Reports

of
General MacArthur

MAcARTHUR IN JAPAN:
THE OCCUPATION: MILITARY PHASE
VOLUME I SUPPLEMENT

PREPARED BY HIS GENERAL STAFF

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60006

Facsimile Reprint, 1994

CMH Pub 13-4

 FOREWORD

The Reports of General MacArthur include two volumes being published by the
Department of the Anny in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by
General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this
foreword and indexes. Since they were Government property, the general turned over
to the Department in 1953 these volumes and related source materials. In Anny and
National Archives custody these materials have been available for research although
they have not been easily accessible. While he lived, General MacArthur was un-
willing to approve the reproduction and dissemination of the Reports, because he be-
lieved they needed further editing and correction of some inaccuracies. His passing
permits publication but not the correction he deemed desirable. In publishing them,
the Department of the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their ac-
curacy. But the Army also recognizes that these volumes have substantial and endur-
ing value, and it believes the American people are entitled to have them made widely
available through government publication.
The preliminary work for compiling the MacArthur volumes began in 1943
within the G-3 Section of his General Staff, and was carried forward after the war by
members of the G-2 Section, headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby with Pro-
fessor Gordon W. Prange, on leave from the University of Maryland, as his principal
professional assistant. Volume II of the Reports represents the contributions of Jap-
anese officers employed to tell their story of operations against MacArthur's forces.
The very large number of individuals, American and Japanese, who participated in the
compilation and editing of the Reports would make a complete listing of contributors
relatively meaningless.
Volume I narrates the operations of forces under General MacArthur's command
from the Japanese attack on Luzon in 1941 through the surrender in 1945. While
service histories have covered much of the same ground in separate volumes, no single
detailed narrative of General MacArthur's leadership as commander of the Southwest
Pacific Area has yet appeared. Chapters dealing with the reconquest of Borneo,
plans for the invasion of Japan, and the Japanese surrender make a distinctly new
contribution. Volume I Supplement describes the military phase of the occupation
through December 1948, reporting events not treated elsewhere in American publica-
tions. Volume II on Japanese operations brings together a mass of information on
the enemy now only partially available in many separate works. Collectively, the
Reports should be of wide interest and value to the American people generally, as well
as to students of military affairs. They are an illuminating record of momentous
events influenced in large measure by a distinguished American soldier.

Washington, D.C. HAROLD K. JOHNSON

January 1966 General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
m
 FOREWORD TO THE 1994 EDITION

I determined for several reasons to republish General MacArthur's reports to

commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. First, the Reports of General
MacArthur still stand as a detailed account from MacArthur's perspective of his opera-
tions against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area. Second, the Reports offer a
unique Japanese version of their operations in the Southwest Pacific that remains one
of the few English-language descriptions of Imperial Army campaigns during World
War II. Third, excellent illustrations, many of them original artwork commissioned for
the Reports, plus superb maps give these volumes an enduring value for military histo-
rians and the American public. Finally, while General MacArthur remains a towering
figure in American historiography, the passage of fifty years has dimmed the contribu-
tions of the U.S. Army units that first checked the Japanese southward advance in
Papua New Guinea, then spearheaded the counteroffensive along the north New
Guinea coastline that enabled MacArthur to make good his promise to return to the
Philippines. The veterans of these campaigns, both men and women, deserve to be
remembered for their contributions to the Nation in its time of greatest peril. These
are General MacArthur's Reports, but they are also his testament to the American sol-
diers who served under his command.

Washington, D.C. HAROLD W. NELSON

31 January 1994 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

IV
 PREFACE

" .. . . I have noticed some impatience in the Press based upon the assumption
of a so-called soft policy in Japan.
". . .. The first phase of the Occupation was of necessity based upon military
considerations which involved the deployment forward of our troops and the disarm-
ing and demobilization of the enemy. This was coupled with the paramount con-
sideration of removing former prisoners of war and war internees from the internment
camps and evacuating them to their homes.
". . . . When the first phase was completed, the other phases as provided in the
surrender terms infallibly followed in a prompt, complete and entire fulfillment of the
terms of surrender.
" . . . . Economically and industrially, as well as militarily, Japan was exhausted
and depleted. Her governmental structure was controlled completely by the occupa-
tion forces and was operating only to the extent necessary to prevent social chaos,
disease and starvation. . . . . . . . . . . . ."

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I : PRELUDE TO OCCUPATION

Page
Concept of Operations : " Blacklist" .. ..... ... .. .. .. .... ......... .. ... .. 4
Initial Objectives of OccupatIOn .. ... .. ........ ... .. ... .. ..... ... ........... 10
The Last Days : Capitulation ...... .. .......... ... .. .. ... ...... .. ... ...... . I I
Organization for O ccupation .. . ....... . .. .. ....... . ... . . ............. ... . . 12

Return of Surrender Delegation from Manila ...... ...... .. .. .. .. .. .... 19

Japanese Reactions ...... . .. .. ............. .. ............. .. .... ... .. .......... 23
Implementation of Operations " Blacklist " .......... .. .. ..... ..... .. .. 24
The Eve of Occupation .... .... .. .. .. .. .. ..... .. ...... .. .. ... . .. ... .. ....... . 25

CHAPTER II: TROOP MOVEMENTS, DISPOSITIONS AND

LOCATIONS
The Spearhead.... .... ... .... .... ... .... ........ ........ .......... ..... ....... 28
Triumphal Entry .... .... ..... .. ... ......... ..... .... ....... ...... .... ....... 39
The Occupation Firmly Established .. ...... .. ..... ... ...... ............. . 41
Sixth Army Occupation Movements ........ ..... ... ........ .. .. ... .... . 45
Japanese Reaction to Initial Occupation .. .. .... ... .. ................... 47
Eighth Army Occupation is Completed .... .. .... .. ............... .. .. . 53
Communications, Procurement and Requisition .. .. ... ... .... .. .. .. .. .. 55
Year-End Summary .... ... ..... ..... ...... . ..... " . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . 56
The Beginning of the Second Phase .. .. ............ .. .......... .. .. .. .. 57
Service Unit and Supply Reorganization .............. .. ...... .. ...... .. 58
British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) .... .............. 62
The Occupatlon Stabilized .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... .. ...... 65

CHAPTER III: THE COMMAND STRUCTURE: AFPAC,

FEC AND SCAP
Establishment of AFPAC: Army Forces in the Pacific .. .. .. .. .. .. 67
Establishment of SCAP : Supreme Commander or the
Allied Powers ...... ... . .......... ... ... ... ....... .......... ... ......... ... . 67
The Far Eastern Commission .... ... ................ .. ... ... .... ......... .. 69
The Allied Council fo r Japan .... .... ........................ ... ...... .. .. . 69
Organization of General Headquarters, SCAP .. .. .... .. ............. . 71
Functions of General H eadquarters, SCAP .. ........... .... .... ... ... . 73
The Civil (Non-Military) Staff Sections, SCAP .... .. .. .. ..... .. .... .. . 75
Foreign Diplomatic Missions .. .......... .... .. .. .. ...... .. .. .. .......... .. 82
Establishment and Missions of FEC : Far East Command .. ...... .. 82
Command Structure of General Headquarters, FEC .... .. .. .... ... .. . 84
vu
 CHAPTER IV: RELIEF OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES
Page
SCAP Directives Regarding Prisoners of War ................ ..... . 90
Formation of Recovery Teams ... ... .. ..... ... .... ..... ..... .......... .... 92
Preparation for Air Drops .... ............. .... ... .... .. ... .... .......... . 94
Location and Supply of Prisoner of War Camps ....... .... ...... . 96
Operation " Swifi: Mercy" .............. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. ... 99
Recovered Personnel Section in Action .. ...... ...... .... ....... ...... . 102
Operations of Medical Teams ........ ...................... ..... .. ... .. 109
Procedure Regarding Dead and Missing Prisoners of War .. .... 1l4
Final Processing of Ptlsoners ot War in Manila ...... .. ... ......... 115

CHAPTER V : DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT OF THE

JAPANESE ARMED FORCES
The General Demobilization Program ...... ........ ... ........ .. ...... . 117
Japanese Plans for Demobilization .. .... .. .. .... ... ....... ............. . 120
Demobilization of the Japanese Home Forces ........ ............... . 120
Demobilization ot Overseas Forces .. .. .. ......................... ....... 123
Reorganization of the Demobilization Machine'}' .... ........ .. .. .... 126
Progress of Demobilization .. .............. .... ...... .... .. .... ......... ... 127
The Process of Disarmament .... .. ... ......... ........... .. .......... .... . 134
Surrendered War Materiel: Disposition ... ............................. 136
Methods of Disposal ...... .......................................... ... .... . 140
Return ot Demilitarized Materiel to the Japanese .................. 142
Disposal of Japanese Fleet Units ............ ....... .. ........... ........ 143
CHAPTER VI: OVERSEAS REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS
The Task .. .. ................... .. .. ............... .... .. ..... ..... ..... ..... .. 150
Policies ............................................ ............. ...... .. ...... ... 151
The Plan ...... ..... .... ......... .. .................... ....... .. ...... ..... .... .. 151
First Phase : 17 Sep 45- 28 Feb 46 ................................... . 15 2
Second Phase: 1 Mar-15Ju l 46 ........ .. ...... ....... ........ ...... . 155
Third Phase: 16 July-31 Dec 46 .... .. .. .. .... .. ...... ... .. .. ....... .. 15 8
Fourth Phase: 1 Jan 47-31 Dec 48 ..... .. .. ....... .. .... .. .... ...... 159
Evacuation of Japanese from South Korea .. .... ........ ...... .. . , .... .. 161
Return of Koreans ............ ............................. ... , .............. . 164
Pacific Ocean Areas ........... ..... ................... . , .. .. .. ..... .... ... ... 166
Philippine Islands .......... .......... .. , . . , ..... ...... . , .. , .. ... " ... .. .. .... 168
Ryukyu Islands ........ ... , .... .... .... , ......... .... ..... ... .. . , ... ........... 169
China Theater .... ........... .... . , .. , ..... , .. ... , .... . , ....... .. , ... .. ... ... .. . 170
Southeast Asia .. .. ............................... ............. ... ..... , ....... 176
Australian Areas ..... ......... .. ............... ... ...... .. .... .. ....... .. ... .. 179
Soviet-Controlled Areas ............... , ........ .. ............ , .. , .... ...... 179
Soviet Indoctrination of PW's ... .. ...... .... , .... .... ...... .. ....... ..... 187
VIII
Summary: 1945 --- 1948 ................ , .. , .. ....... , ............ , ........ . 191
CHAPTER VII : THE EIGHTH ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT
SYSTEM Page
Concept of Military Government ... ...... ... ........ .... ... .... .. .. .... .. . 194
Formative Period ...... ... ... .... .. .. .............. .. ..... ......... .. .......... 198
Evolution of Organization: 1946- 1948 .. ....... ... .. ................ 20 1
Social Affairs Division .. ..... .... ..... .. ..... ......... .. .... ... ... .......... 203
Economic Division ............................. ...... ................... .. .. 2 I 2
Legal and Government Division .... .... ...... .... ... ... ..... . ....... ... .. 219
Finance and Civil Property Division ........... .. .. ... ... .... ....... .... 222
Procurement Demand .. .. ................ .. ....... ... .... ..... ..... ..... ... .. 227
General Conclusion ...... ......... ......... ............... ... .... .... .. ..... 23 0

CHAPTER VIII : OCCUPATION SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

MEASURES
Assignment of Responsibilities .. .. ...... .. .... ... ... ......... .... .. . ...... 231
Basic Plan for Civil Censorship ....... ..... .. ... .... ...... .. ....... ..... .. 232
Evolution of Civil (Occupanon) Intelligence ........... . .......... .. .... 233
Civil Intelligence Section .............. .. ............... .. .... .. ......... 233
Operations Branch ...... .... .. .... ........... ..... .... ........ .. ...... .... 233
Civil Censorship Detachment .. .. ..... .. ...... .. .. .... ... .. ......... .. .. 236
441st Counter Intelligence Corps .. .. ...... .. ....... ... .................. 241
Public Safety Division ...... .... ....... . ... .... ... ..... ......... .. ........ 244
Security Surveillance and Law Enforcement .... .. ... .... .. .... ... ...... 254
Internal Subversion .............. ................ . ........... .. .... ........ .. 256
Repatriation ... .. . .. . ....... ............ ... .... ... ....... .. ... .......... ..... .. 258
The Korean Minority Problem ...... .... .. .... .. .. .. ... ... ....... .. .... .. .260
The Japan Communist Parry ... .... " ....... .. .. ... ....... ... .. ..... .. .... . 264
Communist Infiltration of Repatriates .... .. ..... . .... .. ............. .. .265
CHAPTER IX: AIR AND NAVY COMPONENTS
Part I-Far East Air Forces: Initial Operations ..................... ... .. ..... 268
FEAF : Organization and Missions .... ........... .. . ............... .. . 270
Maintenance of the Air Force in Japan ......... .. ......... .. .... .. ...... 273
Aerial Mapping and Other Activities ...... .. ...... .. ........ .. .. .... .... 275
Troop Carrier Aviation and International Air Traffic .... ..... .. .. ... 275
FEAF-Present and Future ............ .................................... 275
Part II-U. S. Naval Command in the Far East : Initial Operations ...... 277
COMNAVJAP: Organization and Missions .............. .. ...... . 278
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka and Sasebo .. .. ............................. 28 I
Mine.sweeping Operations ...... .... ............. .......... ......... ... ..... 283
SCAJAP- Merchant Shipping .... ........ ... ............. .............. ..286
Repatriation ..... ...... .. ..... ...... .. ..... .. ..... .... ....... .... ..... .. .. .... ..288
Suppression of Illegal Traffic .... ... .... ........ .. .. ...... ........ ... ... .. .288
Miscellaneous Naval Activities: 1946-1948 ........................ 289
EPILOGUE ................... ... ..... ...... ..... .. ........... ... ..... ... ...... .. ... ........ ... 29 1
IX
 ILLUSTRATIONS
Plate Page
I Organization of AFPAC, for" Blacklist" Operation, July 1945 · .... .. ..... 3
2 " Blacklist": Concept of Phase I Operations ...... ... .. ... .................. 5
3 " Blacklist": Concept of Phase II Operations .... ...... ..... .... ..... .... .. 8
4 " Blacklist": Concept of Phase III Operations ..... ...... . .. ............. ... 9
5 Senior Commanders of the Occupation Forces ........ .... ... . ... ... .... ...... 13
6 USN Fleet Commanders at the Beginning of the Occupation ... ...... ... 15
7 Surrender Negotiations at Manila .. ................................. .. .......... ... 18
8 Surrender Negotiations at Manila ... ........ ...... ............ ... . .. .. ....... ...... 20
9 " Blacklist": Area of Initial Evacuation and Withdrawal of Major
Japanese Units ....... ... ................................................ .. .......... 22
10 Pre.occupation Party Arrives in Japan ........ .................................. .. 26
II The Occupation Begins, 30 August 1945 .. .. .. .................... .... ...... .... 30
12 MacArthur Takes the Surrender, 2 September 1945 .. ....................... 33
13 ' Surrender Day for the Japanese, 2 September '945 ......... .. .. ...... ...... 37
14 Tokyo-The End of the Road, 8 September 1945 .. .... .......... .......... 40
15 Prefectures of Japan : The Principal Political Subdivisions ...... .. .. .. .... 43
16 Location of Major Ground Units, 30 September 1945 ... .. ........ .. ...... 46
17 Sixth U. S. Army Commander ............ .................. .. .......... .. ... ... .. 48
18 GI: Ambassador of Goodwill .. ... .. .... .. ... .. .......... ... ......... .. .......... 50
19 Location of Major Ground Units, 31 October 1945 ................ .. ..... . 54
20 Location of Major Ground Units, I January 1946 ... .... . .. .. .... . .. ..... .. 59
21 The British Commonwealth Occupation Force, March 1946 .............. 61
22 Location of Major Ground Units, 6 December 1946 ...... ...... .... .. .... .. .. 63
23 Organization of GHQ, AFPAC, 6 April 1945 .... ................... .... ..... 68
24 Area Controlled by SCAP .. .. .... ... .. ...... ..... ...... .. ...... .. ..... ........ ....... 70
25 The Machinery of the Occupation of Japan from the Far Eastern
Commission through SCAP to the Japanese People, December 1948 .. .. 72
26 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
31 December 1947 . ...... ... .. .. ........... .... ........ .. .. ................. ....... 77
27 Foreign Diplomatic Missions and Agencies in Japan, September 1948 ...... 83
28 General Headquarters, Far East Command, December 1947·· ....... . ........ 85
29 Territorial Subdivisions, FEC, December 1947 ..... .......... ............... .... 87
30 Senior Allied Commanders Released from Prisoner of War Camps .... 91
31 Prisoner of War Relief Missions ................... .... ... ... ...... ........... . ... 98
32 Barracks, Omori Prisoner of War Camp, Tokyo. 30 August 1945 .... .. .. 101
33 Prisoner of War Camps in Japan, August-September 1945 ..... ...... .. . 103
34 Red Cross Duties, September 1945 ... ........................... ..... .. .. .... ... 107
35 Released Prisoners of War, 5 September 1945 .. . .... .. ..... ............... .. . IIO
36 Organization 01 First and Second Demobilization Ministries.
14 June 1946 .. . ............. . ....... . ....... ... .. ...... .... .... ... .... ... ... ........ 121
x
Plate Page
37 Disposition of Japanese Army Ground Forces in the Home-
land at the Time 01 Capitulation, 18 August 1945 ........ .. ... ....... .. 124
38 Japanese Army-Navy Air Dispositions, 15 August 1945 .. .... .... ....... . 125
39 The Demobilization O rgans of the Welfare Ministry, 1 June 1948 .... .... .. 128
40 Organization of the Demobilization Board, June 1946-0ctober 1947 .. .. 129
41 Japanese Coastal Defenses, 18 August 1945 ............................ .. ...... 132
42 Japanese Airfields, 15 August 1945 .... ............ .. .... ........ .. ...... .. ........ 133
43 Scrapping of Japanese Equipment, October 1945 .. ....... .................... 137
44 Disposal of Weapons and Ammunition, October 1945 .. ........ ........ .. .. 139
45 Disposal of Weapons and Ammunition, October 1945 ...... .. .............. 141
46 Disposition of Major Japanese Fleet Units, 1 September 1945 ...... .... . 144
47 The Japanese Light Cruiser lbuki in Drydock at Sasebo-64 percent
Scrapped, 14 March 1947 · .. · ........ ................. · .... .. ...... · ............... 146
48 Japanese to be Repatriated, August 1945 .. .. .... ...... ..................... ...... . 148
49 Repatriation Begins .... ....... ... .. .. ... .... .. ............ ........ , ... ................... 153
50 Shanghai to Y okosuka ......... ......... .. .. ......... ...... .. .. .. .. ......... .. .. ...... 156
51 Soldiers, Sailors and Displaced Civilians .......................... : ............ ... 160
52 Debarkation: Beppu and Uraga .................................................. .. 163
53 From Port to Home ............... ............... .. .......... ... ............ .... .... ... 167
54 Flotsam of War: Displaced Civilians ................................ .. .......... 171
55 Repatriates from China and Manchuria ..................................... .... .. . 175
56 Repatriation Shipping, October 1945-September 1948 .. .. .................... 177
57 Repatriates from Soviet Territory ..... .. ...... .... ................. ..... .... ...... ... 180
58 Return to Home and a New Life .... ............................. ................... 182
59 Repatriates [rom Soviet Prisoner of War Camps, 1949 ...... .. .. ...... .... .. 185
60 Repatriates [rom Soviet Prisoner of War Camps, 1949 .... ....... .......... . 188
61 Japanese Press Expresses Opinion on Soviet Indoctrination of
Repatriates, 1949 .... ....... ..... ....................... · ............ . .............. . 190
62 Principal Reception Centers and Repatriates Processed,
September 1945-December 1948 .. ................................. ... .. ....... . 192
63 Japan's Emperor and the New Democracy .............. .... ............. .... ..... 196
64 Disposition of Military Government Units, January 1946 ..... ..... .. ..... ... 197
65 Organization of Military Government in Japan, July 1948 ............... .. .. .200
66 Military Government in Japan, January 1946- July 1948 .. ...... .. ........ .. .. 202
67 Functions of Military Government Units in Japan, July 1948 ........ ........ 204
68 Modernized Civil Education, March 1946 ...... .. ...... .... .............. ...... .. 207
69 Control of Medical Supplies and Distribution of Army Rations .. ............ 210
70 Rehabilitation of Industry .. .... ........................................ .. ..... " ...... . 2 I 5
7I Blackxnarket and Precious Metals .... ....... .. ........ .... ...... .. ................... 2 18
72 Women's Franchise: Milestone of Politics, April 1946 ...... ................ 221
73 Field Inspection of Laboratories by Technical Intelligence Detachment,
G-2, GHQ, FEC ........ ........... .... ... .... .... ............. .. ................... 225

XI
 Plate Page
74 Military Government Team in Action, February 1948 ....... ..... .... ..... ..... 228
75 Organization of Civil (Occupation) Intelligence Division,
15 October 1946 .. .... .. ............................ ....... .... ......... ... .. ....... 234
76 Censorship, July 1947 ... ...... ... ... .. ..... .... ......... ...... . ................. .. ... 237
77 Comment Sheets Disseminated by CCD to User Agencies:
Comparison between June 1947 and June 1948 .... ........ ... ..... ... .. .... .242
78 441st CIC Districts and Field Detachments, 4 October 1948 ............... .245
79 Police Training Program, 1948 .. .... .. ... .. ... .... .............. ... ... ............. .246
80 Crime Statistics and Police Effectiveness: 1924-1948 ........ .. .. ... .. ... .... 248
81 Fuchu Prison, Tokyo: Improvements Made, '945 - 1947 ...... .... .... .... ..250
82 Fire Prevention ............. .... .... .............. ........... ........... ... ....... .. ... . 252
83 Relationship of Counter Intelligence, Civil Censorship, Military Police
and Military Government Detachments, 15 December 1948 .... ... ...... 253
~ Repatriation Interrogations, August 1948 ... .. . ... .. ... .............. ... ...... .... .259
85 Repatriation Interrogations, August 1948 ..... ..... .... ...... .... .. .... .... .. ..... .261
86 Analysis of Population, Military and Police Strength by Prefecture,
15 December 1948 ........ ............. .......... ..... ........ .. .. .. .... .. ..... ... .. 266
87 Fifth U. S. Air Force Zones of Responsibility, '945-'947 ...... .. ... .. ... .. 269
88 Organization of FEAF Command and Headquarters Staff, 1947 ..... ....... 272
89 Occupation Missions- FEAF .. .. .. .. ... ......... ..... ................. .. ... ....... ..274
90 Pacific Military Airways, November 1948 .. .... ..... .. ..... ............ ....... ..... 276
9' COMNAVJAP: Task Organization, Task Force 96, '947 .. ...... ... . .. .... 279
92 Fleet Activities, Japan .... ..... ..... ... . ... ... .. ....... ... .... .. ................. ...... .282
93 Mine Situation in the Westem Pacific, 20 February 1946 ...... ............... .285
94 Moored and Influence Mines Swept, August 1945- April 1946 ...... ...... 287
95 Japanese Newspaper Editorial Summarizes Four Years of
Occupation, 1945-1949 .. .. ....... ............... .. .... .... ....... ... ... ..... .... 292

XII
 CHAPTER I
PRELUDE TO OCCUPATION

From Melbourne, five thousand miles away' would launch an amphibious assault by veteran
at the bottom of the world, General Mac- Sixth Army troops against southern Kyushu to
Arthur by mid-1945 had smashed his way secure the needed beachhead.' Tremendous
back to the very outposts of the Japanese hammer blows by air and sea would soften
homeland itself: Buna, Biak, the Philip- up the formidable objective before the troops
pine Sea, Leyte-a tremendous itinerary of went in. Then, in Operation "Coronet,"
two and a half years against a fanatically three corps including eight divisions of the
resisting foe. Eighth Army, and two more corps of the
At the end of June, he paused to assemble First Army would be catapulted into the heart
his forces, grown hom scattered, relatively of the Tokyo Plain itself.
green American troops' and a small but It was expected to be costly." The enemy
battle-hardened section of Australians, into would be fighting in prepared positions. He
a mighty concentration of power. ' On the would be fighting for his home, his family.
ground, in the air, and on the sea they He had nothing to gain by surrender, every-
were massing for what would be the final thing to lose by defeat.
drive against the Japanese stronghold, the The much publicized" invincibility" of the
homeland archipelago.- Nipponese soldier had been blasted, however,
Enemy resistance was to be pulverized in an during the long campaign that started over the
invasion drive that would begin in the fall of Kokoda Trail and had now reached a point
1945 and be continued in a second phase in within easy flight range of Tokyo. He bled
the spring of 1946. Operation" Olympic" and died like any other mortal, but of

For detailed account of major operations, see Vol. Iof this series.
2 At the time of his arrival in Australia in March 1942, General MacArthur found approximately 25 ,000

American troops, mostly of service classifications, scattered from Western Australia to New Caledonia, a thousand
miles east of the Australian mainland.
3 Initially, the Australian 6th Division, less two brigades, and the 7th Division. Both served in the ,Middle East.
4 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO.4, Annex 3, "Troop Lists," '5 Aug 45 (S).
5 Operation" Downfall" was the over-all plan for the final conquest of Japan; "Olympic" was the first sub·
division thereof, "Coronet" the second. (l) Rad CX· , 7032, CINCAFPAC to CINCPOA, 26 May 45. In CofS,
GHQ 640 (Navy); (2) Conf of the CinC, USAFPAC and CINCPAC, Held at Manila, P I on ,6 May 45 . In
CofS GHQ 653 (Navy).
6 In recommending courses of action to the War Department as early as April 1945, the CinC had noted that
there would be an anticipated deficiency of some 36,000 hospital beds, even counting everything chen available in the
Paci6c, should " Olympic" and "Coronet" be adopted. (Rad (TS) C.'4442, CINCAFPACto WARCOS, 20 Apr
45. In AFPAC SlB2.)

1
late it had been found that he would Arthur based his plans on the assumption that
surrender.' Could it be that other tales of it would be his responsibility to impose sur-
the seemingly immovable determination of render terms upon all elements of the Japanese
the Japanese people from the lowest coolie to military forces within Japan, and that he would
the Emperor himself, likewise had a basis more also be responsible for coordinating and enfor-
of propaganda than of fact? In other words, cing upon the Japanese Government and High
could there be a sudden collapse? Or even Command the demands of Allied commanders
a total surrender of the Japanese military forces in other areas.
before the scheduled launching by General Operation " Blacklist" called for the progres-
MacArthur of that final, costly drive into the sive occupation of fourteen major areas in Japan
very heart of the homeland? Every contin- and from three to six areas in Korea so that
gency had to be provided for. Allied forces could exert undisputed military,
While operations "Olympic" and "Coro- economic, and political control. These opera-
net" delineated the vast concept of occupation tions would employ twenty-two divisions and
by force, another plan just as complete and two regimental combat teams in addition to
arranged for easy conversion from the basic air and naval elements, utilizing all of the
concepts of "Olympic" and " Coronet," U. S. forces available in the Pacific Theater
emerged from the Staff planning precincts of at the time. Additional forces from outside
General Headquarters: this was Operation the theater would be required if occupation
" Blacklist," General MacArthur's proposal to duties were to be assumed in Formosa or in
meet that other possibility, the sudden collapse China.
or surrender of the Japanese Government and Operation" Blacklist" provided for maximum
High Command. (Plate NO.1) but discreet use of existing Japanese political
Operation " Blacklist" made its official but and military organizations. These agencies
guarded appearance in top commands in July still had effective control of the population,
1945; actually, it had been in the making since and they probably could be employed to
May of that year.' advantage by the Allies. If the existing
The first edition was published 16 July and governmental machinery were swept away,
was presented four days later at a conference the difficulties of control would be enor-
with ranking service representatives of the mously multiplied and additional occupation
Pacific Ocean Areas at Guam." General Mac- forces would be needed. .• The language
7 Toward the end of the war the Japanese were paying some attention to propaganda leaflets as well as U safe
conduct" leaflets issued by FELO, the propaganda agency originally associated with Allied InteUigence Bureau (Vol.
V, Int Ser, GHQ, FEC, Opnations of the Allied Tram/ator and Intupr"" Section (R), Doc. App. VII. See also Vol. N,
lnt Set, GHQ. FEC, Operations of the Allied Intelligence Burellu (R), Sum of AlB Activ, p. 115 .) In addition, between
thirteen and 6fteen hundred Japanese surrendered en masse July 1945 to the 93d US Division at lVIorotai when brought
into that base by a US Navy escort which had intercepted the Japanese hospital ship Tishibdna MdTU actually loaded
with troops and contraband instead pf patients.
8 Rad C.15431, CINCAFPAC to AGWAR, 4 May 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 381/61. GHQ was aware in top
:.:cret intelligence channels of current Japanese peace feelers through its embassy in Russia.
9 (I) Later revised. See GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Oudine Plan for "Blacklist" Opns (2d ed), 25 Jul 45 (TS);
(2) CINCPOA Memo for Record, 23 Jul 45 (TS). In G·3 GHQ Adm 380/6-3 P.
10 (I) GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Oudine Plan for " Blacklist " Opns(2ded), 25 JuI45(TS); (2) RadC.25B92
CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC, 16Jul 45. In GHQ Adm 381 /61 ; (3) RadC-28793, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS,
27 Jul 45 . In CofS GHQ WD 1088.

2
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SIXTH ARMY TENTH ARMY EIGHTH ARMY WESTERN PACIFIC FAR EAST AIR FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC FIRST ARMY

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COMMANDING GENERAL COMMANDING GENERAL COMMANDING GENERAL GARRISONS
SERVICE COMMAND SERVICE COMMAND SERVICE COMMAND
SIX TEN EIGHT AS ASSIGNED
- L ____
barrier alone represented an effective bar to ed, while 35,000 civilian volunteers likewise
administration. would have to be disarmed. '.
A preliminary directive of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff conformed generally to a collateral Concept of Operations: " Blacklist"
staff study prepared by Pacific Fleet Headquar-
ters under the code term "Campus " ." That It was a basic policy in "Blacklist" to
study ptovided for entry into Japan by United delegate authority and responsibility to
States Army forces only after the Navy had designated army commanders and their corres-
made an emergency occupation of Tokyo and ponding naval task force commanders to the
had completely deployed occupation forces in greatest extent consistent with central coordi-
the principal parts. General MacArthur agreed nation by General Headquarters. However, the
that immediately after capitulation the United plan left nothing to chance. It could be
States Fleet should move forward, seize control assumed that at best there would be an attitude
of Japan's home waters, take positions in of non-cooperation in Japan and at worst, armed
critical localities, and begin minesweeping ope- resistance in many parts of the main islands,
rations, but this was considered to be merely a despite such proclamations for the cessation of
prelude for landings by strong, coordinated hostilities as would be required of the Em-
ground and air forces of the Army, prepared to peror. '. Consequently, the commitment of
overcome any possible opposition. forces was stipulated to be sufficient to reduce
General MacArthur considered that naval completely any local opposition, to establish
forces were hardly designed to effect the occu- bases at the strategic points outlined, to seize
pation of an enemy country whose army was control of the higher echelons of government
still in existence; the occupation should rather in both Japan and Korea, and to immobilize
proceed along sound tactical lines, with each the armed forces of Japan. It was planned to
branch of the service performing its appropriate organize these strategic centers with utmost
miSSIOn. General MacArthur objected to speed in order to make them service bases
major reliance on airborne landings because from which air and ground action could be
they involved what he considered to be unwar- brought to bear wherever the exigencies of the
ranted hazards. He saw no reason for hasty situation might require.
or rash action. Occupation by a weak force Second priority for occupation would be
might encourage local opposition, with serious restricted to strategic points to establish control
repercussions among the bomb-shattered popu- of remaining major political centers and avenues
lation." It was estimated that there would be of sea communications.
in excess of 1,700,000 regular combat service- A third priority for occupation would be
men to be disarmed in Japan proper and more concerned with areas for the establishment of
than 3,200,000 civilian defense volunteers. In control of food supply and of principal overland
Korea about 270,000 regulars could be expect- and coastwise communications.

II Rad WX-17064! 14, JCS to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, 14 Jun 45.

t2 (I) CINCPAC to CINCPOA, Joint Staff Study" Campus," 9 Aug 45; (2) Rads C-29"35 and C-28810,
CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, 27 .lui 45.
13 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p. 4.
14 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO.4, Annex 4, Essential Elms of Enemy Info, 15 Aug 45 (S).

4
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PLATE NO.2
" Blacklist" : Concept of Phase I Operations
 Objectives selected for occupation in the The directed occupations would permit con-
theee priorities or phases outlined were :" trol of the political, economic, and military life
of the two countries. The areas designated in
PHASE l-IGznto Plain, Sareb<>-Nagafaki, Ko-
be-Ofaka--Kyoto, Ke,jo (Korea), Japan included 60 percent of the population,
Aomori-Omindlo. 80 percent of the industrial capacity and 48
(Plate No.2) percent of the food production. Those in
PHASE Il-Japan: Shimonofeki-Fukuoka, Korea included 39 percent of the population,
Nagoya, Sapporo (Hok-
18 percent of the industrial capacity, and 44
kaido).
percent of the food production.
-Korea, FUfan. (Plate No . J)
PHASE Ill-Japan: Hiroshima-Kurt, Koch, To accomplish Phase I objectives, it was
(Shikoku), Okayama, TlU- planned in general to use the forces already
ruga, Olomari, Senda;, designated in "Olympic" plus some elements
Niigdla. from" Coronet." A total of 644,000 troops
-Korea: Gum<tn-Zenfhu. were earmarked as available. These included
(Plate NO.4) 251,800 of the Sixth Army and 308,700 of the
Additional points under Phases II and III Eighth Army. ,6 (Of this total 83,500 were
would be occupied by available troops as committed for the Korean Occupation.)
deemed necessary by anny commanders Itt There also were roughly 62,000 available
accomplishment of their missions. from the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). '7

15 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p.8.
16 Ibid, Ann... 3d (I).
17 Occupation units, target dates and objective :ircas for Japanese main islands only were as follows:
UNIT ARMY TARGET DATE AREA
Elms XI Corps Eighth 2 Sep Tokyo
tIth Al B Div Eighth 15 Sep Sendai
27th Inf Div Eighth 3 Sep Tokyo
1St Cay Div Eighth 3 Sep Tokyo
I 12th Cay RCT Eighth 3 Sep Tokyo
Amedcal Diy Eighth 8 Sep Tateyama Bay
43d Inf Div Eighth 13 Sep Yokohama
Elms XIV Corps Eighth I, Sep Yokohama
Elms IX Corps Eighth 26 Sep Hokkaido
77th Inf Div Eighth 4 Oct Otaru
But Inf Div Eighth 3 Oct Aomori
t58th RCT Eighth 2. OCt Yokohama
Elm. X Corps Sixth 3 Oct Kurt

24th Inf Div Sixth 22 Oct Kochi 8< Okayama

41St Inf Div Sixth 3 Oct Kurt &. Hiroshima
Elms V Amphib Corps Sixth 22 Sep Sasebo
5th Mar Diy Sixth 22 Sep Sasebo 8< Nagasaki
pd Inf Diy Sixth 15 Oct Fukuoka 8< ShUnon~
2d Mar Div Sixth 26 Sep Nagasaki
Elms I Corps Sixth 25 Sep Osaka
33d Inf Div Sixth 27 Sep Kobe 8< Kyoto
6th Inf Div Sixth 23 Oct Osaka or Nagoya
25th Inf Diy Sixth 2 Oct Nagoya
(From GHQ SCAP Daily Sit Rpt No. t5, .2 Sep 45.)

6
 Operations to accomplish the three phases Japan proper. Th.ater Command, SWPA.
of occupation constituted the " B" or " Baker" t_ Sixth Army
Landing forets, Kyushu, Shikoku, and
series conducted by the United States Army
W estern Honshu area.
Forces, Pacific, with individual operations de- Operations 0/ Occupdtion Forces, Sdme dred.
signated by numbers within blocks of twenty PreparatIon of Sixth Army elements from
assigned each Army concerned, and B-Day Western Padfic.
designated by the Commander in Chief for the Mounting of elemenu transported und"
initiation of the operations. "Baker " assign- Sixth Army control.
2. Tenth Army"
ments were: Block r to 20, Sixth Army
Landing jorces, Korea.
operations; Block 20 to 40, Eighth Army ; Operations of OccupatiollForces, Idmeared.
Block 40 to 60, Tenth Army.'· Preparation of Tenth Army elements
"Baker-Sixty" was the alternate plan for from Western Pacific.
" Baker-Twenty." " Baker-Twenty" required Mounting of elements transported und..
Tenth Army control.
initial amphibIous landings by XI Corps in
3. Eighth Army
the area of the Tokyo Plain (Kanto), followed Landing forces, North.m Honshu , Hok-
by XIV Corps landings in northern Honshu. kaido, Karafuto."
" Baker-Sixty" called for air landings by the I rth Operattons of Occupation Forces,same area.
Airborne Division and the 27th D ivision in Preparation of Eighth Army eiemenu from
the vicinity of Tokyo, followed by XI Corps Western Pacific.
MoulI/ing of elements transported under
amphibious landings in the Tokyo Bay area.'"
Eighth Army control.
Utilization of the total forces at the com- 4. First Arm) (when a.ailable)
mand of General MacArthur to effect the PreparatIons for jurth.r operations as
Occupation was established as follows: » direaed.
5. Far East Air Forces
United Slates Forces Land-bared air support, "Blacklist" opera-
hons.
Troop carrier operations.
a. United States Army Forces, Pacific
PreparatIon of FEAF element, for
Command of U. S. Army ",SOUTees in th.
displacement to Japan and Korea.
Pacific. (Except Alaskan Department, Establishment of FEAF elements in
USASTAF and South.ast Pacific). Opera- designated locations.
tiom of U. S. Army Forces, "Blacklist" 6. United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific
optTdlions. Preparation and mounting of u.s. Army
Command of AFPAC Occupation Forces Forces from Middle Pacific for CINCAFPAC
and imposition of surrender terms m ctIIlgned as directed.
areas of responsibility. Appro.al of repatria- Logistic support and administrati>e control
tion of Japanese Forces and nationals to of U. S. Army Forces in Middle Pacific.

18 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist .. Opns (2d cd), 25 Jul 45 (TS).
19 The decision to effect extensive landings by the I Ith Al B Division was in consequence of General MacArthur's
conviction that any show of naval landing strength should be accompanied by similar army (orees which eventually
would be better prepared and serviced to con stitute a permanent occupying force. (Rad C· 30508, CINCAFPAC to
WARCOS, 3 Aug 45. In CofS GHQ WD 1099.)
'0 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Oulline Plan for " Blackli .. " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), pp. 10- II.

21 Occupation mission subsequently assigned to XXIV Corps.

22 The proposed occupation of southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) was purely speculative since high-level negotiations
turning over Sakhalin and the Kueiles to the Soviets were not at that time known to theater commanders. This was
one of the famous Yalta concessions.

7
 f

A P N

S E

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£ A
/
/
c H • ~ /
• LEG END
5 £ A • I /
I / PHASE II OCCUPATI ONS
AND ALLOCAT IONS
/
I PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS

I AND AVAILABLE FORCES

" ........ \ / / JAPAN AND KOREA

""""~L/./ """-"1 c;owf-.. c;oIIlC: "IIO.o((;lt01O

W PHILI
(UV,uIOHS I" 'UI
APPROXIMATE SCALE I :1,000,000

o MI 100 IMI tOO no 100 iIIIL('

PLATE NO. 3
" Blacklist": Concept of Phase II Operations
 x
i"lltr
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on w

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LEGEND
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AFPAC RESERVE
PHASE mDESIGNATION
OCCUPATlON- Sf 25
C H N ADOITIONAL OBJECTIVE
•
5 A I
RE - DEPLOYED PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS

AVAILABLE FORCES •
a
~.
I DIVISIONS
IN JAPAN KOREA
I
. AS AFPAC RESERvE
\
~CT I RECEIVED
JAPAN AND KOREA
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UV.flO/tt Ifj 'IU
APPIIOXIIo1AT[ SCALE I &,000,000

PLATE NO. 4
" Blacklist" : Concept of Phase III Operations
 7. United Statts Arm')' Forces, Western Paofic in character. From that point on, there would
Logistic ,upport of U. S. Army Forces, inevitably be a progressive fusion of the
Westem Pacific. military with civil and political aspects of the
Logi,tic $Upport of" Blackli,, " operations. nation which would also become the respon-
U.S. Garrisons, WesternPaciftc, as directed.
sibility of the Commander in Chief. For
Preparation and mounting of Base Ser~ice
some months, however, control would prob-
element, transported under USAFWESPAC
ably be direct and rigid. Accordingly, it was
control.
designated in the plan that army commanders
Di'position of captured Japanese war
material as directed.
would have assigned to them certain general
8. Na.al Forces, SWPA and special tasks common to all occupation
Prep4Tation and mounting of Na.al and localities. " Under the heading of "General
Marine elements, SWPA, for CINCPAC. Tasks" the following were outlined:
b. United States Pacific Fleet (a, <rrranged) a. Establishment of control of the armed
Na.al co,"r and ,upport, "Blackli,t" forces and civil population in areas
operations. assigned and imposition thereon of
Na.al and amphibiou, phase, "Blacklist" prescribed terms of surrender requiring
operation" including Sixth, Tenth and Eighth immediate military action.
Army operations. b. Preparation for establishment of sepa-
Prep4Tation and mounting of U. S. Na.al rate post·war governments and armies
and Marine elements from PDA.
of Occupation in Japan Proper and
Theater Command, PDA.
Korea as subsequently directed.
c. United States Army Strategic Air Foret
The initial " Special Tasks" envisioned for
(as 4Tranged)
army commanders were as follows:
Tran,port of troop' by air a, arranged.
a. Destruction of hostile elements which
VHB operations.
might oppose by military action the
The Commander in Chief realized that there imposition of surrender terms upon the
would need to be a considerable reorganization Japanese.
of AFPAC forces in order to properly strength- b. Disarmament and demobilization of
en the Occupation spearheads. Plans for such Japanese armed forces and their auxil-
changes were drawn up and were to be an- iaries as rapidly as the situation would
nounced within a few days." permit. Establishment of control of
military resources insofar as would be
practicable with the means available.
Initial Objectives of Occupation c. Control of the principal routes of coast·
wise communication, in coordination
The initial primary missons of the Occupa- with naval elements as arranged with
tion forces were set out as being the disarma- the appropriate naval commander.
ment of the Japanese armed forces and the d. Institution of military government, if
establishment of control of communications." required, and the insurance that law
These initial missions were P!JCely military and order would be maintained among

23 See Ch. III.

24 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacldist" Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), p. 8.
25 Ibid, pp. )2"4,

10
 the civilian population. Facilitation of tured enemy combat materials, including docu-
peaceful commerce, particulatly that ments, the proper securing of industrial
which would contribute to the subsis- properties against damage, and the preservation
tence, clothing and shelter of the of public utilities.'" It was emphasized that in
population. view of the limited forces which would have to
e. Recovery, relief, and repatriation of occupy a country of roughly eighty millions,
Allied prisoners of war and civilian army commanders would make all possible use
internees without delay. of Japanese demobilized forces within the
f. The securing and safeguarding of bounds of security, and would take all steps to
intelligence information of value to the insure that public servants, such as the civil
United States and Allied Nations. police, railway workers, communication work-
Arrangement with the U. S. Navy for ers, utilities operators and public health offi-
mutual interchange and unrestricted cials, not only remained at their tasks but in-
access by each Service to matters of tensified their efforts to insure a continuation
interest thereto. of all functions under what was certain to be a
g. Suppression of activities of individuals period of great stress." It was imperative that
and organizations inimical to the opera- discipline should be maintained, both among
tions of the Occupation forces. Appre- the armed forces of Japan and the civil popula-
hension of war criminals, as directed. tion. Accordingly, provisions for enforcing the
h. Support of elements of the initial requirements of the Occupation authorities were
Occupation forces in the occupation made; these were strictly in accordance
of subsequent objectives, as directed. with the established rules of land warfare, and
1. Preparation for the imposition of terms were so specified.·8 Looting by Occupation
of surrender beyond immediate military forces and all other forms of violence against
requirements. the habitants of the country were expressly
J. Preparation for the extension of control forbidden .
over the Japanese as required to imple-
ment policies for post-war occupation The Last Days: Capitulation
and government, when prescribed.
k. Preparation for the transfer of responsi- General Headquarters was prepared to press
bilities to agencies of the post-war the final act-occupation by force, or occupa-
governments and armies of occupation, tion by acquiescence.
when established. Which would it be: Operation" Olympic"
Army commanders would issue their own or Operation " Blacklist" ?
detailed orders for the accomplishment of these The possibility of surrender now was openly
general and special tasks. The orders would discussed in the world's capitals. On 27 July
cover such matters as the safeguarding of cap- the Allied Powers called upon the Japanese

26 Operations Instructions NO. 4 included specific detailed instructions which envisioned a comprehensive picture
of conditions to be found and methods of dealing therewith.
27 Actually. upon entry of US Public Health and Welfare units , it was found to the astonishment of the
commanders of these units that there existed no public health plan for Japan i responsibility appeared to be a matter of
desultory community interest and action.
28 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist " Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), App. IV, Annex 5h,
Enforcement of Surrender Terms.

II
Government through the Potsdam Declaration the unconditional surrender by the Japanese
to cease the struggle, to throw out militarism Imperial Government. On the same day, Gen-
and to invite the establishment of democratic eral MacArthur was named Supreme Com-
processes under the direction of an Allied Com- mander for the Allied Powers and was charged
mander in Chief to be named. with taking all steps he deemed necessary and
Tokyo was silent and remained silent. Ap- proper to effectuate the surrender terms with
parently it would be " Olympic." the least practicable delay."
Then came 0800 of 6 August 1945 and the Simultaneously on that date two vital direct-
first atomic bomb unleashed against an inhab- ives emanated from headquarters of the Su-
ited place." Three days later the Union of preme Commander in Manila. One cancelled
Soviet Socialist Republics declared war against Operation" Olympic" and ordered implementa-
the staggering empire. On the same day the tion of the initial phases of Operation " Black-
second atomic bomb was dropped, this time list." The other ordered the Emperor to take
against Nagasaki. immediate effective steps for the cessation of
Stunned by these developments, and well hostilities and for the opening of radio com-
aware that continued large-scale resistance munications between Manila and Tokyo."
would be impossible, the Japanese Government With regard to the latter, exasperating and
indicated receptiveness to the terms of the suspicious delays occurred and it was some days
Potsdam Declaration. before a reliable channel was established. As
General MacArthur shifted quickly to meet soon as this was done, however, General Mac-
probable exigencies. He alerted Lt. Gen. Arthur radioed a demand for the dispatch to
Robert L. Eichelberger of the Eighth Army, Manila of a responsible Imperial Mission with
Gen. Walter Krueger of the Sixth, Gen. Joseph full powers to receive details of the terms of
W . Stilwell of the Tenth, and Lt. Gen. John surrender and to provide GHQ with pertinent
R. Hodge of the XXIV Corps to hold their information which would secure the safety of
commands in readiness for the Occupation Allied prisoners of war, and eliminate any
of Korea and Japan; in other words, to be capability to resist occupation forces."
prepared for the immediate implementation of
" Blacklist," as somewhat augmented by a new Organization For Occupation
edition put into the hands of Army command-
ers early in August.'· Simultaneously with the order to implement
President Truman announced on 15 August "Blacklist," SCAP initiated a thorough re-
29 For details of these historic days, see SWPA Ser, Vol. I, The Campaigns of MacArthur in /h~ Pacific.
30 The final editions of " Blacklist" plan were dated 8 August 1945· The perfected and expanded plan was
the product of a war-hardened, cohesive General Staff at the zenith of its efficiency. This would be no haphazard
occupation, no "trial and error effort." The Commander in Chief's determination that history would regard the
Occupation as an enlightened military effort by a Christian nation to assist rather than destroy a fallen foe, yet do so
with firmness, efficiency and dispatch was reflected in the wealth of the directive planning outlined in the various
annexes of "Blacklist." Foresight based on critical military studies and research into the customs and reactions of
the Japanese was evident in the detailed measures to be taken by all commands in regard to counterintelligence,
communications, engineering projects, military government. enforcement of surrender terms, control. disarmament
and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces. and care and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian
internees.
31 Rad (TS)WX-49042, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, t4 Aug 45. In CofS GHQ AFPAC WD 1I22 (TS).
32 See Vol. I, this series.
33 Rad 2'501, SCAP to}apanese Emp.'o" I}G, and I} GHQ, '5 Aug 45.

12
 Gen. Walter Krueger Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger
Sixth U. S. Army Eighth U. S. Army
1943-1946 1944-1948

Vice Adm. R. M. Griffin Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead

Naval Forces Far East Far East Air Forces
1946-- 1948 '945- 1949
PLATE NO.5
Senior Commanders of the Occupation Forces
 organization of AFPAC forces to provide 6th, 24th, 25th, ]Jd, 41I1 and 98th Di.i-
strength where it would be most needed by the rion;, 2d, 3d and 5th Marine Di.iriOnI
Sixth and Eighth Armies and the XXIV Corps (2) Eighth U. S. Army
(then with the Tenth Army in the Ryukyus)." Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, U. S. Army
The Ilth Airborne Division had already IX, Xl and XIV CarpI
passed to the control of the Commanding 27th , 43d, 77th, 8lIt and Americal Di.i-
General of the Eighth Army, and had moved rions, 1st Ca')loiry Di"ision, lIth AiTbor~
by air with fUll combat equipment from Lipa Di"is;o1J, 112th Ca'Yalry ReT, 1581n[an.
in Luzon to Okinawa, in a record time of forty- try RCT.
four hours. The Division was preparing to (3) XXIV CarpI
spearhead the invasion forces . Four days later, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, U. S. Army
certain additional adjustments were made. The 7 th , ¢th and 40th Di.iIionI.
Eighth Army, which would occupy Japan alone (4) Tenth U. S. Army
from 28 August to 22 September, was given Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, U. S. Army
the IX and XI Corps, in addition to the XIV As constituted.
Corps which it already controlled." The Sixth (5) FirIl U. S. Army
Army was increased primarily by the addition Gen. Courtney B. Hodge;, U. S. Army
of the V Amphibious Corps, with its 2d, 3d As laur constituted.
and 5th Marine Divisions, located in Saipan, (6) Far EaIt Air Force;
Oahu, Guam and Hawaii. General Krueger, Gen. George C. Kenney, U. S. Army
Commanding the Sixth Army, also assumed 5th,7th and 13th Air Force;.
control of the X Corps, the 6th Division from (7) U nited State; Army Force; Middle Pacific
the Eighth Army, and the 98th Division from Lt. Gen. Robert C. RichardIon, U. S. Army
AFMIDPAC. Simultaneously, control of both As constituted.

these divisions passed to I Corps, already under (8) United State; Army Forces WeIlern Pacific
the Sixth Army. Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, U. S .. Army
Control of the XXIV Corps on Okinawa AI conItituted.
passed from the Tenth Army to AFPAC,
General MacArthur assigned the responsi-
because it was to operate independently as the
bility for the security of the Ryukyus to
Occupation force in Korea south of the 38°
ASCOM-I and directed AFWESPAC to as-
parallel.
sume combat responsibilities in the Southwest
The total U. S . land and air forces now
Pacific Area. The Commanding General of
available to the Commander in Chief for Occu-
AFWESPAC established two commands to
pation operations and all other responsibilities
maintain security in the Philippines: the Luzon
in his area of command were as follows :"
Area Command and the Southern Islands Area
(1) Sixth U. S. Army Command.
Gen. Walter Krueger, U. S. Arm y A recapitulation as of 15 August of the
I and X CarpI and V AmphibiouI Corp' strength of combat and service troops commit-
(Marine) ted exclUSIvely to the Japan and Korea Occupa-

34 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opn., Aug 45 (S).

35 Ibid.
36 GHQ USAFPAC, Opn. Instns NO·4, '5 Aug 45 (S).

14
 Adm. William F. Halsey Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid
Third U. S. Fleet Seventh U. S. Fleet

Adm. Raymond A. Spruance Vice Adm. Frank ]. Fletcher

Fifth U. S. Fleet North Pacific Force

PLATE NO.6
U. S. N . Fleet Commanders at the Beginning of the Occupation
tion operations was as follows: J7 the operations either in combat or troop trans-
portation missions and which were located
XXIV Corps :
A. Combat
within respective zones of responsibility were
as follows :,8
B. Ser"ice
Total XXIV Corps 9 1,800 XXIV Corps : 475th Fighter Groups and one
Sixth U. S. Army: squadron of JI7th Troop CaTTier
A. Combat 122,355 Group.
B. Ser"ice 63,55 1 Sixth Army : Eighth and 348th Fighter Groups,
C. V Amphibious 93.5 22 the 375th and 443d Troop Carrier
Total Sixth U. S. Groups and the Sec01id Combat
Army Cargo Group.
Eighth U. S. Army:
A. Combat Armyand Corps commanders were directed
B. Sen-ice to organize Army service commands from
Total Eighth U. S. troops to be made available to them from or-
Army ganizations envisioned for "Olympic" and
Far East Air Forces: " Coronet" operations.'- The Commanding
A. XXIV Corps Zone 10,669 General of Sixth Army was to establish Army
B. Sixth Army Zone 35,654 Service Command" 0" (from" Olympic")
C. Eighth Army Zone 4 2 ,810 and General Eichelberger's Eighth Army was
Total Far East Air to be supplied and serviced by a similar unit,
Forces " C " (from" Coronet "):'0
Gra,id total for the operation
The Commanding General, AFWESPAC,
Air Corps units, exclusive of service ele- was directed to release men and materials for
ments, which might be called upon to sustain these purposes as rapidly as possible."

37 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO.4. 15 Aug 45 (5), Annex NO.3, Tentative Troop List, Recapitulation,
p.61.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, Annex 5, Logistics.
40 Known as "USASCOM-O" and" USASCOM·C" respectively.
41 The complexity and magnitude of the supply problem was fully appreciated by GHQ . The Logistics Annex
of the operations instructions creating USASCOM-O and USASCOM-C stated: .. Because of the short time avail-
able for purposes of planning and organization logistically, these operations must be accomplished on the basis of
availability of troops, materials, supplies, and transportation, rather than fulfilling planned requirements . Service
troops are made available to commanders based on their availability at appropriate locations, and materials and supplies
designed for support of troops in rear areas and loaded on ships to meet these requirements will be diverted to the
occupied areas. As a result, supplies and materials arriving in occupied areas will not be those which would ordi narily be
shipped to meet requirements for support of troops and for construction of specific facilities. It will therefore be
necessary that commanders take advantage of all existing facilities found in occupied areas and accommodate construc·
tion of additional essential facilities to that which can be accomplished with materials located in the areas and those
received in diverted shipping. Supplies as received will be unbalanced. Measures will be taken by this headquar·
ters to obtain balanced stockages of supplies in occupied areas at the earliest practicable date . Service troops excess
in one category will be employed to meet shortages in other categories. The maximum practicable number of service
troops should arrive in the objective areas during the early phases of the Occupation, in order to better meet the
needs of combat troops arriving later .
II Troops to be employed in this operation will be mounted with equipment and accompanying supplies which
can immediately be made available to them upon announcement of I B' Day. Commanders responsible for provision
of equipment and accompanying supplies will take all possible measures to completely equip in advance all troops
designated for these operations and to have available in the vicinity of staging areas accompanying supplies in
quantities as indicated . ... "

16
 The Eighth Army was to lead the Occupa- on the part of recalcitrants. These flights would
tion forces into Japan and was directed to execute be restricted to critical areas south of 38° north.
., Baker 60"." This called for air landings in The U. S. Pacific Fleet was to provide air
the vicinity of Tokyo by the llth Airborne protection for naval forces, convoys and ship-
Division and the 27th Division (if re9uired), pIng.
followed by IX Corps amphibious landings in The Thirteenth Air Force was to take over
the Tokyo Bay area. The seaborne troops fo, the Philippines area of responsibility, while the
Japan and Korea were scheduled to begin Seventh was to support the Tenth U.S. Army
arriving after the formal surrender ceremony operations in the Ryukyus. The RAAF Com-
aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, but mand would continue to operate in the southern
the airhead would be secured by the llth Air- areas, particularly the Netherlands East Indies.
borne three days before the ceremony. The Aircraft of the Seventh Fleet as well as Eighty-
27th Division had been alerted for airlift from fifth Fighter Wing of the Air Defense Com-
the Ryukyus. The 4th Marine Regimental mand would continue to operate in the Philip-
Combat Team (the Fleet Landing Force), was pines area.""
to occupy Y okosuka Naval Base, south of The U. S. Pacific Fleet would be charged
Yokohama , at the same time the 11th Airborne with the establishment of military government
units were to establish their positions near in the Marianas, Bonin, Volcano, lzu, and
Tokyo." Kurile Islands and on Marcus Island.' At the
Upon the Fifth Air Force would fall the same time it would have the responsibility for
chief responsibility for the tremendous air conducting the naval and amphibious phases
movements. To assist the Fifth Air Force, the of the occupation of Japanes< territory by the
Strategic Air FNce was to release heavy bomb- United States Army Forces, Pacific. This
ers to the operational control of FEAF as would include provision of destroyer station
re9uested by the latter. Strategic Air Force was ships along the entire convoy route from Oki-
also charged with dropping of food and supplies nawa to Honshu. The Third U. S. Fleet, under
to prisoners of war and civilian internee camps. command of Admiral William F. Halsey, was
The Air Transport Command was to lend the ro occupy Tokyo Bay and support Eighth
bulk of its carrier planes as re9uested by FEAF Army landings. As has been stated , the USS
and a.signed by FEAF to Fifth Air Force. As Missouri of the Third Fleet, flying the pennant
aircraft which would carry in Occupation forces of Admiral Chester Nimitz, was to become the
were turned around, they would be loaded with scene of the formal surrender ceremonies.'·
repatri~ted Allied prisoners of war re9uiring The Fifth Fleet, under the command of
hospitalization. In addition, FEAF was charged Admiral Raymond Spruance, was to occupy
with continuing its regular tasks of reconnais- and patrol sea approaches and coastal waters
sance and photographing of Japan and Korea of Japan west of 135 degrees. Eventually it
to facilitate the implementation of" Baker 60". was to land elements of the Sixth Army in
A tentative series of " strategic" flights would Kyushu, Shikoku, and western Honshu."
be stepped up in fre9uency and size to consti- The Seventh Fleet, under command of Ad-
tute a show of force to discourage possible plots miral Thomas C. Kinkaid, was to be held to
42 Alternate plan for" Baker 20." 45 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO. 4, '5 Aug 45 (S).
43 See n. '9. 46 GHQSCAP&USAFPAC, MoSum ofOpns, SeP45(S).
44 AlliedHq, SWPA,OpnsInstnsNo. 97, 22Aug45. 47 Ibid.

17
 The Japanese delegation amves at Nichols Field, 19 August '945.

Col. S. Mashbir, Chief, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS),

G'2, acts as interpreter during a pre-conference interval.

PLATE NO. 7
Surrender Negotiations at Manila
assist in staging, training, and mounting troops acceptance of the surrender of the ] apanese
for the control of the coastal waters of China armed forces would occur in Tokyo Bay aboard
and Korea." a United States battleship on 3' August. To
The North Pacific Force, under Vice Admi- prepare for this, he indicated that an advance
ral Frank]. Fletcher, was to be loaned for mine- party would arrive by air at Atsugi airdrome
sweeping operations between Honshu and near Toky", that United States Navy forces
Hokkaido.'· would arrive in Sagami Bay, immediately south
As had been the practice throughout the war of Tokyo Bay, and that naval forces would
in the Pacific, units of the British Com- advance into Tokyo Bay. These movements
monwealth naval strength, particularly Aus- were set for 26 August. Airborne forces accom-
tralianships which had distinguished themselves panying the Supreme Commander were expect-
by their splendid war record with the American ed to land at Atsugi 28 August while, simulta-
fleets, would be included in these critical neously, naval and marine forces were to land
Occupation operations. in the vicinity of Y okosuka Naval Base. The
landing and establishing of airborne and naval
Return of Surrender Delegation forces would continue during the two days prior
from Manila to the surrender ceremony.
The second document concerned the ad-
Details for initial moves for the Occupation vance landing party and its point of entry. It
of] apan were outlined to the Imperial delega- specified that the immediate area surrounding
tes which had arrived at Manila '9 August and the city of Tokyo was defined as the "Tokyo
had been in session with GHQ staff oRic~rs that Bay Area."" This area comprised the region
and the succeeding day.'· When they depart- from Choshi north of Kumagawa, east of Ishi-
ed again for Tokyo, they carried with them oka, and southeast to Choshi. The boundary
four documents which outlined the require- across the harbor entrance included the island
ments laid down by SCAP for the spearhead of Nishima. Within the Tokyo Bay Area the
of occupation, for the formal surrender ceremo- portion from Otsuki eastward along the south-
nies, and for the subsequent reception of Occu- ern city limit line and extending across the Bay
pation forces." to Chiba and south of Amatsu, was defined
In these documents SCAP stated that the as the "Area of Initial Evacuation." (Plate
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 This mission was lead by Lt Gen T. Kawabe, who had become Vice Chief of the General Staff in April.
There were fifteen other members. They were met at Nichols Field by Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, AeofS,
G-2, acting for SCAP, and Col Sydney F. Mashbir of Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. one of G-2'S
important subsidiary organizations which was to playa vital part in the conferences. For a complete report of these
events see Vol. I, this series.
51 General title was : co Requiretnents of 'the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Presented to the
Japanese Representatives at Manila, P. 1.,19 Aug 45 ". The specific titles of the documents were (I) "Orientation,
Agenda, and Requirements", (2) U Requirements for Entry and Operations of an Advance Party Representing the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers within the Tokyo Bay Area," (3) " Requiremencs for the Entry of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and His Accompanying Forces," and (4) II Requirements for Entry
and Operations of Initial Occupation Forces in Kanoya Area of Southern Kyushu ".
52 GHQ SCAP, Requ irem ents of SCAP presented to the Japanese Representatives at Manila, P I, 19 Aug
45, Sec. n,"Requirements for Entry and Opns of an Adv Party Representing SCAP within the Tokyo Bay Area ."

19
Conference for terms of Surrender opens. L to R, on the Japanese side, Capt. H. Yoshida,
Capt. T. Ohmae, Rear Adm. 1. Yokoyama, Lt. Gen. T. Kawabe, Mr. K. Okazaki, Maj.
Gen. M. Arnano, and Lt. Col. M. Marsuda; on the American side, Maj. Gen. L. J.
Whitlock, Maj. Gen. R. J. Marshall, Rear Adm. F. P. Sherman, Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland,
Maj. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby and Brig. Gen. D. R. Hutchinson.

Escorted by General Willoughby, the Japanese delegation amves for conference. Ranking
American officers await: Brig. Gen. D . R. Hutchinson, Maj. Gen. S. ] . Chamberlin, Maj.
Gen. R. K. Sutherland, and Rear Adm. F. P. Sherman, representing Admiral Nimitz.

PLATE NO.8
Surrender Negotiations at Manila
NO·9) municate 10 flight concerning time of arrival,
The advance party would make preparations landing instructions and other matters relating
for the entry of the Supreme Commander and to the arrival of the party.
his accompanying airborne and naval forces The third document, in addition to provid-
into the Area of Initial Evacuation. The Japa- ing for the immobilizing and disarming of
nese Imperial General Headquarters would be Japanese naval and air force units and installa-
required to acknowledge to the Supreme Com- tions, required provision for the safety of the
mander by 25 August safe conduct for the ad- United Nations prisoners of war and civilian
vance party which was to consist of about 150 internees pending the arrival of Occupation
persons, transported in planes with standard forces. " Camps were to be marked to enable
U. S. markings. This party was scheduled Allied aircraft to identify them. The Y okosuka
to land at Atsugi airfield. The Japanese Naval Base was to be ready for occupation by
would be required to provide for the follow- 27 August. All combatant units of the Japanese
ing: security and preservation from harm of armed forces were to be evacuated from the
personnel, airplanes and equipment of the Area of Initial Evacuation and confined to
party while in the Area of Initial Evacuation; the limits of their assigned bivouacs, with the
provision of every courtesy and facility to exception of civil police; measures were to be
members of the party in the accomplishment guaranteed for the provision of adequate ac-
of their mission; provision for suitable quar- commodations, billet and camp area facilities
ters and a police escort to insure absolute and utilities in the Area of Initial Occupation
safety for each member of the party; the ser- for the Supreme Commander and his accom-
vices of senior officers from the Japanese Army panying- forces.
Air Headquarters, the Naval Air Headquar- It was directed that on the date scheduled
ters, and the Japanese Army and Naval Head- for the arrival of General MacArthur in
quarters, available to the commander of the Japan, members of the Imperial General Staff
advance party upon his arrival at Atsugi and would be available for conference with repre-
prepared to provide such information as might sentatives of the Supreme Commander at
be required as to facilities in the Area of In- Atsugi airfield upon arrival, and at such times
itial Evacuation; free communication by radio and places thereafter as might be directed
between the advance party and the Supreme for the prompt settlement of all matters re-
Commander for the Allied Powers in Manila. qt!lnng attention. Guides and interpreters
The Japanese Imperial General Headquar- familiar with the Area of Initial Evacuation
ters was to evacuate all combatant units of the would be available.
Japanese armed forces from the Atsugi airfield General measures to be taken by 25 August
area, with the exception of civil police, which by the forces of the Allied Powers were announ-
were to be maintained as necessary to prevent ced as follows: Allied aircraft would conduct
overt acts. The airdrome ·was to be in full daylight and night surveillance flights over
operational condition. N otification would be Japan and Japanese controlled areas; Allied
required prior to 25 August as to the identity aircraft would drop supplies to the United
and frequency of the radio station in the Tokyo Nations prisoner of war and internee camps ;
area with which the advance party could com- naval forces would occupy the coastal waters of

53 Ibid, Sec. III, II Requirements for the Entry of SCAP and His Accompanying Forces."

21
 KASHIMA
~,.-,.-
NADA

LEGEND
BOUNDARY· AREA OF INITIAL EVACUATION·
I
---- BOUNDARY· TOKYO BAY REA·

PLATE NO.9
"Blacklist" : Area of Initial Evacuation and Withdrawal of Major Japanese Units
Japan and Japanese controlled areas. Mine- ther 'our invigorated Tokko Tai' (air attack
sweeping operations by Allied naval forces were units) had shot them down." If he was glad
scheduled to be initiated in the ports of Osaka. to hear that both planes were safe, he was far
Sasebo, Nagasaki, Takasu, Jinsen, Tsingtao, happier to learn that General MacArthur's
Canton, Shanghai, Hongkong, and Singapore. terms for his nation were not so severe as he
In these prescribed duties, the Allied forces had feared.'·
would be unmolested. Higashi Kuni promptly took General Kawa-
The fourth document concerned the initial be to the palace to make "a very minute report."
Occupation forces in the Kanoya Area of According to Higashi Kuni, "The Emperor
southern Kyushu." It stipulated that an was quite relieved.""
advance party, representing General Head- General MacArthur's humane and consider-
quarters, would enter the area I September ate occupation policies unquestionably took
to prepare for the entry into the "Kanoya Japan by complete surprise.'" A Domei broad-
Area" of seaborne and airborne initial forces cast, 18 August, stating that the Allies had no
on the next day. The Japanese Imperial intention of confiscating private property, reas-
General Headquarters was directed to provide, sured Japanese who had feared that Americans
by noon 30 August, guarantee of full security would follow the Japanese policy of looting
for entry into the Kanoya area of this adva!1ce civilian goods.
party, consisting of twenty personnel, transported Immediately following the Emperor's sur-
in two airplanes bearing standard U. S. mark- render proclamation, officials of the Agriculture-
Ings. Exact time of arrivaL would be commu- Commerce Ministry and the Chief of the Tokyo
nicated to Kanoya radio station by direct mes- Economics board estimated that Japan's food
sage from the planes in flight. Ranking mem- supplies would be entirely dislocated be-
bers of Japanese staffs were to hold themselves cause of expected heavy food requisitions by
in readiness for conferences with high ranking Occupation forces. Yomiuri-Hochi warned that
American officers landing at Kanoya airfield. the food requirements of the "tens of thou-
sands" of Occupation troops would have a
Japanese Reactions "great effect upon our present and future
livelihood.""
The return to Tokyo of the Manila envoys When Japanese armies invaded foreign
was delayed when one of the planes carrying lands, the conquered populations, despite their
the principals experienced engine trouble and poverty, had been expected to furnish not only
had to be "ditched." The pilot was able to full but even luxurious provisions for the
beach the plane so that, although all passengers invaders. Japan consequently looked upon
were shaken up, none was hurt. It required General MacArthur as the precursor of a truly
most of the night, however, to arrange trans- enlightened civilization.
portation to Tokyo and this interval was marked Confidence in General MacArthur's justice
by considerable anxiety." Prime Minister Prince went far toward reassuring Japanese who still
Higashi Kuni sat up all night wondering "whe- credited pure wartime propaganda rumors."
54 Ibid. Sec. IV, II Requirements for the Entry and Opns of Initial Occupation Forces in the Kalloya A rea
of Southern Kyushu."
55 Rad (S) '5&,6, IJG to SCAP, 21 Aug 45. 58 Ibid.
56 Higashi Kuni, My M<moirs (Tohoshobo, 1947). 59 Tokyo, Yomiuri-Hochi, 18 Aug 45.
57 Ibid. 60 Tokyo Shimbun, '7 Sep 45.

23
Tokyo Shimbun, among others, deplored that Okinawa both the lIth Airborne and the 27th
wild gossip swept Japan. Of this kind Yomi- Division were stalled on the scheduled airlift
uri reported: ... :within three days after sur- to Japan by the succession of typhoons.
render Tokyo citizens feared that: All available troop transports of the Far East
American soldiers would loot Japal!.
Air Force and dozens of the huge " Skycrains "
Americans would rob Japau of all the food. and " Skymasters " of the Pacific Air T rans-
Women and girls would be .iolated. port Command had been mobilized at Oki-
All mel! would be killed. nawa for this mammoth air operation-the
What was left of Tokyo would be de.astated. 6 ' greatest aerial movement during the Pacific
The American decision to reserve all Japa- war. The initial target date was officially
nese food resources for the Japanese people and postponed from 26 August to 28 August
to supply the Occupation forces and their de- because of the adverse weather."
pendents with foodstuffs brought from America Then the weather cleared and a cool, refresh-
therefore produced a profound, completely ing breeze, "very refreshing to the spirit," blew
unexpected, and highly favorable impression." over the Kanto Plain."
During the next few days, while Japanese At Atsugi airfield near Tokyo, Japanese
people were attempting to adjust their thinking planes sat helplessly stripped of their propellers.
to this new concept of enemy occupation, the A picked detachment of the Naval Security
weather became unfavorable and a series of Corps, armed with clubs, guarded the Atsugi
typhoons lashed the home islands; never- airfield where Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Lt.
theless, the people heard the drone of Allied Gen. Senichi Kamada, Captain Chuzaburo
aircraft overhead and from force of habit ran to Yamazumi and Ken Tsurumi of the Foreign
their air raid shelters. There were no bombs; Office awaited the arrival of the American
instead, this was the beginning of the air force advance forces.
missions to drop relief supplies of food, medi- The heralds of that advance force, American
cine and clothing to the wretched Allied prison- Corsairs and Grummans, had appeared with the
ers of war and civilians interned in camps in dawn of that historic day and continued to fly
Japan. The missions continued despite ex- in strong formations over the entire Tokyo Bay
tremely unfavorable weather which became and Atsugi area.
sufficiently adverse to delay the implementation The first American formations flying from
of " Blacklist" by forty-eight hours . Okinawa were not expected until 0900, but half
an hour earlier a twin-engined aircraft appeared
Implementation of O perations: in the skies from the south. It was a C-46
" Blacklist" transport. The plane circled the field and then
came in from the south to touch down upon
General Eichelberger had moved his Eighth the center runway at 0828. This plane was
Army Command Post from the eastern coastal followed by fifteen others. 6 ,
plain of Leyce to Okinawa on 26 August. On From the leading plane debarked Colonel

6, Tokyo, Yomi",i, 19 Aug 45. 63 GHQ SCAP&USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S).
62 Higashi Kuni, op cit. 64 Tokyo, Yomiuri , 29 Aug 45.
65 Maj Gen Seizo Arisue, in charge of the preparat ion of Atsugi airfield, reported in his unpublished
U Memoirs of Atsugi " that for" some strange reason " th is aircraft and the following ones came in downwind despite the
fact that the Japanese had painstakingly erected an air sock for their guidance . The Americans probably preferred
10 lake their chances with a slightly unfavorable wind than to nose helplessly into some prepared Japanese armoured trap.

24
Charles P. Tench, GSC, of the G-3 Section of officer, led the first of these on an inspection of
GHQ, commanding the advance party." the former Sagamigahara Air Unit barracks at
Waiting automobiles conveyed Colonel Tench the west end of the airfield. It was proposed
and party to the Japanese reception group. by the Japanese that this barracks should serve
General Arisue stifHy saluted Colonel Tench as accommodations for the advance party.
and, after introductions, the group entered a Other inspection teams immediately deployed
tent in the center of the field. General Arisue over the entire airfield area.
offered food, but Colonel Tench who had A second flight of fifteen C-54' s, C-46' s, and
brought his own rations, declined with thanks. C-4?'s arrived at 0935 and a third group of
Colonel Tench explained that his party fifteen C-54'S landed at lIOO. These planes,
consisted of approximately 150 officers and men carrying a total of 30 officers and 120 men
and that their directive from the Supreme wearing regular combat equipment were escort-
Commander was divided into four main divi- ed by ten carrier-based Seventh Fleet F6F
SiOns. It was as follows: liaison planes flying from Sagami Bay.
a. Reconnaissance of the Atsugi airdrome The Japanese were amazed by the efficiency
area to determine its suitability for the with which these Grumman fighters, landing on
airborne operation to follow. the grass, fulded their wings "like cicadas,"
b. Establishment of required air installa- even while the planes were taxied into posi-
tions and supplies to support initial tion.·' The Japanese made no attempt to
phases of the air operations in the area conceal the degree to which they were impressed
as provided by the Commanding Gen- by the speed with which the Americans motor-
eral, FEAF. ized themselves and invested the entire field
c. Supervision and coordination of im- area. Their amazement was outspoken when
provements required at the Atsugi air- within forty-five minutes after the leading planes
drome. had touched down, portable Signal Corps
d. Establishment of communications with transmitters were on the air establishing com-
GHQ, AFPAC, without delay and re- munications with Okinawa. The last planes
porting on suitability or non-suitability of the party brought fuel , lubricants, and
of the Atsugi airdrome for the purpose maintenance equipment to make the intrepid
intended. All messages to be transmit- little unit compact and self-sustaining until the
ted in code. Reporting over signal anticipated arrival on 30 August of the main
communications net additional informa- airborne force which would constitute the first
tion desired by the Commanding Gen- of the Occupation troops for Japan.
eral, FEAF.
While this initial conference took place, The Eve of Occupation
soldiers debouched from the planes coming to
earth every few moments, unloaded jeeps, and While the air lift of the main initial force
prepared to form exploratory parties. Colonel was in progress on 30 August, GHQ, AFPAC,
Hutchinson, who had been assigned as billeting issued an amendment to Operations Instruc-

66 Col Tench was followed by his immediate staff comprising Capt C. B. Jones, USN, Col E. K. Warburton,
5th AF, Cols C. R. Hutchinson and D. M. Dunne, CE, Cols S. S. Auchincloss and L. Park, SigC, and Maj F.
Bowers, A TIS interpreter .
67 Tokyo, AJahi Shimbun, 29, 31 Aug 45 j Mainichi Shimbun, 29 Aug 45.

25
This communications plane served for three days as the only means of communication
between the advance party at Atsugi and headquarters on Okinawa and in Manila.

The advance party at Atsugi Airfield, 28 August r945 . Col. Charles P . Tench
is met by Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue.

PLATE NO . 10
Pre·occupation Party Arrives in Japan
tions NO.4, which materially altered the to four million soldiers of all classifications were
missions assigned to the Army commanders still under arms, and as far as the Americans
who soon would be arriving on the Nippon knew, were only precariously held in discipline
homeland. Instead of actually instituting by the proclamations of one man- the
"military government," Army commanders Emperor.
were to supervise the execution of the policies It was imperative that every effort be made to
relative to government functions which GHQ, insure the early and safe arrival of the llth
AFPAC, was to issue directly to the Japanese Airborne force of some seven thousand men.
Government;M likewise the functions of the An inspection of Atsugi revealed the necessity
Armies with respect to the disarmament and for the immediate construction of landing strips
demobilization of the Japanese armed forces long enough to accommodate B-29S and C-54s
were changed from " operational control" and which would be landing in rapid succession
direction to "supervision of the execution" of once the movement had started. Only one
orders, as transmitted to the Japanese by GHQ, night could be devoted to this construction work
AFPAC. In contrast to the original concept involving strips one and one-half kilometers in
the headquarters of the Japanese Government length. Under the supervision of the small
and its armed forces were required to shoulder American force, the Japanese workmen recruit-
the chief administrative and operational burden ed by the indefatigable General Arisue became
of disarmament and demobilization. The new efficient to a degree apparently never before
plan was designed to avoid possible incidents experienced by the Japanese officers.'· With
which might result in a renewed conflict; no the break of dawn, the work was near enough
seizures or disarmaments were to be made by to completion to enable the advance party to
Allied personnel." signal GHQ at Manila for relay to Okinawa
Actually, with the arrival of the advance that everything was in readiness for the initia-
party, the toe-hold of occupation had been tion of the real Occupation of Japan- the first
established. But less than 200 men with light by a foreign army in the recorded history of
weapons could hardly be described as constitut- that nation."
ing an occupation force in a country where three

68 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns [nstns NO.4, 15 Aug 45 (S ), Amendmen[ No. 12, Doc. App. [V. This [ype of
military government is known as II passive" as contrasted to the U active" type introduced in Germany.
69 G-2, GHQ. was charged with the development and surveilla nce of plans for the demobilization and disarma-
ment of the Imperial Forces, in view of expert knowledge of the internal structu re of the Japanese Army. The first
step was to be the abolition of the Imperial General Staff but the cautious retention of the Army and Navy Ministries
which WeIe Z of [agencies. (See Ch. rr, p. 42.)
70 In his informal 'I Memoirs of Atsugi," General Arisue states: "I may say thac through thi s all from the
first to the final building of the runway, as long as I have been in the Army, I have never had to use my head and
body for so long to such a great extent."
71 The communications unit established for this purpose actually was installed in the command plane in which
Col Tench had arrived.

27
 CHAPTER II
TROOP MOVEMENTS, DISPOSITIONS, AND LOCATIONS

if necessary.' Forts and shore batteries on

The Spearhead Futsu-saki, a narrow spit jutting out from the
eastern shore into Uraga Strait, were occupied
While the advance party secured Atsugi by small landing parties.' The main Fleet
airstrip and made arrangements for the land- landing party went inland and established
ing of additional troops, the Ilth Airborne headquarters at Y okosuka Naval Base. While
Division on Okinawa prepared itself for airlift United States forces were securing these im-
to Japan. Its first echelon began landing at portant points in the Area of Initial Evacua-
Atsugi early on the morning of 30 August, tion, not a shot was fired, although the
and troop and cargo-carrying aircraft continued Marines, like their airborne counterparts at
to arrive at three-minute intervals throughout Atsugi, took no chances and were ready for
the day. immediate combat should there be the slightest
Immediately upon his arrival, Maj. Gen. attempt at deception by the Japanese. It soon
Joseph M. Swing, Commander of the Divi- became apparent that the Japanese had meti-
sion, conferred with Lieutenant General Arisue, culously followed the requirements stipulated
making final arrangements for the arrival of in Manila.' The area had been cleared of all
General Eichelberger and later, General military personnel except for a small detach-
MacArthur .' ment which policed and guarded the area_
Simultaneously with the development of this Coastal defenses and antiaircraft had been
airhead at Atsugi, elements of the Third Fleet demilitarized and were marked with white flags
anchored in Sagami Bay supported the landing which were visible for some miles. Courteous
of the 4th Regimental Combat Team of the 6th Japanese officers and guides were available for
Marine Division at Y okosuka. The First and further instructions.'
Second Carrier Task Forces (Task Forces 39 In the missions outlined in "Blacklist,"
and 38) patrolled the coastal waters of the Eighth Army was assigned responsibility for
Empire, prepared to make a show of force occupying the Tokyo Bay area." Therefore,
J HQ Eighth US A,my, G-3 P.. iodic Rpts. 29-30 Aug 45.
2 TF 38 and 39 cove .. d both the amphibious and Atsugi ai, landings. (GHQ SWPA & USAF PAC. Mo
Sum of Opns. Aug 45 [S]. Naval Sum. p. 6.)
3 Occupational Monog' of the Eighth US A,my in Japan. Vol. I. Aug 45-Jan 46 (C). p. '7. US and B,itish
flags were rai sed at 0100.
4 Since Japanese chai ns of command were still in tact, the requirements of the Cine as laid down in Manila were
implemented through them. Accordingly, specific directives to the Japanese armed forces in the Initia l Evacuation
Area were contained in a series of orders as follows: Imp GHQ. Army Sec Ord No. l387 . 21 Aug 45; Imp GHQ,
Navy Sec O,d No. 52. 21 Aug 45. Oi, No. 533. 22 Aug 45. Oi, Nos. 534. 535. 536. 23 Aug 45. and Oi, No.
538. 24 Aug 45.
5 Occupational Monog' of the Eighth US A,my in Japan. Vol. I. Aug 45-Jan 46 (C). p. 17.
6 GHQ USAFPAC. Basic Oudine Plan fa. " Blacklist " Opns (3d ed). 8 Aug 45 (TS).

28
upon landing at Y okosuka, the Marine forces Near the adminstration building on the far
came under the command of General Eichel- side of the Atsugi airfield, some anxious-to-
berger. Hardly had rhe Marines established please Japanese armed guards were saluting
themselves when an infantry patrol /tom the every American who passed within yards of
IIth Airborne arrived /tom Atsugi to effect them. Meanwhile, regiments of the IIth
contact. The liaison patrol was /tom the Airborne were establishing their headquarters
5IIth Parachute Infantry of the IIth Airborne, near the airfield. Units of the forward eche-
a unit which, after landing at Atsugi, had lons of GHQ and Headquarters, Fifth Air
moved eastward to secure the Yokohama dock Force, were arriving by plane and were loading
area in preparation for large scale amphibious equipment to be used for an operating head-
landings in that vicinity. quarters into the nondescript trucks which the
Throughout the morning and early after- Japanese had assembled. " Manpower" was
noon of 30 August the big transport planes as important as "horsepower," as one after
continued to arrive in steady succession at another of the worn-out vehicles broke down
Atsugi. When General Eichelberger arrived on the road between Atsugi and Y okoharna.
approximately six hours after the first troops, For the first time, the occupying forces could
his paratroopers sent up a great shout of wel- see for themselves to what straits the Japanese
come. He waved back to them saying, "This nation had been reduced by the prolonged and
is the beachhead where I was supposed to land exhausting war.
in the invasion of Japan. General MacArthur Shortly before I400 there was a stir of
gave me this area. I certainly never expected excitement. A strong contingent of news-
to get here by plane without a shot being papermen, photographers, and newscasters
fired.'" General Swing briefly reviewed the swarmed to witness the arrival of the Supreme
situation for him and introduced General Commander. As the General stepped /tom
Arisue. They discussed plans for the recep- the plane he was greeted by Generals Eichel-
tion of General MacArthur and his party ex- berger and Swing and cheering veterans of the
pected later that afternoon. General Arisue IIth Airborne Division to whom he said:
suggested that he act as guide, but the Eighth " Melbourne to Tokyo was a long road but
Army Commander directed him to proceed at this looks like the payoff.'"
once along the proposed route to check security General MacArthur paused only a few mo-
measures and then to remain in Y okohama. 8 ments at the airfield, then stepped into a

7 As General Eichelberger alighted, a sergeant of the 187th Para-glider Infantry turned to one of his men and was
heard to say : II Do you know when the last time I saw that Joe was? We were the lead battalion walking up the
road to Tagaytay Ridge last February. We were hurrying to take Manila from the south. I looked over my shoulder
and there was this big guy wearing a helmet with three stars. A few of the boys were talking to him, so I eased over
too. He's a swell egg. All of a sudden this jeep comes wheeling up the road. It was General Swing. He stood
up and yelled at us, II Hey- break it np--dispcrse-keep moving-let's go. What's the matter with you men? There
are Jap snipers all over the place.' We kind of broke up a little and there was Eichelberger standing there grinning,
so he yells back {that's the idea, Joe, that's the spirit, good advice, keep them scattered.' Yeh. I still think with a
couple of breaks we could have been sleeping in the Manila Hotel by the time the 1st Cav hit town." (Occupational
Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan. Vol. I. Aug 45- }an 46 [C]. p. f8.)
8 General MacArthur had ordered that there be no formal Japanese reception party. Gen Arisue was designated
as liaison officer, between the US headquarters and the remnant Japanese scaffs.
9 GHQ SWPA & USAFPAC. Mo Sum of Opn' (S), Aug 45, p. f2.

29
General R. L. Eichelberger, at right, with Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing, Commander, llth
Airborne Division, receives the report of Japanese officers at Atsugi airfield,
during the initial landings.

General Eichelberger greets General MacArthur at Atsugi airfield.

PLATE NO. I I
The Occupation Begins, 30 August 1945
waltmg automobile to go on to Yokohama kits replaced all other sounds. It was a peace-
where temporary General Headq uarters were fu I sound and one which few men of the II th
being established. General Arisue had assured Airborne Division had expected would char-
General Swing that requirements presented acterize their descent upon the home soil of
to the Japanese emissaries in Manila had been Japan.
fulfilled and the route was safe. ,. The At the New Grand Hotel the Supreme
fifteen miles of roadway between the airfield Commander had his evening meal in the com-
and the New Grand Hotel were lined with pany of news correspondents and his ranking
thousands of armed Japanese soldiers and generals. It was a democratic gathering and
policemen. They stood at attention but faced the meal was a simple one-hamburgers and
away from the road, an additional security grapes. "
measure which was customarily used only for The weather turned against the Occupation
the movements of the Japanese Imperial family. plans during the night. Okinawa dispatched
In spite of these elaborate preparations, the only eight airloads for Atsugi airfield; never-
Americans took no chances. The Honor theless , this lift was sufficient to bring forward
Guard Company of the 3d Battalion, 188th the remaining elements of the 5IIth Parachute
Para-glider Infantry, had taken the precau- Infantry, and the regiment was able to establish
tion of guarding the entire length of .the its command post that day in Yokohama.
Atsugi-Yokohama road. There were now more than 2,000 occupation
Units of the forward echelon of GHQ troops within the confines of the city.
managed to move most of their equipment to In spite of the bad weather, ground opera-
the Yokohama Customs House for the estab- tions continued. Patrols ranged out to Asano
lishment of GHQ. But before unpacking and Yokohama docks, through the bombed
was thoroughly under way, orders were given industrial city of Kawasaki and up to the
to unpack only the essentials needed to carry Tama River on the outskirts of Tokyo. No
on for a few days. It was General MacArthur's incidents were reported. The 187th and 188th
intention to move his staff and his headquar- Para-glider Infantty Regiments dispatched
ters to the capital itself as soon as reports had men to scout the Hayama- Misaki area (guard-
been received on suitable sites for billets and ing the entrance to Tokyo Bay) and west along
offices. Eighth Army Headquarters staff like- Sagami Bay as far as Odawara. OJ They report-
wise set up a temporary arrangement prepara- ed these areas completely cleared. Every-
tory to moving into the Customs House which where women and children ran into hiding,
it was to occupy when GHQ transferred to while men and boys saluted and bowed at
Tokyo. the approach of the paratroopers. There
By the end of the day, 4,200 troops and was no sign whatever of civil disturbance or
123 planes had completed the move from Japanese resistance. During the afternoon a
Okinawa." Weary troopers dropped their reinforced company from the Third Fleet land-
gear in assigned areas and the rartle of mess ing Force occupied Tateyama Naval Air Sta-

[0 Requirements of SCAP Presented to Japanese Representatives at Manila, PI, 20 Aug 45, Doc II, Require-
ments for Entry and Opns of an Adv Party Representing SeAP withi n the Tokyo Bay Area.
II Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-jan 46 (C), p. 20.

12 Personal notes of Carl Mydans, correspondent. Tjm~ and Lift magazines.

I} Occupational Monogr of Ihe Eighth US Army in japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 - Jan 46 (C), p. 20.

31
tion on the east side of Tokyo Bay. It was to take place at 0900, 2 September 1945, aboard
anticipated that this area would be occupied the USS Missouri.
by the 1I2th Regimental Combat Team. To Occupation operations did not pause even
prepare for this, the Marine unit planned a for that historic event. An umbrella of 400
reconnaissance of the whole area on the follow- B-29'S and more than 1500 fleet carrier planes
ing day. circled above the bay. At the same time, while
The first airshift of occupation troops within the surrender document was being signed a-
Japan took place on I September. The recon- board the battleship," Task Force 33 arrived in
naissance troop of the lIth Airborne Division Tokyo Bay with the first elements of XI Corps.
was transported by plane across Tokyo Bay and By noon the leading elements of this force,
to Kisarazu airfield where it secured both the which was under the command of Mai_ Gen.
field and surrounding installations." Mean- William C. Chase, began to debark. Ap-
while, the 1st Cavalry Division and 1I2th Caval- proximately 3,000 men were landed and by
ry RCT, under the XI Corps, arrived in Saga- early evening the convoy to the assigned
mi Bay and prepared to land the 1st Cavalry divisional assembly areas ofHara-Machida had
at Yokohama on 2 September, and the RCT at begun. The 1I2th Cavalry RCT also arrived
Tateyama (Chiba Peninsula) on 3 September." with the leading elements of XI Corps but
The Japanese had been repeatedly told remained afloat until the following morning.·s
through official communiques during the course That historic day witnessed numerous other
of the war that American naval strength had developments of vital importance to the Oc-
been reduced to impotency. Consequently, the cupation. Immediately after the signing of the
tremendous collection of seapower anchored in surrender document, the Supreme Commander
Tokyo Bay in preparation for the official sur- issued Military and Naval General Order
render ceremonies must have been a shocking Number I to the Japanese. It was based upon
and sobering sight.'6 By evening preparations the "United States Initial Post Surrender
were complete for the ceremonies which were Policy for Japan " .• and confirmed the general
'4 Ibid. p. 21.
15 HQ XI Corps FO 23 had provided for alternate landings for the 12th Cavalry, one on Sagami Bay beaches,
and lhe other at Yokohama docks . Since the docks were found to be in good repair, the unit was ordered to prepare
for land ing there.
16 The first US ship to enter Yokohama harbor was USAHS Marigold. carrying the 42nd General Hospital.
Included with the concentration of US warships were the British battleships Duke of York and King George V and two
Australian cruisers accompanied by two destroyers. (HQ Eighth US Army, CWS Hist Rpt, Mil Occupation of Japan
<hrough Nuv 45, pp. 12- 13.)
J7 The actual signing by General MacArthur occurred at 0908 and four minutes earlier by the Japanese re·
presentatives. (GHQ SWPA & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns [S]. Sep 45, p. 2.)
18 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I. Aug 45- J.n 46 (C), p. 29.
19 This policy, which had concurrence of the State D epartment, had been announced by the President and
given wide circulation throughout the world, (GHQ USAFPAC PRO Release No. 227, 23 Sep 45.) It specified
tha t the ultimate objectives of the Post Surrender Policy were (0 insure that Japan would not again become a menace
to the peace and security of the world , and [0 bring about the eventua l establishment of a responsible government
which would respect the rights of other states and would support the objectives of the US as reRected in the ideals
and principles of the charter of the United Nations . Democratic processes would be insti tuted in determining the
type of government the Japanese desired and the ideals of a democratic social and political order would be promulgated.
The document specified that there would be milita ry occupation to destroy despotic power in the land, disarm the
country, free prisoners of war and internees, and carry out all such other operations as SCAP might direct. (See
Ch. III for organization and operations of SCAP.) The Japanese people would be expected to comply completely
with a program of announced regimentation in order to effect a rehabilitation of the economic structure of the land so
that the population would be able to maintain itself within a reasonable time. This clause was to come into prominence
later when certain of the Allied Powers challenged the right of SCAP to forbid strikes by government employees
engaged in such vital fields as transportation and other public utilities upon which the day-to·day welfare of the people
directly depended.
32
 Japanese Delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and
General Umezu, on board USS Missouri In Tokyo Bay.

General MacArthur takes posltlon before a microphone as the Japanese general signs
the Surrender Document. In the rear of the Supreme Commander stands Lt. Gen.
Jonathan Wainwright, defender of Corregidor until its fall in May 1942.

PLATE NO. 12
MacArthur takes the Surrender, 2 September 1945
 re<Juirements which had been outlined to the East Indies, and Australian and New Zealand
Japanese emissaries at Manila two weeks pre- Forces in the East Indies, south of the Philip-
viously. The order called upon the Imperial pines and Manus Island.
General Headquarters " ... by direction of the Immediately after the surrender ceremonies
Emperor and pursuant to the surrender to the were concluded, Eighth Army Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Po- authorized the dispatch of several "mercy
wers . .. ", to order the Japanese forces to sur- teams," organized in early August for the
render themselves and their arms to designated recovery of Allied prisoners of war and inter-
representatives of SCAP in various parts of the nees. These units landed at Atsugi on 30
Pacific Theater and China.'" The Japanese August and established themselves in Y oko-
police force was initially exempted from the hama, impatiently awaiting the order which
general disarmament and was ordered to remain would permit them to fan out rapidly through
on duty for the preservation of law and order, the surrounding areas to begin their work."
for which it would be held responsible. The In order to avoid incidents which might
Japanese Government was directed to provide develop from operations of these teams and to
detailed information about the armed and insure that the Japanese population would
economic resources of the country. The safety quickly learn precisely what was expected of
and well-being of prisoners of war and civilian them, GHQ, SCAP, did not depend solely
internees was specifically demanded and all upon General Order Number 1. People were
pertinent records were required immediately. informed directly through existing newspaper
The Japanese were to be prepared to deliver and radio facilities." This action was also
all such persons to Allied authorities . expected to serve as an automatic and effective
To permit maximum concentration upon the check against the recurrence of militaristic or
immediate occupation problems in the Japanese ultra-nationalistic propaganda. After screening
• main islands and Korea, responsibility for im- by the Counter Intelligence Corps, civilian
plementation of surrender and subsequent personnel recommended by the Japanese as
operations in all other Pacific areas was con- being trustworthy and pro-democratic in their
sidered outside the province of SCAP. The beliefs were retained to assist in dissemination
following commands were dissolved: Allied of news and information from GHQ. In-
Land Forces, Allied Naval Forces, and Allied itially Domei and Joho Kyoku news agencies and
Air Forces. For surrender purposes the British the Japan Broadcasting Corporation were util-
Empire assumed control of certain portions of ized and administered by GHQ!l Orders were
the Southwest Pacific Area, the Netherlands issued that all Japanese outbound international

20 In developing the general agenda of the surrender negotiations in Manila, G -2/G-3 had already laid the ground-
work for the demobilization of the Japanese forces in the Home Islands , which represented the major immediate prob-
lem for the Occupation.
2[ Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), p. 21. Actually Navy
units had H jumped the gun" (Halsey) in the matter of recoveri ng PW's. For a detailed account of these activities
and all others associated with the recovery of prisoners of war see Ch. IV. The Monograph quoted above credits
Eighth Army with recovering a total of 23 ,9B5 persons .
22 This action was in keeping with a policy jointly concurred in by State , War, and Navy Departments as well as
by the OWl, and radioed to SCAP a week previously. (Rad W-52702, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 22 Aug 4S·)
23 Ibid.

34
news services to unoccupied areas would origi- occupation agencies was also placed under its
nate from Tokyo. GHQ, SCAP, would jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this ar-
authorize through its established agencies the rangement were the Y okosuka Naval and Air
use of all world news and pictures published Bases which were assigned to the Navy.
or broadcast in Japan. News releases would Boundaries were later fixed by agreement be-
be supplied by the Office of War Information tween the Eighth Army and the Navy. The
in continental United States. Japanese radio Eighth Army Commander allocated the Atsugi
stations picked up OWl broadcasts directly airdrome and surrounding territory to the Far
from San Francisco, Hawaii, Saipan, and East Air Forces, and made available to General
Manila." Headquarters those fitcilities requested through
Japanese radio and newspapers might freely its representatives.
use news originating within Japan provided: ., On 30 August GHQ, AFPAC, issued an
amendment to the last operations instructions.
1. Nothing was disseminated prejudicial to public
order dlld safety, including aiticism of surrender terms
This amendment materially altered the missions
and Allied control measures. assigned to the Army commanders. Instead
2. No suggestion was imparted of dIsunity in Allied of actually instituting "military government,"
Powers policy toward Japan. Army commanders were to supervise the ex-
3. No praise or pity was expressed for Japanese ecution of the policies relative to government
taken into custody by Allied authority.'" functions which GHQ, AFPAC, was to
4. No promises were attributed to Allied Power, issue directly to the Japanese Government."
excepting basis of direct textual quotations from Likewise, the functions of the armies with
official documents reported without comment OT
respect to the disarmament and demobilization
interpretation. of the Japanese armed forces were changed from
5. Files of all publications wert maintained for
operational control and direction to supervision
Allied impection.
of the execution of orders, as transmitted to the
It was decided also that motion picture shows Japanese forces by GHQ, AFPAC. In con-
would be temporarily suspended pending review trast to the original concept, the Japanese
by censorship authorities." Government and its armed forces were required
Eighth Army assumed responsibility for the to shoulder the chief administrative and oper-
Area of Initial Evacuation but functioned ational burden of disarmament and demobiliz-
through the Japanese Government. The task ation.'· The new plan was designed to a void
of allocating areas, fitcilities, and equipment to possible incidents which might result in spo-

'4 Ibid.
25 Ibid. News releases were subject to mild censorship through ceo (Civil Censorship Detachment), an
operating agency of the theater G-2.
26 The fact of seizure could be reported.
'7 (I) See Ch. VIII. (,) GHQ FEC, Int SeT, Vol. VIII, Operation, of the Count" Intelligence Corp' in SWPA
and Occupied Japan (5), and Vol. IX, The Ci'Yil Intelligence Section: Occupation PhaIt, 1945- 48 {S). This series was
distributed to Service schoo ls primarily.
,8 GHQ U5AFPAC, Opn' Instn, NO.4, Aug 45 (5), Amendment 12.
29 G-2 GHQ was charged with the development and surveillance of plans for the demobilization and disarma-
ment of the Imperial Forces, in view of expert knowledge of the internal structure of the Japanese Army. The first
step to be taken was to abolish the Imperial General Staff but to retain (with qualifications) the Army and Navy Mini-
stries which were essentially Zone of Interior administrative agencies and demilitarize them progressively, as required.

35
radic conflict. The Commanding General of the Second
On 3 September, GHQ, SCAP, issued Japanese Army (Group) reported to the Sixth
Directive Number 2.'° It was a comprehensive U.S. Army Commander. At the same time, a
document, the basic authority for the Occupa- senior representative of the Chief, Japanese
tion of Japan by Allied Forces. Among its Imperial Naval General Staff, reported to a
numerous provisions was an order to the Japa- designated naval representative for instructions
nese Imperial Government and the Japanese covering the entry of United States naval
Imperial Headquarters, to comply with all the forces into Japanese and Korean waters and
outlined requirements, to assure prompt and naval establishments.
orderly establishment of the Occupation forces, The II2th Cavalry Regimental Combat
and to establish specific controls over disarma- Team landed at 0930 on 3 September nea~
ment and demobilization of Japanese armed Tateyama Bay naval air station and established
forces." control over coastal defenses. Immediate con-
To facilitate the Occupation of Japan by the tact was made with the IIth Airborne Division
two United States Armies, this Directive spe- reconnaissance troop which was patrolling
cified that the boundaries of the FirstJapanese north to Chiba and south to Tateyama.
Army (Group) would be adjusted to coincide Control of the II2th Cavalry RCT passed to
with those of the Eighth U.S. Army. Similar- the IIth Airborne Division.
ly, the boundaries of the Second Japanese Four years of bitter warfare had taught the
Army (Group) would coincide with those of the American soldier that appearances where Japa-
Sixth U.S. Army. As specified by the Directive, nese were concerned could be fatally deceptive.
the Commanding General of the First Japanese As patrols pushed out to the Y okohama-
Army (Group) reported to General Eichelberger Tateyama area, carbines were ready and faces
for instructions. General Eichelberger directed were grim, despite the fact that Japanese men
him to notify all Japanese military commanders and boys continued to salute respectfully.
and civilian officials that, beginning with 6 Here is what an official situation report had to
September, they could expect United States say of the period:"
reconnaissance parties to travel throughout
No hostile military or ci"ilian action during period
their areas. Following this, the occupying
as 112th RCT landed Tateyama where 1,600 armed
troops would move in. Seventy-two hours'
troops were reported: Jap Army, Navy and State
advance notice of a reconnaissance party's ar-
Dept officials met our forces and agreed to stipulation
rival in a particular area and forty-eight hours'
of the surrender. 11th A l B Div and Fleet Landing
notice of the movement of troops would be Force continued to patrol area of responsibility with
given. These detailed arrangements would no reported unusual incidents. CIC Detachment and
permit the Japanese commanders to disarm their Japanese Civil Police completed investigation of 2 Jap
units prior to arrival of occupation forces and ci,.ilians found dead ')Iidnit., Grand Hotel, Yokohama,
to restrict them to barracks or camp areas, thus I Sep. Japanese Police satisfied deaths not result any

reducing the possibility of any clashes. American action.

30 See Ch. V.
31 G-2 was charged with the GHQ staff supervision of plans and execution as developed by the Japanese au-
thorities, in regard to demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Forces in Japan. G-3 and US Navy took over
repatriation movements of contingents abroad. See Ch. V.
32 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, No. I, 5 Sep 45 (5), p. I.

36
 Prayers at the Imperial Palace.

Prayers at Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo.

PLATE NO. 13
Surrender Day for the Japanese, 2 September 1945
 The next day witnessed an event unique quently in the local press."
in Japanese political history. While troops While the Emperor was addressing the
continued to unload in Tokyo Bay, an Japanese people, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall's
emergency session of the Diet was called to XI Corps Headquarters finished unloading and
hear the Emperor's address and Prime Minister opened in Yokohama. The 8th Cavalry
Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni's explanation Regiment (1St Cavalry Division) passed to
of the developments which led to the Imperial control of the Commanding General, XI Corps,
decision to surrender. The Emperor's opening and relieved the llth Airborne Division of
address to the Diet was significant. It was the guard dury on the perimeter along the inner
first time he gave direct orders to his subjects. Yokohama Canal and at vital installations in
The address was lucid and Iree of ambiguous Yokohama proper." The 12th Cavalry Regi-
terms. Previously, the Imperial rescript had ment moved to the Tachikawa area, west of
merely stated acceptance of the Potsdam decla- Tokyo, and occupied Chofu, Yokota, Showa,
ration. The people knew only that the in- and Tachikawa airfields, completing United
strument of surrender had been signed by re- States control of all important airfields on the
presentatives of the Emperor. Now the Em- Kanto Plain." Meanwhile, elements of the
peror told them in person that, in his desire to IIth Airborne continued to arrive at Atsugi
improve Japan's difficult position, he had despite unfavorable weather. Service troops
ordered capitulation. Thus, even in defeat, of the Far East Air Forces and the first battalion
the unique traditional relationship of the" Em- of the 127th Infantry (32d Division) landed at
peror-head of the Japanese Nation-family" had the Kanoya airdrome on 4 September. They
been preserved. Peaceable fulfillment of Al- occupied the area south of Tokyo." On 5
lied demands could mean continuation of this September, reconnaissance parties from the XI
relationship. At the same time, it was hinted Corps and 1st Cavalry Division penetrated
that this privilege might be lost if the Allied Tokyo in preparation for the main movement
demands were not peaceably fulfilled. The of troops planned for 8 September. The 1st
Emperor ordered the people to abide by the Cavalry Division thus claimed to be the first
terms of surrender and to work toward regaining unit in Tokyo.
the trust and faith of the world. He stressed The weather continued to be unfavorable
the need for coolness, self-discipline, and as- and the remaining elements of the IIth Air-
sistance to soldier's families and others who borne on Okinawa were forced to postpone
suffered as a result of the war. To the Japanese departure for Atsugi until the following day.
this was a clear directive to work in peace, an On 6 September the llth Airborne closed at
indication that a new chapter in' the life of the Okinawa. No casualties had been reported in
nation was beginning. It is interesting to note the movement of the llth Airborne between
that although the term "surrender" was not Okinawa and Atsugi, but fifty-nine men had
used in the Imperial address, it occurred fre- been killed and nine seriously injured in crashes

33 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, Sep 45 (S).

34 HQ Eighth US Army, G'3 Periodic Rpt, 2-3 Sep 45.
35 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-lan 46 (C), p. 30.
36 GHQ SCAP &: USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S), p. 3. The 32d Division was assigned to Sixth
Army which was not yet scheduled for occupation movements. The Division was still in the Philippines; the 127th
lnfantry thus became the first Sixth Army combat unit to enter Japan.

38
between Luzon and Okinawa." Troop carrier ated by United States air attacks. Only
planes began moving elements of the 27th scattered corrugated metal shacks, some steel
Division.'" By evening of 7 September the and concrete safes and vaults, a few tall stacks,
air movement of the 27th Division from and forlorn , fire-blackened ruins remained of
Okinawa to Atsugi had assumed sizeable pro- what had been a thriving industrial city of
portions_ Approximately 25 percent of the 60,000 people. Along the Chofu Highway
strength of the I05th Infantry Regiment had Japanese children waved, shouted, bowed or
arrived. The forward command post of the saluted. It was difficult to believe that this
Division closed at Okinawa and opened at occasion emblematized conquest. The convoy
Hiratsuka. seemed more like a triumphant parade of
troops rerurning home to receive the victor's
Triumphal Entry plaudits.'-
The cavalcade halted at the city limits.
The initial landing at Atsugi was the first General Chase alighted from his jeep and
occupation ofJapanese soil by American troops. stepped across the line. As soon as he was
·However, the event which was to symbolize seated again in his jeep, the convoy resumed its
the real defeat of Japan was the entry of the movement. The U.S. Army was in Tokyo.i'
Supreme Commander and his forces into A few hours later, at a simple ceremony in
Tokyo, the final step on a long trail. front of the American Embassy, General
At 0800 on 8 September a motor convoy left MacArthur gave the following order to General
the assembly area of 1st Cavalry Division at Eichelberger: " Have our country's flag un-
Hara-Machida and rurned toward Tokyo. furled and in the Tokyo sun let it wave in its
Among other vehicles was a jeep which carried full glory, as a symbol of hope for the oppressed
General Chase, the Division Commander. and as a harbinger of victory for the right."i'
Unforrunately for all those of the Division The guard of honor presented arms and the
who had so thoroughly earned the right to be officers saluted, as the Stars and Stripes waved
"first" in Tokyo, the bulk of the Division over Tokyo, Japan's capital city-humbled,
was carrying out occupation duties and not charred, and flattened in defeat.
many units could be spared for the mission. The Commanding General, XI Corps be-
Only the band, the second squadron of the 7th came responsible for the city of Tokyo, a task
Cavalry Regiment, the 302d Cavalry Reconnais- delayed for several days to allow the Japanese
sance Troop, and one veteran representing each to disarm the troops within the capital. During
of the other non-participating troops were the day, the 2d Cavalry Brigade Headquarters
included for the formal entry. and the 7th Cavalry Regiment moved to Tokyo,
North and east the convoy sped. The establishing their bivouac area on the Y oyogi
cavalrymen moved through pine-covered hills, Parade Ground adjacent to the Meiji Inner
pock-marked with caves dug by the Japanese. Shrine. Elements of the 1pd Infantry of the
They passed through Hachioji, almost obliter- Americal Division had arrived at Yokohama,

37 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, No. ~ , 9 Sep 45 (S).

38 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 4O-Jan 46 (C), p. 30.
39 Ibid, pp. 30- P·
40 Ibid.
4' Ibid.

39
General MacArthur with Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase, followed by Admiral Wm. F. Halsey
and Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger enter the American Embassy grounds, Tokyo, for the
official raising of the American flag.

Salute to the flag In the American Embassy grounds.

PLATE NO. [4
Tokyo-The End of the Road, 8 September [945
and were en route to their assembly area two artillery was established in the Yokohama area,
miles southwest of Hara-Machida.·' while more than 60 percent of the 164th
The r87th Para-glider Infantry of the llth Infantry was billeted in the vicinity of
Airborne Division continued to guard Atsugi Tachikawa.
airfield and vicinity and relieved elements of Good weather had favored large-scale air
the 1st Cavalry Division at Hara-Machida movements from Okinawa and seventy-four
Military Academy and Ordnance School. planes arrived at Atsugi carrying personnel and
During the course of guard duty around the equipment of the 27th Division. The regi-
field an incident occurred which was initially mental headquarters of the I05th Infantry had
thought to be the first clash with Japanese been established at Odawara and rail transpor-
civilians. Approximately 100 men attempted tation had been marshalled for the movement
to loot wa.rehouses at the northeast corner of the of the incoming troops on 10 September." On
airfield. Troops of the 187th broke up the the same day Task Force 35, bearing Eighth
attempt and arrested three persons. Another Army representatives, entered Katsuyama Bay
resisted arrest and was killed. An immediate on the U raga Peninsula east of Tokyo, and a
investigation revealed that the offenders were landing was made at Katsuura. Considerable
not Japanese but Koreans." army and navy equipment was found in good
condition and no incidents were reported.
The Occupation Firmly Established By 10 September primary security duties
were taken over by the Americal Division
With the United States troops in Tokyo, which, with the exception of a battalion of the
the Occupation became an accepted fact to the 164th Infantry, had completed unloading and
Japanese people. There were no hostile or moving from the docks. Elements of the
subversive moments, only a curious interest on Division relieved 1st Cavalry units on duty in
the part of all classes of Japanese as new units Tachikawa and Chofu airfield areaS and in the
moved through the streets of Yokohama and Yokohama area. At Hara-Machida the 182d
Tokyo. The Japanese press in general main- Infantry of the Americal Division replaced
tained an attitude which was almost that of a elements of the llth Airborne which was to be
host. transferred to Sendai. Soon thereafter the
With the exception of the 8th and 12th advance party of the 11th Airborne departed for
Cavalry RCT's, on security duty in the Yoko- Sendai. The air movement of the 27th Division
hama-Tachikawa area, remaining units of the from Okinawa went on without interruption
1st Cavalry moved from Hara-Machida into during the day, while the I05th Infantry, which
Tokyo on 9 September. had arrived earlier, moved by rail from Atsugi
The Americal Division continued its debar- to Odawara. Meanwhile the 106th opened a
kation during 9 and 10 September and temporary command post at Zama.
established its command post northwest of At the initiation of G-2, SCAP directed that
Hara-Machida. Nearly all of the division the Imperial General Headquarters should be

42 Ibid, p. 32.
43 HQ Eighth US Army, G-3 Periodic Rpt No. IO, 9 Sep 45 (R).
44 Ibid.
41
dissolved not later than 13 September." It had party at least forty-eight hours in advance for
served its immediate purpose. The pattern of verification of Japanese compliance with exist-
the Occupation in the Initial Evacuation Area, ing directives. No subordinate commander
as outlined in the original surrender documents, was allowed to issue directives to the Japanese
was assuming definite shape. The Eighth military authorities. He submitted his request
Army, charged with execution of General to Eighth Army Headquarters for specific
Order Number 2, was ready to expand its area instructions, which were then sent from that
of operations. Radiation movements of several headquarters to the Japanese. Considerable
subordinate units were carried out:'· (I) XIV attention was given to dress, conduct, discipline,
Corps landed at Sendai on 15 September and and military courtesy of the troops. All com-
opened its headquarters on the 18th; (2) IIth manders were ordered to take positive steps to
Airborne and 27th Divisions transferred control protect shrines , objects of art, historic and
of and responsibility for their current assigned religious monuments; Imperial residences and
areas to XI Corps; 6) IIth Airborne Division buildings; and all embassies, consulates, and
began rail and motor movement to Sendai on buildings belonging to any of the United
14 September, occupied Miyagi Prefecture and Nations.'-
opened its command post on I October at Nearly all of the 1st Cavalry Division was
Sendai; (4) control of both divisions passed established in Tokyo by 13 September. On 14
to XIV Corps; (5) farther north, the 81st September, the final plane load of 27th Division
Division, IX Corps, landed in the Aomori area troops arrived at Atsugi. Elements of the
on 27 September; (6) elements of the 77th 43rd Infantry Division moved to Kumagaya,
Division landed on 15 October at Otaru and northwest of Tokyo. The Eighth Army's area
secured the city with its port facilities, occupied of responsibility was extended by CINCAF-
Sapporo, and as troops became available, PAC to include the entire prefecture of
extended control throughout the island of Nagano. Patrols by the newly-arrived 27th
Hokkaido.'7 Division were operating in the Hadano area.
In the same order were included a number of The same day, elements of Headquarters XIV
other instructions generally in keeping with the Corps began unloading in the Sendai area.
prudent policy of avoiding friction. Among XI Corps was informed by Eighth Army that
them were discreet reminders to commanders its area of responsibility would include the
that the moves were still operational in charac- prefectures of Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Saitama,
ter. It directed that all units be continuously Tokyo, Gumma, Nagano, Yamanashi, and
in a state of combat readiness. Each com- Kanagawa (excluding the Yokosuka Naval
mander charged with initial occupation of an Base)." (Plate No. 15)
area was directed to dispatch a reconnaissance During the period 17-20 September, expan-

45 SCAPIN 17, 10 Sep 45. This measure indicated the close G-2 survei llance of general policy matters
connected with the demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces . The Japanese General Staff was an operational
entity for strategic decisions; it was not required for the administrative processes of repatriation , demobilization and
disarmament: such matters were within the purview of the Ministries of War and Navy which were retained temporarily.
46 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 38.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, pp. 38-39.
49 Ibid, p. 39·

42
 JAPAN
UEVUIO...s I H HU
APPROXIMATE SCALE I 6,500,000

HOKKAIDO --->
AOMORI
IWATE
AKITA
MIYAGI
YAMAGATA
FUKUSHIMA
NIIGATA
NAGANO
TOYAMA

SHIGA
KYOTO
HYOGO
TOTTORI TOCHIGI
OKAYAMA GUMMA
SHIMANE
HIROSHIMA
YAMAGUCHI
TOKYO
KANAGAWA
YAMANASHI
SHIZUOKA
AICHI
GIFU
MIE

KAGAWA
TOKUSHIMA
EHIME
OITA KOCHI
FUKUOKA
KUMAMOTO
SAGA
MIYAZAKI
NAGASAKI
KAGOSHIMA

PLATE NO. 15
Prefectures of Japan: The Principal Political Subdivisions.
sion and readjustment continued within the the advance party left by plane for Ominato,
Initial Occupation Area.'" The 43rd Division and from there proceeded by motor to Aomori.
sent elements in to relieve the I64th Infantry There they conferred with the prefectural
Regiment at lrumagawa airfield. The IIth governor, the chief of police, and the senior
Airborne Command Post opened in Matsu- army commander of the area. The party found
shima in northern Honshu on 17 September. that the Japanese had complied with the
Fifth Air Force troops began to relieve infantry surrender terms and that the landing area was
units at airfields. On 20 September the 4th cleared of all Japanese troops." Arrangements
Marine Regiment assumed the responsibility were made for troop billets, transportation, and
for all areas and missions formerly assigned the office space for IX Corps units scheduled to
Fleet Landing Force which reverted to the occupy Hokkaido. Only minor disturbances
control of the 6th Marine Division. The 27th occurred during this visit. They were caused
Division moved from Muratsuka to occupy by Chinese and Korean laborers. Officers of
Kashiwazaki, Takada, Korizama, Fuchishima, the advance party visited the laborers' camps
Sanjo, and Nagaoka in the Niigata area on 20 and quieted the Chinese and Koreans by assur-
September." ing them that plans were already under way
On 20 September advance elements of the for their evacuation home."
97th Division arrived in T okyo- the first XIV Corps was directed to assume control
division from the European Theater of Opera- of the IIth Airborne Division and the 27th
tions in Japan. The 97th was ordered to relieve Division and to take over occupation respon-
the 43rd Division which prepared to return to sibilities within the Corps zone of occupation
the Zone of Interior." on 27 September." The Eighth Army would
In compliance with instructions from Gen- continue to be responsible for moving elements
eral Eichelberger, an advance party of staff of the IIth Airborne Division and the 27th
officers of IX Corps, 8Ist Division, and 77th Division into the zone of occupation of the XIV
Division arrived in Yokohama on 2 September. Corps until they were established in their
After conferring with the Eighth Army staff, areas.'· The Occupation of Japan meanwhile

50 On 17 September, General MacArthur moved his GHQ from Yokohama to Tokyo. Beginning at 0800 a Reet
of 50 trucks shuttled back and forth between Yokohama and Tokyo transporting 600 officers and 1.400 enlisted men.
Japanese residents stared in amazement as columns of trucks which seemed to continue for miles, ru-mbled to a stop
near the side-entrance of the Dai Ichi building. In the vacated rooms of the building, Japanese electricians were still
stringing wires while ten special units were cleaning the building. No formal ceremonies took place. The only out·
ward sign that this building was to be the site of GHQ was that two guards stood at each entrance. The entire pro·
gram was completed by 1700.
51 GHQ SCAP /JI. USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45. p. 5.
52 Ibid. p. 8.
53 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- J.n 46 (C), p. 40.
54 Ibid.
55 Amendment to Eighth US Army FO No. 32. er! 27 Sep 45 . (XIV Corps Rpt No. t on the .. Blacklist "
Opn, 20 Aug- 30 Sep 45·)
56 The 27th Infantry Division, having left personnel on Okinawa and having lost a sizeable group by redeploy·
ment to the US, had only approximately 66 percent of its organizational strength in the objective area. By 28 September
all elements of 27th Division had closed in their respective areas as assigned by the Division Commander, but a large
Division rear echelon of assigned replacements, together with the Division's heavy equipment, was on Okinawa or en
route to Japan under control of Eighth Army.

44
had proceeded so well that shipments of all perts.'" In the midst of these activities the
combat elements of Corps troops (except combat 43rd Division, the first to be returned to the
engineers) were cancelled. Zone of Interior, sailed from Yokohama on 28
Before the end of September, IX Corps September.
units landed in force in northern Honshu."
81st Division troops landed on 25 September Sixth Army Occupation Movements
and established Division headquarters in Ao-
mori. Regimental command posts were located Because the initial occupation under Eighth
as follows: the 321st Infantry at Tsuchiya, the Army had gone so smoothly, it was possible
322d Infantry at Hirosaki, and the 323d to accelerate Sixth Army occupation assign-
Infantry at Hachinohe. (Plate No. 16) ments. Originally it was planned for Sixth
With the exception of the 158th Regimental Army moves to be initiated only after the
Combat Team, which was scheduled to occupy Eighth Army had completed its assignments
Utsunomiya (northwest of Tokyo) in October, under" Blacklist," and the desire of Japan to
Eighth Army's occupation of Honshu was accept the surrender terms had been established
virtually completed by the end of September. beyond all doubt. Although no sizeable Sixth
The main and supporting movements had Army landings were planned until October,
taken place with smoothness and dispatch, main preliminary moves began on 25 Sep-
something that had not been anticipated. Not tember."
one serious incident marked the movement of General Krueger's area of responsibility was
thousands of Eighth Army troops into Honshu. divided into three zones. I Corps, commanded
All areas were under firm control. Units of by Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, was to occupy the
the IX, XI, and XIV Corps carried out their Osaka-Kyoto- Kobe zone. This zone in-
missions without trouble. They operated routine cluded thirteen prefectures and extended south
security patrols, seized and secured critical from the Eighth Army boundary to a point
Japanese installations and made local checks between Kobe and Okayama. The central zone
on the demobilization of the Japanese armed of the Sixth Army area was adjacent to the I
forces. The progressive destruction of enemy Corps zone and comprised the remainder of
ammunition and materiel was also supervised. southern Honshu (except the Shimonoseki tip)
In a surprise move at the end of the month, and the island of Shikoku. Maj. Gen. Franklin
troops and CIC units established guards over C. Sibert's X Corps was given responsibility
all Japanese financial institutions and strong for this area, which became the second zone.
rooms. The banks were closed, pending a The third zone, which included the Shimono
detailed inspection by SCAP technical ex- seki tip of Honshu and the island of Kyushu ,

57 This was not the first US occupation movement at that northern port. On 9 September elements of the
North Pacinc Fleet entered Mutsu Bay and occupied the naval base and air6.eld at Ominato. Mine sweepers cleared
the Bay, and several cruisers and destroyers were available to provide naval gunfire support if needed. Two eYE's
provided air cover.
58 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 56.
59 The first Sixth Army troops to arrive in Japan occupied Kanoya airdrome in southern Kyushu in company
with FEAF troops. The unit was the Ist Battalion, 127th InfantrYI 32d Division. The Battalion reverted to Division
control during November. An advance echelon of Sixth Army HQ of 19 officers and 2 enlisted men under Brig Gen
H. W. Kiefer arrived at Wakayama, Honshu, 19 September, to initiate implementation of GO No.2. (Sixth US
Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan, 22 5eP-- 30 Nov 45, p. 23.)

45
 JAPAN
Q.[V""O,iS I II nn
APPROI(IMATE SCALE. I 6,500,000

J A p

5 E

~tClIT-I\AS!;ED TO
COIHROL1,AS,F AT
SEPT

PLATE NO. r6
Location of Major Ground Units, 30 September 1945
was assigned to the V Amphibious Corps the original" Blacklist" plan were possible in
commanded by Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, expediting the Occupation. Paragraphs of that
USMC. order regarding possible resistance were elimi-
The leading elements of the 5th Marine nated."
Division landed at Sasebo (Kyushu) on 22 When General Krueger (Sixth Army) as-
September, and on the following day the 2d sumed command of ground forces in the zones
Marine Division went ashore at Nagasaki. of responsibility of V Amphibious Corps and
After these key objectives had been occupied, I Corps on 24 and 27 September respectively,
the 2d Marine Division expanded south of he established his headquarters in Kyoto. I
Nagasaki to assume control of the Nagasaki, Corps was to control the Osaka- Kyoto - Ko-
Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima pre- be area; X Corps, the central portion of the
fectures. In the meantime the 5th Marine Sixth Army Zone; and V Amphibious Corps,
Division expanded east to the prefectures of the extreme southern part.
Saga, Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi.60 All movements of Sixth Army units were of
Headquarters Sixth Army landed at Waka- dual nature: occupation and adjustment for
yama on 25 September and opened at Kyoto early inactivation of the veteran Sixth. After
two days later. Two of the three divisions this was accomplished, transfer of low-point
of I Corps, the 33d and the 98th, arrived on troops into Eighth Army and deployment of
25 and 27 September respectively." The 32d high-point troops to the Zone of Interior
Infantry Division was not scheduled to move for discharge or reassignment would follow ."
from the Philippines to Japan until October.
There was every indication by the beginning Japanese Reaction to
of October that the Occupation was proceeding Initial Occupation
satisfactorily. Although there was good co-
operation on the part of both the Japanese The Japanese reaction to the initialoccupa-
population and the officials of the government'" tion was so favorable that the Supreme Com-
it was necessary to move Sixth Army troops mander issued an official statement in Septem-
into their zones of responsibility in order to ber in which he estimated the total occupation
make the Occupation complete. In view of force could be cut to 200,000 men by I July
complete Japanese cooperation, modifications of 1946." This seemed unbelievable and some
60 Sixth US Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan. 22 SeP-30 Nov 45.
61 Ibid, p. 18.
62 By I October 1945 the demo bilization of Japanese armed forces was approximately 87 percent co mplete.
See Ch. V .
63 Sixth US Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan 22 Sep-30 Nov 45, FO 75. 21 Aug 45.
64 The" point system " provided for the early return of men who had 85 or more points. According to a memo
issued by G·3 GHQ . 6 September 1945. sub : Readjustment, 80,000 high.point personnel would be returned during
the first month of occupation. Between September and the end of 194'5. 390,000 would be scheduled for return .
General MacArthur requested that there be 25 .000 replacements each month during November and D ecember. (Rad
[S] C-ISl73. CINCAFPAC to WARCOS. 26 Sep 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 370.) All of this was in conformity with
the plans of the War Departmenl to reduce the tOtal army to approximately 2, 100.000 by 1 July 1946. The War.
Department was under great pressure from Congress. In the various theaters including the Pacinc, the amazed citizens
of occupied countries saw American soldiers participating in open protest rallies, demanding early action on their return
to the 21.
65 Occupauonal Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C).

47
Gen. Walter Krueger as he appeared m
the field in 1945

Gen. Walter Krueger amves in Tokyo for

a visit with the Supreme Commander.

PLATE NO. 17
Sixth U.S. Army Commander
American magazines and newspapers were quite prefectural authorities laid in a store of onions,
antagonistic, claiming that the statement had potatoes, fruit, and meat. Since all intelligence
been made for effect only and was not in the surveys had correctly reported an acute shortage
best interests of safety. Nevertheless, the oHoad in Japan, Occupation personnel express-
"man on the ground," the American soldier, ed considerable surprise at this abundance.
was inclined to believe it. When a member of the reception committee ex-
Calming a nervous populace called for plained that the food had been "requisitioned,"
discipline and friendliness. General Mac- one of the United States officers made it clear
Arthur's troops proved themselves equal to the that no such special consideration was desired.
task. American personal kindness and official This attitude, wholly at variance with Japanese
consideration were wholly unexpected by the Army practices abroad, produced an immediate,
Japanese. Those factors went far toward build- favorable effect upon Japanese public opinion.
ing good relations with an emotionally dis- The Japanese were further impressed by early
turbed people. Beginning with the first hours reports of tolerant treatment of the Japanese by
of the Occupation, the old authoritarian back- our soldiers.
ground of the Japanese contrasted with the Two days after the surrender, twenty truck-
free, liberal philosophy of the American forces. loads of flour, rolled oats, canned goods, and
Adjustments had to be made and sometimes rice arrived at the Y okosuka municipal office
led to misunderstanding and confusion. as relief supplies for the local people. The
Japan, accustomed to close control from the next day eleven more trucks appeared with
top and always indifferent to independent medical supplies, blankets, tea, and other
thinking from those in lower strata, had no goods. Mayor Umezu, completely overwhelm-
criteria by which to initiate or to judge the ed by this unexpected generosity, expressed
value of the original measures so strongly his deep appreciation." Simultaneously, Amer-
desired by the occupation authorities. Adjust- ican soldiers on patrol or sightseeing in trucks
ment, however, proved far less difficult than and jeeps circulated throughout the occupied
had been anticipated. This was partly due to areas. Amused by the Japanese children, they
the apparent eagerness of the Japanese to adapt handed out chocolate bars, hard tack, chewing
themselves to occidental methods, although a gum, and candy drops."
great deal of credit must be given to the shrewd There were other humane actions, as in the
advance planning of General MacArthur. case of three American soldiers who gave first
Japanese ideas of how their conquerors would aid to a girl knocked down and severely injured
react once Japan was occupied were based on by a Japanese street car. The soldiers were
former Japanese Army policy in the conquered further reported to have hailed a passing army
Asiatic and Pacific Ocean areas. In those vehicle and to have taken the injured girl to a
areas the native populations, regardless of their hospital. This act was greatly appreciated by
own food shortage, were always expected to the Japanese."
feed the Japanese troops. Mindful of their Units temporarily billeted in the Y okohattla
army's policy and in anticipation of food requi- Museum and the Yokohama City Library
sitions by the Occupation forces , the Kanagawa created a vety favorable impression. Just before
66 Tokyo, Nipporl Times, 7 Sep 45.
67 Ibid.
68 T okyo Shiff/bUrl, 11 Sep 45.

49
 GI with Japanese children.

Shopping on the Ginza.

PLATE NO. 18
GI ; Ambassador of Goodwill
 leaving, they carefully cleaned the rooms, gath- cupation zone. The police, stationed outside
ered up all the trash, and buried waste and the zone, stopped all passers-by to make sure
refuse in a neighboring lot." that no armed individuals penetrated. Tbe
The friendly boyishness of the new arrivals troops remained for the most part within their
who, when strolling along the Ginza for the area and arrested those who acted suspiciously.
first time, polled the numerous street stall eat- Cooperation between the Occupation forces and
ing places to ask for milk'" amused the Japanese Japanese civil police was thus early established."
and eased the tension. These minor incidents The Japanese press, which at first had been
exemplifY what appealed to the " face saving" inclined to be dubious about American be-
tradition-bound nature of the Japanese people. havior, now voiced unanimous praise." Japa-
To forestall any incidents which might be nese authorities, in striving faithfully to avoid
caused by exuberant, irresponsible soldiers unpleasant incidents which might lead to
seeking souvenirs, all commanding officers were violence, urged their people to act prudently,
instructed to take necessary precautions. Con- decorously, and with composure, " thereby dis-
sidering the fact that the majority of occupation playing the true essence of the Yamato race.""
troops were combat veterans, relatively few This took several forms. Initially, the
incidents marred the initial occupation. The Japanese publicists and officials recommended
Japanese received the victors submissively passive acceptance of Occupation authority, and
following the Emperor's mandate. They had avoidance" as far as possible" of all but the
accepted the Americans cautiously and were most essential business relations with Ameri-
eventually impressed by the complete absence cans. This, it was pointed out, was not due
of systematic looting and violence which many to hostility between the two peoples but to the
had fully expected. The one factor which unavoidable fact that customs differences and
had an immediately noticeable effect on the language barriers posed almost insuperable
people of Japan was the spontaneous generosiry obstacles to normal social relations." As a
of the Americans. further means of lessening conflict they began
There was no lack of a realistic attitude on to intensifY efforts to widen the use of English.
the part of the Occupation authorities. This This was not an easy task. English had been
was an occupation of enemy country, and frowned upon during the war, school courses
fanatics were known to exist and circulate. For in the language had been discontinued, and in
this reason, ten check points, manned jointly many places casual use of English had been
by Japanese policemen and Eighth Army regarded as a sign of disloyalty. Nevertheless,
troops, were established around the initial oc- as soon as surrender was proclaimed, efforts

69 Ibid, 6 Sep 45.

70 Ibid, 9 Sep 45·
71 The so-called Public Safety Division (PSD), an operating agency of G·2, was established early to initiate and
supervise certain police reforms j this section utilized US experts of the caliber of Mr. L. J. Valentine, former police
Commissioner of New York City. See Ch. VIlf.
72 Tokyo. Yomiuri and Tokyo Shimbun, which had been the worst offenders, completely reversed their attitude.
73 Tokyo, Nippon Times, I Sep 45. There should have been no doubt in the ofliciai mind: the carefully
calculated treatment of the Japanese delegation in Manila set an official psychological pattern that was immediately
persuasive.
74 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 23 Aug 4~.

51
were made in every town and village to revive General MacArthur, who had lived in the Ori-
the study of the language." Specifically, the ent for many years, was reluctant to make an
police advised the Japanese to stop worrying, to issue of a delicate problem. The subject was
disregard rumors, and to report to the police therefore handled with tolerance, restraint, and
all problems arising between Japanese and discretion.
foreigners." Newspapers, using a well worn Recognizing early that restoration of good
Japanese method, warned that the eyes of the relations depended largely upon the correctness
world were upon Japan and that calmness was of Japanese behavior, and that this in turn
to be maintained. n One newspaper, blandly called for proper understanding of American
assuming that." ... coquetry is the cause of psychology, Japanese newspapers stressed the
trouble .... ," warned women against the use need for promoting good relations. Lack of
of heavy lipstick, rouge and eyebrow pencil. information concerning American ideals and
It also urged Japanese to be cautious of the methods was cited as a chief obstacle in
type of English used on the streets. "Do not promoting mutual confidence.·' Although this
loiter in the streets nor follow the troops, and do was a complete reversal of form according
not try to purchase anything from soldiers .... " to their former pronouncements, it was not too
was probably its most significant advice.'" surprising. The Japanese psychology was
Yomiuri and Tokyo Shimbun were the most quite pliable where their country's future was
consistent of all Japanese newspapers in warning concerned.
Japanese women against improper costumes The Japanese eagerly sought contacts with
or behavior.'" After cautioning girls against American soldiers. They made strenuous ef-
walking unattend.,d even in the daytime, forts to facilitate proper social relations. Tokyo
Yomiuri added: "Even when called upon by municipal police prepared a chart of entertain-
foreign soldiers saying' hello' or ' hey', inter- ment places and distributed it to all policemen,
mingled with their broken Japanese, women officials, and others who might be asked to
will pay no attention and will avoid all contact direct Occupation troops to such resorts. Vari-
with them."" The press and the people alike ous associations worked out elaborate plans for
were soon to learn that even in the few instances restaurants, recreation centers, theaters, dance
when women were molested, the offenders halls, and other entertainment facilities. Rather
were punished. than depend on Japanese recreation plans
Washington suggested that restrictIOns (some of which were not appro,ed by Occupa-
should be placed upon associations of Occupa- tion authorities), clubs and snack bars were
tion personnel with the Japanese population provided by the American Red Cross and Army
only in the event that the Occupation authori- Special Services. Special Services also took
ties considered such restrictions necessary.·' over numerous hotels, theaters, parks, golf
75 Tokyo Shimbun reported, 23 September, that railway employees in Tokyo Station were required to attend a
morning drill in English language conversation.
76 Tokyo, Nippon Times, , Sep 45.
77 Ibid.
78 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 7 Sep 45.
79 (,) Tokyo Shimbun, '9 Aug 45; (2) Tokyo, Yomiuri, 23 Aug 45·
80 Tokyo, Yom;",ri, 23 Aug 45.
8, Rad WX 5~6, Wash to CINCAFPAC, 30 Aug 45.
82 Tokyo. Yomiu", 26 Aug 45.

52
clubs, and other facilities , providing a variety the "Bushmaster" unit, I58th Regimental
of supervised recreation for Occupation per- Combat Team, which occupied Tochigi
sonnel. Prefecture." Thus, by the middle of October,
By the end of September, Japan's defeat had roughly seven weeks after the first troops of
become a reality to her people. For the first time the IIth Airborne Division landed at Atsugi
in her long history Japan had become a nation airfield, Operation " Blacklist" was virtually
completely dominated by a foreign power. The completed as far as the Eighth Army was con-
firm hand of General MacArthur was control- cerned. All important areas were controlled
ling and guiding the Japanese nation and the either by assigned troops or by active patrols.·'
people seemed responsive and cooperative. (Plate No. 19)
The large task of demilitarization of factories Hardly had the troops reached their objec-
and resources had begun. War criminals were tives, when extensive movements of high point
being arrested and held for trial. Ammunition, troops to the Zone of Interior began a second
weapons, and other military material were being phase of Eighth Army movements within
moved to depots to be inventoried and eventual- Japan. The Americal Division relinquished
ly destroyed. All th~e things the Japanese control in Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectures
people had initially accepted, and continued to (except Yokosuka Naval Base area) to the 1st
accept submissively, if not favorably. Cavalry Division, and in Yamanashi Prefecture
to the 97th Division. The 97th Division also
Eighth Army Occupation is Completed relieved the 27th Division in Niigata and
Fukushima Prefectures and assumed operation-
A responsibility of the IX Corps, occupation al control of the I58th Regimental Combat
of Hokkaido began 4 October when the 306th Team in Tochigi Prefecture. The 1st Cavalry
Regimental Combat Team of the 77th Division assumed responsibility for Yamanashi Prefec-
made the initial landing. The remainder of ture, formerly under the 97th." Closing its long
the Division proceeded by water convoy and Pacific campaign record, XIV Corps returned
landed at Otaru the following day. The 307th to the United States with the 27th Division
Regimental Combat Team immediately took in December. In January, the IIth Airborne
control at Sapporo. On 7 October, Headquar- Division took over the northern tip of Honshu,
ters IX Corps landed and Maj. Gen , Charles relieving the" Wildcats" (8Ist Division). Its
W. Ryder assumed command of all IX Corps control was further extended in March to
troops.·' The last major organization to move include Hokkaido, thus relieving the 77th
in the Eighth Army zone of occupation was Division.

83 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 42.
84 Ibid, p. 42. Originally scheduled to go on to nO[thern Japan as part of me IX Corps command, soldiers of
this unit entered Yokohama Harbor instead on 13 October for their 6rst glimpse of the goal for which they had
been destined when organized at Panama. On 14 October the combat team assumed responsibility for the occupation
of Tochigi Prefecture.
85 Troop movements only; the tremendous task of administering the terms of the surrender had hardly begun,
and would continue as long as the Occupation itself was mai ntained under SCAP.
86 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), pp. [04-5. Preparing
for the inactivation of the Il2th and 158th RCT's in January 1946, and with approval from Army, 22 December, XI
Corps directed that the 1st Cavalry Division relieve the 112th on 2 January and that the 97th Division relieve the
'58th on 5 January.

53
 JAPAN
L&1I 8(IIT eONfORN AI. CONIC 'l!OJlef!OI<
[L[VATIQNS IN '[fT

APPROXI MATE SCALE I 6,500,000

RCT

PLATE NO. '9

Location of Major Ground Units, 3' October 1945
 There arose an immediate need for an orderly,
Communications, Procurement supervised system which could provide billeting
and Requisition space and bivouac areas with the least possible
delay. .The problem had been anticipated,
The initial work of Signal Corps units however, and the advance party which landed
required not only installation and maintenance at Atsugi on 28 August carried instructions
of communications over the island of Honshu from General Headquarters for the establish-
as the number of Occupation troops increased ment of the Eighth Army Area and Facilities
weekly, but also necessitated survey and over- Allocation Board. On 2 September an advance
haul of worn Japanese e'luipment to determine party of seven officers organized the Board in
ways and means of blending this into a swiftly Yokohama in order to coordinate demands on
growing communications network. Bombings the Japanese for procurement of facilities. This
of Japan had caused destruction of about 25 original small section was greatly enlarged when
percent of all wire communications. An most of the personnel of the Eighth Army Field
additional 25 percent had reached a low state Artillery Section, headed by Brig. Gen. Eugene
. of efficiency through overloading and poor McGinley, were placed on temporary duty with
maintenance. In Tokyo only 50,000 of the the Allocation Board. Its maximum strength
original 200,000 instruments were in service. was forty-five officers and twenty enlisted
In all of Japan it was estimated that approx- clerks."
imately half of all the instruments in use at the To handle efficiently the volume and variety
beginning of the war were buried in the debris." of requests submitted, the Board was organized
There was no difficulty in procuring bi1lets into four sections: Billeting and Housing,
and office space during the initial occupation. Area and Storage, Records, and Coordination
The Ilth Airborne Division took over barracks and Planning. A fifth section was later added
vacated by Japanese soldiers. For several days, to assume control of the Tokyo area, excluding
the paratroopers and the 1st Cavalry men the part which General Headquarters had al-
moved from one installation to another in their ready acquired for its own use."
respective assigned sectors and occupied what- Japanese officials played an important role in
ever space was available. But with the arrival many phases of the Occupation and the work
of additional troops and the heavier concen- of the Allocation Board was no exception.
tration of forces in the half-gutted Tokyo- The Yokohama Liaison Office, created to
Yokohama area, the problem became acute. simplify and coordinate routine administrative

87 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), p. 101 .

88 Divisions and other units assigned occupation duties outside the Tokyo-Yokohama area requisitioned their
billets and bivouac areas through the Allocation Board, but this was done mainly for the purpose of keeping central
records. Actually, there was little possibility of conaiee in the outlying areas, because only one unit was in occupational
control of a single area. For example, after an advance party of a corps had made reconnaissance with the aid of local
officials, the corps submitted a requisition, with accompanying overlays, for approval of the Allocation Board. At
first much delay resulted from slow action on the part of the Yokohama Liaison Office. It was necessary that this
office learn from the local civil officials many miles away whether the use of facilities requested could be turned over
to the Americans without serious loss, from the Japanese point of view, to the community. Later this condition was
remedied by designating representatives in all the prefectures who could make spot decisions for the Liaison Office.
(Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 [C], pp. 64-{;5.)
89 Ibid, p. 65.

55
matters, was a subordinate echelon of the sign of softness. In a significant press release
Japanese Facilities Agency. The office oper· dated '4 September he stated;9)
ated in compliance with the provisions of an
Eighth Army administrative order." The same I have noticed some impatience in the press based

order directed that all billeting space, barracks, UpOll the aIJumption of a so·called soft policy ill Japan.
This can only drise from an erroneous concept of what
camp areas, port facilities, transportation, and . .
IS occurrrng.
many other major installations would be al-
The first phase of the occupation must of necessity
located by the Board, based on requirements
be based upon military cOtuiderations which in'Yo/"e
submitted by subordinate units."
the deployment forward of our troops and the disarm-
ing and demobilization of the enemy. This is coupled
Year-End Summary WIth the paramount consideration of withdrawing our
former prisoners of war and war internees from the
Beginning with a mere handful of men late intemment camps and tllama/jng them to their homes.
in August, the Eighth Army moved three corps, S4ety and security require that these steps shall pro-
seven combat divisions, and supporting service ceed with precision and completeness lest calamity may
troops into Japan within less than a month. be precipitated. The military phase is proceeding in
By October a total of 232.379 Eighth Army a" entirely satisfactory Wdy. Oyer half of the enemy's
men were in the country." The Sixth Army force in Japan proper is now demobilized and the e1llire
in its zone of responsibility had an approxi- program will be practically complete by the middle of
mately equal number. However, this was the October. During this i1ller.al of time s4ety and
high water mark and already the tide was turn- complete security must be assured.
ing the other way. It was apparent to careful When the first phase is completed the other phases
observers that the capitulation of Japan was as as pro.ided in the surrender term, will infallibly fol-
. comprehensive as it was real. Consequently, low. No one need ha>f any doubt about the prompt,
General MacArthur's mid-September estimate complete and entire fulfillmetll of the terms of sur-
that an army of 200,000 would be adequate to render. The process, howf'Yer, takes time. It js well
garrison the islands was now widely acclaimed. understandable in the face of atrocities committed by
General MacArthur was impatient with critics the enemy that there should be impatience. This
who mistook the Occupation policy of allowing natural impulse, how"", should be tempered by the
the Japanese considerable freedom in rebuilding fact that security and military expediency will require
the country economically and politically as a an exerci5e of some restraint. The surrender terms

90 HQ Eighth US Army, Adm Ord No. 15. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol.
I, Aug 45- Jan 46 [C], p. 65.)
9I GHQ pursued the same policy. A Japanese Liaison Group was organized under G-2 to parallel the corre-
sponding Japanese Government Central Liaison Office. The entire range of governmental contact was handled through
this channel, as a buffer unit. It must be noted that in this period the bulk of GHQ had remained in Manila as the
customary rear echelon j the tremendous problems of the initial crucial months from the fall of I945 to the spring of
1946, were handled by the small forward echelon. G-2 entered the picture repeatedly because it was the only source
of linguist talent "and possessed inherent expert knowledge of the Japanese civil and military structure.
92 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), p. 107.
93 GHQ USAFPAC Press Release, 14 50p 45. The Occupation fell into two inescapable phases: (a) demo·
bilization and disarmament and (b) political reform and economic rehabilitation. Impatient onlooken, safe from
direct military contact, agitated for the second phase, completely ignoring the military risks of the first. Unlike the
battered Germans in Europe, the Japanese Army in the Home Islands was entirely capable of combat i potential reactions
had to be carefully weighed.

56
 are not raft and they will not be applied in kid-glo.ed policy of greatly reducing the armed forces,
fashion_ plans were developed for deactivation and
Economically and industrially, as well as militarily, redeployment. The result was that by the
Japan is completely exhausted and depleted. She is end of the year, General Eichelberger's com-
in a condition of utter collapse, her governmental
mand (Eighth Army) was under 200 ,000'" and
structure is controlled completely by the occupation
was still going down. Meanwhile, the Occupa-
forces and js operating only to the extent necessary to
tion continued at an undiminished pace, quietly
insure such an orderly and controlled procedure as will
and efficiently.
prevent social chaos, diseaje and starvation.
The over-all objecti"s for Japan ha" been clearly
The first four months of the Occupation
outlined in the surrender terms a,u/ will be accom- were also a period in which great changes were
plished in an orderly, concise a"d comprehensi.. way brought about in the social, political, and
without delays beyond those imposed by the magnitude economic life of Japan.·' Beginning with the
of the physical pr~blems invol"d. famous" Bill of Rights" directive in the second
It is extremely difficult fOT me at times to exercise month of the Occupation, SCAP had issued a
that degree of patience which is unquestionably de- steady stream of orders to the Japanese Govern-
manded if the long-time policies which ha" been ment designed to destroy those influences III
decreed are to be ruccessfully accomplished without Japan which had led her into war, and to
repercussions which would be detrimental to the well- establish a democratic form of government.
being of the world but I am restraining myself to the
Political prisoners were liberated; the secret
best of my ability and am generally satisfied with the
police force was dissolved; Shinto religion was
progress being made.
separated from the state; the Emperor re-
The inconsistencies of armchair strategists, nounced his divinity; women's suffrage was
clamoring for repressive measures while weaken- promulgated; the educational system was re-
ing U. S. troops through accelerated demobi- vised; trade unions were legalized; and scores
lization became obvious III all theaters. of other political and social reforms were
Fortunately, General MacArthur's accurate launched. All of this required supervision
psychological appraisal of the Japanese system and surveillance on the part of military occupa-
enabled him to handle a contradictory situation. tion personnel.
It was possible to utilize the Japanese govern-
ment structure to the extent necessary to prevent The Beginning of the Second Phase
complete social disintegration, insure internal
distribution, maintain labor, and prevent With the opening of 1946, a new phase in
calamitous diseases or wholesale starvation. the Occupation of Japan began. Activities
With the Occupation well under way it was during the first months, trom the landing at
General MacArthur's opinion that the purposes Atsugi in August to the end of the year 1945,
of the surrender terms could be accomplished consisted primarily of movements to occupy
with only a small fraction of the men, time, Japan and the deployment of large numbers of
and money originally projected. combat troops prepared equally to fight or
Following the newly adopted Congressional favor, the recovery of Allied prisoners and

94 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), p. 108.

95 This period saw the creation of several predominantly civil agencies under SCAP in contradistinction to
normal staffs under FEe. Among the earliest to begin to function were : Government Section (GS), Economic &
Scientific Section (ESS), Public Health & Welfare (PH&W), and Civil Intelligence Section (CIS).

57
internees, the establishment of Occupation diers to fill it. Consequently, the point system,
facilities, and the disarming and demobilizing which had already undergone revision down-
of the Japanese armed forces. ward, was again modified." Following this
From a military standpoint, the new phase change of the point system, Eighth Army lost
would be concerned primarily with the main- 48,830 commissioned and enlisted personnel
tenance of immediate objectives and the enter- in January. The 1,385 replacements received
ing upon long-range objectives of the Occupa- hardly offset this loss, and the Eighth Army
tion. Both would be accomplished with a strength dropped sharply to '94,06, by the end
greatly reduced and constantly adjusting of January."
military force, yet one capable of meeting all The IIth Replacement Depot at Okazaki
emergencies, even combat, if necessary. and the 4th Replacement Depot at Zama
Among internal military problems confront- shipped the soldiers home through the ports
ing the Occupation, one of the most important of Nagoya and Yokohama respectively. Dur-
was redeployment and deactivation of troops. ing January both depots reported the return of
Sixth Army was relieved of occupation duties the" IOo,oooth homeward-bound soldier."·~
on 3' December '945, and General Eichel- The Air Force strength in January was
berger assumed command of all occupation listed at 30,799.'.' The Fifth Air Force with
army troops." At that time his Eighth Army its base at Irumagawa was charged with the
consisted of five corps, eleven divisions, a responsibility for air operations in Japan; the
number of lesser tactical units, and hundreds Fifth Fighter Command, based at Itazuki in
of service organizations. (Plate No. 20) The Kyushu, covered southern Japan; and the
total strength was 18,123 officers and 223,383 Fifth Bomber Command, also at lrumagawa,
enlisted men." This seemed to guarantee controlled northern Japan.
Eighth Army a personnel pool adequate to
cope with its assigned mission, but by this Service Unit and Supply Reorganization
time the United States' demobilization program
had developed the tremendous momentum During January the largest single unit
which reached its peak in January 1946. operating under Sixth Army was USASCOM-
Actually there was more shipping available to C,o, which was originally the service of supply
the Zone of Interior than there were sol- for Eighth Army under the old "Coronet"
¢ Inactivation of Sixth US Army took place on 26 January t946.
97 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in J~pan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 20.

gB The current troop movements were revised to release all officers with 67 army service record points or with
45 months of service as of 30 April, and all enlisted men with 45 points or 30 months of service as of that date . Then,
to provide absolute assurance that all available space would be used, authority was granted to call officeu with 65 points
or 42 months as of that date, should s11ch action prove necessary.
99 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 2(.

100 At Okazaki the January record showed 1.425 officers and 33.304 enlisted personnel returned to the US. At
2ama the total for the month came to 43.506. of which 2¢ were returned by air and 43.2[0 by water transportation.
In all, 78,235 individuals were started homeward in January through these depots. Eighth Army losses for the month made
up less than two-thirds of this total, the difference being accounted for by readjustment of personnel from GHQ. Fifth
Air Force, Merchant Marine and other services in Japan. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan
Vol. II, Jan- Aug 46 [C], p. 21.)
101 Ibid. pp. 22- 23.
102 Ibid, p. 30.

58
 JAPAN
1.."""'" ~_\,. COfItC '1IO.IIC'IOIi
lI.,IVilT"*' ,1$ flU
APPAO)(l NATE SCALE 1· 6.~,OOO

158 Re T

x
-xx
x

, SY r:~::~;~:!L~'N~;E;~S
MBOLS WITH
INDICATE UNITS
CONCERNED WITH

PLATE NO. 20
Location of Major Ground Units in Japan, I January 1946
operations plan. There were nearly HO,OOO peak efficiency, '.. were those of the 42d General
troops in this unit, the result of a merger of Hospital at Tokyo. This unit, housed in the
USASCOM-O and USASCOM-C (the re- St. Lukes International Medical Center, had
spective "Olympic" and "Coronet " supply an authorized strength of 144 officers and 450
organizations of the Sixth and Eighth U. S. enlisted men as of I January, but its actual
Armies). Inactivation of surplus units was strength was only 130 officers and 171 enlisted
undertaken immediately, particularly of those personnel. •.,
in the Kure area. Control of that region was It became necessary to use combat troops
transferred to the British Commonwealth for services when personnel shortages grew
Occupation Force at the end of January. acute. For example, the 68th Antiaircraft
USASCOM-C was concerned with the im- Artillery Brigade, together with Automatic
mediate improvement of water systems, housing, Weapons Units, was made responsible for the
airdrome and hospital installations, and com- operation and supply of Aomori and Sugamo
munications. Over-all communications traffic prisons, where accused Japanese war criminals
increased 30 percent in one month. Trans- were confined.'06
portation problems increased as supplies en Large quantities of supplies were accumulated
route for Sixth Army were diverted to the because of the unexpectedly peaceful nature of
already overloaded Eighth Army ports.'o, To the Occupation and the sharp reduction of
handle these assignments in the face of rapid troop strength.'" Although every effort was
military reshuffiing, the Army began to employ made to reroute cargoes which were not needed
Japanese nationals. More than 2,800 of them in the Theater, much of the incoming cargo
were employed at the Yokohama central pier. had to be unloaded to withdraw needed items.
In the Medical Service, five general hospitals, After inventory and selection, the surplus sup-
three station hospitals , and three evacuation plies were referred to the Foreign Liquidation
hospitals were inactivated during January. Commission of AFWESPAC for disposition.
General hospitals were maintained in the Supplies confiscated from the Japanese were
Tokyo-Yokohama area and at Sapporo, ordinarily useless or unsuitable for occupying
Sendai, Kyoto, and Kobe. Typical of the forces. Consequently, channels were organized
personnel difficulties encountered by all medical to return them to Japanese authorities. All
services, which were expected to carry on at stores of food, clothing, and medical supplies

103 The 3d Military Railway Service reported nearly [40,000 troops and 600,000 short tons of freight moved
during January. The 11th Major Port in Yokohama broke all records in January by handling an average of 6,284
long tons daily. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 32 .)
104 It was during the spring of this year that the worst epidemic in the post· war world hit Japan and placed
serious demands on the Medical Corps. In the Kobe- Osaka area, typhus and smallpox reached epidemic proportions
among the civilian population in February, when 3,000 typhus cases were reported ; at the peak, in March, 7,841 persons
died of typhus and 6,~ of smallpox . In one instance 377 new typhus cases were reported in Osaka in one day. Of
10 cases of smallpox among American soldiers, all died. Strict medical control measures were instituted and in April
the authorities could announce that the epidemic had been brought under control. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth
US Army in Japan Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 l Cj, p. 55.)
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid, p. 36. Other units of the 68th Brigade furnished :;ecurity guards for the 11th Major Port, 71st QM
Depot, Yokohama Ordnance Base Depot, the Engineer Depot, and other USASCOM·C installations.
107 Occupational Monograph of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan- Aug 46 (C), p. 73·

60
Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger and Lt. Gen. H. C. H. Robertson, BCOF, inspect Kure dock area.

General Eichelberger inspects the Australian Guard of Honor at Kure,

British Commonwealth Occupation Force Headquarters.

PLATE NO. 2I
The British Commonwealth Occupation Force, March I946
were distributed as equitably as possible when These were headquarters staff personnel. The
and where they were most needed . As far as following day a naval shore party arrived. It
practicable, scrap hom combat equipment was was not until 13 February, however, that the
converted into domestic articles which reap- first sizeable unit came in. This was the 34th
peared on the Japanese market. Destructive Australian Infantry Brigade, consisting of 1,200
munitions were dumped. ,08 troops, which landed and was established at
Occupation troops were constantly uncover- Kure the same day. On 20 February Head-
ing caches of precious metals and gems, which quarters, BCOF, opened at Kure.'" Six days
either were of Japanese origin or were looted later Lt. Gen. J. Northcott, the Commander,
hom invaded countries. On 14 January Eighth arrived.11:t
Army troops in Chiba Prefecture found sixty two Iwakuni airfield in Yamaguchi Prefecture
tons of silver in one cache. In another instance was made Headquarters of the BCOF Air
the Civil Intelligence Section of G-2 recov- Group, which was under the operational con-
ered 46,000 carats of industrial diamonds trol of the Fifth U. S. Air Force. Air Vice
seized mainly hom the optical plants of occu- Marshal C.A. Bouchier opened the head-
pied territories, particularly the Netherlands quarters of the British Commonwealth Air
East Indies. 'co Group there on 1 March 1946. The following
week, the 81st Wing, Royal Australian Air
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, flew in hom Borneo. Other air units
Force (BeOF) included the 14th Squadron of the Royal New
Zealand Air Force which arrived on 24 March.
Following agreements reached between Brit- By 24 April the preceding units were joined
ish Commonwealth and United States Gov- by the lIth and 17th Squadrons, RAAF, and
ernment representatives in Washington late the 4th Squadron, Royal Indian Air Force.
in 1945,"'· and between Australian authorities BCOF ground forces continued to arrive
and SCAP in December, the first elements of throughout the spring and summer of 1946
BCOF arrived in Japan by air 8 February. until they reached their troop strength in

loS Between I October 1945 and 30 August 1946, occupation troops disposed of nearly 866,000 tons of munitioru
of all types. Of this total, nearly 140,000 tons of explosives were returned to the Japanese for commercial usc.
(Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 [C).)
109 Additional material concerning this subject may be found in GHQ FEe, G-2 CIS Records.
IIO The British Government proposed a combined force from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand and India to consist of a brigade group (regimental combat team) and elements of Air Force and Navy from
each country. The Australian Government agreed to provide I brigade group, 3 air 6ghter squadrons and certain
warships. New Zealand volunteered a brigade group, an air fighter squad ron and small naval units. The United
Kingdom Government's contribution was to be I brigade group, 2 air nghter squadrons and selected warships of the
British Pacinc Fleet. Canada,because of her commitments in Europe could not contribute towards the British Com·
monwealth Force. It was decided that Australia should provide the bulk of the headquarters and the commander of
the Force, which wo'uld be under the direct operational control of SCAP. However, the commander of the Force would
be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia QCOSA). Agreements between Britain and India resulted in a
decision to combine 5 Brigade (UK) and 268 Brigade (India) under British command. The senior regiment was the
Royal Welsh Fusiliers. New Zealand's contribution was the 9th New Zealand Infantry Brigade renamed 2d New
Zealand Expeditionary Force, Japan. The ·Australian units had fought in the Middle East and SWPA, .while the
United Kingdom and Indian troops had a splendid fighting record together in the Burma campaigns. The New Zealand
Brigade had a distinctive record in the North African Campaign. (BeOF Hist, 1948, Part I.)
'" HQ BCOF was moved to Eta Jima, an island near Kure, ,6 May. (BCOF Hist, '948, Part II.)
II2 Lt Gen H.C.H. Robertson assumed command of BeOF on 7 June 1946.

62
 JAPAN
~T eotItOflWoL. eOflIC ...o.Kt<TlOI(
!LIY.u_ t. PIn
" " "O)UMATE SCALE f : l,s.oo,OOO

PLATE NO. 22
Location of Major Ground Units, 6 December 1946
 August with a total of 36,154 officers and assignments with troops of the 1st Cavalry
men. ". On 25 March the Occupation took Division. The first Commonwealth unit se-
on a distinctive international aspect when lected for Tokyo duty was the 34th Australian
headguarters of the British and Indian Divi- Infantry Brigade.'"
sion, under Maj. Gen. D. Tennant Cowan, The BCOF troops in Tokyo provided a
arrived at Hiro. On the same day the 5th colorful relief to the solid background of the
British Infantry Brigade arrived, moving on numerous American forces engaged in general
the 24th of the month from Hiro to Kochi duties. With these relatively small, well-drilled
(Shikoku). units participating in many ceremonies, BCOF
The military role of BCOF, under the greatly impressed the Japanese. The freguent
direction of SCAP, included the following parades, including one" trooping of the colors"
functions: the safeguarding of all Allied instal- in front of the Imperial Palace by the 2d
lations, and of all Japanese installations await- Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were
ing demilitarization; the demilitarization, among the most interesting and colorful func-
disposal, and military control of Japanese tions of the Occupation. The daily change of
installations and armaments. ". In March, guard at the palace was watched with interest
BCOF progressively relieved I Corps troops in by Japanese and Americans alike. ".
Shimane, Yamaguchi, Ehime, Kochi, Toku- The usual occupation duties were lightened
shima, Kagawa, Tottori, and Okayarna Pre- somewhat for BCOF in its area of responsibility
fectures, and the island of Shikoku. The in October 1946 when the last of repatriation
operation was completed by 10 June. centers in that area was closed because only
Liaison between GHQ, SCAP, and BCOF small numbers of repatriated Japanese arrived.
was maintained through the establishment in BCOF, however, fell heir to a troublesome
Tokyo of a headguarters known as British problem - the illegal entry of Koreans into
Commonwealth Sub-Area, Tokyo. This head- Japan. Although the solution of such smug-
guarters became responsible for the administra- gling was placed in the hands of the Japanese
tion of all British subjects, military and civilian, Government by SCAP, complete supervision
stationed in the capital. by BCOF was necessary in its area. There
In order to assure the British Commonwealth was need for close operational coordination-
Force greater participation in the Allied " show involving the use of air, land, and sea forces to
of strength," BCOF troops were ordered to properly patrol the coastal areas and apprehend
Tokyo in April to share the responsibility of violators. Cooperation between BCOF and I
guarding the Imperial Palace and other honor Corps was developed early and continued. "7
113 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan. Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C). p. 41.
"4 ( I) BeOF HiS!. 1948, Part I. (2) FO No. 35 was published by HQ Eighth US Army, 7 March 1946.
This directed BeOF to: (a) Progressively assume responsibility for all occupation missions except military government,
in the area assigned them on dates mutually agreed upon by the General Officers commanding I Corps and BeOF;
(b) provide necessary troops to assist MG units in performance of their mi ssions i (c) provide troops for military
operations other than the occupation of its zone; (d) assume responsibility for supervi si on of operation of repatri-
ation centers located in the zone of occupation. (Occupatio nal Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II,
Jan-Aug 46 [C] p. 4 1 .)
"5 BeOF Hist, 1948, Part II.
116 The US divisions in Japan inaugurated a rotation roster so that representative units of each division would
be given an opportunity to share in H onor Guard duties and to see Tokyo; the plan became effective in August 1946.
"7 BeOF Hist, 1948, Part V .

64
 Provost courts were established in the BCOF quarters at Osaka...•
area in May for the purpose of handling all The 2d Marine Division was to be relieved
types of cases of United Nations nationals who of occupation duties as rapidly as compensa-
were not connected with the military forces . tory shifrs could be made. After BCOF troops
BCOF reported" a remarkable lack of crimes arrived, the area af responsibility for the Marines
against personnel of the Armed Forces.""· was gradually decreased through the indirect
The Intelligence Corps of BCOF was made action of BCOF substituting for the 24th
responsible for the disposition of enemy equip' Division. For the latter, in tum, gradually
ment. The one large disposal operation took began to relieve the 2d Marine Division.· w
place on Okuno Shima, where the principal The 24th finally replaced the Marines on 15
Japanese chemical warfare arsenal had been JUne,lal
functioning nom 1925 to 1945. The elimina-
tion of dangerous chemicals and decon- The Occupation Stabilized
tamination in this area, known as Operation
" Lewisite," took over six months to complete. Early in 1946, with the reduction of strength,
At the end of this hazardous operation, over troop lists were revised, and the number of
18,000 tons gross weight of war gasses and units reduced. By mid-year, Eighth Army
vesicants had been destroyed, and much valuable consisted of I Corps with the 24th and 25th
information had been collected on Japanese Divisions, IX Corps with the 1st Cavalry and
preparations for chemical warfare. IIth Airborne Divisions, and the necessary
I Corps Realignments: With the introduc- service organizations and base commands. The
tion of BCOF troops into the Kure area, I deployment of major tactical units in zones of
Corps' area of responsibility was split-25th responsibility was stabilized by July 1946. No
Division was located in central Honshu,. north major, and only a few minor, changes in troop
of the BCOF zone, while the 24th Division lists or locations of units occurred during the
occupied the southern part of the island. By remaining months of 1946 or in 1947. ou (Plate
mid-year the shifts necessary to allow BCOF to No. 22)
assume its duties were completed. The 24th By the end of 1946, most of the combat
Division left Shikoku and Tottori Prefectures veterans had been returned to the Zone of
to relieve the 2d Marines on the west coast of Interior and had been replaced largely by
Kyushu. By the end of August, this Division draftees inducted near the end of the war or
occupied all Kyushu. The 25th Division was afterward. Many of them arrived in Japan
replaced by BCOF in Okayama. By the end with incomplete basic training; camps were
of August, 25th Division occupied all of the built and special training programs were insti-
Kinki region, operating its patrols from head- tuted. Units were so critically short of
lIB Ibid, Part VI.
119 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan Vol. II, Jan- Aug 46 (C), p. 46.
120 Ibid, p. 50. By mid-year the 19th Infantry relieved the Marines in Oita and M iyazaki Prefectures. The
2d Marine Regiment moved to Sasebo at thi s time .
J21 On 15 June the 8th Marine Regiment departed fro m Kyushu and reverted to control of CG, Fleet Marine
Force, Paci6c, for disposition; on 5 July e lements of the 5th Marine Regiment left Kyushu under the same conditions
while the remaining elements followed shortly thereaf..,r. (Eighth US Army, G' 3 Periodic Rpts No. 67, 22 Jun 46;
No. ~, 6 Jul 46.)
122 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. III, 50p 46-Dec 47 (C), PP' 5-6.

65
personnel that much of this took the form of fairly constant after 1946. The decline in
on-the-job training_ Within ten months the strength of military forces was contrasted by
bulk of these young draftees were replaced by the rise in the number of civilian specialists and
Regular Army enlisted men, increasing the other employees sent in from the Zone of
trend toward a more stabilized peacetime or- Interior or hired locally to carry on the Occupa-
ganization. From the military standpoint, tion. Although the administration of the
local duties became routine. Except for guard Occupation was still in the hands of the
duty and disaster relief work, the primary duties military, its operation became increasingly a
of a combat ~rmy disappeared. function of the Japanese civil sections operating
The Occupation pattern had developed under General MacArthur in his capacity as
sufficiently to have its characteristics remain the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

66
 CHAPTER III
THE COMMAND STRUCTURE: AFPAC, FEC AND SCAP

with instructions issued byjCS already.

Establishment of AFP AC : Army On the same day General MacArthur issued
Forces in the Pacific General Order Number 1, GHQ, AFPAC,
which established AFPAC and placed it under
The conquest of the Philippines completed his command. Four months later the Japanese
the principal mission of the Commander in surrendered.
Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area. The command structure of AFPAC remain-
On 4 April 1945 a command directive was ed static throughout the initial phases of the
issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Occupation and furnished the military back-
guidance of commanders in the Pacific Theater. ground for the development of SCAP, the
This directive stated that the over-all objective next evolutionary step in the high command.
in the war against Japan was to be brought (Plate No. 23)
about at the earliest practicable date by es-
tablishing sea and air blockades, by conducting Establishment of SCAP : Supreme
intensive air bombardments and destroying Commander for the Allied Powers
Japanese air and naval strength, and by invad-
ing and seizing objectives in the industrial At Potsdam in July of 1945, the heads of
heart of Japan. General MacArthur was the governments of the United States and the
designated as Commander in Chief, Army United Kingdom agreed upon the terms of
Forces in the Pacific, (CINCAFPAC) and all the surrender ultimatum to be offered Japan.
U. S. Army resources in the Pacific (less SE Following this agreement, the Potsdam Decla-
Pacific Area and Alaskan Department) were ration, concurred in by China and subsequent-
placed under his control.' ly approved by the Union of Soviet Socialist
On 6 April, the War Department ordered Republics, was issued on 26 July. The Japa-
the above consolidation: ' nese capitulation proclamation included accept-
Effecti.. at once U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific ance of the terms of this declaration.
is tstablished. Short title AFPAC. U.S. Army Forces On 14 August General MacArthur was
in the Pacific .,ill consist of those forces presently designated "Supreme Commander for the
assigned U.S. Army Forces in POA. Gen"al of
Allied Powers " (SCAP) pursuant to an inter-
the Army MacArthur is designated Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (CINC- national agreement among the above four gov-
AFPAC), in addition to his present assignment. ernments. This instrument accorded the Gen-
Transfer of forces .,ill be accomplished in accordance eral an extraordinary range of authority:)

1 Rad WX 62733 (TS), ]CS to MacArthur, 4 Apr 45. In CjS GHQ SWPA, WD 956 (S).
2 Rad WX 63939, Washington to Distr, 6 Apr 45. In CJS GHQ SWPA, WD 959 (S).
3 (I) Rad W 48672 (TS), WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45. In CIS GHQ SWPA, WD 1119 (S).

67
 COMMA NDER IN CHIEF
ARMY FORCES PAClFIC
GENERAL OF THE ARMY
OOUGLAS MACARTHUR
0
a<l (GENERAL OF THE ARMY MACARTHUR
ASSUMED COMMAND BY AFPAC GENERAL
S
~.
ORDER NO. 1 OF 6 APRIL 1945. OTHER
STAFF MEMBERS APPOINTED BY AFPAC
M MILITARY SECRETARY
GENERAL ORDER NO. 2.. OF 6 APkn. 1945. )
s" TO THE
COMMANDER· IN·CHIEF
BRIG. GEN.
I
I
AIDES DE CAMP I
...,.,
0
BONNER F. FELLERS
C)
g
e!.. CHIEF OF STAFF
LT. GEN.

t
$-
RICHARO K. SUTHERLAND

"i;'" t""'
P ~
'"
>tI1
~ B
;:p ...
§ w G·l G ·2 G·:J G·.
'" BRIG. GEN. MAj. GEN. MAJ. GEN. MAJ. GEN.
s· MATTHEW J. GUNNER CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY STEPHEN J. CHAMBERLIN LESTER J. WffinOCK
M

If
rf
~.

}f'
0\

.?0.
~

M
PUBLIC
~
VI
ADJUTANT
GENERAL
A NTIAIRCR AFT
OFFICER
CHIEF
ENGmEER
CHIEF
SIGNAL OFFICER
HEADQUARTERS
COMMANDANT
RELATIONS
OFFICER
BRlG. GEN. MAJ. GEN. MAJ. GEN. MAJ. GEN. COL BRIG. GEN.
BURDETTE M . FITCH WI LLIAM F. MARQUAT HUGH J. CASEY SPENCER B. AKIN VACHEL D. WHATLEY
LEGRANDE A. DILLER
 From the momeTll of mrrendtT, the authority of The Far Eastem Commission
the Emperor and the Japanese Ga>ernmeTll to rule
the state will be subject to you and you will take Although in its basic concepts the Occupa-
such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the sur- tion of Japan was undertaken on behalf of the
render terms. principal Allied Powers, in its practical aspects,
You will exercise supreme command o.er all land,
it was essentially a United States operation.
sea and air forces which may be allocated lor enforce-
It did assume a more Allied character, however,
ment in Japan of the ,uTrender teT/1lJ by the Albed
with the establishment of the Far Eastern Com-
Forces concerned.
mission in Washington and the Allied Council
While the Occupation of Japan was still in for Japan in Tokyo. These two organs were
progress, the U_ S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued agreed upon in a meeting of the Foreign Minis-
a "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military ters of the United States, United Kingdom,
Government in Japan Proper" ;' this directive and U.S.S.R. at Moscow in December 1945,
reiterated General MacArthur's authority as and were subsequently approved by China."
SCAP and defined policies for his guidance The Far Eastern Commission was established
in the Occupation and the control of Japan. as a high policy-making body for the Occupa-
It described Japan as consisting of four tion of Japan. It consisted of representatives
main islands: Hokkaido (Yezo), Honshu, from eleven nations: China, the United
Kyushu, Shikoku, and about 1, 000 smaller Kingdom, the United States, Union of Soviet
adjacent islands. (Plate No. 24) Later di- Socialist Republics, France, the Netherlands,
rectives extended the area south to 300 north Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and
latitude.' the Philippines. The Commission formulated
SCAP was granted authority to establish policies, principles, and standards for accom-
direct military government if necessary; 6 he plishing the terms of the surrender; it reviewed,
was, however, to exerCISe his power, as far as upon the request of any member, directives
compatible with the accomplishment of his issued to the Supreme Commander or action
mission, through the Emperor of Japan and the taken by him involving policy decisions within
Japanese Government.' This authority deter- the jurisdiction of the Commission ; and it
mined the administrative character of the Oc- considered such other matters as might be
cupation. Direct military government, similar assigned to it by agreement among the partici-
to the type operating in Germany, was not pating governments. However, the Commis-
established in Japan. The Japanese Gov- sion had no authority to make recommendations
ernment was permitted to exercise normal for territorial adjustments nor to conduct
powers in matters of domestic administration; military operations.-
certain changes in governmental machinery
and personnel were made to insure that The Allied Council for Japan
requirements of the Occupation were met.
The Allied Council for Japan was initially

4 ]CS Dir '380/ '5, 3 N ov 45 (TS).

5 GHQ SCAP Occupation Instns N O·5, ' Ian 48.
6 ]CS Dir '380/ ' 5, 3 N ov 45, sub : Basic Dir for Post Surr Mil Govt in Japan Proper.
7 USAFPAC Opn Instns N O·4, 29 N ov 45 (Rev) (R), Annex 8, Mil Govt.
8 Rad WCL 32355, Washington to CINCAFPAC ADV, 28 Dec 45·
9 Communique of Moscow Conference, 27 D ec 45·

69
 /
/ H OK

/
/
/
/ g
/
/

A N I
I~ I
,{ I
/ I
/ I
/ I
r
r

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I
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CV-~,,/ I
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N o R T H
C H N A •
• P A c I F I c
SEA •
o c £ A N ~ ..

JAPAN AND KORE;A

L~T C:OfIFOIhW. GONIC PIIOJ(ClION
D.!YUIOIn III Hlf
!!i,ooo,ooo

.
APf'ROXI",,"TE SC"L.E I '

o MI 100 1500 toO UO JOG IO ILl'

PLATE NO. 24
Area Controlled by SCAP
an advisory body. It was located in Tokyo Government as a whole, or related matters, the
and consisted of four members: the Supreme Supreme Commander did not issue final orders
Commander (or his Depury), who was Chair- until there was agreement with the Far Eastern
man and United States Representative; a Commission." (See Plate No. 25 for visual
representative each from the Soviet Union and presentation of relationships discussed.)
China; and a member representing jointly the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Organization of General Headquarters,
and India. ,. The Council met every two weeks SCAP
"to consult with and advise" the Supreme
Commander on the implementation of the After the appointment of General Mac-
terms of surrender, the occupation and control Arthur as Supreme Commander," a General
of Japan, and any supplementary directives; it Headquarters for SCAP was established with
exercised certain limited authoriry. origins in the then existing GHQ, AFPAC
The Supreme Commander carried out the (U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific); GHQ,
terms of the basic directive and supplementary AFPAC, and GHQ, SCAP, were physically
interim directives of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of combined and, for practical reasons, a number
Staff. Policies adopted by the Far Eastern of staff sections, agencies and individuals
Commission were transmirted to him through continued to perform dual roles for SCAP and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SCAP issued the AFPAC. There was, however, a distinct
necessary orders and directives to the Japanese demarcation between the authority and res-
Government and to the Occupation forces, and ponsibility of SCAP and CINCAFPAC.
insured that these orders were put into effect. SCAP's authority was limited to Japan, whereas
Despite the fact that he was directly CINCAFPAC commanded all Army Forces
responsible to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Pacific area.
he consulted and advised the Allied Council The Supreme Commander exercised authori-
for Japan on matters of substance in the ty over all land, sea, and air forces which were
execution of policy decisions of the Far Eastern then assigned to Japan. These forces included
Commission. the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
In the event that a member of the Council (BCOF)-the only representative Allied force
disagreed with the Supreme Commander's present-the U.S. naval forces, and U. S. air
proposed action regarding the execution of forces. The Eighth U. S. Army was the actual
policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, Army of Occupation" and was charged with
concerning a change in the regime of control, the tactical mission of implementing and en-
fundamental changes in the Japanese constitu- forcing SCAP directives.
tional structure, a change in the Japanese The Supreme Commander exercised control

10 Rad WCL 32355, Washington to CINCAFPAC ADV, 28 Dec 4S.

II Other than the foregoing. the Allied Council had no obvious relationship to the Far Eastern Commission.
There have been recognizable instances, however, in international press releases, in which the timing of publicity
indicated thal certain foreign powers simultaneously presented the same subject, agenda, comment or argument in the
Council and in the Commission.
12 Rad W 48672 (TS), WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, '3 Aug 45. In CfS GHQ SWPA, WD IIl9 (S).
'3 The Sixth US Army occupied the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and the western half of Honshu from 22
September to 31 December 1945. at which time control passed to the Eighth US Army. The Sixth Army was inac-
tivated on 26 January '946. (8th Info and Hi" Sv, Sixth Army Occupation of Japan, 22 Sep-30 Nov 4).)

71
 FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
Australia Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
China Philippines
~rance Soviet Union
India United Kingdom
United States

I
JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF

I
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER
for the ALLIED COUNCIL
ALLIED POWERS, •••• for JAPAN
GENERAL of the ARMY
DOUGLAS MAC ARTHUR

I
CHIEF of STAFF
I J DEPUTY CHIEF of STAFF
I I
PUBLIC
DIPLOMATIC LEGAL
SECRETARIAT INFORMATION
SECTION SECTION
SECTION
STAFF SECTIONS

•
Econom ic and Scientifi c
•
AC of 5, G.I, 6-2, G-3, 6_4
Genefal Accounting Adjutant General
Genefal Procurement Agent Civil Communication s
Government Civil Information end Education
Natural Resource, Civil Intelliguel
Public H •• lth {, Welfare Civil Property Custodian
Statist ic s and Reports Civil Transportation

• •
Ordefs
I Orders

I I
Japanese Government Occupation Forces

•
Military Government
Government
Surnil1ance
Teams
~
Agencies

and

Japanese
• Enforcement Courb ...
People
, Surveillance Troops ~

PLATE NO. 25
The Machinery of the Occupation of Japan from the Far Eastern Commission
through SCAP to the Japanese People, December 1948.
of the Japanese people through the normal point of view .. '
administrative organs of the Japanese Govern- There were other equally important enforce-
ment. The established form of communication ment and surveillance agencies operating on a
was a memorandum for the Japanese Govern- national scale from the outset of the Occupa-
ment (known as a SCAPIN), authenticated by tion: Counter Intelligence, Censorship, Public
the Adjutant General, and dispatched through Safety, the Military Police and local Provost
the Liaison and Coordination Office, an Marshal.
administrative agency in the Prime Minister's
Office." The Liaison and Coordination Office Functions of General Headquarters,
then transmitted the memotandum to the SCAP
proper ministry or other agency of the Japanese
Government for necessary action. To insure General Headquarters, SCAP, functioned
Japanese compliance with the directives of the along the lines of a conventional military staff,
Supreme Commander, two methods were used: but since SCAP was charged with the primary
transitory inspections by representatives of the mission of steering the Japanese nation and
staff sections of GHQ, and continuous observa- people along the lines of SCAP directives, its
tion and surveillance by the Occupation forces." staff structure was designed to meet require-
In order to accomplish these aims, the ments of Japanese civil affairs in all phases of
Eighth Army utilized the military government human activity.
teams which had been organized, prior to the Operations instructions, SCAP, were carried
surrender, for possible use in establishing out by the Eighth U. S. Army" and, when
direct military government in Japan.'· practicable, through the CG, FEAF, and
The General Staff Sections, AFPAC, per- COMNAVJAP. The Supreme Commander
formed certain limited duties for SCAP.·' exercised jurisdiction over the air forces al-
For example, the G-r for AFPAC was also the located to the Occupation through the CG,
G-r for SCAP; the General Staff, however, FEAF ; ,. the latter also had operational control
did not coordinate the activities of the SCAP over BCOF's air contingent."
Civil Sections except in matters affecting the BCOF was integrated in and under the
Occupation forces from a specific military operational control of the Eighth U. S. Army

14 The Japanese Central Liaison Office also maintained a representative in the grade of Chokunin (Minister) in
the G-2 Foreign and Japanese Li aison Section. The ever-increasing problems of interpretation and translation were
handled by wartime ATIS (A llied Translator and Interpreter Service) which adjusted its operations to meet Occupa-
tion conditions.
I~(I) SCAP Staff Memo NO.7. 13 Feb 46 ; (2) SCAP III USAFPAC Staff Memo No. ~6. 10 Dec 46.
16(I) See Ch. VII ; (2) SCAP Occupation Instns NO.4. 20 Sep 46 (R).
17GHQ SCAP Cir No. '4. 26 Dec 46. par. 2.
18 Several of the SCAP Civil Sections were headed by officers who remained chie fs of Stalf Sections of GHQ
AFPAC; for example, Gen Willoughby was Chief of Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) as well as G'2 for GHQ. SCAP
and AFPAC i Brig Gen G.!. Back was Signal Officer of AFPAC as well as Chief of (he Civil Communications Sec-
tion; Gen F.S. Besson was Transportation Officer for AFPAC as well as Chief of the Civil Transportation Section.
'9 SCAPIN 436. '3 Dec 4~ , sub: Regrouping and Consolidation of Occupation Forces in Japan (GC).
20 (I) SCAP Occupation Instns No. I. '3 Sep 45 (S); (2) JCS Dir 1259/ 27. I I Dec 46; (3) Rad ZX
291'7 8• CINCAFPAC to CG's Conc. 30 Dec 46; (4) GHQ FEC Cir No. I. 1 Jan 47.
21 ( I) SCAP Occupation Instns NO.3. 12 Feb 46 (R); (2) USAFPAC G-3 Opns Rpt No. '4'5. 22 Feb
- I Mar 46.

73
and received operational orders in the same NAVJ AP was responsible for the disposal and
manner as United States forces." The Com· scrapping of the Japanese Navy ;,8 repatriation
manding General, BCOF, however, had direct ofJapanese and other foreign nationals ;" mine-
access to the Supreme Commander on matters sweeping in Japanese waters ;'0 the supervision
of major policy of his force!' BCOF was of the Japanese Merchant Marine ;" and decIa-
administered and supported logistically by the ration .and disposal of surplus naval property.
British Commonwealth and had direct commu- The Military Government teams which the
nication with the British Commonwealth Joint Eighth Artny used to insure Japanese compli-
Chiefs of Staff in Australia.'" ance withSCAPdirectives were spread through-
The Supreme Commander exercised com- out Japan to cover the principal centers of pop-
mand of naval forces allocated to the Occupa- ulation and industry." The Army command-
tion through COMNAVJAP. Actually the er, however, was not limited to these teams
headquarters of COMNAVFE (Commander, in his supervision, bur used tactical troops in
U. S. Naval Forces, Far East) and COM- surveillance missions when necessary."
NAVJAP were physically combined. COM- Progressive steps were taken to enforce
NA VJAP controlled the coastal waters of SCAP's orders. First, the Japanese Govern-
Japan, commanded all naval activities ashore in ment was held responsible for its actions and
the Occupation area, and exercised operational for the enforcement of laws, ordinances, and
control of all naval forces, both U. S. and regulations which were promulgated to carry
Allied, assigned to the Occupation of Japan." out the instructions of SCAP. Second-
COMNAVJAP also controlled activities of ly, juridical enforcement was effected by the
Japanese shipping through SCAJAP (Shipping military occupation courts. They had sole
Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant jurisdiction with Japanese courts over any act
Marine).'" SCAJAP played an important role prejudicial to the objectives of the Occupation."
in the general repatriation movements. Ultimate enforcement rested with the Occupa-
As naval representative of SCAP:' COM- tion troops.
22 (1) SCAP Occupation Instns NO.3, '3 Feb 46; (2) Eighth Army Rad EX 34063 FB, 4 Mar 46. (GHQ
SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 4.)
23 SCAP Ocrupation Instns NO.3, 12 Feb 46.
24 Ibid.
25 SCAP Occupation Instns NO·4, 20 Sop 46.
26 SCAP Occupation Instns No. 5, 1 Jan 48.
27 Rad 200157, COM5thFLT to COMNAVJAP, 20 Mar 46. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects
of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45- 1 Jan 47, p. 5.)'
28 SCAP Occupation Instns NO.4, 20 Sop 46.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
3' Ibid.
32 Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAF PAC, 5 Aug-2 Oct 45. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects
of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45- 1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
33 As a corollary, the «1St Cle, an operating agency of the AC of 5, G·2, in his dual role as Chief, CIS,
SCAP, deployed immediately into the field detachments, on initial landing in 1945, and maintained a complete coverge
throughout Japan in each prefecture.
34 (1) SCAPIN 756, '9 Feb 46, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (2) SCAPIN 853, 25 Mar 46,
sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (3) SCAPIN 1218, 19 Sep 46, sub: Amendment of Memo on Civil and
Criminal Jurisdiction.

74
 A 6 September basic Occupation policy
The Civil (Non-Military) Staff directive ordered that :"
Sections, SCAP .. . in 'Yitw of the prestnt chdTader of Japanese
society and the deri" of the United Stater to attain 'If
Before the Japanese surrender 10 August objecti'Yfs with a minimutl commitment of ;Is forces
1945, a Military Government Section was dud resources, t~ Supreme Commander will exercise
established in GHQ, AFPAC, to administer authority through Japanere Go>emmenl41 machinery
occupied Japan." This section with its subordi- aud agencies, including the Empewr, to the extent
nate units was to take over the Government of that this satisfactorily further United Stater objecti.er.
Japan in every phase of activity. It assumed Certain supervisory activities of the Military
the duties of preparing plans for direct military Government Section were then transferred to
government of Japan." Personnel specially the newly established Economic and Scientific
trained for military government were assigned and Civil Information and Education Sections
to the Military Government Section and to of General Headquarters, AFPAC.'·
the Sixth and Eighth Armies, where they On 26 September the Chief of Staff, AF-
performed staff functions at army, corps, and PAC, announced that :"
division levels and were organized into units for
(1) So long as the system of enforcing the Polr-
use at the prefectural and local levels." dam Declaration and the surrender terms through the
On 28 August 1945 Military Government Japanese Go.ernment worked ratirfactorily, there
activities of army and corps commanders were would be no direct military go.-rnment in Japan.
limited to a few specified functions and the (2) A number of special staff sections would be
following policies were set forth :,8 "tablished by General Headquarters, SCAP, to ad.ire
the Supreme Commander on non-military matters in
(1) SCAP will issue all necessary instructions
relation to the occupation of 'apan.
directly to the Japanese GOYfrnment.
(3) The Military Ga.erument Sedion, General
(2) EYfry opportunity will be gi>en the Go ..rn-
Headquarters, USAFPAC would be discontinued
melll and people of Japan to CttTTy out such in-
and its remaining perronntl trans!trred to tilt ft'JItral
Jlrudions without further compulsion.
new rtaff fections or to the military gO'JIernment of
(3) The Occupation Forces will act principally
Korea.
as an agency upon which SCAP can call, if necmary,
to secure compliance with instructions issued to the The Supreme Commander established Gen-
Japanere Go.-rument and will obse,."e and report on eral Headquarters, SCAP, on 2 October 1945"
compliance. with general and special staff sections, using

35 USAFPAC GO NO·9', 5 Aug 45 (R).

36 USA PM 27-5, par 22, defines the duties assigned to the MG sections of a theater staff.
37 Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAFPAC, 5 Aug-. Oct 45.
38 USAFPAC Opns Instns NO.4, .8 Aug 45 (S), Annex 8, Mil Govt. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil
Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, • Sep 45- 1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
39 SWNCC 150/4. 6 Sep 45. Subsequent basic Occupation directives repeated the substance of this provision.
(GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, • Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 7.)
40 USAFPAC GO No. '70, '5 Sep 45 ; No. ,83, •• Sep 45 (R).
4' Rpt of the MG Sec, GHQ USAFPAC, 5 Aug-. Oct 45 (C). (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil As·
pects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, • Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 6.)
4' GHQ SCAP GO Nos. 1 and " • Oct 45.

75
 the G-1, G-2, G-3, G -4, and Adjutant General's and the directives received from higher authori-
Sections and the Public Relations Office of ties. They carried on continuous research and
U. S. Army Forces, Pacific" to perform their analysis and maintained close liaison with their
respective fUnctions for SCAP." counterparts in the Japanese Government.'·
Ten special staff sections were activated on They operated directly under a Deputy Chief
2 October: the Economic and Scientific, Civil of Staff who was assisted by an Executive for
Information and EQucatlon, Natural Resources, Administrative Af&.irs and an Executive for
Public Health and Welfare, Government, Economic and Industrial ARairs.
Legal , Civil Communications, Statistics and These staff sections of SCAP Headquarters
Reports, and Civil Intelligence Sections, and were charged with responsibility for initiating
the Office of the General Procurement Agent." action on Occupation matters, and with con-
Those subsequently established were the Office tinuing necessary staff action to follow the as-
of Civilian Personnel, International Prosecu- signed tasks through to completion." In cases
tion Section, General Accounting Section, Civil where several staff sections had a major inter-
Property Custodian, Diplomatic Section, and est in a problem, the initiating section was re-
Civil Transportation Section." sponsible for accomplishing intra-staff liaison
The Civil Intelligence Section was discon- to bring about complete and coordinated ac-
tinued on 3 May 1946 and its duties assumed tion. In effecting this liaison, staff sections
by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2." On were directed to make liberal use of personal
29 August it was reactivated" but continued contact and other informal methods."
under operational control of G-2 in his dual The International Military Tribunal for
capacity as Chief of Theater Counter Intelli- the Far East (IMTFE) was not a part of the
gence. Headquarters, but a related operating agency.
The SCAP Sections (Plate No. 26) cor- It was established by the Supreme Commander
responded in general to the technical branches on 19 January 1946 for the just and prompt
of the Japanese civil government with which trial and punishment of major war criminals in
they were associated.'· They were responsible the Far East. It consisted of judicial represen-
for making recommendations to the Supreme tatives of nations who were members of the Far
Commander on policies and actions which Eastern Commission. The Supreme Com-
would implement the terms of the surrender mander was charged with reviewing the proceed-

43 Of which he was Commander in Chief. (SCAPIN 2; Dir No.2, Office of SeAP, 3 50p 45.)
44 SCAP Cir No. 14, 26 Dec 46, inclosing organization chart of GHQ SCAP.
45 SCAP GO Nos. 3, 4. 5. 6, 7. 8, la , 1 I, 12, and 13. 2 Oct 45 ·
46 SCAP GO No. 16, 14 Nov 45 ; No. 20, 8 Dec 45; NO.4, 24 Jan 46 j No. 10, 8 Mar 46; No. 18, 18
Apr 46 ; No. 35, 7 50p 46.
47 GHQ SCAP GO No. 22, 3 May 46.
48 GHQ SCAP GO No. 34, 29 Aug 46.
49 SCAP sections have no exact counterparts in a normal military staff. Their establishment was caused by
me
conditions peculiar to the Occupation and they played an important part in the outstanding success of control and
rehabilitation of a nation of over 77 million people.
50 When necessary, the General Staff sections of GHQ, AFPAC, furnished administrative, logistic, and service
support to SCAP civil staff sections and agencies.
5' SCAP Staff Memo No.6, 28 Nov 45. (TS) (GHQ SCAP, Hisl of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied
Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45- 1 Jan 47, p. 9.)
52 Ibid.

76
 SlJPK£M& O>MMANDIiI:
._---------------------- GENERAL OF THE A.DlY
DOUGLAS MA.CARTHUR

re. IN'l'UNA'.'ONAL

SU: WN. WEN.

""UT""'"
TRlBUNAL Rl« THE 'AI: lEAST

N£SIJ)£HT
I A'~ "CAM' I
I
COL S. L HUff
COl. L L ..uNItEII
AWED COUHClL FOI JA'AN

"'. . .. J. su.o..W,USA CHAI~

G€N. SHAN(; CHEN. C"HI", ...
LT. GEN. L N. O&aEVYAHIlO. U . s. ....
,.... P..,T1lKX SHAW, U. It.

I
~ ~.uJAT
I
PUaLlC INfOtMATlON
GENERAL ST,u:F S6CTIONS

GHQ. " " FOIl SCM .

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ings of the Tribunal on the completion of its of violation of the rules and regulations of the
work and with the execution of its judgments." Occupation orces, and the rules and procedures
The International Prosecution Section was for the guidance thereof."
established as a special staff section to prepare The Diplomatic Section, an outgrowth of
for trial and prosecute all cases involving crime the Office of the United States Political
resulting from planning, preparing, initiating, Advisor for Japan, was an integral section of
or waging of a war of aggression or a war in GHQ, SCAP.'" It dealt with international
violation of international treaties and agree- affairs pertaining to Japan. The Section con-
ments, or participation in a common plan or trolled relationships with foreign diplomatic
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of representatives ahd supervised other U. S.
the foregoing." State Department agencies in Japan." As
The Legal Section was established as a chairman and member for the United States
special staff section to advise the Supreme on the Allied Council for Japan, the chief of
Commander for the Allied Powers on: gen- the Diplomatic Section was also deputy for
eral policies and procedures with respect to war the Supreme Commander.
crimes in categories other than the internation- The Economic and Scientific Sec/ion was
al aspects, which are commonly known as established as a special staff section which was
violation of the laws or customs of war, and to responsible for developing economic, industrial,
supervise the prosecution of war criminals financial, and scientific policies to be pursued
accused of such offenses; general policies and in Japan in order to implement the Potsdam
procedures with respect to Occupation courts; Declaration." Its functions consisted of mak-
and legal matters of a general nature. This sec- ing recommendations towards maximum pro-
tion investigated such war crimes as mentioned duction and equitable distribution of essential
above, prepared such cases to be tried, estab- goods among the civil population and the
lished and maintained a central registry of maximum production of supplies required by
all Japanese war criminals and suspects and the occupying forces. It coordinated the activi-
made recommendations pertaining to their ties of commercial, technical, and industrial
apprehension and incarceration (this comprised missions from the United States and Allied
all categories of war criminals). It recommended nations which were concerned with the eco-
composition of military courts, commissions or nomic, industrial, financial, or scientific reha-
other tribunals for the trial of Japanese war bilitation of Japan.'" The Economic and
criminals accused of violation of the laws or Scientific Section also advised the Supreme
customs of war, and the rules and procedures Commander on Japanese labor policies and
for the guidance thereof, and recommended programs, including labor relations and labor
composition of military courts, commissions or unions; employment and employment ex-
other tribunals for the trial of persons accused changes; wages, salaries, and hours; protective
53 GHQ SCAP GO No. 20, 26 Apr 46.
54 GHQ SCAP GO No. 20, 8 Dec 45.
55 GHQ SCAP GO No. 21,9 Dec 45.
56 Note the previous intervention of G-2 Foreign Liaison: September 1945 to March 1946.
57 GHQ SCAP GO No. 18, 18 Apr 46.
58 GHQ SCAP GO NO·3, 2 Oct 45·
59 G-2 maintained a remnant of its wartime Technical Intelligence Teams (S250th Tech lnt Co) which worked
on numemus projects for ESS.

78
labor legislation; and labor procurement for processing and exporting. This credit base was
the Occupation forces." first utilized on 13 May 1948 when one govern-
SCAP's mission in the economic field in ment and three private banks pledged to finance
Japan was an integral part of the totalOccupa- a 60,000,000 dollar credit. The Economic and
tion objective, namely, to insure that Japan Scientific Section was responsible for advising
would not again, alone or jointly with other the Supreme Commander on policies and
powers, commit aggressive warfare. In an programs relating to the custody, operation,
attempt to carry out this mission, three major management, and control of this fund."
lines of action were followed in the economic The Natural Resources Section. Although
field: the industrial and scientific disarmament Japan claimed that the basic reason for her
of Japan, the democratization and reform of aggression in the Far East was economic, the
the economic structure, and the restoration of chief cause being the desperate need for raw
the Japanese general economy on a self- materials, the ironic result was further deple-
supporting basis. Since Japan could feed tion of her meager resources. To establish
herself only by exporting manufactured pro- favorable econonVc conditions, which would
ducts, her economy was closely geared to foreign help prevent the revival of militarism, it was
trade. American aid was limited to the most necessary to increase Japan's resources to satisfY
urgent requirements necessary to avoid disease her needs and to democratize her institutions.
and unrest in the harrassed population. Ameri- The Natural Resources Section was estab-
can appropriation made possible the importa- lished as a special staff section to advise SCAP
tion of food, fertilizer, petroleum products, and on agricultural, forestry, fishery, and mining
medicines. With the exception of cotton, Japan (including geology and hydrology) policies and
had no funds to import raw materials. activities in Japan." It arranged for and co-
In March 1947 ESS was granted the power ordinated surveys and reports; located source
to issue licenses to approved foreign concerns data in Japan relating to agriculture, forestry,
desiring to conduct business in Japan. Such fishing and mining in countries formerly oc-
licenses incorporated restrictions which were cupied by Japan; and recommended measures
necessary to assure compliance with all existing to insure the development, exploitation, produc.
regulations." On 15 August 1947, private tion, processing, and distribution of basic
foreign trade representatives were permitted to industry products required for rehabilitation of
enter Japan. the national economy.
As a still further potential stimulus to foreign The Ci"il Intelligence Section maintained
trade, SCAP projected a plan to use Japanese- a national system of intelligence and informa-
owned gold and silver as a base for acquiring don coverage through its law enforcement and
foreign credits. This was achieved by creating surveillance agencies. This section was the
the "Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving operating agency for counterintelligence and
Fund" which was to be used as a credit base general security functions within the command
for furancing importation of raw materials for and was primarily responsible for the dissolu-

60 GHQ SCAP GO No. 33. 29 Aug 46.

61 GHQ SCAP GO NO.3. 19 Mar 47.
62 (1) GHQ SCAP GO No. 12. 15 Aug 47 ; (2) GHQ SCAP Cir, NO.9. 15 Aug 47. and No. 15. II
Dec 47.
63 GHQ SCAP GO No. 6. 2 Oct 45.

79
tion and surveillance of ultra-nationalistic and and welfare activities was to achieve a level of
militaristic organizations. It was charged with health and welfare among the civil population
public safety matters in Japan, including police, which would prevent widespread disease and
prison, maritime safety, and fire control sys- unrest likely to interfere with the Occupation.
tems, and also maintained censorship of Japa- The major problem in attempting to achieve
nese information media, mail, and telecom- this goal was the lack of trained and qualified
munications ... Japanese personnel to conduct the various
The Go."ernment Section was responsible programs at national, prefectural, and local
for policies pertaining to the internal structure levels. Also, there were not enough personnel
of civil government in Japan."' It investigated among military government teams to supervise
and reported to the Supreme Commander any SCAP-directed national programs. A complete
modifications and reforms of civil government public health organization, from the Ministry
in Japan. It made recommendations regarding of Welfare down to and including the health
the demilitarization and decentralization of the center level, was established throughout Japan.
Japanese Government as weij as elimination of This called for many educational and ttaining
feudal and totalitarian practices. It investigated, programs to instruct Japanese officials in
reported, and made recommendations regard- modem public health and welfare practices.
ing laws, policies, practices, procedures, and The improvement of public health and the
other factors in the personnel administration of development of welfare activities was an integral
the Japanese Government, in order to develop part of the program designed to help develop
democratic precepts, integrity, and efficiency in civic responsibilities.
its administration. The Ci."il Information and Education Sec-
The Ci."il Communications Section's func- tion had the job of formulating policies for
tions were to rehabilitate and operate civil public education, religion, and other sociologi-
signal and postal communications in Japan.66 cal problems of Japan." It concentrated on
It arranged for and coordinated surveys and educational and sociological reforms, with
reports on exist~g teleradio and postal com- particular reference to the democratization of
munications systems and on laboratories and the national school system. It made recom-
educational institutions which were adapted to mendations to insure the elimination of
the study of problems relating to signal com- doctrines of militarism and ultra-nationalism,
munications facilities and conditions. including juvenile military training, from all
The Public Health and Welfare Section elements of the Japanese educational system."
was required to initiate policies relating to pub- It also insured the protection, preservation, and
lic health and welfare problems." salvage of works of art and antiquity, cultural
The primary consideration in public health treasures, religious articles, libraries, museums,

64 See Ch. VIII. In general terms, this section operated in a manner analagous to the American FBI. Adapted
to Occupation conditions its activities became important in view of the rise of international communi sm.
65 GHQ SCAP GO No. '0, 23 Jun 47.
66 GHQ SCAP GO No.6, '3 Apr 48.
67 GHQ SCAP GO NO·7, 2 Oct 45 .
68 GHQ SCAP GO No. 27, 3 Jun 46. G-2 linguist agencies furnished a complete daily coverage of the
Japanese press, as an aid to public opinion digests.
69 Through the collateral intervention of CIS in the control and surveillance of ultra-militaristic and subversive
elements.

80
archival repositories, religious buildings, and The Office of the Civil Property Custodian
historical monuments. advised on general policies and controlled and
The Civil Transportation Section's duties disposed of enemy and Allied properties and
consisted of making plans ror the use and assets under its jurisdiction." This office rec-
rehabilitation of water and land civil transpor- ommended and established proced.ures , and
tation facilities of Japan, except for operating executed approved programs for the blocking
responsibilities assigned to Commander, Naval and impounding of property which was ac-
Activities, Japan." The Civil Transportation quired by Japan under duress, wrongful acts
Section, in conjunction with the Economic and of confiscation, dispossession or spoilation.
Scientific Section, established requirements and Lastly, it was responsible for the maintenance
priorities in raw materials and industrial capac- of complete records and accounts of all confis-
ity necessary to provide the facilities arid cated property and its disposal.
equipment for the transportation system in The Reparations Section planned the pro-
order to serve the essential needs of the internal gram for processing Japanese industrial assets
economy of Japan. considered available for claim and removal as
The Statistics and Reports Section was reparations. 75
responsible for the collection, tabulation, and The Reparations Technical Advisory Com-
presentation of statistical and other special and mittee was established as a consultative com-
routine reports which pertained to the non- mittee to assist the Supreme Commander in
military aspects of the Occupation of Japan." the development of technical and. adminis-
The General Procurement Agent coordi- trative procedures to assure an orderly removal
nated, controlled and issued regulations govern- of reparations goods from Japan and in setdin!;
ing the procurement of supplies, equipment, problems between countries ansmg over
materials, services, real property, and facilities claims." The Chairman of the Committee
in Japan in order to prevent competition in was the Chief of the Reparations Section. The
procurement. It provided for the equitable other members of the Committee were chiefs
allocation of supplies, equipment, materials, of the Reparations and Restitutions Delega-
real property and facilities , and services; tions which represented the Far Eastern Com-
standardized procedures for procurement; and mlSS10n.

effected equitable allocation of Japanese re- The Restitution Advisory Committee was
sources. The General Procurement Agent established to assist the Supreme Commander
was also responsible for liaison with the Central in matters dealing with the disposition of prop-
Liaison Committee of the Japanese Gov- erty found in Japan and identified as having
emment.72 been located in an Allied country and removed
The General Accounting Section was re- to Japan by fraud or coercion by the Japanese
sponsible for general policies and procedu res or their agents.n The Restitution Advisory
pertaining to financial accounting matters and Committee consisted of a chairman and one
maintained records covering the financial as- member from each of the Reparations and
pects of the Occupation." Restitution Delegations representing nations in

70 GHQ SCAP GO No. 35, 7 Sep 46. 74 GHQ SCAP GO No. 10, 8 Mar 46.
71 GHQ SCAP GO No.6, 18 Apr 47. 75 GHQ SCAP GO No. 8, 8 May 47.
72 GHQ SCAP GO NO.5, 2 OCI 45. 76 GHQ SCAP GO NO.9, 21 May 47.
73 GHQ SCAP GO No. 4, 24 lan 46. 77 GHQ SCAP GO NO.5, 13 Apr 48.

81
the Far Eastern Commission who desired to was simply the old staff continuing under a
participate. The Civil Property Custodian was new name, with many of its officers remaining
Chairman of the Committee. in the same relative positions.
The Far East Command included the
Foreign Diplomatic Missions United States fotces in Japan, Korea, the
Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas and
In addition to the administrative and ad- the Bonins.80 General MacArthur exercised
visory staffs authorized for the members of the unified command over all forces allocated to
Allied Coun~il of Japan, a number of foreign him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Allied
diplomatic representatives, pre-war embassies, Powers; however, it was at this time that
legations and agencies were accredited to SCAP the Army Forces in the Middle Pacific
rather than to the Japanese Government. (AFMIDPAC) passed from his contro!'
(Plate No. 27) These diplomatic agencies served The Commander in Chief, Far East Com-
as channels of communication on operational mand, (CINCFE) was made responsible for
and administrative matters between their gov- United States occupation functions in Japan
ernments and SCAP. Certain functional rep- and in Southern Korea, and United States
resentatives, distiner from these mISSIons, military duties m the Philippines. He was
worked directly with SCAP in handling matters also responsible for security of the Far East
which pertained to restitution and reparations, Command, including the protection of sea and
as well as to foreign trade, on a government to air communications, United States policy
government basis." within the limit of his command, and support
of the 'Commander in Chief, Pacific, in his
Establishment and Missions of FEC: mission. Lastly, he was charged with making
Far East Command plans and preparations in case of a general
emergency. He was to provide for the safety
On 1 January 1947 a GHQ, FEC, order of United States forces in Korea and China;
established the Far East Command, with Gen- oppose enemy advances; secureJapan, the Ryu-
eral MacArthur as Commander in Chief." kyus, the Marianas, and the Bonins ; and dis-
This command was established as an interim charge United States military responsibilities
measure for the immediate post-war period, in the Philippines.· '
with particular consideration to the taerical In the event of an emergency declared by
requirements for protraered occupation of General MacArthur, United States forces in
former enemy areas. It was, in faer, an adap- China were to come under his contro!.B' He
tation of the then existing AFPAC organiza- was also assigned operational control of the
zation, with no change in the GHQ staff. It facilities and local forces in the Marianas and

78 SCAP instituted a Foreign Liaison Section, under control of G-2, through which communications with
diplomatic miss ions and the Japanese Government were initially handled. ( [ I] SCAP Staff Memo No. 41, 9 }un
46, sub: OfIicial Relations and Contacts with the IJG, with Stalf Sees of GHQ, and with US Occupational Forces;
[2] SCAP Stalf Memo No. 49, 27 Jun 46, sub: Channels of Communication with Foreign GOYts.)
79 GHQ FEC GO No. " ' Jan 47. The order was in accordance with JCS Dir 12)9/ 27, I I Dec 46, sub :
Unified Command Plan.
80 GHQ, FEC Opns Instns No.2, 1 Feb <f8 (S).
81 Ibia.
82 Ibid.

82
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Bonin Islands;" this change was significant operations and joint logistic planning. The
because the control did not include responsi- Group was small, and its functions were limited
bility for the military and civil government of to the preparation of joint plans for possible
these islands, nor any responsibility for naval major emergencies.
administration and naval logistics." The over- The bulk of General Headquarters was lo-
all plan, however, did make General Mac- cated in the Administrative and Executive
Arthur responsible for their security; local Group, which consisted of a conventional high-
forces and their facilities were assigned to his level General Staff and a Special Staff. This
operational control to assist him in discharging Group handled the major part of CINCFE's
his mission.'" military operational functions, including those
administrative aspects of joint command per-
Command Structure of General taining to the peacetime missions of the three
Headquarters, FEC servlces.
It should be mentioned again that the
The organization through which CINCFE nature and duties of the General and Special
administered and controlled the far-flung tacti- Staff Sections did not change with the order
cal establishment of FEC was a General Head- creating the Far East Command. The change
quarters. It consisted of a conventional high- was merely in nomenclature- for example,
level military staff, with the addition of a G-3, GHQ, AFPAC became G-3, GHQ, FEC.
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group. The primary mission of the Far East Com-
There was also an increase in the number of mand was to support the Occupation of Japan
special staff sections. (Plate No. 28) and Southern Korea." A major portion of
The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations the Far East Command, including the British
Group became an important staff element in Commonwealth Occupation Force, carried out
the exercise of unified command. It consisted Occupation missions inJapan under the direct
basically of three small, co-equal Ground, control of SCAP." The command structure
Navy and Air Staff Groups which furnished of the Far East Command and the allocation
planning teams for joint intelligence, joint and distribution of forces was dictated by the
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 (r) lCS Dir [259/27. [[ Dec 46 (C). sub : Unified Command Plan; (2) Rad WK87793. Washington to
CINCAFPAC. r7 Dec 46.
86 GHQ FEC Opns Instns No.2. r Feb 48 (S). In addition. the FEC was assigned the following missions:
(a) Discharge of US military responsibili ties in the Philippines. under the terms of a Military Assistance Agreement
and a Military Bases Agreement negotiated in March 1947. These responsi bilities included the roll-up of wartime
bases in the Philippines and the disposition of supplies accumulated there for the support of a full-scale offensive against
Japan. (b) Maintenance of the security of the FEC, including the protection of sea and air communications. (c) Support
of US policy within the scope of CINCFE's command responsi bility. This mi ssion involved carrying out cite terms
of numerous property sale and transfer agreements, cite conduct of military government in the Ryukyus, and the
conduct of a program of mapping land areas in and adjacent to the FEC, the latter in accordance with international
agreements which provided for making such maps available to the Allied governments concerned. However respon·
si bility for civil and military government functions in cite Marianas-Bonin·Volcano Islands was specifically excluded
from CINCFE's mission and assigned to the Pacific Command under the CinC, Pacific and US Pacific Fleet. The
Pacific Command comprised the forces throughout the Pacific other than FEC forces. (d) The conduct of an exten·
sive program of mapping and procurement of terrain intelligence in accordance with international agreements (See
u c" above) Field operations covered the establishment of ground control and execution of aerial photography for

mapping and charting Japan , Korea, Ryukyus, Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and other areas in the South
and Southwest Pacific.
87 leS Dir [259/ 27. r 1 Dec 46 (C). sub: Unified Command Plan.

84
 PLATE NO. 28
General Headquarters, Far East Command, December 1947
miSSions and the military geography of the lowed a somewhat different pattern, making it
area. (Plate No. 29) mandatory that control for each of these ser-
By far the largest number of United States vices be centralized in a single commander.
Ground Forces allocated to CINCFE were The Commander, Naval Forces, Far East,
assigned to the Eighth Army, the major com- (COMNAVFE) controlled all naval forces
mand charged with the tactical mission of assigned to CINCFE and exercised his au-
occu pying Japan. United States forces under thority through appropriate subordinate naval
the Eighth Army were divided into two corps- headquarters." The Commanding General,
the IX Corps and the I Corps, each consisting Far East Air Forces, (CG, FEAF) was respon-
of two divisions. The British Commonwealth sible for all air forces assigned to the Far East
Occupation Force came under General Mac- Command," including operational control of
Arthur's operational control in his capacity as the British air contingent in Japan. He exet-
Supreme Commander and was assigned to cised his power through three Air Force head-
Eighth Army. The XXIV Corps, consisting quarters and Headquarters, 1St Air Division.
of two United States divisions, occupied Korea Within the over-all air and naval commands,
and was designated as U. S. Army Forces in the subordinate structure conformed to the
Korea (USAFIK). geographical areas where the naval and air
Generally speaking, the Far East Command bases were located.
was divided into an "Occupation Area" and CINCFE controlled all ground forces and
a " Support Area," with major ground combat activities in the Ryukyus, including Military
elements located in the Occupation Area. The Government, through the Commanding Gen-
remaining ground troops, primarily service eral, Ryukyus Command. The over-all objective
troops and Philippine Scouts, were distributed of the Military Government administration in
among the major ground headquarters in the the Ryukyu Islands was to maintain exclusive
Support Area, and the Ryukyus, Philippines United States control in this area until such
and Marianas- Bonins Commands. All of time as the international status and the future
these, like Eighth Army and XXIV Corps, administration of these islands was deter-
were army components. There was no over-all mined."
headquarters for the ground elements within the The Philippine Command had only a small
Far East Command, and the four separate force, maintained primarily as a supervisory
ground commands reported directly to CINC- echelon for the direction of the activities of the
FE. Philippine Scouts."' The Scouts, although still
Because of their greater mobility, command retaining a number of combat unit designations,
of naval and air forces within the theater fol- performed guard duty over surplus property

88 SCAP Occupation Instns NO.5, I Jan 48.

89 Ibid.
90 SpeCific objectives of the Ryukyus Command were : (a) Liquidation of political, social, and economic ties
with the Japanese mainland . (b) Restoration of sta ndards of living consistent with those existing prior to the war
by : physical restoration of damaged property and facilities; continued improvement of health and sanitation;
institution of a sound program of economic development of trade, indusuy, and agriculwre along lines which would
insure that the profits and benefits thereof accrued to the native inhabitants and which would assist them in achieving
the highest possible level of economic independence; and establishment of an educational program adapted to native
capabilities and to local environment.
91 SCAP Occupation Instns No.2, 1 reb 48.

86
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~---
V
__~-J~-----~. ;,~----_..
e T/IlBaiII ...... ..-
~--+---------~------------~. --~-----.--~

.,....
~ ....
;

CHINA
.-
- •

.-........
T ~

{
I
I' - . '{9
_.-
------
' ~ . . Po
... . . . T_
. '" / t-~ I IlII 0' 's ' r

.-
~ a.-IC" 'f

a .' '1 • • .::...' ' / '"";,,~~~ RYUK US a MMAND I

JIORf>sA
."-
~ ~l ....r
~, HONGICONG
a..c.mo.fv T.... ~. t I MARl NAS-BONINS
T__
, I
OMMAND
----~
~--------------~~-----------------------+----------------L-------~-------M~I.
....... L
,

...... .......
....... 1.
"-I .
"'-I.
............
'-
v.-"
PHILIPPINES
MARIANAS _
IS.
I.

"'-'-I.
......1.
... f COMMAND

(HI >{

MINDORO
.,._ .
• MANILA

PHILIPPINE IS. I
R_I.
o-L
~E f •
PANAY • <.- " SAMAR
...,YTIl r ----~--
PALAWAN
~------~~~~
, .~-r'N"~~~~-S~ __-------T--+-------------------~ ... -t--,_--...--~~~~L~--~
"-to...... Y.L

....... _10........'_10.
"--
,
•
~
..- MINDANAO I,

CAROLINE
..... 1•

ISLANDS
10.

PLATE NO. 29
Territorial Subdivisions, Far East Command, December 1947
and provided the bulk of the troop labor." government in the Marianas-Bonins area was
CINCFE also had jurisdiction over all specifically excluded from CINCFE's mission,"
United States Ground Forces in the Mari- and COMMARIANAS came directly under
anas- Bonins Area, known as the Marianas- CINCPAC and the U. S. Pacific Fleet for
Bonins Command (MARBO)." MARBO con- these functions. United States trusteeship over
sisted almost entirely of service troops, includ- the former Japanese mandated islands was ad-
mg some scouts. ministered through naval channels and was
Subordinate Navy echelons were located in not a function of CINCFE.
the same areas as the ground commands. In The subordinate echelons of the Far East
Japan, COMNAVFE had a dual assignment Air Forces also corresponded to the principal
as Commander, Naval Activities, Japan (COM- land areas. Since the primary mission of the
NAVJAP). In the Philippines, COMNAV- ground forces in the Marianas-Bonins Area
FE commanded the local naval forces through was the support of the air forces, the Com-
the Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines manding General, 20th Air Force, was also
(COMNAVPHIL)." The Commander of the placed in command of the ground forces. In
Marianas Islands (COMMARIANAS) was his first capacity he reported to CG, FEAF,
under COMNAVFE for the operational con- and in his second role, he reported directly to
trol of local naval forces and under CINCPAC CINCFE.
for those naval functions which did not come Under the established structure, the unified
under CINCFE.·' These functions included command of air, ground, and naval elements
responsibility for the civil government of Guam, was exercised only by CINCFE. However, in
the United States trusteeship over the man- an emergency, local commanders were to as-
dated islands, and the Naval Military Govern- sume jurisdiction over all Far East forces within
ment in the Volcano Islands. Since the last their areas and execute previously prepared
two groups had been previous possessions of plans. This arrangement insured unified ac-
Japan, they were not included in the trustee- tion in an emergency and, at the same time,
ship agreement. COMMARIANAS also left the command structure flexible enough to
commanded naval forces in the Caroline and permit independent employment of air and
Marshall Islands and reported in this capacity naval forces.
directly to CINCPAC. Military and naval

92 Under the terms of the Philippine Military Assistance Agreement, signed March 1947, the US, subject to
a mutual agreement to be arrived at later, was committed to furnish unspecified military assistance to the Republic of
the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces, and in the performance of other services which might
devolve upon the Republic under its international agreements . It was specified in the Agreement that the US would
furnish equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of a Philippine armed
force of such stre ngth and composition as might mutually be agreed upon . The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated a
policy as to the general extent to which the US would aid in its development. No dear-cut agreement as to the size
of such a force had been reached between the two governments as of the end of December 1948.
Also specified in the Military Assistance Agreement was the establishment of aU. S. Military Advisory Group com-
posed of Army, Navy, and Air officers whose duty it was to assist and advise the Republic on military and naval
matters. This Group, known as .. USMAG ", was set up at Manila and placed under the command of CINCFE.
However, si nce, by the' terms of the Agreement, it had to deal through the local State Department officials on all policy
matters, and, since the extent of US aid was governed by policies established in Washington, CINCFE could exercise
little control over its activities.
93 GHQ FEe Opns Instns NO.2, I Feb 48 (5). 95 Ibid.
94 Ibid. ¢ Ibid.

88
 CHAPTER IV
RELIEF OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES

Allied prisoner, of ",ar in Japanese coustody, portant objectives in the specific plans which
includi"g merchant seamen, are ( to be) repatrfated at senior staffs were directed to " develop and
the earliest possible date consistent ",ith military maintain in an advanced state of readiness, as
operation!. The urgency of this missioll is second a matter of urgent priority.'"
ouly to military operations and to the maintenance
One of the major missions outlined in
of the forces of occupation.'
"Blacklist" Was to locate United Nations pris-
Thus read the operational instructions oners of war and internees, to provide them
implementing Operation " Blacklist," the basic with adequate food, shelter, clothing and medi-
plan for the occupation of Japan and Korea cal care, and to register and evacuate them to
on the surrender of the Imperial Japanese rear areas."
Government. Within a few hours after As defined by "Blacklist," the term " United
the first reconnaissance party of Americans Nations prisoners of war" included all persons
arrived at Atsugi airfield to initiate the pre- held in Japanese custody, who were or had
surrender requirements, the first Allied prison- been members of, or accompanied or served
ers of war became free men. Three weeks later with, the armed forces of any of the United
virtually all those held as prisoners on the Nations ; captured members of the armed
Japanese mainland had been evacuated and forces of countries occupied by Japan, as well
were on the way back to their homes. The as those who had served with the merchant
speed of liberation (rom all prison camps in marine of any of the United Nations, were also
Honshu, Hokkaido, and Shikoku within the included. All of these categories, under terms
first two weeks of September put the Eighth of the Geneva Convention, should have been
Army weeks :thead of the most optimistic treated as prisoners of war even though not
estimates made for this enterprise.' recognized as such by Japan; at the same time,
Prior to the cessation of hostilities there " Blacklist" designated a civilian internee as a
was considerable concern in General Mac- person" without a military status, detained by
Arthur's Headquarters about the fate of the the enemy, who is not a national of the Japa-
prisoners o~ war and civilian internees. The nese Empire as constituted on 10 July 1937.'"
care and evacuation of these persons were im- The general term did not include personnel
1 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist" Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), Annex 5f, Ca,. and
Evacuation of Allied PW's and Civ Internees.
2 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 (C), p. 28.
3 (I) GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist" Opns (2d ed), 25 Jul 45 (TS). .. Blacklist"
operations had been in the making since May 1945 and went to top commands in July of that year. The 1 St edition
was published 16 July 1945 and presented at Guam 4 days later at a conference of ranking service representatives. (2)
Rad (TS) C.'543' CINCAFPAC to AGWAR, 4 May 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 381/61 (TS).
4 GHQ USAFPAC Basic Outline Plan for " Blacklist" Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS), par. 2e, Common Tasks,
p. 13·
5 Ibid, Annex 5f, App I.

89
who, although formerly held in Japanese custo- internees immediately. They asked to be
dy as prisoners of war, had accepted release notified as soon as possible as to where and
from the status in exchange for employment when the Allied Nations would have the neces-
by Japan_ Persons in this category, after defi- sary ships for the prisoners' repatriation, and
nite identification, were to be dealt with as indicated that the following ports had been
displaced persons. selected as embarkation points: Hakodate,
The "facts and assumptions" of " Black- Niigata, Aomori, Fushiki, Tsuruga, Sendai,
list," though a pre-surrender document, proved Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, Shimonoseki, Na-
generally correct : gasaki, and Hakata. They further stated that
a committee comprised of members of the
Best estimales indicate that there are approximately
Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Army
36,000 (Allied) personnel of "ar;oUJ categories located
in approximately 140 camps. In most instances this and Navy Ministries, and the Foreign Office
personnel will be in extremely poor phy'ical condition had been formed. The committee was to make
requiring increased diet , comfortj atld medical care. preparations to return Allied prisoners, with
Poor housing and sanitary conditions will requirt assistance from the Swiss and Swedish lega-
immediate large scale transfers to best d'Ydi/abie facili- tions and the International Commmee of the
ties to be preemptorily commandeered. Complete Red Cross in Japan.'
reclothing will be Imperati". Records in general Elaborating on the prior demand, the earliest
will be incomplete faT both ,uT,ivars and deceased. 6 SCAP directives to the Japanese Government
prescribed a speedy release of the prisoners.·
On 2 September, SCAP General Order
SCAP Directives Regarding
Numbet I ordered:
Prisoners of War
(I) The 'afety and well-being of all United
Document I of the "Reguirements of the Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internus
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be JeTupulously preser>ed, to include the admmis-
Presented to the Japanese Representatives at trati,. and supply ser,ices wential to pro,ide adequate
Manila, P . 1., on 19 August 1945 ", called for food, shelter, clothing and medical care until ,uch
responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Com-
the Japanese surrender delegation to be pre-
mander for the Allied Powers.
pared to furnish all available information per-
(2) Each camp aT other place of detention of
taining to "prisoner of war and civilian intern-
United Nations Prisoners of W ctT and Ci"i/ian Inter.
ment camps and places of detention, wherever
nees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms,
located, within Japan and Japanese controlled and ammunition, will be de{i"ered immediately to
areas." The location and status of Generals the command of the senior officer or designated rep-
Jonathan M. Wainwright and Arthur E. resenlati"e of the Prisoners of War and Ci"ilian
Percival, top-ranking United States and British Internees.
prisoners of war, were specifically reguired. (3) As directed by the Supreme Commander for
The Japanese emissaries at Manila presented the Allied Powers, Prisoners of War and Ci,ilian
an agreement to return , prisoners of war and Internees will be transported to places of safety where

6 Ibid, Annex 5f, par. 2 (GHQ USAFPAC O pns Instns NO. 4 (S), Annex 12, 15 Aug 45, gives an estimate " ...
36,000 Allied personnel. . .located in approximately 140 camps ... ")
7 Documents Submitted to SCAP by Ute Japanese Mission to N egotiate Surrender, Manila, PI, 19 Aug 45,
Repatriation of POW's and Internees.
8 SCAP Dir No. I, 2 Sep 45, enclosing SCAP GO No. I, and No.2, 3 Sep 45.

90
 Gens. Jonathan M . Wainwright and Arthur E. Percival
after release from PW Camps m Manchuria.

Maj. Gen. E. P. King at Nichols Field,

Manila, on his way to the United States.
PLATE NO. 30
Senior Allied Commanders Released from Prisoner of War Camps.
 they can be accepted by Allied authoritieI. to insure that the prisoners and internees would
(4) The JapaneIe imperial General Headquar- receive rations equivalent to the highest scale
ters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the locally available to Japanese armed forces or
Allied Powers, without delay after receipt of this
civilian personnel. All of the prisoners were
order, complete lists of all United Nations Prisoners
to be furnished the best medical care possible,
of War and Ci.ilian Internees, including their
together with all necessary medical supplies,
locations.
and adequate shelter, clothing, and bathing
A day later, Directive Number 2 instructed facilities.
the Japanese Imperial Government to dispatch Complete lists of all prisoners of war and
instructions for all prisoners of war and civilian civilian internees (showing name, rank or posi-
internees without delay. The prisoners were tion, nationality, next of kin, home address,
to be assembled at the earliest opportunity and age, sex, and physical condition) were to be
the following statement was to be read to them prepared and dispatched to the Supreme Com-
in English and in such other languages as mander for the Allied Powers. Extracts from
might be required: available records on deceased or transferred
prisoners of war and civilian internees, showing
The formal surrender of Japan to the Allied
substantially the same data (including data of
Powers was signed on 2 September '945. General
death and burial site, or transfer and destina-
of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been named
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. United
tion), were also to be furnished.
Nations Forces are proceeding as rapidly as possible
with the occupation of the Japanese Home Islands Formation of Recovery Teams
and Korea . The relief and r<co.ery of Allied
Prisoners of War and Ci.ilian Internees will be Every military unit arriving in Japan in the
accomplished with all possible speed. days just before and after the formal surrender
Pending the aTTi.al of Allied representati." the ceremony on 2 September 1945 played its par-
command of this camp and its equipmem, stores, ticular role in the recovery of the prisoners of
records, ClTm! and ammunition are to be turned o'Ver war and civilian internees.
to the Senior Prisoner of War or a designated Ci",r/ian GHQ, AFPAC, had been given the re-
Internee, who will thenceforth gi')lt instructions to the sponsibility to operate and train the necessary
Camp Commander for maintenance of supply and liaison, recovery, and final processing teams
administratj"e ser"ices and for the amelioration of which would be required to speedily liberate
local conditions. The Camp Commander will be the prisoners.9 The Recovered Personnel De-
responsible to the Senior Prisoner of War or desig- tachment had organized and trained teams to
nated Ci'Vi/ian Internee for maintaining his command
accompany field forces in the anticipated inva-
intact.
sion of Japan.'· This project was a joint mission
Allied representati..s will be sent to this Camp as
of the Adjutant General and the Commanding
soon as possible to arrange for your remo"al and
General, Special Troops, GHQ. Meanwhile,
t'Ventual return to your homes.
a liaison team of three officers and three en·
This directive also authorized the reqUi- listed men (one each from the United States,
sitioning of government or military stocks British, and Netherlands Forces) had been

9 GHQ USAF PAC, GO No. 103, I I Aug 45, Estab of the Recovered Pers Det.
10 ( t) GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for" Blacklist" Opns (TS) (3d ed), Ann« 5f, 8 Aug45 (2)
GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO.4 (S), 15 Aug 45, Annex 12 .

92
trained for duty with each of the two armies military command maximum resources and facilities
and six corps which were scheduled to make a>ailable to assist in the accomplishment .. _( of the
the initial entry into Japan." abo .. ).
The recovery teams (approximately seventy) (8) Assume operatioll of Allied prifoner of .,ar
and internment camps located within their respec/i)lt
were set up on the basis of one for each 500
areas.
prisoners of war and civilian internees. Each
(9) Utilize first enailable air, motoT, (IT 'Water
team was composed of two officers-one United
transport to expedite tYdcuation.
States and one British. Twelve additional
recovery teams were held in reserve to be at- Duties of the Commanding General, AF-
tached when needed ... · The final processing WESPAC, were outlined in the same doc-
teams were to be assigned to the four recovered ument, as follows:
personnel disposition centers or collecting (I) Pro>ides fupplies and equipment required by
points proposed for Japan and Korea. Every reCO'lltT'Y and processing ttams.
team was composed of nine officers and twenty (2)Pro.id" Commandillg Generalf, Sixth and
enlisted men, and included one officer and one Eighth Armies and XXIV Corps .,ith ample
enlisted man from Great Britain, Australia, clothing and equipment for prifonerr of "ar and
Canada, and the Netherlands. internees i neluding 'Women and children; Iubsistence

The job of locating the prisoners was dele- of proper type and quantity; medical supplies and
[acili/res to insure adequate medical eme of the
gated by GHQ to the commanding generals of
recoverees.
the Sixth and Eighth Armies and the XXIV
(3) Establishes and operates a final processing
Corps, within their respective areas. Each was
center in the Manila area, conSIsting of one replace-
charged with the following duties :'j
ment depot augmented by one British and one Aus-
(1) Locate, cttr< for and safeguard all Allied tralian procerring unit compttrable to a Replacement
Ttcovtred personnel. Battalion.
(2) Pro .. de billets, food, clothing, comforts and (4) Pro. ides mersing detacbments, supplier dnd
medical caTe. equipment and administrati>e facilities at final dif-
(3) Accomplish initial processing of subject per- position ce nter.
sonnel . ... 'i (5) Recei ..f, billetf, and pro. ides rationf, cloth-
(4) Establish TtcO"/leree disposition centers ~QT ing and medical CtZTe for reco'/lered personnel in
ports of embarkatioll or landing fields as may be reco.eree difposition centers established in the Philip-
required. piner.
(5) Evacuate reco'Yered personnel to reco'Yeru (6) Furnishes air, motor or water tranportation
disposition centers established by Commanding Gen- t1S may be needed in the mO')lement of reco')lereeJ
eral, AFWESPAC, in the Philippinef. within his dTea of responsibility.
(6) Collect,preser>e and forward all records that (7) Procerses and e>acuates from the Philippines
may be captured pertaining to recO>fred personnel. prisoners of 'War ana ci'/lilian internees after ciedTance
(7) Exact from the Japanese Go.emment and by thif (AFPAC] headqU<1Tterr and as <1TTanged with

II Eighth Army, IX, Xl, and XIV Corps; Sixth Army, 1, X and V Amphib Corps. XXIV Corps went to Korea.
12 Actually each additional recovery" team" consisted of one Dutch enlisted man and was used whenever Dutch
repatriates were involved.
13 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns NO.4 (S), 15 Aug 45, Annex 12.
'4 USAFPAC, Cir 19, sub: Adm of Recovered Mil Pers Other Than Phil Army, covered forms to be filled
out by PW's providing information on treatment, atrocities, etc. eir 20 made similar provision for civilian personnel.
(GHQ USAFPAC Cir 19 & 20, 9 Jul 45, Incl I, RPD Forms 44 & 23.)

93
 the gO'Yernmentai authorities concerned. military authorities to arrange for immediate
The planned process of evacuation for relief measures to ease the last days of incarcer-
Americans, British, Canadians, and Australians ation. ,8 It was estimated that thirty days would
was from the camps to recovered personnel be required for complete evacuation of Japan,
disposition centers, to the final processing center, and that many lives could be saved by supply-
and thence to their destinations. Nationals of ing food, clothing, and medical supplies during
the other United Nations were to be held in the interim. '9 Air transport was chosen as the
the final disposition centers until provision most feasible method of providing the necessary
could be made by their respective governments supplies. The original plan called for Far East
for their return home. Air Forces planes, based on Okinawa and in
Highest priority on transportation was di- the Philippines, to share the air supply task
rected, with movement by air to be used to the with Marianas-based B-29'S. Just as the pro-
maximum. Priority was given for the evacua- gram was about to be initiated, the entire
tion and repatriation of the sick and wounded, project was assigned to the Twentieth Air
but there was no discrimination because of Force and prisoner of war supply missions were
rank, service, or nationality. executed from 27 August to 20 September
In early August numerous messages regard- 1945.'·
ing the relief and release of internees and The spearhead of the Tokyo shuttle arrived
prisoners of war were transmitted between at Kadena Airfield (Okinawa) in mid-August.
Tokyo and Washington via Bern." The They were planes of the Air T ransport Com-
Recovered Personnel Sub-section was then mand which were to carry the 11th Airborne
transferred from Manila to Okinawa in prepa- Division north to Tokyo for the Occupation
ration for moving to Japan .. ' and bring back the former American prisoners
to Okinawa on their way to the States. The
Preparation for Air Drops Air Transport Command crews, which came
from all over the world for this epoch-making
Meanwhile, the reported conditions of star- operation, shuttled their planes between Tokyo
vation rations, disease, and maltreatment of the and Okinawa. They were called in from
men and women in Japanese camps" spurred " Snowball" : the Presque Isle, Maine-to-Paris

15 The communications addressed to the Japanese Government by the Department of State concerning the
treatment of American PW's and civilian internees totaled approximately 240 from 7 December 1941 to 2 September
1945·
,6 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45·Jan 46 (C). Col M. H. Marcus
and Lt Col E. E. Graham headed the Recovered Personnel Division, AGO GHQ USAFPAC, Manila.
17 (I) From collection of various regulations regarding PW's and issued by PW Int Bur, 22 Nov 43. (2)
" The answer of the Japanese Government to the Red Cross regarding the treatment of POW's is that Japan has not
ratified the treaty regarding treatment of POW's." (IPS Doc No. 2197, 24 Jun 46 p. 3.)
18 " In the event of unconditional surrender or sudden collapse of the Japanese Govt and Imperial High Com-
mand, it is proposed to immediately air drop emergency supplies to prisoners of war and civilian internees of the
United Nations held in known Japanese camps . .. . Supplies to be flown from bases in the Philippines and Ryukyus
nonstop .... " (Rad(TS) C-32871, CINCAFPAC G-4 to CG China Thealer, 12 Aug 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 384.1/ 13-2.)
19 " ... Swiss representative of International Red Cross reports aU POW camps desperately in need of food.
Recommend plane drops particularly sugar, chocolate, candy, condensed milk .... " (Rad [TSJ 281101/Z, COM3rdFLT
to SCAP, 29 Aug 45 . In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.6 [TSJ.)
20 HQ 20th AF, Tac Mission Rpt, Mission No. POW, 27 Aug-20 Sep 45 (C).

94
run; from "Crescent": the Wilmington, the Operational Engineering Section in order
Delaware-to-India run; and from North Africa to make detailed plans. Throughout the course
via India and the Philippines. of these tests, it was found that a 10,000 pound
Because of the nature of the project, it was load consisting of forty individual drop units
decided .that only general planning would be was the capacity of a B·29. The best altitude
done at Twentieth Air Force Headquarters. during the initial dropping was determined to
Specific planning on routes, loading, and dates be between 500 and 1,000 feet; while the most
of missions was to be done by the wings en- practical speed for the drops was established at
gaged in the operation." An important factor approximately 165 miles per hour.
in planning the operation was the availability After the first three days of operation, how-
of food, medical supplies, and cargo parachutes. ever, it was decided that the established alti-
It was obvious that if the Twentieth Air Force tude was too low, and crews were briefed to
were to carry out the supply drops quickly, all drop bundles above 1,000 feet. This height
supplies must be packaged and made available allowed for better functioning of parachutes,
in the Marianas. The food and medical sup- and avoided causing injuries among prisoners
ply requirements for the program were set up and destruction of supply bundles." To fa-
on the basis of thirty days' supply for 69,000 cilitate identification, all aircraft engaged in
persons. (This figure included the Japanese these operations were marked" PW Supplies"
Home Islands, Korea and China.) Arrange- in letters three feet high under each wing.
ments were made through the Western Pacific Plans were made to drop supplies in incre-
Base Command for all supplies to be made ments of three, seven, and ten-day units. The
available at Saipan. This was made possible three-day su pplies were to include juices, soups,
by borrowing on stores and provisions which clothing and medical supplies. The seven-day
had been accumulated for the planned invasion packages would contain additional medical
of Japan. Since 63,000 cargo parachutes were su pplies and food of a more substantial nature.
required for the project and only I I ,000 were The ten-day supplies were to consist of almost
available in the Marianas, it was necessary to all food, with some medical supplies. A fourth
obtain additional ones from the Philippines. increment of additional supplies would simply
After determining where and in what quanti- repeat the three-day unit bundles. Instruction
ties the necessary supplies could be delivered, leaflets for allocation and use of supplies were
loading and dropping tests were conducted by included, and each aircraft was to take
21 Ibid.
22 This was evidenced by the following extracts from GHQ SWPA Daily Sum and G-2 Est of the Enemy Sit
(TS), 20 Aug-4 Sep 45: (a) "COM3rdFLT RA 33 Japan, 30 Aug 45: PW's are tremendously appreciative of
food drops. Pilots are urged to select nearby areas for drops, as some packages without parachutes have been
plummeting through roofs." (b) "JAP GOV'T X 345. 30 Aug 45: Referring to information on civilian internee
camp number 25, it was learned that ... accidents happened as a result of the dropping of the supplies to the camps
by Allied ai rcraft on 27 and 28 August . .. . Some casualties were caused, although details arc still unavailable, within
Tokyo prisoners camp No. 4 at Naoetsu and prisoners camp NO.7 at Hanaoka and other places. A drum was dropped
at three places in the central area of Tokyo in the vicinity of which no prisoners or internees camps are located. It seems
that these accidents were mostly due to the faulty attachment of the dropped material to the parachute, causing the
former to come off from the latter when dropped, or the failure of the parachute to open because of the extremely low
altitude from which the material was dropped . ... " (c) "JAP GOVT 453: PW Supply-dropping 8.29's Cause
Casualties: 4 Sep 45: ' Several' 8.29's dropping PW supplies in Higashi Maizuru City (Maizuru area) wounded
several persons. Request that future supply drops be only made to POW camp at Miyazu."

95
photos of the operation whenever conditions this subject was considered too unreliable for
permitted. the successful execution of airdrops. Because
Normally every plane was to carry supplies population figures for many of the camps could
sufficient for 200 persons for the particular be only estimates, it was inevitable that there
three, seven, or ten-day period. But for camps would be cases of over-supply and under-supply.
of 1000 or more population, aircraft were slated A study prepared by the MIS-X Section of
for special loads which would provide for GHQ on '4 August indicated locations, con-
greater efficiency in packaging. ' 3 ditions, and strengths of Japanese prisoner of
On ,8 August '945 medical supplies for war camps." The only positive intelligence on
3' , 0 0 0 people had been assembled, packed, these camps was intermittently furnished by the
and stored on Guam while quartermaster stores International Committee of the Red Cross;
for 50, 000 people were assembled, packed, and however, since that agency was allowed to visit
stored on Saipan. All these supplies were relatively few camps in Japan, conditions listed
prepared for air-dropping to PW's and inter- in its reports could not be considered repre-
nees held by the Japanese." sentative. All other camp intelligence came
from a variety of sources; much of it was ob-
Location and Supply of Prisoner of tained from interrogations of Japanese prisoners
War Camps and had to be assessed accordingly.'"
According to the principles established by
The most perplexing problem in planning the Geneva Convention, the International
these operations was determining the location Committee of the Red Cross was to be notified
and population of the camps to be provided. of the location of all PW camps. Since the
On ,6 August '945 the Commanding General, Japanese did not consider themselves bound to
USAST AF, radioed Commander in Chief, these principles, it was only after the surrender
AFPAC , that an official current rist of PW that this organization was able to obtain access
camps and civilian internee centers from Japa- to Japanese prison camp records . In cooper-
nese Government sources was urgently needed ation with Allied authorities, Dr. Marcel
for the efficient execution of the assigned air Junod, who had been active in International
drop mission. The camp designation, the Red Cross activities throughout the war, es-
number of PW's present, general location, and tablished a plan for rapid evacuation of prison-
geographic coordinates were requested. Evacu- ers of war and civilian internees. Conditions
ated camp sites were to be named and located, in Japan, camp strengths as of the latest reports,
since the currently available information On and plans for evacuation were outlined in a

23 HQ 20th AF, T ac Mission Rpt, Mission No. POW, 27 Aug- 20 Sep 45 (C).
24 Rad (TS) NR: 2302, COMGEN USASTAF CO COMGEN FEAF, ,8 Aug 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm
383- 6 jIfTS.
25 GHQ USAFPAC- MIS·X (a G-2 operating agency), Locations and Strengths of POW and Civ Internment
Camps in Japan , J4 Aug 45 ·
26 Captured Pers and Mat Br, G-2 WO. Principle sources included NEFIS (Netherlands East Indies Forces
Int Sv), AlB (Allied Int Bur), ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Sv, G·2), and what information MIS·X (Mil
Int Sv) , AFPAC, had been able to obtain through intensive interrogations of released prisoners in the PI CINCPACI
POA, AGAS (Air Ground Aid Sv). See G-2 GHQ FEC Int Set, Vol. IV, O/,<rationJ of tht Allied Intelligrnce
Bureau (R) ; Vol. V, History of the Allied Geog>"aphical Section (R).

96
radio message via Washington. '7 nating the location of these camps with those
On 29 August, in compliance with SCAP's listed in "Blacklist", aircraft of the 314th
request for further information, the Japanese Bombardment Wing were dispatched to verify
radioed that they were trying their best to the location of camps on the Japanese home
collect the required data concerning the Allied islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu."
prisoners of war. They complained, however, This reconnaissance established the existence
that it was practically impossible in so short a and location of several additional encampments.
time to complete the comprehensive investiga- When the ground forces began occupation
tion demanded since communications with of all strategic areas in Japan, the necessity lor
various places either had been severed or were air surveillance lessened, and the Far East Air
extremely difficult.'" Forces turned their efforts toward deploying air
The first official Japanese compilation of units to Japan for occupation duties and the
prisoner of war camps, known as the " Yellow continued dropping of supplies ..• During the
List" and containing the names of seventy-three period from 27 August to 20 September,
camps, was made available to the Twentieth aircraft of the 58th, 73rd,. 313th, 314th, and
Air Force on 27 August 1945. After coordi- 315th Bombardment Wings flew 900 effective

27 H •• • Following information received from Tokyo . . .in order to facilitate: repatriation POW and civilian
internees Far East. Organization 7 groups delegates Intercross and protecting power who are authorized to go to 7
main camps in Japan, namely Hakodate. Seodai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka in order to supervise
conditions concerning evacuation POW and CI from internment centers to debarkation centers . . . }apanese delegation
who left for Manila communicated these intentionllo to Allied Headquarters and acceptance by the}apanese Government
of these measures. Junod established contact with all delegates and other interested by group giving all instructions
... .Junod asked Japanese Govern ment to increase immediately food rations all POW especially CI. Orders have already
been given. Junod. established plan with authorities for evacuation of POW and CI which will be ready August 24th.
He believes that in view of conditions massive regrouping of prisoners in ports of embar'kation impossible but be pr0-
poses evacuation of nearer camps to the ports and gradual transportation from faraway camps toward nearby camps
which have been previously vacated. This will a.ssure maximum security in feeding of POW and prevent crowding.
Transportation towards camps and ports by train 80 percent 3td class, 20 percent 2nd class, reserved for sick and officers. In
consideration of the great number of sick people Junod. has spoken to have necessary hospital ships available. Evacuation
of CI complicated by great numbers who are residents Japan and occupied territories. Would like to transmit to Junod.
opinions Governments concerned . . .. Approximate strength or numbers of POW transmitted to Allied General Head.·
quarter~ by Japanese Government on June 301945: Hakodate 1,579. Sendai 3.844, Tokyo 5,848. Nagoya 3.357. Osalca
4.541 , Hiroshima 3.155, Fukuoka 10,457. total in Japan proper 34.509··· .Total occupied territories, fi9,346 general total
POW, 103,855, of whom 1I ,572 sick. Approximate strength of CI in April: Tokyo 36, Kanagawa 66, Hyogo 163,
Nagasaki 41, Saitama 56, Fukushima 140, Hokkaido 24, Miyagi 35, Hiroshima 44. Aicbi 35. Total in Japan 640 . ...
This list does not mention civilian internees under Military control. More detailed and more recent lists follow.
Would like to have opinion of Governments concerned to enable us to inform Junod Tokyo who will re-transmit to all
delegates Far East. Coordinating action interested. powers seems indispensable for satisfactory execution of above
plan. We ask that all Allied Commands Far East be informed of this plan, and contact our delegates on the spot
to assure fast application of necessary measures. We put at disposal Allied authorities all our delegates. If another
plan already established and applied would be grateful to be informed so that we may advise Junod . Would like
very much to receive ultimate lists of repatriates established by Allied authorities. Same text sent to London delegate •. "
(Rad NR : '946, Washington to CINCAFPAC, China, India, 24 Aug 45. G-3 Adm 383.6 [S])
28 (,) Rad (S) 3094, COMGEN USASTAF to COM G'5, 26 Aug 45 · In G'3 GHQ Adm 383/6 (S);
(2) GHQ SWPA Daily Sum and G'2 Est of the Enemy Sit (TS), 29 Au~ 45.
29 HQ 20th AF, Tae Mission Rpt No. POW, 20 Sep 45 (C).
30 GHQ SCAP and USAFPAC Mo Sum of Opns (S), Sep 45.

97
 Sendai PW Camp NO.3 Relief Mission flown by 20th Air Force, 12 September 1945.

Japanese unloading supplies dropped by air at Omori PW Camp near Tokyo, 30 August 1945.

PLATE NO.3'
Prisoner of War Relief Missions
sorties and dropped 4,470 tons of supplies. that beginning on the day of initial landings
Successful drops were made to 158 camps." his command was prepared to provide for and
The Navy was notified of these relief opera- screen a considerable number of Allied prison-
tion plans and furnished air-sea rescue facilities, ers of war and internees. In. Tokyo Bay area
consisting of surface vessels on permanent the Third Fleet had immediately available three
statlOns along the routes flown." hospital ships, thirty doctors, ninety corpsmen,
and clothing and food for 3,000 men. By the
Operation "Swift Mercy" first of September the Navy expected to have
additional small ships, twenty doctors, sixty
In the outer bay just beyond Y okosuka, corpsmen, and food and clothing for 4,000
elements of the Third U. S. Fleet, under men. H
command of Admiral William F. Halsey, had The Swiss representative of the Internatior",l
awaited the signal which would allow them to Committee of the Red Cross, with Task Force
.enact the Navy's role in the Occupation mis- 31, anchored offYokosuka, meanwhile reponed
sion." On 21 August Admiral Halsey had that many of the PW's were sick (150 were
radioed Commander in Chief, Pacific Advance, seriously ill in Shmagawa camp hospital) and

3' FINAL STATISTICS ON PW CAMP PROJECT":

A/C Air Elf Non·EIF Tons Tons Tons Jet· Tons A/C CuuaI·
Wing Sch.d Borne Sorties Sorties Ldd D,pd tisoned Rtd Lon t ies
,8 76 60 282 '0 67 2 12
76 58, "
580
222
472
'5
108
3'9
293 2 237° 99·3 463 4
,
39
3'3 23' '90 32 II9 2 1018 11·3 ,63 '4
3'4 62 62 6, 248 244 '0 4 () 0
3'5 126 12 7 "7 '0 6,0 55 6 0 54 12
'°7 6 ,066 ,66 8 77
999 '34' 4470 120.6 75'
* Totals include camps in China, Korea, and Formosa for which separate statistics unavailable. (HQ 20th AF,
Tae Mission Rpt No. POW, 27 Aug-20 Sep 4' (C).)
32 Ibid. Surface vessels were stationed between the following points during me period of these missions:
Marianas to Iwo jima, Iwo lima to Honshu, Okinawa to Honshu.
33 (I) Rad (TS) 2oo245/z, COM3rdFLT to CINCPAC ADV, 21 Aug 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 383.6 (TS);
(2) Rad (C) 240219/Z, COM3rdFLT to SCAP, 25 Aug 45 ; (3) GHQ SCAP /3(, USAFPAC Mo Sum of Opns
(S), Sep 45.
34 On 25 August, General MacArthur had advised Admiral Halsey that I I • • • it is not believed advisable for
Third Fleet to undertake any unilateral action re assistance and evacuation prisoners of war Tokyo Bay area. Action
being taken by this headquarters to effect coordination in this matter." (Rad [C.125I 457, SCAP to Halsey, 2, Aug
45. In G'3 GHQ Adm 383-6",S.)
Admiral Halsey proposed that immediate action be taken and, in a radio to General MacArthur 29 August. stated that:
I f • • • aU facilities under my command are available to you and to the CG Eighth Army for the immediate extension

of urgent care, assistance and evacuation of the Allied POW's in eastern Honshu. Suggest that the liaison officers
of the Eighth Army be sent to me at Yokosuka in order that I may initiate and expedite this task in accordance with
your policies .. .. Have a tactical organization ready with all the available information and prepared to act. Propose
for the most expeditious action: I. Send medical assistance and food with Red Cross and Japanese liaison to T okyo
Bay waterfront camps promptly reportIng to CG Eighth Army and to you on conditions found. 2. Receive released
POW's on board hospital ships and APA's in Tokyo Bay for evacuation to points CG Eighth Army directs. 3. Send
on 3 Sep with 8th Army liaison party I LSV, I APA, with appropriate escorts and minesweepers to an East Coast port
in the Sendai area to contact camps in that area, extend medical assistance and evacuate to points CG Eighth Army
directs. 4. Estab.lish transient hospital. c:;lothing, and supply station for POW's at Yokosuka for use as required."
(Rad [TSj, Halsey to MacArthur, 29 Aug 45. In G'3 Adm 383-6.)

99
that all camps were in desperate need eX food. required the handling of 30/ 40,000 internees.
The Red Cross Committee also furnished In view of these reported conditions, on 29
information on 200 aviation personnel, in August, Admiral Halsey was authorized by
extremely bad condition at Omori camp on the Admiral Nimitz to take prompt action regard-
waterfront. The urgency of the situation was ing the PW'S.,6 Within a short period the
confirmed by extensive photographic coverage evacuation of waterfront camps was under way.
of PW camps, which showed prisoners signal- The first prisoners to be evacuated were from
ling to planes for food and medical supplies." Omori, Shinagawa, and Ofuna camps." Com-
From the Japanese it was learned that there mander Task Group 30.6 radioed to Com-
were supposedly 6,125 Allied PW's in the mander Third Fleet: ,8
Tokyo area, of which 4'7 were bedridden. There has neyer been a blacker hellhole than the
This distressing situation was further confirmed POW hospital we are now evacuating one·half mile
by two British marines who were rescued by a north of mooring. Approximately 500 have now
patrol boat near Sagami Bay anchorage. They (30 August) been processed to Benevolence including
had escaped from Kawasaki prison camp, a fradure, open wounds, concussions, burns and in
one-story wooden barracks where there was a general the worst malnutrition imaginable. BeJtial
critical lack of food, medicine, and clothing. beatings were common especially at Ofuna, inquisi.
The hopeless predicament of prisoners in torial den of brutism. The cheers of pow as our
Tokyo waterf ront camps indicated that their boat hove into sight brought tears to our eyes. Oper-
release was one of prime urgency. Medical ations are proceeding according to plan. The bath,
medical care, chow, interview, and clean bed routine
care was badly needed and had the highest
is a merciful machine of efficiency . ... Preliminm'Y
priority. Obviously, there was no reason to
list of pow will be sent Commander JTd Fleet in
assume that the Tokyo area was an exception
mormng.
but that conditions in inland camps were
equally bad, a strong reason to handle the A touching scene greeted rescuers at the camp
problem on an over-all basis rather than piece- near Y okosuka Naval Base. There, more than
meal evacuations on a possibly preferential 1,000 emaciated and starving Allied war
basis; as a matter of fact, the inland camps prisoners were taken aboard the USS Ancon.

35 Messages Painted on PW Camps included: "SOS,)I" 406 Prisoners," "503 Men Here." "Have Hospital
Cases Here," "Drop Radio Please," I< Thanks Yanks, Aussies," "PW US PW 1734 Men," "Men from Corregidor,
Bataan Thank Wasp." "Hong Kong Men Thank You," "All Left This Camp." (HQ 20th AF, Tac Mission Rpt,
Mission No. POW, 27 AUg-20 Sep 45 [C].)
36 Upon receiving Admiral Halsey's report of conditions in waterfront camps, Admiral Nimitz sent an urgent
message to General MacArthur: " In view of circumstances outuned urge that you immediately authorize Halsey to
take immediate action to contact POW and to take such action as necessary for alleviating their condition and moving
them into American jurisdiction. In order that the intolerable conditions outlined by him may be corrected in minimum
time and to provide for possible failure or delay in communications, COM3rdFLT is hereby authorized, if no reply
is received from you by 1300 Tokyo time today, to initiate such local action as to POW's as humanitarian considerations
require." (Rad [C) 281830, CINCPAC ADV to SCAP, 29 Aug 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383-6 / 1/ 5.)
SCAP radioed his concurrence, stating that evacuees should be returned to AFWESPAC, Manila. (Rad [C] 290339,
SCAP to CINCPAC ADV, 29 Aug 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.6.)
37 u... On the evening of 29 August 1945, a U. S. Naval Landing unit of about 150 men under the command
of a Rear Admiral, broke into the Shinagawa camp of the Allied War Prisoners, Tokyo, and forcibly led away the
prisoners .... " (Rad [C] CA51551, CINCAFPAC ADV to CINCPAC, I Sep 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.6 [C].)
38 Rad 2923'OZ, COM TG 30.6 to COM3rdFLT, 30 Aug 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.6.

100
 Close-up of Barracks, Omori Prisoner of War Camp.

Leon S. Johnston of Atlanta, Georgia, and Harry R. Sanders of

Terre Haute, Indiana, interned for over three years ar Omori Camp.

PLATE NO. 32
Barracks, Omori Prisoner of War Camp, Tokyo, 30 August J945
Among them were the gallant survIvors of seventy recovery teams had been organized and
Wake and Bataan who had withstood long assigned to the Sixth and Eighth Armies and
months of solitary confinement and threats of the XXIV Corps. In addition, nine liaison
death. At least 80 percent of them were teams, in which the British, Canadian, Austra-
suffering from malnutrition ;19 all of the prison- lian, and Netherlands Governments were
ers at Omori and Shinagawa camps, except for represented, were attached to army and corps
the few who were of recent capture, were headquarters.
suffering from the same deficiency, a majority After V-I Day, teams were immediately
of them seriously. Many were medical and dispatched to prison camp areas in Japan where
surgical cases. The conditions in these two they released, processed, and arranged trans-
camps had been abominable and the treatment portation for 32,624 prisoners of war, all of them
extremely brutal. The third camp, Ofuna, had liberated within a period of three weeks."
been the Gestapo center of Japan. The Recovered Personnel Section (28 teams)
arrived in Yokohama on 30 August '945 with
Recovered Personnel Section in Action the advance airborne echelon of Eighth Army
Headquarters." Advance planning proved
As stated previously, the Occupation ground invaluable. in coordinating airdrops of food,
forces had also made careful plans for thei r clothing and medical supplies for immediate
part in the evacuation program. The Recovered relief to the prisoners; although some changes
Personnel Sub-section of G-" Eighth Army, became necessary since the Japanese had made
had made systematic arrangements for the extensive transfers of prisoners after 30 June
liberation of prisoners as rapidly as possible ;'0 '945." It should be noted that there were also

39 Th~ Rtd CTOH Coun"tr, October 1945.

40 See pp. 100 If.
41 PRISONERS OF WAR RELEASED, AUGUST- SEPTEMBER 1945:
AREA BASE CAMP NO. SUB-CAMPS U.S. BRITISH DUTCH OTHERS TOTAL
Hakodat.e Bibai 4 50 5 828 208 56 1597
Sendai Kurozawa jiri II 16 38 86 3 480 58 5 3566
Tokyo Omori-Ku 21 27 28 13 61 1208 77 2 ~
Nagoya Nagoya-Shi II 1596 1127 472 141 333 6
Osaka Shinden 12 19 1 4 1444 529 81 9 4706
Hiroshima Ashima 9 523 146 3 477 493 295 6
Fukuoka Fukuoka 18 239 1 25 8 3 3799 1621 10 394

7 7 86 112 95 ¢69 7 173 448 7 326 24

(USAFWESPAC Semi·Ann Rpt, I Jun·3' Dec 45.)
42 Until 12 July 1945, G-r Section administered problems dealing with recovered personnel through section and
base commanders; thereafter, staff supervision was exercised through Recovered Personnel Division , Adjutant General's
Office, actual operation having been turned over to the Replacement Command. (USAFWESPAC Semi-Ann Rpt, I

Jun-31 Dec 45, p. 24·)

43 One report stated mat approximately J 1,000 British and American PW's had been transferred from the
Tokyo area to Yamaguchi Prefecture in the Ube area. Nearly 3,000 of these had last been reported working in
coal·mines near Onda, west of Ube. (GHQ USAFWESPAC MIS-X Sec Rpt, Locations &: Strengths PW &: CI
Camps in Japan, '4 Aug 45 ·)

102
 JAPAN
\,. ... M.£IIT C;O .. FO" ..... \,. tONlt ,1I0JECnON

APPROXIMATE SCALE I· 6,~OO,OOO

OSAKA

FUK

CAMPS )
TOKYO

\\~~t~~~~:~" (4 CAMPS)
\W--TA':AO':A(2 CAMPS )
H MA

,0lIl._
'.~: ~;IO'GU'jl'·";"""~"'~I:.~~t~ ';~'11-==========~;~7~~ AREA TOKYO
WI~~T6~"~:J~~~~~::~;----------------OKiii~'AI~A BASE CAMP
•
SUB CAMP o

PLATE NO_ 33
Red Cross Duties, September '945
 many internees confined in places other than thirty-three additional PW camps, including
prisoner of war camps." The accuracy of PW the infamous Ofuna camp and interrogatIon
strength figures was further reduced by whole· center operated by the Japanese Imperial
sale movements of Allied PW's from camps in Navy.'· As revised information about locations
heavily bombed coastal areas. To add further and needs of individual camps reached the
to the confusion, the Japanese Government had Recovered Personnel Subsection, it was com-
placed restrictions, despite vigorous protests, piled and passed on to FEAF. Such information
upon the activities of representatives of the Swiss brought prompt action: planes went swooping
Government and the International Red Cross over freshly located Japanese prison stockades
Committee. This action made it more difficult to drop food and supplies often on the very day
for the American authorities to have a full and the new locations were repotted. (Plate No. 33)
accurate picture of the conditions under which An American surgeon, inmate of one of
many prisoners were held by the Japanese. these camps gave a graphic account of the
Most civilian internees were held in camps reactions of the prisoners of war :47
which were visited by neutral representatives, Six tiny black ,peckI appeared in the ,kyo Flying
low O')IeT Tugged mountain ranges, these pldnes 1VC1'JIe
but practically nothing was known of the
whereabouts or welfare of military personnel back and forth in ringle file, following the courre of
who were held in camps which the neutral the ri,er. At a height of fi.- thouIand feet they
roared o>er camp. . .. Three hundred ragged
representatives were not permitted to inspect."
primnerr ran up and do",n the little compound ",a,ing
Soon after the Occupation began, the Japanese
their armI hYIterically and yelling thernIelYeI hoarJe,
Government reported to SCAP that there had
trying to attract their attention. On the roofI of
been ninery-four PW camps in Japan. Notic-
the barrack< "'e had painted in huge orange letterr
ing that several camp names in the affidavits " P. O. W.", on a black background. We had laid
from former prisoners were not among those out gray blanketI forming the Iame letterr on a Itrip
. listed, the Chief of Legal Section's Investigation of ",hite Iand outIide the camp. . .. The flyer,
Division sent out investigators to comb Japan. mined the IignI, cOYered by the hea>y ground min
They returned with the names and locations of which Jettled o'er the tiny ,alley in the early morning.

44 TABLE OF PERSONS DETAINED UNDER OrnER rnAN MILITARY JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION LOCATION PERSONS PRINCIPAL NATIONALITY
Ministry of Metropolitan Police HQ 36 American, British, others
Internal Kanagawa-Ken, Totsuh 19 Australian. others
Affairs Kanagawa-Ken. Yamakita 47 British, Canadian, others
Hyogo 163 American, British, others
Nagasalc.i 41 British, Canadian, others
Saitama 56 Canadian, British, others
Fulcwhima 140 British, Greek, others
Holck.aido "4 American
Miyagi 35 Dutch, America n
Hiroshima 44 Dutch
Aichi 35 Dutch, Italian
TOTAL 640
(Documents Submitted to SCAP by the Japanese Mission to Negotiate Surrender, Manila, 19 Aug 45, p. 87.)
45 (,) GHQ USAFPAC MIS-X Sec reported on '4 August '945 that there were 25 civilian internment campo
in Japan, with a total of 1,362 internees, 166 of these being Americans. (2) Dept of State Press Release No. 6'3,
4 Sep 45·
46 GHQ FEC PIO Press Release, '0 }un 48.
47 Alfred A. Weinstein, M D, Barbed-Wire Surg<on (New Yorle, (948), pp. 293-4.

104
 They disappeared o..r the horizon as we moaned it. There was a note stuck in a sandbag which had a
and cussed. An hour later we heard the drone of long, red cloth streame T. It read : "Hello, Folks:
motors in the west. They appeared again, lower The crew of the U. S.S. Randolph send their best.
this time, their black wings shining in the morning Hope you enjoy the chow. Keep your chin up.
sun. Down through a cleft in the mountain range We'll be back."
the {light leader do>e straight for the enemy camp, OUT first contad with American forces in three
waggling his wings. We howled, cheered, and pound- and a half years! ...
ed each other. Tears of joy streamed down our Liberated prisoners were taken from camps
faces. Hearls thumped with happiness as we saw the in the interior to Yokohama where hospital
white star in its blue circle on the wing' of the plane.
ships, billeting accommodations, and food
The planes followed one after another at a Ie>el
supplies were available. Twenty-eight specially
of a thousand feet . They circled round and round
the hidden .alley, checking wi.d currents and trying trained AFPAC recovety teams, each composed
.arious approaches to the little camp. Finally the of an officer and three enlisted men, were
flight leader made his run, clearing the pine trees on attached to the Eighth Army for this mission."
the o.erhanging mountain range by feet. Down Some of the teams moved into the interior
he do .. rteeply to a Ie>el of three hundred feet abo.e
before demilitarization of the Japanese armed
camp. A black objed hurtled down from the plane ;
forces, in order to seize camp records before
an orange parachute fluttered open. A suspended
fifty-fi.e-gallon drum pendulumed back and forth they could be destroyed by camp commanders.
three times and dropped with a thud in a clearing Diaries, records of deaths, and inform ation on
fifty feet square, between the Nip adminrstration atrocities (later used in the trials of war crimi-
building and the galler--a bull's eye! The plane nals) were seized by these teams. Other
pulled out of its di.e, clearing the barracks, and
recovery teams boarded Navy vessels to aid in
climbed rapidly to top the opposing hills. One after
another the planes roared down and dropped their
evacuation of camps near the coast."
loads. One food packet landed in the doorway of Eighty-six Red Cross field men arrived with
the galley. The parachute of another failed to the first occupation troops, and four Red Cross
open. Its drum plummeted to the ground and buried girls attached to the 42d General Hospital
itself deeply in the mud near the bank of the ri.er. arrived In Tokyo Bay on the USAHS
Something red fluttered down . The men high-tailed Marigold." These American Red Cross repre-

48 On 26 August 1945, 9 officers and 16 enlisted men, making up Recovery Teams Nos. 62,63,64, and 65 and
liaison personnel of the US, Australian, and Dutch armed forces, reported for duty with the XIV Corps and were
placed under the jurisdiction of the IG Section for the movement of the occupation forces into Japan. The activities
of the IG Section were to include the supervision and coordination of all recovery work by the teams attached to the
XIV Corps. In addition to their normal task of handling Allied prisoners of war and their processing and evacuation,
these teams were assigned the task of examining all former camp sites in their assigned area, after the release of the
pmoners. (XIV Corps, Rpt No.1 on the" Blacklist" Opn, 20 Aug-30 Sep 45 [R], p. 9.)
49 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C).
50 (,) The first US ship to enter Yokohama was the USAHS M.rigold. carrying the 42nd General Hospital.
(Med Hist of 42d Gen Hosp, Ann Rpt of Activ for 1945, gives this date as 30 August 1945 i however, Occupational
Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan. Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46, gives the date as 3' August.) (2) The first
medical unit to arrive in Japan was the 5th Portable Surgical Hospital, which landed with elements of the 11th Airborne
Division, 28 August. (Occupational Monograph of the Eighth US Army inJapan. Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 [C], p. 2,6.)
(3) Early in September the Surgeon's Section (I Corps) had been informed of the desirab ility of having an officer from
its section go to Japan, with an advance echelon for the purpose of evacuating Allied PW's. G'4 of Corps accepted the
recommendation of the Surgeon that one evacuation hospital participate in this advance operation, The 54th Evacuation
Hospital, then located at Urdenata, Luzon, was alerted and within 24 hours had loaded out on an LST. The 70th
Replacement Depot which accompanied the advance echelon received medical augmentation which enabled them to
accomplish their mission. (HQ Eighth US Army, CWS Hist Rpt, Mil Occupation of Japan through Nov 45, PI"
12-13.)

105

•
sentatives were among the first visitors from the conversation of the American medical men
outside to talk to prisoners of war at Kawasaki who cared for them. Buried in prison camps
camp Number I , where medical care was most for three years, they had no idea that the
critically needed. Most of the prisoners United States had twelve million men under
captured earlier at Guam, Bataan and Corregi- arms and that Germany had surrendered. Not
dor had been imprisoned for more than three even the name of Harry Truman meant any-
years. Many of them had died from abuse thing to them. They listened to unfamiliar
and hunger and deprivation during their long expressions and names of battles, planes, and
confinement; however, those who had survived army units about which they knew nothing.
were in a slightly improved condition, due to Year after year, men had vanished into Japan
the earlier air drops of food, clothing and without a trace- the men of Singapore, of
medical necessities." Hong Kong, of Bataan, of Wake, of the ships
In camp Number 3 at Maibara, sixty-five sunk at sea, and of the planes shot down in
miles northeast of Osaka, the prisoners had spent combat. Only a few had received Red Cross
their noon hours diving for mussels to ptovide packages; practically all their guards had
the only nutritious food obtainable during their engaged in graft; they had been beaten and
long imprisonment; as in all the other camps, kicked, had been forced to bow and to obey
they had been forced to sustain life on watery endless petty rules invented by their captors."
soup, scanty greens, and barley gruel. Mount For stubbornly rebellious prisoners and airmen
Futabi Camp, near Kobe, contained civilian from whom the Japanese hoped to extract
workers who had been taken prisoner at Guam information there was a special treatment.
and had been interned for three and a half They were sent to Ofuna, a camp for unregis-
years." United States veterans of 'Wake Island tered prisoners, where they endured months of
and Bataan also emerged from these] apanese solitary confinement and torture." The fate
prLson camps. They listened dazedly to the of prisoners who became sick was hardly better.

51 T~ Rtd Cross Couri~r, Oct 45.

52 Ibid.
53 Time Magal,ine, 3 Sep 45.
54 (1) Secretary of State James Byrnes made public on 5 September a rO,ooD-word report on the maltreatment
of American PW's by the Japanese Army in which he said: U Persons who mistreared PW's in violation of the Geneva
Convention Land Warfare and International Law ought to be punished severely. In this respect, Japanese war crimi.
nals will be held responsible to the utmost as was the case in Germany."
The State Department report is based on about 200 protests presented to Japan since the outbreak of war by former
Secretary of State Hull, former Secretary of State Stettinius, and former Ass't Secretary of State Grew. Many of
them have been withheld from publication on the gtound that the war was in progress. In the report in question, the
names of those who are responsible for the maltreatment of Allied prisoners of war are enumerated. (Tokyo, AIahi
Shimbun, 8 Sep 45.)
(2) According to a Manila report, prisoners of war who arrived there on their way home have told the press as
follows regarding treatment by the Japanese Army: Without any provocations, the Allied PW's were beaten badly.
High Allied officers were humiliated, and the Japanese Army schemed to ferment division of opinions among the lower
ranks of the Allied troops. B' 29 Ayers were especially maltreated. Food and medicines were not satisfactorily provided
for the Allied prisoners. In many instances, Allied patients died because diagnosis was refused until they were at the
stage when operations were necessary. All kinds of sickness were prevalent among the PW's : malaria, dysentery and
TB were common diseases. These were due to lack of proper diet and treatment. TB patients were made to stand in
the cold outdoors, and Japanese guards would pour water over them every half an hour. In spite of the Geneva Con-
vention, officers were put to forced labor. (Tokyo, AIahi Shimbun, 12 Sep 45.)

106
Lt. Gen. H . Tamura, Chief, Japanese PW Intelligence Bureau, points out camps to Col. R. R. Coursey,
G-I, GHQ, Col. A. E. Schanzie, G-1, Eighth Army, and IRC delegates Dr. M. Junod and M. Strahler-

At Atsugi Airfield, Allied prisoners of war released from Toyama Camp bring [etters to the American
Red Cross table for postage and mailing back home.

PLATE NO. 34
Red Cross Duties, September 1945
The majority of these men, when sent to the camps where these apalling conditions existed
dirt-floored buildings of Shinagawa, lone to relay points from which they could be sent
hospital for 8,000 prisoners near Tokyo, to processmg centers and then home. In order
simply went to their deaths." There was a to bring in necessaty ships for loading, mine
complete lack of sanitation. Patients slept on sweepers were ordered in to clear the various
Rea-infested mats without blankets. The ports used. Ambulances, trucks, food and
operating tables were bare boards. A number medical supplies were rushed to the various
of the prisoners died as a result of being used loading areas. Principal landing places were
as guinea pigs for incredible experimentation." Kochi for Shikoku, and Omuta in Shimbara,
Prisonets were promptly evacuated from Kaiwan lor Kyushu and western Honshu camps,

55 PRISONER OF WAR rNTERNMENT CAMPS IN JAPAN PROPER:

LOCATION OF CAMPS AGGREGATE PW'S RELEASED NUMBER OF PATIENTS
Hakodate 1,597 67
Sendai 3.5 66 495
Tokyo 6.0~ 4' 7
Nagoya 3.33 6 288
Osaka 4.706 30 5
Hiroshima 2.9~6 199
Fukuoka 10,394 899
Total 32,624 2,670
(DocumenLS Submitted to SCAP by the Japanese Mission to N egotiate Surrender, Manila, 19 Aug 45 LC], Part 1, p.
97· Aggregate from footnote 41 supra. The surre nder data were too low.)
56 (I) T ime Magd~int, 17 SeP45. (2) Evidence presented in the War Crimes Trials held in Yokohama
described the fate of captured American flieu held by Western Army of Kyushu after April 1945. (Interview with
Mr. Paul K. von Bugen, Legal Sec, GHQ SCAP, 13 Jun 49) Kyushu Imperial University was located a few miles
away from Western Army Headquarters in Fukuoka City. With the consent of authorities of Western Army and
under the observation of staff officers, several Riers were taken from their cells to the medical college where they were
used for medical experiments. While there were modern, adequate operating facilities available, the fliers were actually
vivisected in an old, wooden, dirty room used by medical students in the studies of autopsy and anatomy, on a tin
covered table used by the students to di ssect corpses . At the time the army was particularly interested in obtaining a
blood substitute. Cn this instance sea water was used on the prisoners: blood was drained and sea water injected until
the victims bled to death. New techniques in the removal of lungs were attempted. Instruction on the practical tech-
nique of stomach resection was demonstrated. In one instance a slit was made in the heart muscle, then sutured, after
which the suture was removed so that other 'surgeons could practice. In one or more operations a complete Live. was
removed . The.e was at least one brain ope.ation. After the prisonels were killed, other medical scholars dissected
the corpses and obtained specimens including the brain.
On the night of 19 June 194~;, Fukuoka City had its one air raid afte. which the remaining eight plane c.ash sur-
vivors were taken out into the compound and decapitated in retaliation. On or about 10 August 1945, approximately
eight prisoners were taken to Aburayama and used in Ihe training of the guerrilla squad, a unit of specially selected
young officers training to lead the civilians in a last ditch stand, in karat~, a hand-to-hand combat technique in which
Riers were punched and kicked in vital areas. One prisoner was subjected to bow and arrows , and all of them ultimately
to decapitation.
On 15 Augus, 1945, after the broadcast of the Imperial rescript of the Emperor, the remaining seventeen American
captives held were summarily decapitated in the fear that otherwise they would have been able to disclose the previous
atrocities.
The fliers were reported to the Occupation authorities as having died in the Fukuoka and Hiroshima bombings and
in an incident where, after the 15th of August, a plane of the special attack corps came from Tokyo, took up the re-
maining prisoners and suicide crashed into the Bay.

108
 except Kagoshima and Nagasaki which were
accessible locally." After I September the Operations of Medical Teams
movement of prisoners was rapid, and on. 6
To supplement the work of the Recovery
September General Eichelberger requested
Teams, the Eighth Army Surgeon organized
evacuation and processing facilities for 1,600
(our medical teams which were sent to various
prisoners of war at Hakodate and for
camp areas to care for the sick and alleviate
3,802 at Sendai." On 10 September eight
suffering. These arrived in Yokohama, from
Allied ships arrived in Shiogama and began
Okinawa, on 30 August 1945. After physical
loading personnel for evacuation early the
examination, the prisoners were formed into
following morning."
groups and escorted to Yokohama. One team
After years of unbelievable suffering, released
was assigned to Navy Task Force 36 and made
prisoners of war often had their former Japanese
two mercy trips, utilizing the USNHS Rescue
captors at their mercy, since control of each
for hospital cases. The first mission covered
camp was turned over to a senior officer or
the Hamamatsu area near Nagoya, where ap-
civilian prisoner. To their everlasting credit,
proximately 3,850 prisoners were processed;
most of the prisoners refrained from revenging
15 percent of them required hospital care.
themselves. In several instances, some of them
The second troop covered the Sendai and
did all in their power to aid those Japanese
Kamaishi area, where about 3,000 prisoners
who had shown them kindness during their
were found."'
long period of confinement. Many of them
A second team proceeded to the Kobe area
gave articles of food and clothing from
by rail and established headquarters in Kobe
their own inadequate supply to their former
Prison House Number 2. This territory had
jailers."
originally been assigned to Sixth Army, but due

57 Rad 030730/', GUAM to CINCAFPAC, 3 Sep 45 . In G-3 GHQ Adm 383.6/ , (S).
58 (,) Rad DX7'5'7, CG 8th Army LO CINCAFPAC ADV, CINCAFPAC, COMNORPAC WCINCPAC
3rd FLT CTG 30.6, 6 Sep 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 383.6 (S); (2) Rad 05,,2,(T, CG 8th Army to COM3rdFLT,
6 Sep 45, In G-3 Adm.
59 Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, ,2 Sep 45.
60 (1) II The prisoners did something else which I shall always remember. Making up bundles of their old
Red Cross shoes, blankets, and clothes, these stalVed men went into the villages and out in the countryside to find the
aqualid huts in which lived the Jap foremen who had befriended them on their work details. They knew these small-
timers hated the lap military and monopolistic industrial machine. They Ic.new their families were facing another hard
winter. They gave these Jap civilians their pitifully shabby collection of clothes." (\,(ieinstein, op cit, pp. 290-1.)
(2) "A Good Deed by US POW's: A railway accident occurred at Sasago on the 6th with some casualties . Im~
mediately after the accident, a train bearing 80 American POW's arrived at the Sasago station on its way from Kayano
to Yokohama. The railway officials were worried over a possible delay in the POW transportation, but on learning
of the accident the POW's proposed to help those in need and a dozen men, getting out of the train, began giving
first aid to the wounded with what medical supplies they had with them. In the meantime, other POW's opened canned
foods and gave them to the wounded . Offering their own blankets, these POW's made impromptu beds for the
wounded.
" When the repairs were completed and the POW train was about to pull out of the station, canned goods, blankets,
coats, overcoats, etc., were thrown out of the windows une after another to help out the injured.
"At the request of the Kofu Railway Co.ntrol Section (that) their thanks be conveyed to the POW's, Transportation
Ministry, Kobiyama, was instructed to obtain grapes, well known product of Kofu, to present to the POW's as a
token of gratitude." (Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, (2 Sep 45.)
6, HQ Eighth US Army, Office of Surg, Med Rpt on the Occupation of Japan for Sep 45, Annex 4, Inel d.

109
 Prisoner of war, newly arrived at Yokohama Central Station, is carried to
an ambulance by medics of the 1st Cavalry Division, XI Corps.

Recently arrived ptlsoners of war relax outside a warehouse on docks at Yokohama.

PLATE NO. 35
Released Prisoners of War, 5 September J 945
to the urgency of the situation, areas assigned Training Base, and all evacuees were transported
to Eighth Army were extended in order to bring to Yokohama by plane."
speedy relief."' By 7 September the team had In the turmoil of the first days of the Occupa-
cleared 7,500 evacuees from thirteen camps in tion, one of the earliest of many conferences at
the vicinity and had them enroute to Y oko- Headquarters (Yokohama) was held by the
hama. This group also handled all litter cases Eighth Army Surgeon on I September '945.
from the International Committee of the Red In this meeting plans were perfected for evacua-
Cross in Kobe, where the Japanese had collected ting prisoners of war who required hospitaliza-
the seriously ill patients from the nearby tion and evacuation. It was decided that all
stockades. Ninety percent of these patients recoverees should be screened by the medical
were in advanced stages of tuberculosis."' staff of USAHS Marigold, anchored in Y oko-
Processing in the Kobe area was completed by hama harbor. The repatriates were classified
a third team which evacuated approximately in three categories: (I) Those found to be
6,900 prisoners from 6 to 20 September. acutely ill and requiring extended hospitaliza-
The fourth team operated from 10 to 20 tion were to be assigned to the Marigold for
September and processed 1,600 prisoners In direct transportation to a hospital in the United
five separate camp areas on the island of States. This group was to include United
Hokkaido. Traveling thence from Yokohama, States service and civilian personnel and Ca-
they were the first Americans to land on an nadians if they so desired. (2) Those who
airstrip near Chitose City. Headquarters of were found to be not only acutely ill, but also
the team were set up in the Chitose Naval Air in need of a period of rehabilitation were to be
62 " Reurad NR 311012-Z. Urgency of situation indicates advisability of immediately extending evacuation
of prisoners of war to 6th Army and 5th Fit areas. 8th Army and 3rd FIt working jointly to evacuate those within
8th Army and adjacent Honshu area to screening point at Yokohama. 6th and 8th Armies assisted by 3rd or 5th Fit units
and regardless of Army and Fleet bounda ries to extend cpos to include all of Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. It is
desired that POW and civilian internees evacuated from western H onshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu be evacuated to
Okinawa. Navy hospi tal ship to be made available at Okinawa for sceening purposes as majority of this personnel is
Allied and destined for Manila, Australia and NEI. Naval vessels carrying Army contact teams to approach ports suitable
for evacuation to naval vessels at pre.arranged ports. Army teams available at Yokohama now. Request conference
earliest at Yokohama for complete planning with fleet representatives as designated by you. Plan discussed with Fleet
Liaison who concurs. In view of reported conditions especia lly in Kyushu it is desirable to place rescue teams there
simultaneously and at earliest practicable date." (Rad ZAX 5029, SCAP ADV to CINCAFPAC, 3 50p 45. In
G'3 GHQ Adm 383-611/5.)
63 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46, (C).
64 U Subject evacuation of POW and civi lian internees from western Honshu, Sh ikoku and Kyushu. Request
5th Fleet use Ports of Wakanoura and Nagasaki. Task Group with hospita l ship to proceed Wakanoura to receive
personnel transported there by rail from camps western Honshu and Shikoku. Ten recovery teams from 8th Army
will proceed by destroyer from 3rd Fleet to join task group at Wakanoura and execute initial processing and 2d Task
Group with hospital ship proceed to Nagasaki for similiar action and 6th Army to provide 10 recovery teams at Okinawa
to be picked up by Nagasaki Task Group and hospital ship to evacuate North American bed cases to Marianas and
other British nationals in accordance with arrangements to be made with CINCBPF and am bulatory except Navy to
be evacuated to Okinawa then to Manila via air and surface vessels and hospital ship to Okinawa no longer required
and notify SCAP, 8th Army and 3rd Fleet date of rendezvous at Wakanoura and notify SCAP, 8th Army and 6th
Army date of arrival ship at Okinawa to receive recovery teams and personnel to be evacuated estimated 10400 at
Nagasaki. 10600 at Wakanoura and standard procedure now effective with 3rd Fleet and 8th Army will furnish 5th
Fleet and 6th Army representative for guidance upon ship arrival." (Rad ZAX, SCAP to GHQ Manila, 6 Sep 45.
In G'3 GHQ Adm.)

111
transferred to a hospital ship (possibly the them to the hospital area. A division band
USNHS Rescue) fOr transportation to the from either the" Americal " or the ,st Cavalry
Marianas Islands for the required period of was on hand to brighten the occasion with
rehabilitation. (3) Ambulatory cases not reo popular American tunes. After the evacuees
quiring hospitalization or treatment were to be reached the hospital area, all undesirable
flown to various points, as indicated by results equipment and clothing was discarded; sal-
of the screening process." vageable articles were sent to the Quartermaster
Processing for Home: Before the above Depot. A hot, substantial meal was served to
plan could be launched, circumstances of rapid all incoming groups, a measure of practical
evacuation of the camps necessitated some psychological value, inasmuch as most of them
reVISIOns. The 42d General Hospital, which had been traveling from fourteen to sixteen
had arrived in Tokyo Bay on August '945 hours without food. During several twenry-
aboard the Marigold, assumed the processing of four-hour periods in these busy days, the mess
liberated PW's and civilian internees." Facili· served as many as 3,500 meals."
ties were established for this purpose in ware· After this reception, evacuees were taken to
houses in the Yokohama dock area on 3 a decontamination room where they disrobed
September, and twenty· four hours later the completely. Each individual was then required
first group of evacuees went through the to take a shower, while at the same time his
processing routine. Despite the three rypes of clothing and personal effects were sprayed with
processing involved-medical, factual, and DDT. An army nurse interviewed each one,
dispositional-this famous hospital unit even· recorded his temperature, pulse, respiration,
tually was able to handle three persons per and complaints, as well as other personal data.
minute. A complete physical examination followed.
Four phases made up the processing routine. Non-patients were given an issue of new cloth-
Upon arrival at the Yokohama Central Station, ing and proceeded to the General Headquarters
the former prisoners found that every effort was processing area, where the required War
made to make them feel at home. General Department data were obtained. They were
Eichelberger was there as often as possible to then classified for various rypes of evacuation,
extend his warm personal greetings."' The according to status. Litter cases were carried
welcoming committee, composed of a group of to a separate area, served a meal, disrobed,
officers and nurses, distributed candy, cigarettes, bathed, given a physical examination and
and other luxuries to the arrivals and escorted admitted directly to a hospital ship." War
65 HQ Eighth US Army, OIIice of the Su'g, Med Rpt on the Occupation of Japan for 50p 45.
66 Processing (of liberated PW's) began on 4 September 1945 and ended on 21 September 1945. The average
number processed per day was 1033 with as many as 2450 in one 24 hour period. A total of 17,731 PW's were pro·
cessed through this hospital unit. (Med Hist of 42d Gen Hosp, Ann Rpt of Activ for '945, 24 Jan 46.)
67 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 -Jan 46, (C).
68 HQ Eighth US Army, Med Rpt on the Occupation of Japan for 50p 45, Annex No. 4, Incl d.
~ II We clambered aboard the U . S. S . Rescue and were promptly told to strip and throw our lice-covered rags

overboard. Into a steam-filled shower room we crowded. Oh, the first heavenly thrill of plenty of soap and piping.hot
water squirting through the needle valves of the shower! We scrubbed and scrubbed our bodies, peeling off one layer
of filth after another. We squirmed with pleasure under the jets. As we left the showers, medics with Bit guns
sprayed our heads and bodies with DDT while we pirouetted slowly, arms raised. In freshly washed pajamas sweet
with cleanliness we walked through a line of docs who checked us over quickly. On the softest mattress, between the
whitest sheets I have ever seen, I slipped into bed in the hundred·bed ward . ...
"Better than food was the God·sent feeling of safety. We had been living at the mercy of barbarous, hair-trigger

112
 Department data were obtained from these Britain and Ireland, Canada, Australia, New
individuals by supplemental processing teams Zealand, India, the Netherlands, Greece,
aboard the hospital ships. As passenger mani- France, Spain, Iceland, Finland, Italy, Malay,
fests were made up, each group was evacuated Guam, China, Norway, Hawaii, Czecho-
by air or water. All ambu latory cases left slovakia, Mexico, Burma, Poland, Malta, and
Japan within twenty-four hours of arrival in Portugal."
Yokohama." The 608th Medical Clearing Company
Radio reports were prepared daily and sent (Sep), under directions of the Eighth Army
to Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific, Surgeon, served as a holding station at Atsugi
Tokyo; Commander in Chief, Army Forces airfield and arranged for air transportation.
Pacific, Manila, and the Adj utant General, Americans and Canadians were flown to Guam,
Washington, which meant that relatives in the Saipan, or Manila." Nationals of other coun-
United States and in other United Nations tries went by air to Okinawa, and from there
were usually given the news of recovery within flew to Manila. Rapid preparation of passenger
a few days. Machine records showing the lists and coordination with the Air Transport
nationality, branch of service, date and place Command made it possible to fly as many as
of recovery, and physical condition were made. 1,600 individuals in one day by C-54's from
These rosters enabled many servicemen of the Atsugi to Okinawa and thence to Manila."
Allied Powers to gain information that relatives Similar numbers were evacuated to Guam
and former comrades were alive and had been aboard U. S. Navy vessels. By 21 September
freed from the prison camps. Copies of this the processing of prisoners of war and civilian
roster were furnished to Commander in Chief, internees had largely been completed and the
AFPAC Advance, in Tokyo, the U. S. Navy, 42d General Hospital ceased operations as the
and the Marine Corps. One copy went to processing agency. This work was then assumed
representatives of the International Committee by the 608th Medical Clearing Company (Sep)
of the Red Cross for transmittal to Geneva." and the 30th Portable Surgical Ho;pital, both
A grand total of 17,531 prisoners and located at Atsugi airfield, but relatively few
internees were processed rhrough the 42nd recoverees remained to be taken care of.'" In
General Hospital during the eighteen-day all, the Eighth Army freed and evacuated
period it operated in this capacity. The evacuees 23,985 persons."
included people from the United States, Great

69 (coned.) personalities for so many years that the gentleness and kindness we were shown was enough to make
us sob silently in our pillows. Terms like I freedom of speech,' I trial by one's peers/ 'the right of red ress,' . habeas
corpus/ were no longer a series of glib words that rolled off the tongue. They had a flowing, vivid quality to the
liberated prisoners who had existed for years w;thout the protection of these monuments of civilization. They were
music to our ears. We could never forget their significance." (Weinstein, op cit, pp. 296-7 .)
70 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46, (C).
7' Eighth US Army, G·, Rpt, 1945.
72 HQ Eighth US Army, Office of the Surg, Med Rpt on the Occupation of Japan for Sop 45, Annex 4, Incl d .
73 (1) Rad 060535/Z, CinC BPF to CinC Hong Kong, 7 Sop 55; (2) Rad 081lI7/Z, CinC BritPacFlt
to COMGEN AFWESPAC, 9 Sop 45; (3) Rad 060533/Z, SHA No. 404 to GHQ Manila, 9 Sop 45 ; (4) Rad
1402lI /Z, VABPF to COM3rdFLT, '5 Sop 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.
74 "1648 Allied Recovered Prisoners of War evacuated by air to Okinawa 7 Sep 45 signed Eichelberger." (Rad
7'53' , Eighth A ADV to Navy Okinawa, 9 Sop 45. In G·3 GHQ Adm 383.6).
75 HQ Eighth US Army, Office of the Surg, Med Rpt on the Occupation of Japan for Sop 45, Annex 4, Incl d.
76 Americans. 8.946; British, 7,613; Canadians, 1,7 51; Australians. 1.45'5; Dutch, 3a01; other nationals, 919.
(Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45- Jan 46 [C).)

113
 to what action had been taken to secure the
Procedure Regarding Dead and Missing personal property of all deceased prisoners. The
Prisoners of War report was also to include evidence of funds,
such as credits for money held by or on deposit
All former prisoners of war camp sites were with any agency or representatives of the
examined. During the investigation of these Imperial Japanese Government; 7' and all sums
camps , Japanese officers, doctors, and employees due but not paid to a prisoner of war for
of mining companies were interviewed. Records services rendered prior to his death. In the
and documents were secured. They included event that the above outlined action was not
lists of prisoners, reports on prisoners who had taken regarding a deceased prisoner's property,
died at the camps, hospitalization reports, it was to be inarked to show the prisoner's
authorization to dispose of bodies, receipt for name, rank, serial number, nationality and
ashes of those who had died and had been branch of service, as well as the name of the
cremated, photographs of camps, camp regula- camp where he had been confined. The
tions, employment of prisoners, food , clothing, belongings were then to be delivered to the
housing, and general welfare. Effort was made headquarters of the major Allied military force
to determine cause of death and to obtain a occupying the zone or district where the items
full report if death was not due to natural were found. After delivery was made, a report
causes. In one instance it was learned that was to be sent to SCAP. This report was to
thirty-two prisoners of war were killed or died include a roster showing all information listed
as a result of shelling and bombardment by above for every deceased prisoner of war and
the Allied Navy. In many instances it was civilian internee .79
found that available records and documents In a further effort to account for all missing
had been removed when the prisoners were prisoners of war, not located in camps by the
released. n recovery teams and not listed among the dead
On 30 September '945 SCAP issued a in camps, the Adjutant General's Office sent
memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Govern- another memorandum to the Imperial Japanese
ment regarding regulations of prisoners of war. Government on 26 November '945 requesting
The memorandum directed that articles and additional information. 80 Recovery teams also
money of the dead prisoners, whether possessed attempted to acquire all possible information
by the military personnel in charge of camps, on deceased prisoners who had been cremated.
government offices, hospitals, or dressing sta- The customs of the Japanese did not allow for
tions, must be sent to the Prisoners' Informa- the proper burial of the dead, and consequently
tion Bureau. It demanded a prompt report as the problems were much greater than anticipat-

77 XIV Corps, Rpt No. [ on the " Blacklist" Opn, 20 Aug-30 Sep 45 (R), p. 9·
78 "An office r among the Prisone rs of War can give his services out of his own volition but he will not be
paid for his labor. The amount of pay for a POW general will be 35 yen less than that for a Japanese general; 30
yen less for POW field office r ; and 27 yen less for company officer. Surplus money of POW's will be turned over to
the National T reasury." (IPS Doc No. 2[97, 24 Jun 46. In PW Info Bur.)
79 Memo, SCAP for IJG, AG 383.6, 30 Sep 45·
80 This memorandum reque1>ted informacion regarding Japanese vessels sunk while carrying Allied prisoners of
war or internees, the name of the ship, port of embarkation, date, place and circumstances of sinking and a nominal
roll of prisoners of war or internees who had died of illness or from other causes while aboard Japanese vessels.
(Memo, SCAP for IJG, AG'560, 26 Nov 45.)

114
ed. The varied problems confronting the medical facilities and care for recovered Allied
Quartermaster Section in this task included military personnel, a 1500-bed general hospital
the investigation of prisoner of war camps, the was attached to the Replacement Command.
recovery of air crashes. and the disposition of In addition, two infirmaries and a number of
the remains of all deceased persons. Diaries dispensaries were operated in twO reception
of prisoners, conferences with prisoner camp centers near Manila. A medical processing
commanders, and interrogations of other Japa- group was set up at Nichols Field for the
nese were chief sources of information for lists preliminary separation of former prisoners into
of the dead and their location. For personnel two groups: those needing hospitalization and
not accounted for, further investigation was those able to proceed directly to the depots.
carried on by Graves Registration personnel.s, Five thousand beds were held in reserve in
This search for the dead was carried out the Manila area, 500 of them for women and
simultaneously with the evacuation of the children at the 120th General Hospital at Santo
living. Tomas University, and the remainder at the
Mandaluyong Hospital Center. A total of
Final Processing of Prisoners of War 2,000 beds were also held in reserve at bases
in Manila in northern Luzon. These bed credits were
based upon the assumption that 45,000 freed
Evacuees from Japan were processed in persons would be processed through the Philip-
Manila before leaving for home. From the pines. The allotment proved to be more than
moment these former prisoners came under the adequate. s, Clothing, equipment, and post
control of American forces everything possible exchange su pplies wete issued free; well earned
was done to add to their comfort. They were promotions were given and decorations award-
given an enthusiastic and warm welcome, and ed; accrued pay accounts were settled; and
an attempt was made to comply with all of entertainment and Red Cross recreation activi-
their requests. ties were provided. By utilizing air travel to
The mission of receiving, processing, and the greatest possible extent, transportation to
looking after these people was given to the their homes was arranged with little delay.
Replacement Command. Here recreation pro- Of the 28,786 evacuees received by 30
grams, a central registration file, and communi- September 1945, 12,286 were repatriated. From
cation centers were established. Messages October to December approximately 3,000
from home were delivered as quickly as additional persons arrived. By this time
possible. s, British, Australian, and Canadian repatriation shipments had progressed so satis-
male personnel and later the Dutch were factorily that by the end of October there
assigned to the 5th Replacement Depot; remained only a few hospital cases, together
women, children, and family groups were sent with 6,529 Dutch personnel. The latter
to the Women's Replacement and Disposition remained only because of the uncertain political
Center for processing. To provide adequate situation in the Netherlands East Indies. By

8, Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C).
82 Gen Jonathan Wainwright was the first person to receive a 1616 message form. It was delivered when he
reached Manila on 30 August. (The Red Cross Courier, October 1945 .)
83 31,617 recoverees had been received in the Philippines through 31 October j only 183 remained in need of

hospitalization on that date, a [mal of 2,676 having been hospitalized during the preceding period.

115
the end of the year a total of 31,879 former internees had been restored to their families.
prisoners had been processed with but a few Through careful preparation, the efficient
hundred still under the jurisdiction of the execution of plans, and the full cooperation of
Replacement Command." all personnel concerned, "Blacklist's" rescue
Thus, in the short period of four months, mission proved most successful.
most of the Allied prisoners of war and civilian

84 USAFWESPAC Semi·Ann Rpt, I jun-31 Dec 45, p. 8.

116
 CHAPTER V
DEMOBILIZATION AND DISARMAMENT OF
THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

structure of the General Staff an~ other military

The General Demobilization Program organs after four years of intimate combat
association, the intelligence section was given
There must be eliminated for all time the authority a prominent role in the surrender negotiations
and influence of those who decei.ed and misled the In the agenda of the conference, the basic con-
people of Japan into embarking on world conquest,
ditions were laid down for demobilizing and
for we insist that a new order of peace, Jecurity and
justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism disarming the Imperial Forces. G-2 was directed
is dri.en from the world. . .. The Japanese military to supervise the initial demobilization and
forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be per- disarmament plans of the Japanese Govern-
mitted to return to their homes with the opportunity ment, to exercise GHQ supervision of subse-
to lead peaceful producti.e li.es.' quent developments thereunder, and to render
These principles enunciated in the Potsdam periodical progress reports.
Declaration formed the basis for the elimination On the day of surrender, the Imperial
of military power and the initial plans for the Japanese Forces totaled 6,983,000 troops, an
demobilization of the Japanese armed forces aggregate of '54 army ground force divisions,
incidental to occupation movements. Upon '36 brigades,' and some 20-odd major naval
the return of the surrender delegation to Japan units.' Army and Navy forces stationed within
in August '945, a complex demobilization the home islands numbered 3,532,000; air
machinery went into high gear: the rapid, force units were then integral parts of the Army
orderly repatriation, demobilization and dis- and Navy. The balance of the Japanese forces
armament of the Japanese armed forces, at were spread in a great arc from Manchuria to
home and abroad, began immediately. the Solomons, and across the islands of the
In view of the Theater G-2' s detailed Central and Southwest Pacific.-
knowledge of the strength and dispositions of Accurate and reliable figures on total
the Imperial Japanese Forces and the internal strengths at the time of surrender were unavail-

1 Potsdam Declaration, 26 Jul 45 . pars. 6 and 9.

2 GHQ SCAP, Prog«ss of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 3' Jul 48, p. 9.
3 GHQ SCAP, Final Rpt, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 3' Dec 46 (R), lnel 6,.
4 Ibid.
LOCATION OF JAPANESE FORCES, 3' December '946:
HOME ISLANDS OVERSEAS' TOTAL
Army (inel Air comps) 2,353.000 3,17 2 ,000 5.5 2 5.000
Navy (incl Air comps) 1,179,000 279,000 1,458 ,000
Totals 3,53 2 ,000 3.45 1 ,000 6 ,983 ,000
*Forces in the Kuriles and KarafulO are included in the overseas strength.

117
able for some time. Original figures presented simple formula of preserving the existing Japa-
to General MacArthur's headquarters required nese Government, and utilizing its normal
continuous adjustment; and as repatriation agencies to effect the complicated processes of
progressed, it became apparent that hundreds disarmament and demobilization.
of thousands of men, included in initial Japa- The program for the accomplishment of this
nese strength estimates, had perished prior to tremendous task was initiated under the pro-
the conclusion of hostilities. visions of several key directives in August-
In the over-all picture, enormous military September J945.' Immediate responsibility for
risks were involved in landing initially with demobilization was vested in the Imperial
"token" United States forces. The Japanese General Headquarters and the Japanese Army
mainland was still potentially a colossal armed and Navy Ministries, in order that their techni-
camp, and there was an obvious military gamble cal and administrative skill could be exploited
in landing with only two and a half divisions, to the maximum degree. Supervising and
then confronted by fifty-nine Japanese divisions, planning this complicated operation required
thirty-six brigades, and forty-five-odd regiments careful coordination on the part of the Occupa-
plus naval and air forces. The terrific psycho- tion forces and ultimately involved practically
logical tension was dissolved by the relatively all General Staff sections' and several Japanese

5 SCAP Dir No. I, 2 September 1945, ordered immediate dissemination and compliance with GO No. I, 2

September 1945, which outlined the methods for surrendering of Japanese armed forces in Japan and abroad, named
SCAP representatives to accept the surrender of troops, and ordered immediate disarming of all Japanese troops.
SCAP Dit' No.2, 3 September 1945, Part II, Japanese Armed Forces, outlined in detail controls and procedures
concerning disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces deemed necessary to insure orderly compliance
with terms of surrender. The Imperiallapanese GHQ was ordered to conduct a speedy and orderly demobilization of
all Japanese forces and outline specific procedures to be followed.
GHQ USAFPAC Operations Instructions NO.4 (S). 31 August 1945. Appendix II. SCAP Control. Disarmament
and Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, outlined instructions to the commanding generals of the Sixth and Eighth
Armies. In general, these instructions were to establish a system of surveillance and inspection, effect coordination of
movement of Japanese troops, and aid in the transfer of arms and equipment to insure rapid and complete demobilization
and disarmament.
6 Functions of the responsible staff sections and agencies were as follows :
Development of Basic Plans . . .... ..... ... . .. . ............. G·2, GHQ., SCAP; Japanese War & Navy Ministries
Control of Army Demobilization . . . .. ....................... .... . . ........ Japanese War Ministry; First Demob Bureau
Control of Navy Demobilization .. .. ................... .... . . ........ ... Japanese Navy Ministry: Second Demob Bureau
GHQ Control of the First Demobilization Bureau ..... .... .......... .......... ........... ....... .. . G.2. GHQ, SCAP
GHQ Control of the Second Demobilization Bureau ..... .. .. .. .. .......................... COMNAYFE: SCAJAP"
Disposal of Armament and Equipment ................ .... ........ _.... _.......... .... _.................. G-4, GHQ, SCAP
Periodic Reports on Demobilization ........... ... ... ... ................................................. G-2. GHQ. SCAP
Repatriation Movement .... ............................................ . ... . ...... .... ...................... G-3 . GHQ, SCAP
Operation of Repatriation Centers ............. . ........ . ........................... .. ......... . . Japanese Welfare Ministry
Control of Repatriation Shipping..... .. .... ........................................ COMNA YFE : SCAJAP
Operation of Repatriation Shipping .......... . .................... ........ .......... . .. . .... Second Demobilization Bureau
Periodic Reports on Repatriation ............................. ... . ........................................ G'3, GHQ. SCAP
Control and Disposal of Armamenr .......................... ............... . ....... . .................... G-4, GHQ, SCAP
Collection of Armament and Equipment in the Field ...... ..... Sixth and Eighth US Armies; COMNAYFE; FEAF
" SCAJAP tShipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine) was under the control of COM-
NAYFE.

ll8
agencies. plete demobilization was quickly carried
Certain civil sections were also drawn into out. 9

this complex picture in connection with various Orders published by the Sixth and Eighth
phases of the demobilization operation. For U. S. Armies implemented SCAP Directives
example, the Public Health and Welfare Numbers I and 2. In essence they called for
Section of GHQ, SCAP, cooperating with existing agencies (such as the Japanese military,
G-3, was instrumental in developing effective naval, and civilian police, and the senior naval
repatriation quarantine policies, a step which and military commanders) to disarm all person-
prevented the dangerous epidemics so often nel found with weapons . These agencies were
associated with mass movements of people! also charged with expediting the transportation
To effect coordination and facilitate progress of Japanese military and naval personnel to
of the demobilization and disarmament pro- their homes and directing the local authorities
gram, each local Japanese commander was in the storing of surrendered arms and muni-
ordered to report to the senior U. S. Army tions and undertaking reconnaissance to insure
commander in his area for command instruc- that Occupation orders were being obeyed. ,.
tions; the Japanese staff was required to Only the local Japanese police were permitted
produce such information as locations of regi- weapons considered necessary to maintain law
ments and all larger units, tables of organiza- and order.
tion, actual strength figures, status of demob- In the initial Occupation phase, the infantry
ilization, and locations and names ot com- regiment became the chief instrument in the
manders of demobilization depots. When this local supervision of demobilization. The entire
information was checked against the same plan for the imposition of surrender terms was
information submitted by the Japanese Imperial based on the presence of infantry regiments in
General Headquarters' some discrepancies allJapanese prefectures. The outline ofOccupa-
were noted; for example, the Japanese failed tion duties was fairly well established by SCAP
to report twenty-three units of the looth Air and AFPAC instructions. The Sixth and
Brigade located at Takamatsu airfield on Y ura Eighth Armies assigned prefectures to corps,
Island (Shikoku District). However, through divisions, and regiments . The specific number
local surveillance by Occupation troops, com- of prefectures assigned was determined by

7 "The following instances are cited as being indicative of the magnitude of the quarantine problem and the
value of strict procedures enforced by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The occurrence of 71 I proven
cases of cholera and 479 carriers aboard 114 vessels resulted in 232.907 persons being detained in quarantine. Two
hundred fifty-five cases of typhus fever were found among repatriates on some 52 vessels, most of which arrived from
China, Manchuria and Korea. Two hundred seven cases of smallpox were discovered on 54 vessel s from China and
Manchuria. At no time has there existed in this program any threat of danger among the Occupation forces."
(GHQ SCAP, PH&W Rpt, 31 Jul 48, p. 38.)
8 SCAP Di. No.2, 3 Sep 45, Pan II, pa.. 4.
9 8lh Info & His< SV, HQ Sixth A.my, Sixth A.my Occupation of Japan, (undated) p. 58.
10 \X/ hen the Sixth Army entered Japan , approximately 80 percent of the Japanese armed forces in the area of
entry had been demobilized. The active troops, in most cases , were employed as guards for military installations and
as administrative personnel in the demobilization and disarmament program. The Japanese commander, in collaboration
with the chief of police, submiued lists of all Japanese installations and inventories of materiel within the area for
consolidation and forwarding to SCAP. As soon as the US Army accepted custody of Japanese military installations,
the Japanese authorities were informed that there was no further need for the guard and service personnel who were
then relieved and subsequently demobilized. See Ch. II.

119
population density, industries, and militaty These plans, submitted mainly in chart form,
installations. Usually regimental zones of were approved by SCAP on 10 October."
responsibility comprised a single prefecture. There were certain inferential conditions: the
The Japanese had not waited for the Allied dates listed in the plan would be regarded as
forces to appear before they started to disband absolute maximum, not to be exceeded; J apa-
their Army and Navy: in September-October nese authorities would exert every effort to
88 percent of the Army was demobilized. The advance specific dates whenever possible.
Occupation troops soon found the bulk of their Demobilization of the Japanese armed forces
activities directed towards supervising disposi- fell naturally into two major categories, the
tion of war material. The demobilization demobilization of the forces in the home islands
program functioned smoothly and efficiently on and the forces overseas. The Japanese Navy
its own momentum and reports to GHQ were Ministry (later the Second Demobilization
monotonously uniform : "No disorders; no Ministry) was given the mission of transporting
opposition; cooperation continues." all repatriates to Japan. Upon their arrival
in the homeland they were channeled through
Japanese Plans for Demobilization either army demobilization or navy demobiliza-
tion channels, depending upon their individual
The over-all plan for the completion of the status. Demobilization of the overseas forces
Japanese demobilization program, prepared by depended entirely upon chronology of repatria-
the Chiefs of the Military and Naval Affairs tion to Japan.
Bureau provided for the transformation of the
existing Japanese Army and Navy Ministries Demobilization of the Japanese
into Ministries of Demobilization, on I Decem- Home Forces
ber 1945. (Plate No. 36) The two Demobiliza-
tion Ministries were to be staffed by civilians At the time of surrender, the command
and organized much in the same way as the structure within the Empire was organized into
already existing Japanese civil ministries. As two major branches, Army and Navy, both,
the demobilization program decreased in scope, however, under Imperial General Headquarters.
the Demobilization Ministries were to be The Army, which consisted of fifty-seven
further changed into small bureaus, tentatively infantry divisions, two armored divisions, thirty-
by I April 1946. It was estlUlated that the six brigades, the Emperor's personal guards,
General Staffs of the Army and Navy and the and the four anti-aircraft divisions was grouped
Department of Military Training could be into several major commands as follows: First
dissolved by mid-October; the only professional General Army (Group): Eleventh, Twelfth,
personnel to be retained were those necessary and Thirteenth Area Armies, stationed in
to carry on essential business, liaison, and northern Honshu, Aomori to Nagoya; Second
information for the Occupation forces. The General Army (Group): Fifi:eenth and Six-
naval recommendations mcluded estimated teenth Area Armies, stationed in southern
dates for complete repatriation of all Japanese Honshu, Nagoya to Shimonoseki, and Shi-
then serving outside the Empire, minesweeping, koku and Kyushu; and the Fifth Area Army
and completion of administrative problems such which was directly under the Imperial GHQ,
as operation of hospitals, ports, and shipyards. stationed in Hokkaido, Karafuto, and the

II SCAPIN 137, 10 Oct 45, sub: Demobilization, Japanese Armed Forces.

120
 FIRST
DEMORlIJZATION
MINISTRY

I I I I
JUSTICE lNTENDANCE I)EMOBILlZATION GENERAl. MINISTERIAL
AFFAIRS
BUREAU RUf.l:EAU BUREAU SECRETAHIAT
BUREAU

I I I
REMAINING WESTERN DEMOBIJ.lZATION DEMORII.1ZATION EASTERN HOME
DEMOBILIZATION UEMOBIUZA-nON
AFFAIRS INTENDANCE COMMUNICAnONS DEPOT
LIAISON J.IAISON
OFFICES BUREAU OFFICE OFFICE BUREAU
BUREAU

r I I 1 r I
WESTERN SHIKOKU CHUGOKU CENTRAL TOKAI EASTERN NORTHERN N. EASTERN
CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL . CONTROL CONTROL
OFFICE OFFICE OFFICE OFFICE QFF1CE OFFICE OFFICE OFFICE

I 1 I I I I
LOCAL ASSISTANCE BUREAUS
(.a OFFICES IN ALL)

SECOND
DEMOBILIZATION
MINISTRY

JUSTICE ACCOUNTING PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATIVE

MINISTERIAL SECRETARIAT
BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU

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I I I
YOKOSUKA KURE SASEBO MAlZURU OMINATO OSAKA
DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT
DEMOBILlZAnON DEMOBILlZATION DEMOBIUZATION DEMOBILIZATION DEMOBILIZATION DEMOBILlZATION
BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU BUREAU

REGIONAL REGIONAL REGIONAL REGIONAL REGIONAL REGION,\L

PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL PERSONNEL
OFFICES OFFICES OFFICES OFFICES OFFICES OFFICES

PLATE NO. 36
Organization of First and Second Demobilization Ministries, 14 June 1946
Kuriles. (Plate No. 37) For convenience in Navy.
effecting demobilization, the Japanese boundary On the recommendation of the theater
between Army Groups was altered to conform inteiligence, the Japanese Imperial General
to the established boundary between the Sixth Headquarters was abolished on '3 September,
and Eighth U. S. Armies." a decisive step toward Japan's demilitarization.'"
A new but temporary command function of Responsibilities formerly held by the Imperial
" Demobilization Commissioner" was created. General Headquarters were transferred to the
The commanding generals of the First and Japanese War and Navy Ministries."
Second General Armies (Groups) functioned By mid-September approximately 55 percent
as senior commissioners. Under the Ministers of the total of 2,353,4' 4 army strength had been
of War and Navy and the Chief of the General demobilized.· 8 By October some 83 percent
Staff, all commanders of units down to and of the original strength was out of the army;
including divisions operated as "commission- on '5 October, the tentative target date assign-
ers "; while lower echelon commanders did ed by SCAP," the remaining tactical units that
not rank as commissioners, they were responsi- had not been disbanded were attached to their
b
e for the demobilization of their own units. original depot headquarters for demobilization.
Under this organizational framework, the Japa- All military forces in Japan were demobilized
nese War Ministry completely demobilized by December.
1,96, ,368 troops without incident or disorder The largest of the three major Japanese
between August and October '945." ground force units was the First General Army
The Japanese surrender delegation in Manila (Group). This Army of 852,060 men, stationed
reported on '9 August that the strength of in the northern Honshu area, was over 90
their naval personnel on , August . was percent demobilized by October. Transporta-
1,024,255." These forces were organized into tion difliculties, aggravated by a heavy typhoon
the major commands of Naval Section of the and floods which further disrupted an already
Imperial General Headquarters, Fleet Head- badly damaged rail system, slowed up demobi-
quarters, Southwestern Area Fleet, Southeast- lization of the Second General Army (Group) ;
ern Area Fleet, and combined Naval Force of its total of 700,723 men, about 75 percent
Headquarters, plus ten naval station units, five was discharged by October; in November,
area fleets, three air fleets, and one combined demobilization was nearly complete.
command corps." These naval units under The strength of the Fifth Area Army was
direction of the Navy Ministry were responsi- approximately '50,700 men; of this force
ble for demobilizing the once powerful Imperial 72,600 were located in the Kuriles and Kara-

12 SCAP Dir No.2, 3 Sep 45. See Ch. II.

13 GHQ SCAP, Final Rpt, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 3' Dec 46 (R), p. 12.
14 ATIS Translation, 21 Aug 45 , «Documents Furnished to SCAP by the Japanese Mission to Negotiate Sur-
render," delivered at the pre-surrender conference in Manila on 18 August 1945. Data later corrected to show 1,178 ,750
personnel.
'5 GHQ SCAP, Final Rpt, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Dec 46 (R), Incl 6,.
16 SCAPIN '7, 10 Sep 45 , sub; Abolition of the Japanese GHQ.
17 SCAPIN 25, 13 Sep 45, sub: Functions of Imp GHQ to be Executed by Respective Ministries.
18 This figure does not include those troops of the Fifth Area Army in the Kuriles and Karafuto occupied by
Soviet troops.
19 SCAPIN 137, 10 Oct 45 , sub: Demob, Japanese Armed Forces.

122
futo, under Soviet control. The demobilization Japan. (Plate No. 38) were reported at a
rate was obviously dependent upon the progress strength of 262,000 Army and 29' ,537 Navy.
ot repatriation. The Soviets, however, did not Air Force personnel outside the Empire were
begin returning prisoners until December '946, discharged together with other forces and were
and in December '948 approximately 408,700 not listed or handled separately. Ninety-five
were still held in Soviet areas. In comparison, percent of the Air Force personnel in Japan
over half of the Fifth Area Army, stationed in was released by October ; by the middle of
Hokkaido, was 87 percent demobilized by 24 December the Japanese Army and Navy Air
September '945; by the end of November, all Forces ceased to exist, and what was left of their
personnel under SCAP jurisdiction had been installations and eguipment was either destroy-
released. ,. ed by the Occupation forces, saved for repara-
The Navy data presented by the surrender tions, or converted to civilian use.
envoys at Manila was ultimately found to be
inaccurate. Navy strength in Japan proper, Demobilization of Overseas Forces
stated to be ',024,225, was later established at
',178750. However, naval demobilization At the same time that the home forces were
proceeded at a more rapid rate than that of being disbanded, the program for repatriating
the Army. By 10 September approximately and demobilizing the Japanese forces overseas
82 percent of the total naval strength in Japan was also initiated. The overseas forces at the
had been demobilized; by the end of Novem- close of the war consisted of approximately
ber the only personnel on duty were those who 3,450,000 service personnel and over 3,000,000
had been discharged from the Navy and were civilians. The repatriation of these began
employed by the Second Demobilization Min- promptly after surrender and progress was
istry in a civilian status. They continued to comparatively rapid in all areas except those
work on essential naval tasks, such as mine- controlled by the Soviet Government." The
sweeping, operating disarmed vessels engaged speed with which troops were demobilized in
in repatriation shipping, and maintaining Japan obviously could not be duplicated for
Japanese war ships held for the Allied Powers. those overseas; the time element in the me-
In addition to service personnel, the Japanese chanics of repatriation was the delaying factor.
Navy at the end of the war employed approxi- Japanese military and naval commands in
mately 739,000 civilians as workers and em- appropriate port areas initially processed return-
ployees in naval arsenals, construction gangs, ing repatriates (civilian and military) through
and other affiliated jobs; with the exception of the existent machinery previously used by the
those reguired in the demobilization program Japanese Army and Navy in the deployment of
these civilians were promptly dismissed. their forces . On 28 September SCAP directed
All personnel of both the Army and Navy the Japanese Government to establish repatria-
Air Forces stationed in the four islands of tion reception centers at designated ports. =
20 In addition to trOOps assigned to the three major ground force units, there were some 460.546 personnel in
units under direct control of the War Ministry not including air force personnel, in military schools and administrative
offices; the largest unit was the Army Ordnance Administration Headquarters with 38, 294 assigned personnel; 95 percent
of thi, group was demobilized by November and the remainder by December '945. (GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob
of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. J2.)
21 Repatriation is fully covered in Ch. VI. Discussion here will be limited to its effect upon demobilization.
22 Otaru, Niigata, Tokyo, Kobe, O saka, Maizuru , Hiroshima, Moji, Shimonoseki, and Hakata. (SCAPIN 70,
28 Sep 45, sub: Rad Designating Certain Ports and Their Facilities to be Prepared for Use in Repatriation of Japanese.)

123
 JAPAN
l Ul'EII! CONfO RMAL CONIC ,ROJ ECTIO N
t\.tllU IOfrII I N flU
~'l KUNASHIFtIJI/olA
's..IOOT~ ,0
~TU''''U · , (I
APP ROXI MATE SCALE

"
.
,
I ' 6 ,500,000

'" ZOO IIIllU

II)""~ I 1iH11I01$U $HIllA

H DO
XXXX
fifth Area Army
5 DIvisions 84,199
2 BrtQodes 9,884
(l1l1II(I·s,u1
Others 56,011
Total 150,700
000 0 0

6 Ojyj,tons
"'I.ROAI ' $HlItA 2 Bri9Qdn
Others
Total
J A p A N

20 Divisions
14 BrigodH
Others

E A

676,863
Ground
Foreu 1,678,083
Grand Tota l 2,354,946

17,814
19,305
73,740
170, 859

Tota l
Army groups and oreal in Japan, 18 number of ,,,,,.,'/>,
division ...porot. troop' In loch . Total, do
include Air GHC ovlrh.od i the.. included in Imperio I
I,I,U-GUIITO
GHQ . and 4 antiaircraft division, not shown.

PLATE NO. 37
Disposition of Japanese Army Ground Forces in the Homeland at the Time of Capitulation,
18 August '945
 JAPAN
L~KIIT CON'~L COIfI(; '~G.l"' IOII
n.[V.'_ 111 fur
APPR01U MATE SCALE , 6,~.OOO

AIR BRIGADE

COMBINED AI R

NAVAL 8 GUARD
il NCL AIR )

,QIII. IIIMI&
(' DAlUCHIUli t6
~1U·_"6

u,lI",un6

PLATE NO. 38
Japanese Army- N avy Air Dispositions, '5 August 1945
By 10 October under guidance of the War Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara concurrently
and Navy Ministries this had been accom- assumed the portfolio of the two new min-
plished_ The centers were capable of temporari- istries.
ly housing, feeding, and extending emergency The regimental district headquarters at pre-
relief to all repatriates, whether disarmed fectural capitals were abolished and replaced
military units or individuals. Following a later by "Local Assistance Bureaus." Staffed partly
directive, reception centers were established and by demobilized officers whose technical skill in
operated at Maizuru, Shimonoseki, Sasebo, demobilization administration was indispensa-
Senzaki, Kagoshima, Kure, Hakata, Uraga, ble, those local ag~ncies completed the process-
Yokohama, Moji and Hakodate.'· Subsequent- ing of repatriates ; they also served as contacts
ly, control of all agencies concerned with the between unrepatriated servicemen and their
operation of reception centers and known as next of kin. As the demobilization burden
"Repatriation Relief Bureau" was gradually gradually lessened, the machinery came under
withdrawn from the Japanese War and Navy careful scrutiny and in June '946 was again
Ministries (including succeeding agencies) and reorganized, sharply reducing the size of the
assigned to the Welfare Ministry. (Plate No. two Demobilization Ministries,'" They were
39) The former military demobilization agen- renamed First and Second Demobilization
cies at the reception centers handled only the Bureaus, and placed under a single Demobiliza-
processing required to properly release re- tion Board, headed by a Minister of State.
patriated military and naval personnel from (Plate No. 40) Preceding this important change,
further service and get them to their home the Local Assistance Bureaus had been trans-
stations. ferred from the Demobilization Ministries to
the Home Ministry as a preliminary step to
Reorganization of the Demobilization shifting jurisdiction to the prefectural civil
Machinery authorities.
In the reception centers, demobilization
Under basic Japanese plans prepared with procedure included submission of personal
SCAP's approval, the War and Navy Minis- statements, used in clarifying the fate of missing
tries were abolished on 30 November," inas- personnel, processing of ashes and personal
much as all major components of the Japanese effects of deceased personnel forwarded from
armed forces had been demobilized." In their overseas , preparation of demobilization and
places a First Demobilization Ministry (Army) discharge reports, and final settlement of pay
and Second Demobilization Ministry (Navy) status. The centers were also burdened with
were created. They were headed by a civilian furnishing initial aid to dependents.
minister and staffed partly by demobilized All personnel who were employed by the
military and naval officers in a civil capacity. demobilization agencies assumed civilian starus
23 SCAPIN 142, 15 Oct 45 , sub: Reception Centers in Japan for Processing Repatriates . (Superceded
SCAPIN 70)
24 (I) Plans were submitted to the CofS GHQ SCAP by the Japanese Government on 2 October 1945. They
consisted of draft programs for further demobilization of military and naval forces. (2) SCAPIN 137, l~l OCl 45.
sub: Demob, Japanese Armed Forces.
25 There remained 14 members of the Air Force who were demobilized prior to 15 December 1945.
26 SCAPIN 993, 1 Jun 46, sub : Approval of Plans for Establishment of Demob Bd in Lieu of the Two Demob
Ministries .

126
but continued to perform their duties until and related necessary act!vltLes were assumed
their phase of the job was completed," key by the Maritime Bureau of the Transportation
personnel included specialist crews for mine- Ministry and the remaining associated activities
sweepmg_ were charged to the First Demobilization
The basic organization of the Demobiliza- Bureau which became simply the Demobili-
tion Board remained unchanged until it was zation Bureau. By 31 May '948 the number of
dissolved on '5 October '947. By this time repatriation ports and demobilization centers
over half its task had been completed. "" There had been reduced to three- Hakodate, Mai-
had been a progressive and marked reduction zuru, and Sasebo. At that time, the last
in personnel of the Board, and repatriation remnants of the Japanese demobilization ma-
centers at Uraga, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Ha- chinery were eliminated as independent agen-
kata, and Senzaki were closed; the Second cies" and their functions and responsibilities
Demobilization Bureau's operation of repatria- completely transferred to the Repatriation Relief
tion shipping was discontinued in January Agency, Welfare Ministry." Within one
'947. Meanwhile, with the adoption of the month after the completion of repatriation and
new constitution and the Japanese Local Auton- therefore of physical demobilization, the Japa-
omy Bill on 3 May '947,'· the Local Assistance nese Government planned to decrease the size
Bureaus, previously placed under Home Minis- of the Repatriation Relief Agency to a small
try jurisdiction, became sections of the Welfare Repatriation Liquidation Bureau. The latter,
Department, on the prefectural level. in tum, was scheduled to operate for just one
As a transitional step, the First Demobiliza- year. Only when the last}apanese servicemen
tion Bureau and its local agencies were trans- had been returned to Japan could the demobili-
ferred intact to the Welfare Ministry which zation of the Japanese armed forces be consider-
was already partly operating the repatriation ed completed, and the existence of a well-
centers; the Second Demobilization Bureau integrated and efficient demobilization system
and its regional agencies were temporarily terminated."
placed in the Prime Minister's office. The next
step in the reduction of the demobilization Progress of Demobilization
machinery was the elimination of the Second
Demobilization Bureau which was approved by Due to a later start (December 1946),
SCAP on 10 January '948.'. Its former temporary delays, and low monthly rate of
functions of mine-sweeping, ship maintenance, repatriation of Japanese from Soviet controlled
27 The employment of ex-service personnel declined rapidly from a total of 190 ex-generals and ex-admirals in
January 1946 to 6 in July 1948. Total employment dropped from 80,474 demobilization employees (5°,227 Navy;
30 •247 Army) to 5.232 in July 1948 (1.364 Navy; 3.868 Army) or a total loss of 75.242 persons. (GHQ SCAP.
Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, Plates 20, 21 and 22.)
28 SCAPIN 1791. 4 Oct 47. sub: Demob Machinery, Reorg of.
29 The establishment of local self government as provided in Chapter VIII of the new constitution.
30 SCAPIN 1843, 10 Jan 48, sub: Plan for Abolition of 2d Demob Bur.
31 SCAPIN 1791,4 Oct 47, sub: Demob Machinery, Reorg of.
32 Ltr, Central Liaison and Coordination Office, Japanese Govt No. 1578 (2 P), 4 May 48, sub: A New Plan
for Reorg of Domob Machinery. (GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul48, Inel7.)
33 Apparently this policy is not followed by all nations. A rejected Soviet proposal suggested that a Japanese
military unit be considered demobilized when disarmed and disbanded. (Tok.yo, Nippon TimeI, 15 Feb 48, Kyodo~
AP Rpt)
127
 WELFARE MINISTRY

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PLATE NO. 40
Organization of the Demobilization Board, June 1946-0ctober 1947
areas and Communist-dominated districts of continuation of dependency allowances, the
Manchuria, an estimated total of 499,000 necessity for issuing valid death certificates for
Japanese army and 2,000 naval personnel still legal purposes, and humanitarian obligations
had not been returned to Japan in July 1948-" of the Japanese Government to the next-oF-kin
Since repatriates included both civilians and of missing service personnel made such verifica-
servicemen, the totals of repatriation and tion indispensable. The demobilization agency
demobilization do not coincide_ All repatriates was charged with this increasingly difficult and
who were in Japanese military or naval service time consuming task. The Home Depot
at the time of surrender were demobilized Division, a subdivision of the Demobilization
promptly and formally upon arrival at a Japa- Bureau combined with the prefectural Local
nese repatriation port, although final processing Assistance Sections, performed the bulk of
was completed at the Local Assistance Section the work.
of the returnee's home prefecture." The deaths of 1,402,153 servicemen who,
An aspect of demobilization which was of prior to the surrender had not been reported
great importance to the Japanese although not dead or missing in action, were verified; and
of direct concern to the Occupation was the by August 1948 only 76,960 were carried as
verification of the fate of the large number of missing.'· With a few exceptions, nussmg
personnel missing in overseas areas. The personnel were presumed to be dead.

34 GHQ SCAP. Prog ress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 3 I }ul 48, p. 16. The Japanese servicemen
had been completely repatriated and subsequently demobIlized from all areas except those controlled by the Soviet
Government and eer tain sectors of Manchuria. Since no information has been made available by Soviet authorities
concerning the Japanese troops detained in Soviet controlled areas, it is not possible at this time (May 1949) to esti·
mate the number dead or missing among the Japanese forces that surrendered to the Soviets and which were removed
to Soviet territory or left in Communist dominated areas of Manchuria.
On 21 May 1949, an announcement was made through the official Soviet news agency Tass that U the remaining
95,000 ]apane5G PW's" would be repatriated between May and November 1949. The announcement made no mention
of thousands of civilians which Japanese claim were in Soviet controlled areas. SCAP figures, based on those prepared
by the Japanese Government, showed a total of 408,729 military and civilian prisoners still to be repatriated from
Soviet controlled areas. See Ch. VI.
35 DEMOBll.IZATION.Aug 4>tojuI4S , ARMY N AVY TOTAL
Demobilized in Japan proper 2,353,000 1,179,000 3,532,000
Demobilized in Repatriation 2,597,000 268,000 2,865,000
Total 4,950,000 1,447,000 6,397,000
36 JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL VERIFIED DEAD AND MISSING
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AFTER SURRENDER VERIFIED DEAD MISSING
U. S. occupied territories ... . ...... .. . .. ....... .. . ".... .. ......... 479,335 35,700
British and Dutch forces territories ......... ... ........ ,.. .. .. ... 207,626 4,500
Australian forces territories . .. .......... . .... . ... .. .. ,.... ...... .. 199,205 1,800
French Indo-China ..... .. . . .. _...... ....... .. .. .. .. ..... .. .. ... ... 2,752 360
China (excl Manchuria) ...... _.... .... . .. ....... .. . .. ..... . . _.... ... 202,907 1,800
Others (excl Manchuria & Soviet controlled
areas, chiefly personnel lost enroute) ...... ............. .. ...... 23,177 3,700
Total Army Personnel 1,1l5,002 47,860
Navy Sv pers (excl Soviet controlled areas) .... .. ............. .. 151,072 2,600
Civilians attached to Navy (excl Soviet areas) .. .... .. .......... 54,~9 26,5 00
Total Navy Personnel 206,061 29,100
Known deaths awaiting repatriation (other
than Soviet) .... .. . ............ . .. ... ... .. .. .. ......... .. . _...... . 81 ,09"
=
Total 1,402,153
=
Total Dead and Missing ....... ... .. . .. ' " .... .. .. -... ....... .. .. .
(GHQ SCAP, Progress ~f Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. 17·)

130
 Since no information was made available by Approximately s..en million armed men, including
the Soviet authorities concerning the Japanese those in the outlying theaters, hoye laid down their
troops detained in Soviet-controlled areas, it weapons. In the accomplishment of the extraordinarily
was impossible to determine the number of difficult and dangerous surrender of japan, unique in
the annals of histoTY, 7Iot a shot 'Was neCtSIdT'Y, not
missing men among the Japanese forces which
..en a drop of Allied blood was shed. The .indica-
surrendered to the Soviets. Of the 900,000
tion of the great decision of Potsdam is complete.
Japanese servicemen estimated to have surren-
Nothing could exceed the abjectness, the humilia-
dered to the Soviet forces, only 436,000 had
tion . nd finality of this surrender. It is not only
been repatriated by 3' July '948, and at the
phYSlCally thorough, but has been equally destructi>e
end of '948 the fate of many of those under
on Japanese spirit. From swagger and arrogance,
U . S. S. R. control had not yet been fully the former Japanese military ha>< passed to ser>ility
determined. " and fear. They are thoroughly beaten and cowed
General MacArthur, realizing the difficulties and tremble before the terrible retribution the surrender
encountered in effecting complete demobiliza- terms impose upon their country in punuhment fOT
tion of all Japanese armed forces , directed its great sins.
activities toward the speed-up of the demobili- Again, I wish to pay tribute to the magnificent
zation program in Japan and in areas under condud of our troops. With few exceptions, they
SCAP or AFPAC jurisdiction on a geograph- could well be taken as a model for all time as a con-
ical basis. It was obvious that American quering army. Historians in later years, when pas-
commanders could do little to accelerate SIons cool, can arraign their conduct.

demobilization of Japanese forces held by the They could so easily-and understandably-ha>e

•
U. S. S. R. until international disputes had been emulated the ruthlessness which their enemy ha><
resolved and mutual agreements reached~ freely practiced when conditions were rnersed, but
their perfect balance between their implacable firmness
In a radio report to the American people on
of dUly 0/1 the one hand und resolute restraint from
'5 October '945, General MacArthur sum-
cruelness and brutality on the other, has taught a
marized the achievements of initial Occupation
lesson to the japanese ci.il population that is startling
objectives: ,.
in its impact.
Today the japanese Armed Forces throughout Nothing har so tended to imprm japanese thought
japan completed their demobilization and ceased to -not e>en the catastrophic fact of military defeat
exist aJ such. These forces are now completely itself. They hoye for the first time seen the free
abolished. man's way of life in adual adion and it has stunned
I know of tlO demobilization in history, either in them Into new thoughts and ideaJ.
war or in peace, by our own or by any other country,
The experience of an American lieutenant in
that has been accomplished so rapidly or so friction-
lessly. E.erything military, na.al or air is forbIdden
an encounter with a Japanese armored column
in japan. is typical of many similar events that occurred
This ends its military might and its military in the initial days of the Occupation. A jeep
influence in international affairs. It no longer bearing a 43rd Division lieutenant was spinning
reckons as a world power either large or small. Its along the road from Kazo to Kumagaya when
path in the future, if it is to sUT1'i"e, mwt be confined an approaching cloud of dust resolved itself
to the ways of peace. into a Japanese tank company moving to a

37 See Ch. VI, pp. 43-52.

38 GHQ USAFPAC Press Release, 15 Oct 45.

131
 JAPAN
APPROX1NA TE SCALf: 6,500,000

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INFANT""
~ DEFENSE ZOIIt:S

PLATE NO. 41
Japanese Coastal Defenses, 18 August 1945
 JAPAN
APPROXI MA TE SCALE I 6,500,000

..

AIROROME(PERMANENT BASE FOR COMBAT

AND/ OR TRAINING UNITS)
o LANDING GROUNO(OPERATIONAL BUT NOT USEO
AS PERMANENT BASE LIMITED FACILITIES)
1 SEAPLANE STATION (WITH FACILITIES)
,& KAMIKAZE(SUICIOE ) AIR STRIPS.

J .a p

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PLATE NO. 42
Japanese Airfields, '5 August '945
demobilization center. As the lead tank to report the progress of demobilization to the
stopped to permit passing, the jeep driver world.
cautiously skirted it to the left on the narrow The problem of disarmament and the
road. The soft shoulder crumbled and the disposal of war materiel, however, proved to be
American found himself tilted at a perilous more difficult; considerable stocks of war
angle with his vehicle mired in the soft muck eguipment were dispersed amid the tangled
of a rice paddy. Climbing out, the officer masses of fire blackened girders, in thousands
scratched his head and pointed to a cable of caches located deep in the hills, in carefully
attached to the side of one tank. Meanwhile constructed tunnels and warehouses, and over
a Japanese officer had come running up and miles of Japanese landscape. Along the shores
asked in passable English if the tank driver near the great ports, there remained many
had been at fault. Assured to the contrary, permanent fortresses. Japan's frantic prepara-
he barked orders to his men and the tank driver tions for a last ditch stand against invasion
jockeyed his tank into position, hooked the resulted in numerous hastily built coastal
cable on the jeep and pulled it back on the road. defenses. (Plate No. 4IJ The majority of these
The Japanese captain bowed his apologies, coastal defenses were manned by brigades. The
accepted an American cigarette with thanks, larger and more permanent installations were
ordered his tank column to continue and, eguipped with heavy artillery and were concen-
waving amiably to the American, disappeared trated in strategic locations such as the
in a cloud of dust. peninsula which forms Tokyo Bay, the northern
A month earlier these men would have shot entrance to the Inland Sea, the southern tip of
one another on sight. Significantly, the Kyushu, and the coastline around Fukuoka.
Japanese armored unit was travelling without Almost three hundred airfields, ranging from
guard to be demobilized; the Americans and bomber and supply strips to "Kamikaze"
and the Japanese alike were integrated in a strips, sheltered some 6,000 Japanese combat
demobilization program which was evidently aircraft capable of providing air cover and
successful. 39 close support for the ground and naval forces.
(Plate No. 42) Japanese arsenals, munitions
The Process of Disarmament factories, steel plants, aircraft factories, and
ordnance depots were widely scattered through-
As remarkable as the demobilization of the out the country.'· Japanese naval vessels
Japanese armed forces had been, it would have consisting of carriers, battleships, destroyers,
been of little value had it not been accompanied submarines, and auxiliary and maintenance
by an egually exhaustive program designed to craft were anchored in all of the major
dispose of Japanese weapons, armament, eguip· ports.
ment, and other war materiel. The demobiliza- The initial disarmament procedures com-
tion process transported former Japanese plied with the instrument of surrender and with
soldiers to their homes, left them to their own early SCAP directives. The Japanese troops
resources, and gave them freedom to lead their turned over their individual weapons to unit
own lives. It provided an accounting system officers, who in turn assembled them in the

39 Occupational Monog' of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. r, Aug 45-1an 46 (C), p. 33·
40 Japanese arsenals and ordnance depots were located chiefly in Kyushu, and Kyoto-Osaka area, Nagoya area
and the Tokyo-Yokohama area, and consisted of 108 principal installations.

134
supply rooms, warehouses, and depots formerly forces are typified in the following account :,-
used by the Japanese Army. With the prompt With the Xl Corps Artillery in Mito-Two of
disarmament and demobilization of the indi- the white peace negotiation planes bearing green
vidual soldier the way was cleared for the crosses 'Were among the 1,500 JapdnfSe aircraft de~
disposal of more bulky war equipment. strayed during the past 12 days by men of the 6]7th
As soon as the surrender arrangements were Tank Destroyer Battalion which is located just

made, the four small islands protecting Tokyo northeast of Tokyo .

Bay were vacated by the Japanese and the Allied Moving in on 12 airfields, and (oYering a ground
area of 800 square milts, these men hd'Ye organized
Navy entered the Bay without a shot being
into what ther call U Destruction Incorporated "
fired. The Japanese had cleared the important
crews. A crew comists of [i.. men, a Japanese full
naval installations of all personnel except for
track prime mover and a gas pump spray mounted
skeleton crews, demilitarized all coastal defense
on a Japanese truck.
and antiaircraft installations, and had marked The srstem for destruction is simple, but believed
the latter with large white flags. When the to be foolproof. Two men on the prime mover pull
-initial landing parties came ashore, Japanese the planes to the selected burning area. One man
officers and guides led them to the facilities searches the entire plane for bombs and ammunition .
available at the Y okosuka naval b,,-,e, thus Another member punctures all gas taniu to prevent
setting a pattern for a peaceful occupation. explosion. The remaining man stands by the gas
The burden of location and disposal of pump spray and at the signal" all clear" spray, Japa-
ammunition, explosives, military stores and any nese synthetic gas over the plane to be destroyed. It is
other property belonging to the Japanese forces then ignited and the crew moves on to the next aircraft.

was placed upon the Japanese; they were Because of the large number of agencies
ordered to collect all war materiel and assemble involved in the destruction or scrapping of
it as directed by the local United States Japanese aircraft and because of the variations
commanders." Items which could not be in nomenclature and other statistics, exact
readily transported were reported as such and figures of planes destroyed were not available.
processed later. However, the Occupation authorities made
Spot inspections covering all of Japan, com- certain that there were no Japanese planes in
pleted by I October 1945, attested to the full operational existence in the four home islands.
compliance with surrender terms by the Japa- During the early days of the Occupation
nese Army and Navy Air Forces. Except for many of the planes were disabled with no intent
a few types which were preserved for technical to salvage materials. That procedure was later
air intelligence purposes, all aircraft were at that discarded in favor of an economical scrapping
time grounded and were in the process of be- program. Dismantling naturally proceeded
ing destroyed. Initial destruction methods of at a slower rate than burning or demolition,
enemy aircraft employed by the Occupation but the salvaged items were useful in aiding

41 Japanese armed forces were defined to include aU Japanese-controlled land , sea, and air forces and military
and para-military organizations, formations, or units and their auxiliaries and civilian volunteer corps, wherever situated.
(Memo, SCAP for IJG, 24 Sep 45. In AG 402.5.)
42 GHQ SCAP, Press Release No. 1030, 13 Dec 45.

135
restoration of the war torn Japanese economy." were in operation, and approximately 4,500 tons
of ammunition were disposed of daily.
Surrendered War Materiel: Disposition One of the most interesting features of the
disarmament program was the disclosure of the
Prior to the Occupation of Japan it was precarious condition of the Japanese defending
anticipated that the quantities of Japanese forces in the home islands. After Allied
general war materiel would be enormous and victories of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the Phil-
tentative plans were made to dispose of it. ippines and the establishment of Allied naval
Based on plans and directives from technical blockade of China, only the troops in Japan
agencies and ample experiences in other the- were supplied by the homeland. On 3' August
aters, the program for the disposition of this '945 the Japanese reported on hand ',369,063
materiel was formulated on the premise that riRes and light machine guns with limited
large numbers of Japanese service troops and ammunition of only 230 rounds per weapon.
adequate numbers of Japanese military vehicles Records later indicated that actually some
would be available. However, in many areas 2,468,665 riRes and carbines were received by
of Japan the military forces had been completely the Occupation forces and later disposed of.
demobilized prior to the Occupation. Vehicles The Japanese reported more artillery ammuni-
were already lacking both in quantity and tion than small arms ammunition. Ammuni-
quality. Completion of the disarmament tion for the grenade launcher, often known as
program was delayed as the personnel used in the "knee mortar," was also more plentiful;
final disposition of the materiel consisted of some 5',000,000 rounds were reported, or an
Japanese laborers, a limited number of Japanese average of ',794 rounds for each weapon.
technicians, and specialist crews from United As in the case of demobilization, the infantty
States forces. Tactical troops were often used regiment was also the chief instrument in the
initially in congested areas to perform the work disarmament program, charged with seizing all
of destroying the materiel as it was located or .Japanese military installations and disposing of
to oversee its transportation to waterfronts for all confiscated materiel. As inventory lists
loading and dumping. Army LCM's and were received from the Japanese, reconnaissance
Navy craft were used for this purpose. As fast patrols, consisting of an officer and a riRe squad,
as Japanese ships and crews could be substi· made the rounds in the regimental area to
tuted, the United States personnel were verify these inventories and to search for any
relieved. In the Sixth Army zone during the unreported installations or caches of materiel.
month of November '945, at least ten ports The infantry company became the working unit

43 DISPOSAL OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT (Progress Report, 3 [ Dec 46):

DISPOSITION MIse GLIDERS TOTALS
Total to be Disposed of 10,797 3[ 12,735
Destroyed 8,4 2 9 [6 9,7 66
Scrapped 1,016 2 1,09 2

Allied Operations [79 [88

Intelligence Research 73 [00

Total Disposed 582 827 23 9,~7 [7 II,146

Totat on Hand 138 291 46 1,100 14 [,589
(8,g62 planes were located on Honshu, 2,637 on Kyushu, 631 on Shikoku, and the remainder on Hokkaido .) (GHQ
SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Dec 46, pp. 69-70.)

136
Japanese laborers place gasoline drum under plane to be destroyed, Kyoto, Japan.

Japanese tanks are rendered impotent by use of dynamite prIor to scrappmg.

PLATE NO. 43
Scrapping of Japanese Equipment, October '945
which performed supervision of disarmament reconnaissance and inspection by the Occupa-
and disposal of equipment. Among unreported tion forces brought to light many situations
installations was an extensive underground which were resolved before they could become
fighter aircraft engine plant, with a capacity 6f serious problems." For example, a check on
100 per month, which was discovered by 1St the police stations in Aomori, Hirosaki, and
Cavalry reconnaissance units in the Tokyo area. Sambongi (all towns in Aomori Prefecture)
The entrances to tunnels, which had been in produced some 1,880 rifles, 1,881 bayonets, 18
the process of being extended and expanded light machine guns, 505,260 rounds of rifle and
during the war, were cleverly concealed and in machine gun ammunition, 46,980 rounds of
all probability could not have been detected blank ammunition, one case of TNT, and ISO
from the air. military swords. Daily G-2 and CIC reports
It was found that some discrepancies noted revealed many instances of smaller caches,
in the Japanese inventories were due to the sometimes in school compounds. Officials and
difference in Japanese phraseology and nomen- teachers, when questioned, usually pleaded
clature and errors in translations. For example, ignorance, and very often investigation did show
at Matsuyama Air Base on Shikoku Island, that faulty dissemination of instructions had
" 20 Needles" were thought to refer to some been the root of the trouble."
sort of Japanese aerial weapons. Examination The G-4 sections of the various commands
by troops of the 24th Infantry Division proved were designated to supervise the disposition of
them to be packages of ordinary sewing needles. war materiel and report on progress. Systems
Ammunition and weapons, particularly small were established to indicate readily by means
arms, could have been hidden easily by rebel- of maps and charts the type and class of sup-
lious individuals or groups, only to be brought plies located in each dump, the status of
out at some later time in revolt against the disposition within each camp, the percentage
Occupation forces. Apparently there were of dumps recovered, and dumps returned to
more than a few abortive attempts in that the Japanese. Continuous information was
direction, for although the Japanese military sent to all echelons regarding the locations of
commanders appeared to be acting for the most principal installations in their zones. All
part in good faith in surrendering their arms equipment, whether received by unit com-
and equipment, every month of the Occupation manders or uncovered by patrols, was secured
disclosed new caches of military supplies. and labeled, the date and place of surrender or
Though the caches usually were not heavily discovery indicated, a record made of the unit
stocked, their very existence was enough to concerned, and a statement made to show that
indicate that the chain of Japanese responsibility it had been acquired by the United States
had broken down somewhere. Thorough armed forces.'·

44 (I) Tokyo, Pacific Stars and Stripes, December 5, 1945; (2) GHQ SCAP Press Releases, 21 Dec 45 & 19 Feb 46.
45 HQ Eighth US Army, G'2 Periodic Rpt No. 74, 10/ [ I Nov 45 .
46 To the average US soldier in Japan one of the more interesting aspects of the demilitarization program was
something that affected him personally: the distribution of war trophies. WD Cirs No. 155 and 267 (1945) authorized
the issue of souvenirs to military and naval personnel who had served in the SWPA during World War II . On the
basi s of these circulars, each officer and enlisted man recei ved one of the following articles : rifle, carbine, saber, bayonet,
pistol, or pair of binoculars. Responsibility for collection of these items rested with corps commanders, who issued
instructions for their distribution to field units under their respective commands. The War Trophy Depot, located
in Yokohama, issued trophies to officers and men who were on orders to return to the US. A central issuing agency
for fleet units within the Eighth Army area was established at Yokosuka Naval Base for distribution to naval personnel
at sea. GHQ and FEAF personnel were supplied by Eighth Army facilities .

138
Japanese arms are inspected by an American soldier at the Katsuura School.

Ammunition 15 removed from storage cave at Takatsuki Dump, Osaka.

PLATE NO. 44
Disposal of Weapons and Ammunition, October '945
 The most persistent difficulty encountered
Methods of Disposal during the destruction of Japanese ordnance
material was the acute shortage of qualified
Policy directed that enemy equipment would technical personnel, both Japanese and Ameri-
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of at the can. Even under nottnal circumstances the
location where the Japanese turned it over to disposal of large quantities of Japanese am-
the disposal units . In destroying equipment munition and explosives would have presented
other than ammunition and explosives, units many risks. With the loss of skilled techni-
were granted authority to use any practical cians due to the demobilization program in
method to render the materiel useless. The Japan and the readjustment program in the
most common methods employed were: smash- U . S. Army, the task became even more
ing, cutting with acetylene rorches, burning complicated. Most of the work had to be done
with thermite grenades, or salvaging and melt- by slow and unskilled Japanese laborers; their
ing down in blast furnaces. The resulting apparent disregard for personal safety, combined
scrap was turned over to the Japanese Home with the language barrier, made the job danger-
Ministry. Negotiations were opened with steel ous. In accordance with agreements betw~en
plants and blast furnaces and contracts were the commanders of the Sixth U. S. Army and
drawn for the disposition ofJapanese ordnance Fifth U. S. Fleet, Sixth Army assumed respon-
items. Arrangements were made to transport sibility for disposition of naval equipment and
all such equipment to industrial areas for dis- installations ashore in western Japan. Some
posmon. Destruction and re-smelting were ofJapan's largest naval installations were located
accomplished rapidly and the ingot metal in this area and the quantity of naval equip-
turned over to custody of Home Ministry ment increased the disposition problem con-
representatives. Unfused artillery ammunition, siderably. Mine and bomb disposal specialists
bombs, and other inert projectiles were trans- were borrowed from units in the Occupation
ported to fottner munitions factories where they forces, both Army and Navy, and ordnance
were broken down to save both the explosive explosive technicians from all available sources
(for conversion to peacetime use) and the scrap were located and utilized. Efforts to locate
metal skilled technicians through the Japanese Home
Because the work was hazardous, special Ministry met with indifferent success. The
instructions were issued to all units for the rapIdity of the demobilization of the Japanese
immediate disposal of explosives, chemicals, armed forces had scattered these persons to all
and poison gases. All Japanese ammunition, parts of Japan.
bulk explosives, and other loaded equipment Under the best conditions, there is a certain
(ordnance, chemical ammunition, and engineer peril connected with handling ammunition
explosives) were destroyed without delay, with stored without adequate safety precautions.
the exception of items desired for technical Japanese supply dumps were located in caves,
intelligence purposes. The principal method on small islands, in marshlands, and in forests.
utilized was dumping into the sea at a depth In many of these areas seepage led to deterio-
in excess of 300 feet (later 600 feet). In areas ration of highly sensitive ingredients such as
that prohibited transportation to port facilities fuses, safety devices, and packaging materials.
both detonation and burning were used to The lack of safety devices on much of the
dispose of large quantities of munitions. Japanese equipment often made it impossible

140
Weapons of the Japanese 58th Army are loaded aboard LSM for dumping at sea.

Japanese ammunition on its way to the bottom of the Pacilic Ocean.

PLATE NO. 45
Disposal of Weapons and Ammunition, October 1945
to remove and detonate the mUnItIons In
accordance with the usual sa:fety procedures. Retum of Demilitarized Materiel
Wherever this situation existed, the contents to the Japanese
of a cave or tunnel were detonated at the site;
this method, to mention one example, had to Throughout the process of disarmament, at
be used in handling 100,000 pounds of picric no time was there any wanton destruction of
acid and blasting powder stored in a cave on materials and equipment; those stores which
Eta J ima. Deterioration had progressed to a could be reasonably converted to civilian use
point where movement of the stores was impos- were saved. There was urgent need for the
sible and detonation on the spot became the return of salvaged materials to the economy of
only solution. Japan. The countty was impoverished_
Progress of the munitions disposal program Many of its people were near starvation and
was sporadic. While disarmament of the generally in need of clothing. A large percent-
troops and demobilization of personnel were age of the nation's houses in the urban areas
accomplished rather rapidly, materiel disarma- had been destroyed by heavy bombing. To
ment took much longer. The destruction of alleviate these conditions in every possible way,
munitions was equally slow but by the end of the Occupation forces returned to the Japanese
1946 the program was reported 80 percent Government all Japanese military stores of food,
complete_" extensive stocks of uniforms, rubber boots,
garrison coats, medicines, and other items."

47 (I) USAFPAC, Adm Hist of the Ord S~c, 24 Jun 45 to 13 Dec 46, p. 16. (2) GHQ SCAP, PIOgress
of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 21 Jul 48 p. 20, gives the following statistics on progress of munitions
disposal as of mat date :
QUANTITY DISPOSED OF, RE11JRNED
CAPTIJRED AND TROPHY. MUSEUM. TO JAPA-
ITEMS SURRENDERED TECHNICAL USE DESTROYED NESE (al
Rifles and
Carbines 2.468 •66 5 1,226,146 1,24 2,5 19 None
Bayonets 1,568 ,254 7 13,83 2 85404 22 None
Pistols and
Revolvers 81,061 62,760 9,559 8,742
Swords and
Sabers 661 ,621 37 2,60 9 289,012 None
Artillery 201,244 II ,260 189.~4 None
Automatic
Weapons 186,680 3, 20 3 18 3.377 None
Tanks and
Tankettes (h) 2,97 0 435 2,535 None
Ammunition
(all ,ypes) (c) I, I 92,000 tons 1,192 ,000 None
Fire Concrol
Equipment 90,700 90,700 None
Vehicles 14.494 14,494
Aircraft 12,725 8,000 None
(a) The only weapons refurned to Japanese were a small number of pistols for use of civil police.
(h) USAFPAC, Adm Hist of the Ord Sec. 24 Jun 45 to 13 Dec 46. p. 16.
(c) 100,000 tons of chemical warfare supplies were also destroyed. (Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the 15th Meet·
ing of ,he Allied Council for Japan. Tokyo, 18 Sep 46. Nternoon Session).
48 More man 21,000,000 pairs of socks, approximately 7,000,000 woolen blankets, and over 5,000,000 pairs of
leather shoes were returned to the Japanese Government for distribution LO Japanese citizens.

142
Further need for these supplies developed with had been demilitarized."
the inception of the repatriation program. By October, the majority of Japanese naval
More than six million Japanese were repatriated, units were undergoing inspection and 114
many of them returning without sufficient vessels had been selected for use in the huge
clothing." shipping program of repatriating Japanese
Engineering and automotive equipment, vital from other countries." In addition to the
in rebuilding devastated areas, was specifically repatriation vessels, all mine-sweeping vessels
excluded from the list of materials to be de- were inspected and allocated to the urgent task
stroyed and much of it was returned to the of clearing necessary ports and sea lanes.
Japanese. Initial requirements of the Occupa· As soon as repatriation and mine·sweeping
tion forces in such articles as nails, ropes, were under way, orders were issued, on 3 Sep-
cement, wire, and plywood were met but, in tember 1945, that all Japanese naval vessels
general, these and other construction items not required for transportation of personnel or
were redistributed for Japanese civilian use. for mine-sweeping were to be retained in Japa-
nese waters, either in Tokyo Bay, or Sasebo.
Disposal of Japanese Fleet Units Suicide craft, midget submarines, and other
surface craft so designated were to be retained
On 18 August 1945 the Japanese emissaries at occupied naval stations in an inoperative
at Manila presented reports with detailed infor- condition; fleet commanders were to report all
mation concerning the Japanese Navy, names, naval or merchant vessels of roo tons or over."
condition, classification, and location of naval Unfavorable weather caused a delay in carry-
vessels, location of mined areas, shore installa· ing out the first of these orders. Meanwhile,
tions, ammunition and fuel on hand; this since there was a possibility of suicide craft
information was incomplete due to lack of being used by some fanatical group or indi-
recent surveys and the fact that certain units vidual, the second order was amended and all
were at sea.'· Later documents were filed by such craft were ordered immediately destroyed
the Japanese Government and accurate infor· or delivered into custody of American per-
mation was finally available in early September. sonnel; actually only one attempt to use suicide
(Plate No. 46) Following SCAP Directive craft during the postwar demilitarization of
Number 2,Japanese naval vessels were promptly Japan occurred. On 31 August 1945 three
rendered inoperative [or war purposes." As suicide craft were seen moving from Picnic Bay,
early as 12 September the Imperial Japanese Hong Kong, after British naval units had made
General Headquarters reported that all war and their entrance. One was sunk, one was turned
merchant ships, both in home ports and at sea, back to the harbor and sunk, and the third

49 GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. 20.

50 These documents were u-anslated and p~blished by GHQ USAFPAC, Office of the ACofS, G'2, ATIS, on
21 August 1945.
5[ SCAP .oir No.2, 3 Sep 45, par. 8e.
52 SCAP Die No.2, 3 Sep 45. Annex B established in GHQ USAF PAC, a Naval Liaison Group representing
CINCPAC. The Japanese Senior Naval Commanders were ordered to adjust their boundaries to coincide with those
of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and to report to the commanders of the Fifth and Seventh US Fleets for instructions
in demobilization and disarmament.
53 See Ch. VI.
54 GHQ SCAP, Final Rp[, Progress of Demob, of [he Japanese Armed Forces, 3[ Dec 46 (R), p. 86.

143
 JAPAN
APPIIOKIMATE SCALE 6.~,OOO

,,,:;:. __~<====..
; MlI.U

SASEBO
CV (I)
I DO III
2 ss

OBAMA
r 00 (II

KOBE
2 SS

YOKOSUKA
88 (I)
2 DO til
• ss

• SHIOfIO-IIIISA'U

--
~
TSU- SWIMA

BB
CV
" ND
LEGE
8ATTLfSHtP
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
C CRUISER
DO DESTROYER
SS SUBMARINE
NOTE : FIGURES IN PARENTHESES I NOICATf
DAMAGED SHIPS. AND ARE IN EXCESS OF
THE FIGURES PRECEDING SYMBOLS, WHICH
REPRESENT UNDAMAGED SHIPS
OUTSIDE JAPAN PROPER
..........
fOllo-$IIIIIIo SINGAPORE CV
100
255
(21

TSINGTAO 200
SOERA8AJA 155
u,u-4UJlr6 JOGJAK ARTA 155

PLATE NO. 46
Disposition of Major Japanese Fleet Units, I September 1945
 was beached and later destroyed." the Transportation Ministry. The last transfer
In Japan, various rypes of suicide craft were of functions relieved the remaining military or
reported in twenry·four scattered port areas: naval demobilization agencies completely of
393 midget submarines, 177 human torpedoes, operating any ships."
and 2,412 suicide surface craft." By October On 12 February 1948 the Far Eastern
over 90 percent of this fanatical arsenal was Commission belatedly ordered an early com·
either destroyed or placed under immediate pletion of the disarmament and demobilization
control of the Occupation forces. As the of the Japanese Armed Forces and, in general,
Occupation progressed, the remaining 10 approved the steps already taken by General
percent, together with 141 additional midget MacArthur toward the completion of this
submarines, was destroyed. gigantic task."
The general reports regarding all Japanese Combatant ships of destroyer tonnage and
vessels, merchant and war, revealed 2,524 vessels less were divided among the United States,
of all kinds belonging to the Japanese Navy." United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, and China
By February 1946 the Second Demobilization when no longer needed in the service of the
Ministry was using 408 vessels of the former Occupation. Deliveries of the several lots were
Imperial Japanese NaVY-138 for repatriation, based on four separate drawings held in Tokyo.
269 for mine·sweeping, and one for transporta- During the remainder of 1947 a total of 135
tion of fuel. Many of the ships so used were former Japanese naval ships were allocated and
former aircraft carriers, cruisers, escorts, sub· delivered to the four major Allied Powers."
marine chasers, transports, and hospital ships. Japanese crews, consisting of ~ormer naval
By mid·October 1946 the number of vessels personnel, sailed all ships to ports previously
employed by the Second Demobilization specified by the receiving nations. The vessels
Bureau had been progressively reduced to 250 assigned to the U . S. S. R. were delivered to
vessels, 89 in repatriation service and 160 in the port of Nakhodka ; the Chinese lot to
mine·sweeping activities. In the first month Shanghai and Tsingtao; the United States lot
of 1947 all of these craft were withdrawn from to Tsingtao, Yokohama, and Y okosuka; and
control of the Second Demobilization Bureau the United Kingdom lot to Singapore and
and were reassigned to the Civilian Mar- Kure. Three ships in the first lot, all of the
chant Marine Committee. On I January 1948 ships in the second lot, and the bulk of the
the Second Demobilization Bureau's functions third lot received by the United States were
of mine.sweeping and ship maintenance, were held in Japan for scrapping. In the four
assumed by the General Maritime Bureau of drawings, the U. S. S. R. , the United States,

55 Ibid, p. 84.
56 Ibid, p. 84·
57 Ibid, p. 86.
58 SCAPIN ' 79' , 4 O ct 47, sub : Demob Machinery, Reorg of.
59 ]CS Dir No. 89, '7 Mar 48.
60 Ships D elivered to A llied Powers. 1947 :
Destroyers." . .. .... . , . .... . . . , .. . .. . . . .. . .... .. 26 Sub-chasers .. , . . . . ... . . .. . . . .. .. . .. ..... . .. . . .. .. . .. .. . . . . . 5
Destroyer Escorts . .......... . ................. .67 Torpedo Boats . .... .. ....... . . .. .............. . .. .. . .. ..... I
Minelayers and Auxiliary Minelayers . .... . . . . 11 Transports ... . . . . . . ..... ... .. .... ........... . ..... ... . .. . ... 8
Minesweepers and Auxiliary Minesweepers .. I 4 Supply Ships . ....... . . . ...... . ..... . ........ .... . . ... . . .. ... 3
T otal .. ........ .. .. . ... I35

145
 PLATE NO. 47
The Japanese Light Cruiser lbuki in Drydock at Sasebo-64 percent Scrapped, 14 March 1947
 and China received thirty-four vessels each, the second half of 1948 .• ' The 42' former
and the United Kingdom thirty-two vessels·' warships in the scrapping program ranged in
Smaller craft of one hundred tons or less were size hom the Ire, a 40,000 ton battleship, to
returned to the Japanese for use as fishing or small torpedo boats of about twenty tons.
cargo vessels, fernes, freight barges, and other Types of craft included aircraft carriers, de-
peacetime purposes; those returned totaled stroyers, destroyer escorts, cruisers, submarines.
some 200,000 displacement tons of shipping. and high speed transports. Most of these
According to a plan prepared by COM- ships had suffered damage during the war but
NAYJ AP and approved by SCAP on 2 April were still afloat. Steel and other metals obtain-
'946, all former Japanese Navy combatant ed from salvage were turned over to the Japa-
ships larger than destroyer class were to be nese Government as returned enemy material
completely scrapped within one year of their to be used in peacetime industries." Scrapping
release from the repatriation service. Wrecked costs were high due to the high cost of carbide
and heavily damaged ships were to be sunk in and the low market value of the scrap.
deep water. By October '946 all submarines With the completion of the scrapping of
(a total of '5') had thus been dis posed of and the Japanese cruiser Tone, the last of the large
the scheduled scrapping of other vessels was remaining combat vessels above the 3,000 ton
well under way. Eighteen Japanese scrapping class was destroyed. On '5 January '949 the
companies were assigned to carry out the dis- U. S. Navy reported that the scrapping pro-
posal of the major ships.·' gram and disarmament of the Japanese naval
The scrapping and salvage work on former strength was complete: the Japanese Navy was
Japanese warships was almost completed in extinct."

6, GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. 23.
62 COMNAYJAP, Comd Narr, 21 Jan to 1 Oct 46 (C), p. I,.
63 COMNAYFE, Comd Nan:, 1 Apr to 30 Sep 48 (C).
64 Tokyo, Pacific Stars & Strip<s, Sept<:mbe[ '7, 1948.
6) Ibid, June 5, '949·
147
 .
OUTER M0 GOLI A .
IJ /
.,c;....,.

L-4_~j---l N A
') _ . .....0\1

--
I ~ OS
...
..._ ~
IONIN \SLAIClIS

_16.-

19,200 Philippines
132,900

. ~.

CAROLINE I S LA OS

NETH ERLAN OS INDIES

3,600 n Hawaii

PLATE NO. 48
Japanese to be Repatriated: August 1945
 CHAPTER VI
OVERSEAS REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS

At the end of the war over SIX million was recovered from the Japanese and such
Japanese were scattered throughout the islands United States manned ships as could be utilized
in the Western Pacific and on the Asiatic at this time. Evacuation from United States
mainland. Their repatriation became one of controlled areas in the Western Pacific was
the major problems confronting General Mac- given priority.
Arthur. Their early return to Japan was During the second phase, , March to 15
desirable for purely humanitarian reasons as July '946, United States owned ships were
well as for the purpose of easing the economic made available to the Japanese to augment
burden of the liberated countnes. (Plate their own meager resources in shipping; re-
No. 48) patriation from overseas areas was at its peak
In addition, there were approximately and reached a maximum rate of ' 93,000 per-
1,170,000 aliens in Japan, many of whom had sons per week. Throughout this period evacua-
been forcibly removed from their homelands. tion from Chinese and British controlled areas
Early in September 1945 a large number of was emphasized. Approximately 1,600,000
these displaced persons flocked to ports in ,Japanese were returned to Japan from these
southern Honshu and Kyushu, hoping thereby two areas alone. '
to obtain preferential treatment for their re- The third phase of mass repatriation covered
patnatlon. This influx resulted in congestion the period from 16 July 1946 to 19 December
and created health and sanitation problems 1946. It was marked by a decline in the
which threatened public welfare in Japan. numbers repatriated, owing to the diminishing
Recognizing this urgent problem, SCAP numbers of repatriates delivered to embarkation
promptly initiated a program for mass repatria- ports from areas outside Japan.
tion, placing it under the staff supervIsion of Following 19 D ecember 1946, the program
G-3 in conjunction with the Naval High was largely concerned with the repatriation of
Command. approximately 1,617,650 Japanese from Soviet
Mass repatriation can be divided into four controlled areas. Throughout the course of
phases. The first phase covered the initial this fourth phase, however, approximately
period from 14 September 1945 to 28 February 100,000 Japanese were repatriated from British
1946. Throughout this period the only ship- controlled Southeast Asia, a residual program
ping available ror repatriation was that which substantially completed by October 19470'

This chapter is based primarily on Draft Report, G-3 GHQ SCAP, "Repon on Mass Repatriation in the
Western Pacific/' April 1947. Original strength statistics, however, have been adjusted using latest avai lable figures as
given in G-3 GHQ SeAP 8{, FEC, Status of Repatriation Repmts . Original strengths given in these reports have been
revised to coincide with actual numbers repatriated. No allowance has been made for deaths of Japanese prior to re-
patriation, a highly controversial issue.
2 G-3 GHQ SCAP &: FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 1 Jul 49.
149
 The general repatriation program was charac- could be operated efficiently. The most suit-
terized by the large numbers moved, the able shipyards where this could be accomplished
fact that all repatriation had to be conducted were located at Y okosuka, Kobe, Osaka, Kure,
over sea lanes, often over very great distances, Sasebo, Maizuru and Ominato. While there
and the amount of coordination which was was a lack of materials to be used in ship
necessary between SCAP and the various repair, many parts could be procured by strip-
overseas area commanders. ping beached and sunken Japanese ships for
This chapter covers only the details of mass spare parts and scrap metal. It was estimated
repatriation of Orientals' in the Western Pacific, that about 167 Japanese ships with a total
defined as that portion of the ASIatic-Pacific passenger carrying capacity of 87,600 spaces
Theater west of the 180th meridian; it excludes could be operated 50 percent of the time.
the repatriation of Occidentals, diplomats , and Sailors who had formerly manned ships in the
other special categories since these were handled merchant marine and navy were immediately
on their individual merits. The narrative is available for assignment to repatriation ships.
not final because at the end of 1948 repatria- Operational control and supervision of mainte-
tion of Japanese from Soviet controlled areas nance was exercised by the U. S. naval re-
was still not complete; I it does, nevertheless, presentative of SCAP for merchant ships and
cover the period during which a great mass of by the commander of the U. S. Fifth Fleet
repatriates was moved and the agreem-ents (or naval ships.
reached under which the remainder would be The necessary logistic support to the repatria-
eventually returned home. tion program was available from Japanese
resources except for the supply of fuel oil for
The Task ships. In order to commence the program at
an early date, oil used by repatriation ships
In arrlvmg at a feasible solution to the was provided initially from United States
problem of transporting more than seven and a sources.
half million persons over ocean areas, shi p- Although rolling stock was somewhat limit-
ping not required to support the economy of ed, the rail system in Japan was relatively intact
Japan was made available from the remnants and could be utilized with little dislocation of
of Japan's once powerfiIl navy and merchant normal functions for the transportation of
marine. A variety of shi p types were re- personnel to and from ports. The ports and
presented: aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, port areas, however, presented quite a different
three masted sailing ships, escorts, troop trans- picture. Bombing by U. S. forces had caused
ports, hospital shi ps and merchantmen. It was widespread destruction of port facilities. Mines
necessary to demilitarize all naval ships before in the harbors, channels and inland waters
using them and the majority of vessels had to precluded the use of many fine ports and made
be converted to make them suitable for trans- the operation of shipping in others extremely
porting personnel. All of the craft were in a hazardous.
very poor state of maintenance and repair, hence Since repatriation involved personnel in
considerable work was necessary before they areas under varIOUS Allied commanders and

3 Ibid, 31 Dec 48 .

150
 was to be implemented by the Japanese, closely carrying capacity of the liesIel is not curtailed therth,).
centralized control was necessary.' Under the d. The Imperial japanere Go"mment will oper-
concept of the Occupation, the machinery of ate, man, .ie/ual and ,uppl~ japaTlere ,hipping "red
the Imperial Japanese Government (I]G) was for repatriation 10 the maximum pr:Jcticable ex/eu/.

utilized for implementation of the repatriation e. First priority will be granted to the moyement
of japanere military and na.al perronnel, and recond
program.
priority to the mOl'ement of Japanese ci"ilia,u.
The threat of epidemics was realized, but
f. All Japanese perronnel will be di,errmed prior
this risk had to be accepted. Provisions for
to retum to japan proper_
rigid quarantine procedures at points of entry
g. In the ,>acuation oj japan,re national, from
in Japan were required; similarly, certain area, under the control of CINCAFPAC and CINC-
controls had to be established In Japan to PAC, the former will prescribe the percentage of
prevent unauthorized traffic in goods, currency, ,hipping allocated for repatriation purporer, to be
financial instruments, and precious metals. To employed in sen..icing the rtspedi'JIt areas. Prionties
provide these controls, the flow of repatriates jar the '>ac"'!tlon of ,pectfic arear will be establi,hed
was channeled through designated focal points as necessary . .. .
called " Reception Centers." Responsibility h. In the e'JIacuation of japanese tlatio1J4is from
lor their operation and maintenance was charged areas under the control of the GeneralIssimo, Chinese
to the Japanese Ministry of Welfare, in con· Armier, SACSEA, GOCAMF and the Commander
junction with the demobilization machinery tn Chief, So>iet Forcer in the Far Eart, SeAP will
operated by residual military and naval per- make the necessary dTrangements.
sonnel in a civil status.
The Plan
Policies
The plan, as finally conceived, provided for
SCAP evolved certain basic policies which the division of responsibility as follows:
with minor modifications governed the planned a. SCAP
repatriation program throughout its imple- I) Completed the n«mary errrangemenU with
mentation. The original policies were:' coordinate and subordinate commanders for the
a. Maximum utili,ation will be made of Japanese e'JIacuation of repatriates.
na.al and merchant ,hipping allocated for repatria- 2) Arrumed responsibility for repatriates after
tion of j apanese nationals. they "'ere emberrked on SCAP-controlled ,hip,.
b. Japanere na.al .ersel, and thore japanere mer- 3) Retatned control of the reptltriation fleet
chant >e,re" derigned primaril~ for the tramport of to include the allocation of ,hipping to the Je>eral
personnel aud not required for i"ler~iIland or coastal areas concerned.
parrenger ....ice, will be utili"d for the upatriation 4) ["wed neCeIrerry directi.er to the Imperial
of Japanese na/jonah. japanese GO'JIernmenJ for: the reception, (are,
c. Perronnel to b. repatriated will be tran,ported demobilizatIon (of military and llayai pCTs01lnei)
0" cargo lifSselr only to the extent that the cargo and transport to their homes of returning japanere

4 The following commanders participated in repatriation: Commander in Chief, Army Forces Paci6c (CINe·
AFPAC); Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC); Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command
(SACSEA )j Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea (CG USAFIK); Commanding General of the
Soviet Forces in the Far East; Generalissimo, Chinaj General Officer Commanding Australian Military Forces(GOCAMF)j
and commanding generals of the Occupation armies.
, G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47, p. 4.

151
 repatriates ; transportation from their homes in long range shipping serviced more distant
Japan to the el'acUdtion ports in the case of the islands in the Pacific. Korea, the Ryukyus,
repatriates from Japan. and the Philippines were cleared expeditiously
J)Supemud the ""er-aU extcutioll of the except for small remaining numbers of prisoners
program.
of war. For all practical purposes, mass re-
b. Responsibility for the operational control of
patriation from these areas was completed by
repatriatiotl shipping dud the superl';s;oll of its mainte·
January 1946. The rapid rate at which the
nance was 'Yesled initially ;n Commauder, U. S. FJfth
U . S. Army Forces were redeployed to the
Fleet, imofar as it co7lctmed former Japanese 1k1')lal
,hip" and in Fleet Liaison Officer, SCAP, (FLTLO- Zone of Interior. created an acute shortage of
SCAP) for former merchant ships. labor in the Ryukyus, Philippme Islands, and
c. The Imperial Japa,,,,u Go>ernment was charg- Pacific Ocean Area. To compensate for this
ed with the execu/lon of the pro"isions of the repa/ria. shortage, authority was granted to retain tempo-
tion directi.es published by SCAP. Th" included rarily prisoners of war and Japanese surrendered
establishme7lt, organization and operatlou of repatria· personnel in areas under control of U. S. Army
ti01l reception centers, transporting of repatriates to Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), U. S.
and from these centers, and pro'JIiding of crews and Army Forces Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC),
,upplies for repatriation ,h,p,- At the reception and CINCPAC.
centm the ljG was required to sub;ect each repatriate During this phase, arrangements were con-
to physical examinations and quarantine procedure, cluded with the Chinese Government, the
os were necessary ; inoculations agaimt cholera and
General Officer Commanding Australian Mili-
typhus, 'Yacc;nation against smallpox, and disill!esta·
tary Forces and the Supreme Allied Com-
tion by DDT of person and baggage; screening for
mander, SQutheast Asia Command, for repatria-
war criminals ; inspectzon of baggage aud pers01lJ to
tion of Japanese nationals under their control.
pre'JIt!nt unauthorized traffic in goods, fmandal instru-
ments and precious metals. In addition, the following These arrangements were relatively simple. It
functions were performed at reception centers .- rail was agreed that the governments and commands
and ship mo'Vements were coordinated ; food and evacuating Japanese nationals were to be re-
clothing, to be placed aboard repatriation ,hip, or to sponsible for delivering repatriates to designated
be used at the centers, were assembled aud distributed; ports of embarkation, processing them for
retumi" g japanese soldiers and sailors were demobi- communicable diseases, and inspecting for ex-
lized and furnished free rail transportation to their cesses in amount of authorized articles in their
homeJ.6 possession and for contraband. The overseas
commanders were further charged with over-
First Phase: 17 September 1945- seeing proper loading of ships prior to departure
28 February 1946 and furnishmg necessary emergency supJi'lies.
Allocation of shipping to the various areas
In order to save time, repatriation from was based on the original number of persons
United States controlled areas was set m to be returned from each area and the geo-
motion concurrently with the preparation of graphical distance from Japan.
the over-all program. Short range shi ppmg When reduced to passenger spaces, however,
was allocated to Korea and the Ryukyus, while the Japanese shipping became completely in-
6 Ibid, pp . 6-, . Since the majority of repatriates were in the military or naval categories, the demobilization
process) at reception centers, was a rna jor operation . Staff supervision was exercised by G'2, in the development of
demo bilization plans and procedures, in co njunction with the Sixth and Eighth Armies.

152
 Ashes of comrades are carried from Rabaul for delivery to families In Japan.

Japanese commanders receive Allied instructions on disarmament and repatriation.

PLATE NO. 49
Repatriation Begins
adeguate. For this reason, representations were SCAJAP worked through successive agencies
made to Soviet Russia, China, Southeast Asia established under the Japanese naval demobi-
Command, and Australia to utilize Japanese lization program_'
shipping then under their jurisdiction. This Early in 1946 it became apparent that,
shipping was to be used under SCAP control statistically, repatriation in the Western Pacific
to support a minimum economy of Japan and would take several years unless the shipping
for repatriation . SAC SEA responded by re- resources of the Japanese were substantially
porting fourteen ships with a total carrying augmented; action was accelerated to increase
capacity of 23,000. These ships eventually shipping assigned to repatriation_ Following
were operated for repatriation purposes under this policy, [00 U _S_ Liberty type cargo ships,
SCAP control. Repeated efforts to obtain [00 LST's, and sufficient U. S_ hospital ship-
shipping from China and the Union of Soviet ping to move 25,000 patients before July [946
Socialist Republics were unproductive. Aus- were made available to SCAP for repatriation
tralia reported that she had confiscated no early in March 1946- These ships were
shipping which was suitable for this purpose. operated under SCAJAP and were manned by
During this phase, the repatriation of non- Japanese crews_
Japanese from Japan was progressing satisfacto- In the first half of January [946, operation
rily. Of those desiring repatriation, 58 percent procedures were incorporated in a single paper
of the Koreans, 63 percent of the Formosans, entitled: "Agreements Reached at Conference
97 percent of the Chinese, and [2 percent of on Repatriation, January [5-[7 [946, Tokyo,
the Ryukyuans Uapanese) were returned .to Japan ." Similarly, all directives to the Japa-
their respective homelands_' nese were combined in a single directive during
The naval organization controlling repatria- March of the same year_
tion shipping underwent conSIderable change Under the broad concept of the Occupation,
during this period_ A U_ S_ naval organiza- the Sixth and Eighth U_ S_ Armies established
tion, known as the Shipping Control Authority troop detachments at each of the reception
for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP), centers so that close supervision over the Japa-
was established in Tokyo on [2 October nese could be exercised_ When the Sixth
[945.' On 6 March [946, when the office of Army was inactivated in January 1946, the
Commander, Naval Activities, Japan (COM- Eighth Army became the sole local supervising
NA VJAP), was established, SCAJAP was agency.
integrated into that office as an important As the first phase neared completion, the
subdivision, but continued to perform the basic policies had been published and opera-
same functions_ In dealings with the Japa- tional procedures had been established and
nese Government, SCAJAP worked through tested_ A good beginning had been made since
the Ministry of Transportation and the approximately a million and a half Japanese
Ministry of Navy until the latter went out of had been returned to their homes and over
existence on 3 I December 1945; thereafter 800,000 non-Japanese evacuated from Japan.

7 G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47·
8 SCAjAP took ove r duties formerly performed by FLTLOSCAP (US Pacific Fleet Liaison Group with SCAP)
and the Commander, U. S. Fifth Fleet-di rect control over all ships greater than 100 gross tons operated by the Japanese.
SCAP effected coordination with SCAjAP in repatriation matters through the G-3 Repatriation Section.
9 See Ch. V.

154
SCAP was ready to speed up the program of China proper by 12 July 1946. Vast numbers
repatriation. 10
were moved under oriental passenger standards
-the carrymg capacities of the Liberties and
Second Phase: 1 March- 15 July 1946 LST's were raised to 3,500 and 1,200 pas-
sengers respectively, an increase of 1,000 and
During the second phase of the repatrlation 300 each over the maximum number established
program, emphasis was placed on evacuatmg by the U. S. forces during the war for the
over a million and one-half Japanese in China same type shi ps. "
proper and Formosa, and the three quarters of The problem of clearing the China Theater
a million in British areas in the Pacinc." The was complicated by a cholera epidemic which
largest portion of the burden was borne by occurred among repatriates who were being
United States shipping, made available early returned from Haiphong, French Indo-China;
in 1946. Canton, China; and Kiirun, Formosa. This
Liberty ships from War Shipping Adminis- situation interfered considerably with the re-
tration, vessels released in the Philippines, patriation program since infected ships were
and Navy LST's released in the Marianas quarantined and the passengers held aboard,
began arriving in February. They were turned examined, and treated until medical authorities
over to the Imperial Japanese Government were satisned that they no longer constituted a
under an indemnity agreement; the Japanese hazard to the public health of Japan. Some
were to be fully responsible for manning, of these ships were held in quarantine as long
supplying and repairing. Although the ships as thirty days. To indicate the magnitude of
had been demilitarized prior to arrival in Japan, the problem, there were at one time twenty-two
there was considerable rentting to be done to ships with a total of 76,000 repatriates in
make them suitable for carrying passengers. quarantine at Uraga, Japan. A total of 438
Since the ships' crews were to consist of persons died of cholera before the epidemic
Japanese, all signs and instructions had to be was brought under control; only the determined
changed rom English to Japanese. SCAJAP efforts of the Public Health and Welfare
was responsible for training the crews and, in Section of SCAP and port quarantine agencies
carrying out this task, did an outstanding prevented introduction of widespread epidemics
job. into Japan.
The ships were ready for use in early March During the peak of repatriation from China,
and were initially assigned to shuttle between great demands were made on the reception
China (including Formosa) and Japan in centers and rail system in Japan. In two
accordance with the schedules agreed upon at successive weeks reception centers in Japan
a conference in Tokyo the preceding January. handled loads of more than 185,000 persons
Except for minor departures, the original per week. Effective prior planning by reception
schedules were followed . Formosa was cleared centers and transportation units permitted the
for all practical purposes by 12 April and housing, welfare, and ultimate absorption into

10 G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47.
II G-3 GHQ SCAP & FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 4 Mar 49.
I2 Normal carrying capacjty of a liberty ship during combat was 1.500, and of an LST, 400; for emergency
evacuation and short trips, up
(0 2,500 Amencans can be carried on a liberty and 900 on an LST.

155
Troops pack their kits near Shanghai preparatory to the final voyage to Japan.

Homeward Bound: Y okosuka

PLA TE NO. 5.0

Shanghai to Yokosuka
Japan of these large numbers without any For those who indicated a desire to be re-
major difficulties. o, patriated, the privilege of review by United
When United States owned ships began States authorities of legal proceedings as ruled
operating in March, long range Japanese ships, by Japanese courts was continued. The Japa-
previously on the China shuttle, were diverted nese Government was also held responsible
to evacuate over three guarters of a million for their continued welfare, transportation to
Japanese in Southeast Asia and Australia. In reception centers, and ultimate emb~rkation on
April, when the reguirements for shipping repatriation ships. For those who did not
from China decreased appreciably, authority indicate a desire to go back to their home
was obtained ttom the U. S. Joint Chiefs of countries, these privileges were withdrawn.
Staff to also utilize United States ships for Thereafter, according to established policies,
repatriation from these areas. As a result, by they were reguired to live on the indigenous
August 1946, Australia and Southeast Asia resources of Japan. Furthermore, the decision
were cleared of all Japanese, except for war to remain in Japan once made, was considered
criminals and those retained for labor. irrevocable and such persons were no longer
In addition to returning Japanese ttom entitled to the privilege of repatriation. This
China, Australia, and Southeast Asia, repatria- same policy was followed in respect to persons
tion shipping under the control of SCAP trans- who were scheduled to be repatriated, but who
ported about 65,000 Koreans from Chinese failed to report where ordered. Exceptions
controlled areas to Korea. Movement of these were made only when such failures to report
nationals was an extension of the United were due to unavoidable circumstances. In
States policy of repatriation, as expressed in furtherance of this policy the mass return of
the .Potsdam Declaration, and was executed Chinese nationals and Formosans was con-
under instructions ttom the U. S. War sidered completed in May 1946. The repatria-
Department. tion of Koreans continued at a sluggish rate
In February 1946, after the initial rush to of about 6,000 per month during the period.
be repatriated had subsided, there was a marked Efforts were again made to initiate repatria-
decrease in numbers who wished to be re- tion ttom Soviet controlled areas on the local
patriated from Japan. This was particularly military level. InJanuary 1946 the Command-
noticeable among Koreans. Most commonly ing General, U. S. Army Forces in Korea,
advanced reasons for this change of heart were conferred at Seoul with the Commanding
the poor economic and political conditions General of the Soviet Forces in the Far East,
reported as existing in Korea, and the restrictions in order to effect repatriation from North
against removing goods and currency from Korea to Japan. These negotiations were
Japan. In order to determine how many unsuccessful due to certain demands made by
persons still desired to be returned to their the U. S. S. R., chiefly the furnishing of food
homelands and to set a target date for the and rail transportation through Korea for the
completion of SCAP's responsibilities to re- repatriates. In Japan a plan for repatriation
patriate all non-Japanese, it was decided to from North Korea was proposed to the Soviet
register all Koreans, Formosan and Chinese member of the Allied Council for Japan.
natlonals, and Ryukyuans (actually Japanese). No agreement could be reached on matters
13 A distinction must be made becween II repatriation" (G-3) i. e., overseas shipments and delivery to port centers
and udemobilization" (G-2) i. e., inland movements from centers [0 home towns and villages.

157
concerning the supply of fuel oil (or repatria- difficulty of obtaining satisfactory labor, the
tion ships and the granting of preferential major commanders were desperately in need of
treatment to repatriates destined for North the services of Japanese PW's in order to
Korea. perform the important task of terminating our
Early in June it was realized that shipping wartime bases.
available for repatriation far exceeded the The issue was squarely met on 8 August
number of repatriates that could be sent '946, when SCAP announced plans to return
to evacuation ports. Mass repatriation had all Japanese PW's and displaced personnel in
reached its peak and was then on the decline. United States controlled areas by the end of
the year. This affected some 45,000 in the
Third Phase: 16 July- Philippines , 5,000 in Hawaii, 7,000 In the
31 December 1946 Pacific Ocean Area, and 12,000 in Okinawa.
These were duly evacuated in three equal
With China proper cleared and Southeast increments from each of the above areas
Asia shipping requirements established, there during the months of October, November, and
was a lull in repatriation activities beginning December.
in mid-July '946. The number of repatriates Return of Okinawans was authorized during
to evacuation ports dropped to negligible the latter part of July after the transfer of
figures except in the case of Hulutao, Man- military government from CINCPAC to
churia, from which repatriates were being CINCAFPAC was effected on I July 1946.
evacuated at a rate of 7,500 a day. Meanwhile, The plan, involving the return of some, 50,000
except for unproductive laborers, repatriation from Japan and Formosa during the period of
from United States controlled areas had been '5 August to 3' December '946, was organized
temporarily suspended. The British announced and implemented without any major problems.
their intention to retain "3,500 PW's in The flow of Japanese from Hulutao, Man-
their areas until some time in '947. By this churia, increased progressively until by the
time South Korea had been cleared. end of September over '0,000 were being
A review of repatriation shipping require- evacuated daily. Because of a cholera epidemic
ments was made and at this time it was decided in Hulutao, it was difficult to supply shipping
that fifty-five U. S. Liberties could be sent to maintain the above rate, as all ships from
back to the War Shipping Administration. cholera ports were held in quarantine until
These ships were returned to the United cleared by public health officials. With
States by Japanese crews who later came back the advent of cold weather, the threat of this
to Japan in other SCAP Liberties dispatched disease diminished and the critical shipping
from Japan. The first of thes, ships sailed situation eased. Manchuria was cleared by
for the United States on '5 August '946. the end of October 1946, except for certain
The lull was of short duration. For some groups in areas controlled by Chinese Com-
time SCAP had been faced with the question munist (orces and a limited number of techni-
of retaining Japanese nationals in United cians retained by the Chinese Government.
States controlled areas. Due to the rapid These were estimated to number about
demobilization of our own forces and the 68,000."

'4 G-3 GHQ SCAP & FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt. '2 Nov 46.

158
 It is interesti ng to note that while the General MacArthur agreed to furnish the
Chinese Nationalist forces and Chinese Com- necessary shipping and to assume all responsi-
munist forces were conducting civil war, the bility for repatriates from time of embarkation.
truce teams under General Marshall were H e accepted a rate of 50,000 per month
instrumental in obtaining an agreement from although he had offered to evacuate up to
the Communists to repatriate the Japanese 360,000 per month. A total of approximately
under their control. Because of this under- 30,200 were returned from North Korea,
standing, Japanese nationals in Communist Siberia, Dairen-Port Arthur, Sakhalin, and
held areas of Manchuria were sent home the Kuriles during December."
through Hulutao which was under control of Repatriation from Japan continued slowly.
the Nationalist forces (with exception of the By the end of 1946 all non-Japanese and
68,000 noted above). Ryukyuans who desired repatriation had either
During this period General MacArthur's been repatriated or had forfeited their privilege
Headquarters directed evacuation of some to return. The only ex~eptions were those
89,000 Japanese nationals released from the destined for northern_ Korea and a few others
British controlled areas in Southeast Asia. On who could not move due to circumstances
various occasions, General MacArthur requested beyond their control. These latter cases were
governmental action to induce the British to reviewed and decisions were made on their
return all their Japanese nationals by 3' D ecem- individual merits."
ber '946. These efforts !ailed' and some 80,000
remained in Malaya and Burma at the year's end. Fourth Phase: 1 January 1947-
On 26 September the representative of the 31 December 1948
Soviet Government in Japan announced to
G eneral MacArthur that they were ready to At the close of '947 approximately 625,000
repatriate Japanese PW's and other Japanese Japanese had been repatriated from Soviet
nationals; this was quite a conciliatory attitude controlled areas (Dairen, Siberia, North Korea,
on the part of the Soviets after ignoring (since and Karafuto-Kuriles). In addition, some
January '946) continuous SCAP attempts to 294,000 Japanese had crossed from North into
start repatriatIon. Action was immediately South Korea and had been repatriated from
taken to conclude an agreement governing this there, although this movement received no
repatriatIOn. The negotiations moved slowly official sanction."
and it was not until '9 December '946 that The Occu pation authorities estimated that
full agreement was reached. Under its terms some 751,000 Japanese remained to be repatri-
the Soviets guaranteed to return all Japanese ated from Soviet controlled areas as of 3' Decem-
surrendered personnel and all Japanese civilian ber 1947.'8 The Soviets were exceedingly
personnel who desired to come back to Japan. secretive about the number of deaths among

15 Ibid, 10, 17 , 24 and 31 Dec 46.

16 By 31 December 1946, the third phase of repiltriation was completed . A total of 5,% 03 , 323 had been repatri-
ated co Japan, 1,152,632 evacuated from Japan, and 187,600 repatriated directly from other areas in the Pacific. (G-3
GHQ SCAP III FEC, Starus of Repatriation Rpt, 6 Jan 47.)
17 Ibid, 2 Jan 48.
,8 Ibid. Japanese Demobilization Records and Status Reports In the Surrender Agenda supported this
figure.

159
 Processing Repatriates: Customs

D isplaced civilians are processed at Hakata Reception Center, Kyushu.

PLATE NO.5'
Soldiers, Sailors and Displaced Civilians
 internees so this figure was not necessarily cal camps.
accurate. To expedite repatriation from Soviet The Soviets completely disregarded the
controlled areas the United States representa- individual rights of approximately 469,000
tive on the Allied Council (or Japan, on 29 Japanese who, as of 3' December '948, were
October '947, offered enough shipping (includ- still held by them under conditions of slave
ing fuel) to increase the rate of repatriation labor, and made no attempt to justify their
immediately to '3',500 persons for the first actions in the-eyes of the world. Their repatria-
designated month, and to ,60,000 per month tion policies should have demonstrated to the
thereafter. No Soviet answer to this offer was peoples of the Far East what international
received. On the other hand, allegedly because communism really holds for ·them. The issue
climatic conditions made the use of embarka· was squarely met in General MacArthur's
tion ports in Siberia and Karafuto in winter response to a Soviet charge that SCAP was
impossible, the Soviet authorities suspended all pursuing policies in violation of the Potsdam
repatriation of Japanese from December '947 Declaration: ,.
until May '948.'. There IS a deep and natural resentmenl throughout
From June '948 on, the Soviets did not Japan at what is generally regarded by all Japanese
fulfill their 50,000 monthly quota as specified as a basic disregard of hurna" and moral 'Yalues i71
in the agreement of '9 December '947, in spite the retention in Russia after more than three yeaTS
following surrender of half a million Japanese
of General MacArthur's repeated protests; they
prisoners employed under shocking conditions of forced
suspended repatriation for periods of several
st!T"II;tude ;71 works designed to increase the SO'Yiel war
months without any apparent justification. The
potelltial. This, despite solemn undertaking elltered
repatriation of Japanese nationals still detained
illto by the Allied Powers in Clause 9 of the Potsdam
in Soviet areas thus evolved into a perplexing Declaration offered as a condition to the Japanese
situation, involving difficulties of an entirely surrender, which reads as follows: " The Japanese
different type than those encountered in repatri· military forces , after being romplelfly disarmed, shall
ation from other areas. Heretofore, the prob- be permitted to return to their homes with the oppor-
lems of repatriation consisted of tremendous tunity to lead peaceful and producti,e li,es."
distances, limited shipping, epidemics inherent
in mass movements under crowded conditions, Evacuation of Japanese from
and integration of millions of returnees into the South Korea
economic and political life of Japan; repatriation
from Soviet areas, however, posed a problem In the early days of the Occupation, a high
in the uncompromising attitude of the Soviets. priority was given to the evacuation of Japanese
Their repatriation policy was probably predi- nationals from Korea, south of 38° north
cated on the prolonged use of inexpensive latitude. In that part of Korea, there were
Japanese labor. Interrogation of repatriates some 600,000 Japanese nationals, the majority
also revealed calculated indoctrination in politi- of whom were either military, former admin-

19 A total of 87,546 Japanese were repatriated from Soviet controlled areas during May and June 1948. As of
30 October 1948 a total of 877,015 Japanese had been repatriated from these areas during the whole program while
some 446,670 were still awaiting repatriation. Also during this fourth phase over 80,000 Japanese were repatriated from
Southeast Asia, the program from that British controlled area being substantially completed by the end of 1947. (G-3
GHQ SCAP &. FEC, Status of Repatriation Rprs, 5 Nov &. 2 Jan 48.)
20 GHQ SCAP Press Release, ,8 Sep 48.

161
istrators, or technicians. In accordance with closed, many Japanese seeking repatrIation
United States policy for a self-governing evaded the road blocks and drifted into the
Korea, it was necessary to clear the way for a United States zone as early as September 1945.
democratic government representative of the At first , the number of Japanese from North
freely expressed will of the Korean people, by Korea was low . During the period from '5
removing at the earliest date possible the September '945 to 21 March 1946, only 42,500
influence exerted by the former Japanese offi- were evacuated via South Korea. However, from
cials. military and civilian. 21 May to 30 June 1946, about 10,000 Japanese
Coincident with the surrender, the Japanese per week entered the United States zone from
had resumed passenger ferry boat schedules North Korea, Manchuria, and Siberia. This
between Korea and Japan. This shipping waS number was further increased to approximately
promptly augmented by asslgnmg short range 1,500 per day by the middle of August 1946.
Japanese vessels to assist 10 the repatriation of To protect the public health of Korea, collecting
Japanese from Korea. By the end of September statIons were established along all natural
1945 an average of 4,000 persons per day was avenues of approach into South Korea from the
being evacuated from South Korea. Additional north. All Japanese were rounded up and
shipping spaces were obtained by shuttling brought to these collection centers where they
Japanese from Korea In LST's, which were were examined medically, immunized against
under control of CINCPAC and were engaged small-pox, typhus, and cholera and dusted with
in moving the U. S. XXIV Corps from Oki- DDT to prevent th'e introduction of epidemic
nawa to Korea. A total of twenty LST's were diseases into South Korea. They were then
employed fo r this purpose and returned approxi- evacuated through reception centers to Japan.
mately 20,000 Japanese to Japan between 12 The repatriation program from this area was
and ,6 October '945. Similarly, 50,000 Japa- handicapped by various incidents. In January
nese were evacuated in LST's from Saishu, a 1946 all repatriation activities were suspended
large island off the southern ti p of Korea. for a four-day period because of a threatened
Because of the importance of this operation, general strike. Flood conditions caused another
the Japanese nationals were cleared from South halt of activities for six weeks, from 26 June to
Korea rapidly. All Japanese military and naval 10 August 1946- A railroad strike in Korea
personnel, except some 2,650 retained for labor caused a further delay in repatriation from 26
were evacuated by 21 November '945 . The September to '7 October, while a cholera
sole purpose of holding a small group of Japa- epidemic made it necessary to place all repatri-
nese was to have them aid in the repatriation ates in guarantine prior to their evacuation.
of Japanese civilians, who, except for key This guarantine lasted from 10 August to mid-
technical advisors, were evacuated by the end of December 1946-
March 1946. The final contingent of the Japa- Prior to 10 August 1946, SCAP controlled
nese Army was returned home on 28April1946. shipping was placed on shuttle service to Korea;
An additional repatriation burden was im- subseguent to that date, however, ships were
posed upon the XXIV Corps" by Japanese dispatched on reguest of XXIV Corps as
natIonals who crossed the 38° parallel into processed repatriates became ready for shipment.
South Korea. While this border was techn ically The clearance of the Japanese from South

21 Later known as the U. S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK).

162
Japanese repatriates arrive at Beppu, Kyushu, for processmg
prior to returning to their homes.

Japanese repatriates arrive at Uraga. one of the principal

reception centers in Japan.

PLATE NO. 52
Debarkation : Beppu and Uraga
Korea was accomplished more expeditiously centers. This situation was eased when
and completely than from any other area. United States and Japanese-manned LST's,
Approximately 592,000 were evacuated from used to repatriate Japanese from northern
the beginning of the program until 31 Decem- China, on their return trip were utilized to
ber 1946." transport Koreans.
During the period from 6 January to 17
Return of Koreans February 1946, the average daily rate of Koreans
being transported dropped to 3,000, and the
In September 1945 the Japanese reported Japanese Government reported that its job of
that approximately 1,356,400 Koreans were inducing Koreans to move to reception centers
located in Japan. The policy concerning repa- had become increasingly difficult. This
triation of Koreans provided that they should slowing down of repatriation to South Korea
be treated as liberated people insofar as military was attributed to the confused political situa-
security permitted. Those desirous of repatria- tion which existed in Korea, housing shortages,
tion, who were not being held as war criminals widespread unemployment, general lack of
or for securi ty reasons, would be returned to organized agencies in Korea to aid repatriates,
their homeland as soon as practicable. How- and economic conditions which were reportedly
ever, since they had been Japanese subjects, much poorer in comparison with those in
they could, at SCAP's discretion, be treated Japan. The limitation on the amount of
as enemy nationals and, if circumstances so money and baggage that could be taken out
warranted, be forcibly repatriated. In essence, of Japan especially warranted serious consid-
all Koreans In Japan were gLven the opportunity eration on the part of those Koreans who
to be repatriated, provided they had not been had been established in Japan for a long
in active support of the FaSCIst governments or time.
guilty of distributing propaganda. Those In In order to solve the problem so that the
the latter category were repatrtated regardless Occupation forces could discharge the implied
of their desires. obligation to repatriate Koreans from Japan
Initially, Koreans flocked to repatriation within a reasonable period of time, it was neces-
ports in southern Honshu and in Kyushu in sary to determine the number of Koreans in
uncontrolled movements, thereby causing a Japan who were desirous of repatriation, estab-
serious health menace and congestion in these lish a plan for their evacuation by a definite
port areas. Since regularly scheduled ships date, and impose a forfeiture feature upon those
were repartriating Japanese from Korea at the who would not move according to plan.
outset of the Occupation, these ships were used As a result of this plan, on 17 February 1946,
to repatriate Koreans on the return voyage." the Japanese Government was directed to
The shipping assigned to repatriate Koreans conduct a registration of all Koreans in Japan
could not evacuate them fast enough to alle- to determine their desires concerning repatri-
viate the overcrowded conditions in reception ation." The Koreans were told at the time of

22 G-3 GHQ SCAP & FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 31 Dec 46.
23 During the period 15 September J945 to 6 January 1946, approximately 630,600 Koreans were evacuated,
averaging approximately 5,500 per day.
24 G·3 GHQ SCAP Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47. This registration revealed that
there remained approximately 508, [00 Koreans in Japan, 9,200 of whom formerly lived in North Korea and 498,)100 in
South Korea.

164
 registration that if they did not reguest repatri- to the end of D ecember.
ation, they forfeited this privilege until regular In September 1946, as an added incentive
commercial facilities were available. At the for Koreans in Japan to return to Korea, pro·
same time, those who indicated they desired vision was made whereby each Korean family
repatriation, but refused to move according to was allowed to ship home 500 pounds of
plan set up by the Japanese Government, also household goods, and 4,000 pounds of tools
forfeited this privilege. A deadline date of 30 and handicraft eguipment. This allowance
September 1946 was established for repatriation was in addition to personal belongings which
of Koreans from Japan. Application of this they carried with them. Provision was also
forfeiture proviso was not arbitrarily enforced, made for Koreans who had already been re-
however; such cases were subject to review and patriated to have their tools and handicraft
when circumstances warranted, provision was eguipment left behind in Japan shipped to
made for later repatriation. them.
The initial policy for repatriation had been During September 1945 illegal traffic between
to return Koreans from north of 38° via South Korea and Japan began flourishing by means
Korea. This became such a burden on the of small unregistered ships. Until May 1946
railroads and the economy of South Korea that unauthorized persons smuggled by these ships
it was decided to suspend movement of Koreans (mostly Koreans) were no serious threat to the
to North Korea until such time as they could health or economy of either country. Late in
be returned directly to their homes. the same month, however, South Korea suffered
During June 1946 heavy rains and floods an epidemic of cholera. The entry into Japan
disrupted rail and highway communications of unauthorized persons conseguently consti-
from the major ports to the interior and tuted a grave danger to public health, since the
damaged crops and buildings. By the end of illegal entrants were not processed through any
the month the damage to communications was guarantine ports. To stop this traffic, vigorous
severe enough to cause repatriation activities to patrol measures were undertaken by units of
be discontinued. Although the Commanding the U. S. and British Navies, the Allied Occu-
General, USAFIK, reguested that the tempo- pation forces, and the Japanese Government.
rary suspension remain in effect until 30 No- Those illegal ships which were apprehended
vember, General MacArthur, considering the were impounded and the passengers and crews
political repercussion that could result if placed in guarantine. After this isolation ter-
Koreans were prohibited from returning to minated, the Koreans were returned to their
their homeland, lifted the suspension on 10 country under guard.
August 1946 and repatriation was resumed. From August to the end of December 1946,
As a result, the date for completing the program some '5 AOO Koreans, trying to gain illegal
of returning Koreans to South Korea was set entrance into Japan, were apprehended and
at 15 November 1946. Another stoppage of returned to Korea." The majority of those,
repatriation was due to a railway strike in it was discovered, were former repatriates who
Korea during the period 26 September to '7 were returning to resume residence in Japan.
October. This unexpected delay changed the By the end of D ecember 1946 a total of
estimated date for completion of the program approximately 929,800 Koreans had been re-

2, G·3 GHQ SCAP IX FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 6 Jan 47.

165
patriated from Japan, excluding the illegal en- of remaining Formosans, Koreans and Chinese
trants.'" There remained some 5,570 who would be continued under existing arrange-
were eligible for repatriation and whose return ments ; repatriation of other nationals (of
was scheduled during the early part of '947. Indonesia, Malaya, Manchuria and the Celebes)
By May 1947 repatriation of Koreans was sub- would be handled separately in each case.
stantially completed. As a result of this conference, processing of
repatriates was expedited, operation of shipping
Pacific Ocean Areas facilitated, and additional passenger comforts
made possible. The areas where repatriates
Evacuation of the '7',000 Japanese and would be processed and refueling ports were
other nationals dispersed throughout the many decided upon. The commander of the Mari-
islands of the Japanese defensive system in the anas area at Guam was made responsible for
Pacific" presented one of the more difficult onward routing and supply of repatriation
problems of repatriation from United States vessels while within the limits of the Pacific
controlled areas. Personnel and shi pping Ocean Area. During the winter months,
shortages delayed the start of the operation, repatriation ships were stocked from United
but within a month after V-J Day, movement States sources with blankets and warm clothing
of Japanese, Ryukyuans, Koreans, Formosans, for the prospective passengers. This equip-
and Chinese was well under way.'" A few in- ment, the cost of which was charged against
dividuals had requested and obtained authority reparations, was later collected at debarkation
to remaIn because of past residence in these ports in Japan. The articles, after being dyed
areas for over ten years. and marked, were further distributed by the
By September 1945 Japanese shipping of a Japanese Government for relief purposes.
total passenger capacity of 18,000 was allocated Eventually, customs processing procedures
to the clearance of these areas. This shipping established at the conference were strictly
was augmented by a number of small American applied when it was found that many PW's
manned ships which had been operating in the were returning from the Pacific Ocean Area to
Pacific Ocean Area. In the second month of Japan with large quantities of newly-purchased
1946 those United States ships that were luxury items of United States manufacture,
designated for use as SCAJ AP controlled, wrist watches, fountain pens and silk stockings;
Japanese manned repatriation ships sailed for all items in excess of amounts normally required
Japan with full loads. by individuals were confiscated.
During the period '5-'7 January 1946, a Though hampered by the low operational
conference was held in Tokyo by representatives efficiency (about 50 percent) of the Japanese
of all commanders concerned with repatriation shipping and occasional supply shortages, re-
in order to establish standard operating pro- patriation schedules set in September were
cedures. It was agreed that repatriation of maintained with minor interruptions and negli-
Japanese nationals would be suspended until gible loss of life through mid-March 1946.
July '946, except for ineffectives; repatriation Since by that time 163,000 had been repatriated

26 Ibid.
27 These were in general [he Bonin, Volcano, Marianas, Caroline, Marshall and Gilbert Islands.
28 Numerically chey consisted of approximately 131,000 Japanese, 26,000 Ryukyuans, 14,000 Koreans, 600 For-
mosans, and 100 Chinese .

166
 Customs search for contraband and weapons.

Repatriate from Soviet territory returns to his family.

PLATE NO. 53
From Pore ro Home
 and the remaining 7,000 were being utilized as Both United States and Japanese ships were
labor, shipping schedules were curtailed except supplied with additional life· saving equipment,
for evacuation of those no longer needed for overside latrines, and food and water stores.
labor. During cold weather, blankets and warm cloth-
On 8 August 1946 General MacArthur ing, fUrnished by the United States, were placed
reguested CINCPAC to return all remaining upon all shi ps engaged in repatriation; the
Japanese prisoners of war and surrendered passengers were allowed to keep the clothing
personnel in three monthly increments starting issued to them.
in October 1946, so that the target date of 3' Until February 1946, with slight modifica-
December 1946 ror the completion of the tions, evacuation of Japanese proceeded accord-
over·all repatriation program cou ld be met. ing to plan. On 24 December '945 General
CINCPAC agreed to the plan, and through its MacArthur directed the Commanding General,
implementation, the task of repatriation from AFWESPAC, to route shipping on the Japan
the Pacific Ocean Area was completed ahead shuttle via Takao, Formosa, to permit return
of schedule when on 24 Decemberr 949 the of approximately 12,000 Formosans from the
Japanese ex·destroyer Sugi with her last load of Philippines and subseguent transport of Japa-
repatriates arrived at Uraga, Japan,'" nese in Formosa to Japan. On the same date
When Phase Three of the repatriation pro· movement of approximately 1,400 Koreans and
gram ended, a total of approximately 130,800 53 ,000 Chinese direct to their respective home-
persons had been returned to Japan and 40,700 lands was also authorized.
returned directly to Formosa, the Ryukyus, Suspension of repatriation in J anuaty affected
China and Korea." approximately 43,600 Japanese PW's who were
required for maintenance and repair of essential
Philippine Islands installations in the Philippine Islands. Evacu-
ation of sick and other ineffectives from this
Extensive United States base installations grou p in American cargo ships continued until
which existed in the Philippine Islands facili- May 1946. At this time, authority to utilize
tated control and evacuation of the 152,400 United States shipping was withdrawn and
repatriates." Principal concentrations were on limited SCAJAP Japanese shipping was sub-
Luzon, Mindanao, and Leyce. The initial stituted.
proportional share of Japanese repatriation When General MacArthur decided that all
shipping allotted to the Philippine Islands United States controlled areas were to be
amounted to only 12,000 spaces but was cleared by the end of 1946, a plan was set up
augmented by routing supply ships returning to clear the remaining Japanese from the
empty to the United States from the Philippine Philippine Islands. Shipping was prepared
Islands via Japan. On 7 October '945 the to remove the Japanese from camps located
first Japanese ships, modified to transport reo near Tacloban , San Fernando, and Manila.
patriates, arrived in the Philippine Islands. Approximately egual monthly increments were

29 Concurrent with incoming shipments to Japan, some 160 pre-war residents of the Bonin, Caroline, and Marianas
Islands were transported [0 their homes.

30 G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47, p. 29·
3I This total includes approximately 1,400 Koreans, 6,000 Chinese and 12,000 Formosans who were returned
direct to their respective homelands.

168
evacuated during October, November, and ,60,000 Ryukyuans in Japan who had been
December 1946. By the end of the year only hurriedly evacuated from their homes just prior
665 Japanese remained in the Philippine to the invasion by the United States forces.
Islands. They were detained there either as They had been permitted to carry with them
witnesses or as suspected criminals for the little in the way of baggage, clothing or funds.
war crimes trials. There was also an unde- Their situation in Japan rapidly became worse
termined but fast dwindling number , probably from a social and economic standpoint. It was
not exceeding 500, hiding in the mountains. therefore to the interest of General MacArthur's
headquarters to return them to their former
Ryukyu Islands homes.
Early agreements with CINCPAC were
Although the Ryukyus, because of their reached under which repatriates from Japan
proximity to Japan, should have presented an destined for localities in the Ryukyus other than
easy repatriation problem, such was not the Okinawa would be accepted. Consequently,
case. The Ryukyus, especially Okinawa Island, Ryukyuans were loaded on shuttle ships which
had been ravaged by invasion and rehabilitation were returning Japanese. The program for the
proceeded slowly. As late as the spring of 1946 return of Okinawans moved slowly. Repeated
there ware still 130,000 residents homeless on representations to CINCPAC to initiate this
Okinawa itself. Never self-supporting, the program were unproductive. CINCPAC, with
food situation on Okinawa was further aggra- considerable justification, refused to accept the
vated by the loss of many acres of arable land Okinawans on the grounds that food and
taken over for base installati ons. shelter were not available locally to support the
Initially, militaty government in the Ryukyus added increase in population. When the
south of 30° north latitude was exercised by responsibility for military government of the
CINCPAC. As such, that headquarters was Ryukyus was transferred from the Navy to the
responsible for the return of some 69,200 Army on 1 July 1946, the matter was recon-
Japanese military personnel.·· A ferry service sidered. General MacArthur was most anxious
was established to the Ryukyus in October '945 to evacuate the Ryukyuans because they were a
to transport only the Japanese military. This serious relief problem in Japan. It was for this
was supplemented almost immediately by the reason he directed that they be repatriated
assignment of short range Japanese shi pping, without further delay and that necessary food
and further augmented by empty United States and shelter be provided for them from Japanese
cargo ships returning home via Japan. and United States resources. A conference
Japanese military were returned to Japan by was called in Tokyo on 22 July, at which time
the beginning of '946, with the exception of the representatives of AFWESPAC and SCAP
14,000 whose return was temporarily suspended agreed upon a plan for the repatriation of all
until the last quarter of the year. During this Ryukyuans in Japan who were willing to return
period their services were utilized to repair war home.
damaged facilities and to assist the native This plan, published late in July, was quite
population to return to their former homes. complicated because of conditions in the Ryu.
The return of displaced Ryukyuans was not kyus. It provided that repatriation would
so easily achieved. There were approximately begin on 5 August '946; repatriates would be
32 G'3 GHQ SCAP 13< FEC, StaN' of Repatriation Rpt, J Ju l 49·

169
segregated in Japan and loaded on ships
according to destination;" further distribution China T heater
in the Ryukyus would be made by small boats;
and all repatriates would undergo a six-day Because of the large numbers involved,
guarantine period before departing. The rate repatriation of over 3,000,000 Japanese and
of repatriation to Okinawa was established at other nationals from China and adjoining areas
4,000 per week until 26 September, after that became another 01 the more difficult and pres-
at 8,000 per week until the program was sing tasks on V-J Day. On that date, this
completed. Incorporated in the plan were mass of humanity, consisting of approximately
provisions for the return of approximately egual numbers of military and civilian person-
'40,400 Ryukyuans from Japan." Careful nel. was reported to be geographically situated
supervision smoothed out the complicated as follows: "
mechanics of the entire operation. Art.a NumlHrr
The military government authorities in the China J , 50J ,200

Ryukyus were faced not only with the task of Manchuria 1, 10 5,85 0
receiving the repatriates but of transporting Formosa 479,05 0
them to their homes and providing shelter and North Indo-China 3 2,000
food for them. Inter-island transportation was Hong Kong '9,200
provided by small native and United States Two (actors made necessary the assignment
craft, including six LST's made available by of a high priority to repatriation from China
SCAP. Overland transportation was furnished and adjoining areas. First, it was United States
from the meager resources of the military policy to assist in the establishment of a sound
government authorities in the Ryukyus. central government in China. This objective
Houses for the incoming repatriates were could not be accomplished as long as the
built of lumber, with cement and nails security of China was threatened by the
fUrnished by SCAP. Over '7,000 simple presence of large numbers of Japanese troops.
dwellings were constructed; the frames were of Second, large numbers of Japanese were
wood while the roofs and walls were of thatch. located in areas of conflicting interests of the
Almost 10,000 pyramidal tents were used to French Government, Viet Nam, Chinese
provide for immediate needs." Nationalists, and Chinese Communists, mak-
All remaining Japanese prisoners of war and ing early evacuation of these groups imperative
surrendered personnel retained in the Ryukyus to prevent their being used as pawns in the
for labor were returned to Japan in three various political disputes. These factors com-
monthly increments starting in October '946. bined with extremely poor interior transporta-
The program was completed by the end 01 the tion and communication facilities in war-
year. ravaged China made even the concentration of
repatriates at evacuation ports a formidable
task.

33 These were Okinawa, Amami O shima, Miyako, and Ishigaki.

34 G-3 GHQ SCAP III FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 6 Aug 46.
35 During (he period 1 July [0 3 I December 1946, over 545.000 pounds of food were furnished repatriates from
US resources .
36 G-3 GHQ SCAP III FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, I Jul 49.

170
 Japanese repatriates aboard ship.

Repatriates are admitted to the Matsuasa Restaurant at Omori.

PLATE NO. 54
Flotsam of War; Displaced Civilians
 Full appreciation of the repatriation problem ment was made responsible for the delivery of
in Chinese areas is possible only through repatriates to the ports, their medical and other
knowledge of the role played by the U. S. forces processing and their correct loading aboard the
stationed in China. Upon the cessation of SCAP controlled ships according to the
hostilities with Japan, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of monthly quotas scheduled; however, supervi-
Staff assigned the task of advising and assisting sion of this loading and processing was also
the Chinese in repatriation of Japanese to the made a responsibility of the United States
U . S. Army Forces, China Theater, (later re- forces in China. This was accomplished by
designated as the U. S. Army Forces, China). sending American liaison teams, which included
When this headquarters was discontinued, its communications and medical personnel, to the
duties were transferred to the Peiping H ead- main evacuation ports in China. These teams
quarters Group, acting mainly in an advisory solved the communication problem and greatly
capacity to the Chinese Government, General reduced the amount of epidemic diseases carried
MacArthur, and the U. S. Navy in China. Of to Japan.
the coordination tasks assigned to the various After two previous conferences (representa-
U. S. Army forces in China, the maintenance tives came from General MacArthur's head-
of effective liaison with the Chinese authorities quarters, Navy Command in the Pacific, and
was the most difficult. Successful liaison was United States Forces in China) had resulted
accomplished only through patient, persistent in establishment of general policies regarding
efforts. ships, shipping routes, and embarkation
No time was lost in getting the program rates," a third one was called for '5-'7
under way. Under an interim plan imple- January '946 in Tokyo. At this time, all
mented early in October '945, the first shipping United States commands in the Pacific and. Far
was used in evacuating Japanese situated near East (except AFMIDPAC) were integrated into
Shanghai and Tangku. Concurrently, a more a theater-wide organization for repatriation.
complete organization fo r repatrIation was Operational procedures and schedules were
developed by SCAP through a series of con- developed with emphasis on the plan for evac-
ferences, in which the Chinese and United uation of China. The results of this conference
States ground and naval commanders in China were published as "Agreements Reached at
were integrated into the SCAP repatriation Conference on Repatriation '5-'7 January
system. As in the case of other areas, many 1946, Tokyo,Japan." This document governed
of the ships and direction of the program came repatriation procedures from that time on.
from the United States. The Chinese Govern· At the conference, daily evacuation rates

37 Agreements on general policies included: utilization of US naval ships, when available, to augment Japanese
shipping removing Japanese from areas occupied by forces in China; vessels to be back-loaded with Chinese, Formosans
or Koreans and Japanese civilians from Japan ; US cargo ships to be used for repatriation when space was available;
embarkation rates aggregating 154.000 monthly for Japanese were established for the Tientsin, Tsingr3o, and Shanghai
areas j monthly rates of reception of Chinese from Japan were set at 10,000 for the Tientsin area and 2,000 for the
Shanghai area.
Upon receipt of an offer from Washington of 1 00 Liberties and LST's as needed, for use in repatriation, a second
conference was held at Tokyo on 7 December 1945, as a result of which it was recommended that 100 Liberties, 100

LST's and 7 hospita l ships be made available to SCAP for repatriation. The ships were to be convected in Japan to
carry repatriates and were to be crewed by the Japanese. (G·3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western
Pac, Apr 47, p. 39·)

172
 were set as follows: North China, 4,000; about [,300 Japanese for labor until December
Central China and Formosa, [6,000; South [946, when this number was reduced to 268.
China and North French Indo-China, [5,000; These were subsequently repatriated.
an aggregate of 1,050,000 per month. These Central China evacuation schedules were
rates were based upon use of United States interrupted by an outbreak of smallpox in
shipping for Chinese repatriation.'" Shanghai in April, a typhus epidemic in May,
Within two months of the [7 January and cholera in June. On the Shanghai-Sasebo
conference, repatriation from Chinese areas was shuttle, the only major shipping accident of the
limited only by the numbers made available at entire repatriation program occurred on 22
evacuation ports . With the exception of January 1946 when the Enoshima Maru, carry-
stragglers, war criminals, and 28,000 civilian ing 4,300 Japanese civilians, struck a free mine
technicians retained by the Chinese Nationalist and sank slowly, fifty miles out of Shanghai;
Government, the greater part of China was through the assistance of another repatriation
cleared by June [946." vessel, all but seventy-seven of the passengers
South China was cleared by 25 April and crew were saved. Except for stragglers,
[946, repatriates being removed through the Central China was cleared in July [946.
principal ports of Canton, Amoy, and Swatow. Repatriation from Formosa was delayed until
Hainan Island was cleared without incident in early December [945, when the Chinese
March. Also included in South China repatri- Government landed troops and took control of
ation was that part of French Indo-China north the island. The northern half of Formosa was
of [6° north latitude. Although operational cleared through Kiirun and the southern
control of this area was being transferred from portion through T akao. The Japanese located
the Chinese Nationalists to the French Govern- in a comparatively inaccessible strip on the east
ment concurrently with evacuation of Japanese, coast were removed through Karenko by small
the area was cleared during May [946 without draft vessels loaded by lighters. Cholera once
difficulty other than a major dislocation of again slowed the program. However, except
shipping due to a cholera epidemic. for some 24,000 technicians required for opera-
The Hong Kong area of South China, under tion of essential public facilities, Formosa was
British control, was cleared early in May cleared by [5 April [946. By the end of [946
through combined use of Japanese manned those retained by the Chinese had been reduced
United States repatriation ships and British to [[ ,000 through use of both Chinese and
cargo vessels. The British, however, retained SCAJAP shipping.

38 Of the shipping requested, 106 Liberties and tOO LST's were received, but only 85 of the LST's were retained
for repatriation, the remaining 15 LST's being utilized to support the economy of Korea. Upon arrival in Japan, under
direction of SCAlAP these ships were modified to carry passengers, provided with trained Japanese crews, and placed
in service at a rate of 25 a week. Six of the Liberties were converted into hospital ships of about 1,200 beds each .
Since total available passenger capacity of these SCAjAP vessels was approximately 400,000 by the end of March 1946,
all Seventh Fleet shipping was released from repatriation. Over 50 pef'cent of the total Japanese repatriation Beet, .with
a capacity of 100,000 spaces supplemented US shipping. Consequendy by 1 March, it became apparent that the flow
of passengers from the interior could not fill available shipping to capacity.
39 Concurrendy with the main repatriation program of Japanese in China, a total of approximately 31,200 Chinese
and 32,000 Formosans were repatriated from Japan while 7,500 Chinese and 36,300 Formosans were repatriated from
other areas in the Pacific. Also some 52,650 Koreans were repatriated from Chinese areas, The British assumed
re sponsibility for retu.rn of 287 Koreans in Hong Kong.

173
 North China repatriatIOn, though affected central and north Manchuria under Chinese
by the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Communist control. Early in September evacu-
military operations which occasionally blocked ation from Chinese Communist areas was at
the ports of Tangku and Tsingtao, was com- last made possible; the outAow from Hulutao
pleted late in May 1946. During periods of increased to 10,000-15,000 daily during the
internal Chinese strife and strained relations in next two months. By the end of October all
North China, repatriation was expedited Japanese had been evacuated from Manchuria
through efforts of the U. S. Marines. except the 250,000 under Soviet control and
By comparison with the rest of China, some 68,000 unaccounted for in the interior."
repatriation from Manchuria proved the most A straggler program was set up in September
difficult. Though the Chinese Communists 1946 to accomplish repatriation of scattered
had agreed upon the desirability of repatriation groups of Japanese at Canton, Hainan, Shang-
of Japanese, few efforts were made by them to hai, and Formosa. Included in this program
cooperate until the fall of 1946. Though never were the 24,000 Japanese technicians and their
definitely ascertained, it was estimated that dependents held in Formosa. They were
612 ,000 Japanese were concentrated in the initially expected to be transported to Japan by
Mukden-Hulutao area, 387,000 near Chang- Chinese ships. Of this group SCAP actually
chun in central Manchuria, 3'0,000 in the provided transportation for all but 3,000 of the
vicinity of Harbin in north Manchuria, and '3 ,000 repatriated by the end of 1946." When
250,000 in the Dairen-Port Arthur area.'· in December 1946 repatriation shipping facili-
After the Nationalist forces had advanced ties were further reduced, SCAP established a
well beyond Mukden, repatriation began in policy to provide transportation for only those
April through the port of Hulutao. The initial straggler groups of more than 200 persons.
evacuation rate of 3,000 daily was increased to Repatriation of Koreans from China to Korea
7,500 daily by July. Peak loads were trans- was started late in J anuary because of military
ported to Japan during the summer months expediency, medical considerations, and availa-
except for minor interruptions because of a Aood bility of surplus repatriation shipping from
in the interior and another delay of three weeks China shuttles. Because of the limited port
during August because of cholera. During facilities in Korea, the traffic was divided
this period every effort was made to push between the ports of Inchon and Fusan.
repatriation in order to complete the program By mid-March 1946 the situation of remain-
in Manchuria before the port of Hu lutao was ing Koreans in north and central China
frozen in. Out of the 1,300,000 believed to awaiting repatriation had so deteriorated that
be in the area, only 469,000 Japanese, mostly their early repatriation was imperative. Con-
civilians, had been repatriated by mid-August sequently, schedules were advanced and this
1946 . repatriation was completed in June 1946.
During the summer repeated attempts were During the repatriation program from China,
made to secure evacuation of Japanese from cholera, typhus, and smallpox epidemics origi-

40 G·3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47. These figures are based on in-
formacion obtained from the Japanese Government . Although there is no absolute proof of their accuracy, Japanese
Government figures proved co be quite accurate in repatriat ion from other areas.
41 It is believed that retained technicians and labor and i.naccurate initial estimates partially explain the discrepancy.
42 G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47.

174
Orderly embarkation under U . S. Navy.

Aboard an LST at T singtao. China.

PLATE NO. 55
Repatriates from China and Manchuria.
 nating there during the spring and summer of control of SACSEA." The immediate problem
1946 had a tremendous effect on reception involved disarming the Japanese and assem-
facilities in Japan. Shipping and passengers bling them in areas near appropriate ports of
tied up in the quarantine ports of Uraga, embarkation. According to British policies
Hakata, and Sasebo at times totalled over regarding Japanese civilians, those who entered
eighty vessels with more than '50,000 repatri- British or other Allied areas after the outbreak
ates aboard. Control of quarantine ports and of the war were to be repatriated. Those
maintenance of nearly normal evacuation rates individuals, nevertheless, who had either
from all areas during the spring and summer of resided in such areas prior to the outbreak of
1946 required a high degree of rapid and war or were not objected to by territorial
effective coordination of all United States and 3.uthorities, did not have to be rerurned to
Japanese agencies; with the institution of Japan .
adequate measures to limit the return of un- Ie was agreed between SAC SEA and SCAP
authorized Koreans to Japan in small craft, even rhat useable Japanese shipping recovered in
minor outbreaks of these diseases in Japan were Southeast Asia areas,6 would be utilized, under
eliminated. United States control, in transporting repatri-
Mass repatriation from Chinese areas was ares from Southeast Asia ports directly to Japan.
completed by the end of December 1946, with In addition, such other Japanese shipping as
some '3 ,101,700 Japanese returned home." could be made available would also be allocated
The problem of repatriating Japanese strag- to Southeast Asia repatriation.
glers in Manchuria still existed, however; in a Because of the limited number of ships and
G-3 report of 29 April 1949 it was estimated the distance involved only 34,300 Japanese had
that there were slightly more than 60,000 been repatriated from SACSEA by 21 April
Japanese still in the Chinese Communist con- 1946." Early in 1946 it was realized that four
trolled areas of Manchuria." Their repatriation or five years would be rp.quired to complete the
could be accomplished only if they were able to Southeast Asia repatriation program with ship-
infiltrate into NationalIst areas and then be ping then available. This situation was unac-
transported to ports on the coast. General ceptable to both British and United States
MacArthur was prepared to send shipping authorities, and various sources for procurement
whenever there were sufficient number of Japa- of additional shipping were investigated.
nese available for repatriation. (Plate No. 56) Previously, some 106 Liberties and 85 LST's
had been made available to SCAP from United
Southeast Asia States resources to accelerate repatriation from
China. By the end of March 1946 it was
In September '945 approximately 710,670 foreseen that some of these ships would be in
Japanese awaited repatriatIon from areas under excess of the repatriation requirements of China

43 Ibid.
44 G:3 GHQ SCAP, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 29 Apr 49.
45 It developed thar initially about 14,000 passenger spaces in SEA recovered shipping were available, plus an
additional 9.000 spaces from SCAP controlled shipping, making a total of 23,000 spaces allocated to service these areas,
The first repatriation ship departed Singapore on 22 November 1945 .
46 G'3 GHQ SCAP & FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, I Jul 49.
47 Ibid, 23 Apr 46.

176
 s~~.~--'--'--+--'--'--'--'--'--'--'--''--.--'--,--+--'--'--'--'--'--'--'r-'---r--r--r--I---r--.--'--'--'--r--'--T--'--Y--'-~
••SPaCES

eoo,ooo

~
'"g
~

~.
500,000 ~ ilIT6'"
(5
;:l
\Jl
Vl
2": ,
'""0
'"Q ,.'.
I 400.000
, ,, ," '.
~ '0
,, :
5: ,,• .:
.j
I
~
o~ :40S SliP".H

I~
tIl ,
o
Z ,,,
0- ,
" <:) I 300.,000
~

,
~

~
VI
!,
VI

I
if
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'""0
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g.. \' 'Vf\
~iV /lh'~ kh
"
~

t ~~. I :
I
~~1',I /{·t~,
r';Hi{p,,~O'"
r1\,-,
100,000
~~-'I· - ..'I \ ,-,,1'-' I \I }fTOT"-' "'-
....,
\ ,, ..... PA~ ~IPPI~ I
\/1 ,, , ·~/.

/! '.: ,,
•,U,;, ~ 9HI~~ ~"G
,j, ~.

1945 1946 1947 1948

and could be used profitably in the evacuation it was agreed that SCAP would supply the
of Japanese from Southeast Asia. Authority necessary ships to repatriate such Japanese as
was therefore obtained from the U. S. Joint the British would agree to release through
Chiefs of Staff early In April to employ United August 1946, but would make no commitments
States owned shipping in this manner on a of repatriation shi pping after that time. The
charter free basis until 30 June 1946. The British on their part agreed to fuel all repatria-
British agreed to make available operating tion ships on a round trip basis and to pay
supplies such as fuel, emergency victuals and charter hire for the use of United States owned
stores in kind, that were required for SCAP ships utilized. Further agreements were reached
shipping used in repatriation service from SEA whereby three ]>ipanese warships would be
areas. After 30 June 1946 the British were placed at the disposal of SCAP on their last
obliged to pay charter hire for United States repatriation trip to Japan, and that Japanese
owned ships used in repatriation from their ships other than warships recovered in South-
areas. 48 east Asia would be returned to SAC SEA upon
SACSEA established priorities for clearing completion of the program. These agreements
areas in the following order: North Borneo, were approved by SCAP and SACSEA. By
south French Indo-China, outer Netherlands the middle of August provisions had been made
East Indies, Siam, Malaya, Java, Sumatra and for the return of virtually all repatriates from
the inner Netherlands East Indies, and Burma. Southeast Asia areas, except those retained for
A plan for repatriating Formosans and Koreans labor.
directly to their home lands was integrated General MacArthur did not agree to the
into the program. Similarly, provisions were postponement of repatriation and made state-
also made for the movement of sick evacuees ments to this effect to the U. S. War Depart-
by SCAP controlled hospital shipping. Two ment and to SACSEA. The British continued
British hospital ships, the Gerusalemme and the to retain 82,000 Japanese in areas under their
Amapoora, assisted by returning one shipment control and in addition turned over 13 ,500 to
each of invalid Japanese. the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) Govern-
In July 1946 SCAP set 31 December 1946 ment.
as the target date [or the completIon of the In November '946 SCAP made a final offer
repatriation program. The British, however, to SAC SEA to evacuate altJapanese repatriates
contemplated retaining some 90,000 Japanese from Southeast Asia to Japan, and in a separate
prisoners of war and surrendered personnel for action endeavored to dispose of the ships in
labor during 1947. accordance with the June agreement. The
Representatives of SCAP and SACSEA con· British did not accept the offer and, in addition,
ferred at Tokyo from 11 to 17 June 1946, expressed a desire to retain all Japanese ships and
consummating agreements which covered im- their crews seized in Southeast Asia. The last
mediate shipping requirements, disposition of Japanese repatriates were evacuated from that
shipping recovered in Southeast Asia, and area in October '947, except for those retained
details of fuel supply and charter hire. In short, for war crimes trials."

48 On 16 April 1946, the first of 48 Liberties and 4 LST's, in addition to 22 Japanese ships, departed Japan
destined for SEA ports. In late May, 40 Liberties, 4 LST's and 15 Japanese ships comprised the second major lih to
SEA areas.
49 G'3 GHQ SCAP 8< FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 3 I Oct 47·

178
 In December '946 the Netherlands Govern- This number was eventually increased to
ment agreed to return the '3,500 Japanese held sixteen. By early April, the Australian main-
under their control. Repatriation from the land had been cleared of Japanese. Only a
Netherlands East Indies was completed in May few were held in connection with war crimes
'947, but for those Japanese who were held as activities.
witnesses or defendants for war crimes trials.'· In April and May the program was nearing
completion. Shipping was kept flowing into
Australian Areas Rabaul to the limit of the port's ability to
process and load repatriates. By '3 June '946
Following Japan's surrender, the respective all areas controlled by AMF had been cleared
areas of responsibility of Australian Military of Japanese, Korean and Formosan repatriates.
Forces (AM F) and SACSEA were not clearly Eight hundred Japanese held for war crimes or
delineated. During autumn '945 and prior to judicial investigation were returned to Japan in
the actual inauguration of repatriation from November, leaving a balance of 8,6 as of 3'
AMF areas, successive phasing resulted in the December '946." The area was completely
establishment of AMF control of the Australian cl~ared during the following year.
mainland, New Guinea east of '42. east longi-
tude, and the Admiralty, Bismarck (New Soviet Controlled Areas
Britain, New Ireland), and Solomon Islands.
Approximately '38,700 Japanese awaited re- Incomplete reports available indicated that
patriation in these areas." there were approximately 1,617,650 Japanese in
By agreement between AMF and SCAP, areas controlled by the U.S.S.R. at the conclu-
some Japanese shipping (including warships) sion of hostilities."
capable of making the long voyage, was dis- Following instructions from the U. S. Joint
patched in late '945. Because many evacuees Chiefs of Staff, appropriate representations were
in AMF areas were sick or disabled, a large made in October 1945 to the Soviet Govern-
amount of hospital shipping was provided by ment requesting that it turn over to SCAP
SCAP. By the first of March 1946 some ships recovered in areas under Soviet control to
3' ,900 Japanese had been repatriated." be used for repatriation and to support a
Early in April authority was obtained to minimum economy in Japan. No replies to
utilize Japanese manned United States Liberty this or other radios of a similar nature were
ships to augment the seventeen Japanese ships received until 12 April 1946. It was only then
then engaged in repatriation from AMF areas. that the U.S.S.R. Member of the Allied Council
The Australian Government agreed to make for Japan reported the amount of shipping
available operating supplies in kind as required recovered from the Japanese by the Soviet
for SCAP shipping when used in such repatria- Government but stated that none was suitable
tion service. Consequently, eight Liberties for repatriation purposes.
were assigned to the clearance of AMF areas. On a local level, the respective military

50 Ibid, 20 May 47.

5' Ibid" Jul 49·
52 Ibid, 6 Mar 46.
53 Ibid, 3' Dec 46.
54 Ibid" Jul 49.

179
 Japanese repatriate children aboard ship.

Repatriate from Soviet territory is met by his family.

PLATE NO. 57
Repatriates from Soviet T erritory
commanders exercising authority in North and in Tokyo in July 1946. SCAP proposed that
South Korea conferred in January 1946, on agreements be reached regarding repatriation of
the question of repatriating Japanese nationals Japanese from northern Korea and the Dairen-
located in North Korea to Japan via South Port Arthur area, Manchuria. Since the Soviet
Korea. The main difficulty involved was the representative was not authorized to discuss the
supply of fuel for rail transportation, but repatri- return of Japanese prisoners of war and sur-
ation of Japanese from North Korea actually rendered personnel from those areas, the con-
adjusted itself while these and later conferences ference was adjourned. To support SCAP's
were in progress. Although there was no legal position, the basic authority contained in the
repatriation traffic across the 38' border in Potsdam Declaration was used, wherein the
Korea, a total of some 292,800 Japanese filtered Allied Powers announced their intention to
through and were repatriated to Japan through permit the Japanese military to return toJapan;
South Korea. When negotiations were finally hence the repatriation of civilians was secondary,
consummated it was found that there were less being conducted primarily for humanitarian
than 15,000 Japanese to be repatriated from reasons. The entire matter of repatriation from
North Korea." Soviet controlled areas was then presented to
During the period between October 1945 the War Department, requesting that arrange-
and April 1946, sporadic attempts to effect ments be conducted on a governmentalleve!. "
repatriation of isolated groups from restricted In the latter part of September 1946 Soviet
areas under Soviet control were made without authorities advised SCAP of thei, willingness
success. In April 1946 SCAP forwarded to undertake the repatriation of Japanese PW's
proposals for mutual repatriation between Japan and civilians ·from the U.S.S.R. and territories
and North Korea to the Soviet authorities. under its control; repatriation could begin the
The proposals contained in this document were following month. By 3 October 1946 SCAP
patterned on the existing agreements made by had forwarded proposals lor repatriation of
SCAP with other Allied governments and Japanese natIOnals from the Soviet and Soviet
commands. In May the Soviet Government controlled areas. The proposals were similar
returned the document suggesting certain to those sent to the Soviet authorities in April.
changes to the proposed agreements. As a In an attempt to overcome points of difference
result of this communication, a conference was encountered m the June conference, the plan
held in Tokyo the following month. No contemplated the use of Japanese coal burning
agreement was reached inasmuch as the Soviet ships. Japanese oil burning ships and United
Government requested preferential treatment be States owned ships were to be used for repatria-
given to Koreans in Japan who were to be tion only when payment for fuel and charter
returned to North Korea, but was not willing hire by U.S.S.R. had been arranged on a
to furnish any fuel or other supplies for repatria- governmental leve!.
tion ships. From 14 October until mid-December 1946,
A further conference between representatives a series of thirteen conferences were held in an
of SCAP and the Soviet Government was held attempt to reconcile points of difference: the

55 Ibid, 3 [ Dec 46.

56 On 22 August 1946 a radio was received From Washington which contained proposals, essentially the same as
those proposed by SCAP at the Tokyo Conference, to be presented to the Soviet Government by the United States.
As the situation later developed, this action was not undertaken by the US Government,

181
 Home.

And a new life.

PLATE NO. 58
Return to Home and a New Life
rate of repatriation, the payment of fuel oil for 50,000 a month, but thereafter the rate fell
repatriation ships, and the furnishing of below that figure." Consequently, the Repre-
emergency supplies and services in the Soviet sentative for the Supreme Commander and
controlled ports. Impatient to complete the Chairman of the Allied Council, Mr. W.J.
repatriation program, SCAP conceded all the Sebald, raised the issue at a meeting of the
major points and agreed to accept responsibility Council on 29 October '947. He stated that
for the return of all Japanese nationals from SCAP could and would supply ships to re-
Soviet ports up to 360,000 per month. Sole patriate as many as 160,000 Japanese per month,
responsibility of the Soviet Government was to and within five months SCAP was prepared to
deliver them to the evacuation ports. The return to Japan every Japanese then in Soviet
Soviets finally accepted but established the rate controlled areas.
at 50,000 per month." In this same agreement, The Acting Soviet Member replied to Mr.
si gned on '9 December 1946, the Soviet Sebald's statement by saying that he considered
Government consented to receive 10,000 the subject of repatriation outside the purview
Korean repatriates from Japan." of the Allied Council for Japan. He contended
While the over-all agreement was being that the failure to repatriate 50,000 monthly
negotiated, a conference was held at the request since June '947 should not be commented
of the Soviet authorities on 18 November 1946. upon, as the average over the entire period
They proposed an interim agreement to repatri- since December 1946 was slightly in excess of
ate 25,000 Japanese from Soviet areas" before the 50,000 rate. 62
the end of November; this agreement was to Approximately one month after SCAP's
be based on portions of the over-all accord offer to accelerate repatriation, the Soviet Mem-
which had been confirmed. SCAP agreed to ber stated in a letter to SCAP (2 December
the proposal at once, but final approval was not 1947) that repatriation would be suspended
received from Moscow until late November due to climatic and icing conditions from
1946 . December '947 until the opening of navigation
Under the interim agreement, ships were in April 1948.
dispatched to Soviet ports and a total of SCAP replied to this action of the Soviets
approximately 28,400 Japanese were repatriated. on 10 December '947, by offering icebreakers
Of the 10,000 Koreans estimated for return to clear Soviet ports and stating that SCAP
from Japan to North Korea, only 233 accepted controlled shipping could be dispatched to any
repatriation; the remainder forfeited their privi- other ports where "the difficult icing and
lege to be returned. 60 climatic conditions would not be encountered."
In the first five months of 1947 the Soviets In contradiction to their first letter, the
did repatriate Japanese at a rate of better than Soviet authorities' reply to SCAP's oHer on

57 See pp. ,6-'7·

58 The first request for shipping, received shortly after the agreement was signed, was for 86,000 spaces during
the month of January. The first ships to make this (jft were enrouee prior to 3 I December 1946.
59 5,000 each from Karafuto, Siberia and Dairen, and 10,000 from North Korea.
60 5,600 from Karafuto, 5,000 from Siberia, 6,100 from Dalren, and 11,700 from North Korea. (G-3 GHQ
SCAP /3( FEC, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47.)
6, G'3 GHQ SCAP, Starus of Repatriation Rpt, '7 Sep 48.
62 As of November 1948 this average stood at 38,574 repatriates monthly.

183
24 December stated that the offer was unac- the letter that U the Supreme Commander for the
ceptable because of difficulties in assembling Albed Powers ha, complied explicitly with all proyi-
Japanese at the repatriation ports and the over- siam U of the agreeme,u of 19 December 194 6 U dnd
loaded condition of the Soviet rail transpor- expects the other siguatoTY to Jaid agreeme1lt to do
tation system. It was stated that the decision likewise. "
to suspend repatriation would remain un- The SCAP spokeslllan recalled that the problem
changed. No reply was made to SCAP's offer oj repatriatIOn from SOl'iet·contTol/ed areaJ 'Was thor·
to send shipping to other Soviet ports. The oughly aired a"d discussed in the 44th meeti"g of the
letter also stated that the monthly average as Allied Council for japan and that additIOnal reliable
information d'Vailable to the Supreme Commander
of that time approximated the 50,000 quota of
indicates that conditions approachmg slave labor COtl-
the agreement.
tillue to apply /0 the estimated more than 500,000
In response to previous inquiries, the
japanese still held by the So.iet,. He further refer-
Soviet Member informed SCAP on 5 April
red to the mounting C07lcern of the Supreme Com-
1948 that Japanese repatriation from Soviet mauder oyer this unprecedented SituatIOn dud /0 the
controlled areas would be resumed in May circumstance that this "ear-s/aye labor is being utiliz.ed
instead of April as had been indicated initially in SOlilet and Soyiet-cotltrolled areas, under appalling
by the Soviets. He stated that due to un- (onditions of se rl'itude, to increase the military
favorable climatic conditions this year and also potetltial of So.iet Russia. It is reported that these
taking into consideration transportation and men are used in mu"it;ous pla1us and airfield construc-
technical facilities, the repatriation would be tion as well as in the mines.
resumed in May of this year." The spokesllla" further said that the offer made by
A SCAP press release of 8 September 1948 SCAP almost a year ago to repatriate japanese held
stated: by the So.iets at the rate of 160,000 per 1110 nth still
No/withstandiug constant and persistent efforts on stands, but that this offer remains unanswered and
the part of SCAP to expedite the repatriation of ignored by the So.iet Rep;esentati" in japan.
japanere from So.iet and So.iet-controlled areas, all The ,pokesman said that the So.iet attitude on the
efforts to date halif been undyailillg dnd without question of repatriation is in marked contrast with the
result, a SCAP spokesman said today. This cotl/inued fuifillll<lll of the rel..ant pro.ision of the Potsdam
SCAP conce,,1 oyer the failure of the Soyiet authori- Declaratiou by the GOl'ernmetUs of Australia, China,
ties to repatnate japanese from SOYJet-co1ltrolled areas France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippi'"
on schedule and in accordance with tbe repatriation Republic, the Un;ud Kingdom, and the United
agreement of 19 December 1946, »:as indicated in a State> which haY< offered prompt and full cooperation
sharply worded letter dated 3 September 1948, mil ;11 the implemeutatio1l of the repatriatjoft program.
on behalf of SCAP to Lt. Gw. Kwma N. Dert- Additionally, he stressed that "the So.iet authorities
.yanko, So.iet Member, Allied Council for japan. haY< callously refwed to proyide SCAP with statistics
The lett" indicated that not si"" May 1947, ha.. of any kind relating to japanese held in So.iet and
repalriauI released from Soyiet and Soyie/-control/ed So.iet·controlled areas, and that to date SCAP is
areas reached tbe 50,000 monthly rate, dnd tbat completely without official informatiou c01lceruing the
Augwt 1948, marks the fiftee"th co",ecuti .. month health, ti'Ving condjti01u, numbers, Hames, or where-
that the So.iet repatriatio" aUIhorities haYe failed to abouts of a ringle japanese held by the Soyiet au-
meet fhi! agreed upon rate. It was further stated ;71 thorities."

63 During May, June, and July 1948, approximately 45,000 Japanese were repatriated from Soviet controlled areas
cach month. In August the number fell to approximately 40,000 . (G-3 GHQ SCAP, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 17
Sep 48.)

184
 Confusion at the Railroad Station.

Repatriates form cordon and challenge police.

PLATE NO. 59
Repatriates from Soviet PW Camps. 1949
 Sina t~ uJumption of Ttpcltricltion on 1 May nese are still held in Siberia or territory under
1948-a/ter comp/ttt cessation of tht program sinct Russian control, almost fOUl years after the
early in December 1947, the So,iet authoriti" haY( war's end. "6,
again failtd month aft~r month /0 meet the agreed A startling Tass press release in Moscow
upon monthly raU of 50,000 "patriau,. The latest on 20 May announced that only 95,000 former
SeA p Itlter told the So,iet Member that .. at the
Japanese troops remained to be repatriated.
begl1ll1l1lg of the fourth year of the occupation of
This figure was at complete variance with the
Japan, ,t i, hoped that an illcreased e!fort on the part
of the Go>erumelll of the USSR to meet the agreed official compilations by the Demobilization
repatnatlo,t rate mar bring the Japanese repa/n"a/ion Bureau of the Japanese Government and GHQ
program to a COUclUSI01J without further delay" G-2 and G-3 Demobilization Repatriation
At the end of the year an estimated 408,743 Record Sections. Their records listed a total of
Japanese remained in Soviet controlled territo· 469,04' personnel still to be repatriated from
ry." A few repatriates arrived from Siberia in Soviet controlled areas.
the early part of '949 bringing the estimated Repeated efforts by SCAP to obtain precise
total still to be repatriated to 408,729 as of information from Soviet authorities on general
April '949. prisoner of war totals or on deaths of Japa-
Information of vital importance to the Japa- nese internees were fruitless. Soviet repatria-
nese regarding death, disappearance or illness tion authorities not only refused to allow
of Japanese prisoners of war was again repatriates to carry ashes of their dead back to
requested of the Soviet Government by Mr. their homeland, an old Japanese tradition, but
Sebald, chief of SCAP's Diplomatic Section, did not even permit the transmittal of rosters
in Apri l. His letter stated : " ... there has of deceased internees. Japanese authorities
at no time been any report whatsoever from were required to complete death lists through
Soviet authorities concerning Japanese prisoners exhaustive and time-consuming interviews of
of war held in the Soviet Union nor is it ap- returnees. Under this system prisoners
parent from information available to the were not officially listed as dead until the
Supreme Commander that any effort is being exact date, place, and cause of death were sub-
made by Soviet Authorities to furnish such stantiated by at least two witnesses. It was
information.... " The letter went on to state believed that failure of the Soviets to report
that" ... more than a dozen J apanese·operated deaths among prisoners held for over three
ships under SCAP control are standing by years in Siberian camps could possibly
awaiting word from Russia to renew the re- account for the wide differences between re-
patriation of war prisoners which was halted patriation figures released by the U.S.S.R. and
during the wima. More than 400,000 Japa- the Japanese Government."

64 G·3 GHQ SCAP & FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 3I Dec 48.
65 Tokyo, Pacific Stars & Strip", April 26, '949.
66 According to the Japanese Government, the surrender of the Japanese Army in I94~ placed under Soviet
responsibi lity 2,723.492 Japanese (civilian and military) approximate ly 700,000 of whom were transported from Manchuria
and Korea into Soviet territory for internment. As of May t949, the repatriation account showed 469,041 military and
civilians still to be repattiated and chargeable to the Soviet prisoner of war authorities. These Soviet authorities were
consequently accountable for 374,041 persons after crediting them with 95,000 to be repatriated by the end of 1949 by
their own announcement. The Japanese Government estimated '53,509 possibly alive, based on the receipt of postal

186
 Shimbun," a formalized indoctrination program
Soviet Indoctrination of PW's" was launched. It included a closely interwoven
network of schools , lectures, study groups, cul-
In 1946 when repatriation to Japan was tural societies, and Communist cells; former
opened for the first time the Soviets chose the Communists and sympathizers, and other dissi-
weak, infirm and aged for return. The reason dent elements were trained to lead in embracing
for this choice was obvious : they could not and propagating communism's disruptive prin-
work and would contribute nothing to the ciples. With this firm core of protagonists,
internal economy of Russia. It was hardly the Soviets found it relatively easy to expand
worth-while to indoctrinate them; the weak their program so as to enlist at least half-
and infi rm would probably die under hardships hearted support of great numbers of individuals
still ahead, while the aged possessed rigid who originally had been neither pro- nor anti-
thought patterns less easily subverted. Almost Communist.
without exception these first returnees were The remainder, who opposed the Communist
extremely bitter toward their captors. ideology, usually came to heel, ostensibly at
The next step taken by the Soviets was de- least, when they realized that the rapidity of
signed to sift and classify prisoner groups. their repatriation would depend greatly on how
Older, high-ranking officers were sent to segre- thoroughly they convinced their more aggressive
gated camps; medium rank officers, too, were comrades and their Soviet keepers that they
separated. The remainder (company grade subscri bed to the Communist doctrines.
officers and enlisted men) consisted mainly of Consequently, except for the diehards who
younger, politically inexperienced, naive men, refused to weaken, Japanese PW's accepted the
whose minds had not hardened into thought propaganda to a greater or lesser extent. As
patterns and cou ld not adjudge the proffered time went on, and especially during the latter
ideology in the light of firmly rooted beliefs part of '947 , the prisoners saw conditions
and opinions. around them steadily improve. Food became
Under the impact of a cleverly calculated more abundant and more palatable. Living
barrage of propaganda, buttressed by the quarters, bathing, recreational, and medical
Soviet directed propaganda newspaper, Nippon facilities were improved, and many internees

66 (coord.) cards by relatives in 1947 and 1948j this was by no means conclusive, and exceeded, under any criterion,
the official Soviet admission:
SO'Yr~t Arta, Manchuria TO/til
Unrepatriated 408.7 29 60,3 12 46<),04 1
Soviet admission 95,000 95,000
Verified dead 39,937 17.4 18 57,355
Verified alive (Mil) 129,87 1 129,87 1
Verified alive (Civ) 23,63 8 23,63 8
Status unknown 21 5, 28 3 4 2 ,4gB 25 8 ,177
Total accountable 313,729 60,312 374.041 469,041
67 (I) GHQ FEC MIS GS, CIS Periodical Sum, 15 Feb and 15 Mac 49 (S); ( 2) GHQ FEC MIS GS,
Plans and Est Sr & CIS Sp Int. Interna l Factors as Security Problems (or the O ccupation Forces (Rev), I Jan 49 (5).
68 l3*tlillll (Nippon Shimbun) was published in Khabarovsk, Siberia, under the di rection of polilical and pro-
paganda specialists of the USSR Intelligence Section. It sparked the class hatreds between officets and enlisted men;
it was [he basic textbook in all phases of the political re-education of prisoners; it supported all changes ordered by
Moscow. The influence of the Nippon Sh,mbun was tremendous as it was virtually the only source of II news" to the
vast majority of internees.

187
Family struggles to keep repatriate from joining Communist demonstration.

Communist-led disorders at railroad station.

PLATE NO. 60
Repatriates from Soviet PW Camps, 1949
began to work an eight-hour day for which Shortly afterward, when processing cards were
they were paid a fairly reasonable wage, expend- distributed to all repatriates, they refused to fill
able for small luxuries. At the same time, them out until their leaders authorized it.
Soviet citizens, who heretofore had wallowed Several communistic speeches were made during
publicly in misery comparable to that suffered processing, and statements such as "being in
by the internees, also began edging upward in enemy tern.tory " and " d on' t wea ken now "
their planes of living. Thus the prisoners had were heard. After leaving the repatriation
visual evidence that the Soviet system was pro- center, Communist agitators again took charge
ducing results which appeared favorable. and led the group in mass singing of commu-
The repatriates of 1947 were more thorough- nistic songs, which continued until the train
ly subverted than those of 1946. Those who pulled out of Maizuru station. This shi pload
returned in the latter part of 1948 were in- of repatriates was different from other groups
doctrinated to a much higher degree and ap' only in that they were better organized. In-
peared to be much better organized. The doctrination in the U.S.S.R. had built up an
first instance of mass refusal of repatriates to actually hostile feeling in repatriates against the
cooperate with the Occupation authorities oc- United States and the Japanese Government."
curred when the Eiho MaTU docked at Maizuru Several days prior to the arrival of this ship-
on 20 November 1948. Immediately after the load of repatriates there was a sizeable alterca-
ship anchored, an unusual loud burst of sing- tion among members of an earlier arrived group
ing of Communist songs and dancing startled In which Communists and non-Communists

the U. S. officers who' had boarded earlier. came to blows. This fight stopped as soon
Although repatriate leaders stopped the demon- as Occupation forces appeared. Such fights
stration when so ordered, many defamatory re- have occurred in the past; they became more
marks were heard, obviously meant for Oc- frequent and the number involved appeared to
cupation personnel and the troop commander. be on the increase.'· (Plate No. 61)

6SJ GHQ SCAP MIS GS, Spot Int Rpl, 3 Dec 48, sub: First Instance of Non-cooperation of Japanese Repatri-
ates with Occupation Authorities. In MIS 014. 33- 1948.
70 When repatriation from Soviet controlled areas was resumed in June 1949. these disturbances continued . One
of the most serious occurred on 4 July 1949 when a large group of members of the Communist Party and the League
of Koreans Residing in Japan staged a demonstration at the Kyoto Railway Station. When the first trainload of
repatriates debarked, the Communists tried to persuade them to join the demonstration. When police interfered, the
Communists resorted to violence. Two of the Communist leaders were arrested. Repatriates who witnessed the arrests
refused to board the train unless the two Communists were released. Officials finally persuaded them to board , but
they got off again, singing the "Internationale", when asked by the Communists to remain and stage a joint struggle
for the release of the twO Communist leaders .
The second and third trains arrived several hours later and repatriates aboard were persuaded to join the struggle in
front of the Kyoto station, making a total of approximately 1800 repatriates and 1000 Communists in the demonstration.
The majority of the repatriates did not dare enter the special train in fear of their leaders. However, when eighty·seven
who were returning to the Osaka district marched to the platform to board, members of the Communist Party attempted
to SLOp them. Again, when the police interfered , violence ensued.
The Kyoto station authorities announced that two special trains would depart at approximately 1030. The repatriates
refused to board. Shortly after midnight, however, the repatriates began to voluntarily move to the platform; by 0300
all of them were aboard and the trains had departed . The people on the platform had already returned to their homes
by the time the repatriates boarded.
It was observed that the repatriates greatly feared their leaders and did not resort to II individual action". It was
further noticed that they seemed to be shrinking from the Communist Party line. Some repatriates told the police that
" succeeding units are outwardly the same as we. The police must go into action with determination. It is only that
.11 of us are fearful of the leader." (CIC Sum of Info, t5 Jul 49, sub: Repatriate Incident at Kyoto Sta.)

189
 Nippnn TOKYO. FRIDAY. AUGUST S. 1949 .~III.

Nippon Times Mea or Beut.? . the kind hanch enended in heartfelt sym.
...,........,
• '1'0"'" H'_
Th nan. U, . pathy. Still othe.. have stonily brushed
fOC",,,.,, ,..", ••, aside their families, who have been impatient-
Are these men or

--- u_'••,-n.o.
TOK)'O Or-FiCC '
1, I th_. Chll00.·
. " c.tIUI.Jp.o.
'b ~I>I>OM:
~ I~ __
Dh .... \111 . . _ 1It1, beasts the Soviets ly waiting these many years to have them
T'eJ.,...phIo ~, ~ 'h- are sending back to back under their family roof. to stay with
1170-,..._" ,
Japan from dIeir the pack. Moving:as animal herds, they move
OSAKA :~---aid;. hI.: a.rt.
"we "'lin.
prison camps? It and act at the direction of the pack leaders
SUUCIU"""'PTiOH flAT&:
"' ..~ .... fOp' 'IO.os:I ........ is no wonder that wh:arcver the action or ~oum may be.
lnc .d
lu _ _ Ub.... h' .. ......
... _ "'c.
......, 'fllllrICA,
""' . .
"'0 ........... _ t . o l '- ..... an anguished mo. Where is their individuality? . Where is
'aa 0... _u. ".JIG. ", ... their feeling for family and home? Where
.~r." I~I.I 14 _.... ....
Ob.. " ... , ,-, dJrwtl, r....... u _ _
ther welcoming her
is their sentiment for 'their native land?
~=~ ;rn:..:. ~r,,"m!:"~
cLclOIntaJ \0 . .1ft u.a. 'OIl f~
long - absent son
Where is their respect for law and order?
......",..... ~. WIJIM ... should cry out,
... ontft ntnr.
"What have they Perhaps the repatriates themselves should
TOKYO. FAlDAY. AUO . .. , ...
done to my son?" not be judged roo severely for they are the
That cry has been products of Communist training. They an
echoed and re-echoed many rimes since the the ones so well indoctrinated th2t the So·
begining of this year's repatriation program. viets allowed their return. They are Com-
These questions are asked because the re- munists.
patri2tes have shown time and again that It is small wonder that the families of the
they apparently lack the basic sentiments and repatriates should ask, "What have they
feelings which differentiate human from done . . . ?" The Japanese know now, if
beasts. For almost a week with their native they did not know before, what communism
land in sight and with Joved ones waiting. does to men. What sensible, freedom-loving
a shipl02d of repatriates have sullenly re- people would take in an ideology which robs
fused to land. Others have snarled and men of their individuality and their sensibiliry
snaped at the warm word~ of welcome 'Ind as human beings?

Excerpts from Japanese newspapers of the same period verify the opinion expressed
In the above editorial:
T okyo Nicbi Nichi Shimbun, 3 Jul- •.. Most of [he
repatriates completely ignored the salutes of the Tokyo
Governor and metropolitan officials. Instead (hey sang the
" Internationale" and waved red flags in answer to the
enthusiastic receptions by red-flag welcomen. This was an
aspect unlike any observed repatriate trains in the past ••..

Asahi Shim bun, 6 Jul- ... Forty-three repatriates alighted

from the tram amidst a burst of cheers br waiting families
and the singing of the .. Internationale' by Communists.
Some, surrounded by famil y members, burst into tears, while
others tried to tear themselves away from their families,
crying, .. Let me go with my comrades." . • .

Jiji Shimpo, 21 Jul CMaizuru D ispatch)- . •. The repatriates

on board these twO ships displayed the greatest defiance and
silence yet seen, perplexing the authorities concerned .... they
appeared emotionless on viewing their native country. It is
said that the 2,000 repatriates on board the Daiiku M aru
maintained a strict silence ever si nce the ship left Nahodka
and that they refused to cooperate in the execution of
repatriation business. . .

Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 Aug CMaizuru Dispatch)- ... The

repatriates rtfused to fill out repatriation papers and as a
result stretcher cases had to wait eight houts before they
could be landed to be hospitalized • ...When doctors or
nurses tried to approach the patients to give them treatment,
the leaders of the repatriates and attendantS of the patients
turned them back .•.•

PLATE NO.6,
Japanese Press Expresses Opinion on Soviet Indoctrination of Repatriates, '949
 Communist indoctrination and propagandiz- 13,500 until May 1947. The Chinese Govern-
ing of Japanese prisoners progressed with ment kept in China, Formosa, and Manchuria,
steadily increasing success, especially after au- a total of 70,000, the majority of whom were
tumn of 1947. To a considerably greater technicians and their dependents who had
extent than had been observed earlier, ;l number elected to remain. In all areas a few individuals
of later repatriates in the 20-30 year age were detained as war criminals or as witnesses
group exhibited a belligerent attachment to for the trial of war criminals."
Communist ideology which often amounted to A total of approximately 1,152,650 Koreans,
fanatical zeal. Many declared their determi- Chinese, Chinese-Formosans, Ryukyuans and
nation to become active adherents of the Japan natives of POA were returned to their respective
Communist Party; others showed undisguised homelands from Japan in repatriation ship-
hostility to Japan's social and governmental ping." All who desired to be moved under
system and violent antagonism to the United the repatriation program were evacuated. The
States and its occupation policies. These zealots few remaining were those who had forfeited
had a firm conviction that capitalism must dis- their privilege to repatriation; Koreans destined
appear, not as the result of a gradual evolution- for Korea north of 38" north latitude, and some
ary process, but by the violent efforts of the few who could not move due to circumstances
" people", who must overthrow it and usher in beyond thei r control.
the" ideal" Communist social order. Koreans, Chinese, Chinese-Formosans, and
It is important to note that the degree of Ryukyuans were found in every area. Rather
the U.S.S.R.'s success in indoctrinating pris- than transport these individuals to their re-
oners of war in communism was in direct pro- spective homelands through Japan, it was more
portion to the length of time prisoners had expeditious to repatriate large groups directly.
been kept in the U. S. S. R. About 187,650 were repatriated from areas in
the Western Pacific directly to their former
Summary: 1945-1948 homes."
At the peak of the repatriation program 188
In the relatively short period from 1 Octo- Japanese ships with a carrying capacity of
ber 1945 to 31 December 1946, mass repatria- 200,000, and 191 United States owned ships
tion in the Pacific as a major operation was with a carrying capacity of 334,000, were avail-
completed. A total of approximately 5,103.300 able for repatriation. These ships, however,
Japanese were returned to their homeland. The could not be operated at all times.
bulk of Japanese nationals remaining to be During the period of mass repatriation,
repatriated, estimated at 1,316,000, were under principal reception centers in Japan were in
the control of the U.S.S.R. A smaller group of operation at Hakata, Hakodate, Kagoshima,
about 80,940 were retained for labor by the Kure area, Maizuru, Nagoya, Sasebo, Senzaki,
United Kingdom in Southeast Asia but were Tanabe, and Uraga. (Plate No. 62) At the
finally repatriated by October 1947, while the end of 1948 reception centers were stiU in op-
Netherlands East Indies Government held eration .a t Hakodate, Maizuru, and Sasebo.

7' (,) G-3 GHQ SCAP 8< FEC, Status of Repatriation Rpt, 6 Jan 47; (2) G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass
Repatriation in the Western Pac, Apr 47.
72 G-3 GHQ SCAP 8< FEC, Status of Repat,iation Rpt, 6 Jan 47.
73 Ibid.

191
 JAPAN
APPROIl''''ATE SCALE 1 . 6,500,000

J A p

SASEBO HAKOOATE
IN-I,437,000 IN - 288, 000
OUT- 29, 000

5 E A

HAKATA

NAGOYA

KAGOSHIMA
IN -428,000
OUT-II,OOO

PLATE NO. 62
Principal Reception Centers and Repatriates Processed:
30 September '945 to 3 I December '948
All incoming and outgoing repatriates were half million orientals from areas as far south as
processed through these centers, and their effi- Melbourne, as far east as Hawaii, and as far
cient operation was a vital factor in the suc- west as Burma could only have been the result
cessful accomplishment of the program. At of a high degree of cooperation among responsi-
one time when cholera broke out among over ble authorities. Careful staff planning and
80,000 repatriates from South China at the brilliant execution were reflected in the vast
reception center of Uraga, they were held in numbers moved, and the attendant negligible
quarantine aboard ships in the harbor while loss of life was caused by accident or disease
infected individuals were examined and treated. and not by shipwrecks. This rapid and suc-
At the peak of the program in May '946, the cessful accomplishment was a major factor in
centers arranged rail transportation for 550,000 raising the morale of the Korean and] apanese
repatriates returned from China during a three peoples and contributed materially to the suc-
week period." cess attained by the Occupation forces. The
The mass repatriation effected in the West- only exception to this outstanding record of one
ern Pacific was a waterborne migration in scope of the major missions of the Occupation was
without parallel in history. The smoothness the uncompleted repatriation from the Soviet
of an operation transporting over six and one- areas,n

74 G-3 GHQ SCAP, Rpt on Mass Repatriation in Western Pacinc, Apr 47.
75 As 01 May '949.

193
 CHAPTER VII
THE EIGHTH ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

A decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Concept of Military Government implemented by appropriate SCAP action, to
utilize the Japanese governmental agencies for
The present-day connotation of "military the execution of Allied policies made the task
government", developed following the close of of Occupation in Japan much easier than in
World War II, is an outgrowth of control Europe. By preserving the Emperor system,
measures under the Potsdam Declaration the Allies continued an acknowledged head
initiated by the Occupation forces of Germany of the Japanese people, whose traditional
and Japan. The Occupation of Japan differed influence permitted immediate governmental
widely in its manner of operating from that of control. Although stripped of his former
Germany. ' power, the Emperor still commanded the respect
In Germany, with the collapse of the Nazi of the Japanese masses who obeyed implicitly
regime, all government agencies disintegrated, his order to cooperate with the Occupation
or had to be purged, leaving the four occupy- forces! These factors determined the method
ing powers no alternative but to create a new under which Military Government was to
government system for the whole country. operate in Japan.'
The Occupation of Japan presented a different Since the Japanese civil government was
picture. The abrupt termination of hostilities, capable of operating, Occupation authorities
permitting an unopposed landing in Japan, were relieved from directly administering a
was not designed to disrupt an integrated, " conquered" country ; instead, they were
responsible government and it continued to charged with seeing that the Japanese
function almost intact. Government complied with SCAP's di-

1 U nless otherwise noted, information contained in this chapter is based on original manuscript prepared by the
loth Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth US Army, Eighth Army Military Government System in Japan,
1945-48 (R).
2 This factor was carefully evaluated by G-2 in the surrender negotiations in Manila, when the personal treatment
of the Japanese emissaries, civil and military, and the phraseology of documents were handled with extraordinary at-
tcntion to psychological effect against a background of Japanese cultural traditions .
3 Although Military Government had been planned and organized prior to the end of the ~ar, it was not in
effective operation during 1945 and the best parr of 1946. Only one-third of GHQ was in Tokyo during the critical
early phases of the Occupation (September 1945- March 1946). Troops and staffs were concerned wi~ establishing
their garrisons and military areas. Neither the Civi l Sections, SCAP, nor their executive offshoots, were in a position
to exercise" military government "; policies and detailed instructions were in continuous process of realistic formulation.
The principal priority objective during this period was the disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces of Imperial
Japan. Plans and po licies for this delicate and risky undertaking were made by GHQ, Tokyo, in a coordinated effort
that involved the General Staff sections primarily; the demobiltzation ports and camps were run by the Japanese.

194
rectives.' Military Government was also to eventual establishme,~ of a peaceful and responsible
advise Japanese officials on matters in which gO>fmment which will respect the TIghts of other states
they had no previous experience under a and will jupport the objecti,es of the United States
totalitarian regime. In effect, there was no as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter
of the United Natiom. The United States desire>
" military government" in Japan in the literal
that this gO>frnmetlt should conform as closely as may
sense of the word. It was simply a SCAP
be to principles of democratic self go>fmment but it
superstructure over already existing government
is not the mpomibility of the AI/ied Powers to impose
machinery, designed to observe and assist the
upon Japan any form of go>ernmetlt not supported by
Japanese along the new democratic channels the freely expressed will of the people.
of administration.
General MacArthur exercised governmental Military Government, while supervising the
authority through instructions issued directly economic, political, social, and cultural structure
to the Japanese Government by the Central of Japan, was to intervene as little as possible
Liaison Committee.' The Central Liaison in Japanese governmental matters. The govern-
Committee routed these instructions to the mental reins remained in the hands of Japanese
officials, and intervention was limited to cases
proper Japanese ministry which, through Japa-
of inadvertent or deliberate abuse of this
nese governmental channels, notified prefectural
governors of the action required by SCAP. privilege. The Japanese were constantly being
Neither the Occupation authorities, civil and prompted to . take the initiative in bringing
military, nor any subordinate agency ever dis- about prescribed reforms.
placed any element of the Japanese Govern- Military Government operated on two levels:
ment. The operational directives which were the policy and plans level, a General Head-
used to implement the SCAP policies were quarters function , and the operating level, in
designed to carry out the ultimate Allied the Sixth and Eighth U. S. Armies. General
objectives, as stated in the United States Initial MacArthur established seven staff sections,'
Post Surrender Policy for Japan :' which were primarily concerned with the non-
The ultimate objectiyes of the United Statts in reo military, civil affairs, and governmental aspects
gard to Japan to which policies in the initial period of the Occupation, for plannmg and policy
must conform drt to insure that Japan will "of again direction.
become d menace to the United States or to the peace On the operational level. the commanding
and security of the world, and to bring about the generals of the Sixth" and Eighth Armies were

4 The Civil Sections, SCAP, particularly the Natural Resources Section and the Economic and Scientific Section
became the great policy-making agencies of the Occupation, employing specialists in every field from the United States to
set into motion great reform movements for every major subdivision of tht: Japanese Government and the economy
of Japan.
5 All contacts between SCAP sections and Japanese governmental organs were made through the Central Liaison
Committee composed of Japanese officials appointed by the Prime Minister, and American officers, asSigned by GHQ,
SCAP. This Committee maintained a liaison group in GHQ, under operational control of G·2.
6 GHQ USAFPAC PRO Rele.. e No. 227. 23 Sep 45, sub : US Initial Post SUIT Policy fot Japan.
7 They were: Government Section (GS); Economic and Scientific Section (ESS); Natural Resources Section
(NRS); Public Health and Welfare Section (PH&W); Civil Intelligence Section (CIS). including Public Safety Di·
vision (PSD) which supervised the Japanese Police, Fire DepartmentJ Maritime and Customs Police Services; Legal
Section (LS); and Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E).
8 For the first four months of Occupation Sixth Army was in control of the southern half of Honshu and the
islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, with headquarters in Kyoto.

195
 The Emperor, renouncing a tradition of divinity, steps from behind the
bamboo screen to meet the people.

The people, free for the first time to express convictions, meet to protest
against an unpopular government policy.

PLATE NO. 63
Japan's Emperor and the New Democracy
 JAPAN

. ".
APf'ROX! MATE SCALE I &,500,000

= -.~

A p

5 E A

-.-

~ DETACHMENT

TOII-_
~ COMPANY

~ GRO UP

P REF ECTURAL BOUNDARIE S

PLATE N O. 64
Disposition of Military Government Units. January 1946
charged with the implementation of SCAP began detailed planning for eventual control
directives. After inactivation of the Sixth of Japan.
Army in January '946, the Eighth Army, Immediately after the surrender, GHQ,
under General Eichelberger, assumed responsi- AFPAC , authorized the organization of
bility for the organization, activities, and proper four MG companies. These were formed
functioning of Military Government in all of specialists provided by GHQ and Civil
Japan.- His mission on this level was to Affairs units operating in the Philippines.
oversee the Japanese in executing the general Officer specialists and Military Government
directives of the Supreme Commander. To units activated in the United States were held
accomplish this, local operational directives in readiness, subject to call when Occupation
designed to implement the policies, plans , and requirements were determined.
directives of the Supreme Commander were In anticipation of any emergencies which
issued to tactical units as well as Military might develop upon arrival in Japan, selected
Government teams. members of tactical units were organized into
Eighth Army Military Government was Military Government staff sections at divisional
organized with three principal agencies: a staff and regimental levels. These sections con-
section at Army Headquarters, a staff section ducted necessary liaison with Japaneso officials,
at each of the two corps headquarters, and requisitioned labor and billets and performed
Military Government units stationed through- general Military Government duties. In Octo-
out Japan. Eighth Army served both as an ber '945 , as trained Military Government units
enforcing agency, implementing SCAP policies, began to arrive, tactical units were gradually
and as a reporting agency. relieved of thei; Military Government responsi-
bilities. On Army level, Military Government
Formative Period activities continued under the Civil Affairs
Section until 21 September '945 , when the
The development of Military Government se,tion was redesignated the Military Govern-
in Japan can be traced in certain background ment Subsection of G-!."
actlvltles. While Eighth Army was still in Soon after the Occupation began, duties of
the Philippines, Military Government was set this section assumed greater proportions; it
up as Civil Affairs Section under G- 1.'. An- was reorganized as the Military Government
ticipating the problems that could arise with Special Staff Section. Headquarters, Eighth
an abrupt termination of the war, this section Army. The newly established section was to
was expanded during the summer of '945 and make appropriate recommendations to the

9 Gen Eichelberger, who brilliantly led Eighth Army during three years of active service in the Pacific and served
with equal distinction the Allied cause during the first three years of O ccupation. returned to the ZIon 4 August 1948
for retire ment.
10 The initial concept of" military government " was apparently heavily influence d by its known application in Italy
and Germany . This concept was inapplicable in the Philippines, a sovereign, associated country, and basically unsound
for Japan since a legitimate, amenable government was in operative existence, and it was decided a prIOri to maintain me
Japanese Government ,and operate through it.
I I This must be considered an ineffective change of phraseology. Psychologically, the term "military government"
was bound to undercut the position of Japanese functionaries, who had to carry a substantial load . Four years later, on
IJuly 1949, SCAP changed the designation of Military Government to Civil Affairs Section; this change was accompanied
by a thorough cut in personnel strengths which eliminated the prefeCtural teams .

198
commanding general concerning economic, po- and were not to be assigned other duties. The
litical, and sociological matters pertaining to the scheme had groups attached to corps for the
civil population; prepare and disseminate local purpose of administering the functions of
orders and directives necessary to carry out Military Government on a geographical,
SCAP orders; coordinate and control the pro- regional level and companies attached to sub-
curement of supplies, labor and other facilities ordinate units within the corps to perform
from the Japanese Government; and main- identical duties in one or more prefectures. "
tain liaison on matters of Military Government After all Occupation duties were assumed
with the other general and special staff sections, by Eighth Army on 1 January 1946, the
the Navy, and separate commands of the Military Government units throughout Japan
United States and the Allied Powers stationed were reorganized to make up six groups,
in the Eighth Army area_" twenty-four companies, and twenty-eight de-
Military Government units had been formed tachments.'" (Plate No. 64)
into groups and subordinate companies_ 'I Both The first six months of 1946 was a period
contained specialists III engineering, legal of exceptionally heavy readjustment and tactical
matters, medicine, public safety, natural re- redeployment of troops. Redeployment in the
sources, industry, supply, translator service, number of tactical units brought about a series
labor supervision and control, salvage opera- of administrative changes and consolidations
tions, and transportation. among Military Government units ; however,
By mid-November 1945 seven groups and no major poliCY changes were involved. In
eighteen companies h~d been assigned to the BCOF zone and in the Tokyo and Kana-
the Eighth Army. Three groups and two gawa Prefectures, the work went on directly
companies were placed directly under the under the Eighth Army staff sectlon ; elsewhere
Army; the others were attached to the corps the activities continued under Military Govern-
under Eighth Army and the U. S. Army ment grou ps or special staff sections under
Service Command-C (USASCOM-C)," which the corps.
operated at corps level in the Kanaga wa Since there were not enough Military
Prefecture. A special detachment was set Government units for each of the prefectures,
up to administer Military Government in it became necessary to break up some of the
Tokyo. organizations into detachments. As the ad-
Eighth Army planned to have Military ministrative procedures became more complex
Government administration uniform through- and it appeared that 9ualified speCialists were
out Japan. Military Government groups and not being employed to the best advantage, a
companies were slated for use as integral teams new type unit known as a .. team" replaced

12 HQ Eighth US Atmy, loth Inlo and Hi" Sv, Eighth Atmy MG Sy"em in Japan, 1945-48 (R), p. 4.
13 Tht:. (ormer consisted of 13 officers, 1 warram office r, and 26 enlisted men, the latter of J 2 officers and 6 en-
listed men.
'4 See Ch. II.
15 At the end of the war, Japan was administratively divided into nine reg ions and further sub-divided into 42
prefectures, one territorial administration (for Hokkaido ), and three city or municipal prefectures. Several purely
administrative changes subsequently lOOk place, and by 1948 all these major subdivisions were considered as prefectures.
For purposes of MG administration, two of the nine regions (Tokai and Hokuriku ) were combined, and Hokkaido was
considered as a d istrict. (One unit combined functions or both district headquarters and prefectural team.)
16 HQ Eighth US Atmy, loth Inlo and Hist Sv, Eighth Atmy MG System in Japan, 1945-48 lR), p. 5.

199
 \
, .,.
JAPAN
APPROXI MA TE: 'jCALE I . 6,!!iOO,OOO

J A p

s f.
\
~~-
0,,-

R~M~~
~\
,
o \• ",,',",' _~ oKYO MG TEAM *'

"1O-.5tII-~ KANAGAWA MG TEAM"*'

~_ , ..,t.~'\\)

X-
CHUGOKU
REGION

.-
\ I?
.of UU [
SHIKOKU
REGION • @
LEG E N:O

REGIONAL HEADQUA~TER S
a

, \ •
•
MAJOR PREFECTURE'-
INTERMEDIATE PREFE CTURE

\ ... MIN OR PREFECTURE

t SPECIAL AREA
MG TEAM* ~NP.f~HD~XW~~ CONTROL OF

PLATE NO. 65
Organization of Military Government In Japan, July 1948
the detachment. The new team paralleled prefectures and one for each of the seven
Japanese governmental organization, so that administrative and geographical regions. Hok-
Military Government groups, companies, and kaido was considered a .. district "in which
detachments transformed into teams were one unit combined the functions of both the
identified with the name of the prefecture to district headquarters and the prefectural team.
which they were assigned. > , For the purpose With the exception of the Tokyo, Kanagawa,
of administration and control, prefectural teams and Shizuoka prefectural teams, the regional
were grouped under seven regional Military and prefectural teams within each corps area
Government teams. (Plate No. 65) Economy were attached to the corps and operated under
in the use of cri tical personnel was achieved the direct supervision of the corps commander. >.
by creating three types of prefectural teams- The three excepted teams and all regional and
major, intermediate, minor-and two special prefectural teams in the BCO F area operated
teams, each in accordance with the relative under the direct supervision of the Eighth
importance of the area to which assigned and Army Commander. Although no Military
the nature of the requirements. >S Government responsibilities were delegated to
the BCOF Commander, a number of Aus-
Evolution of Organization: 1946-1948 tralian officers and enlisted men did serve in
each of the eleven MG teams in the BCOF
Military Government organization, as zone of occupation. ~
evolved in Japan , (Plate No. 66) consisted of The duties of the Military Government staff
a staff section at Eighth Army Headquarters, ~ections consisted mainly of administration,
two corps headquarters, I and IX Corps, each investigation, and the preparation of numerous
of which had a Military Government staff reports. The sections were also charged with
section, and fifty-three Military Government inspections of field teams, training of sub-
teams-one team for each of the forty-six ordinate units, and supervision of the adminis-

17 This was an essential point. The prefecture is an executive and functional unit in the Japanese Government
as well as an administrative or liaison unit. It was placed under the general purview of Military Government, hence
affiliation with the prefecture was essential. As a matter of fact, the MG teams or units progressively conformed [0
and became accustomed to working in the provincial boundaries of the prefecture.
18 With the change of organization and the attending economy of personnel, the field strength dropped from
2,800 to 2,288. With the Army ':1ndergoing its readjustment program, it had become increasingly difficult to secure
military personnel with which to fill positions in the numerous specialized fields, and early in the year Eighth Army
had been authorized to employ civil service personnel in a wide variety of positions. (HQ Eighth US Army, loch Info
and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945- 48 [R], p. 6. ) Some civilians, trained and experienced in such
specialized fields as economics, sociology, and government, were procured. Despite all efforts to adjust the MG or.
ganization to meet the needs of the Occupation with available personnel, shortages continued. In August 1948, there
were 3¢ civilians against an authorized 529, and the military strength had dropped to 1,772 against an authorized
strength of ',9'1. (HQ Eighth US Army, ,oth Info and Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, '945-48 [R],
P·7·)
19 In each" corps, one of the regional teams served as the corps headquarters, MG staH section.
20 After June 1947, one officer and two enlisted men were assigned to each MG team operating in the BeOF
area: 76th MG Co (Hiroshima, Yamaguchi and Shimane Prefectures); 9ISt MG Co (Kagawa and Ehime Prefectures),
8ISt MG Co (Kochi and Tokushima Prefectures), 36th MG Co (Okayama and Tottori Prefectures). These personnel
were under the supervision of the team commander and assigned to tasks in the same manner as US Army personnel.
The operation of these groups as part of the US teams was most successful.

201
 Headquarters
Eighth U S Army
Lt Gen Robert L Eichelberger

Special Staff Section

Headquarters
Eighth Army Military Government
Colonel Rex W Reasley

Administration Tokyo
Language
and Detachment
Section
Person nel 32d Mil Gov Co

Legal and Economics Repatriation

Public Safety
Division Division
D ivi sion

Supply and
W elfare
Finance Division Medical Division Procurement
Division
Division

Fishing and Industry and Labor Trade and

Price Control Utilities
Agriculture Manufacturing Commerce
Subsection Subsection Subsection
Subsection Subsection Subsection
Organization of Eighth Army Military Government Section, January 1946

SCAP
TOKYO
Fuku i
• Eighth Army Akita
•
H yogo
• ~ MG Staff Section
, i A omori
•
Kyoto
• Kinki I
I I Corps Yokohama IX Corps I Tohoku Fukushima .
Nata
• Region I
I
Kyoto Sendai I Region
I
!wate
•
Osaka • T okyo
• +
Yamagata
•
Wakayama .

•
Kanagawa
• H okkaido
Miyagi
•
Shiga
Shizuoka
• District
f- H okkaido
•
Aichi
• (liJ
- Ehime
•
Chiba
•
Ishikawa
-- • Tokai
Kagawa
• l-
@
Gumma
•
Gifu
• Hokuriku
Kochi
•
Shikoku
Region • Ibaraki
•
Mie
• Region
Tokushima .
Kanto Nagano
•
Toyama
• Hiroshima .
Region Niigata
•
Fukuoka
• Okayama
•
@ Saitama
•
•
,•
Kagoshima . Chugoku Tochigi
Kumamoto .
@ Sh imane
• I- Region Yamanashi .
Nagasaki
• Kyushu
Region
Tottori
•
Y .. naguchi . Staff SeClion, Corps Headquarter>
Oita
• Regional H eadquarters
Miyazaki
• • District
+
Prefecture Teams
S aga
• Headquarters

PLATE NO. 66
Military Government in Japan, January 1946- July 1948
tration and supply activities of the regional these sub-branches dealt with social, as dis-
prefectural teams," tinguished from financial or economic, re-
The prefectural teams were the "front line sponsibilities of the Japanese Government.
units" of Military Government in the field. On the basis of reports and recommendations
The personnel of these teams came in frequent submitted by Military Government units in
contact wi th the local Japanese and could the field , the M G staff section forwarded
observe conditions and activities at first hand. consolidated reports and recommendations to
They advised the Japanese authorities as to GHQ, SCAP, designed to keep policy-making
missions and objectives of the Occupation and officials fully informed regarding the impact of
kept them informed of directives and the initia- the Occupation upon J apanese social and
tion of programs designed to promote the economic conditions."
welfare and education of the people in the com- At corps level, M G functioned through a
munity. (Plate No. 67) The reports in mat- staff section with intermediate control over the
ters of compliance with SCAP policies came execution of operational directives, applying
from these teams. Suggestions were offered them to corps zone conditions, facilities , and
for the correction of observed errors in the ex- available personnel. The regional MG offices,
ecution of directives. Despite these manifold at the next lower level, provided a working rela-
activities, team commanders were in no sense tionship with the Japanese Government's
military governors." The direct issuance of regional bureaus and a channel to the teams
an order or. the taking over of any Japanese and tactical units in the region. In operating
governmental agency was to be undertaken at team level, MG, particularly through
only in grave emergencies or when specifically the activities directed by the Social Affairs
authorized by the Army commander. Division, worked closely with the Japanese peo-
ple through individuals and groups representing
Social Affairs Division the Japanese Government and civilian organiza-
tions in prefectures, cities, towns, and villages.
Those phases of the Military Government The prefectural team, SCAP, approached
mission which required the most direct ap- the Japanese people through a variety of
proach to the Japanese people as individuals channels; these included newspapers, motion
were handled through a Social Affairs Division, pictures, street shows (kamishibai), radio pro-
consisting of five sub-sections devoted to Civil grams, courses of instruction, demonstrations,
Education, Civil Information, Public Health, exhibits, conferences, interviews, inspections,
Public Welfare, and Repatriation. All of mass meetings, and special meetings of pro-

21 The strength of the section in August 1948, was 52 officers, 57 enlisted men, and 73 Department of the Army
civilians. App[Qximately 70 foreign nationals and Japanese were employed as clerks, cypists and interpreteu, and for
allied duties. In Augusl 1948 the reams varied in strength from 6 officers and 19 to 26 en li sted men in the minor
prefectural teams to 12 officers and 71 enlisted men in the largest of the teams. (HQ Eighth US Army, loth Info and
Hist Sv. Eighth Army MG System in Japan. 1945- 48 [Rl. p. 8.)
22 The functioning of the typical MG teams is shown on Plate No. 67.
23 SCAP had other means of keeping informed. The Counter Intel ligence Service maintained field stations in
every prefecture, paralleling MG field stations but concentrating on ultra·nationalist movements, subversion, sabotage,
espionage, operations of Japanese or foreign agents, social unrest and agitation, the development of Communism, etc.
Public opinion was thoroughly covered in the "Daily Press Translations" of ATIS, embracing metropolitan as well as
provincial newspapers.

203
 I SENIOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER I
I Oetac:h_c~
I EXECUTIVE (EXECUTIVE AND ADJUTANT)
I
I I I I I
OVlL EDUCAnON PU8UC WELfARE LEGAL AND GOVERNMENT CIVIL INFORMATION PUBLIC HEALTH

Surveillance, encouragement SurveiUaftce, encourqement JapanelC Law. (;uidc alld a ...~ · 1oI in: Surveillance. encouraRement

§ and aeistance in:

Public and Private Educa-
.nd ....... i,,!
Public and Private Welflft
Japancae Con.inltion
Japanete Courts Development of Local In-
and aniltance in :
Public Heahh Program
~ non -~ Purge of Officials except Teachers formation Media .nd PrcI'Cntil'C Medicine

~. Reorpniution .nd 0.- Wc!fare Institution. Governmental Activities Partie, Organizalion!1 VU CanlTol
centralization of School Pen.1 Institutions Election. Planning, Conducti ng Local TH Control
System Re(orm School. Special Investiga tions Information Programs J )i!lribution and Ule of
0
...... Adult Education Welfare Training Program• Assist in Military o..:cupation ReinforcinR National In- Medical Supplies
Relief Supplies POri Quarantine At ti viriel

~
Teacher Tr.ining Coun Matten furma tion Programs
Screening of Teacher. Welfa~ of Foreign Nationals Medical Education
:=:-
g Arts and Monumentl
RelitiOn
DilUter Operations
Social Insurance programa
Hospitalization
Nutrition Sun'eya
Naroocit Controls
Cl '1:1 Nursing Affail"l

~" ~ .., VeteriruT)' Affairl

Sanitar; Affnil"l

~ tIl Dental Affairs

"g
c·
6 I ECONOMICS
I
I
2.
01
-S' I
NA ruRAL RESOURCES tABOR
I I
COMMERCE AND TRADE MANUFACTURING ANO
I I
UNIT ORGANIZATION AND
s· Surveillance of: For Civil Industry : Import-E)[port INDUSTRY ADMINISTRAnOI'f
....... A.,riculture I...abor Relaciona and Edutation Supervision Encournge and Stimulate Critical
Peraonncl
"
."
Land Reform Pqram Strikes Coordination
Storage, ReJeuc and Rationing
Industriel
Su ....·eillance uf RCSlril100 Manu- Training
? Fiahina
MWnc
Tracie Unionl
For Occupation Forces ; of Imported Food facturerl
Supply
....... F..-y Procurement Price Control ·and Rationing Reparations -<':ustody, Control. Mess

'"
-< Petroleum Production and Oi.-
tribution
Prooe.ing
Supervision
Fish and Vegetable Control Program
Staple Food Collection
Inventory and Maintenanl.'C
Military Inttallationl
Motors
Quarterl
~
S torage and Inter-Prefectural Mail
SaIYlip of Ja~DCM! Military Coordinate Return tu Japanese
:g Materiab
I...aborReportl
Shipment GO\'C rnmc:nt
PUll ~change
00 SurYt:il1ancc uf Textille Programs Special Se ....·icc:.
E5ec:tric Powu
US Anny Scnp and Waste Recreation
Wau Chlorination
DiflCipline
Communic:ationl
Tt'anIpOnation
Re1eae of W . . Oils
Civil Property
Organization of Farm Coopera-
ti_
Dissolution of Agricultural Asstl-
dation
- ----
fessional a~d non-professional groups (teachers, students were idle; and only a small percent-
farmers, parents, students, doctors, editors, age of the necessary equipment, textbooks, and
unionists and others). Through these channels other supplies was available. The need for a
the team collected first-hand information on complete reorganization was obvious and acute.
current and anticipated conditions, lent advice Before Occupation forces landed, the Japanese
and assistance in the solution of immediate Ministry of Education had ordered the schools
problems, and submitted reports and recom- reopened, directed the closing of military and
mendations .... naval academies, abolished military training in
O"il Education : The Potsdam Declara- the schools, issued a statement of new educa-
tion directed the Japanese Government to estab- tional principles, specified methods of modify-
lish " freedom of speech, of religion, and of ing and adapting text books, and removed
thought." The United States Initial Post- militarists from teaching positions. In out-
Surrender Policy for Japan declared that "ultra- lining the basic policy for education reform,
nationalistic and militaristic organizations and SCAP directed that dissemination of militaris-
movements will not be permitted to hide tic and ultra-nationalistic ideology and all mil-
behind the cloak of religion." itary education and drill be discontinued. In-
Prior to the surrender, the Japanese school culcation of concepts and establishment of
system was highly centralized and was admin- practices in harmony with representative gov-
istered by a hierarchy of officials headed by the ernment, international peace, dignity of the in-
Minister of Education; all officials and teach- dividual as well as such fundamental rights as
ers were appointed by the government, and all freedom of assembly, speech, and religion were
courses and teaching methods were prescribed encouraged. Following the new education
by the Ministry. The strictly controlled policy, existing curricula, text books, and teach-
education program was heavily influenced by ers' manuals were examined and replaced as
ultra-nationalism, militarism, and "State soon as new instruction materials could be pre-
Shintoism"." There was no real freedom of pared. Personnel of all educational institu-
speech, thought, learning, or religion. tions were investigated, approved or removed,
By the time the war ended, the educational reinstated or appointed, and reorientated and
system had been disrupted and paralyzed. supervised in accordance with the new policy.
Over 3,000 of the nation's 40,000 school Religious activities were separated from govern-
buildings had been destroyed; thirty-one of mental control, banning "State Shintoism"
the country's forty-nine universities were par- from the educational system.'·
tially demolished; approximately ,6,000,000 Under the policy guidance of the Civil In-

24 It should be noted here that the practical control of newspapers, motion pictures, theaters, etc., was exercised
by the Civil Censorship Division (CeD), an operating agency of the Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP j ceo main-
tained stations in the field, especially in communications centers. See Ch. VIII.
25 As a quasi-religious ideology, the" State Shinto" had been used by militarists and ultra-nationalists inJapan
to foster, through school and home education. a military spirit among the people (0 support a war of expansion.
26 (I) SCAPIN '78, 22 OC145, sub: Administration ohhe Educational System ofJapan. (2) SCAPIN 212,
30 Oct 45, sub: Investigation, Screening, and Certification of Teachers and Educational Officials. (3) SCAPIN 448,
15 Dec 45, sub: Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State
Shinto (Kokka Shinto, Jinja Shinto). It should be noted that all details of the educational reform movements were
planned and directed by Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), one of the many SCAP sections created to
initiate governmental reforms; MG became one of several agencies of execution.

205
formation and Education Section (SCAP) in the subjects.'"
reform and rehabilitation of the nation-wide The Ministry of Education issued instruc-
school system, civil education officers of MG tions for bringing textbooks and the subject
teams were required to give special attention to matter of courses into line with the new pro-
surveillance activities, personnel investiga- gram. Corps commands were directed to
tions, school inspections; assistance in school inspect five schools in each prefecture of their
management, budgeting, and administrative commands every month to assure that schools
matters; guidance in teacher training and and teachers complied with the instructions of
placement; and encou ragement of local leader- the Ministry; eventually the responsibility for
ship and responsibility. these inspections was delegated to the civil
Although the screening of school officials and education officers of the MG teams.
teachers was directed in October 1945, it was Many of the reforms recommended by the
May 1946 before the Japanese Government U.S. Education Mission which visited Japan
submitted a plan for screening, through special in March 1946 were inititated.'9 Among these
committees established in each prefecture, were the plans for decentralizing the school
which was acceptable to SCAP. In November system and the introduction of compulsory
1946 a Military Government survey of prefec- teaching of " Romaji ", a simplified system of
tural committees indicated that twenty· one of writing Japanese in Roman characters. Efforts
the forty-six were unsatisfactory and should be toward developing a modern system of free
reorganized; in April 1947 screening committees' education continued.
tabulations showed that approximately 22 per- Ci"i[ Infonnation : Constituted as a sub-
cent of the nation's school officials and teachers section of the Social Affairs Division, the Civil
had resigned or were removed by the screening Information Branch was responsible for observ-
committees. By June 1948 approximately 700, - ing and reporting on all similar Japanese
000 individuals had been screened, of whom activities. This necessitated the indoctrination
less than 3,000 had been found unfit to con- of press and radio representatives in the priv-
tinue in the educational service." ileges and responsibilities attached to their
The program to eliminate obj ectionable positions in conjunction with other SCAP
courses, practices, and textbooks from the agencies." The civil information program was
schools became a matter of continuing concern planned, controlled, and implemented at the
to Military Government. SCAP had directed SCAP level through the Japanese Government
the Japanese Government to reform the school and the utilization of the Japanese press, radio,
program, specifically eliminating the teach- and motion picture industries on a nationwide
ing of Japanese history, morals, and geog- basis. At the lower levels the information
raphy until all traces of the old nationalism program was a part of the civil education mis-
and militarism had been erased from these sion, and a large measure of the progress made

'7 HQ Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, '945- 48 (R), p. '4.
,8 SCAPIN 5'9, 3' Dec 45, sub; Suspension of Courses in Morals (Shu,hin), Japanese History and Geography.
29 A group of distinguished American educators visited Japan to make a study of the education system. They
advised SCAP and the Japanese Minister of Education on technical matters. (SCAPIN 571, 9 Jan 46, sub: Com-
mittee of Japanese Educators.)
30 Civil Censorship, in prefectural field stations, operated an efficient surveillance system in all public information
fields to enforce a standard Press and Publications Code.

206
An American Education Mission studies the school system. Many of the suggestions of
this mission have been incorporated in the Japanese educational program.

Self-instruction material for adults is provided by Civil Information

and Education Libraries located in the major cities of Japan.

PLATE NO . 68
Modernized Civil Education, March '946
 in educati on reforms was due to the informa- Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) or to G-2,
tion projects for reorientation of the Japanese GHQ, SCAP. Neither was the suppression of
people. It became particularly helpful in con- obscene books, pictures, and films a function
nection with matters of public health and wel- of Military Government; complaints or obser-
fare, crop collections, price control and ration- vations in matters of this kind, however, were
ing, land reform, conservation and utilization called to the attention of the proper SCAP
of natural resources, tax collections, labor re- civil section and certain Japanese law and en-
lations, and all forms of education. forcement agencies."
Civil Information programs, on the SCAP Public Health: In the occupation of a
level, were evolved with Japanese Government devasted and impoverished country where
agencies." Upon the basis of national plan- health and sanitation were at best sub-standard
ning, the Civil Information Subsection, in co- and resistance to disease was dangerously low,
operation with other staff section elements, pre- the initiation of an adequate public health
pared detailed information plans and distributed program became an immediate public problem
these to the units in the field. Corps and and development of the program was a
regional oflices processed the plans through major objective. MG oflicers, in conjunction
other elements on their levels and forwarded with the Public Health and Welfare Section,
the program to the prefectural teams. SCAP, began at once to exercise close
The approach to the Japanese at the local supervision over all Japanese health agencies
level, was through Japanese newspapers, radio and facilities and gave assistance wherever
stations, and receivers which were outlets for needed. Their efforts during the first three
the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan;" all years of the Occupation had an important
public speaking systems; motion picture .pro- bearing upon the reduction in dysentery cases
jectors and theaters; citizen's public halls; and other intestinal maladies traceable to un-
magazine, book and pamphlet publishers; sanitary conditions and practices. Through
public libraries and reading rooms (except their vigilant surveillance and reporting, they
school libraries and SCAP libraries) ; dramatic forced the Japanese Government and its agen-
and theater groups; and English-speaking so- cies to take positive action against venereal dis-
cIetIes. Primary responsibility for MG activi- eases, illegal use of narcotics, disease-bearing
ties in connection with other Japanese agencies insects and rodents, impure foods , and other
(such as farm organizations, public welfare in- threats to national health.
stitutions, and professional societies) rested in As in other phases of military government,
each case with the team oflicer whose special the burden of work was in the field. Policies
work was related to that particular agency. and national programs were developed by the
Censorship as such was not a responsibility Ministry of Welfare with SCAP-level direction,
of civil information oflicers. Materials which advice and assistance, but the success of the
came to their attention and seemed to violate plans depended directly upon prefectural and
censorship policy were reported to the nearest local agencies. The prefectural health depart-

31 Policy responsibility : CI&E Sect ion, one of the major operative civil sect ions of SCAP.
32 Po licy respons ibilicy and field superv ision by joint action of CeD and CI&E.
33 In the early part of the Occu pation, the policy. mak ing civil sections were large ly siruated in Tokyo, as staff
agencies of SCAP; field operations, surveillance, and enforcement devolved on agencies in the field; in this category
only three had p<actical effect: MG, CCO and CIO.

208
ment, the city health offices and clinics , and Life Security Law," the first comprehensive
the district health centers were the agencies welfare legislation ever enacted in Japan, was
through which the MG team public health passed by the Diet, MG teams were required
officer and his staff worked." to see that the prefectural and municipal
An example of the operations of Military officials understood the law and complied
Government surveillance in public health was with its provisions. This act placed the
the abolition of neighborhood health associa- burden of responsibility for public welfare
tions at the end of August 1948. The SCAP on local government agencies and provided for
directive was based on field reports indicating assistance to the destitute, care of the homeless,
that "racketeers" had obtained control of health distribution of free food and clothing in ne-
associations and were selling vaccines, drugs, cessitous cases, care of foreign nationals, in-
and insecticides initially issued by Japanese spection of institutions, and disaster relief
health authorities to local governments for free planning. In view of the impoverished con-
distribution. Counterintelligence reports also dition of the country, the lethargy of public
showed that political bosses were beginning to officials, and the lack of trained social workers,
control the health associations as substitutes the position of the public welfare officer in
for the SCAP prohibited Yonan Gumi (Neigh- Military Government was difficult.
borhood Associations) through which the Typical of the many matters confronting
Ministry of Interior used to exercise complete welfare officers were the grievances of foreign
political control over the people." nationals, the illegal disposal of food and
Public Welfare: Public welfare was one of clothing formerly the property of the Japanese
the first concerns of Military Government in Army and Navy, falsification of relief claims,
Japan, a country in which the government had and the problem of caring for vagrants and
previously acknowledged relatively little re- homeless children. Foreign nationals com-
sponsibility for the care of its people, in need of plained about unfair distribution of ration tick-
food, clothing, shelter, or medical attention. It ets, high prices, and the unsanitary conditions
was estimated that at least one-ninth of the in the stores designated by the Japanese Govern-
population needed employment or public as· ment to handle the supplemental food rations.
sistance. Occupation authorities initiated and Early in 1946 MG units verified the Japa-
supervised nationwide surveys of relief needs, nese inventories of former army and navy food
assisted in the organization of emergency relief supply and clothing stocks held by prefectural
programs, exercised surveillance over Japanese governments and kept surveillance over the
agencies responsible for the disposal of former disposition of these supplies and over the relief
army and navy supplies, and checked on the program for unemployed. Despite all efforts,
distribution of commodities through ration unreported or diverted stocks of food and
channels. When the SCAP-inspired " Daily clothing continued to be a source of illegitimate

34 Some of the means used to advertise the health program were hygiene courses, physical examinations, demon-
strations and exhibits, radio programs, newspapers, magazines, slides, film strips, charts, posters, street shows and health
clubs.
35 One of the main objects in creating the TontZri Gu";j in pre-surrender Japan was to facilitate police supervision
over the thoughts and loyaly of the people by encouraging inter-community spying on the same pattern as was used by
the Nazi Gestapo. This is still a favorite method or the special police branch of the people's Commissariat of Interior
(NKVD) in the USSR.

209
Large stocks of Japanese Army and Navy medical supplies, uncovered by Military
Government officials, are distributed to Japanese medical and relief agencies.

Excess American Army food is distributed to the needy to augment the

depleted Japanese stocks.

PLATE NO . 69
Control of Medical Supplies and Distribution of Army Rations
 Income for unscrupulous blackmarket profi- inmates in welfare institutions. For operational
teers. Welfare Ministry investigating teams, purposes, the field of public welfare was eli-
acting under Military Government surveillance, vided into eight major projects; public assist-
discovered vast stores of unreported goods in va- ance, child welfare, disaster relief, penal and
rious prefectures. As a result of their findings, welfare institutions, in-service training of wel-
seven prefectural governors were removed, five fare personnel, communiry organization, foreign
reassigned, and others severely reprimanded nationals' rations, and information.
for their lax administration of relief." Repatriation: The subject of repatriation
In mid-summer of 1946 a field study of the of millions of Japanese nationals to Japan, and
child welfare situation revealed that the larger foreign nationals (mainly Chinese, Koreans,
cities were overrun with homeless children, Formosans, and Ryukyuans) from Japan, has
without visible means of support. A survey been covered in all its aspects in Chapter VI.
was conducted to determine the number of or- The very complicated governmental machinery
phanages available, the rypes of educational designed to operate this project was planned
facilities provided in them, the source of their by G-2 and G-3, GHQ, in conjunction with
funds and rations, and the number of waifs at the former Japanese military and naval author-
large. At Military Government urging, Japa- ItIes. The work of manning and operating
nese authorities were required to enforce control, ships, providing supplies, operating medical,
conduct more frequent" pick-up" campaigns, sanitary, and customs inspections was done by
and make maximum use of the established the Japanese Welfare Ministry.
relief stations for vagrants. The Military The part played by Military Government in
Government representatives developed and the repatriation program was limited to super-
maintained a close working relationship with vision over standards prescribed by SCAP,
national, prefectural, and local Japanese public quarantine controls, maintenance of records,
and private welfare agencies. The primary inquiries regarding disposition of exceptional
objectives of the over-all program were; to es- cases, and forwarding recommendations for im-
tablish and maintain a program which would proved service. MG representatives maintained
provide for the welfare of the civil population surveillance of port operations, investigated
to the extent necessary to prevent unrest, to charges of discrimination lodged against Japa-
provide for a system of administering public nese officers by outgoing repatriates, checked
assistance and welfare services on the basis of into shipments of repatriates' baggage, uncovered
individual need, and to improve the care of contraband, assisted Japanese officials in the

36 Under the emergency relief program, unlawful relief claims were prevalent. Public welfare officials expected
to reveal 100,000 ., ghosts" on the Tokyo relief rolls alone through a census recheck. It was known that many families
were drawing rations for deceased relatives. that the names on many ration cards were fictitious, and that rations were
being drawn for persons, particularly Koreans and Chinese, who had left the country early in the repatriation program.
In Hyogo PrefeC[ure, ceo intercepts indicated the existence of a sizeable "ghost I> population on the critical foods
ration lists . Acting on these leads, the ration records were examined on an exhaustive scale and in this one prefecture
alone it was discovered that during a three months' period 2,571,028 days' rations had been drawn by "ghosts ". [n
the course of this investigation, 33,.0 00 bushels of food, principally rice, were confiscated, 17,336 .. ghosts" laid to rest
and 611 cases prepared for prosecution. As a result of the startling developments in thi s incident practically every
prefecrure in Japan undertook si milar investigations, the result of which contributed immeasurably to the equitable
disposition of critical foods , thereby lessening the amount of food required to be imported from America and elsewhere.
(Memo. CCO (m G-2 GHQ FEC, 14 Jun 49. sub: Mo Rpt of Activ)

211
diagnosis and disposition of communicable the complete converSIOn of the Japanese in-
diseases found among repatriates, and through dustry to the war effort. The cessation of
strict quarantine and other control measures hostilities brought this disrupted economy.to a
helped to localize outbreak of disease in port virtu~ I halt. ESS and NRS, the major civil
areas. They were also responsible for sanitary sections, SCAP, influenced the Japanese re-
inspection of all repatriation ships. Thus, covery to an important degree, utilizing Mil-
although Military Government was not directly itary Government and Technical Intelligence
responsible for any phase of repatriation, its teams for the field supervision of such pro-
representatives contributed to the success of the grams as land reform, development of natural
program which caused more than seven and resources, education and organization of an
one-half million persons to move into or out alert labor force, and maintenance of agricul-
of Japan in less than three years. ture experimental stations.
Natural Resources: When the war ended,
Economic Division the natural resources of the nation were in
a depleted state. This was particularly notice-
The primary duty of the Economic Division able in the fields of agriculture, fishing, electric
was described in an Occupation report: power, and mining. It was immediately ap-
" Through surveillance, supervision, investiga- parent that production would have to be in-
tion, surveys, inventories, studies, and reports, creased tremendously to meet the needs of the
Military Government kept thousands of sensi- populace, and that the feudal agricultural
tive fingers on the economic pulse of the pa- system would have to be revamped if the farm-
tient, and by advice and assistance, encourage- ers were to increase the yield. It was neces-
ment and insistence, injected stimulants into sary to increase fertilizer stocks and the supply
the economic bloodstream."" of farm implements in order t() augment food
This Division, from the earliest days of the supplies. Since it was obvious that actual
Occupation, operated through field sub-sections starvation would result if food production were
responsible [or particular phases of Japanese not supplemented by outside stocks, the Occu-
economy. Some of the original sub-sections pation authorities recommended and supervised
were dropped, others added. In August a rationing system. Stocks of American food
1948 there were four : Natural Resources, were added whenever the domestic stocks fell
Manufacturing and Industry, Labor, and Trade below the subsistence level.
and Commerce. Their individual importance With only one-fifth of the land in Japan
varied with the changing political and eco- arable, it was important that all tillable land be
nomic situation.]8 cultivated. The many Japanese airstrips which
During the war much of Japan's productive were no longer needed were released for farm-
capacity had been crippled by aerial bombard- ing. Later, a program was initiated in the
ment, food production had declined steadily as urban communities to place under cultivation
manpower was drained from the farms , and much of the land laid waste by Allied bomb-
consumer goods had been depleted because of mg.

37 HQ Eighth Atmy, loth Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan '945- 48 (R), p. 26.
38 Policy direction and major economic rehabilitation measures were under the Economic & Scientific Seeden,
one of the major operative civil sections, SCAP j the able chie f of this section was one of MacArthur's pre-war staff officers
in the Philippine period, Maj Gen W . E. Marquat.

212
 One of the principal problems facing Mil- actual transactions did much to expedite this
itary Government was keeping farm products in program.
the authorized channels. The farmers, who Of immediate importance to the economic
mistrusted government promises of fertilizer recovery of the country was the rehabilitation
and farm implements, withheld large quantities of the coal mining industry. When the Oc-
of their products from the legitimate distribu- cupation forces first entered Japan, the mines
tion channels and diverted them into the black- were in need of drilling equipment, were ham-
market. The first attempted solution of the pered by other shortages caused by rail break-
problem was the establishment of patriotic down, and were operated by slave labor which
farmers' unions which encouraged full deliv- was immediately eliminated. Stockpiles of
eries of the rice quotas set by the government. coal had dropped to less than two million tons
Concurrently, the pressure for land reform by the end of '945. Following the SCAP
legislation was increased until acceptable laws instructions to repatriate the Korean coal
were passed in late '946. miners, the shortage became so serious that
By the end of the year resentment of farmers the mining industry was placed under special
over the failure of the government to provide study. One of the big problems was the
fertilizer and implements which had been labor unrest and the many work stoppages,
promised resulted in a movement to hold up especially prevalent in Hokkaido. The Nat-
rice deliveries until the incentive goods were ural Resources Sub-section worked in coopera-
received ..• Actually, only 45 percent of the tion with the Labor Sub-section and, through
'946 rice quotas were filled by the end of the development of unions, higher wage rates, use
year, and if it had not been for the efforts of of special food rations for the miners, and
the Military Government teams which kept the release of incentive goods such as American
collection agencies under close surveillance cigarettes and clothing, coal production was
and did all in their power to encourage farmer gradually increased.'· At the same time,
compliance, collections would have been even special attention was given to the rehabilita-
less. tion of the rock drill manufacturing com-
During '947, under the Land Reform Pro- panies."
gram, the government purchased over two mil- The third major project of the Natural
lion acres of land for redistribution. By May Resources Sub-section was the rehabilitation
'948 the first prefect1,lre, Yamagata, reported of the fishing industry. Initially, the greatest
that it had completed the resale of government need was for boats. Another serious shortage
purchased land to tenant farmers. Constant was in twines and nets, but with the partial
liaison with the regional bureaus of finance rehabilitation of the spinning industry and
and agriculture, education of the farmers con- the importation of hemp from the Philippines,
cernmg their rights, and supervision of the this shortage was overcome. Fuel . remained

39 G-2 GHQ FEe had in its possession definite proof that Communist agitation was largely responsible for this
condition. See GHQ SCAP, Int Set, Vol. IX, Op<,.'ions of Iht Ci.il Inttlligrnct Section, GHQ, SCAP (5).
40 The production for 1946 was approximately 22,000,000 tons. The production quota for 1947 was set at
30,000,000. Actual production, however, did not exceed 27,500,000 tons, 90.6 percent of the last established quota .
ESS, SCAP, established a production quota of 36,000,000 tons for 1948 (the minimum necessary for Japanese ,tconomic
independence). Actual production was 34.79 1,300 tons, g6.6 percent of the quota .
.p This program was so successful that rock drills became an item of export in 1948.

213
a critical item, but the amount of fish available labor was scarce and lethargic; and electric
for distribution increased steadily from the power and coal were lacking for those in-
beginning of the Occupation and, with in- dustries still capable of operation.
creased fuel allotments, this trend continued. The first step taken by ESS, SCAP, was
Electrical output was inadequate in the early to initiate a licensing system under which the
days of the Occupation, and during the severe manufacturers could receive permits to operate
drought of 1947 a national educational pro- with some guarantee that their plants would
gram to conserve electricity was fostered and not be touched for reparations. This step,
publicized. The production of hydroelectric administered through the Manufacturing and
and thermoelectric power became more satis- Industry Sub-section, MG, resulted in a no-
factory in 1948. ticeable increase in production.l l
Manufacturing and Industry: During the With the removal of some plants from the
early phases of the Occupation the basic reparation lists, the lessening of governmental
mission of the Manufacturing and Industry restrictions, and the encouragement of the
Sub-section was to initiate procedures for the Economic Division, producers began to retool
early resumption of production and distribu- for production; but they continued to be
tion of commodi ties and services necessary to hampered by the lack of raw materials. Coal
meet Occupation needs and a subsistence re- production was the key to the industrial situa-
quirement for the Japanese, and to make an tion and the greatest emphasis on the MG
inventory of the industrial machinery earmarked teams during this phase was the rehabilitation
for reparations to the Allied nations. The of those plants most needed to produce the
physical problem in inventorying all the poten- tools required for the full operation of coal
tial reparations plants entailed so much labor mines.
that it became necessary to draw personnel In November 1946 GHQ, SCAP, issued
from tactical units. These units were also instructions relieving Eighth Army Military
utilized to furnish guards for the plants listed Government of the responsibility of processing
for reparations until the armed strength had the Japanese Government requests to utilize
been so depleted through the redeployment plants slated for reparations." This function
program that Military Government was forced was taken over directly by SCAP. Shipment
to utilize Japanese guards to protect the of reparations equipment began on 16 January
plants." 1948 when a load of machinery was dispatchad
Loss of rolling stock imposed an almost to China. Crating and shipping of repara-
insurmountable transportation bottleneck. The tions machinery continued under the supervi-
big industrialists would not operate for fear sion of the Military Government teams. Con-
that their plants would be seized as war booty; currently with this program, the Manufactur-

42 Policy direction and major economic movements were directly handled by ESS, SCAP. Technical Intell1..
genec, a war·time operating agency of G·2, assisted in the field inspection of laboratories, factories and raw materials.
43 A committee, appointed in 1946 by the President to investigate Japan 's ability to make reparations, suggested
that all industrial rehabilitation should be subord inated to reparations and that the finestjapanese industrial equipment
should be reserved for dismantling and removal. These recommendations adversely influenced the economic recovery,
and it was not until more favorable recommendations were made by later committees that Japanese manufacturers gained
confidence and production took a more positive upswing.
44 SCAPIN 1355, 22 Nov 46, sub: Permits for Conversion and Reconversion of Industrial Plants (ESS).

214
Indicative of progress in rehabilitation of industry is the launching of a train-ferry boat,
second ship completed by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, Ltd_, after the end of the war_

The first shipment of silk from occupied Japan is loaded on the

Manne Falcon, ,8 March 1946.

PLATE NO. 70
Rehabilitation of lndustry
 ing and Industry Sub-section carried out a of prison labor by private industry. This labor
program for the destruction of machinery was allotted to employers at rates ranging
capable of producing armaments and continued from one-third to one-half of the prevailing
the high priority inventory of critical materials. wage scale. The prisoners were allowed to
Labor: When the Labor Sub-section, MG , retain one-tenth of their pay, the remainder
was first established, it faced the conflicting being kept by the authorities for the up-
problems of meeting the labor reguirements keep of prisons. Thus, prison labor not
of the Occupation forces and of sponsoring only provided unfair competition against free
an organized, informed, and independent labor labor but also gave employers a cost advantage
force. The first mission of the Sub-section over their competitors. This practice was
was the detailed study of the over-all wage discontinued during the prison reform move-
picture for presentation to the Economic and ment, initiated by the Public Safety Division,
Scientific Section of GHQ, SCAP, which had SCAP.
the final responsibility of promulgating a wage By early spring 1946, labor unions had
scale that would be eguitable and applicable to enrolled 2,700 ,000 members- over six times
the entire country. more members than had ever been enrolled
The first labor unrest became evident about in prewar Japan. Labor then had the num-
three months after the beginning of the Oc- bers to carry out successful programs but
cupation. At that time workers began to lacked rhe discipline and knowledge necessary
assert themselves and test their newly granted to develop workable ones. Conseguently, the
rights. The Labor Sub-section kept in close working men freguently ran into difficulties
touch with the situation and watched the effect because of undisciplined actions and impos-
of the new policy on the wage picture. sible demands.
A difficult problem was the control and Throughout 1946 the unionization move-
eventual elimination of the gumi, or contract- ment was evident in mass parades and labor
ors' gangs, which were rigidly controlled by demonstrations, all of which were closely ob-
labor bosses (oyabun), who exercised complete served by Occupation authorities. Evidence
control over pools of unskilled labor. Follow- of communistic agitation was uncovered,
ing a completely feudalistic pattern, the bosses although in general the parades were orderly
accepted contracts for these groups, collecting and well handled. Many of the banners,
the rations and pay and giving the laborers while publicizing the specific objectives of
only as much as they thought suitable. In an the grou ps which paraded, thanked the
effort to combat this vicious system, employ- Americans for having given them a true free-
ment agencies were established where all work- dom. Typical demands of the parading
ers could register and become available for groups included petitions for complete purge
employment on Occupation projects. Bids by of war criminals, supervision of food rationing
at least three labor organizations were reguired by the people, protection for working women,
for any major project, and wages and rations and closer regulation of prices.
were paid directly to the workers. The bosses By the end of 1946 the Japanese themselves
were reguired to register and to submit the realized the complexity of their labor problem
financial reports reguired of other employers. and established a Labor Ministry during the
Another practice which became an issue first Diet session after the adoption of the
early in the Occupation was the employment new constitution.

216
 Following the many evidences of ignorance under control was not simple, for the black-
in the newly organized labor groups the Oc- market had become part of the national scene.
cupation officials responsible for labor relations The acute food shortage, the insufficient of-
placed major emphasis on education of the ficial prices paid to producers for rationed
laboring man. The educational program was food, the breakdown of the collection system,
carried out through the encouragement of and the despair and loss of morale of a defeated
union educational committees and discussion people were all contributing factors to wide-
groups, the establishment of libraries, the open blackmarket practices.
dissemination of literature on the labor move- Although price control, as it concerned
ment, and the advocacy of " recourse to law" domestic prices, was left to the Japanese, the
for the meeting of many union objectives. MG sub-sections did aid in reducing prices by
Second in importance to the educational pro- offering incentive goods to the food producers
gram was the constant surveillance of factories who delivered their output to the official agen-
to see that the newly adopted labor policies cies. They also worked with the Economic and
were enforced, and of the Japanese Labor Stand- Scientific Section, SCAP, in the rehabilita-
ards Office to see that it performed its func- tion of those industries which were necessary
tions whenever violations of the labor laws to supply needs for food, clothing, fuel, and
were discovered. Other major concerns of the building materials.
Labor Sub-section included continued efforts to The MG Trade and Commerce Sub-section
maintain employment at the highest possible began an immediate inventory of Japanese
level, to require labor bosses to comply with goods suitable for export. Of these, the most
the new labor laws, and to check prefectural important single item was raw silk. Although
governments' records to guarantee that the nothing was done immediately to open foreign
legally liable employers filed reports and paid trade, early in 1946 GHQ, SCAP, authorized
the premiums required by the unemployment the organization of Boeki Cbo (the Japanese
compensation provisions of the new laws. Government Board of Trade).
Trade and Commerce: Prices skyrocketed The Price Control Sub-section was absorbed
after the surrender, and it was essential that by the Trade and Commerce Sub-section in
some of the wartime controls be continued to 1946. The duties of the expanded Sub-section
prevent the complete collapse of the Japanese included the supervision and coordination of
financial system. This was the mission of imports and exports; storage, release and
the Price Control Sub-section which was later return OC imported goods; price control and
to be merged with the Trade and Commerce rationing ; crop collection; storage and inter-
Sub-section. To prevent the defrauding of prefecture shipmen of rice allotments; surveil-
U.S. Army personnel, street peddling was lance of textile projects and the pearl industry ;
abolished and supervised bazaars were estab- control and disposition of Japanese Army-
lished. A tax exemption certificate relieved Navy supplies; and disposition of U.S. Army
Occupation personnel of paying the high scrap and w~ste materials.
tax on luxury items. Prices in laundry and The major emphasis was on imports and
dry cleaning establishments were fixed and the exports, crop collection, price control, and
Japanese police were prodded into forcing rationing. Imports fell into three categories:
Japanese merchants to observe the official price those considered essential to prevent . disease
scale. Bringing the prices throughout Japan and unrest, those r~quired to accomplish the

217
Japanese accused of blackmarket activities await trial by military provost court.

Silver ingots, uncovered by Military Government teams, are loaded on

trucks for transfer to the Bank of Japan vaults in Tokyo.

PLATE NO . 7 1
BIackmarket and Precious Metals
 Occupation miSSion, and those needed to essential.
sustain a minimum economy under policy
directives of ESS. All Imports in the first Legal and Government Division
year of Occupation were included in the first
two categories. All of the initial import- All aspects of an occupation depend directly
export business was carried on by a system upon the functioning of government. In
tantamount to barter ; contracts for export Japan, because the existing governmental ma-
items were not approved until they were cov- chinery was used to execute SCAP directives,
ered by contracts for imports of eCjual value. the functions and operation of the MG Legal
Trading was carried on by only one Govern- and Government Division (i nitially the Legal
ment agency, Boeki Cho, which was reCjuired Divison) were limited." The mission of the
to route all of its contracts through GHQ, Legal and Government Division was to expedite
SCAP, for final approval. As the demand the establishment of an efficient, demo-
for Japanese products began to increase, more cratic, and decentralized Japanese Government,
products were made available for export, and with effective law enforcement agencies working
contracts were permitted which called for for public interest, and a fair and efficient
payment in dollars or sterling, or on open court system upholding individual rights.
accounts when such agreements existed. To accomplish this. Legal and Govern-
Because one government agency handled ment personnel exercised surveillance, made
foreign trade for the entire nation and thus studies and investigations, and filed reports
prevented the desired expansion in trading with the Government Section, SCAP. They
volume, individual traders and exporters were observed elections, interpreted Japanese law for
permitted to carry on negotiations among them- military authorities, served as liaison in legal
selves by mid-August. They were reCjuired matters with Japanese agencies, and gave legal
to procure export licenses issued by Boeki Cho, advice and assistance to all echelons; they
however, and their sales contracts reCjuired offered instruction and guidance to Japanese
both Boeh Cho approval and SCAP validation. officials, and served as advisers and reporters
Control of inflation was a problem from on all matters related to Japanese law, courts,
the earliest days of the Occupation. Military the new constitution, the purge of officials,
Government personnel worked with all echelons governmental and political activities, elections,
of the Japanese Government in an effort to and public safety. The Division was also
prevent runaway inflation and economic chaos. responsible for the surveillance of certain
Japanese reports in the field of economics were customs and immigration matters and served
found to be unreliable and mislead ing, making as an advisory agency on these subjects to the
close supervision over this phase of the problem MG teams in the field.'·
45 Although initially separate, the Legal Division and the Public Safety Division were consolidated in January
'946 under the title ({ Legal and Public Safely Division." Three months later it was redesignated as the /I Legal and
Government Division ". In July 1948 the Local Government Division of the Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, was
transferred to the Legal and Government Division, Military Government Section, Eighth Army. .
The Government Section, SCAP, was one of the major policy.making civil sections of SeAP. Its chief, Brig Gen
Courtney Whitney, was one of the sma i( staff group which had been serving under <;Jeneral MacArthur for many years.
4 6 The interlocking, interdependent character of the Occupation control must be constantly kept in mind; the
line of demarcation between SCAP and Eighth Army MG agencies was nOt rigid. Several SCAP agencies maintained
field stations throughout Japan; covering each prefecture. Public safety, as a form of police control, fell into the purview
of the PSD, SCAP, an operating agency of G·2, charged with the organization of police reform on the American pattern.

219
 Surveillance of the AdministratIon of Surveillance of Political Parties and
justice: Legal and Government represent- Elections: Conferences were held with party
atives personally dealt with Japanese officials leaders and members of local assemblies to
and institutions in carrying out their mission determine their programs and platform. The
of observation and close supervision; the of- strength of parties and their activities were
ficers frequently visited summary and district subjects of monthly reports. Observation of
courts and local procurators' offices to show elections was one of the periodic tasks of the
Japanese officials that the Occupation forces MG Legal and Government D ivision. When
were interested in the operations of the courts. the number of polling places was so large
They encouraged and assisted Japanese officials that Military Government could not provide
to administer justice in accordance with the new enough teams to insure adequate supervision,
constitution, the new criminal code, changes tactical troop personnel furnished assistance.
in court practices, and other new legislation. Ch'il Liberties, Inspections of Jails and
It must be pointed out, however, that Military Police Methods: Prior to the Occupation the
Government did not give orders to nor inter- Japanese police were notorious for mistreating
pretJapanese laws for Japanese courts. In the suspects, confining prisoners for long periods
d iscussions, emphasis was placed on the civil without trial , and denying them counsel.
liberties provisions of the constitution. An The new constitution and the new criminal
attempt was made to develop the dignity of code forbade these and other abridgements
the judicial system, to eliminate favoritism of civil rights. Jails, police stations, and
toward influential persons, and to reduce the other places of confinement were visited, and
backlog of untried cases." Interpretations by personal observation and questioning
placed upon instructions and new laws by the of inmates, MG representatives determined
local Japanese authorities were checked against whether individual rights had been violated.
SCAP and Eighth Army directives; bureau- Violations were reported to the proper Japanese
crats, as well as elected individuals, were authority, and a report was sent to higher
warned that they were serving the people. headquarters." When Japanese individuals
Legal and Government Division officers were deprived of civil rights by the Occupation
worked closely with individual Japanese offi- forces, Military Government took corrective
cials, and were familiar with police organization action by contacting the military unit concerned.
in their prefectures, though policy direction Surveil/mice of the Administration of the
was charged to PSD, SCAP. Recommenda- Purge: The administration of the purge
tions were made by Military Government con- program became ultimately a Japanese re-
cerning removal of undesirable officials for acts sponsibility, and Military Government did not
detrimental to the Occupation, for improper attempt to interpret purge laws for screening
activities, and for inefficiency. committees.'· However, when MG officers

47 Policy direction was under the Legal Section, SCAP. Prison surveillance and reform, on the policy level,
was part of the miss ion of PSD or CIS.
48 Prison reform and the corollary functions of inspection, were charged to the Public Safety Division, an
operating agency of G-2, which employed American experts in ics police and prison reform program.
49 SCAPIN 93, 4 Oct 45, sub ; Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties. Several
SCAP Sections were heavily involved : the MG Section and CIS checked mewar-time, ultra-nationalistic records of many
individuals. Immediately on landing, G-z secured invaluable police and administrative personnel records.

220
Women, pennitted for the first time to take part in the elective and administrative
functions of the government, cast their ballots in an election of Diet members.

The Women Diet Members' Club meets to discuss current affairs.

PLATE NO . 72
Women's Franchise: Milestone of Politics, April '946
suspected a violation or when violations were Information officers were assisted in publicizing
reported by the Japanese, the information elections and new legislation.
was forwarded to SeAP. The actual purge The Legal and Government Division was
list was practically completed by the end of concerned with the entry and exit of personnel
1947· Thereafter, emphasis was placed on and personal property, the import and export
injunctions prohibiting these persons from of commercial cargo, and the surveillance of
holding public office , engaging in politics, or Japanese customs. Although these functions
exercising influence in public life or over per- were the duties of Military Government cus-
sons holding public office. SeAP directed toms units at the designated ports, vessels
local investigations of reported violations. occasIOnally stopped at other than specified
Legal and Government Division was also ports of entry. For this reason all Military
responsible for making investigations, forward- Government teams were required to be familiar
ing claims, and maintaining liaison with other with directives and regulations pertaining to
Occupation officials and with appropriate Japa- customs, quarantine, and immigration.
nese authorities. Another important function The arrival or departure of all non-military
of this Division was the surveillance of cus- personnel, personal baggage, and cargo was
toms, quarantine, and immigration. checked at designated ports in accordance with
Investigations were made when required by SeAP directives. Observation of the Japanese
higher headquarters or upon receipt of in- in customs inspection and examination of
formation from other sources. Japanese po- international parcel post was another duty of
lice, procurators, and agencies were utilized. Military Government. Surveillance generally
The police were encouraged and supported in consisted of semi-monthly inspections. When
their eHorts to control large scale blackmarket- the regulations established by SeAP for
mg. weight or content of packages were violated,
Military Government did not operate a the excessive or prohibited articles were con-
claims service, but Japanese and other nationals fiscated and given to Military Government
often requested information and submitted for disposition through established relief
claims to the teams. These were forwarded agencies.
through channels to the Judge Advocate
Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army, or to Finance and Civil Property Division
SeAP for appropriate action.
The ' Legal and Government Division officer The initial concern of the Finance (later
maintained close liaison with Civil Intel- redesignated the Finance and Civil Property)
ligence Section and tactical troops on legal, Division of Military Government was to assure
government, and police affairs, and with Japanese compliance with SeAP instructions
appropriate Japanese authorities concerning as they pertained to the closing of stock
government admission, laws, courts, procu- exchanges, and to the closing and liquidation
rators, legislative bodies, political parties, fire of wartime banks, development companies,
departme~ts , and penal institutions." Civil and other financial institutions which were

50 The full account of CIS activities may be found in GHQ SCAP, Int Sec, Vol. IX, Operations of the Civil
Intelligence Sedion, GHQ, SCAP (S). The Public Safety Division (PSD), a branch of CIS, was responsible for or-
ganization and surveillance of activities of Japanese police, prisons, jails, fire departments and other instirutions concerning
public safety. CIS was under the control of G·2, GHQ, SCAP, and was primarily a security surveillance unit.

222
 organized to finance the Japanese war effort or as the sole depositoty for precious stones.
to aid in the exploitation of occupied coun- In April 1946 Eighth Army was relieved of
tries." From these strictly fiscal activities, the supervising bank liquidations and its responsi-
Division's field of responsibility was broadened bilities were limited to the guarding of
to include the custody and control of Axis buildings, records, and physical assets. The
property, precious metals and stones belonging functions of the Division thereafter were
to the Japanese Government, and valuables mainly; inspection and supervision of Japanese
belonging to designated individuals, institu- tax collection and administration; rehabilita-
tions, and organizations scheduled by SCAP tion of postal savings branch offices; supervi-
for restriction or dissolution. sion of matters pertaining to the seizure and
The Bank of Tokyo was designated as the custody of civil property; and preservation
liquidating agency for certain banks. The and protection of United Nations nationals'
Division maintained close supervision of the property (not yet restored to its owners), Axis
personnel engaged in this work to prevent property, and looted property (which included
removal, defacement, or destruction of books, packing, crating, and delivety to owners).
records, or other property. It submitted Civil Property Custodian personnel (SCAP)
weekly reports on the progress of liquidation attached to Military Government teams han-
and matters of special financial interest. One dled civil property affairs in areas not covered
of the spectacular tasks of the Occupation by regional custodian service teams.
dealt with collecting and putting under guard Tax Collections: During the fiscal year
the great hoards of gold, silver, precious beginning with April 1947,Japanese tax collec-
stones, foreign postage stamps, engraving tions lagged to a serious extent. In January
plates, and all currency not legal in Japan. 1948 Military Government was directed to
Even though the bulk of this wealth was expedite national tax collections. Surveillance
collected and placed under United States was begun immediately by the seven regional
militaty custody by Japanese officials, unde- bureaus located at Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya,
clared caches of these treasures were known to Osaka, Hiroshima, Takamatsu, and Kuma-
exist. Consequently, the task of investigating, moto. Teams from tactical units began de-
uncovering, inventotying, and safeguarding all tailed supervision of the 450 local tax offices
property in this c;ategoty was a continuing in February. Fifty-five teams were initially
and increasing responsibility." The precious used on this project, which enabled semi-
metals were stored in the United States vaults monthly inspections at each local tax office.
of the Bank of Japan at Tokyo and in the Initial difficulties were; the public's general
Imperial Mint at Osaka. Eighth Army noncompliance with tax laws, particularly pay-
furnished custodial staffs for both depositories. ment in advance of the self-assessed income
The Osaka vaults were initially used for the tax, and the opposition and slowdown tactics
storage of all types of seized property but in of tax collectors' unions. However, improve-
May 1946 the Bank of Japan was designated ment in tax payments was immediately notice-

51 A SeAP civil section, as usual, controlled this particular field, utilizing field agencies for local implication;
fiscal and banking controls, including assets and alien properties, were handled by ESS and the Civil Property
Custodian.
52 All Occupation agencies were engaged in this search; the counterintelligence, including field agencies, were
enormously productive: between 30/ 40,000 carats of diamonds were recovered, war loot from South East Asia.

223
able when the program started, and supervision Institutions Liquidating Commission" (Japa-
was extended for an indefinite period. nese) accomplished the detailed work of liqui-
Occupation personnel did not attempt to dation.
interpret tax laws to Japanese officials. They Rehabilitation of Postal Sa"'ings Branch
first ascertained the tax goals set for each Offices: The progress of rehabilitation in four-
financial bureau and the allocation of quotas teen of the twenty-eight Postal Savings Branch
to local tax offices, then determined the pro- offices in Japan was subject"to surveillance and
gress made in the collections. Following that, report by Military Government. Japanese made
they encouraged publicity of the program and deposits in local post offices, but permanent
exerted their influence to promote efficiency. records were kept in branch offices. During
Action was taken to alleviate the general the war many of the branch offices were
shortage of competent personnel in the Japa- damaged and records were destroyed. Origi-
nese tax structure. Surveillance discouraged nally, reports on all twenty-eight branches were
corrupt practices, and much was accomplished required, but with improved conditions, super-
through the prosecution of dishonest tax vision and reports for fourteen of the branches
officials and tax evaders, although relatively were discontinued by April 1948."
few of them were brought to trial. Ci",il Property Custodian Regional SeT'l'ice
Financial Restrictions: The Zaibatsu" Teams: The Civil Property Custodian Section
and the many affiliates and subsidiaries which (CPC) was established by SCAP on 8 March
controlled the Japanese industty prior to the 1946. It developed general policies and
Occupation were reorganized by SCAP to established procedures for control or custody
eliminate monopolistic practices. These re- of the various properties and assets over which
stricted firms were not permitted to perform SCAP exercised authority. The seizure and
financial transactions, except normal operating custody functions became the responsibility
collections and payments, without specific of both MG field teams and tactical units;
SCAP approval. SCAP approval was nec- in view of manpower limitations and the
essaty for: loan transactions, property trans- technical nature of some of the property, it
fers, stock transactions, construction contracts, was found necessary to attach CPC (SCAP)
and donations.'" Military Government per- personnel to Military Government units for
sonnel did not maintain surveillance over these this type of work.
firms but did report monopolistic practices Regional service teams of the Property
and illegal transactions by such concerns when- Service Branch, Comptroller Division (CPC)
ever reliable information indicated such vio- were attached to Military Government teams
lations. in areas which could not be conveniently
The Japanese financial institutions which covered from Tokyo. The teams, composed
were created to finance and exploit Japanese of civilian personnel and augmented by Japa-
conquests outside the home islands were closed nese hired locally. varied in strength and
early in the Occupation period. The" Closed composition. Members had the same status

53 Zaibatsu, big financial trusts, six of which (Mitsui, Mitsubishi , Yasuda, Sumicomo, Kawasaki, Fuji), together
with their affiliates and subsid iaries, controlled practically aU financial, commercial, and industrial life of pre·surrender
Japan.
54 HQ Eighth Army, lOth Info & Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan (R), p. 45.
55 Ibid, p. 46.

224
 Study of synthesis of nylon is carried on in the Organic Chemistry
Laboratory, Noguchi Research Institute, Tokyo.

Study of Vande Graeff Generator is made in the Physical Chemistry Laboratory,

Tokyo University.

PLATE NO. 73
Field Inspection of Laboratories by Technical Intelligence
Detachment, G-2 , GHQ , FEC
as members of the Military Government teams Government for yen. >7
to which they were attached except that work United Nations and Axis Property: The
assignments were made by Cpe. preservation and protection of United Nations
Seizure and Custody of GO'Yernment property confiscated by the war-time Japanese
Property: Eighth Anny was directed to seize Government became a concern of Military
and maintain custody of precious metals and Government teams. The Japanese prefectural
diamond stockpiles owned or controlled by the governments were required to furnish pre-
Japanese or Axis governments in Japan during fectural MG teams lists of wrongfully
the war. Eighth Army agencies were also transferred items; checks were then made to
authorized to confiscate and deposit precious determine whether there was proper mainte-
metals and gems in the United States vaults nance and protection of such property. The
in Tokyo or Osaka whenever such items were Japanese Government was charged with pre-
to be found in violation of SCAP directives. venting deterioration but was not required to
The program, as it pertained to known stocks, rehabilitate war damage. It was further re-
was practically complete by August 1948. quired to impound and maintain Axis property,
Hoarded precious metals and industrial dia- and periodic inspections were made by Militaty
monds, found from time to time by field units, Government teams to ensure compliance.
were taken into custody,'· and many offenders Restitution: Surveillance was maintained
were prosecuted in provost courts. over the restoration of United Nations na-
Eighth Anny was directed to take custody tionals' property. Most of it was American,
of excess movable property of Axis repatriat~s British, or Dutch property which was taken
and movable property of Axis business firms over or disposed of by the Japanese Enemy
which had ceased operating. Property to be Property Custodian during the war.
taken in custody was specified for each repat- Copies of the applicable SCAPIN were
riation operation of Axis nationals and for given to the owner and to the Militaty Govern-
each seizure from Axis individuals or concerns. ment team in the area where the restitution
Seizure was accomplished by tactical troops on was to be made. A Military Government
orders from Eighth Anny. This property was officer was present at the meeting between the
then stored in three CPC warehouses which owner and the Japanese Government represen-
were operated by Eighth Army agencies in tative in charge of the restitution to guarantee
Tokyo, Kurihama, and Osaka respectively. that SCAP directives had been obeyed and
The local accounting system in each CPC the owner received just compensation.
warehouse was prescribed by Eighth Army. Some property ordered restored to United
Under the direct supervision of the CPC, Nations owners had been utilized under pro-
property subject to deterioration was sold; it curement demand by the Occupation forces.
was auctioned off to the Occupation forces In these cases the title transaction was com-
for dollars, while property unsuitable for sale pleted by the military forces who continued to
to Occupation forces was sold to the Japanese occupy the property until the necessity for its

56 Personnel operating the US vaults in Tokyo Bank of Japan were assigned to the MG Section, HQ Eighth
Army, and those at the Osaka Mint to the Kinki MG regional team . The operating staffs were attached for adminis-
tration to the Tokyo MG team and the Osaka MG team, respectively. The accounting system used in the depositories
was prescribed by SCAP.
57 SCAPIN 5358-A, 6 Mar 48, su b: Disposal of Certain German Property.

226
continued use no longer existed. branch offices in each of the prefectural govern-
Looted Property: All property suspected ments to expedite all requests submitted by
as having been seized in areas occupied by the the Occupation forces . Initial operations were
Japanese armed forces was classified as looted carried out by the Supply Division (later
property unless definite legal ownership could redesignated Procurement D ivision) of Military
be established. In general, it was handled Government, which was instrumental in deter-
directly by SCAP through the Japanese Gov- mining policy and procured all supplies and
ernment. Military Government personnel re- services needed by military units under Sixth
ported illegal transactions, prevented unauthor- and Eighth Army control. In January 1946
ized transfers or movements, and maintained Eighth Army assumed control of all Occupa-
general surveillance over such property. tion troops in Japan, and by March 1946 every
Plundered property included occasionally in Military Government unit included in its
reparation plans was ordered removed from organization a procurement officer who was
reparations inventory. In such cases, the pro· responsible for processing demands made by
perty (usually machinery) was left in place and the various units located within his area. In
given a Civil Property Custodian number. order to expedite the procurement of various
The Japanese Government was directed to items and services, the commanding general of
maintain a " watch list " of looted vehicles. Eighth Army, in March 1946, delegated ap-
In August '948 it was directed that all prop- proving authority to the commanders of I and
erty which had been taken from or produced IX Corps, base commanders, and senior com-
in areas occupied by Japanese armed forces manders of Air, Navy and BCOF forces.
during the war be impounded and reported. To mini~ize Occupation demands upon the
The Japanese Government was required to exhausted Japanese economy, special lists were
pack, safeguard, and deliver pillaged items to prepared enumerating the items which could
ports of shipment. Close observation and not be procured without specific approval from
spot checks were conducted to ensure compli- the controlling headquarters involved. These
ance. lists included such items as medical and dental
supplies, nearly all types of food, petroleum
Procurement Demand products, certain categories of commercial
vehicles and communications equipment, and
The Occupation forces in Japan were self- numerous other indigenous products. Certain
sustaining in food, clothing, ammunition, and classes of real property which could not be
other essential supplies. It was necessary, procured without direct approval from Head-
however, to procure billeting and office space, quarters, Eighth Army, included religious insti-
certain communication facilities , construction tutions, any property occupied by members of
supplies, and labor. the royal family , educational institutions,
A General Procurement Board was estab- hospitals , and facilities designated for the
lished in September '945 , and authority was distribution of food , clothing and shelter.
delegated to the commanding generals of the The procurement of communications and
Sixth and Eighth Armies for the normal over- transportation was a Military Government
all procurement of indigenous supplies. The responsibility at the beginning of the Oc-
Japanese Government created a Central Liaison cupation, but by the end of November 1946
Office in September 1945 which established procurement of communications supplies and

227
 Check on Japanese machinery marked for reparations. This machine, destined
for Great Britain, is inspected for proper crating.

Military Government representatives check scrapping of "special purpose " machines

which cannot be converted to any peaceful use.

PLATE NO. 74
Military Government Team in Action, February 1948
services became a direct responsibility of Eighth Before a request for an article could be
Army Signal Section. In January '947 the submitted, the design and othet physical
Third Military Railway Service assumed control aspects of the required item were ascertained.
of the procurement of all necessary rail service, Following final approval, the necessary papers
right-of·way , and related facilities. were submitted by the Procurement Division
Early in the Occupation hand receipts were to the Japanese Government which placed the
required where immediate procurement was contract. Working against specific delivery
necessary, but numerous reports showed that deadlines, the manufacturer was required to
unauthorized appropriation was common prac- submit samples to the requesting agency for
tice throughout Japm. Many of these local testing. The Procurement Division maintained
appropriations were justified; in view of this fact a testing laboratory available to all interested
SCAP ruled that all hand receipts in the parties.
possession of Japanese nationals dated prior to Whenever an adequate supply of raw
April '946 would be honored on a confirming materials was not immediately available, the
procurement demand." expediting officers of the Procurement Division
Under the procurement plan all supply attempted to locate the heeded materials, even
requests were submitted to the Military Gov- though this was a Japanese responsibility .
ernment teams in the area of the approving Upon final delivery, each shipment was ac-
headquarters. Necessary papers wete pre- cepted on a procurement receipt which in-
pared by the local procurement officers and dicated completion of the contract and enabled
submitted to the Japanese liaison official. The the s~pplier to collect payment from the Japa-
Japanese Government was responsible for nese Government. The expediters were not
locating manufacturers and raw materials and in control of fuel and power allocations but
allocating the lattet. By late '946 certain assisted in obtaining increased allotments for
changes in Occupation missions and the insti- manufacturers of items on procurement de-
tution of long range planning made central mand.
procurement necessary . Team procurement In August '947, by direction of SCAP, a
offices were closed and, in July '947, Eighth Special Procurement Board (SPB) was estab-
Army announced that all items and services lished as an agency of the Japanese Govern-
would be obtained thereafter by central pro- ment to replace the agencies previously utilized
curement on a forecast basis. The Procurement for procurement purposes. The detailed oper-
Division set up four district offices at Sapporo, ational procedures of the SPB became the
Sendai, Yokohama, and Kyoto. The main responsibility of the Eighth Army Commander,
islands were divided into four administrative who in tu~n delegated the authority to the
districts , but because of the large area under Procurement Division. The Division imple-
the Kyoto district, four branch officers were mented SCAP procurement policy and fulfilled
established at Osaka, Kure, Kobe (later at requirements by methods based on practices
Nagoya), and Kokura. In addition, because in the Zone of Interior. The Tokyo branch
of heavy needs, a Tokyo branch of the Yoko- of the Yokohama District Office supervised
hama Office became tesponsible for procure- the over-all operation of the Special Procure-
ment for GHQ and other units in that area. ment Board. The agency and its field repre-

58 HQ Eighth Army, lOth Info III Hist Sv, Eighth Army MG System in Japan, 1945- 48 (R), p. 50.

229
sentatives were authorized to receive and settle of the country. All officers in the Japanese
procurement receipts and to make payments to Government were appointed or dismissed by
suppliers, thus expediting both delivery and the Japanese themselves, subject only to the
payments. SCAP purge directives . All of them were
Real estate and local construction projects directly responsible to Japanese authorities.
also came within the" province of the Procure- The Military Government agencies could
ment Division. Large amounts of real estate report on and recommend the removal of any
were placed on demand early in the Occupa- Japanese government official found corrupt,
tion. Many pieces of property, however, had inefficient, or uncooperative.
been Japanese military or naval holdings and. The smoothness with which the complica-
as such, were confiscated as surrendered enemy ted machinery of the Occupation worked in
eguipment and installations." Japan surprised competent observers all over
From the beginning, the over-all effort was the world. Its success must be credited to
primarily a vast planning program. Producers four main factors: the foresight of Allied
and contractors were instructed in modern high level planninJ in utilizing the existing
production methods and standardization of Japanese Government and the authority of the
specifications and design. By centralized Emp,ror institution; the wisdom of the
procurement and large scale contracts, the Supreme Commander in solving the complex
Procurement Division substantially reduced problems arising [rom a program designed to
production time and materially increased pro- transform a totalitarian country into a democ-
duction. In April 1948, to meet the demands racy, by tolerant and humane treatment of a
of its mission, the Procurement Division was vanquished foe, rather than by punitive mea-
established as a special staff section of Head- sures for past crimes; the patience and
guarters, Eighth Army. tact with which Occupation agencies handled
a humiliated and defeated people whose
General Conclusion national psychology differed radically from that
of any western peoples; and the unexpected
The functions of Military Government In cooperation of Japanese officials and popula-
Japan were limited to inspecting the activities tion, in response to tolerant and intelligent
of the government whose officials continued guidance.
to perform the duties of actual administration

59 Prior [0 July 1947 all procurement requests were audited on an account basis of relative values, which were
stated in units rather than in dollars or yen. The tocal number of unit values expended w~rc converted into dollar
eGuivalents by use of a predetermined conversion [actor,

230
 CHAPTER VIII
OCCUPATION SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

lion to itlSuri71g military recurity by detlying infor.

Assignment of Responsibilities ma/IOH to the enemy, CoulIter 111~elligetlce persoll1lel
will be c01lfr o1lted with the problem of suppression
Parallel with the establishment and slow of orgalli~dtjonr, individuals and mOl'emellts whose
growth of Military Government, the operations existence and cOlllillued acti'JIities are co,uidered an
of certain civil and counter intelligence units impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of
and agencies entered into playas an indispensa- Japan. >
ble factor in the tranguil development of the This paragraph of " B~acklist " clearly charac-
Occupation. As the Occupation progressed, terized the operation of CIS from the begin-
the duties of combating and controlling diverse ning of the Occupation to the end.
elements, subversive or inimical to the objec- "Blacklist " specifically identified in a gen-
tives of the Occupation, which were envisioned eral " wanted list " some of Japan's most danger-
in the basic plan for Operation " Blacklist,'" ous elements, naming particularly the Kempei
were expanded immeasurably to cover every Tai (Military Police), Tokumu Kikan (Secret
facet of the intelligence problem. Intelligence Service), Kokuryu Kai (Black Drag-
Developed before Japan's capitulation' the on Society), Dai Nippon Seijikai (Political As-
Intelligence Annex to " Blacklist " was origi- sociation of GreaterJapan),Koku Sui-to (Extreme
nally designed to serve only during the initial Nationalist Party), and other extremist organi-
phase of the Occupation; however, it already zations, as well as lists of top personnel in the
contained the essentials later appearing in the general staff and government.- It arranged for
second basic document relating to the general coordination in the field between counter and
intelligence information mission , " Basic Direc- operatiQnal intelligence stallS in their work of
tive for Post-Surrender Military Government apprehending and interrogating persons on the
in Japan Proper.'" " wanted lists," and for a central card file on
" Blacklist" recognized the" joint character all persons arrested; this coordination also
of operational and counter intelligence ". and covered the seizure and safeguarding of valu-
further envisaged that: able documents and the interrogation of prison-
The surrender of Japa1l . . . will alter the general ers and suspects.'
mission of CoutUer Intelligence operalious. Itt addi. In addition to these specific tasks, the nor-

1 Military blueprint co cover O ccupation of Japan and Korea under non·invasion conditions ( 3d ed), 8 Aug 45.
2 On the basis of a Joi nt Chiefs of Staff UCS ) D i[ective.
3 ]CS Dir 1380/ 15 (TS), 3 Nov 45·
4 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Oudine Plan for " Blacklist " Opns (TS) (3d ed), 8 Aug 45, Sec. I, par. 5.
5 Ibid, Sec. X .
6 Ibid, Sec. I, 4.
7 Ibid, Sees. V and VI.

231
mal responsibilities of counter intelligence re- nant roles in the formation of Japan's program
garding enemy espionage, sabotage, and sub- of aggression and to hold suspected war crimi-
versive activities continued in force, and inten- nals incommunicado without distinction as to
sive security education programs to alert troops rank or position; Japanese and Korean col-
in vigilance (especially necessary in enemy ter- laborators were to be removed from positions
ritory) were instituted. s of responsibility as rapidly as possible. CIS
The civil censorship responsibilities outlined was further directed to establish censorship of
in " Blacklist" called for centralization of the civil communications and to preserve certain
technical direction and control at theater level. governmental and civil records.
This control was to be exercised with the primary
objective of promoting military securiry and Basic Plan for Civil Censorship
the peaceful future of the country, for action
by appropriate agencies and regulation of com- The Basic Plan for Civil Censorship as for-
munications and information media. 9 mulated before Japan's surrender called for
A general SCAP memorandum'· defined censorship control of Japan under military in-
certain responsibilities: criminal and police vasion conditions." This outline was sub-
agencies were to be purged of undesirable sequently modified by " Blacklist " which deli-
elements; prisoners held solely under abrogated neated the primary objectives of civil censor-
laws were to be released; certain Japanese ship under "conditions of peaceful occupa-
political associations and all military and civil- tion. "" A third plan, the one eventually
ian ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, and secret followed, was adjusted to meet the favorable
patriotic associations and their affiliates or conditions actually encountered in the first days
agencies were ordered dissolved; military train- of the Occupation. 'J Under this modification,
ing was banned; foreign nationals were required Civil Censorship in Japan developed into a
to identify themselves and be registered. medium of information on the Japanese mili-
CIS was instructed to place under protective tary, economic, social, and political activities
custody diplomatic and consular officialsofcoun- through control of Japanese communications.
tries, except Japan, which had been at war with It became apparent early that the extent of
any of the United Nations, as well as to hold compliance with terms of the surrender, and
those civilians from neutral countries or United the trend of acceptance by the Japanese of Oc-
Nations nationals (resident or interned in cupation directives could be determined. The
Japan) who had participated in the war against Press Section of Civil Censorship was to assist
the United Nations. The instructions also also in the enforcement of the free and factual
contained provisions to intern certain categories dissemination of news based upon United
of Japanese who had played active and domi- Nations standards. Through intelligent eval-

8 Ibid, Sec. X.
9 Ibid, Sec. XI.
10 The implementation of JCS Oir 1380/ 15 was by SCAP Memo No. 6 (TS), 28 Nov 45, which also assigned to
various staff sections the execution of the provisions of )CS Die 1512, 13 Sep 45, and State, War, Navy Coordinating
Committee, Dir 176/ 91 13 Oct 45.
II GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in Japan, 10 Jul 45.
12 GHQ USAFPAC, Bas:c Outline Plan for" Blacklist" Opns (TS) (3d ed), 8 Aug 45, Sec. XI.
13 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Plan for Civil Censorship in Japan, 30 Sep 45 (Rev).

232
uation of intercept information, Civil. Censor- tary. strategic theater intelligence, was gradual.
ship would assist in prevention of secret rearma- The objectives of the Occupation, in its civil
ment, the apprehension and conviction of sus- aspects , predominated in all missions: gradu-
pected war criminals, the prevention of disor- ally, all counter intelligence activities were dir-
ders, the location of Japanese overseas assets, ected toward that end as surveillance and
and the recovery of property seized during the security operations.
war. By control of communications, military The Civil Intelligence Section played a
security would be maintained as leads devel- dual role in the Occupation, as a SCAP Staff
oped to expose the existence and activities of Section (CIS) and as an operating agency
underground or other subversive elements and (Counter Intelligence Division); with its various
of blackmarket operators. components, distributed throughout Japan, this
agency became a sort of F.B.I. for the Occupa-
Evolution of Civa(Occupaticn) Intelligence tion in its special field of security surveillance. '7
It functioned in four major components: Oper-
The original CIC mission was defined in ations Branch, the 44,st Counter Intelligence
. orders of long standing: Corps , the Civil Censorship Detachment, and
••• to assist in maintaining security by detecting the Public Safety Division." (Plate No. 75)
and takiug cou,Uermeasures to nullify enemy 1 1Ilel~ The Operations Branch acted as a coordinat-
ligellc~ operations, to inl'tstigate matters pertaining ing staff: evalution of information gathered
to espionage, s~botage, treason, sedition, diJajfection, from the field by CIC and CCD and the
atld Jub'Versjyt acti'Vities occurring within the military initiating of staff action pertaining thereto were
establishment, and to make security SUT'Veys dnd assist its primary interests. From" research for future
in the security iustruaioll of military persollllel . .•. '<1 operations," the mission of its wartime pre-
Upon arrival in Japan, the basic mission was decessor, the scope of the division abruptly
expanded to include detecting conditions inimi- broadened to one of coordination and action
cal to the general objectives of the Occupation, on all aspects of counter intelligence activities.
with special emphasis on subversive activities, In the fall of '945 , the apprehension of
in addition to current responsibilities of CIC Japanese war criminal suspects became an im-
within the military establishment." mediate and urgent mission. Allied public
By September '945 plans for the organiza- opinion exerted heavy pressure on Occupation
tion of the Allied Forces which would occupy authorities to take prompt action against the
Japan were completed. war criminals. The responsibility of selecting
The evolution of civil intelligence, a term the priority or "Class A" group, who would
adopted in counterdistinction to purely mili- be tried before the International Military

'4 Lt<, WD to CG's Concerned, 3' Oct 44, sub: CIe. In AG 322 (ClC).
'5 Lt<, GHQ USAFPAC to CG, E;ghth A, 22 Mat 46, sub: Employment of CIC Pets. In AG 322 (CI ).
16 SCAP GO No.2, 2 Oct 45. On 2 October Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby was appointed Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2 and Brig Gen E. R. Thorpe, Chief, Civil Intelligence Section; concurrently, Gen Thorpe remained Chief
Counter Intelligence Officer, GHQ, A.FPAC.
17 In the period of 1947/ 1948, new conditions and problems facing the Occupation caused a revision of adminis-
trative and operational procedures. By order of G-2, a number of changes were made in the organization of CIS, includ-
ing its name which became Occupation (Civil) Intelligence.
,8 SCAP GO No. '3, 2 Oct 45 .

233
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Tribunal, was a heavy one. Utilizing infor- press, politics. and religion. Many enforcement
mation developed by intelligence agencies in groups operated secretly and extreme influence
the Philippines, War Department instructions was wielded by the Special Higher Police.
and new data obtained in Japan, the first list There were also the" Thought Police" who,
of such persons was compiled on I I Septem'ber under the "Protection and Surveillance Law
'945' '. It was headed by General Hideki Tojo, for Thought Offense " and partially through
the premier who led Japan into war, and listed use of the " neighborhood associations,"
forty men charged with directing the Japanese attempted to control , supervise and regulate
war effort. The 44,st Counter Intelligence the trends of people's thought and opinion.
Corps was assigned the initial task of ap- Their methods were often brutal; they could
prehending these war criminal suspects ; on '3 hold persons for long periods without charges
September '945, however, the Japanese Govern- and, by using third degree tactics, they could
ment was ordered to turn over to Occupation force confessions to false charges from those
authorities all of those on the "wanted list." who had incurred their disfavor.
In February 1946 the investigation of war SCAP Directives issued 4 and 10 October
criminals was undertaken by Legal Section, ordered the elimination of laws permitting such
GHQ, SCAP, which became responsible for actions and of police agencies which carried
their prosecution." This relieved CIS of them out. They further directed the immedi-
further responsibility for Japanese war crimi- ate release of political prisoners and required
nals, although it retained the task of arresting the removal from office of numerous top police
" neutral nationals who actively participated at officials, including the chiefs of the metropoli-
war against anyone of the United Nations." tan police departments and of each prefectural
Nevertheless, CIS continued to be interested in police department in Japan; also relieved from
those war criminal suspects who were interned office were the Minister of Home Affairs who
through its efforts; their cases were studied and directed police policy, and the Chief of the
recommendations made for release of those Home Ministry Bureau of Police. All these
suspects whose arrest was not justified. mandates were designed to pave the way for
An early accomplishment of CIS was the the emergence of a democratic Japan.
issuance of two important directives which One of the first important investigations in-
made possible the modification of police laws itiated by CIS in the Occupation concerned the
and agencies through which absolute control Kempei Tai and Tokumu Kikan , the particular
over the Japanese people had been maintained." adversaries of counterintelligence agencies
Under a series of regulations which were during the war. On 4 November the Japanese
gradually strengthened over the years, espe- Government was ordered to submit complete
cially during the war, the Japanese police ex- information about these organizations, in-
ercised virtually unlimited power; their control cluding lists of all members . organizational
extended into the fields of economics , drama, charts, descriptions of functions and operations.

'9 Ltr, GHQ USAFPAC, to CG Eighth A, II Sep 45, sub: Apprehension and Detention of Certain
Individuals. In AG 383.7 (CI).
20 SCAP GO No. 21, 9 Dec 45 .
21 (I) SCAPIN 93, 4 Oct 45, sub : Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties ; (2)
SCAPIN lIS, 10 Oct 45, sub: Answer [0 Pro MemOria Cone the Memo of SCAP on Removal of Restrictions
on Uberties, dated 4 Oct 45.

235
and the policies and laws under which they naval personnel, and members of the Na2i
acted. This was the beginning of comprehen- party. Their elimination from Japan under
sive studies on the two groups , which had been Washington policies strengthened the Occupa-
abolished at the beginning of the Occupation tion by reducing security risks.
concurrently with the demobilization of Japa- Ci'l'i[ Censorship Detachment (CCD): Al-
nese armed forces. though less sensational in nature, the admin-
From the outset Operations Branch main- istration of censorship over Japanese media of
tained special channels of information which public expression offered no less responsibility
were in direct contact with Japanese sources , and and no fewer problems than the investigation of
thus often made possible more rapid acgu isition war criminals. It was soon evident that close
of specific data needed for immediate action . scrutiny of evety newspaper, radio script, movie
Initially, CIS also collectedJ apanese documents scenario, dramatic production, book, maga2ine,
and source material on ultra-nationalistic and pamphlet in Japan would be necessaty.
individuals and organizations which were to be The job reguired inspection not only of the
purged ; later this activity was extended to current production of material, but also of that
include left-wing extremists as well. Dossiers prepared in the years during and before the
and files were prepared on all foreign nationals war. The immediate need, however, was to
resident in Japan, as well as a monthly chart introduce a code of ethical practice for dissemi-
showing the distribution of these persons within nating organs. "
the country. Based on these valuable records, To establish a permanent criterion, press and
recommendations regarding the repatriation of radio codes were devised, based on ethical
foreign nationals, especially the German practices in the United States. These were
groups , became a CIS function , as was the passed on to the Japanese Government in the
apprehension of non-Japanese who assisted in form of memoranda: the "Press Code for
the Japanese war effort, including both neu- Japan,"" and the" Radio Code for Japan.""
trals and non-neutrals. Seventy-two persons Each followed the directions set forth in the
(among them two Americans) were apprehended " Freedom of Speech and Press" directive, but
in the early days of the Occupation ; all were also elaborated on several points. One salient
eventually returned to their own countries ; stipulation was included in the Press Code:
some were prosecuted as war criminals. " There shall be no destructive criticism of the
Approximately 2,000 enemy nationals , Allied Forces of Occupation and nothing which
whose records were verified by CIS, were re- might invite mistrust or resentment of those
moved from Japan in two mass repatriation troops." During the early months of the Oc-
movements; the majority of these were Germans cupation this and the public tranguility clause
- former diplomats, interned military and were the most freguently violated press rules.
22 Ltr, CCD ' 0 Ch CI USAFPAC, ' 5 Sep 45, sub , Periodic Rp' of CCD. [0 3'9.J. Radio and press
censorship was inst ituted on 10 September when the Japanese Government was officially notified that thereafter there
woul d be no disse mination of news j4 throug h newspapers, rad io broadcasts, or other media of publ ication which fails to
adhere to the truth or wh ich distu rbs public tranqu ility. " (SCAPIN 16, fa Sep 45 . known as the U Freedom of Speech
and Press " directive) The directive pointed out, however, that " freedom of discussion of matters affecting the future
of Japan is encouraged by the Allied Powers, un less such discussion is harmful (0 the efforts of Japan to emerge from
de feat as a new nation entitled [0 a place among the peace-loving nations of the world."
23 SCAPIN 33, , 8 Sep 45·
24 SCAPIN 43, 22 Sep 45.

236
 Japanese censor revIews film in Motion Picture Department of
Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division of CCD, Osaka.

After being read by Japanese nationals , material of interest IS referred to me

senior translator who passes on the matter and translates it into English.

PLATE NO. 76
Censorship, July 1947
As early as 18 September the first case such time as private enterprise creates accept-
of public reprimand of a newspaper occurred able substitutes for the present monopoly."
when the Asahi Shimbun was suspended for two Soon afterward the Domei News Agency was
days for violating the press code." The fol· voluntarily abolished.
lowing day the Nippon Times, Tokyo English Another memorandum, "Clari~cation of
language paper, was also suspended for twenty· Censorship Directive,"" covered radio news
four hours.'" These suspensions, which were broadcasts, which were restricted to Radio
accompanied by explanations of pertinent Tokyo. Regulations for the Japanese press
policy, brought home sharply the standards handling news regarding the Occupation forces
required by SCAP. were also stipulated: news items would be
The next step in the direction of establishing usable only if they had been cleared through
free speech and free press in Japan was made the GHQ Public Relations Ollice.
by removing government controls ftom the Censorship Advance Detachments were
agencies of public expression. Domei News authorized to impound international mail
Agency exercised a monopoly of the news dis· found during their initial surveys and on 13
semination field, operating under strict censor· September the postal division of CCD took
ship of the Board of Information. The Mai· over the Japanese postal system, to place
nichi·Asahi· Yomiuri newspaper combines, also communications in every prefecture under
under careful government control, similarly Occupation scrutiny."
monopolized the newspaper publishing field. Shortly thereafter pre-publication censorship
A directive of 24 September, prepared by CIS, of all major Tokyo newspapers and magazines
ordered that :" and Japanese news agency dispatches was
In order further to encourage liberal tendettc;es initiated; censorship detachments in the field
in Japan dud establish free access to the news sources began surveys of post ollices, mail channels,
of the world, st.ps will be tak." by the Japa'''5e press, drama, and radio organizations, and
GO)lemme1lt forthwith to elimi,ktte gol'erumenl- control was placed over telecommunication
created barriers /0 dissemination of news dud to outlets from Japan. Four district censorship
remO)lt itself from direct OT indirect control of news- stations had been installed by the end of
papers dud news agencies . ...
1945·'·
This memorandum further provided that no Examination of internal communications
preferential treatment be accorded to any news became immediately one of the most direct
distributor. Foreign news agencies were thus and reliable" intelligence" sources. Through
permitted to serve the Japanese press. Com· this medium, leads were developed in practi-
munications facilities were also made available cally all cases against major blackmarket oper-
to newcomers in the field. Aside from that, the ations. In the pictorial field there were
existing system of distribution of news in Japan sporadic attempts by foreign nations to dis-
was tolerated under strict censorship" until tribute motion pictures that were likely to stir

25 SCAPIN 34, 18 Sep 45. sub: Suspension of Tokyo Newspaper, Arahi Shimbun .
26 SCAPIN 37, 19 Sep 45, sub: Suspension of Tokyo Newspaper, Nippon Timtt.
27 SCAPIN 51, 24 Sep 45. sub: Disassociation of Press from Gave.
28 SCAPIN 52, 24 Sep 45.
29 Memo, Ch Postal Oiv for OCCO CCO, sub: Activation of Postal Censorship, Tokyo, 13 Sep 45.
30 Dist I, T okro ; Dis[ II, Osaka j Dist III, Fukuoka j Dist IV (XXIV Corps), Seoul and Pusan, Korea.

238
up public unrest. In the broadcast or relay censorship was modified on 6 June 1947."
of certain foreign news services, there was a Another relaxation of censorship control-the
positive field of publicizing racial hatreds, first major one- occurred on 1 August when
foreign ideologies, and anti-American, anti- all Japanese broadcasting stations were trans·
Occupation attacks which required constant ferred to post-censorship, though they were
supervision. The enormous volume of internal required to submit for precensorship question·
mail and telegrams checked by CCD consti· able material concerning the Allied Powers,
tuted a strong security measure;" for example, and the Occupation or its objectives." During
intercepts of foreign subversive propaganda be- the following month a close check on broad -
ing mailed into Japan from Hong Kong ran casts revealed that radio stations had taken
as high as 295 pounds in one week. great pains to conform to the radio code. Only
Examples of security coverage can be found two tenths of 1 percent of the broadcasts were
in a continuous flow of information in the disapproved during the period."
form of " spot intelligence reports" on public The second major reduction of censorship
rallies, formations, plans and programs of or- took place on '5 October, with the transfer to
ganizations bent on disturbing the public post·censorship of all book publishers ex-
peace: the May-Day celebrations; the Korean cepting fourteen who specialized in ultra-right
riots in the Kobe·Osaka area; and inflam· and ultra-left material. These continued to
matory rallies, usually instigated by Com· be on the pre·censorship list."
munist agitators, involving as high as 50,000 On '5 December came the third relin-
participants. quishing of censorship control, when 97 percent
It was a general policy of SCAP to relax of all magazines edited , published, and dis-
all restrictions progressively, as the Japanese tributed in Japan were placed on post-censor-
recovered their pace and reform movements ship. )" Again ultra-right and ultra·left publi-
became practicable. Under this policy and cations and those which, because of circula-
because of the marked decrease in violations tion, subject matter, censorship record, or
and a concurrent upswing in the number of influence, required closer surveillance were kept
publications submitted for pre-censorship, press on pre-censorship. There were twenty-eight

3I Civil Censorship Detachment Communication Division Activity for October 1948 (HQ ceo Mo Opnl RptJ
)-3) Oe[ 48):
Mail flashed . . . . . . 22,754,~5
External mail examined . .84,659
Internal mail examined . 3,779,003
External telegraph and cables examined 14,788
Internal telegrams examined 3.537,375
Telephone calls monitored 25,889
Reportable intercepts 67,87 6
Comment sheets allocated to user agencies 33,991
Valuable intercepts processed 23,75 I
32 Memo, CofS to G-2, 6 Jun 47, App "L ", sub: Modification of Censorship Comtois in the Occupied Area,
FEe.
33 Ibid.
34 Memo, G-2 to CotS, 10 Sep 47, sub: Post-Censorship of Broadcasts.
35 CCD Mo Opnl Rpt, Oct 47.
36 CCD Mo Opnl RplS, Nov, Dec 47.

239
 magazines in this category. papers was five times as great, In books,
The fourth major relaxation of censorship twenty times as great, and in magazines, twice
control over informational media was effected as great as before transfer. The upsurge in
on 26 July 1948, when all pre-censored news- magazine violations was less pronounced than
papers and news services were transferred to in newspapers and books because of the fact
post-censorship." The pre-censored , indige- that twenty-eight extremist magazines were kept
nous press was transferred to a post-censorship on pre-censorship, whereas ioo percent of the
status in four separate increments during the newspapers and books were post-censored}·
period '5 through 25 July 1948}8 On 15 October 1947 twelve publishing
In each of the three major publications firms had been placed on post-censorship with
fields, some publications were on post-censor- but one proviso: that all books dealing with
ship even before these major transfers. In the Allied Powers, the Occupation or its
each field, however, the existence of partial objectives were still to be pre-censored. On
pre-censorship controls was an indirect but that same date fourteen others had been
effective restraint on the post-censored pub- retained on the complete pre-censorship list.
lishers as well. The possibility of being By 30 August 1948, however, these companies
returned to pre-censorship status was sufficient were notified that thenceforth all of their
incentive to keep most post-censored publishers publications would be post-censored.'·
in line with the Press Code. When this At the end of the year, magazines, books,
. indirect restraint was largely removed by the prefectural newspapers , broadcasts, and motion
major transfers to post-censorship, the effect pictures were being post-censored. This re-
on the volume of Press Code violations was lease from pre-censorship control over the
graphic: the monthly violation rate in news- major portion of the Japanese publishing field

37 Censorship control had been gradually relaxed as reRected in the volume of work handled by Press, Pictorial
& Broadcast Division in the month preceding complete transfer to post-censorship, June 1948: (PPB ceo, Me Stat
Rpt, 30 Jun 48. In CCO 319.[.)
Pr~<~ntor~J PO!I·umortd
News items 140 ,854
Newspaper issues 14,7¢
Magazines 26 3.5 1 5
Books 15 1,943
Bulletins 3,~
Periodicals 593
Pamphlets ,06
Sheet music 50
Catalogues . 'I'
Motion pictures
Lantern slides .
Theatrical scripts
Theatrical productions reviewed 374
Kami-shibai chapters
Bro'3.dcasr sc ripts
Recordings. . . .
38 [bid, Jul 48.
39 Memo, G-2, 19 Jul 49, sub: Relaxation and Elimination of Censorship: PPB.
40 PPB CCO, Mo Star Rpt, Aug 48. In CCO 319.1.

240
 pennitted CCD's Press, Pictorial. and Broad- Information obtained through censorship
cast Division to expand its mission as an intel- was forwarded to SCAP sections or other user
ligence and analysis agency." agencies in the fonn of so-called "comment
As the facilities and communications sur- sheets" that were, in fact, substantiated bases
veillance techni9ues for obtaining information for corrective action. An enonnous volume
of subversive activities developed, this phase of information otherwise unobtainable by user
of CCD operations increased in importance agencies, since they did not maintain field
until it dominated Communications Division surveillance themselves. was furnished through
reporting. Surveillance of telephone, tele- these comment sheets. (Plate No. 77)
graph and postal channels yielded a continual The effect of this type of infonnation was
flow of "action leads" information to user recogn ized as a direct contribution to the
agencies. Such reporting was concerned with economy of Japan. Many SCAP civil sections
violence, strikes, Communist activities or any benefited from this service and acknowledged
other developments which were of a subversive its direct monetary or economic values. In a
or possible subversive nature. In addition to single month, CCD "leads" furnished to
intelligence of this type, CCD often obtained, ESS disclosed thirty-eight large scale economic
chiefly through the monitoring of telephone violations , leading in turn to the indictment of
conversations, valuable advance information ninety-three companies and two hundred
on plans for strikes. demonstrations and other seventeen persons with a recovery of materials
actlvltles. These spot reports were forwarded aggregating a value of 101,071,017 yen."
immediately to CIC and other action agencies CCD "watchlist" reports of over a
in time for them to take precautionary year enabled ESS to recover critical items in
measures. Individuals and organizations illegal market operations to an aggregate
believed to be of a subversive nature were amount of 431 million yen; blackmarket value
watch listed by CCD and communications to of these goods was estimated at five billion
or from them were carefully studied by per- yen ." Through investigation of one CCD
sonnel trained to detect subversion and clan- intercept, the Civilian Property Custodian
destine correspondence methods. located 16,000 carats of industrial diamonds.
In January 1948 communications surveil- Further searching disclosed the location of
lance reporting of public reaction based on sufficient diamonds to make the final total
four million intercepts per month was in- 30,000 carats. As a result of only one intercept
stituted, providing all SCAP agencies with an 52.5 pounds of hoarded platinum, with an
unbiased. accurate picture of public reactIon official value of 53,679,377 yen, was recovered."
to the government, to SCAP policies, and to The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps:
other controversial issues. The 441st Counter lnteliigence Corps (CIC)

4' Memo, G-2 to CofS GHQ FEC, ,8 Jan 48, sub: Post-Censorship of Newspapers .
.p Rpt, ceD to G-2 GHQ FEC, 14 Jan 49, sub: Contrihucions to the Occupation.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. In consonance with the Cine's general policy of relaxation of all forms of restrictive measures vis-a-vis
the Japanese people, all categories of Civil Censorship operations were discontinued on 31 October 1949. This policy
decision was one more decisive step toward liberalization of the Occupation and enlarged freedom of action and
responsibilities on the part of the Japanese Government.
Civil Censorship, an operating agency of G-2, was instituted under JCS Directive in 1945 primarily as a preventive
and security operation. It was designed to implement the broad features of the Potsdam Declaration with a view to

241
 ...
UI
o
..
o
o
.-,.
'"
.'"'"
o
'"'" '"...
'"o

2611

~88

2072

2243

750
624

38~
COMNAVFE
SCA]AP
:::==~~~4~4~5
489
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
3953 ------------1
488

~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4357 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2322

1123 "'-1947
",-1948

PLATE NO. 77
Comment Sheets Disseminated by CCD to User Agencies:
Comparison between June 1947 and June 1948
and the 319th Military Intelligence Company purposes; however, in early 1946 SCAPIN's
(MIS linguist unit) constituted the major were developing faster than surveillance
investigating agencies in the field pertaining agencies could be organized to cope with them.
to foreign espionage, sabotage, treason, sedi- It was during this period that two of the
tion, subversive activities, security violations most important SCAPIN's were issued;
or other acts inimical to Occupation objectives. they ordered the abolition of certain ultra-
In the field of counter intelligence the surveil- nationalistic organizations and the removal of
lance coverage of Japan was uniform through those office holders whose wartime policies
national distribution of field detachments. and activities indicated they were unfit to lead
(Plate No. 78) Japan along democratic lines.'!
Fifty-eight separate Counter Intelligence Under these "purge directives" CIS, in
Corps held detachments were established in conjunction with the Government Section,
localities corresponding to the political, pre- furnished advisory opinion concerning the
fectural division of Japan. The 441St CIC eligibility of persons to hold public office or
was closely coordinated with the Occupation a position of responsibility and influence in
troops; the First CIC region corresponded to public or important private enterprise. CIC
the I Corps Area; the Second CIC region, to field teams were soon taking definite action
that of the IX Corps. Six CIC districts in relation to these SCAPIN's. When
coincided with areas assigned to United States informed that a person considered unfit was
divisions and British units. Fifty field units, still holding office, CIC took immediate steps
with seven additional sub-detachments were to determine the validity of the allegation,
distributed to cover every important political and, if proved, to remove the man &om his
subdivision of Japan, i. e., the prefecture, the position.'·
hub of provincial administration. On other occasions the activities of certain
Reports on activities of field detachments organizations indicated to CIC agents evidence
in investigating potentially subversive or other of doctrines propagated by officially banned
undesirable individuals and organizations were groups. Members of a purged organization
sent to the 441St Headquarters in Tokyo. sometimes joined or created new groups under
Initially the check on enforcement of different names and seemingly different consti-
SCAPIN's was the responsibility of the tutions but with the same old militaristic or
agency initiating them or the one whose supra-nationalistic tendency." CIS' connec-
functions were most closely related to their tion with the purge directives terminated in

44 (coord.) eliminating and controlling ultra.nationalistic, militaristic, and subversive influences. The record of
censorship in Japan was one of patience and liberal interpretation and steady, progressive relaxations in each successive
year: authorization of locally originated radio broadcasts in February 1946, removal of pre-censorship of radio in
August 1947. of books in Octobe. 1947. of magazines in December 1947, and of newspapers in July 1948.
What minor restraints then remained consisted chiefly of post-facto. sensible precautions against attempts by ex-
tremist minorities to abuse the civil liberties granted the Japanese people under a tolerant Occupation. In October
1949 even these barriers of rational protection were lifted, and the Japanese public information and communication
media were on their own.
45 (I) SCAPIN 548, 4 Jan 46, sub: Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Assns, Societies and OtherOrganiza-
tions; (2) SCAPIN 550, 4 Jan 46, sub: Removal and Exclusion of UndeSirable Pers from Pub Office.
46 44'st ere Det, Mo Info Rpt of Activ, Mar 46.
47 Such was the Japan Science and Culture Association, which claimed as members go percent of the SCAP
banned Japan Aerial Academic Association.

243
early 1948. Elsewhere. CIC continued to in- and reporting of subversive activity.'"
vestigate non-compliance with SCAPIN's but The CIC Training School, which opened in
essentially only in the role of a fact-gathering the Brisbane area in 1943, provided special
agency." To CIC, well deployed in every training in investigative procedures for officers
prefecture in Japan, went the additional and and agents and replaced its " combat courses"
informal responsibility of enforcing the direc- with classes pertaining to Japanese social,
tives of other SCAP agencies until they were political, and economic life. Lectures were
ready to function in the field. given by native authorities on political changes
Another SCAPIN which absorbed much in Japan during the war; Japanese court and
of CIC's attention in the early days of the newspaper systems and methods used by civil
Occupation concerned the surrender of arms and military intelligence. police and secret
by the J apanese people... This responsibiliry agencies were studied. An effort was made
continued throughout the Occupation in con- to concentrate on the practical aspects of
junction with troop patrols, and small caches CIC activities; great emphasis was laid on the
of arms or ammunItion were uncovered at Japanese prefectural and national government
irregular intervals. structure and means by which CIC could
Following the completion of apprehension best utilize Japanese . investigative facilities."
of the majority of "Class A" war criminals, Public Safety Diyision: The organization
the tasks of CIC shifted largely to detection of a public safety regulatory body was another

48 Ler, HQ 441S[ ere Oet to all ere Units in Japan, 5 Aug 46, sub: Direct Action on Removal from Office
Taken by Local crc Det.
49 SCAPIN 181, 23 OCt 45. sub; Insms Cone the Surr of Arms by the eiv Pop of Japan. Also see
Ch. V.
50 This trend is illustrated by comparison of the following figures:
}un~ 1947 JU"~ 1948
Cloud Pending Cloud Pending
Sabotage 5 <2 5 3
Espionage 7 14 8 28

Treason 0 0 0 0

Sedition 0 0 0 0

Subversive Activities 260 43 2 195 736

Disaffection . 0 0

Violations of AR 380- '5 0 2 0 0

Security Risks 0 2 <0

Security Investigations 56 66 99 [08

Security Surveys 0 0 3
Miscellaneous 43 45 32 [00

The increase in the number of cases of subversive activity can be largely attributed to the activities of the Japan
Communist Parly that were inimical to the policies of the Occupation. The number of espionage cases increased with
the rise in the number of repatriates returned to Japan from Soviet occupied areas. With the beginning of the repatri-
ation program of Japanese prisoners from Soviet occupied territories, e IC organized Port Interrogation Teams to screen
repatriates as they arrived at ports of entry in Japan who were believed to be of interest to CIe. Following the return
of these people to their homes, a surveillance in their local prefectures resulted in the detection ·of espionage agents
among some of such returnees.
51 44lst crc, Mo Info Rpts of Activ, Dec 45- Apr 46. Extensive courses in report writing, the jurisdiction and
limitations of ere operations, and investigative procedures were offered, along with briefings on the organization of ers
G-2, AFPAC, and SeAP. As had been the case since the first crcrs class, outside experts on all subjects related to
the counter intelligence mission came as guest speakers to give the agents a thorough indoctrination.

244
 LEGEND
JAPAN
Q_rUl"O
. UIUIlU-f O
APP ROXI MATE SCALE I 6,500,000

-
o

..
I L:JJAKt<l1T'lA1
CIC AREA
KU!;HIFIO CIC AREA
ASAHIGAWA CIC AREA
HAKODATE CIC AREA
SAPPORO CIC AREA

5th CIC DISTRICT (SE~IIIAI

AOMORI CIC AREA
HACHINOHE SUB DET
HIROSAKI SUB DE T
•
IWATE CIC AREA IMORIOKA)
AKITA CIC AREA
YAMAGATA CIC AREA
MIVAGI CIC AREA ISENDAI)
FUKUSHIMA CIC AREA
NIIGATA CIC AREA

41h CIC DISTR ICT (CP

TOCHIGI CIC AREA I UTSUNOMIVA)
IBARAKI CIC AREA IISOHAMA)
GUMMA CIC
NAGANO CIC

LlUS~A~'T~~~~
AREA
CIC AREA
I CIC AREAIKATSUVAMA)

2nd CIC DISTRICT (KURE)

CIC AREA

~:~~ti:~;~CIC C AREAIMATSUE)
AREA
CIC AREA

~.~~~~i(~thCICAREA
AREA
I TAKA"'ATSU)
CIC AREA
CIC AREA IMATSUVAMA)
CIC AREA

HEADQUARTERS
441s1 CIC DET

CIC DISTRICT

3rd CIC
TOYAMA CIC AREA
ISHIKAWA CIC AREA '''.N,\".WA
NANAO SU B OET
(KOKURA) GtFU elC AREA
AICHI CIC AREAINAGOVA)
FUKUOKA CIC AREA FUKUI CIC AREA
TSUSHIMA SUB OET SHIGA CI IOTSU)
SAGA CIC AREA MIE CIC
OITA CIC AREA I BEPPU)
KUMAMOTO CIC AREA
NAGASAKI CIC AREA
SASEBO SUB DET
MIYAZAKI CIC AREA
KAGOSHIMA CIC AREA

PLATE NO. 78
44,st ere Districts and Field Detachments, 4 October '948
Police trainees at National Rural Police College In Tokyo
attended lectures on variety of subjects.

Entire motorcycle force of T 9kyo lin'ed up prior to parade

terminating "Traffic Safety Week ".

PLATE NO. 79
Police Training Program, 1948
task in the field of Occupation control plored and not too closely related to previous
and reform. Japan's pre-Occupation public assignments of CIS, it was necessary to build
safety services, developed under purely milita- a Public Safety Division from the ground up.
ristic control, required new policies and re- A skeleton staff was immediately appointed
education. Since the public safety organs within\
the CIS administrative office, but the
were the only stabilizing forces which would Public Safety Division (PSD) did not begin
remain in Japan upon the eventual withdrawal operating until early 1946.'>
of the Occupation forces, the early reorgani- At that time CIS introduced experts in the
zation and training of these agencies along public safety field from the United States to
democratic lines became a prime objective of advise on the reform of corresponding Japanese
SCAP. The Japanese pre-war police had organizations. Under the guidance of these
been a national organization, directed from specialists, the Public Safety Division super-
Tokyo, with wide powers of surveillance, ar- vised the reorganization of the Japanese police,
rest, and other forms of " protective custody." fire fighting, and prison systems. In attempting
They were to be stripped of all illegal powers to establish modern democratic organizations
and their procedures were to be consonant in these fields , it was necessary that the status
with those of police in a democratic state. In of Japan's shattered economy be kept in mind
order to cover activities which had been under while adequate measures were being provided to
the police, such as fire defense and fire preven- permit future realization of ultimate objectives
tion, wholly new organizations would have to as the level of Japan's economy was raised."
be developed. The prison field , regarded On the basis of numerous suggestions by
chiefly as a money making organization, was Police Branch, PSD, the Japanese Government
to be brought into line with western standards submitted a master plan of police reform.
and given a reform emphasis. The Japanese All municipalities of 5 ,000 or more population
people, defeated in war, with their cities were to have autonomous police departments.
burned, their factories demolished, their These were to be directed by municipally
economy bursting out of control, were in a elected Public Safety Commissions. A few
difficult position. They lacked food, clothing more than 1,600 cities fell in this population
and shelter, the basic necessities of life. group, and 95 ,000 municipal policemen would
National unrest developed quickly due in part serve. It was planned to police the non-urban
to uncertainty as to Occupation attitudes and areas of Japan with a national rural police
activities, but more to the disruptive acti"ities force of 30,000. A National Public Safety
of the discordant elements, including many Commission, appointed by the Prime Minister,
recently released political prisoners. would be charged with establishing policies and
Since the field of public safety was unex- plans for the national force. This plan, ap-

52 For more complete coverage of PSD, see GHQ SCAP, Int Ser, VoL IX, Operations 0/ the Ciyii Inttlligence
S.ction. GHQ. SeAP, Parr II (S). The mission of PSD is delineated in SCAP·FEC GO No. t3. t945. and in SCAP-
FEe Staff Memo NO.7. 1949, which required PSD to advise, guide, coordinate, inform SCAP and effectuate democratic
practices and procedures in police, fi(e, prison and coast guard services of the Japanese Government.
53 GHQ FEC MIS GS. Rpt (S) sub: Org and Functions. G-, SCAP III FEC. t Apr 48. The scientific
character of Occupation reforms was evident in the high caliber of its consultants. PSD employed the services of Mr. L.
J. Valentine, former Police Commissioner of New York and Mr. O . G. Olander, Superintendent of the Michigan State
Constabulary.

247
 THOU- )
( SANDS 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
32 33 ! 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
1,800 - i---- i --

j
1,600
, II /,. ~
-,
I ~
j
1,400 -
'~
1,200
L
,f ,,
'--
'P'
, ,,. ----
-,,
\

1,000 1/ I\-
, -..
:/ ' '- -, I'-- r--- v-.
I
""
; ,;
800
~ " ... '~ , ~ ,I
v,: t.--
--- .' "
....
1/
'/

600 -,- V, I '.

, I

-- I \1

400

200 - --
I- REPORTED

o - , --- CLEARED
I
Offenses Reported and Cleared: '924-'948

TH OU - )
( S AND S
18 0

16 0

140
.-

t MONTH~AVERAGE
y"'\.
• •
,
. _
I--r- J \- f----~ -·~~V
--
1933-1935
..
120
-.;; .~

~
100 ~
J. ~
V
!
80
t= ~E.!lA/
/
M...llliJtiLL
';'4'-1945
- +- --
60

40
~\/
. JAPAN
1946-1947 CRIME
193
RATE

GERMANY 390
20 JAPAN I POLICEMAN PER 843 POP.
GERMANY 1 POLICEMAN PER 437 POP.
o
45 46 47 48 49

Offenses against the Criminal Code: '945-'948

PLATE NO. 80
Crime Statistics and Police Effectiveness: '924-'948
proved in principle by SCAP, was passed by municipal Public Safety Commissions in their
the Diet in December 1947. functions , and taught the Japanese people to
Now no longer under police control, the fire consider the police as a safeguard of liberties
prevention agencies were necessarily re-grouped. and civil rights."
Japan's fire losses, Fire Branch discovered, Japan had never had a really excessive crime
were largely due to the combination of closely rate, although the middle thirties saw Japan's
spaced houses along narrow streets, the constant highest pre-war rate with an average of 130,000
use of open fires and carelessness in handling offenses per month. The effectiveness of the
them, and meager equipment for fire-fighting wartime police reduced crime to the lowest
coupled with a lack of "know-how" among the recorded in police histoty: the 1941-45 average
thousands of volunteer fire fighters. Whenever showed only 75,000 offenses per month. With
conditions indicated that municipalities had the end of the war, the inherent unrest of a
ability to support a paid fire department, they defeated people, the lack of adequate food,
were authorized to have them. These, like clothing and housing, and the return of mil-
the local police, were under the local Public lions of demobilized personnel, crime took an
Safety Commissions; while on the national upward swing until it exceeded the high figure
level the Fire Research Institute was under the of the thirties. (Plate No. 80) This increase
national commission. Within one year of the in crime required constant surveillance by the
opening of the first police school nearly 80,000 Public Safety Division.
recruits had been given . basic training in Studies were made of police communications
American methods as adapted to Japanese systems, police training, metropolitan police,
needs." A series of schools followed: they and rural police. Along with its research work,
continued to train the police in the powers, the Division conducted numerous widespread
limitations, and responsibilities of law enforce- investigations throughout Japan." Inspections
ment, oriented newly created prefectural and :nd surveys of public safety organizations

54 Months of inspection, evaluation and comparison went into development of a single PSD recommendation
with approval having far reaching effect on Japanese life and welfare as well as the economic stabi lity of their government.
55 84,000 police were trained and retrained during 1948 and early 1949. It was expected that 102,000 would be
trained in 1949-195°. Modem texts and curricula were developed and revised . The National Public Safety Commis.
,ion, with 46 prefectural and 159B municipal commissions, became increasingly important in internal security, and
required guidance . 125,000 police required effective arms and training in their use.
56 Continued assistance was essentia l since crimes. fires, illegal entrants and prison population necessitating PSD
help showed no decline. PSD experts guided the Japanese Government in submitting and obtaining ample budgets on
a sound basis. Amounts originally requested (subsequently reduced through PSD guidance). proposed by Finance
Ministry (F/M), and recommended and obtained by PSD are shown below. Fifty-one billion yen was saved the Japa-
DeSe Government without appreciable loss in effectiveness. (Figures in millions of yen)

R~qu~Jltd F/ M [>,opomJ PSD R«omm~,.Jdtion

Police 33,75 0 4.400 9,"90
Coast Guard 8,370 2,800 3,5 00
Fire (Nat'l Budget) 480 30 80
Prison 29,000 5,000 7,300
Total 7 1 ,400 12,23 0 19,970

249
CeIl blocks made spotlessly Kitchen made sanitary and food
clean and kept sanitary. improved in amount and qualiry.

Prison industries revitalized All prisoners made to learn

and expanded. and do useful work.

PLATE NO. 81
Fuchu Prison, Tokyo: Improvements Made, 1945-1947
were constant." Many corrections were made bation practices, and prisoner classi fication.
on the spot, merely by supplying helpful Nter establishment of the Public Safery
suggestions. Almost all the police detention Division, the prisoner mortality rate in Japan
cells in Tokyo were rebuilt and modernized declined sharply."
in this manner. Police brutality and cor- Studies of Japanese public safety laws and
ruption were curtailed and Japanese police regulations made by the Legal Branch, resulted
inspectors were trained to continue the new in recommendations for changes in criminal
program on their own initiative. and juvenile codes, jury laws , rules of evidence,
By thoroughly investigating the Japanese criminal defense and prosecution procedures,
prison and reformatory systems, experts in and other legal aspects of public safety.
penology were able to gain first-hand infor- Equally effective work was accomplished in
mation of every important penal institution. the other branches of the Division. The Fire
The Ministry of Justice was abolished and the Branch extended its investigations into every
Attorney General took over the approved major city of Japan. A system of local au-
duties , but the change carried little of new tonomous fire departments was set up. Local
import for the prisons. There was no change units were gradualli' reorga~ized along func-
from national to local control but something tional lines, using the modernized Tokyo Fire
far more diflicult-a change in the prison and Department as a model. A Fire Research
reformatory functions without a corresponding Institute was established. Other problems en-
change in basic authoriry. Japanese prisons countered by this Branch included training in
had been interested in making as much money fire defense and in fire prevention, development
as possible, thus keepmg operating expenses of plans for disaster control, and long-range
at a minimum. Under the direct guidance and municipal planning to minimize damage from
supervision of former American prison war- . catastrophes."
dens, Fuchu and Yokohama Prisons became Great effort was made to improve the working
pilot plants to demonstrate American principles conditions of the firemen , to remove them from
of operation . Again, it was possible to make the control of the police bureaucracy, and give
many corrections on the spot with follow-up them the basic /ire fighting equipment. De-
investigations to insure that suggestions were tailed city grading studies were begun, based
carried out. Several special projects were based on the standard American fire underwriter's
on information thus obtained: guard train- procedures. Deficiencies were brought to light
ing schools, prison industries, paroles and pro- in this way, and insurance rates were equalized.

57 During 1947-1948 PSD completed 216 major projects which involved 90 6e1d trips, broken down as
fOllows :
Unit Confo~"uJ lrup«liom
Police 52 9 1,462
Prison 493 J~5
Fire ~n J05
Maritime Service 35 35
58 Field inspecClons revealed that 100,000 persons were incarcerated in 65,000 capacity space. Legislation for a
relatively good prison and parole system was enacted but required supervisory implementation to be effective. Technical
knowledge was lacking among Japanese Government officials.
59 Fire.fighting equipment remained a prime factor. The enormio/ of fire losses, although reduced, required
continued technical aid due to the impact on national economy.

251
 Japan's Fire Research Institute, April '948, formerly the Japanese
Central Aeronautics Research Institute.

Ichikawa Fire Department IS inspected by PSD Fire Branch, March '947.

PLATE NO. 82
Fire Prevention
 JAPAN
£U:VUIOlll "' .UT
AP'P ROltl hl AT'[ SCALE L 6,500,000

,~ ,~

J A p

KI'O!IDU-u ruAll' '!

LEGEND

,-- •
o
CIC AREAS
CIC SUB - DETACHMENTS
MILITARY POLICE UNITS

""....... • MILITARY GOVERMENT TEAMS

CIVIL CENSORSH IP OETACHMENTS

PLATE NO. 83
Relationship of Counter Intelligence, Civil Censorship, Military Police and
Military Government Detachments, 15 December 1948
By means of an elaborate publicity campaign employment, missions and duties differed. From
during Japan's first" Fire Prevention Week" a an intelligence point of view, the political,
great deal of cooperation was obtained from administrative and economic reporting of Mili-
prominent citizens; neighborhood fire protec- tary Government teams served to supplement
tion associations which gave valuable service and confirm CIC field reports and gave GHQ
in eliminating local fire hazards were formed. a factual picture of current activities. Both
Japan's geographical condition as a group agencies continued to be .deeply concerned
of islands pointed to yet another phase of public with the maintenance of local law and order.
safety, the maritime. Here the national control There was also inferential relationship be-
was weaker and jurisdiction over harbors was tween the Counter Intelligence Corps and the
largely of a local character. Guided by PSD Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the
suggestions, the Japanese set up a Maritime Provost Marshal (PM). Important leads for
Safety Board with functions similar to the the PM/CID investigation of blackmarket
American Coast Guard Service. A Maritime movements, for example, came from CCD and
Training Institute was planned to supplement CIe. The primary mission of the Provost
the seamen's training and the reconstruction Marshal however, continued to be that of troop
of the nation's war-wrecked navigational aids control, while CIC was principally concerned
system was given high priority. with subversive acts by Japanese or foreigners
The Maritime Safety Branch was primarily inimical to the Occupation forces or the policies
interested in the establishment of a Japanese of SCAP. The Military Police and CID (PM)
Maritime Safety Service (Coast Guard) and handled police cases as they related to the U. S.
made recommendations relative to navigational Army personnel : vehicle traffic, off-duty disci-
aids, sea-rescue, hazards to navigation, and pline, theft, and miscellaneous criminal charges.
prevention of illegal entry and smuggling. 60 Counter Intelligence concern with United
States troops and civilians was largely limited
Security Surveillance and to 'luestions of security, i. e., disaffection, dis-
Law Enforcement loyalty, and subversion. CID however, in-
evitably overlapped CIC investigative processes.
The initial and continuous tran'luility of In a survey of the relative density and distri-
Japan, compared with other world areas, has bution of surveillance agencies (Plate No. 83)
perhaps been the outstanding success of the the concentration of Military police and Crim-
Occupation. This was primarily due to accur- inal Investigation Division strengrh naturally
ate counter intelligence information on every coincided with major troop distribution, the
shade of public unrest-in the field of labor, in Tokyo, Yokohama and Osaka areas being
communist infiltration, and in movements of heavily covered. As regards relative density,
disillusioned , repatriated military personnel. Military Police and CID maintained twenty-five
Certain law enforcement and surveillance units in only twenty-four prefectures, while the
agencies in the field maintained potential ob- 44,st CIC manned sixty posts in forty-six pre-
servation posts in affected areas, although their fectures, a complete national coverage"
60 Twenty-three coast guard bases utilizing 46 patrol craft were established protecting 9,J~ miles of coastline.
Training for 10,000 personnel was inaugurated using new texts, curricula and methods. The coast guard agency was
new to the Japanese Government which was utterly devoid of skilled technicians or know-how. Illicit traffic was
declining.
6, fu of April '949. (Rpt, CIS to G-2 FEC, 28 Apr 49, sub: Rei Status, crc, PM, CID [S].)
254
 The Military Government teams more nearly cerned with enforcement of the purge direc-
approximated the prefectural distribution of tives.
the 44,st CIC through~ut . Their purposes A new element made itself felt in this
and capacities were closely related to CIC period: loyalty checks on personnel working
surveillance in the same areas. Although for or with the Occupation. The Loyalty
" Blacklist" anticipated "combined opera- Desk was established in June 1947 at a time
tions " of these two agencies , they were never when Washington, apprehensive of Com-
officially effected, but in practice CIe and munist infiltration into Government offices,
MG units in the field cooperated closely."' required a thorough security investigation of
A major turning point in the development all Army employees.'" Two other special
of the section occurred in May 1946 when it categories of security checks covered persons
was placed under direct control of the theater traveling in the FEC and certain aliens wish-
G-2, thus eliminating the artificial staff divi- ing to marry American Occupation personnel.
sion between counterintelligence and opera- The primary purpose of investigation in both
tional theater intelligence which had been con- cases was counterespionage.
sidered a wartime weakness."' The Loyalty Desk served other staff sec-
Since the Government Section had final tions in numerous ways. It made record
authority over questions regarding compliance checks of proposed entrants for Civil Infor-
with terms of the purge directives, the selective mation and Education Section, appointees
check had assumed such proportions as to holding power of attorney for the Civil Prop-
make proper enforcement impossible for so erty Custodian, and Japanese witnesses and
small a unit as G / A Branch; this responsibility lawyers required by the Legal Section to par-
was transferred from CIS to Government ticipate in war crimes trials held outside Japan.
Section on I I January 1947." Except for the At G-I'S request, checks were initiated on
continued filing of questionnaires in CIS for individual Japanese who desired to return
intelligence purposes, CIS was no longer con- home, and various other staff sections turned
62 Relative Coverage by 441St ere, Military Police and Military Government:
441" CIC MILITARY POLlCE MILITARY GOVT.
YEAR STR. STA. COV. STR. STA. COV. STR. STA. COV.
'946 ' 076 6, '00% 6709 '9 30% 225' 47 79%
'947 '276 6, '00% 6440 34 56% 239' 47 79%
'948 '22[ 60 [00% 3804 34 57% 23[3 54 98%
It should be noted that this coverage was accomplished with one-third the strength of the MP's. In terms of re-
alistic percentage, ere executed 100 percent security coverage as compared with 57 percent Military Police coverage, but
on the numerical basis of approximately 30 percent relative strength.
63 See FM- IOI-5. Sec. II, par. 15 (b). A modification of functions for civil intelligence missions and develop-
ment of new Occupation problems resulted in a reorganization of CIS Operations Branch into four main sub-units :
Special Activities Branch (SJA) which dealt with left-wing subversion; General Activities Branch (G/A) which was con-
cerned with right-wing activity, ultra-nationalism, foreign nationals in Japan, checking on conformance with SCAP
directives, and screening persons subject to the purge; Compilations Branch, which gathered background information on
personalities and organizations of counterintelligence interest; and the Executive Group under which was placed the Pub-
lications and Files Sections as well as a c lassification and control section which disseminated intelligence gathered by held
agencies, coila ted and processed by the other branches.
64 SCAP Staff Memo No. 13, I I Jan 47, sub; Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Japanese Pers from
Governmental and InAuential Private Positions.
65 (I) Bull NO.4, 10 Apr 47, Sec II , Exec Order 9835, sub: Prescribing Procedures for the Adm of an Em-
ployees Loyalty Program in the Exec Br of the GOV[; (2) DA Cir 338, 28 0" 48, sub; Organizations Considered by
the AG to Have Interests in Conflict with Those of the U S .

255
to CIS for clearances of foreign nationals to foreign nationals; Japanese underground move-
handle classified information." ments; German intelligence activities in the
Far East ; requests for information from Allied
Internal Subversion Missions; information about" Tokyo Rose";
possible arson of Occupation forces instal-
The forces working against democracy were lations; information on Japanese war criminals;
not all of foreign extraction. The pattern of investigation of hidden arms and ammunition;
Communist thinking was obvious enough, ultranationalistic, anti-Occupation activities;
but the job of detecting it in individual cases Army postal violations; information on hidden
was difficult. To establish enough positive goods; information for trial of alleged war
evidence to take action against disaffected criminals in the United States; and military
Americans in the Far East Command called script conversion violations.'"
for skillful and painstaking investigations. The Compilations Branch included the Or-
The Domestic Subversion Desk was a con- ganizations, Personalities, Foreign, and Micro-
trol group which followed up G-2'S interest in file Sections. Its role was that of a specialized
the arrest, transfer and/or release of war crimi- information collection agency, with access to
nals, and in addition handled many types of original Japanese documents, direct contact
cases (other than leftist) involving willful ac- with innumerable Japanese persons, and a
tivity to undermine the interests of the United highly developed dissemination system geared
States. Illustrative is the following list of to furnish operational information to other
typical cases acted upon by the Subversion branches of Operations Division. Through
Desk during 1947 : alleged American traitors; continued liaison with CIC and the Document
impersonation of CIC agents by Japanese.and Section of ATIS, and through cultivation of

66 In 1947 when Washington authorities became seriously concerned with the problem of internal subversion
and certain organizations and publications were publicly designated by the Attomer General of the United States as
Communist, subversive or Fascist, CIS was given the responsibility of implementing the loyalty check on personnel in
the FEe. In applying the loyalty criteria concerning communism, .three categories had been set up: (standards pre.
scribed in Dj A Cir No. 17. par 2, 18 Jan 47) membership in me Communist Party, close affiliation with the Party, and
dose association with known members of the Party. In the FEe, association with Japan Communist Party members
and organizations was also included. Membership or sympathetic association with any of the Attorney General's list
of organizations was not taken as me sole criterion of disloyalty, however, but rather as a warning to the various CIS
components to be on the alert, in their mission as "watchdog of the Occupation."
67 The Japanese political situation was of continuing interest to the Domestic Subversion Desk. The information
compiled by political analysts in connection with the arrest of war criminals and the conduct of the purge proved invalu-
able in following the complicated course of mushrooming political parties,' organizations, and individuals. The Political
Subsection maintained current, detailed rosters of political parties within the Diet and a large miscellaneous file on
activities within the political organizations which had potentialities of being antagonistic to the Occupation. Even after
the staff reponsibility for the administration of the SCAPIN regarding undesirable personnel in public office was com-
pletely taken over by Government Section, the Political Desk continued to collate, evaluate, and report information on
political trends for the special purposes of civil and counter intelligence.
Each repatriate to Japan was required to provide personal information: his name, destination, permanent address,
registered address, branch of military setvice, military rank or civilian occupation, unit, place of internment, education
and, if interrogated code indicating type of information supplied. One copy of each card bearing such information was
forwarded to the ATIS Central Interrogation Center in Tokyo, and the duplicate was used to establish in G / A Branch
a central repatriate file providing locator cards on adult Japanese repatriates and a supplementary file of all military men,
organized by internment camps in which they spent the longest period. The purposes of the file were wide and varied.
It offered to G -2 user agencies the possibility of locating uninterrogated repatriates after their processing at the port had
been completed. It helped ATIS Central Interrogation Cencflr locate subjects for re-interrogation, and aided CIC in
chedc.ing addresses of repatriates of counter intelligence interest whose whereabouts were uncertain.

256
 independent Japanese sources not general!y or the Publications Section compiled the counter
easily available to other less specialized groups, intelligence part of the G-2 Daily Intelligence
Compilations Branch built up a Japanese Summary and contributed to the operations
National Reference Library which was recog- report for the War Department.
nized as an authoritative source for original Special Projects Section was under direct
Japanese documentary material. Among its control of the commanding officer of 441st
materials were thousands of personality and CIC Detachment. To meet the international
organization dossiers, an extensive microfilm aspect of counter intelligence, Special Projects
index of Special Higher Police cards, and a sub-sections were established in every CIC
large card file of higher Japanese Civil Service area in Japan." The Section headguarters
officials. concentrated on cases concerning espionage,
The Microfile Section recorded thousands foreign inspired sabotage, and radical or for-
of documents for other sections of CIS as eign inspired subversion.
well as for the Japanese National Reference Organized labor, a force which, due to the
Library. It included among its files the machinations of left-wing leaders, at times
records of all cases pertaining to violations of threatened to defeat the liberal Occupation
the Peace Preservation and the Military Se- directives that had brought it into existence in
curity Laws, the Saionji-Harada Memoirs Japan, was observed by the Labor Branch of
(some 3,000 typewritten pages), the Marguis Special Projects Section. This unit furnished
Kido Diary, and innumerable documents of considerable information to the Labor Division
counter intelligence interest. of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section,
Publications Section, as its name implies, as illustrated by the timely and continuous re-
was concerned primarily with the preparation ports pro~ided prior to the incipient but dan-
of CIS' comribution to various G-2 publica- gerous general labor strike in February 1947
tions. Its chief project, the" Periodical Sum- and a similar disturbance planned by subversive
mary," developed from the weekly " Situation elements in October of that year." It was also
Report- Japan" which was first published on responsible for notifying crc field units of ex-
4 November 1945, and which after three is- pected developments in the labor arena. It
sues became" Occupational Trends-Japan received reports from the field teams in case of
and Korea." Designed as "a compilation of strikes, important labor gatherings, the reac-
Japanese trends in political, educational, psy- tion of local labor organizations to speeches
chological, and religious spheres, as gathered by prominent Communists, and other similar
from reports submitted by counter intelligence events.
agencies," the publication presented to theater Under the new freedoms granted to them
commanders and to the War Department a by SCAP, the Japanese people rushed to or-
full picture of the civil side of occupation in- ganize in the political and labor fields to a
telligence. degree that was bewildering to Western observ-
In addition to the " Periodical Summary" ers. With a hereditary talent for banding

68 44lst ere Det, Me Info Rpts of Activ, Dec 46 and Dec 47. Cases of this nature processed through Special
Projects Section increased from 453 for the month of December 1946 to 1,575 during December 1947, although a case
load chart could not adequately indicate the labor involved. During December 1947, for example, of 139 cases com·
plet ed in headquarters on ]CP activities, 357 investigations were run in field units.
6!1 CIS Periodical Sum No. II, I Feb 47.

257
together, Japanese from all walks of life took GHQ, mobile radio equipment was often used
advantage of their freedom from the militaristic by CIe.
state domination which had guided them for Early in '947 arrangements were made to
centuries and the number of societies, parties, utilize the Eighth Army teletype network for
clubs, and leagues representing every shade of CIC spot reports on a twenty-four hour basis.
opinion gr"W without check. They held By '5 March spot reports were flowing into
meetings, parades, and demonstrations to give 44[st Headquarters via teletype, radio, and
vent to their feelings, whether on political telephone in a steady stream. In that month
matters or for the purpose of winning public alone, I I 3 CIC spot reports were sent to CIS
support for higher wages. This development to be forwarded to the AC of S, G·2."
in the early months of '946 was widespread
and rapid; it soon became apparent that unless Repatriation
some method of keeping track of such events
was established , there would be frequent op- Both operational and counter intelligence
portunities for local troublemakers to circum- agencies were interested in the interrogation
vent the objectives of the Occupation. It was of returning PW's." In November [946 the
at this time, too, that under Communist counter intelligence coverage of this field was
prompting, organized labor was beginning its begun. Although certain ports were designated
first major wave of strikes. To offset this as repatriation centers through which all intern-
situation , the use of "spot reports" was ees entered Japan, the varied destinations of
initiated to cover all unusual occurrenCes repatriates in Japan necessitated coordination
throughout Japan." of all CIC field units in handling this
Such incidents were defined to include problem."
any event which showed indications of actual In the 44 [st CIC Headquarters, a special
or potential sabotage, treason, or other matters Repatriate Branch was established within the
of CIC interest; fires, explosions, epidemics, Special Projects ' Section to coordinate the
earthquakes, or other accidents which might operations of the field units. The over-all
affect the Occupation effort; strikes, mass plan entailed a three-step system of screening
demonstrations, or misconduct of Occupation incoming repatriates. In the initial phase,
or Japanese personnel; and miscellaneous all returnees, while still aboard ship, completed
events such as attempts at assassination, at- forms concerning their original address in
tacks on the Japanese Government, and inci- Japan, full name, age, place of confinement,
dents precipitated by or indicating foreign and intended place of residence following the
interests. All such happenings were promptly completion of repatriation. The forms also
reported to the 44,st Headquarters." For asked for information concerning activities in
outlying areas the telephone presented the the Japanese Army and later within the prison
fastest mode of communication but, for in- camp, indicating political affiliations, social
cidents which occurred in the proximity of activities, and indoctrination. By screening

70 Ltr, HQ, 44ISt CIC Det to all C1C Units in Japan, 2 Aug 46, sub: Spot Int Rpts.
7' Ibid.
72 44'st CIC Det, Mo Info Rpt of Activ, Mar 47.
73 For details of repatriation movement, see Ch. VI.
74 Ltr, Hq 44IS{ eIe Oet, 21 Nov 46, sub : Repatriates from Russian Occupied Areas.

258
 Interrogation officers check passenger list with captain of the
Tokuga Maru.

Repatriates are given instructions on how to fill out repatriation forms.

PLATE NO. 84
Repatriation Interrogations, August 1948
these forms, it was possible to establish which counterintelligence importance who did not
repatriates were of immediate counterintel- require immediate questioning, and those who
ligence interest. These were interrogated at were given a routine check within a designated
the port in coordination with Eighth Army time. Complete statistical data was kept on
intelligence officers, constituting the second them and submitted monthly to 44Ist Head-
phase in the plan. Japanese nationals were quarters, CIS, and G-2."
used to carry on much of the interrogation In an effort to lighten the work load of
and routine work not involving classified in- personnel in the field, CIC operations at the
formation . CIC coverage of port customs reparriation Forts were expanded and im-
check stations was maintained. The third proved. More efficient interrogations were
phase included intensive interrogation by Al- accomplished before the repatriates had a
lied Translator and Interpreter Section{ATIS) chance to begin their rrek home."
in Tokyo of those suspected of possessing sen-
sitive information." The Korean Minority Problem
Data from the personal history forms was
transcribed on cards in English. A card file One of CIS' problems in Japan centered in
of repatriates was set up with master file by CIS the Korean minority.'" If they chose to remain
Operations Division while files pertaining to in the country, they were expected to conform
repatriates in each CIC area were established to Japanese laws and to receive equal rreat-
in the CI C area office concerned. ment with Japanese citizens. The Koreans,
As the number of repatriates continued to however, in a surge of revulsion against their
grow, a priority system for classifying them former oppressors, interpreted their liberation
was adopted, to show those who merited as meaning complete freedom from Japanese-
intense interrogation without delay, those of impo~d restraints of any kind. This at-

75 ATIS furnished translation, interrogation, and interpreter sClVice to key civil and military sections in SCAP
and GHQ, as well as to subordinate units, and procured and processed documents for evacuation to Washington. The
large volume of work handled is indicated by the following figures :

Documents scanned .
Documents translated 1,171 2,326 2,338
Periodicals translated 5,330 32,492 53,619
Documents processed 336,666 28,~ 24,754
Documents evacuated to Washington 417 .497 14,193 Sa9 1
During (947 and 1948, ATIS translated monthly an average of 17,[17 pages from issues of 450 different news-
papers and magazines. An average of 13 ,234 communications per month from the Japanese to the CinC and the Allied
Council was translated and analyzed to sample public opinion trends among the Japanese people. Those requiring action
were forwarded to the. responsible Occupation agency. (G'2 GHQ FEe, ATIS Hist Rpt, t947- 48)
76 Ltr, Hq 44lst crc Oet to all crc units in Japan , 28 Feb 47. sub: Subsequent Screening of Japanese
Repatriates from Russian Occupied Areas.
77 The volume of work done by erc in connection with the repatriation program can be illustrated by the £01·
lowing figures taken from two example months. one in 1947 and one in 1948:
In"trtigatetJ, closely watched
InttTTogateJ by CIC or checked by/.eld "niu
Port Teaml in local pre «Iura
September 1947 . . • . . . • 135 6 39, 82 5
September t948 . . . . . . . 24 28 34,9155
,8 Sp Rpt. Compilations Br. 9 Apr 47, sub: Koreans in Japan.

260
 Japanese shipmaster of vessel returning repatriates to Japan, IS
interrogated regarding number of passengers aboard.

Repatriates are interrogated by members of the Home Ministry aboard

the Tokugu Maru at Hakodate, the initial processing phase.

PLATE NO. 85
Repatriation Interrogations, August 1948
titude of defiance led to recurring conflicts agitators into Japan was severe social and
with Japanese authorities and in 1947 the rate economic disruption. Most Koreans returned
of crime for Koreans was almost three times illegally had no assurance of a livelihood.
that for J apanese. 79 Local Korean communities managed to cir-
Under a voluntary repatriation program cumvent the police by absorbing them speedily
initiated in March 1946," more than I,IDO ,OOO and by undertaking illicit activities to pre-
Koreans were repatriated. In March 1947 vent their detection. To obtain the neces-
there were 542,139 registered Koreans remain- sities of life, the illegal entrants procured
ing in Japan, constituting the largest minority unauthorized ration cards." Living under
group in the country." Korean groups be- assumed names and continually changing
came increasingly restive and their numbers residence, this group constituted a prominent.
expanded through illegal entries." factor in disorder and lawlessness in Japan.
Although police apprehended 21,000 illegal The pronounced nationalism developed by
entrants between April 1946 and January '947, the long-oppressed Koreans made them over-
it was believed that those who evaded the zealous of anything Korean: their national
patrols and successfully entered Japan greatly language, their culture, and their temples
outnumbered those who were caught. Be- were to be preserved by any possible means.
tween March 1947 and March 1948 the reg- Thus, when the Education Ministry issued a
istered Korean population actually increased series of directives designed to attain uniform
by 10 percent. 'J educational standards, the Koreans refused to
The most serious effect of unlawful entry admit that their schools which were not gov-
aside from possible infiltration of agents or ernment subsidized should be affected." The

79 GHQ SCAP, Mo Summation of Non Mil Activ, Jan-Dec 47.

80 SCAPIN 746, 17 Feb 46, sub: Registration of Koreans, Chinese, Ryukuans, and Formosans.
S[ One third of this number was concentrated in the Kansai area (mainly in Kyoto, Hyogo and Osaka Prefec-
tures), the remainder being scattered throughout Japan, with fairly heavy concentrations in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Yama-
guchi, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Aichi, Okayama and Shiga Prefectures.
82 CIS Periodical Sum No. 17, 15 Jun 47. While not concerned normally with smuggling activities either of
persons or materials, ere unit commanders were instructed to maintain close observation and report immediately aU
possibilities of subversive activities connected with illegal entrants (e. g. the smuggling into Japan of Communist litera~
ture). Gases which indicated no activity of counterintelligence jurisdiction were turned over to the local Military
Government or tactical unit for disposition . (Ltr, HQ 44Ist cre Det, 26 Aug 47. sub: Handling of Illegal
Repatriates. )
83 G'2 GHQ FEC, Daily Int Sum No. 2009, 20 Jan 48. See also 5/1, CIC Area 37, 12 Nov 47, sub: Illegal
Repatriation of Korean Nat'ls at Hakodate . .
84 ( I) Sp Rpt, Compilations Br, 15 Dec 47, sub : Korean Smuggling Activities. (2) In Nagano PrefectUre the
Chief of Police reported that the majority of Koreans had no regular occupation and 60 to 80 percent were alleged
blackmarketeers or bootleggers. (CCD Intercept JP/TOK /6oo53, 14 Oct 47) (3) In an attempt to obtain rationed
goods for illegal sale, Koreans frequently resorted to the simple expedient of exaggerating the number of persons in a
family or continuing to draw rations for individuals who had left the community. This II ghost population" was a
problem in almost every Korean settlement. In one instance, four Koreans succeeded in obtaining ration books for 838
persons, with bogus official documents. By forging fI Removal of Residence" certificates and pretending to reside in
several villages simultaneously, they were able to amass approximately 300 bales of rice in a few weeks. (5/1, cre Area
28,4 Aug 47, sub: Arrest of Koreans.)
85 SII, CIC Area 6, 8 Jan 48, sub: Meeting of Fight Committee of Ehime·ken HQ of League of Koreans
Residing in Japan .

262
resultant demand for "racial autonomy" in and recognItIon of a rightist government in
education (i.e., approval of the use of Korean Korea. Despite their efforts the rightist ele-
as the spoken language in the schools, contin- ments never reached the strength and power
uance of the use of Korean textbooks, and of the leftist groups in Japan. . Meanwhile,
placing of the schools under Korean manage- leaders of the Japan Communist Party took
ment and supervision) precipitated one of the note of the leftist trend of the League and
most serious outbreaks of violence during the promptly took steps to bring it into the com-
Occupation.'" munist sphere of influence.
More than ninety Korean organizations The close relationship of the leftist Korean
came into existence following the surrender of groups in Japan with the Japan Communist
Japan. The major organization, "League of Party is well illustrated by the fact that some
Koreans Residing in Japan," ostensibly re- of the top leaders held positions in both. In
presented a consolidation of the aims of the joint movements, these groups were mutually
many former groups to form a strong lobbying supporting, each supplying certain essential
bloc to further interests of Korean residents elements for protest movements. The Koreans
in Japan; the leftist nature of the League, furnished enthusiastic mobs, pickets, and
however, was manifest almost from the first. strong propaganda.
When, through intrigue and intimidation, the Subsequent to the termination of the war,
minority communist faction gained control, a Korean education was chiefly concerned with
rightist group broke away from the League the teaching of the Korean language. Since
and formed the " Youth Organization for the the prospect of their remaining in Japan assum-
Reconstruction of Korea" (Kemei). ed a semi-permanent aspect and since their
In February 1946 the adult members in schools might be suppressed if nothing else
the Kemei formed a separate organization was taught, formal revisions were made in the
known, after a series of mergers and name education policy to include subjects normally
changes, as the "Union of Great Korean taught in Japanese schools.
Republics Residing in Japan" (better known Seventy-two Korean news agencies, news-
under a former name, "Korean Residents' papers and magazines disseminated news and
Union" or the Mindctn). With a few excep- information to the Korean people in Japan.
tions the two rightist groups worked together In addition, the leftist Koreans utilized other
in their pursuit of a mutual goal- foundation media of propaganda, from the Kctmi-Shibcti

86 Tmerpreting the demand for I'racial autonomy" as a refusal to comply with the law, the Education Bureau
ordered Korean schoo ls dosed and, when they continued to operate in defiance of the ban, undertook to close them .
Demonstrations, petitions, and a spectacular series of disturbances featuring sitdown strikes, imprisonment, and intimi-
dation of local officials and various other types of agitation extended over several weeks.
From 23 to 26 April 1948 Koreans in Kobe defied all authority, rioted, wrecked the governor's office, and forcibly
detained prtfectural officials until they signed, under duress, statements rescinding the order to close Korean schools
and directing lhe release of all Koreans held in connection with the disturbance. (5/ 1, eIe Area 8, 2'5 Apr 48, su b:
Korean Educational Strife.) In Osaka, 7,000 Koreans stormed and wrecked the prefectural governor's office following
the arrest of 100 agitators and resorted to violence when police attempted to eject them. (5/1, erc Area 9, 28 Apr 48,
sub: Koreans Hold Mass Meetings and Demonstrations in Osaka City.) Rioting continued in both cities eVen after
police had taken the ringleaders into custody. Bothlapanese and Occupation Military Police reinforcements were called
into action. Subsequently, the education issue was settled when Korean leaders agreed to comply with the original
Education Ministry order. (G-2 GHQ FEe, Daily lnt Sum No. 201)6, 3 May 48.)

263
(picture stories for children) to nationwide The JCP devoted its well-correlated energies
poster campaigns. One of the most power- to interfering with the vital food production,
ful and economical propaganda vehicles was shipbuilding, merchant shipping, democratic
rumor spreading, in which the Korean leaders organization of labor, and the collection of
excelled and to which the average Korean was taxes-to name a few of the methods by which
extremely susceptible. it maneuvered stumbling blocks in the path
of Japan's democratization. It sponsored or
The Japan Communist Party took over many "front" organizations and
put on a comprehensive propaganda program
The greatest single political group as a designed to create spiritual confusion among
medium of potential trouble for the Occupa- the populace and to promote an alien ideology.
tion was the Japan Communist Party OCP), In spite of the essentially conservative char-
with its varied and persistent attempts to acter of the Japanese people, the JCP achieved
discredit and nullify the program of democra- a relative degree of success in penetrating the
tization. From the outset, it was recognized higher echelons of organized labor during the
that this group's activities and methods made first rwo and one-half years of the Occupation.
it less a political party and more a fifth column Capitalizing on the confusion and readjust-
introducing alien ideologies into Japan. This ment which characterized the first posrwar
factor became a prime concern of Counter In- months, the Communist Party, repeating its
telligence.a, tried methods of operation, infiltrated the
Early in the Occupation, it was realized countless labor unions which were springing
that the release of all political prisoners, a up all over Japan as a part of the new democra-
completely laudable political gesture, was also tization program.
opening the doors to a group of well-trained , The radical complexion of the National
fully indoctrinated obstructionists. The Com- Congress of Industrial Unions (NCIU) and
munists were quick to reorganize their Party its wide control of the workers in Japan's key
and to start its program of anti-democratic industries made it a major target for CIS as
activities, which sometimes found unexpected its activities became more and more openly
support from disorganized sections of the threatening to the Occupation's goals. Com-
post surrender population. munist infiltration had reached such propor-
As in every other non-Communist country, tions by August 1946 that the Party's Central
the Party in Japan proved to be a menaCe to Committee was able to instruct the Com-
all duly constituted authority: Its members, munist Party faction in the NCIU to incite
imbued with the philosophy that any means the member unions to plan a general strike
are justifiable as long as they promote the on 15 September 1946, coordinated with a
Party's aims, continually resorted to illegal, threatened rwenty-four hour strike of govern-
subversive, and undercover methods to attain ment railway workers."
their ends. CIS, alerted by CIC and CCD reports,

87 (I) Ln, MID, WD 350."9, pars. 3 (I), 4C (2), 9 Oct 45 , sub: F.. EastInt Requirements ; (2) SCAP GO
13, Functions of CIS, 2 Oct 45 ; ( 3) ]CS Dir 1538, :; OCt 45. sub: Provisions for the Coordinated Exploitation of
Japanese Int Targets of Inter-departmental and International Concern; (4) SCAP GO 15,9 Nov 45, sub: Japanese
Civilian Int Targets.
88 S/A Br, CIS Sp Rpt, 12 Sep 46, sub: Threatened Gen Strike for 15 Sep 46.

264
watched this activity closely. Enough infor- cause among farmers. In essence, the pro-
mation had been correlated and forwarded by gram took the form of encouraging farmers to
CIS' Special Activities Branch preceding the hold back as much of their required rice pro-
intended date of the strike to enable GHQ duction quota as possible. At the same time,
to know exactly what to expect and to plan in metropolitan areas, Communists poin,ed
accordingly.'" out that the Government was unable effectively
Following labor's futile attempt at a gen- to carry out its rice ration distribution program
eral strike in the fall of 1946, the Communist despite the constant threat of hunger to city
Party files in CIS expanded by leaps and workers.·> In addition to obstructing the
bounds. Data continued to Row in from delivery of rice, the JCP also advocated that
networks of informants. The NCIU by now the farmers refuse to buy land from the Japa-
was definitely established as being the in- nese Government, while at the same time in
strument through which the JCP attempted T ~kyo they were agitating that the govern-
strikes." Through extensive G-2 reports, ESS ment sale of land to farmers had been a com-
and other staff sections were apprised of the plete failure.
fact that the NCIU contained many labor While not of threatening proportions, the
unions in a large number of vital industries, Communist Party and its· operations brought
(e. g., coal, steel, communications, newspaper into sharp relief the security problem of the
and radio, publishing and printing, and elec- Occupation. The docility of the Japanese
tric power) as well as such local unions as the since war's end was encouraging, but the in-
Tokyo Area Government Railway Workers filtration of foreign ideologies could not be
Union, which was thoroughly impregnated discounted. As long as Occupation troops
with Communists.·' were available, the relative weakness of the
The Civil Intelligence Se.ction kept day new governmental structure was not apparent,
by day progress studies of the NCIU and its nor would it be seriously tested. There was
Communist·dominated organizations. "Spot" no question that the process of democratiza-
reports were a valuable source of current infor- tion was well under way, but there were certain
mation, often being forwarded to General factors that could not be ignored: the deter-
Headquarters within a few hours after facts ioration in national economy, the rising spiral
were uncovered by CIC investigators. of inRation, the increasing importance of the
The Party's inRuence was tested in the fall labor movement, the unrest in disafFected
and winter of 1947 when the Japanese Govern- groups, and Communist penetration.
ment, recognizing a tendency of farmers to
withhold their crops from regular rationing Communist Infiltration of Repatriates
channels for high blackmarket prices, set rice
quotas for all prefectures to fill. The Com- The decrease of Occupation tro.o ps in Japan
munists, in attacking this form of regulation, represented a steadily mounting internal
hoped to bring discredit upon the methods security risk. As of the end of 1948 the total
as well as the personnel of the Japanese Gov- strengrh was set at I 17,580 of which only 68
ernment, meanwhile furthering the Party's percent were combat troops available for emer-
89 Sj A Br, CIS Sp Rpt, 2 Oct 46, sub: Sum of Strike Sit.
90 CIS, Sp Rpt, sub: Soviet and Communist Strategy in Japanese Labor Disputes.
91 Ibid.
92 CIS Periodical Sum No. 23, 15 Dec 47.

265
 MILITARY OCCUPATION FORCES
NO. DEMOBILIZED JAPANESE POLICE NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PEOPLE
ARMY 8< NAVY NUMBER OF PEOPLE TOONE TROOPS TO ONE OCCUPA·
PREFECTURE POPULATION PERSONNEL POLICEMEN POLICEMAN M. P. C. I. C. M.G. (2) TION SOLDIER
;J>
::J HOKKAIDO (d
"
-< AOMm
IWATE
'"tn· MIYAG ',566,831 133,007 1,818 862 195 56 46 - 5,83l "",
.....,
0 AKITA ',257,398 107,602 1,193 1,054 12 50 62 20,281
YAMAGATA ' ,335,653 116,814 1,307 1,022 11 49 2,582 517
"0 FUKUSHIMA ,460 162,213 1,817 1,097 10 51 61 32,663
0
"0 !BARAKI .< 136,594 1,527 1,319 11 50 61 33,012
"0;-
M GUMMA ,572,787
;5,814
103,364
1,541
1,561
996
1,008
13
12
50
50
63
1,9'
2j,

0' SA.: ,100,453 154,933 1,916 1,096 10 50 2,783

.? CH ,112,917 112,m 2,162 977 17 50 1,707
TO ;,000,777 512,102 26,683 187 1,598 44 5 73 20,926
~
::-:-
KANAGAWA 2,218,120 148,916 5,681 390 860 61 106 19,951 11
M NIIGATA 1),418,271 196,672 2,233 ],083 14 50 6] 37,785
10
-<"
TOYAMA 979,229 89,300 1,142 857 4 37 127
ISHIKAWA 927,743 196,050 1,089 852 86 15 37 52 141
"::J
o...l'
"0
FL
YAMANASHJ
726,264
607,251
185,244
10~,806
794
792
915
1,019 12
4 37
50
41
62
17,714
13,020
NAG} ,060,010 97,367 1,918 ).Q74 13 52 65
"O;J> GIFU ,.......".......... 57,018 1,463 1,021 6 - 46 4,0:;4 368
g,..>-l SHIZI ',353,005 123,890 2,209 1,065 13 56 99 34,101
n' tTl
AICHJ 3,122,902 220,719 6,289 497 14 50 1,709 1,827
"CIlZ M'~ 14,16,494 104,009 1,483 955 12 50 62 22,846
@ 0
::J '
Sh.~,
T ~ ......
KYOTC
858,367
1,739,084
83,880
165,176
884
4,383
971
397 85 48
7 43
47
2.599
2,447
<)"n

0::\ 00 OSAKA ,834,659 264,862 11,111 300 255 52 65 7.715 4.'!

::r'" HYOG'
0- NARA
"< WAKAYAMA
..."0 TC
SH
"n
'"
M

"...
OKAYAMA
HIROSHIMA
YAMAGUC
"
~
TOKUSHI~
KAGAWA
854-,sif
917,673
76,807
73,315
890
944
960
972
6
9
37
37
47
56
18,188
16,387
VI
EHn.JlT":' 1,435,887 115,885 1,427 1,018 6 50 84 22,717
0 ~w
KO ...... 'u 848,337 84,090 878 988 7 37 48 17,673
"n FUKUOKA ,178,134 253.578 4,514 704 106 43 69 8,807 361
"g.. SAGA
NA
917,797
.531.674
70,232
103,374
934
2,118
983
123
5
14
49
65
54
3,598
16,996
426
"...
~
KU
O~..
. J.r\.
,765,726
.L,233,fl51
174,691
]07,589
1,811
],122
975
1,100
In

6
AU

46
~ 'l'll:;

3,178
!'\M\

388
'D MIY .. _ ...
A '7 A YJ_ 1,025,689 74,583 1,165 881 7 37 44 23,311
to 1,746,305 132,781 1,767 988 10 50 60 29,105
TOTAL: 8,621,!XXl 6,465,435 122,613 3,454 1,221 2,313 111,580
( I) All Prefectures in Hokkaido consolidated under this one entry.
(2) Military Strength figures secured tTom G.z .$OW"ce and are T ID slrmgtM of various unin c(xl$idered available for the purposes of Ihis $tudy. The following l)'Pe units were considered: Orgotnic Divisional Troops of all Branches; Mililarv
Government Units including mililary personnel only: AAA. AGF. Chemical and Armored ; Corps MP Platoons; Non·Divisional MP Personnel: BulkOnrhud MP P~rsonnd ; FEAF: U. S. Nav)'; BCOF.
gencles. This force, plus a poorly equipped incidents , no action of defiance in the past, the
Japanese police force of 122,673 men, con- general demobilization and the progressive
stituted the control force for almost 80 million return of millions of jobless soldiers introduced
people. (Plate No. 86) a potential security problem.
Military Police and Counter Intelligence There were five areas in Japan in which
units were scattered so· thoroughly throughout there were particularly heavy concentrations of
Japan that their numbers in any given area repatriates and which were therefore critical
would have been insignificant in an emer- areas from a security standpoint. Note the
gency. However, they were in a position ratio of demobilized personnel to population
to furnish first warning of impending distur- density. Osaka, typical of this general
bance and to supply information to tactical situation, as of 3 I December 1948 had:
troops dispatched to the areas. RetuTlled navy personnel . ....... .. 83423
Each prefecture in Japan contained a Mili- RetuTlled army personnel . . ..•.. • .. 181,439
tary Government team . These units could Total prefectural population .... 3,334,659
have provided guidance and liaison , but would Japanese po. Ice .••.•.••••• • ••.. 1I,I11
'"
have been of no value tactically. FEC troops . ... • .. ••••• ........ 7,715
The British Commonwealth Occupation The significance of these over-all statistics
Force controlled nine prefectures on Shikoku is in the ratio of police and the population
and southern Honshu. BCOF was supplemen- density: one Japanese police to 300 popu-
ted in its area by the Military Government lation, and one Occupation soldier to 1,000
teams, and counterintelligence functions were popuiation. It is obvious that this insignifi-
implemented by U. S. personnel. During cant ratio of Occupation personnel of one to
1948 the strength of BCOF troops had been 432 immediately available FEC troops in a
reduced by about 70 percent, leaving some 4,600 critical area could hardly prevail against a rest-
officers and men of the Royal Australian Army less population of over 3,000,000 with a highly
to handle the principal Occupation activities trained 10 percent nucleus of military repatri-
in Hiroshima Prefecture. There were also ates to furnish organized leadership.
850 representatives of the Royal Australian On a national basis, at the end of 1948,
Air Force, 200 of the Royal New Zealand Air similar ratios existed:
Force, and 140 of the Royal New Zealand
1 U.S. soldier per 670 population
Army based in Yamaguchi Prefecture.'
1 Japanese policeman per 640 population
By placing density of population figures
1 Military Police per 22,800 population
against Occupation strengths, the ratio of
1 CIC operatoT per 64,400 population
repatriates to troops and police becomes
significant. These ratios were insufficient to counter
Repatriates had become a target for the a serious public disturbance or an aggressive
Communist Party. While there had been no fifth column.

93 GHQ FEC MIS GS, P&E Br & CIS Sp Int, Internal Factors as Security Problems for the Occupation
Forces, I Jan 49 (S).

267
 CHAPTER IX
AIR AND NAVY COMPONENTS

As rapidly as the advance party of the Far

Part I-Far East Air Forces: East Air Forces (FEAF) completed reconnais-
Initial Operations sance of the Tokyo airfields, established com-
munications facilities , and set up an air traffic
While the world's chancelleries deliberated control center, the Fifth Air Force brought in
the fate of the Japanese Empire, the Fifth and its tactical units.
Seventh U. S. Air Forces continued to bomb By the end of August FEAF air units were
Japan's lines of communication, industrial concentrated on Okinawa, preparing to deploy
areas, shipping, aircraft, and various other to the mainland of Japan. A mass shuttle
military installations. After the Japanese to Atsugi airfield enabled the llth Airborne
Government notified the Allies of its accept- Division to complete a speedy occupation of
ance of the peace terms, activity of these the Yokohama area on 3013 1 August. All
Air Forces was limited to reconnaissance, available troop carrier transport of FEAF was
surveillance, and photographic missions. utilized as well as "Skytrains" and "Sky-
Meanwhile, during the interim which existed masters" of the Air Transport Command
while arrangements were made for the formal (ATC). Advance headquarters of GHQ,
capitulation, there were numerous interceptions USAFPAC, Eighth Army, and FEAF were
of U. S. reconnaissance aircraft, indicating that airlifted to Japan. Repatriated Allied pris-
the Kamikaze indoctrination had some effect. oners of war and civilian internees in need of
For this reason, American air activity over hospitalization were evacuated on the return
Japanese territory had to be temporarily Il.ights of these planes to Okinawa and the
suspended. ' Philippines.
From 19 August, when the Japanese Sur- To provide staging and servicing facilities
render Delegation Il.ew from Atsugi to Ie- for transport and transient aircraft, a small
shima and was then escorted to Manila by task force composed of service personnel and
American aircraft, until 30 August when equipment was established in September in
General MacArthur landed at Atsugi, in- the Kanoya area, Kyushu. Considerable air
creased armed surveillance missions were Il.own traffic was staged through that area due to the
over Japan by B-29'S to insure that the sur- relatively great distances from Okinawa and
render terms would be kept. This tremendous the Philippines to Japan. Subsequently, Fifth
display of air power throughout Japan left no Air Force combat units with appropriate
doubt of defeat in the minds of the Japanese.' service elements occupied objective locations

I GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Aug 45 (S), Air Sum.
2 Unless otherwise noted the following account of FEAF activities in the Occupation of Japan is based on a
report, HQ FEAF to G'2 GHQ FEC HiS[ Div, Nov 48, su b : FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan.

268
 J A p N

S £

\ c:&,,'~
\
\
\ /
\ /
\ /
£ C T /
N 0 R T H
c ./
> /
308TH BOMB WING
~/ p A C I F I 2 ~H FIGHTER COMMAND
~ 3 49TH FIGHTER GROlP
4 3RO BOMB GROUP
o c E A N
---
5 3RD AIR COMMAND GROUP
5TH BOMBER COMOtAND
WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE

JAPAN AND KOREA

APPROXIMATE SCALE , 5,000,000

• lOCI '!IoIl 2'00

. 1i=-=~
HO sao
=j
. 11.1",

PLATE NO. 87
Fifth U. S. Air Force Zones of Responsibility, I945-I947
in the Keijo area, Korea, the Fukuoka area, the remainder of the month. The Army Air
Kyushu, and in the Osaka .and Aomori areas, Force Weather Control at Okinawa was com-
Honshu. (Plate No. 87) In all, the Fifth Air pletely demolished. When the storm delayed
Force provided twelve combat groups , both supplies and destroyed equipment in the
fighter and bomber, and about twenty separate Okinawa area , B-29'S had to fly relief missions
squadrons for the initial Occupation of Japan comparable to their prisoner of war supply
and Korea. These echelons included tactical drops during September. '
reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, night As on the ground and sea, the air situation
fighter, troop carrier, air-sea rescue, and liaison in the Occupation plan had become stabilized
squadrons. by the end of October 1945 Although con-
In addition to these airlift operations, the siderable repair and construction remained to
missions of the Fifth Air Force in the initial be done before the former Japanese air facilities
Occupation included maintenance of air su- could meet United States standards, the areas
premacy over Japan and Korea; air protection for air occupation had been settled. With
for naval forces, convoys, shipping, and lifeguard the Fifth Air Force deployed in Okinawa,
ships; aerial reconnaissance and photography Japan, and Korea and the Thirteenth Air Force
of Japan and Korea; operation of radar and deployed in the Philippines, preparations for
air warning services; and air-sea rescue service routine air control were complete. All air
and facilities on the Tokyo-Okinawa air route units had either arrived , were en route to their
and in Japanese and Korean waters. new locations, or were loading by the end of
The Fifth Air Force assumed operation of October.
the former Japanese Government air courier As the ground forces began occupation of
service on IO October 1945· Prior to that all strategic areas in Japan, the necessity for
time the Japanese had been permitted to use air observation lessened. FEAF turned its
clearly marked airplanes in scheduled flights efforts toward deploying air units to Japan for
for dissemination of surrender directives to Occupation duties, meanwhile returning its
their isolated forces; in addition, courier " high-point" personnel to the Zone of
service for GHQ was established on a routine Interior.
basis to Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, and
within the Japanese Empire. FEAF : Organization and Missions
Air transport missions - the movement of Prior to the capitulation of Japan, FEAF,
high priority personnel and equipment from under the command of Gen. George C.
the United States to the theater and within Kenney, had its headquarters at Fort Wm.
the theater-operated on routine schedules, McKinley, P. 1. At that time FEAF was
but were considerably disrupted by a typhoon composed of the Fifth. Seventh, and Thir-
which struck Okinawa with full force on I I teenth Air Forces, each with its own combat
October. Although ample warning permitted and service units. It had been assigned two
withdrawal of aircraft from the danger area , major tasks: to coordinate air plans for the
the added · maintenance load and extensive invasion Operations "Olympic" and " Cor-
damage to facilities hampered operations for onet," and to move its forces to Okinawa.'

3 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Air Sum, Oc< 4) (S).
4 See Ch. 1. The Seventh Air Force, Pacific Ocean Area, assigned to FEAF on 14 July t94~, was to be respon-
sible for air defense and air traffic control on Okinawa and for operating the air-sea rescue control for all air forces.

270
 With the surrender came the task of redi- under Far East Air Service Command(FEASC)
recting this powerful offensive force along at Townsville, Finschhafen, Biak, Leyte,
completely different lines.' Practically over- Nichols Field, Guam, and Okinawa. Nichols
night the plans and missions had to be Field, already a large depot and situated near
changed , even though the organizations re- a ready labor market, was built up rapidly and
mained intact until it was determined that the received the bulk of supplies from Townsville,
Occupation was to be a peaceful one. Re- Finschhafen, Biak, and Leyte. Manpower
organization and redesignation took place on shortage made the closing of the Okinawa
25 December 1945, at which time the Pacific depot necessary in October 1946, and the Phi-
Air Command, U. S. Army, (PAC USA) was lippine Islands Treaty granted Nichols Field to
activated .' The U. S. Army Strategic Air the Philippine Government i;" mid-1947.
Force was discontinued. Its Headquarters The designation of FEASC was changed to
and Headquarters Squadron, all its units, Pacific Air Service Command on 26 February
allotments, and personnel were released and 1946, and again on 1 January 1947 when it
assigned to PACUSA. (Plate No. 88) Under became Far East Air Materiel Command
the command of General Kenney, PACUSA (FEAMCOM). On 21 January 1947 FEAM-
was assigned to U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, COM moved from Fort McKinley to Fuchu,
with its initial station at Fort Wm. McKinley Japan." Two depots were under the technical
and advance headquarters in Tokyo. Lt. Gen . control of FEAMCOM : Marianas Air Ma-
Ennis C. Whitehead officially assumed com- teriel Area located at Guam, and Japan Air
mand of PAC USA on 30 December 1945.' Materiel Area located at T achikawa, Honshu,
Throughout the three year period following Japan. These . depots, in addition to their
the cessation of hostilities the organization of normal functions of supply and maintenance,
PACUSA did not change materially. A few had the overwhelming task of locating, identi-
smaller units were activated , deactivated , or fying, classifying, inventorying, and ware-
transferred in order to balance the Air Forces housing the tremendous amount of materiel
and keep them organized in a manner con- left over from the war.
sistent with their missions. One exception Headquarters, PACUSA (Administration),
was the reorganization of the supply and arrived in Japan on 16 May 1946 from Fort
logistics agencies of PACUSA. At the close McKinley, occupying joint offices with the
of the war active supply depots were operating advance echelon in downtown Tokyo.'

4 (contd .) The Seventh was also responsible for the Army and Marine fighter units under its control, the radar
warning system, and antiaircraft artillery units. The Fifth Air Force, commanded by Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead, was to
move to Okinawa to carry the major load of the pre-invasion strikes. Part of the Thirteenth Air Force, commanded
by Maj Gen Paul Wurtsmith, was to establish bases in southern Kyushu and supervise the air strikes for Operation
"Coronet, " while the Fihh was to be established on the Kama Pl ain air bases.
5 See Ch. 1.
6 HQ PACUSA, GO No. I , 25 Dec 45. In HQ FEAF.
7 Gen Kenney left the Paci6c in June 1945 for reassignment to the Z1, and was succeeded by Lt Gen Whitehead
who was Deputy Commander at that time. Official tran sfer of command was made 30 December. Gen Kenney was
the first CG of the Strategic Air Command which was activated in March 1946 as the US' long-range bombardment
air striking force.
S HQ FEAF, GO NO·3, 10 Jan 47, effective r Jan 47. In HQ FEAF.
9 On 7 June J946 Headquarters, Fi rst Air Division was established at Kadena, Okinawa, and at the same time
Headqu~rters Eigh.th Air Force was reassigned to the Strategic Air Command, Washington, D. C ., except for personnei
and equ ipment which was transferred and/ or reassigned to the First Air Division. Missions assigned to the Eighth Air
Force remained the responsibility of the First Air Division.

271
 COMMANDING GENERAL

CHIEF OF STAFF

~ I
~
&' A-I r A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 -,
g' I I
I I
g., I Intelli- I
Adminis- I Adminis- Adminis- Adminis- Adminis- Statistical
"I'l f-+- Personnel
I
1-1-
gence
-I- Operations H- Engineer - f- I
tratlon tration Control I
~
tranon tration tration
I I
I 607 CIC Plans & I
(')"0 Adjutant Judge I Public Flight Budget & Historical Strategic I
f- f- L Detach- Training Require- -
iS
~

General Advocate Relations Control Fiscal Control Planning I

ment ments I
J:l tIl Policy & I
p..z Miscel- Communi- Troop Mainte- Manpower I
I-~ Surgeon I- Supply ~
Special ~
I
~ 0 laneous cations Control nance Control
p..' Projects I
::r: gg
I
Air Reconnais- 20th I
l- f-- r------ --'

t
Defense sance S C Unit
Air Inspector
6th Photo
Adminis-
Adminis- Tech Sq
tration
~ tration
Inspector
-~
~
Technical Tactical Headquarter s Commandant
~ Inspector f-- Inspector

Inspector
General
I I I
I ITHIRTEENTH I I
I
FIFTH
AIR FORCE AIR FORCE
lWENTIETH
AIR FORCE
FIRST AIR
DIVISION l FAR EAST AIR
MATERIEL COMMAND
 PACUSA lost one of its major air forces four airfields and airstrips."
on 1 January 1947 when the Seventh Air Force
was reassigned to CINCPAC.'· At the same Maintenance of the Air Force in Japan
time several new units were assigned to
PAC USA : the Pacific Divison of the Air On V -J Day there were 300,000 Air Force
Transport Command, the 43rd Weather officers and airmen in the Pacific Theater.
Wing, and the 7th Airways and Air Com- Four months later 215,000 of these had de-
munications Service Wing. All had parent parted for the United States and demobili-
units in Washington but were placed under zation, leaving only 85,000 in the theater as
the operational control of the Commander in of January 1946."
Chief, Far East, who in turn delegated control The rapid demobilization of troops affected
to the Commanding General, PACUSA. All the essential team character of the Air Force
of these were service units vital to the proper combat units which thereafter operated at
functioning of balanced air forces , giving reduced strength until the flow of replacements
logistical and technical support to the tactical exceeded the flow of departures for a sufficient
and administrative units of FEAF. period. On-the-job training was immediately
The title of Air Force Headquarters was established in all units, combining individual
again changed. On 1 January 1947 PACUSA training with unit training; this plan had the
became Far East Air Forces, U. S. Army, but advantage of maintaining organizational struc-
with no change in assignment or organization. ture. In order to raise the level of technical
The final title change came in November 1947 knowledge in units, some civilian technicians
when, as a result of the integration program were recruited from the United States. In
of the Armed Forces, Far East Air Forces. September 1947 a FEAF-wide technical train-
U. S. Army, became Far East Air Forces, ing program was established, offering over
U . S. Air Force. FEAF remained under thirty courses, for the most part in specialties
CINCFE, but on a parity of command with not then available through replacements;
the other services. For the accomplishment during the first year approximately 4,800
of its missions, FEAF was allotted a substantial students were gtaduated. This program filled
portion of the U .. S. Air Force; in its desig- the gaps in individual training and developed
nated areas of responsibility, FEAF operated unit training to a state of combat readiness
and maintained a total of thirty-nine air bases unexcelled in the entire U. S. Air Force."
and related installations involving some twenty-

10 HQ PACUSA, GO No. 160, 3' Dec 46.

I I Rpt, HQ FEAF to G'2 GHQ FEC Hist Div, Nov 48, sub: FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan. In
the discharge of the general functions assigned, FEAF was committed to maintain an air power potential in tbe Far East
Command area adequate to accomplish its missions, including: (a) maintenance of a balanced Air Force in the
occupied areas of the theater ; (b) provision of air defense of military and naval installations throughout the Far East
Command; (c) provision of search and rescue operations in coordination with the Navy; (d) provision of aerial
photography in support of the Army's post-hostilities mapping program in the Pacific ; (e) assistance in operations to
alleviate human suffering and preserve order in the event of disaster, and to quell disorders, riots, or other disturbances
requiring use of the US armed forces; (f) establishment and control of military air routes, and operation of an internal
air transport service in the Far East Command area.
12 Rpt, HQ FEAF to G'2 GHQ FEC Hist Div, Nov 48, sub: FEAF Activ in the Occupation of Japan.
13 Ibid.

273
PF-8o flies over rice fields near Tokyo on pho~ographic reconnaissance mission_

Life boat descends by parachute in air-sea rescue operations_

PLATE NO. 89
Occupation Missions- FEAF
 a fast and reliable means of communication.
Aerial Mapping and Other Activities Suitable port facilities and sufficient shipping
were not available nor, except to a limited
FEAF's aerial mapping program developed degree in Japan, did adequate railroad and
into an important post-war activity. Mapping highway facilities exist.
squadrons £lew over 100,000 miles during Measured by any standards, troop carrier
which they mapped or charted thousands of operations in support of the Occupation of
square miles of previously uncharted territories Japan were extensive. During a single repre-
in the Far East. The photographic negatives sentative month approximately four and one-
resulting from aerial photography were de- half million passenger miles were £Iown, and
livered to topographic units of the Corps of over one and one-quarter million ton miles of
Engineers, and to the Aeronautical Chart cargo were distributed to various points within
Service of the U.S. Air Force. The Engineers the Far East Command." In addition, troop
were responsible for technical ground control carrier missions included emergency move-
and for the actual production of maps, while ments of personnel, aerial food drops to posts
the latter was responsible for the production isolated by £Ioods, training with ground forces,
of ~eronautical charts. airlifting units, and air evacuation of patients.
Additional miscellaneous activities of FEAF To maintain this air traffic, a military airways
included the disposal of extensive stocks of war system , under the control of FEAF, was
surplus property, maintenance of base facilities, established. (Plate No. 90) This airways
provision for maintenance and protection of sys'tem ; as modern as any in the world, was
aviation ammunition stores, preparation of complete with airways traffic service, control
plans for Air Force bases involved in the centers, radio aids to air navigation, instrument
permanent base construction program, and landing facilities, search and rescue facilities,
establishment of a civilian manpower control to and weather service. It contained 20,000
insure the efficient allocation of civilian miles of controlled routes linking all points in
personnel employed by FEAF. the Pacific and Far East areas.
Shortly after termination of hostilities in
Troop Carrier Aviation and the Pacific Theater, use of FEAF military
International Air Traffic airways system was extended to authorized civil
air carriers operating over international air
Both during and after the war, increased routes to, from, and within the Far East Com-
dependence was placed on Troop Carrier Avia- mand area. This resulted in a rapid and econom-
tion for the support of the armed forces. ical re-establishment of civil air commerce to
Unique logistical and administrative problems war-torn countries of the Orient and contrib-
developed within the Far East Command uted materially to economic rehabilitation.
which covered vast water areas, mountainous
terrain, and small isolated islands, with cli- FEAF- Present and Future
mates ranging from tropical to sub-arctic. This
area, extending from Hokkaido on the north The Air Forces of FEAF consisted of
to the Admiralty Islands on the south, required balanced elements comprising modern conven-

'4 Ibid.

275
 .c-. MANCHURIA
...........
\ ~ HANKA/
OZERO

orr.. ~,4
.~
vwL·v....w.. I

('/ . ~.~__
\; ;-,- s
~.
. '.
JAPAN

SEA
CHINA
n_
To
y ........ Shemyo

~
•
• .........
-
• •

.......
v........

.-. 1'100......."

SO UT IJ

L~PHii:m~r.----_----+~~
~~ 0-1.
G...I.
SEA To KwoJalein
ond Honolulu

LEGEND
- PRIMARY MILITARY AIRWAYS HAVE ALL NECESSARY
FACILITIES OPERATING CONTINUOUSLY, TO INSURE
SAFETY OF FLIGHT.
SECONOARY MILITARY AIRWAYS 00 NOT HAIlE ALL
NECESSARY FACILITIES TO INSURE SAFETY OF
FLIGHT OR ONE ON WHICH THE NECESSARY
FACILITIES ARE NOT MANNED CONTINUOUSLY.

PLATE NO. C)O

Pacific Military Airways, November 1948
tional and jet-type fighters, fast light-bombers, as these operations concerned the Navy; to
troop carriers, and, in addition, specially trained advise GHQ on all naval matters; and to
and equipped search and rescue units, which control Japanese Merchant Marine shipping
enhanced the safety of both military and civil until a special section was established with
air transport operations. Vigorous training that particular responsibility. ,.
of these units continued and was periodically Naval zones of responsibility were defined
tested through the conduct of exercises and to include the allocation of geographical areas
maneuvers, including joint training operations to Third, Fifth, and Seventh U.S. Fleets,
with army and navy forces. and to the North Pacific Force." The Third
FEAF continued to cooperate with U. S. U.S. Fleet, under the command of Admiral
Army and U. S. Navy Forces in the dis- Halsey, occupied Tokyo Bay and established
charging of responsibilities of the U. S. minor naval and naval air facilities ashore in
Government in the Occupation of Japan. support of the Eighth U.S. Army. The Fifth
U .S. Fleet, commanded by Admiral Spruance
Part II- U.S. Naval Command in the occu pied and patrolled the sea approaches
Far East: Initial Operations and coastal waters of Japan west of 135°east.
Elements of the Sixth U.S. Army were
With the capitulation of Japan, the U.S. landed and firmly established in Kyushu,
Pacific Fleet, consisting of the Third, Fifth, Shikoku, and western Honshu, while the
and Seventh Fleets and the North Pacific clearance of mine fields in the T sushima
Force, occupied strategic naval areas of Japan Strait-Inland Sea area was initiated by the
and Korea and enforced the surrender terms Fifth Fleet. The Seventh U.S. Fleet, under
imposed on the Empire. the command of Admiral Kinkaid, assisted in
In order to carry out preliminary missions staging, training and transport of troops in
for the Occupation, the U.S. Pacific Fleet su pport of operations of the U.S. Forces in
Liaison Group with the Supreme Commander China and Korea. The North Pacific Force,
for the Allied Powers (FLTLOSCAP) was commanded by Vice Adm. FrankJ. Fletcher,
formed in late August 1945 under the com- guarded the lines of sea communications
mand of Rear Adm. J.J. Ballentine, USN." from the Aleutians to Russia and initiated
Offices were set up in Yokohama with the clearance of the mine fields in the Tsugaru
major section of GHQ, and communications Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido. ,.
with Commander in Chief, Pacific, (CINC- Initial occupation tasks of the Navy were
PAC) were established through the USS mine-sweeping channels and transporting oc-
Teton. FLTLOSCAP was to control dis- cupation troops to Japan. During the early
armament, demobilization, and repatriation, part of October mine-sweeping operations were

'5 Rad (TS), SCAP to COM3rdFLT, 26 Aug 45 .

,6 FLTLOSCAP, Confidenrial Rpt of Activ, , Oct 45.
'7 See Ch. II.
,8 Ibid. Third US Fleet consisted of 6 battleships (BB), 4 heavy cruisers (CA), 3 light cruisers (CL), and ,8
destroyers (DO) . Two battleships, 2 ' light cruisers, and 2 destroyers of the British Fleet augmented this force. Fifth
US Fleet consisted of 6 battleships, 4 aircraft carriers, escort (ACE), 2 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 2 large cruisers
(CB), 44 destroyers, and 83 mine sweepers (AM). Seventh US Fleet consisted of 4 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers,
2 aircraft carriers, escort, and 17 destroyers. North Pacific Force was made up of 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers,
6 aircraft carriers, escort, and 24 destroyers. (GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum ofOpns, Sep 45 [S], Naval Sum.)

277
limited to these areas essential for conducting changed. Shipping Control Authority for
the Occupation: Tokyo and Sagami Bays, Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) was
Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Hon- established under the command of Rear
shu, and areas off Kochi in Shikoku, Sasebo Adm. D. W. Beary on 12 October 1945;"
in Kyushu, and Sendai in northern Honshu. this organization assumed control of all ships
Later in the month, mine-sweeping operations over 100 gross tons operated by the Japanese.
began in Bungo Suido between Kyushu and SCAP retained operational control over SCA-
Shikoku, Iyo Nada between Honshu and JAP in repatriation shipping and related ac-
Shikoku, and Hiro Bay off Kure. tivities through the G-3 Repatriation Section.
Amphibious forces of the Third, Fifth, and In dealings with the Imperial Japanese Gov-
Seventh Fleets immediately began to bring in ernment, SCAJAP worked through the Min-
the troops assigned for Occupation duty and istry of Transportation and the Ministry of
to evacuate prisoners of war from Japan on Navy until the latter was deactivated on 3 I
the return trips. These operations were com- December '945. Thereafter, SCAJAP worked
pleted by the end of October.'· The Navy through successive civil offices established
also became primarily responsible for transport- under the Japanese naval demobilization pro-
ing two million servicemen who were due to gram. The Commander of the Fifth Fleet, Ad-
return to the United States. Escort carriers and miral Spruance, was the senior U. S. Naval
attack transports were temporarily converted officer in the Japan area and all naval activities
to augment shipping normally allotted for ashore were under his operational control.
troop transport, and Operation "Magic Car- On 28 January 1946 FLTLOSCAp was
pet" was successfully executed.'· dissolved and a naval command known as
Naval Activities, Japan (COMNAVJAP) was
COMNAVJAP : Organization and established under the command of Vice
Missions " Adm. R. M. Griffin, who retained this
command until 9 July 1948 when he was
As logistic conditions improved and the relieved by Vice Adm. Russell M. Berkey."
situation in Japan became stabilized, the func- (Plate No. 91)
tions and responsibilities of FLTLOSCAP When the Far East Comand was estab-

'9 See Chs. II and IV.

20 See Ch . II.
Unless otherwise noted , the following account is based on reports summarizing the Naval operations in Japan
21

during the Occupation: FLTLOSCAP, Confidential Rpts of Activ, Sep, OCt, Nov 45, and COMNAVFE, Comd
Narrs, 21 Jan-l Oct 46, I Oct 46-31 Mar 47, I Apr-30 Jun 47. I }ul-30 Sep 47, J Oct 47- 31 Mar 48, I .Apr- 30 Sep
48, I Oct 48-31 Mar 49.
22 Later Rear Adm. C.B. Momsen.
23 Ineidem (0 an oral request from SCAP the establishment of COMNAVJAP was authorized by eNO in a
dispatch to CINCPACfpOA on 30 December '945, The original plan contemplated the continuance of FLTLOSCAP
but on 22 january, in. a second dispatch to CINCPAC/ POA, this was modified and FLTLOSCAP was ordered dis-
solved upon the establishment of COMNAVjAP. Pursuant to the above, COMNAVjAP was ordered established by
COM5thFLT on 19 January 1946. COMNAVJAP included all naval activities ashore which at that time consisted of
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, FLTLOSCAP, SCAjAP, Naval Technical Mission to japan (NAVTECHjAP), and Port
Directors at Yokosuka, TokyoJ Nagoya, Wakayama, Kure, Matsuyama J Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, and Sasebo.
On 4 February, Fleet Activities, Sasebo, was established under COMNAVjAP, the latter reporting to SCAP for opera-
tional control, although still under administrative control of CINCPAC. (COMNAVjAP, Comd Narr. 21 jan- I Oct
4 6 .)

278
 COMMANDER
NAVAt ACTIVITIES
JAPAN.

(')
o
3::
Z Naval Ollicer in Fleet Activities, Fleet Activities, Branch Hydrographic Rescue Conttol Liaison Officer,

~
'--'
Charge, Kure Yokosuka Sasebo Ollice, Tokyo Center Kure

>-
'"0

>-l
~ '"0
I' r
oi::j
~ tTl Shipping Conttol Au·
SeatCh and Recon- Flagship British Support
Il:J thority, Japanese Mer- Minesweeping Group Service Units
8. Z naissance Group Group Group
.~ 0 chant Marine

.g ~ ~

~ I I I I
~
'Tl
French Army Survey Tokyo Bay
o Kute Unit
Naval Unit Unit Unit
R
C1>

'"
.0\
U.S. Support
~

~ Gtoup

Tokyo Bay
Flagship Conttol Unit Kyushu Unit
Unit
'---
lished on I January '947, Admiral Griffin Owing to personnel demobilization , trans-
was redesignated Commander Naval Forces, fer and consolidation of Occupation forces , and
Far East (COMNAVFE), with the proviso expansion of Army units in port areas, all
that the title "Commander Naval Forces, port directorates except those at Kure and
Japan," would be used in connection with Kagoshima were abolished on '4 May '946.
duties involving the Allied relationships for Kagoshima controlled a heavy volume of
which Admiral Griffin was responsible to United States and Japanese shipping involved
SCAP." On that same date Commander, in the repatriation program. The Kobe,
Naval Activities, Japan, Commander, Naval KagoshinIa, Nagasaki, and Fukuoka offices
Operating Base, Okinawa, and Commander, that reported ship movements were all closed
Naval Forces, Philippines, reported to CINC- by August when Army authorities assumed
FE for duty while Commander, Marianas, control of port operations.
reported for operational control. CINCFE The Port Director's office at Kure was estab-
in turn reassigned these responsibilities to lished by the U.S. Navy, but when southern
COMNAVFE." Honshu was turned over to the British Com-
Plans for the landing of Occupation forces, monwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in
their equipment, and subsequent logistic sup- March 1946, functions of the port director
port entailed the assignment of a large num- were assumed by the Royal Navy .." The
ber of amphibious craft to Navy commands British Naval Officer in Charge, Kure, and
in Japan. Following completion of operations, all British naval units under his command
most of the landing craft were returned to the were under the operational control of COM-
United States by the middle of April '946. NA VJAP. In accordance with the provisions
Others were decommissioned and sunk by of SCAP Occupation Instructions, the former
combat support forces or scuttled after being Japanese naval yard at Kure remained under
loaded with Japanese ammunition and poison United States control.'7 The COMNAVJAP
gas. liaison officer in charge supervised scrapping

23 (eontd.) NAVfECH]AP completed its work in Japan on I I March and transferred its headquarters to Pearl
Harbor. On 18 March COMNAVJAP assumed all naval responllibilities held by Fifth Fleet incident to the enforce-
ment of surrender terms and contcol of Occupation forces with the exception of mine-sweeping which Commander, Fihh
Fleet, retained until his departure on 25 March 1946.
24 See Ch. III.
2~ COMNA YJAP, Comd Nan, 21 }an-I OCI 46 [C], pp. 3, 4· SCAP Occupation Instructions set fo"h the
basic mission of COMNAVJAP as follows: (a) control the coastal waters of Japan; (b) continue responsibility for
aU naval activities ashore in Japan; (c) continue to superv ise Japanese mine-sweeping as directed ; (d) continue
control of Japanese naval vessels; (e) continue surveillance and inspection [0 verify the execution by Japanese naval
forces of disarmament and demobilization and compliance with directives of SCAP; (f) continue to operate Japanese
shipping and provide port direction as required; (g) continue to control all naval and merchant shipping in the area
of Japan as required for safe navigation, furnishing proper routing and other advice as expedient; (h) assume oper-
ational control of such Allied naval forces as may be provided for enforcement of surrender terms in Japan; (i) conti-
nue to perform air-sea rescue as required, in coordination with Commanding General, Pacific Air Command , U S
Army ; U) coordinate with Commanding General, Eighth U S Army, in plans to alleviate human suffering and
preserve order in the event of disaster and to quell incipient disorder riots, or other disturbances which might endanger
lives or property of Allied nationals; (k) secu re and safeguard intelligence information of value to the Allied Powers
and arrange with Commanding General, Eighth U S Army, and Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, U S
Army, for mutual exchange and unrestricted access to matters of interest thereto.
26 See Ch. II.
27 SCAP Occupation Instns N O.3. 12 Feb 46 (R).

280
of former Japanese naval vessels. ,8 (Station NOT)'· and other communications
Drydock and limited repair facilities at facilities located in the Y okosuka area; assist-
Kure , Sasebo, Y okosuka, and Maizuru were ance in the logistic support of fleet units
retained . By March 1948 approximately based at Y okosuka and naval units ashore
1l,000 Japanese workers were employed at in the Tokyo Bay area; and administration
Kure, Sasebo, and Maizuru. Almost 30 of Port Directors at Y okosuka , Yokohama,
percent of these were actually engaged in ship and Tokyo. By inspection and surveillance,
work. Approximately 1,000 Japanese were control of all former Japanese naval vessels in
employed by Fleet Activities, Y okosuka, for Japanese ports east of longitude 138° was
work in the ship repair department.'· maintained.
With the surrender of the Japanese, the
Fleet Activities, Y okosuka and Sasebo U.S. Navy was assigned Y okosuka as its
zone of authority." The Japanese had evacu-
The largest shore establishments under ated hastily before the Allied landings and
COMNA VJAP were Fleet Activities, Yoko- left the base in complete disorder. Demil-
suka, and Fleet Activities, Sasebo, both lo- itarization was begun immediately and was
cated on the sites of former Japanese naval completed within the first year. Ninety per-
bases. Fleet Activities, Y okosuka, was re- cent of the former arsenal was returned to the
sponsible for general administration of the people for reindustrialization."
Yokosuka Naval Base, Yokosuka Marine Air Y okosuka Base repaired ships supporting
Base, and Kisarazu Naval Air Base, and for the Occupation, became the supply center for
control of the United States personnel in the US Navy ashore and afloat in Japan,
communities adjacent to these establishments. and governed the ciry of Y okosuka. The
Other duties included demilitarization, inven- military government of Y okosuka was integ-
tory, and disposition of enemy equipment in rated into the Base organization instead of
its area of responsibiliry in accordance with being a separate command.
cu rrent instructions, operation of Radio Tokyo The area of responsibility and scope of

28 According [0 a plan prepared by COMNAVJAP and approved by SCAP on 2 April [946, all former Japa-
nese Navy combatant ships larger than destroyer class, which could be operated or towed, were [0 be completely scrapped
within one year of their release from the repatriation service. It was also planned to sink wrecked and heavily damaged
ships in deep water, and to dispose of all submarines afloat . Eighteen Japanese scrapping companies were assigned the
job of scrapping the major shi ps. This tremendous [ask of disposing of the Japanese Navy was assigned to
COMNA VJAP and was declared completed as of '5 January J949. In all, 4'5 vessels were destroyed: 35 major ves-
sels, 128 minor vessels, 42 submarines, and 106 midget submarines were scrapped, and 104 submarines were sunk: '90
vessels were distributed as reparations, and 80 remained in Japan subject to reparations. (Tokyo, Pacific Stars and Stripes,
June 4, '949. p. 9·) See Ch. V.
29 COMNAVFE, Comd NaIT, , Oct 47 [0 3' Mar 48 (C).
30 Physical control of Radio Tokyo (NOT) was transferred from Yokosuka [0 HQ COMNA VFE in Tokyo on
4 Feb 47·
31 Commodore O. O. Kessing, USN, was placed in command of Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, on 8 September 1945.
He was relieved by Capt H . M. Briggs, USN, on 23 November 1945 . Capt B. W. Decker, USN, replaced Capt Briggs
on 3 April 1946. One of the outstanding accomplishments of the U S Navy in Japan was the industrialization of the
former secret city of Yokosuka. Under the able leadership of Capt Decker, the ex-Japanese naval base became one of
the most progressive communities of Japan .
32 Commem Prog, Flt Activ, Yokosuka, Japan, Navy Day, 27 Oct 48.

281
 Japanese destroyer Okake is disarmed for conversion to troop
transport duty, Maizuru Naval Base.

y okosuka Naval Base drydocks service an American destroyer. Completely repaired,

these drydocks offer modern service to ships in port.

PLATE NO. 92
Fleet Activities, Japan
command of Fleet Activities, Sasebo," were during the war period."
considerably smaller since the greater part of The immediate task assigned was the clear·
Sasebo Naval Base was then under the juris· ing of navigable channels, through Japanese
diction of the Second Marine Division, opera· and American mine fields, into certain key
ting under Eighth U.S. Army controL" Japanese ports to secure the landing of Allied
Occupation units ; this was to be followed
Mine.sweeping Operations by additional clearance of channels and harbor
facilities to insure safe entry for the supply
Prior to the end of the war, U.S. mme vessels brought in to maintain the troops
sweepers had been engaged in clearing the ashore. The secondary tasks ' assigned were
mine fields in the East China Sea. Upon the sweeping of sea lanes around southern
cessation of hostilities, this operation lost its Kyushu and 'between the Japanese ports of
importance and sweeping operations in the occupation so that United States ships could
East China Sea southwest of Kyushu were move without restriction between these ports,
suspended. All mine craft were returned to and providing mine-sweeping units for task
Buckner Bay (Okinawa) for regrouping and groups of Fifth Fleet.
preparation for their new tasks incident to the Early in the Occupation, the Japanese were
evacuation of Allied military personnel and instructed by Commander Fifth Fleet to sup'
the entry of Occupation forces." ply information on mine fields and safe chan·
More than 3,700 acoustic, approximately nels for the ports of Sendai, Nagoya , Kobe,
2,500 pressure type, and 4 ,500 magnetic Osaka, Kure, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Waka·
mines had been laid in Japanese waters noura. Arrangements were made to have the
during the war. Samples of United States Japanese meet United States forces and assist
mines had been recovered by the Japanese, in sweeping operations which began 12 Sep·
analyzed, and means devised for removing tember 1945. Japanese coastal defense vessels
them. They developed effective sweeping for were used as additional mine sweepers and
ground mines of all types and for acoustic were controlled by Commander Minecraft,
mines. While their methods of sweeping U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMINPAC), through a
influence (pressure type) mines were not as Task Group Commander established in Tokyo,
effective as those of the United States, they and through U . S. Sweep Group commanders
reported that before the end of hostilities in the field. Japanese sweepers not operating
they had swept 1,250 United States influence directly under local U. S. commanders were
mines; they also reported that 623 of their controlled from Tokyo where COMINPAC's
ships were either sunk or damaged by mines representatives issued the necessary directives

33 The duties assigned to Fleet Activities, Sasebo, included security, direction of recreational facilities for use of
Fleet units based at Sasebo and shore and naval personnel, operation of Radio Sasebo and other available communica-
tion facilities, logistic support for shore based naval units and for the 2d Marine Division insofar as practicable. oper-
ation of boat pools, and supervision of harbor services and Fleet post office facilities. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, was also
responsible for maintaining contact with aU former Japanese naval vessels in ports of Kyushu and Shimonoseki. Port
Directors, Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Fukuoka were supervised by Fleet Activities, Sasebo.
34 See Ch. VII.
35 Rpt (C), COMINPAC to CNO, 29 May 46, sub : Mine.sweeping Opns Supporting the Occupation of
Japan and Korea, 3 I Aug 45 to 7 Mar 46.
36 Ibid.

283
to the Japanese mine-sweeping central authority_ tial casualties. Even though the entry chan-
Where practicable they were assigned tasks nel was swept for all other types of mines,
directly in support of United Srates interests; and chosen for probable lack of pressure
these tasks included entry into Japanese mines, some means was obviously desirable to
ports, freedom of movement on the high avoid risk. "Guinea-pig" ships were obrained
seas for United States shipping, and elimi- and fitted out for this purpose. While sweep-
nation of Roater sources. After completing ing, these ships were operated by skeleton
such tasks Japanese naval units were em- volunteer crews. All personnel remained
ployed to assist the Japanese repatriation top-side, operating the ship by remote engine-
program , then to sweep Japanese ports which room controls. Precautions were taken against
appeared desirable for Japanese use and might personnel casualties by padding decks and
later be desirable for the use of United States overheads and by providing crash helmets.
vessels. Since Japanese mine-sweeping ves- " Guinea-pig" ships were not used until after
sels were equipped to sweep for moored mines the completion of the magnetic and acoustic
only, they were assigned to areas which were sweeping. In planning the mine-sweeping
sown with this type of mine. Later when operations in Japanese home waters, an effort
United States vessels conducted magnetic and was made by choice of harbors and channels
acoustic exploratory sweeps of these waters, to avoid as much as possible those areas sown
no mines were found." Progress made during with pressure mines. The sweeping of ports
the initial mine-sweeping operations is shown mined with large numbers of pressure mines
in Plate No. 93. was deferred sufficiently to allow a high per-
The U.S. Navy mines laid in Japanese centage of these mines to become sterilized.."
and Korean waters were almost exclusively On 25 March 1946 a total of 328 Japanese
inRuence mines containing firing mechanisms vessels and 9,064 Japanese personnel were
which had been modified; pressure and low engaged in mine-sweeping duties .." The last
frequency acoustic mines were an exception. moored mine-sweeping tasks were completed
Since srandard mine-sweeping gear and pro- in August 1946. As the sweeping progressed,
cedures were of reduced effectiveness against vessels and personnel were released so that
these modified mines, new gear and pro- by the end of 1948 less than 1,500 Japanese
cedures were instituted at the earliest possible personnel and only fifty-two vessels were
srage of the mine-sweeping campaign. No engaged in mine-sweeping. Major ports of
pressure sweeps were available in the forward Tokyo Bay, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Sasebo, Kobe,
area for use during the earliest sweeping in and Osaka were completely cleared of mines
connection with the Occupation of Japan, and and were declared open to all shipping.
entry of transports heavily loaded with men Operations were continued in the Inland Sea
presented a serious problem involving poten- and the Shimonoseki Straits between Kyushu
37 Ibid.
38 The initial Occupation sweeps were completed about the first of November 1945 . Channels had been cleared
in the Tsugaru Strait, Tokyo, Nagoya, Sendai, Chesi, Wakanoura·Kii Suido, Kochi, Shikoku, and Bungo Suido in
the Honshu area, and in harbors of Kagoshima, Nagasaki, Sasebo, Arcadia, Van Diemen Straits, and Kadoura in the
Kyushu·Korea area. In the second phase of the mine-sweeping operations, add itional Japanese ports required for
occupation or repatriation were opened, and facilities of ports already opened to Occupation traffic were expanded.
39 In October the ligures had been reduced to ,6, vessels and 4573 personnel. (Rpt [g, COMINPAC to
CNO, 29 May 46, sub: Opns of Minecraft 5th FIt for Period 3' Aug 45 LO 7 Mar 46).

284
 J A P
\ A N
\
I;:'

5 £
\
A

\ C,

·. Ul.WIIQ-DO

0
\
\ ~

\
'"
£ A 5 r
"-
N o R T H
\
CHI N A \
p A c I F I c
s E \
\
o c A N \
LEGEND
REMAINING JAPANESE MOORED
MI NEFIELOS
U S MINEFIELDS
JAPAN AND KOREA
MOORED MINEFIELDS SWEPT ONLY

-
"..-
BY JAPANESE SWEEPERS
AREAS RESTRICTED BY CURRENT APf>RQXI M.... n SCAL E I 5,000,000
HVQROPACS .~

CHANNELS SWEPT BY U 5 SWEEPERS

PLATE NO. 93
Mine Situation In the Western Pacific, 20 February 1946
and Honshu.'· (Plate No. 94) to the war effort. Fuel oil, coal, and lubri-
As mine-sweeping tasks were completed, cants were deficient and were badly distri-
small craft were returned to the Japanese buted. Civilian shipping organizations had
Home Ministry for civilian use and listed as been fully mobilized for the war effort at the
available for repatriation. Converted mer- expense of the basic national economy. Labor
chant ships and hospital ships were similarly was scarce and the enormous problem of re-
returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. patriating over six million nationals required
Hull and engine repair for boats was set up prompt action. Since many Japanese mer-
at Y okosuka, Sasebo, and Kobe so that small chant vessels had suffered from bomb damage
boats could be repaired and sold through the and required voyage repairs, which were delayed
Forei,5n Liquidation Commission. by lack of acilities and spare parts at the
repair yards, additional shipping for repatria-
SCAJAP-Merchant Shipping tion was required. Therefore, various United
States vessels, principally Liberty ships and
In order to simplify the task of operating LST's, were delivered by the Administrator,
the Japanese Merchant Marine most efficiently, SCAJAP, to the Japanese Civilian Merchant
trained civilian Japanese ship management Committee for manning and operation by
and operational personnel, as well as existing the Japanese under SCAJAP operational con-
shipping and related civilian organizations, tro!"-
were used. Representatives of the civilian On the third anniversary of the Occupation,
Japanese ship industry and related fields were 2 September 1948, SCAP directed that the

formed into a group known as the Civilian initial steps be taken to decentralize the Japa-
Merchant Marine Committee (CMMC) to nese Merchant Marine. Each agency of the
provide a simple medium through which the government would control the Government
Administrator, U.S. Naval Shipping Control owned special type vessels required by its
Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine missIons: patrol, training, research, and
(SCAJAP), could act. weather ships. Private owners would take
As a result of the natural confusion and over vessels such as tugs, salvage vessels,
chaos following the end of the war and dur- dredgers, small ferries, and floating cranes.
ing the first phases of the Occupation, many Owners of fishing and whaling vessels would
problems concerning the Japanese Merchant take control of their ships subject to the super-
Marine had to be met through improvisation. vision of the Fisheries Agency of the Japanese
The crews of all ships were directed to remain Government.
on board their respective vessels , but the This directive reduced the Occupation in-
question of replacements and qualified reliefs terest in the foregoing group of vessels to lit-
arose. Perishable goods and foodstuffs had tle more than maintenance of an accurate
to be moved. Stock piles for civilian indus- inventory. The directive further provided
try were rapidly diminishing or nonexistent. that the remaining vessels, which were in fact
Repair facilities were idle (rom bomb dam- the true merchant marine carrying freight and
age. Spare parts were lacking and machine passengers, were to remain under charter to
tools for their manufacture had been assigned the government's CMMC. The charters,
40 Tokyo, Pacific Stan & Stri~J. October 24, 1948, p. 10, and June 4, 1949, pp. 8, 9, 11.
4' COMNAYJAP, Comd Nan, 21 Jun to 1 Oct 46 (C), pp. t9-20.

286
 MOORED MINES SWEPT

(Wt:K·,\l .l . $W.:.:I', MiNt:.... "liNE.'> SW": I~ AV. SI7.t: t:('KC": ARF.A SWEF.PER
tU"': R:\Tltl~ IN\.; (lAn:." 1.,\111 .,.US ..,..JAP US JAP SWt:PT IJAYS KF.MARKS

T.U~;lru 7 Sep I~ 0.,:, 4S :11!•.'i !)4!, 0 12 0 112.'1 IJf1 mi 504

ToIc.\"O 28 Aug- :t &p :!!",o H 0 25 0 lao RDCite (OE 197) dal'Nll(ed by Ba.tinR mine Z1 Sep 45.
Srndai- ChOlhi 10 St'p- 15 Stop 4,.<;
4,.'i
tl20 264 0 Hi 0
!Iq

HI:! :ifl mi
mi
""
24
Waknnoura 11 St-p- 2 0...,.:.... 6:10 :~4 0 !'i24 :til mi 594 1 jap ship reported mined on 2 $rtp 45.
46 "
8 ~ 8Nuv 45 420

f8-
Kochi 185 27 8 2 103 IIfJ mi 7"
Bu~o Suido 22 St-p-:J I Ocl 45 3640 1687 221 39 2 :100 Iq mi 1360
N~o\.. 28 Sep-26 Oct 45 170 o 0
66 "
121 MI mi 360
Kaltos hima 1 ~ 8 Sttt 45 320 166 88 8 not Hated 164 8q mi 48
9 Srp-16 $rp -IS 694 278 0 7 0 4J6 IIQ mi Includes 2/3 of Fube Shima- Nomo Miuki mine lina. 125 of mines lwept were dummies.
"
::l
c..
Nagasaki
5u<bo 9 ~ .. ()ct 45 1114 396 58 50 12 162 .q mi
72
92' Includes remainder 01 mines north of lkitauki Shima. One jap ah.ip reported mined. 28 Oct 45.
...... Arcadia 1 s.,,- 7 s.... 1068 31 0 21 0 600 eq mi 135
::l Yan Di~men 15 Sep- 1 lnc 45 780 80 0 11 0 1291 IQ mi 112
""
'""::l
Kadoun
Omai Saki
24 Oct- 29 No\.' 4S
lS'No\'-31 1M:: 45
120
290
73
13
0
229
"
4
0
13
75
612
IQ
IQ
mi
mi
23
30
PI us 3 obItructon..
US IWeepen checked jap sweeping.
"'" Twshima 12 Oct- I'" Apr 45 6196 3001 478 19 9 lIOB IQ mi 412 Bridtfc (AF 1) mined 1 Nov 45. Dailo M.,,,
mined and sunk while sweepillll 16 Nov 45.
lGuuJul M.,.. miDed and sunk 9 Oct 45. Mi";Wf (AM 371) miDtd and. sullk 29 Dec 45.
s::"O
~.
~
s:
>-l
Tachibana
Ricksha..
KJon<fik.
14 0«- 26 Jan 46
19 Oct- 1 Dec: 45
'l7 Oct- 7 Nov.s
480
4966
1500
16
511
411
310
0
0
24
26
2 10
0
0
595
2565
1371
IQ
IQ

IQ
mi
mi
mi
138
194
21"
jlpane.e ~ported 52 mines nrept Pl'iorB Sep 45. 2 jap landire craft mined. US sweepers checked lap.

C/lm Sur·a)" 27 Oct- 9 No\' 45 3700 896 0 26 0 3960 IQ mi 550 «0 mines swept by US forces in Aug 45.
~ Z R.no 2 No\'-28 No\' 45 1400 619 0 24 0 1475 .. mi 75
'"g 0 TGGI 11,7" 10.010 1."12 16,119 .q IDi
'.""
>-:g
i
M

:g
V>
INFLUENCE MINES SWEPT

I OPER.ATIQ~"S
OVER· ALL SWEEP·
INC DATES
MINES
LAID
MINES
by US
SWEPT
by JAP
AV. SIZE FORCE
US JAP
AREA
SWEPT
SWEEJ'ER
DAYS REM .... RKS
>-
"0 Toln-o 29 Aug- 3 $ep 45 26 3 0 25 0 21 IQ mi 36 ja". reported 12 mints swept previously of total 26 laid.
2.:. Bungo ( Hiro) 22 $ep-31 Oct 45 86 33 0 39 45 152 IQ mi 230 japs reported 10 mines swrpt pr"Cviously. LSM 114 fired a mine on 31 Oct in ahallow water.
Xa"(.oya 29 $rtp-14 Oec 45 45 • 0 .. 0 HI IIq mi 1900 Two minca fired on 1eC0oo coverage. M5 (b) sweep fired mine near ~ prnsure stick.
:g 5u<bo 14 $ep- 4 Oct 45 60 2 0 50 0 150. MI mi 260 One of thcac on lCCond coverage. Japs ~ 5 influence mines swept previously.
0\ jape J"qJOrtcd 'Z7 miRCI swqJI in Kobe channel rrevioualy.
K.'" 28NQV- 9 Mar 46 659 2 o 56 14 34 so m i 41!50 Mine fired by GP Mar.flAo" on 20 jan, I'NIV have ~n magncttc outside swept channel.
9 Jap shipe mined in buminada after I Scp 45.
Kure·OtUe 27 (kt 45-26 Feb 46 571 12 o 26 17 420 *I mi 1331 japs reported <4 mines .wept in Kure channel prcviouaiy.
Fakuoka 13 Oct 45-11 jan 46 306 o o 2!! 8 19 IIQ mi 1«5 3 lap ahi". mined in Fukuou. Wllln after 1 Scp 45.
f ..... 28 $cp 45-29 jan 46 197 4 o 1H 5 IQ mi japs reported 39 mines swept prior to 2B Sep. jap GP KMN mined and. sunlt outaide twept
" 260
area on 9 Oct 45. 4 other lap ships miDe<! in FUII.D abet 1 Scp 45.

TGGI 1950 62 o 882 .. _ IO,JI2

however, were to be changed from" bare boat" civilian personnel believed held In these
to time charters; this thrust the responsibil- areas. 1
'

ity of manning, supplying, and repairing ships

on the owners. The entty of private enter-
Suppression of Illegal Traffic
prise into these fields was expected to reduce
the drain on the national economy and pre-
A considerable amount. of unauthorized
pared private companies for eventual full con-
waterborne traffic was conducted between
trol of their ships. SCAP designated SCA-
Korea and Japan, consisting mainly of Japa-
JAP, which continued to operate as a staff
nese attempting to return to Japan and Kore-
section of COMNAVFE, to implement this
ans attempting to return to Korea with more
program, regulating its progress to the ability
than their authorized allowance of personal
of the shipping industry to assume responsI-
effects as well as extensive commercial smug-
bilities.'>
gling. In order to prevent these activities and
the introduction of contagious diseases by
Repatriation illegal entrants rom Korea, Occupation forces
maintained beach and off-shore patrols to
One of the largest tasks performed by the intercept such traffic.'· Destroyer patrols
Navy in Japan was the repatriation of Japa- operated in Korean waters from the cessation
nese nationals from all areas of the Pacific of hostilities until January '947 under Com-
and the return of aliens in Japan to their mander, Seventh Fleet, and after that date
homes." Responsibility for the operational under Commander Naval Forces, Far East,
control of repatriation shipping and the super- (COMNAVFE) ; in addition, intermittent
vision of its maintenance was vested initially patrols were maintained off the coast 01 Hon-
in Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, insofar as it shu and Kyushu.
concerned former Japanese naval ships, and It was recognized from the start that the
in FLTLOSCAP for former merchant ships. suppression of illegal sea traffic in Japanese
Repatriation was under way when the Shipping and Korean waters should eventually become
Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant the responsibility of the Japanese and Korean
Marine (SCAJAP) was formed." SCAJAP governments. Japan, however, did not have
was continued as a task group of COM- a coast guard organization prior to the war;
NAVJAP. By the end of 1946 mass reo the coast guard functions were performed by
patriation was completed from all areas the Imperial Japanese ·Navy. Korea was in
except those controlled by the U.S.S.R. the initial stages of achieving national sover-
SCAJAP vessels continued to be available eignty. A small operating coast guard con-
to repatriate the thousands of military and sisting of former United States vessels was

1-2 COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, I Apr-3D Sep 48 (C). Responsibility for the operation of certain categories
of vessels was returned to their owners in February 1949. through the General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Trans-
portation . COMNA VFE, however, retained administrative control over these vessels. (COMNAVFE, Comd Narr,
1 0" 48-31 Mar 49 [C).)
43 See Ch. VI for details of repatriation program as it operated under G·3. GHQ. SCAP.
44 See p. 28 7.
45 Tokyo. Pacific Stars & Stri".,. May 29. '949·
46 COMNAYjAP Opn Plan 3-46, Annex C (C). 8 jul 46.

288
established in Korea." In Japan, twenty-eight USN, in charge. He also assumed direction
patrol craft formerly engaged in mine sweeping of the Japanese Hydrographic Office which
were allocated to the Japanese Coast Gua,rd had formerly been under the supervision of
because it was felt that activation of the Coast SCAP through the Army Engineer Corps.
Guard would reduce u.s.
Navy patrol tasks. The mission of the Hydrographic Office at
This added new responsibilities to the U.S. Tokyo, In addition to services to United
Navy in the form of supervision and direction States and Allied shipping, was the re-
of the coast guard operations." organization of Japanese hydrographic facil-
In order to coordinate better the work of ities and resumption of hydrographic work
various agencies formerly concerned with mari- in Japanese waters. When the U.S. Office
time matters and to provide a firm founda- was closed in 1948, work was continued by
tion for the development of a Japanese Coast the Japanese Office.
Guard , the Japanese Diet passed the Maritime Support Groups: United States and
Safety Authorities Bill. This law became British Naval Support Groups were assigned
effective on 1 May 1948, establishing a Mari- tasks that backed the U.S. Army and Navy
time Safety Board under the Ministry of and Allied units in their control of the Japa-
Transportation.'· nese Empire. They conducted inspections of
Japanese shipping including suspicious vessels
Miscellaneous Naval Activities: encountered at sea, controlled movements and
1946- 1948 inspections of ex-Japanese naval vessels and
shipping, performed escort duties, and assisted
Branch Hydrographic Office : On 1 July In air-sea rescue operations. Units were
1946 Branch Hydographic Office, Tokyo, was maintained in the Y okosuka and Sasebo areas
established with Commander E. B". Dodson, available to meet emergencies and frequent

47 An intensive training program was set up and supervised by the US Coast Guard personnel at HQ. USAFIK.
On I September 1947 the newly organized Korean Coast Guard assumed responsibility for the illegal shipping patrol
in Korean waters, and the US naval forces assigned to COMNAVFE were accordingly reduced by three destroyer
escorcs. US and British units continued to operate out of Sasebo, japan, on intermittent patrol for the purpose of inter·
dieting such illegal shipping of southwestern J~pan and in Tsushima Strait, and also stood ready to operate in Korean
waters if required.
48 After 1 June 1948 operational control of the Japanese Coast Guard was vested in the Maritime Safety Board ,
operating under the guidance of the Public Safery Division.
49 (I) Its functions were: to enforce laws and orders pertaining to safety of vessels, to establish the qualifications
and number of ship's officers required , to aSSIst vessels in distress, to investigate marine disasters, to prevent and suppress
crime at sea, to provide service concerning waterways and navigational aids, and otherwise to insure maritime safety. In
addition , this bill placed under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Board all former functions of the Secretariat of
the Mini ster of Transportation , the Director General's Secretariat (under General Maritime Bureau), the Maritime
Transport Bureau, the Ship Bureau, the Seamen's Bureau, the Commissioners of Marine Courts of Inquiry, the Light-
house Bureau, and the Hydrographic Bureau. It provided for a Beet of vessels not to exceed 125 in number and limited
to a total tonnage of 50,000 gross tons, with no individual vessel having a displacement greater than 1,500 tons or .a
speed in excess of fifteen knots, and for a total personnel strength not exceeding 10,000, only 720 of whom might be
assigned to duty aboud ships. (COMNA VFE, Comd Narr, I Apr to I Sep 48 [C).) (2) After passage of the Maritime
Safety Authorities Bill, COMNAVFE exercised no operational control over the Maritime Safety Board (MSB)
except in the custody of ex-nava l vessels and mine-sweeping operations. These were only temporary functions of the
Maritime Safety Board; control was therefore retained through SCAJAP which functioned as a staff section of
COMNAVFE.

289
visits were made to all ports open tb United Communications: Communications for
States shipping to observe conditions and GHQ and the Navy Liaison Office were
inspect Japanese shipping. Each group con- handled by the USS Teton upon arrival at
tained one cruiser and four destroyers. The Yokohama in August 1945. When the Army
U.S. Group had three additional destroyer Mobile Radio was set up in Tokyo, a mobile
escorts assigned primarily to perform patrol communications unit set up transmitting and
duties in Korean waters. During 1947 and receiving stations to handle the Navy com-
1948 Support Groups continued assigned munications for GHQ. Later, this unit was
tasks. The British Group operating under dissolved and Radio NOT at Y okosuka
COMNA VJAP was dissolved on 30 Novem- took over the guard for SCAP, SCAJAP,
ber 1947 and in its place a unit consisting of FLTLOSCAP, and the Port Directors in this
three destroyers was formed to operate as a area. In early 1947 physical control of this
part of the U.S. Support Group. unit was transferred to Headquarters, COM-
Na'l'al Air Units: In February 1946 NAVFE. At the end of the year the Army
COMNAVJAP had under his control one receiver station located on Tsushima Island
Marine Air Group, MAG 31, composed of near Tokyo took over the receiving side of
II6 aircraft of various types.'· The Naval the Guam-Tokyo radio teletype circuit, making
Air Base at Kisarazu serviced the needs of possible the joint use of facilities and personneL
Naval Air Transport Service (NATS) until A joint emergency transmitter station was
it was decommissioned in May 1946 and constructed at Totsuka which furnished emer-
the NATS detachment was moved to Atsugi gency service requirements of GHQ, FEAF,
Airfield; Air search and reconnaIssance .Army Air Communications Service, and Eighth
functions were operated directly from Head- Army Headquarters."
quarters COMNAVJAP, with air facilities The cooperation of Navy and Air com-
provided by Fleet Air Wing One. The ponents with the Army ground forces made
boundaries of search and reconnaIssance, it possible for the Occupation of Japan to pro-
including search and rescue functions, were ceed in an orderly, efficient manner. From
defined by CINCPAC and the ports of Y oko- the very beginning, when individual and coor-
suka and Sasebo were selected as seaplane dinated missions were outlined, through the
bases. Ready duty destroyers, fleet tugs, and initial landings and later when the Occupation
seaplanes were used singly or in coordinated was established, the contribution of each of
action in rescue search missions at sea. the forces in carrying out its assigned mis-
These missions included searching for downed sions was a tangible element of the success
planes, removing sick patients from ships, and of the Occupation.
towing disabled Allied and Japanese vessels_

50 MAG 3 I was ordered to return to the US in June and by October the total aircraft ·assigned COMNAYJAP
had beeil reduced to only six.
5r COMNAVFE, Comd Narr, I Apr to 30 Sep 48 (C).

290
 EPILOGUE

The fourth anniversary of V-J Day found In a parallel statement made on this same
the character of the Occupation changed anniversary, General MacArthur summarized
through gradual evolution from the initial stern the progress of the Occupation and expressed
qualiry of a military operation to the friendly his belief that Japan was ready to shoulder a
guidance of a protective force. Japan was well major part of the responsibility for her re-
on the road toward becoming a sovereign na- covery ::1

tion once again. (Plate No. 95)

ToddY mar'" the fourth dnni.wtlry of thdt his-
The Prime Minister spoke for his people in
toric e.e,1/ on the Bdltleship Missouri ill Tokyo BdY
conceding progress toward economic recovery:'
",hell the Wtlrrillg IIdtiom of the Pdcific elltered illto
In the economic field, "'e hd>e sttlrted well Oil the solemll COY"!dllls desigrred to Ttltote the pedce. The
rOdd of stdbilkdlion . .. .Our budget is bdldllCed. four yedrs sillce pdssed hdYe beell fruitful yetlrS here
The ddmi";Jtrdli.e reddjustmellt progrdm is IIetlring in terms of humdll progress, dI the }dpdnese people
completion . . . .the go.emmell' is 110'" engdged in the hd.e fully dnd fdithfully obser.ed their surrender
formulation of a plan fOT tax reform and tax reductlou commitments dnd dd.dllced steddily d,od progressi.ely
thdt will ellSure equity d,od efficiency to our tdX "'ollg the rOdd of spiritUdI regenerdtioll dnd physicdl
system . ... recollstrue/ioll. ToddY}dpdll might, indeed, be .iewed
In purSUdllct of its economic stdbilizdtioll policy the dS d symbol of hope for less fortulldte peoples 0>,,-

gO'JIe,nmetll will c07ltiuue to H,i"e to e!fed further ",helmed by the despotic rule of coerci.e force. For,
wrellchmellt in expenditures. We illtend to simplify despite the colltillued presence on }dpdn's soil of dn
and stream-lint OUT administrati'Jle machinery $till occup<1tioll force from beyond the sedI, the }dpdnese
further, while tdkillg ddeqUdte medIum for ullemploy- people in their enjoymellt of full perJOlldl freedom
~nt compensatioll and relief. We dTe "igarously know thdt by their skill dnd their industry they ser.e
pushillg forwtlrd to promote ellterprises, ldrge d,od no other Cduse but their o",n. They, themsel.es, plot
smdll, dI d medllS ofproyiding jobs to the u,remployed, the ultimdte course ofjdpdn's destiny within the fdmily
at the lame time of euhancing the natiou's economic of Iree IIdtions.
power. The pdst yetlr hdI witnessed dccelerated progress in
To thdt end it is imperdti.e thdt "'e expd,od our e.ery phdIe of }dpdll'S recollstruction. True, dI
export trade and import raw materials and technology elsewhere, there hdYe heen dISdU/t, UpOll the integrity
dI ",ell dI cdpitdl from dbrodd. We must d"O of the democrdtic process by the smdll existent Com-
estdblish firmly I"", d,od order, dssure the world of our munist minority, but these assaults were effectiytly
socidl dnd induSlTidl stdbility, dnd gi.e proof of the repuiJed-not by the repressi.. force of po/ice power
soulldness of OUT economic policy a,ui pradices . .. ,a but by the weight of dll illCTedItngly informed and
gredt dedi hds been dccomplished-Itlrgely, howe.er, de/i.e }dpd,rese public opi,,;oll droused to meet the
with Allied dIsistdllCe. But d gredt dedi mo" remdim threat to their free institutio"s. As a result, the
yet to be do,ae-dont more by .our own j"it;ati"e threat of Communism tlJ tI major issue in Japanese
dud efforts. life is pdIt. It fell ,ictlm of its 0"'" excesses. The

Radio Address by Prime Minister Yoshida, 2 Sep 49.

2 GHQ FEe PIO, Press Release, 2 Sep 49.

291
 Nippnn
TOKYO, SUNDAY, AUGUST 14, 1949

Nippon Times Today vast improvements have outlook of the people. No longer
Publilhed by been made, thanks to the Occupa- are they the cringing subjects of
The Nippon Time., Lid.
KIYOSHl TOGASAKI, 're,iden' tion and the efforts of the pation's a militaristic police state. They
TOKYO OFFICE, farmers, and no longer do urban now have the freedom to think
1. Ichome Uchisaiwai-cho, ChiYQda- citizens take long treks into the and speak as their conscience
ku. Central P. O. Box ]44, 352. :::58. countryside to grub for food.
Telephone: Ginza (57):;03,403,5857, directs them. This and other
~858, 5859, 700~. Four years ago cities were freedoms granted the people
Telegraphic Address: .. Times To-
kyo-yubin ". almost completely levelled and under a democratic regime nat-
the housing shortage was some- urally led to initial excesses.
OSAKA: DQjima Bldg. Tel.: Hori-
kawa (35) 177. thing beyond imagination. Hous- But the people are now finding
-- ing is still an acute problem, but their equilibrium. As proof of
SUBSCRIPTION RATE , the war devastation has almost this happy development. the
y 2.945 per copy, ¥ 0.05..l:i charges
incidental to sales tax. Thutsday been obliterated with houses and weight of public opinion recently
issue with supplement ¥ 4.905,
¥ 0.095 charges incidenta l to sales buildings TlSIng in mushroom prevented the Government railway
tax. One month ¥ 89.00, ¥].65 fashion. The pecple are better workers from resorting to illegal
char,ges incidenta l to sales tax.
Obtainable directly from all news- dressed. Progress in health and tactics and made possible a
paper agents in Japan . By mail sanitation aTe keeping them in personnel retrenchment program
¥ 104.5 per mont h, ¥ 1.79 charges
incidental to sales tax. For foreign better health. Serious epidemics which the pecple believed
countries postage ¥ 150.00 per are aJmost nonexistent. Trans- necessary for the ultimate
month extra. welfare of the nation.
portation facilities have shown
T OKYO, SUN.• AUGUST 14,1949 Credit for the remolding of a
tremendous improvement. No
longer do passengers enter and war-shattered nation into a shape
Years of Progress leave trains through the windows, from which she may soon be-
and they do not ride the con- come a contributing member of
The four years following the necting rods between trains. the international society must go
end of hostilities in the Pacific The rampant waves of burglary, to the benevolent policies of the
on August 15, 1245, have been murder. and other serious crimes Occupation as well as to the
fruitful years of progress for have been halted. Four years diligence of the Japanese people
Japan. As compared to the ago honest citizens could not as a whole. Too much credit
war-battered, bewildered nation walk the streets of their cities cannot be paid the unexc~lIed
which accepted unconditionally at night without risking their statesmanship of General Mac-
the Potsdam agrefment, Japan lives and limbs. Arthur and the excellent deport-
today can look with justifiable The nation's economy has been ment of the members of the
pride upon the preEent progres- placed on the road to recovery O:cupation Force who brought
sive state of the nation. Indeed, and on a stable basis. The with them practical examples of
the four years have been years streamlining of industrial and the dem ocratic way of life.
of achievrment as seen from business activities with the stress The past four years since the
forward steps taken toward re- on efficiency and economy is, of fateful surrender date have been
building the country not as course, bringing the problem of years of progress. But it is to
another military machine but as unemployment to the fore. But be hoped that the years to come
a nation pursuing those high con- the progress made in production will see no slackening of the
cepts of peace and democracy. from the utter ruin of four years pace in the forward surge of the
The task is not over yet. Far ago must be considered almost a Japanese people toward the at-
from it. But even the most miracle. The adjustment of tainment of a peaceful, democratic
severe critic must admit that government personnel and the nation-one which will be able to
t remendous progress has been balanced budget promise a more ward off any attack by those
believers in false gods. Holding
achieved. Compare the food situa- efficient administration at lower
firm to the lessons learned in the
tion four years ago and today. operating costs. past four years, the Japanese
The rations of staple food at that Aside from the physical pro- nation with competent leadership
time were not only meager but gress achieved, a most remark- and a responsible citizenry can
more often their distribution was able transformation for the better face the future with hope and
delayed for days and weeks. has taken place in the mental optimism.

PLATE NO. 95
Japanese Newspaper Editorial Summarizes Four Years of Occupation, 1945-1949
Japanese mind penetrated the hypocrisy ,upporting its gillen lIitaf reafity to the c011Stitutiollal assurance of
position. This test of strength, while disturbing to " equality before the law". There is thus rapidly
orderly progress, sened to bring to light for the first taking form the ethical base upon which the pillars
time the full latent power of the Japanese deYotion to oj a free, respomible and represe1ltati'JI.e gOl/emme1U
the concepts of freedom aru! the integrity of their safely may rest.
constitutional proctsses. Therein lies fncouragemelJl Socially, the Japar."se people are wearing well
of Japan's pote1!tial strength as a bulwark of human their c01lStitutiollai mantle of personal liberty alld
freedom. individual dignity. Apart from the growing conscious-
Politically, progressive gains have been made in the ueH of indi"idual respousibility in the conduct of
fabrication of a system of government truly representa- public affairs, there has been a sharp re')lulsion agaiust
ti'Vt in character. The lines of separation between perro", who have failed to abide the law, with a
the three great branches, executive, {eg,slati'Ve and resuiting decisiye drop in the incideJice of pri')late
judicial, as pro.ided by the constitutional design, have (Tnne. The basic causes of social unrest throughout
found strength in healthy public discussion of the Asia ha>e large/:y been eradicated in Japan by a
"ital issue of constitutional int.erpretation, and as a redesign of the social structure to permit the equaliza.
result the affairs of government ha'l'e ad'Ydtlced with a tion of indi.idual opportunity aru! personal privilege.
minimum of oYer/apping friction and iucreasillg inteT- This is haying a profound iufluence upon the ecollomi,
branch cooperation. potential, thereby fortifying the spirit against radical
The deyelopme1!t of the desired autonomous desigm of either extreme to suppress freedom.
resp01lJibility in the conduct oj local affairs has been Substamial progress has been made in the building
retarded somewhat by the need for ratio11alizatioll in of an effocti'Vt police system based upon the statutory
the field of gOl'ernment finance to permit local prillciple of decentralization in the exercise of the
re"enues to support local government . A remedy for police po:.". lrlCreasingly the Japdnese people are
this difficulty is now being e>ol>ed, providing hope that comjug to understand that this power rests in their
the coming year will produce the legal basis fully to bauds, rather than in the hands of any ruling clique,
sustain the Ie'Verance ofpre-existing centralized controls and provides the legal weapon for the preserYation of
and support the de>elopment of a political aru! social the local security by their direction. They realize
system resting UpOIl interrelated and selj.rustaiuiug that the mailllenatlce of internal order in the nation
segments at the community leYeI fro.7I which the as a whole, subject to the safeguards provided by IdW,
national government may draw its porver and direc- is dependent upon the manner in which each com-
tion. Therein will lie the safeguard again't the munity administers the police power corresponding to
re·emergence of autocracy as the pre>ailing philosophy its local responsibility. Here, too, difficulties are
of governme1U in Japan. being experierlced due to the prese1l/ maladjustment
Probably the most sigr.ificant political de>elopment of govemme1l/ finance, but this problem, as pointed
of the past year has been the growing conscioumess out, is in process of solution. Apart from this,
of individual respomibility in the conduct of public progressi')le strides haye been made toward implementa-
affairs. This has been giYen emphasis by a popular tiOl1 of the new concepts embodied in the police law,
demand for higher standards of public morality, and the police services are being administered with
keynoted by actioa of the electorate m rejectmg for restraiut, tolerance and commendable efficiency. The
return to electille office public officials whose public dallger that a police state will re·emerge or that the
record was compromised by the expOfure of corruption police system as now c01lStituted and manned will fail
in government . Administrati'Ve ,and judicial actiou to maintain reasonable law and order is n01J·existeut.
in the in.estigation of the rtewardship of public Progress of trade unionization during the past year,
resp01lSibility and 'Vigorous prosecution, without fr.ar despite a degree of freedom unsurpassed i" modem
or favor, of violators of the pub/ic trust, not o,Jy ci.ilization, has been somewhat impeded by the
haY< served to safeguard the public interest, but have machi1latiotIJ of an irrespo1Jsible UlJi01J leadership, but

293
its rank and fil~ are showing an incr~asing tl'WareTJeSS by the Japanese Go>trnment to remo.., t!trough the
oj this t!treat to labor's legitimate objecti." and are Economic Deconcentration Program on the one hand
mOl'ing to iurist upon moderation and ob/~ctivjty. and the Land Reform Program on the other, these
Workers in the public ser.ice, through the functioning barriers to the existence of a free society, has
oj a modmuzed and enlightened ci.il seT>ice system established in japan the economic basis for the
established by law, for the first time in Japan's history existence of a broad middle class which, haYing a
find protection of their rights and interestJ adequately stake in the economic ",ell· being of the country, will
pro.ided for, without continuous struggle on their Jupport the ideal of democracy as their way of life
part, with machinery established for the hearing alui and will reject ",ith scorn any will.oJ.the-wisp economic
adjudication of indi'Yidual or collective grie,.auce5. utopias which require the surretuier of the indi.idual's
This has resulted in a marked uplift in indi.idual freedom to the State.
morale and greater attendant efficiency in the conduct With patie/lCe, fortitude and selJ.discipline the
~f the affairs of go>trnment. japanese people withstood the pri.ations of the im-
The enfranchised women of Japan are exating an mediate postwar period. With comparable energy,
increasingly beneficial influence upon Japan's political, industry alui hope they are now IauIlChed on the huge
economic arul Jocial life. They are responding taJk of making japan once again seIJ.supporting
magnificently to the challenge of the attending among the family of Ildtions. On the way to that
responsibility arul gi>t ..ery promise of pro.ing a goal great obstacles ha .. been o..rcome, although
powerful and e/focti>t force in the shaping of Japan's some still remain. Since the summer of 1945, when
peaceful destiny. producti .. acti.ity in japan was utterly paralyzed,
Economically, Japan is still in transition from an the production of commodities and goods for home
economy of sUT>i.al to one .of health, but the past cousumption, for industrial use and for export has
year has willlessed significant progress along a broad risen steadily until now it is rapidly approaching the
front. Foremost of the gains made lies in the aYerage le ..1for the years 1930 to 1934, pwcribed by
d..elopment of a more positi.. leadership and an the Far Eastern Commission as an interim statuiard.
illCreasingly informed public opinion. Coal, basic to so much of japan's industry, is now
Both leaders and people are coming to understatui being produced at a monthly rate of 3.2 million
that representali .. democracy draws its strength from metric t011$ as contrasted with less than 1.7 million
the support of a broad majority of the people imbued metric tons in 1946. Electric powa, another basic
with the belief that unda it they may attain a standard ingredient of iluiustrial acti.ity, has attained a
of li... ing commensurat~ with t~ capabilities of mod~rn monthly .olume of 3.2 billion KWH, as compared
ci"i!ization-thczt a prer~quisite to that condition is with 2.8 bi/[ion one year ago. Production of chemi-
indi.idual freedom of acti.ity in the field of economic ca/;, neceSlary both for industrial uses alui for the
~nt~rprise, for no indi ...idua! bound in uo"omic protection of the public health, has attained a .0Iume
thralldom can be politically free. Thus, for the .ast of 105 % of the 1930-34 a.erage, as compared ",ith
majority of those ",ho earn their li.ing in industrial 76 % one year ago and 21 % in january 1946.
and commercial pursuits there could be no political Equally significant ad.allCes ha.. betn made in
freedom 50 long as their uonomic destiny was other fields of uOllomic activity, such tIS in the
determined by decisions made in the closed councils comtruction of dwellings and business buildings to
of the few families which formerly controlled the .ast replace those destroyed by war, and in the production
bulk of the producti.. and financial resources of of an increasing .ariety of goods both for home
Japan. Nor could there be any political freedom c01lSumption and sal~ o"erseas.
fOt those who ",ork the soil so long as they wae To acquire the raw materials nuded to fud her
economic serfs unda a feudalistic system of land industrial machine as well as to o,"come the deficit
tenure. The fruition during the past year of the in her indigenous food production, japan must export
pia", laid down by the Occupation and carried out a large .olume of goods and re"ices. DeJpite
294
 existing handicaps, chieflr the limited a..ilability of the first time in matly rems achie;;ed a true balatlct,
Taw materials from those sourctI which customarily dud Iubsequent action to sharpl., curtail the cost of
supplied Japan in the prewar years, progress in this gO}lemment b., ltreamlining its 1Irudure and reducing
direction has been heartening. In 1946, Japan's its personnel, hdl'e struck at one of the contributing
total exports 'Were $103,000,000.00; jn 1947, $173, faC/orr ill the postwar inflation and are gradually
000,000.00; ;n 1948, $ 258,000,000.00, dud in 1M effecting greater rtability. To pre..nt the specter
first six monthr of 1949, exportr had already exceeded of iliflatiou from rising again, a firm and determined
the total for the full year 1948 by a rizeable margin. courre based UpOIl soulld focal and fina'lCial policier
In the past twelye mOfllhs two significant decisioJls is 110'" beillg purrued by the Japallese Go>emmellt.
to promote the eco71omic rehabilitation of Japan were This, accompanied b., maximum utilization of indige-
taken by the Go>ernmelll of the United States. Olle nous resources and efficient employmeul of the
was that of May 1949, to cease the remo.al of mallpower of Japall ill the useful pursuitr of peace,
indurtrial pla'ils for reparatio,,,. This action dis· ",ill speed the day when the Japallere economy will
pelled the pall of UllCertainty which had pre>iously be stabilized alld its depellderlCe 011 Americall rubsidl
paralyzed entrepreneurial initiati"e and restored 1M eliminated.
inctlltil't to the j7l"ertment of capital in the rehabili- To rtimulate producti .. endea.or d1Jd to rtrellgthen
tation and comtruction of capital plant and equip- the foulldatiom for the growth of free pri.ate com-
ment. The second "'as the authorization by the petitiJ'e eTllerprise in Japan, the economic controls
Congress of the United Stater of limited budgetary necessitated by the wdT-geuerated lhortages of en·tical
appropriations for finducing the importation into materials haJ'e been remoJ'ed as fast as the aJ'ai[ability
Japan of m<.terials needed for rehabilitation purporer of adequate rupplier har oh.iated their necessity.
in addition to the appropriationr pre>iously made for The timing of progrersi .. further relaxatiom I/Iill, of
the importation of primary necessities such dS food, course, depend on the progress of the transition from
fertilizer and medicines to protect the Japanere an economy of rcarcity to oue of 71ormdlry.
people against widerpread ruffering and direare.' Si,lCe October 1, 1945, lIine and 0lle-h4lf million
The enactmelll by the Japanere National Diet in people ha>e been added to the population of
the spring of 1949 of a national budget ",hich for Japd1l-fi.. million by repatriation and the rert

3 In his support of appropriations for the fiscal years of 1949, 1950, and 1951 for economic aid to the Japanese,
Mr. Joseph M . Dodge, well-known Detroit banker and former financial advisor to the American Military Government
in Germany who had visited Japan to survey economic conditions and foreign trade procedures at the request of
General MacArthur, testified before the National Advisory Council Staff Committee about the importance of such aid
and how effectively it was being utilized in Japan :
II The actual and projected appropriations for the fiscal years 1949, 1950 and 1951 for economic aid for Tri-Zone
Germany are approximately twice that for Japan. On a population basis for Germany of something more than half
that of Japan, the appropriations for Germany are over three times the amount for Japan per captia. The proposed
FY 51 appropriation for Tri-Zone Germany is more than twice that of the amount of economic aid requested for Japan.
U We should note the substantial progress that has been made in Japan on relatively modest appropriations.
Effective financial stabilization substantially has been achieved. There has been an increasing transfer of responsibility
from the Occupation to the Japanese Goverment and to the Japanese people. There has been a substantial increase in
exports and industrial recovery has proceeded at a heartening pace and is now at almost the level of the 1932-1936
period. For the first time (in 1949) there is a reduction in the foreign trade deficit.
U In no other nation has so much been accomplished with so little.

U The FY 51 appropriation request for Japan has been reduced substantially. On a basis of $ 320 million for
Japan and the Ryukyw, the reduction for FY 51 from FY 50 is 33.6%. In economic aid requested for Japan there
is a reduction of 35%. This compares with a proposed reduction for FY 51 in the ECA total of 21.4% and for Tri-
Zone Germany of 21.7%." (Statement by Mr. Joseph M. Dodge befote National Advisory Council Staff Committee
on 12 January 1950, p. 2.)

295
through 1I<1tural increase. Yet there has been no industry and commerce cannot thri'Ye and realism
mass unemployment, no social unrest and no large- warns that the potentialities of trade with any people
scale dole. In June 1949, persons reported as totally under the strictures of a collecti"i~tic system must be
unemployed were fewer than 400,000. Further, discounted accordingly. For the time being, there·
despite recent reductions in the number of government fore, and for some time to come, Japan must look
employees in the interest of go'Vernmental economy elsewhere for the sources of her needed imports and
and ejficie1lcy and the (UTreut rationalization of the marketJ for her matlufactures. Against this need
industry nt:Cessitated by the adoption of a single Japan has already initiated foreign trade with 113
foreig'l excha7lge rate for foreign trade and the other couturies and territorial areas.
transition from subsidized to competitive industry, I dare say that no operation in history has
total unemployment by the end of August 1949 is been subject to such extraordinary di'Yergence of
estimated not 10 exceed one-half million penon!. opinion carried in the media of public expression
During the twel.. months elided June 30, 1949, the than has Occupation of Japan. Some Writers have
total number of perso7lS at 'Work in any gi'Vt71 week been extra'Yagant in their praise, others no less
averaged over 34.5 mil/ion, as compared with J2.9 extra'Yaga1lt in their criticism. The truth, awaiting
mil/ion in the preceding twel ..·month period, or an the judgem",t of hi,tory, will rest somewhere in
ayerage increase of 1.6 million in the total number hetween.
of persons at work. In June 1949, the total numba Nor has there been any operation subject to such
of persolls at work stood at an all·time high of 37.4 a 'Yariety of i7lfluences and pressureJ-the ideological
million. These figures ref/ect an orderly absorption protagonists, the special pleaders, the .indicti.e and
of the working energies of the increasing population the lenie1lt-many seeking to influence public opinion
in an expanding number of employment opportunities through pre.arication of the truth. In the search
in industry, agriculture and small scale familyenter- for sensatioualijm, incidents in Japan, el~whert
prises. Unemployment, therefore, presentJ no major scarcely worth the public notice, ha.e been exaggerated
problem al the presenl time, and the expanding out of all proportion to their true significance, with
areas of employment in the work of reconstruction the serenity ttt..d order and sincerity of purpose normal
will stand safeguard against any acute unemploymenl to postwar Japan all but ignored. And time and
problem in the foreseeable future. again simultaneous attack has been leveled against
Since the full employment of Japan's industrial Occupation policy, by the leftists as too reactionary
potential requires a 'Yigorous re'Yi'Yal of her foreign and by the conservatives as too liberal. Such an
trade and since amo1'g her chief customers in the past atmosphere, while giving assurance that our moderate
were the countries bordering on the Pacific basin, the course is well charted, does 1Iot contribute to an
question as to whether Japan will regain her tradi. objecti.. public appraisal of the situation.
li01l<11 trade with China, despite the stranglehold of The great at", noble effort by the American
Communism upon that tragic land, has been mooted people, with the wholehearted support of other Allies,
with increasing frequency. This question is largely toward the reorielltatioll and rec07lStrudion of postwar
academic. Foreign trade requires production in Japan, beyond perad.enture of doubt, will prove
excess of domestic needs. Human experience demon- eminently successful. Long hence history will record
strates with striking clarity that the further removed of the Occupation that itJ greatest contribution to the
a people become from the economic philosophy of progress of civilization was to introduce into Japan
free enterprise in like ratio does its productj'Ye the great concepts of personal liberty and indi.idual
capaCIty deteriorate. This deterioration proceeds dignity and to give the Christian ideal the opportunity
until, as under Commu71ism, with incetlti'Ye completely to adl'allce i7lto Asia.
lost, the human energy and individual initiative which Of the Japanese people I Can pay no higher
find their expression in production gi'Ye way to tribute than to repeat that they have fully and
indolence ar.d despair. In such unhealthy climate faithfully fulfilled their surrender commitment, and

296
 ha.e well earned the freedom and dignity a.uI regional and the Hokkaido (District) civil af-
opportulJity which alolle caU come with the res/ora· fairs teams, ~nnounced by GHQ, SCAP, on
tio" of a formal Peace. 28 July 1949. The remaining teams were to
In a previous message to the people of] apan be maintained at approximately their former
on the second anniversary of their new consti- strengths but were to be staffed primarily by
tution the General had forecast the future m civilians trai ned in economics, education, wel-
a policy of progressive emancipation :' fare or some other of the civil affairs depart-
While insisting upon the firm adherence to the ments, with a minimum number of military
course delineated by existing Allied policy and personnel for administrative purposes. The
directive it IS my purpose to continue to ad'llQllce
J plan further provided for the discontinuance of
this tramition just as rapidly as you are able to the Civil Affairs Section OC Eighth Army and
assume the attending autonomous responsibility. Thus the establishment of a small Civil Affairs Sec-
progresn'Yt! latitude will come to 'You ;n the steward· tion in GHQ , SCAP ; the transition was to be
ship of your own affain. completed by 31 December 1949.'
One of the most important elements in re- This progressive relaxation of controls was
laxation of controls was a plan for the gradual designed to permit the :oca' Japanese officials
deactivation of forty.seven prefectural civil af- to assume more and more responsibilities in
fairs teams,' culminating in the absorption of their respective fields as rapidly as they demon-
their duties and responsibilities by only seven strated their capacity to undertake them.'

4 GHQ FEe PIO, Press Release, May 49.

2

5 In keeping with the changing aspect of the Occupation, designation of "Military Government Section H was
changed to "Civil Affairs Section" and its prefeccutai units deactivated. (GHQ SCAP & FEe Staff Memo No. 26,
2. Jun 49· AG 323.3, 20 Jun 49)
6 GHQ FEe PIO, Press Release, 28 Jul 49.
7 GHQ FEe PIO, Press Release, 15 Aug 49.

297
 REPORTS OF GENERAL MacARTHUR

VOL I: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific

VOL I: Supplement: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation, Military Phase
VOL II: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area

" . . . This report has been prepared by the General Staff to serve as a background for, and introduc-
tion to the detailed operational histories of the various tactical commands involved.
The pressure of other duties having prevented my personal participation in its preparation, it has
been entrusted by me to that magnificent staff group which actually conducted the staff work during
the progress of the campaigns. They speak with that sincere and accurate knowledge which is pos-
sessed only by those who have personally participated in the operations which they record . . . "
Preface by General Douglas MacArthur.

Senior Commanders: South West Pacific Areas

Gen W. Krueger: Sixth Army; Lt Gen R . L. Eichelberger: Eighth Army; Gen Sir Thomas Blamey:
Aust. Imp. Forces; Lt Gen G. C. Kenny : AAF; Adm T . H. Kinkaid, USN: Seventh Fleet

The General Staff: GHQ: South West Pacific Area

Lt Gen R. K. Sutherland, CofS; Maj Gen R. J. Marshall, D CofS; Maj Gen C. P. Stivers, G--r: Maj
Gen C. A. Willoughby, G--2; Maj Gen S. J. Chamberlain, G--3; Maj Gen L. J. Whitloc~, G--4; Maj
Gen S. B. Akin, CSO; Maj Gen W. F. Marquat, AAO; Maj Gen H. J. Casey, CE ; Brig Gen B. M .
Fitch, AG ; Brig Gen L. A. Diller, PRO.

Editor in Chief
Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, G--2

Senior Editors
Col E. H. F. Svensson, G-2; Gordon W. Prange PhD ; Mr. Stewart Thorn

Associate and Contributing Editors

Brig Gen H. E. Eastwood, G--4; Col F. H . Wilson, G--2; Col R. L. Ring, G--2; Col W. J. Niederpruem,
G--3; Lt Col M. K. Schiffman, G--2; Maj J. M. Roberts, G--3; Capt J. C. Bateman, G--2; Capt Mary
Guyette, G-2 ; Capt John L. Moore, G--2; Lt Stanley Falk, G--2; Mr. Jerome Forrest; Mr. Kenneth
W. Myers; Miss Joan Corrigan.

Translation- Interrogation- Production

Lt Col W. H . Brown, G-2; Louis W. Doll, PhD; Capt E. B. Ryckaert, G--2; Capt K. J. Knapp, Jr.,
G--2; Lt Y. G. Kanegai, G--2; Mr. James J . Wickel; Mr. John Shelton, ATIS ; Mr. Norman Sparnon,
ATIS; SFC H. Y. Uno, G--2; Mr. K. Takeuchi; Mr. S. Wada.

299
 INDEX

Aburayama, 108n American Red Cross, 52, 105. See also International
Administrative and Executive Group, FEC, 84 Red Cross
Admiralty Islands, 179, 275 Amoy, 173
Aeronautical Chart Service, USAF, 275 Amphibious operations, 29
Africa, 95 Ancon, 100
Agriculture, 212-213 Antiaircraft artillery units, 60
Agriculture-Commerce Ministry (Jap. ) , 23 Aomori, 42, 44-45, 60, 90, 120, 138, 270
Aichi,97 n Area of Initial Evacuation, 19, 21 , 28,35,42- 43
Air Defense Command, 17 Arisue, Lt. Gen . Seizo, 24- 3 I
Air Division, 1St , 86 Annies
Air Forces First, I, 7, 14
Fifth, 14, '7, 29,44,58,62,268-270 Sixth, I, 6-17, 36, 45-47, 56-60, 75, 93, 102, 109,
Seventh, 14, 17, 268, 273 119, 122, 136, 140, 152n, 154, 195-198,227,277
Thirteenth, 14, 17,270 Eighth, 1, 6- 10, 14- 17,24,28,35,3 1,34,36,4 1- 45,
Twentieth, 88, 94-95, 97 51-65, 71-75, 86, 89, 93, 104-113, 119, 122, 152n,
Far East, 6, 7,16-17, 24-25,35,38, 45n, 73, 86, 88, 154, 195- 201, 214, 223, 226-229, 260, 268, 277,
94,97, 104 283, 290, 297
air traffic handled, 275 Tenth,7, 10, 14, 17
Army Forces, China Theater, 172, 277
communications, 290
initial operations, 268-270 Army Forces in Korea, 86, 151n, 157, 165,277
joins USAF, 273 Army Forces, Middle Pacific, 7, 14, 82, 152
maintenance in Japan, 273 Army Forces, Pacific, 4, 7, 14, 17, 23- 31, 35, 4 2, 67,
mapping and photographic activities, 275 7 1- 76,82,96, 105,113, 119, 131 , 151 , 158,198,268
number of personnel, 273 27 1
number of units, 270 Army Forces, Southeast Pacific, 7
organization and missions, 270-273 Army Forces, Western Pacific, 7,10, 14,16,60,93,152,
surveillance missions, 268 168- 169
training, 273 Army Service Command- C, 16, 58,60, 199
transport mission, 270, 275 Army Service Command- I, 14
types of units, 275-277 Army Service Command- O, 16, 60
Strategic,?, 10, 17,96,271 Arms, personal, surrender of, 244
Air Transport Command, 17,24,94, 113,268, 273, 275 Army Air Communications Service, 290
Airborne Division, 11th, 60, 7, ' 4, 17,24, 27-32, 36, Army Air Forces
38,4 1- 44,53,55,65, 94,268 troop strength, 58
Aircraft types. See individual types of planes units in support of occupation, 16-17
Airlift operations 7, 14, 17, 27-28, 32, 38-42, 94-96, Army Air Forces Weather Control, 270
268-270 Army Mobile Radio, 290
Airways and Air Communications Service Wing, 7th, Arsenals, location, 134n
273 Asahi Shimbun, 238
Alaskan Department, 7
Asano, 3 1
Aleutian Islands, 277
Asian mainland, 149
Allied Council for J apan : 69"-71,77, 82, 157, 161 , 179,
Assault plans, 1- 2, 12
183
Atomic bombs dropped, 12
Allied forces, 34
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, SCAP, 256, Atsugi airfield, 19,21 , 24- 3 1, 34- 35, 38-4 2,53,55, 89,
260 I 13, 268, 290

Amapoora, 178 Auchindoss, Col. S. S., 25n

301
Australia, 104, I 13, I 15, 179 Caroline Islands, 88
RJ\AF Coounand, 17 Cavalry Brigade, 2d, 39
U.S. troop strength, 1942, In Cavalry Division, 1st, 6n, 14, 32, 38--42, 53, 55, 64,
in war and occupation, I, 19, 32n, 201, 267 112,138
Australian Air Force, 267 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, 302d, 39
Australian Military Forces, 15 1- 154, 157, 179 Cavalry Regiments
Australian units, 62-64 7th ,39
8th, 38, 41
R-29's 27, 32, 94--95, 27 0 12th, 38, 41
Back, Brig. Gen. George 1., 73n I 12th, 6n, 14, 32, 36
"Baker" series, implementation of, 7, 17 Celebes, 166
Ballentine, Rear Adm. J . J., 277 Censorship, civil, 73, 206-208, 232- 233, 236-241
Bank of Japan, 223 Central Liaison Committee, 195
Banks. See Financial institutions Central Liaison Office (J ap. ) , 73n, 8 I , 227
Bataan, 102, 106 Central Pacific, I '7
Beary, Rear Adm. D. W., 278 Changchun, 174
"Benevolence," 100 Chase, Maj. Gen. William C., 32, 39
Berkey, Vice Adm. Russell M., 278 Chiba, 19, 36
Bern, 94 Chiba Prefecture, 42, 62
Besson, Gen. Frank S., 73n China, 2, 19, 67, 69, 82, 95, 99, 113, 13 6, 145, 147,
Biak, 27 I 151-159,164- 168, 17C>-176, 191, 214
Billeting, 55 Chinese Communists, 158-159, 170, 174, 176
Bismarck Islands, 179 Chinese Naval Air Training Base, 1 I I
Black market operations, 209-21 1, 213,217, 238,241 Chi tose, I 1 I
BLACKLIST, 2, 4, 11 - 12, 28,47, 8g-g0, 97, 116, 23 1- Chofu airfield, 38- 41
23 2, 255 Choshi, 19
Board of Information (Jap.) , 238 Civil affairs, administration of, 57, 297
Boeki Oho (Board of Trade), 217- 219 Civil Affairs Section, SCAP, 198
Bombardment Wings, 97 Civil Communications Section, SCAP, 80
Bomber Command, V, 58 Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP, 75,
Bonin Islands, I 7, 82~6 8~1, 205- 206, 255
Borneo, 62, 178 Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, 62, 7~0, 222, 233-
Bouchier, Air Vice Marshal C. A., 62 238,243-247,255, 257, 260,264- 265
Bowers, Maj. F., 25n Civil liberties, safeguarding, 220
Branch Hydrographic Office, Tokyo, 289 Civil Property Custodian, SCAP, 82, 223-226, 241 , 255
Brisbane, 244 Civil Service (Jap. ) , 257
British Commonwealth JCS in Australia, 74 Civil Transportation Section, SCAP, 81
British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 19, 3 2n , 34, Civilian internees, non-Japanese. See country of na-
60-65, 71 , 73-74, 84, 86, 102, 199, 201 , 227, 267, tionality
280,289-290. See also United Kingdom Civilian internees, UN (see also Prisoners of war, UN )
British Commonwealth units, 64, 86 nations represented, I 13
British Naval Officer in Charge, Kure, 280 number detained, I04n, 149
Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, 34, 208 relief and repatriation, 8g-1 16
Buckner Bay, 283 Civilian Merchant Marine Committee, 145, 286
Bungo Suido, 278 Civilians, Japanese. See Japanese nationals
Burma, 113,159, 178,193 Clarification of Censorship directive, 238
Byrnes, James F., 106n Closed Institutions Liquidating Commission, 224
Coast Guard (Jap. ). See Maritime Safety Service
C-46'S, 24- 25
Coast Guard, U.S., 289n
G-47's, 25
C-54'S, 25, 27, 113 Coast defenses, 134
CAMPUS, 4 Collaborators, internment of, 2321 236
Canada, 69, 102, I l l , 113, 115 Combat Cargo Group, 2d, 16
Canton, 23, 155, '73-174 Command structure, 67~8

302
Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC ), 4, 10, 18, Daily Life Security Law, 209
82,88, 151n, 152, 158, 168- 169,273, 277,283, 29° Dairen, 159, 174, 181
Commander in Chief, Pacific Advance, 99 Demobilization and disannament
Commander, Marianas Islands (COMMARIANAS ) , achievements summarized, 13 1
88,280 aircraft, number disposed of, 136
Commander, Minecraft, Pacific Fleet, 283 disarmament process, 134-135
Commander, Naval Activities, Japan (COMNAV disposal of materiel, 136
JAP), 73- 74,81,88, 147, 154,278- 281 , 288, 290 disposal methods, 140- I 42
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), fleet units, disposal of, 143- 147
86, 88, 280, 288, 290 general program, I 17- 120
Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, 280 home forces demobilization, 120-123
Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines (COMNAV- Japanese plans, 120
PHIL ) , 88, 280 Japanese role in, 2-4, I 1,27, '34-36, 65, 1,8
Commander, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, 280 materiel returned to Japanese, 142- 143, 147
Commanders, U.S ., missions in occupation, 4, 10- 11, number of persons demobilized, 122, 123
25- 27, 35, 42 of overseas forces, 123
Commerce, rehabilitation of, 217-219 rate of progress, 127- 134
Communications reorganization of system, I 2&-1 27
establishment with Japan, 12, 25 weapons reported, disposed of, destroyed, returned,
Japanese, surveillance of, 24 I 136, 138, 14 2n
in occupation forces, 55-56,290 Demobilization Board, 126, J 27
Communist infiltration, 187- 191 , 239, 241 , 255, 258, Demobilization Commissioner, 122
263- 267. See also Subversion, internal Derevyanko, Lt. Gen. Kusma N. (USSR), 184
Compilations Branch, SCAP, 256-257 Diet ( Parliament ) , 38, 209, 249, 289
C ORONET, 1-2 , 6, 16, 58, 60, 270 Diplomatic missions, foreign, 82
Corps Diplomatic Section, SCAP, 77
I, 6n, 14, 45,47,64-65,86,201 , 227, 245 Disannament, Japanese. See Demobilization and
IX, 6n, 14, 17,42,44- 45, 53, 65,86, 201,227,245 disannament
X , 6n, 14,45,47 Dodge, Joseph M ., 295n
XI, 6n, 7, 14, 32,38-39,42,45 Dodson, Comdr., E. B., USN, 289
XIV, 6n, 7, 14,42,44-45,53 Domei news agency, 23, 34, 238
XXIV, 7n, 14, 16, 86, 93, 102, 162 DOWNFALL. See Assault plans
Corps Artillery, XI, 135 Duke of York, 32n
Corps of Engineers, 275, 289 Dunne, Col. D. M ., 25n
Corregidor, J 06
Corsair aircraft, 24 East China Sea, 283
Counterintelligence. See Security and intelligence Economic and Scientific Section, SCAP, 75, 77-79, 81
Counterintelligence Corps, 34, 36, 45, 73, 233, 254- 214- 219,24',257, 265
256,260,264-265 Education, civil, 205- 208
Education Ministry (Jap. ) , 205-206, 263
4 ISt , 74 n , 233, 235, 241-244, 254- 260
Education Mission, 206
mission, 254
number of field units, 245, 267 Educators, screening of, 205-206
Ehime Prefecture, 64
in repatriation program, 258-260
Eiche lberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 12, 14, 24, 28- 29,36,
Training School, 244
39,44,58, 109, 112, Ig8
Courts, sUiveillance of. See Juridical system, surveil-
Eiho Moru, 189
lance of Elections, surveillance of, 220
Cowan, Maj. Gen. D. Tennant (Brit.), 64 Electric power, 214, 294
uCrescent," 95 Emperor of Japan. See Hirohito
Criminal Investigation Division, SCAP, 254 Enoshima M aru, 173
Customs, surveillance of, 222 Enemy Property Custodian (J ap.), 226
Czechoslovakia, 1 13 Epidemics, control of, 600. See also Prisoners of war
Doi Nippon S eijikoi ( Political Association of Greater Eta Jima, 142
Japan ), 231 European Theater of Operations, 44

303
Evacuation Hospital, S4th, losn Fusan, 174
Exports. S ee Imports and exports Fushiki, 90
Futsu-saki, 28
F6F's, 24-25
Facilities Allocation Board, 55 General Accounting Section, SCAP, 81
Far East Air Materiel Command, 271 General Headquarters, SCAP. S ee Supreme Com-
Far East Air Service Command, 27 [ mander, Allied Powers
Far East Command General Hospitals
air and naval forces, 86--88, 268--290 42d, 32n, 60, 105, 11 2- 11 3
establishment, 82--134, 278-280 1 20th, 115
forces included, 8 2, 86 General Maritime Bureau, 145
GHQ command structure, 84--138 General Order No. [, SCAP, 32- 34
mission, 84-86 General Procurement Agent, SCAP, 8[
Far Eastern Commission, 69,71 ,76,8" 145, 294 General Procurement Board, 227
Fighter Command, V, 58 Geneva Convention, 89, 96
Fighter Groups, [6 G erusalemme, 178
Fighter Wing, 85th, [7 Ginza, The, 51
Financial institutions, control of, 222- 224 Glider Infantry Regiments
Financial restrictions, 224 [87th, 3[, 4[
Finland, [[3 [88th,3 [
Finschhafen, 27' Government Section, SCAP, 80, 219, 255
Fire fighting, 249-254 Graves Registration SelVice, I 15
Fire Prevention Week, 254 Great Britain, 69, 102, 113, 115, 14S, 147, 158-1S9,
Fire Research Institute, 2S1 [73, '76-[ 78. See also British Commonwealth Oc-
First D emobilization Ministry (Bureau ), 120, 123- 127 cupation Force
Fisheries, 2 I 3-2 14 Greece, 113
Fisheries Agency (Jap.)' 286 Grew, Joseph C., 106n
Fleet Activities, Sasebo, 281- 283 Griffin, Vice Adm. R . M., 278, 280
Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, 281 - 283 Guam, 2, 14,88,96, 106, I 13, 166, 271 , 290
Fleet Air Wing One, 290 Gumma Prefecture, 42
Fleet Liaison Officer, SCAP, [52, [54n
Fleets Hachi-nohe, 45
Third, [7, 28, 3 [,99-100, 277- 278 Hachioji, 39
Fifth, I7, 140, ISO, IS2, '540,277-278,283,288 H adano, 42
Seventh, 17, 25, 277- 278,288 Hagashi-Kuni, Prince N aruhiko, 23, 38
Pacific, 277 Hainan, [73- [ 74
Fletcher, Adm. Fran k J., [9,277 H aiphong, [55
Food Supplies, civilian, 24,44 Hakata, 90, 126, 127, 176, 191
Foreign Liaison Section, SCAP, 82n Hakodate, 90, 97n, 109, 126, 127, IgI
Foreign Liquidation Commission, 60,286 Hall, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 38
Foreign Office (Jap.) , 90 Halsey, Adm. William F., [7, 99-100,277
Formosa, 2, 99, [55- [58, [66-[70, [73-[74, [78-[79, Hamamatsu, 109
[9[ Hara-Machida, 32, 39, 41
Fort William McKinley, 270, 271 Harada memoirs, 257
France, 69, 113, J 70, 173 Harbin, [74
Fraternization, 5 I- 52 Hawai i, 14, 35, 11 3, IS8, 193
Freedom of Speech and Press directive, 236 Hayama,3 1
Fuchishima, 44 Hiratsuka, 39
Fuchu, 251, 271 Hiro, 64
Fuji trust, 224n Hiro Bay, 278
Fukuoka, 97n, 108n, 134, 270, 280 Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, 4, 12,23,27,34,38
Fukuoka Prefecture, 47 Him-saki, 45, [38
Fukushima, 97n Hiroshima, 12, 97n, 108n, 127,223,283
Fukushima Prefecture, 53 Hiroshima Prefecture, 267

304
Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R ., 12, 14 Imperial Navy Ministry, 27n, go, liB, 120, 122, 126,
Hodges, Gen. Courtney H., 14 154, 27 8
Hokkaido, 7, 19,42,44,53, 6g, 89, 97n, II I , 120, 123, Imperial War Ministry, 27n, go, liB, 120, 122, 126
201, 21 3,275,277- 278,297 Imports and exports, 2 I 7-2 I 9, 295
Home Depot Division, I go Inchon, 174
Home Ministry, 126, 127, 140, 235, 286 India, 69, 95, I 13
Hong Kong, 23, 106, 143, 170, 173,239 Indian units, 62-64
Honshu, 7, 17, 19,44-45, 53, 55, 65, Gg, 89, 97, 99 n, Indochina, 155, 170, 173, 178
108, 120, 149, 164, 267, 277-280,288 Indonesia. See Netherlands East Indies
Hulutao, 158- 159, 174 Industry, rehabilitation of, 214- 217
Hutchinson, Col. C. R., 25 Infantry Divisions
Hydrographic services, 289 American, 6n, 14, 39-41 , 53, 1 12
Hyogo,97 n 6th,6n, 14
7th , 14
Ibaraki Prefecture, 42
24th, 6n, 14, 65, 13B
Iceland, I 13 25 th ,6n, 14, 64
Ie Shima, 268
27 th , 6n, 7, 14, 17, 24, 39, 4 1-42 , 44, 53
I mperial Army Air H eadquarters, 21
32d, 6n, 38, 45n, 47
Imperial Army Headquarters, 21
33 d ,6n, 14,47
Imperial General Headquarters, 21 , 23, 34, 36, 41-42, 40th, 14
118- 120,122, 143
41st,6n, 14
Imperial General Staff, 2 1,270 , 122
43d, 6n, 14,4 2, 44- 45, 13 1
Imperial Government, 36
77 th ,6n, 14, 42, 44,53
Imperial Japanese Army. See also Demobilization
8 1St, 6n, 14, 42,44- 45,53
and Disarmament; Japanese armed forces
96th, 14
First General Army (Group), 36, 120, 122
97 th, 44, 53
Second Area Army, 120
gSth, 14,47
Second General Army (Group ), 36, 120, 122 Infantry Regiments
Fifth Area Army, I 2(}--1 23
105 th , 39, 41
Eleventh Area Army, 120
106th, 41
Twelfth Area Army, 120
127th, 38, 45 n
Thirteenth Area Army, 120
13 2d,39-4 1
Fifteenth Area Army.. 120
I 58th, 6n, 14,45,53
looth Air Brigade, 119
164th, 4 1, 44
major commands and stations, 120-122
182d,41
number of troops in home islands, 4, 27,95, IIB-120
306th ,53
number of units, 120
30 7th ,53
number of verified dead and missing, 130n
32 1St, 45
total number and location, I 17, 122
3 22d, 45
Imperial Japanese Navy. See also Demobilization and
32 3d,45
disarmament ; Japanese anned forces Inflation, control of. See Price controls
Fleet Headquarters, 122
Information, civil. 20~208. See also Civil Infor-
Naval Force Headquart ers, 122 mation and Education Section, SCAP
South eastern Area Fleet, 122
Initial Occupation Area, 44
Southwestern Area Fleet, 122
Initial Post-Surrender Policy, Ig5, 205
civilians employed, 123
Inland sea, J34, 277, 2B4
major commands and stations, 122
number in home islands, 123 Intelligence measures. See Security and intelligence
number verified dead and missing, 130n Interior Ministry, 20g
total number and location, 1 I7n International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 76-
Imperial Mint, 223 78, 233
Imperial Naval Air H eadquarters, 21 International Prosecution Section, SCAP, 77
Imperial Naval General Staff, 36 International Red Cross, 90, g6, 99- 100, 104,106, III,
Imperial Naval Headquarters, 21 113

305
Irumagawa airfield, 44, 58 Kashiwazaki, 44
Ise~ 147 K atsuura, 41
Ishioka, 19 Katsuyama Bay, 41
Italy, 11 3 Kawabe, Lt. Gen. T., 190, 23
Itazu ki, 58 Kawasaki, 31, 100, 106
I wakuni airfield, 62 Kawasaki trust, 2240

I wo Jima, 99n, 136 Kazo, 131

I yo Nada, 278 Keijo, 270
Izu I slands, 17 KempeiTai (Military Police), 231, 235
Kenney, Gen. George C., 14,270, 271
Japan Air Materiel Area, 271 Kido diary, 257
Japan Communist Party, 19 I , 263-265 Kiefer, Brig. Gen. H. W.,45n
Japanese armed forces Kiirun, 155, 173
aircraft, number in homeland, 134 King George V,32
arsenals and ordnance depots, location, 1340 Kinkaid, Adm. Thomas C., 17,277
definition , 1350 Kinki, 65
demobilization and disarmament. See D emobiliza- Kisarazu Naval Air Base, 32, 281 , 290
tion and disarmament Kobe, 45, 47, 60, go, 109, I I 1, 150, 229, 239, 280,
number overseas, 123 283- 286
prisoners of war. See Prisoners of war, Japanese Kochi, 64, 108, 278
Japanese Facilities Agency, 56 Kochi Prefecture, 64
Japanese Hydrographic Office, 289 K oku Sui-to (Extreme Nationalist Party), 23 I
J apanese Liaison Group, 56n KakuTa, 229
Japanese nationals K okuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society), 23 I
employment by U.S., 60 Korea and Koreans, 19, 34, 82, 84, 86, 95, 99, 152,
reaction to occupation, 49- 53, 13 1- 134 157- 159, 181 , 270. See also Army Forces in
Java, 178 Korea
Jinsen, 23 areas planned as objectives, 2, 4--6
Joho K yoku news agency, 34 armed Japanese in, 4
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4, 67, 69, 71, 88n, 157, 17 2, 178- crime rate among, 262
'79, 194 education of, 262-263
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, FEC, 84 epidemics among, 162, 165
J ones, Capt, C. B., USN, 25n Japanese evacuation from, 161 - 164
Junod, Dr. Marcel, 96, 97n minority problem in Japan, 260-264
Juridical system, surveillance of, 220 nationalistic organizations, 263
Justice Ministry, 251 number in Japan, 262
Justice, surveillance of administration of. See Jurid- return of nationals to, 164- 168, 174, 178-179, 183,
ical system, surveillance of 19 1,262
total U.S. forces, use in, 7
K adena airfield, 94 troop strength assigned, 6, 14- 16
Kagawa Prefecture, 64 troop units assigned, 7, 14
Kagoshima, 109, 126, 19 I, 280 Korean Residents U ruon, 263
K agoshima Prefecture, 47
Korizarna, 44
Kaiwan, 108
Krueger, Gen. Walter, 12, 14, 45,47
Kamada, Lt. Gen. Senichi, 24
Kumagawa, 19
Kamaishi, 109
Kumagaya,42, 13 1
Kami-Shibai, 263
Kumamoto, 223
Kanagawa, 97n Kumamoto Prefecture, 47
K anagawa Prefecture, 42, 49, 53, 199, 20 I Kure, 60, 62, 126, 145, ISO, 19 1, 229, 280-281, 283
K anoya, 23, 38, 45 n, 268 Kurihama, 226
Kan to Plain. See Tokyo (Kanto) Plain Kuril e Islands, 7n, I7, 122, 159
K arafu to (Southern Sakhalin ) , 7, 120, 122- 123, 159, Kyoto, 45, 47,60, 229
161 K yushu, 1,7, 17, 23,45,65,69,97, loB, 120, 134, 149,
Karenko, 173 164, 270, 277,283, 288

306
Labor Ministry, 2 I 6 Mapping program, 275
Labor, rehabilitation of, 216-217, 296 Marcus Island, 17
Labor Standards Ollice (Jap. ), 217 Marianas Air Materiel Area, 27 I
Land Reform Program, 213, 294 Mariana Islands, 17,82, 84n, 86, 94-95, 99n, I L2 , 155,
Law enforcement, 254-256 166
LCM's, 136 Marianas- Bonins Command (MARBO ), 86, 88
League of Koreans Residing in Japan, 263 Marigold, 32n, 105, 111-112
Legal Section, SCAP, 78, 235, 255 Marine Air Group 31, 290
"Lewisite," 65 Marine Amphibious Corps, V, 6n, 14, 16,47
Leyte, 24, 168, 271 Marine Divisions
Liaison and Coordination Ollice (J ap. ) , 73 2d, 6n, 14,47, 65,283
Liaison measures, 64 3d , 14
Liberty ships, 154-155, 158, 176, '79,286 5th,6n, 14,47
Lipa, Luzon, 14 6th, 28,44
Local Assistance Bureaus, 126, 127, 130 Marine Regiments
Local Autonomy Bill, 127 2d,65
Loyalty checks, 255-256 4th, 17, 28, 32, 44
LST's, 154-155, 162, 164, 170, 176,286 Maritime Bureau, 127
Luzon, 39, 115, 168 Maritime Safety Authorities Bill, 289
Luzon Area Command, 14 Maritime Safety Board (Jap. ) , 254, 289
Maritime Safety Service (Jap.) , 254, 28&--289
MacArthur, Gen. of the Army Douglas. S ee also Maritime Training Institute, 254
Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Marquat, Maj. Gen. William E., 212n
arrival in Japan, 21, 28-29, 31 , 268 Marshall, Gen. of the Army George C., 159
arrival in Tokyo, 39-41, 44n Marshall Islands, 88
basis for plans, 2-4 Mashbir, Col. Sidney F., 19n
on British-held POW, 159, 178 Matsushima, 44
directive to Imperial Government, 36 Matsuyama air base, 138
estimate of force required, 56 McGinley, Brig. Gen. Eugene, 55
and fraternization, 52 Medical Clearing Company, 608th, I 13
governmental authority of, 195 Medical services, 60
issues GO No. I, 32-34 Meiji Inner Shrine, 39
named CINCFE, 82 Melbourne, 193
named CINCAFPAC, 67 Merchant marine, 1apanese, 154, 286-288
named SCAP, 12,67 Mexico, 113
occupation policies, 23-24, 56-57 Military government, 74-75
on return of Koreans, 165 concept of, 194- 198
on Soviet-held POW, 161, 179-186 credit for success, 230
speeds demobilization, 131 Economic Division, 212-219
summarizes progress, 2g 1- 297 Finance and Civil Property Division, 222- 227
MAGIC CARPET, 278 formative phase, 19&--201
Maibara, 106 functions of staff sections, 201-203, 230
Mainichi Shimbun, 238 Legal and Government Division, 219-222
MaizuTu, 126, 127, 150, 189, 191 ,28 1 organization, evolution of, 201-203
Malaya, "3, 159, 166, 178 prefectural teams, 203-205
Malta, 113 procurement demands and procedures. See under
Manchuria, 117, 130, 158-159, 162, 166, 170, 174, 176 Occupation forces
Mandaluyong Hospital Center, 115 Procurement Division, 227-230
Mandated Islands, 88 regional organization, 199, 201 , 267
Manila, 12, 19,27,35, go, 94, 113, 115- 116, 122, 123, Social Affairs Division, 203- 2 I 2
143, 168, 268 staff sections, agencies and units, 195- 227
Manufacturing, rehabilitation of. See Industry, re- Military Government Companies, 20 I n
habilitation of Military Intelligence Company, 3 (9th, 245
Manus Island, 34 Military police, 73, 254, 267

307
Military Railway Service, Third, 229 organization and missions, 278-281
Military Security Law, 257 role in occupation, 4, 7n, 10, 17,21 - 23
Mindanao, 168 role in Japanese repatriation, 288
Minesweeping operations, 277-278, 283-286 role in UN POW relief, 9g-' 02
Mining industry, rehabilitation of, 213 support groups, 289- 290
Misaki, 3' transport operations, 278
Missouri, 17, 32 Netherlands, 69, 102, I 13, I 15, 179
MIS- X Section, SCAP, 96 Netherlands East Indies, 17, 34, 60, 84n, 115, IbO.
Mito, '35 '78- 1 79
Mitsuhishi trust, 224" New Britain, 179
Mitsui trust, 224n New Guinea, 179
Miyagi, 97n New Ireland, '79
Miyagi Prefecture, 42 New Zealand, 69, "3
Miyazaki Prefecture, 47 New Zealand Air Force, 62, 267
Moji, 126 New Zealand Army, 267
Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 69 News, dissemination of, 34- 35
Mount Futabi, 106 Nichols Field, 115, 27 I
Mukden, '74 Niigata, 44, 90
Muratsuka, 44 Niigata Prefecture, 53
Mutsu Bay, 45n Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W ., 17, 100
Nippon Shimbun, ,87
Nagano Prefecture, 42 Nippon Times, 238
Nagaoka, 44 Nishima, 19
Nagasaki, 12, 23, 47, go, 97n, 109, 280, 283-284 North Pacific Force, 19, 45n, 277
Nagasaki Prefecture, 47 Northcott, Lt. Gen. J. (Aust.)' 62
Nagoya, 58, go, 97°, 120, 127, 191 , 223,229, 283- 284 Norway, 113
Nakhodka, '45
National Congress of Industrial Unions, 264- 265 Oahu, Hawaii, 14
National Reference Library, 257 Objectives of occupation, lerI I , 57- 58
Natural Resources Section, SCAP, 79 Occupation forces
Naval Air Transport Service, 290 air units, role in, 268-277
Naval Security Corps, 24 arrival of, 24- 32
Naval Task Forces behavior of troops, 49- 5'
First Carrier, 28 control by, completed, 53
Second Carrier, 28 cooperation, key to success, 290
31St, 99 economic benefits derived from, 291 - 297
33 d , 32 military government administration. See Military
35 th , 4' government
36th, 109 movements, dispositions, locations, 28-66
38th, 28 Navy's role in, 277- 290
39th, 28 number in forces, 56-58, 265-267
Naval Task Group 30.6, '00 objective areas planned, 2-6
Navy Ministry. See Imperial Navy Ministry objectives, 10--11, 57- 58
Navy, U.S. procurement demands and procedures, 55- 56, 227-
air units, 290 23 0
Branch Hydrographic Office, 289 recreation, 52- 53
civilians employed, 281 reduction in, 47- 49, 57-5 8
command structure, 277 roles and missions, 7-10
communications, 290 security and intelligence measures. See Security
illegal traffic, suppression of, 288-289 and intelligence
initial operations, 277- 278 stabilized, 65- 66
merchant shipping, control of, 277- 278, 286-288 troop strength allocated, 2, 6, '4- ,6
minesweeping operations, 277- 278, 283- 286 troop units available, 6n, 14
miscellaneous activities, 289- 290 O ccupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund, 79

308
Odawara, 31, 41 Population increase, 295
Office of Civil Property Custodian, SCAP, 8 I Port Arthur, 159, 174, 181
Office of U .S. Political Advisor for Japan, 77 Portable Surgical Hospitals,
Office of War Information, 35 5th, !05 n
Of una, 100, 102-104, 106 30th, 11 3
Oita Prefecture, 47 Portugal, I 13
Okayama, 45, 65 Postal savings offices, rehabilitation of, 224
Okayama Prefecture, 64 Potsdam Conference and Dec1aration, 12, 38, 67,75,
Okazaki, 58 77, 117,157, 161 , 181 , 184,194, 205
Okinawa, 14, 17, 24, 27, 38-39, 41, 94, 99n, 109, Precious minerals, custody of, 223, 226, 241
113, 136, 158, 162, 169, 268, 271 Presque Isle, Maine, 94
Okuno Shima, 65 Press, attitude of, 51 - 52, 190
OLYMPIC, 1, 2, 6, 11 - 12, 16,60, 270 Press censorship. See Censorship, civil
Ominato, 44, 45n, 150 Press Code for Japan, 236
Omori, 100, 102 Price controls, 217- 2 I9
Omuta, 108 Prime Minister. See Higashi-Kuni, Naruhiko;
Onda, 102n Shidehara, Kijuro
Operational Engineering Section, SCAP, 95 Prisoner of War Information Bureau (Jap. ) , 90
Operations, concept of, 4-10, 12n Prisoners of war, Japanese
Orders, implementing, 12, 17 Communist infiltration among, 187- 191, 265-267
Ordnance depots, location, 134n epidemics among, 155, 158, 173- 176, 193
Organization for occupation, 12- 19 evacuation from Australian areas, 179
Osaka, 23,45, 47,65, 97n, 15°, 223, 226, 229,239, 254, evacuation from China Theater, 170-176, 191
267, 270, 283-284 evacuation from Korea, 161 - 164, 179-181
Otaru, 42, 53 evacuation from NEI, 191
Otsuki, 19 evacuation from Philippines, 168-169
evacuation from POA, 166-168
Pacific Air Command, U .S. Army, 271 , 273 evacuation from R yukyus, I 69- I 70
Pacific Air Service Command, 27 I evacuation from SEAC, 176-179, 191
Pacific Command, 84n, t 51 evacuation from Soviet control, 123, 127- 131 , 149,
Pacific Fleet Liaison Group with SCAP, 277- 278, 288, 159-161 , 179-186, 191
29 0 evacuation from Western Pacific, 191 - 193
Pacific Ocean Areas, 2, 10, 67, 152, 158, 166, 168 organization for repatriation integrated, 172
Pacific Theater, 67 medical relief, 151
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 5IIth, 29-31 Navy's role in repatriation, 288
Paris, 94 number overseas, 149
Park, Col. L., 25n number returned, 149, 191 , 193
Peace Preservation Law, 257 phases of repatriation, 149-150
Peiping Headquarters Group, 172 rate of processing, 149
Percival, Gen. Arthur E. (Brit. ), 90 reception centers, location, 191
Philippine Command, 86-88 repatriation and processing, 64, 123- 126, 143, 149-
Philippine Islands Treaty, 27 I 193, 211 - 212
Philippine Military Advisory Group, 88n SCAP pla n for, 151- 152
Philippine Military Assistance Agreement, 88n SCAP policies, 151
Philippine Scouts, 86-88 screening by CIC, 258--260
Philippines, 14, 17,34, 47, 69, 82, 84n, 86, 88, 93-95, transportation allocated, 150, 154- 155, 158- 162,
115, 136, 152, 155, 158, 168, 235, ~68 166, 168, 170, 172-174, 176-184, 191 - 193
Photography, aerial, 275 U.S. commanders involved, '5 t n
Picnic Bay, 143 Prisoners of war, non-Japanese, 154, 157, 164-165,
Planning phase, 2- 1 I 170, 17!3n, 191
Point system, 47n, 53, 58 Prisoners of war, UN. See also Civilian internees,
Poland, 113 UN
Police, civil, 36, 51 , 220, 235- 236, 249-25 I , 267. See airdrop operations, 94- 96
also Public safety atrocities against. See Recovered Personnel Sec-
Political parties, surveillance of, 220 tion, SCAP
309
Prisoners of war, UN-Continued Repatriation Liquidation Bureau, 127
camps, location and supply, 96--99 Repatriation Relief Agency (Bureau), 126, 127
concern for, 8g Replacement Command, 115- 116
dead and missing, procedure regarding, 114-115 Replacement Depots
definition, 89 4th, 58
list of camps, 108n 5th , 115
medical relief, 10g-113, 115 11th, 58
nations represen ted, I I 3 70th, 105n
number interned, go, 97n, gg Replacements, 58, 65-66
number released, processed, evacuated, I02n, I 13, Requisition procedures, 55-56
115- 116 Rescue, 109, 112
processing for home, 112-116 Resources, natural, 212- 214
recovery teams, functions of, 92-94 Restitution Advisory Committee, 1:$1
relief and repatriation, 21, 34, 44, 8g-116 Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., 14
SCAP directives regarding, 9~2 Robertson, Lt. Gen. H. C. H. (Brit.)' 62
Operation "Swift Mercy," g9-102 Royal Navy. See British Commonwealth Occup,,-
Prisons, Japanese, 60 tion Force
inspection of, 220 Ryder, Maj. Gen. Charles W., 53
labor force from, 216 Ryukyu Islands, 14, 17, 82, 84n, 86, 152, 157, 159,
reform in, 25 I 166, 168, Igi
Propaganda leaflets, 2n Ryukyus Command, 86
Property
looted, restitution of, 227 Saga Prefecture, 47
private, policies regarding, 224-226 Sagami Bay, Ig, 25, 28, 31-32, 100, 278
public, seizure and custody, 226 Sagamigahara Air Unit, 25
UN and Axis, protection of, 226--227 St. Luke's International Medical Center, 60
Provost courts, 65 Saionji, Kimmoch i, 257
Provost Marshal, SCAP, 254 Saipan, 14, 35, 95-96, 113
Provost marshals, 73 Saishu, 162
Public health, 208-209 Saitama, 97n
Public Health and Welfare Section, SCAP, 80, 119, Saitama Prefecture, 42
155, 208 Sakhalin, 8n, 159. See also Karafuto
Public Relations Office, SCAP, 238 Sambongi, 138
Public safety, 73, 244-254 San Fernando, Luzon, 168
Public Safety Commissions (J ap. ) , 247-249 San Francisco, 35
Public Safety Division, SCAP, 216, 220, 233, 244-254 Sanjo, 44
Public welfare, 20g-211 Santo Tomas University, 115
Publications Section, SCAP, 257 Sapporo, 42, 53, 60, 223, 229
Purge, directives on, 220-222, 245 Sasago, IOgn
Sasebo Naval Base, 23, 47, 126, 127, 143, 150, 173,
Quarantine, Ilgn, 155, 158, 162, 165, 176, Ig3 176, 191, 278, 281, 283-284, 286, 289-290
SCAPIN, defined, 73
Rabaul, 179 Schmidt, Maj . Gen. Harry, USMC, 47
Radio Code for Japan, 236 Schools, civilian. See Education, civil
Radio Tokyo, 238, 281 Sebald, William J., 183, 186
Real estate projects, 230 Second Demobilization Ministry ( Bureau), 120, 123,
Recovered Personnel Section, SCAP, 102-1 13 126, 12 7,145
Redeployment to ZI, 58, 152 Security and intelligence, 2 I, 23, 41, 5 I
Regimental Combat Teams. See Infantry Regiments anns, personal, surrender of, 244
Relief, civilian. See Public welfare censorship procedures, 232- 233, 236--241
Reparations procedures, 214-216 CIC mission, 233
Reparations and Restitutions Delegations, 81 CIC regions and units, 245
Reparations Section, SCAP, 81-82 Civil Censorship Detachment, 236
Reparations Technical Advisory Committee, 8 I communications means, control of, 241

310
Security and intelligence-Continued Spain, 113
information, processing, 241 Special Higher Police (Jap. ), 235, 257
intelligence, civil, evolution of, 233-244 Special Procurement Board (Jap. ), 229
law enforcement, 254-256 Special Projects Section, SCAP, 257-258
loyalty checks, 255- 256 Special Services, 52-53
police agencies, directives concerning, 235-236 Spruance, Adm. Raymond A., 17, 277-278
postal system, control of, 238 State Department, 88n, 106n
propaganda, interception of, 239 Statistics and Reports Section, SCAP, 81
in public safety, 244-254 Stettinius, Edward R ., 106n
publishing industry, control of, 239-241 Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W., 12, 14
radio broadcasts, control of, 239 Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D., 14
repatriates, screening of, 258-260 Subversion, internal, 256--258. See also Communist
responsibilities, assignment of, 231-232 infil tration
subversion, surveillance of, 256-258 Sugamo, 60
surveillance measures, 254-256 Sugi, 168
violations, number of, 2440 Sumatra, I 78
Sendai, 41-42, 60, go, 97n, tog, 229, 278, 283 Sumitomo trust, 224n
Senzaki, 126, 127, 191 Supply seNices. See also Occupation forces, pro-
Service units, 58-62 curement demands and procedures
Shanghai, 23, 145, 172-174 problems of, J6n
Shidehara, KijUTO, 126, 127, 291 reorganization of, 58--62
Shikoku, 7, 17, 45, 64, 6g, 89, 97, 108, 120, 138, troop strength, 60
267, 277 Support Area, FEC, 86
Shikoku Prefecture, 65 Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP ), 35,
Shimane Prefecture, 64 64, 131 , 147. See also MacArthur, Gen. of the
Shimbara, 108 Army, Douglas
Shimonoseki, 45, go, 120, 126 civil staff sections, 75-82
Shimonoseki Strait, 284 comm':lnications, 2g0
Shinagawa, 99-100, 102 , 108 Directives Nos. 1 and 2, Jig, 143
Shintoism, state, 205 establishment, 67--69
Shiogama, 109 functions of GHQ, 73-75
Shipping Control Authority (SCAJAP), 154-155, functions of staffs and agencies, 73, 118n
166, 168, '73 GHQ established, 75
Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Mer- naval forces, control of, 74
chant Marine, 74, 278, 286--288, 290 organization of GHQ, 71-73
Shipping resources, 58, 149, ISO special staff sections, 76-82
Shizu-oka Prefecture, 20 I Surrender, Japanese
Showa airfield, 38 ceremony of, 32- 34
Siberia, 159, 161-162, 186 events leading to, 11 - 12
Signal Corps, 55 Japanese delegation, directive to, 19-23, 31-34
Singapore, 23, 106, 145 Swatow, 173
Skymasters, 24, 268 Sweden, go
Skytrains, 24, 268 Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P., 45
Smuggling, suppression of, 64, 165, 262, 288-289 Swing, Maj. Gen. Joseph M., 28- 31
"Snowball'" 94 "Swift Mercy," 99-102
Social Affairs Division, SCAP, 206 Switzerland, go, 99, 104
Solomon Islands, 117, 179
South Pacific, 84n Tachikawa airfield, 38, 41, 271
Southeast Asia, 149, 151, 157- 159 T acloban, 168
Southeast Asia Command, 151 - 152, 154, 176--179 Takada, 44
Southern Islands Area Command, 14 Takamatsu, 119, 228
Southwest Pacific, 84n, 117 Takao, 168, 173
Southwest Pacific Area, 7, 14, 34, 67 Takasu, 23
Soviet Union, 12, 69, 123, 145, 151, 154, 157, 277 Tama River, 31

311
Tanabe, 191 Uraga, 126, 127, 155, 168, 1]6, IgI, 193
Tangku, 172, 174 Uraga Peninsula, 41
Tank Destroyer Battalion, 637th, 135 U raga Strait, 28
Tass news agency, 186 U rdaneta, Luzon, Iosn
Tateyama Bay Naval Air Station, 31- 32, 36 Utsunomiya, 45
Tax collections, 223- 224 Vietnam. See Indochina
Tench, Col. Charles P., 24-25 Volcano Islands, 17, 84n, 88
T eton, 277, 290
Thailand, 178 Wainwright, Gen. Jonathan M., 90, I 15n
"Thought control," 209n, 235 Wakanoura, 283
Tishibana Maru, 2n Wakayama, 45n, 47
Tochigi Prefecture, 42, 53 Wake Island, 102, J06
Tojo, Gen. Hideki, 235 War criminals, 233- 235
Tokumu Kikan (Secret Intelligence Service ), 231, War Department, 157, 181 , 235, 257
235 War Ministry. See Imperial War Ministry
Tokushima Prefecture, 64 War Shipping Administration, 155, 158
Tokyo, 4, 7, 12, 17, 21 , 3 1- 3 2, 35, 39-4 2, 44, 55, War trophies, 138n
60, 64, 71 , 94, 97n, 100, 102n, 108n, 138, 145, Warburton, Col. E. K., 25n
199, 223, 226, 229, 251 , 254, 265, 268, 27 I , 283, 299 Washington, D.C., 94, 97
Tokyo Area Covernment Railway Worke" Union, 265 Weather Wing, 43d, 273
Tokyo Bay Area, 7, 17, 19,24, 28, 31,38,99, 105, Welfare Ministry, 126, 127, 151,208,211
112, 134, 135, 143, 277- 278, 281, 284 Western Pacific, 149, ISO, 154, 191
Tokyo conferences, 154- 155, 166, 16g, 172, 178, 181 , Western Pacific Base Command, 95
18 3 Whitehead, Lt. Gen. Ennis C., 271
Tokyo Economics Board, 23 Whitney, Brig. Gen. Courtney, 219n
Tokyo (Kanlo ) Plain, 1,7,24, 38 Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A., 19D, 7311
Tokyo Prefecture, 42, 53, 199, 201 Wilmington, Del., 95
Tokyo Rose, 256 Women's Replacement and Disposition Center, 115
Tokyo Shimbun, 24, 52 Wurtsmith, Maj. Gen. Paul, 27In
Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Associations ), 209 Yalta Conference, 7n
Tone, 147 Yamagata Prefecture, 2 I 3
Totsuka, 290 Yamaguchi Prefecture, 47, 64, 102n, 267
Tottori Prefecture, 64-65 Yamanasm Prefecture, 42, 53
Townsville, 27 I Yamazumi, Capt. Chuzaburo, 24
Trade, rehabilitation of. See Commerce, rehabilita- Yasuda trust, 224n
tion of "Yellow List," 97
Transportation Ministry, 127, 145, 154, 278, 28g Yokohama, 29-32, 34- 41 , 44-45, 49-5 1, 53 n, 55, 58,
Troop Carrier Croups, 16 60, go, 102, 105, 109, II I- I 13, 126, 145, 229, 251 ,
Truman, Harry S., 12, 106 254, 268, 277, 281, 290
Tsingtao, 23, '45, 174 Yokohama Canal, 38
Tsu-chiya, 45 Yokohama Liaison Office, 55
Tsugaru Strait, 277- 278 Yokosuka Naval and Air Base, 17, 19, 21, 28, 35,
Tsuruga, 90 42, 49, 53, 99-100, 135, 145, 150, 281 , 286,289-290
Tsurumi, Ken, 24 Yokota airfield, 38
Tsushima Island, 290 Yomiuri-Hochi, 23- 24, 52, 238
Tsushima Strait, 277 Youth Organization for the Reconstruction of Korea,
Typhoons, 24, 270 263
Yoyogi Parade Ground, 39
Ube, I02n Yuta Island, 119
Umezu, Mayor, 49
Unemployment, 296 Zaibatsu (financial trusts), 224
Union of Great Korean Republics Residing in Japan, Zama, 41, 58
263 Zone of the Interior, U.S., 44- 45, 47, 53, 58, 65, 66,
United Kingdom. See Great Britain t 52, 22g, 270

312
go u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFfICE: 1994 360-579

PIN 07185E