements coming out to the war. Barracks
bull sessions and bivouac yarns added color and not a little weight to the formal periods of
instruction. Thus was the myth that the Japanese were supermen shattered, and the bits of
combat lore or the legendary tall tales and true which begin, "Now, on the 'Canal..." still have
not entirely disappeared from the Marine repertoire.
General Vandegrift summed it up in a special introduction to The Guadalcanal Cam-
paign, the historical monograph which contains the Marine Corps' first study of the operation:
We struck at Guadalcanal to halt the advance of the Japanese. We did no know how
strong he was, nor did we know his plans. We knew only that he was moving down the island
chain and that he had to be stopped.
We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience al-
lowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrines, and our
weapons had been.
We tested them against the enemy, and we found that they worked. From that moment
in 1942, the tide turned, and the Japanese never again advanced.
Likewise, Guadalcanal was more than just another battle for the Japanese, but the lesson
they learned there was a bitter one. The occupation which they started almost on a whim had
ended in disaster, and from this they never quite recovered. Captain Ohmae summed it up:
P a g e | 121
... when the war started, it was not planned to take the Solomons. However, the early
actions were so easy that it was decided to increase the perimeter defense line and to gain a
position which would control American traffic to Australia. Expansion into the Solomons from
Rabaul was then carried out. Unfortunately, we also carried out the expansion at the same
time instead of consolidating our holdings in that area. After you captured Guadalcanal, we
still thought that we would be able to retake it and use it as an outpost for the defense of the
empire. This effort was very costly, both at the time and in later operations, because we were
never able to recover from the ship and pilot losses received in that area.
14

Unfortunately for the Japanese there were very few lessons from Guadalcanal that they
could put to effective use. In a sense this was phase one of their final examination, the begin-
ning of a series of tests for the military force which had conquered the Oriental side of the
Pacific, and they failed it. After this there was neither time nor means for another semester of
study and preparation. Admiral Tanaka had this to say about the operation and its signific-
ance:
Operations to reinforce Guadalcanal extended over a period of more than five months.
They amounted to a losing war of attrition in which Japan suffered heavily in and around that
island ... There is no question that Japan's doom was sealed with the closing of the struggle for
Guadalcanal. Just as it betokened the military character and strength of her opponent, so it
presaged Japan's weakness and lack of planning that would spell her defeat.
15

The Allies entered this first lesson with sound textbooks. In the field of amphibious
warfare, Marine doctrine hammered out in the peacetime laboratory now could be polished
and improved in practice and supported by a rapidly mobilizing industrial front at home.
Modern equipment which everybody knew was needed began to flow out to the test of com-
bat. There it took on refinements and practical modifications, as doctrines and techniques
improved. New models continued to arrive and were quickly put to use in the hands of now-
skilled fighting men.
For example, landing craft which went into mass production aided the tactical aspects
of amphibious assaults and also lessened the logistical problems at the beachhead. Improved
communications equipment made it possible for the Marine Corps to improve and make more
effective many of the special organizations and operational techniques which previously had
been little more than carefully sketched theory. Air and naval gunfire liaison parties experi-
mented with on Guadalcanal later became the efficient tools of integrated warfare that Marines
had been confident they could become. Improved equipment brought improved technique,
and thus began a continuous cycle of increasing efficiency which made the final amphibious
assaults by cooperating U.S. forces at Iwo Jima and Okinawa remarkable models of military
precision.
This strength of new equipment and ability enabled the Allies to take command of the
strategy in a contest in which the enemy had been able to set his men for a checkmate before
the contest began. The psychology of total war found expression for the front-line Marine in
his observation that "the only good Jap is a dead one." But an even better one was the one
bypassed and left to ineffective existence on an island in the rear areas: he cost the Allies less.
Strength gave the Allies this capability to bypass many garrisons.
Likewise Guadalcanal proved that it often was cheaper and easier to build a new air-
field than to capture and then improve one the Japanese had built or were building. This
coincided well with the basic amphibious doctrine long agreed upon: never hit a defended
beach if the objective can be reached over an undefended one. Together these principles some-
P a g e | 122
times made it possible for the Allies to land on an enemy island and build an airfield some
distance from the hostile garrison. This the Marines did in November 1943, at Bougainville. A
perimeter was established around the airfield, and there defenders sat waiting for the Japanese
to do the hard work of marching over difficult terrain to present themselves for a battle if they
so desired. It was a premeditated repeat of the Guadalcanal tactic, and when the Japanese
obliged by so accepting it, they were defeated.
All services, units and men in the Pacific, or slated to go there, were eager to learn the
valuable lessons of early combat and to put them into practice. For the Marine Corps, an
important factor in the continuing success of the advance across the Pacific was the delineation
of command responsibilities between the naval task force commander and the amphibious
troop commander.
Late in this first offensive General Vandegrift was able to initiate an important change
in naval thinking concerning the command of amphibious operations. The general and Ad-
miral Turner had often disagreed on the conduct of activities ashore on Guadalcanal, and
Vandegrift had maintained that the commander trained for ground operations should not be a
subordinate of the local naval amphibious force commander. His theory prevailed, and in the
future the amphibious troops commander, once established ashore, would be on the same
command level as the naval task force commander. Both of them would be responsible to a
common superior.
With this point cleared, and with the valuable lessons of Guadalcanal combat a part of
his personal experience and knowledge, Vandegrift as a lieutenant general became command-
er of the I Marine Amphibious Corps in the fall of 1943 and was able to guide an ever-
expanding fighting force already involved in new actions in the Solomons. Later, on 10 No-
vember 1943, he left the Pacific to become the eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The cost of Guadalcanal was not as great as some later operations. Total Army and Ma-
rine casualties within the ground forces amounted to 1,598 men and officers killed and 4.709
wounded. Marines of the ground forces killed or dead from wounds numbered 1,152; and
2,799 were wounded and 55 listed as missing. In addition 55 individuals from Marine aviation
units were killed or died of wounds while 127 were wounded and 85 missing. Defeat for the
Japanese was more costly. Although some 13,000 enemy soldiers were evacuated from Gua-
dalcanal for new defensive positions farther north, more personnel than this had lost their
lives on the island. Japanese sources list approximately 14,800 killed or missing in action while
9,000 died of wounds and disease. Some 1,000 enemy troops were taken prisoner. More than
600 enemy planes and pilots were also lost.
Combat shipping losses were about even for the two opponents. The Allies and the Jap-
anese each lost 24 fighting ships, with the loss amounting to 126,240 tons for the Allies and
134,839 tons for the Japanese.
There would be bigger battles later. There would by tiny atolls for which the Japanese
would demand higher prices on shorter terms. And far away to the north a dead volcano
waited to be the backdrop of a photograph which would become the symbol of the entire
island war ahead. But nothing could take from Guadalcanal its unique spot in history. The first
step, however short and faltering, is always the most important.

P a g e | 123
Notes
[1] These figures refer to organic units only; such reinforcing attachments as the
3DefBn, 1st RdrBn, and the 1st PrchtBn are not included in these statistics.
[2] This division's other infantry regiments, the 164th and 182d, already were on Gua-
dalcanal as were other elements of the division. Widely separated in their New Caledonia
camps, the units operated together as a division for the first time on Guadalcanal. Other
divisional units included the 221st, 245th, and 247th FA Bns; the 57th EngCBn; the 101st QM
Regt; the 101st Med Regt; the 26th SigCo and the Mobile CReconSqn.
[3] LtGen Holcomb, Marine Commandant, later expressed the opinion the Marston
should have had the opportunity to command his division in spite of his seniority over Patch.
CMC ltr to MajGen C.B. Vogel, 12Feb43. Marston said he was never apprised of the Comman-
dant's attitude, however. MajGen J. Marston ltr to CMC, 30Dec48.
[4] "The XIV Corps's staff section chiefs assumed their duties on 5 January 1943, but
most of the posts at XIV Corps headquarters were manned by Americal Division staff officers
... [who] ... acted simultaneously ... as assistant staff section chiefs for the Corps. As late as 1
February 1943 XIV Corps headquarters consisted of only eleven officers and two enlisted
men." Miller, Guadalcanal, 218-219.
[5] Ohmae Interrogation, 471.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Mount Austen was the "Grassy Knoll" the 1st Marine Division (planning at New
Zealand with faulty maps) hoped to take early in the landing phase of the campaign. The
importance of this terrain feature as a key to the security of Henderson Field had been recog-
nized throughout the Guadalcanal planning and fighting. Gen Vandegrift's Marines patrolled
the area repeatedly, but never had enough manpower to hold the ground permanently.
[8] Tanaka Article, II, 828.
[9] Although the 1st MarDiv landing was supported by naval gunfire, subsequent sup-
port fire from ships had been infrequent and on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Col F.P. Henderson,
"Naval Gunfire in the Solomons--Part I: Guadalcanal," MC Gazette, March 1956, 44-51.
[10] Ibid.
[11] The Japanese did not attempt to escape by this route.
[12] The "Composite Division" was merely a convenient term for the force formed by
Marines and Army units during the January drive to the west. The 2d Marine Division staff
served as the CAM Division staff. The name first appears in a field order from the XIV Corps
on 25 January, but the "division" itself had no administrative identity.
[13] To which Halsey replied in part: "When I sent a Patch to act as tailor for Guadalca-
nal, I did not expect him to remove the enemy's pants and sew it on so quickly. ... Thanks and
congratualtions." FAdm Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947), 148.
[14] Ohmae Interrogation, 474.
[15] Tanaka Article, II, 831.