Institute on Global Conflict and

Cooperation
IGCC Policy Papers
(University of California, Multi-Campus Research Unit)
Year  Paper PP

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons

Kenneth N. Waltz

This paper is posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California.

http://repositories.cdlib.org/igcc/PP/PP15
Copyright 1995
c by the author.
PEACE, STABILITY, AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
CONTENTS

Contents....................................................................................................................................................3

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons ................................................................................................5

WHY COUNTRIES WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 5
THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6
STABILITY 11
CONCLUSION 12
The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation ......................................15
Electronic Publishing at IGCC 16
Current Publications 17
BOOKS 17
POLICY PAPERS 18
POLICY BRIEFS 19
 PEACE, STABILITY, AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
by

Kenneth N. Waltz

University of California, Berkeley

This paper is drawn mainly from Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981) and from Chapters 1 and 3 of Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:
A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). I thank the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation for supporting my research and Karen
Ruth Adams, Amy J. Bricker, and Sandra Escobedo for helping me with this paper.

If proliferation does take place we may continue to complain about it, but we shall live with it. And
leaders who now assert that nonproliferation is indispensable to our security will presumably find other
subjects to dramatize.

James R. Schlesinger, 19561

T hroughout the nuclear age, fear of nuclear

proliferation has been pervasive even though
we have yet to witness the phenomenon.
Rather than proliferating, nuclear weapons have
why countries want to have nuclear weapons. They
want them for one or more of seven main reasons:
• First, great powers always counter the weapons
of other great powers, usually by imitating those who
spread glacially. From 1945 to 1970, only five have introduced new weapons. It was not surprising
countries, counting Israel, followed the United States that the Soviet Union developed atomic and
into the nuclear world. Since 1970 when the Nuclear hydrogen bombs, but rather that we thought the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect, only Baruch–Lilienthal plan might persuade it not to.
three countries—in addition to the three that became • Second, a state may want nuclear weapons for
nuclear by succession to the Soviet Union—have, or fear that its great-power ally will not retaliate if
may have, joined and remained members of the another great power attacks. When it became a
nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. If nuclear power, Britain thought of itself as being a
slowing the spread of nuclear weapons can be great one, but its reasons for deciding to maintain a
credited to the NPT, then it can be called a measured nuclear force arose from doubts that the United
success. States could be counted on to retaliate in response to
an attack by the Soviet Union on Europe and from
Britain’s consequent desire to place a finger on our
nuclear trigger. As soon as the Soviet Union was
Why Countries Want Nuclear capable of making nuclear strikes at American cities,
Weapons West Europeans began to worry that America’s
nuclear umbrella no longer ensured that its allies
In contemplating the likely future, we might first ask would stay dry if it rained.

1.
James R. Schlesinger, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” The Reporter, 20 October 1956, pp. 35–8.
6 • Kenneth Waltz

• Third, a country without nuclear allies will want Offensive use

nuclear weapons all the more if some of its Despite the variety of nuclear motivations, an
adversaries have them. So China and then India American consensus has formed on why some states
became nuclear powers, and Pakistan naturally want their own weapons—to help them pursue
followed. expansionist ends. “The basic division in the world
• Fourth, a country may want nuclear weapons on the subject of nuclear proliferation,” we are
because it lives in fear of its adversaries’ present or authoritatively told, “is not between those with and
future conventional strength. This was reason enough without nuclear weapons. It is between almost all
for Israel’s nuclear weapons. nations and the very few who currently seek weapons
• Fifth, for some countries nuclear weapons are a to reinforce their expansive ambition.”3 Just as we
cheaper and safer alternative to running eco- first feared that the Soviet Union and China would
nomically ruinous and militarily dangerous conven- use nuclear weapons to extend their sway, so we now
tional arms races. Nuclear weapons promise security fear that the likes of Iraq, Iran, and Libya will do so.
and independence at an affordable price. The fear has grown despite the fact that nuclear
• Sixth, some countries are thought to want nu- capability added little to the Soviet Union’s or
clear weapons for offensive purposes. This, however, China’s ability to pursue their ends abroad, whether
is an unlikely motivation for reasons given below. by launching military attacks or practicing blackmail.
• Finally, by building nuclear weapons a country The fear that new nuclear states will use their
may hope to enhance its international standing. This weapons for aggressive purposes is as odd as it is
is thought to be both a reason for and a consequence pervasive. Rogue states, as we now call them, must
of developing nuclear weapons. One may enjoy the be up to no good, else we would not call them
status that comes with nuclear weapons and even rogues. Why would states such as Iraq, Iran, and
benefit from it. Thus, North Korea gained North Korea want nuclear weapons if not to enable
international attention by developing nuclear military them to conquer, or at least to intimidate, others? The
capability. A yen for attention and prestige is, answer can be given in one word: fear. The behavior
however, a minor motivation. Would-be nuclear of their rulers is often brazen, but does their bluster
states are not among the militarily most powerful convey confidence or fear? Even though they may
ones. The security concerns of weaker states are too hope to extend their domination over others, they
serious to permit them to accord much importance to first have to maintain it at home.
the prestige that nuclear weapons may bring. What states do conveys more than what they say.
Idi Amin and Muammar el-Qaddafi were favorite
examples of the kinds of rulers who could not be
The Fear of Nuclear Weapons trusted to manage nuclear weapons responsibly.
Despite wild rhetoric aimed at foreigners, however,
Fears of what the further spread of nuclear weapons both of these “irrational” rulers became cautious and
will do to the world boil down to five. First, new modest when punitive actions against them seemed to
nuclear states may put their weapons to offensive threaten their continued ability to rule. Even though
use. Second, as more countries get the weapons, the Amin lustily slaughtered members of tribes he
chances of accidental use increase. Third, with disliked, he quickly stopped goading Britain when it
limited resources and know-how, new nuclear states seemed that it might intervene militarily. Qaddafi
may find it difficult to deploy invulnerable, deterrent showed similar restraint. He and Anwar Sadat were
forces. Fourth, American military intervention in the openly hostile. In July 1977, both launched
affairs of lesser states will be impeded by their commando attacks and air raids, including two large
possession of nuclear weapons. Fifth, as nuclear air strikes by Egypt on Libya’s el-Adem airbase.
weapons spread, terrorists may more easily get hold Neither side let the attacks get out of hand. Qaddafi
of nuclear materials. (In this chapter, I leave the fifth showed himself to be forbearing and amenable to
fear aside, partly because the likelihood of nuclear mediation by other Arab leaders. Shai Feldman used
terror is low and partly because terrorists can these and other examples to argue that Arab leaders
presumably steal nuclear weapons or buy them on the are deterred from taking inordinate risks, not because
black market whether or not a few more states go they engage in intricate rational calculations but
nuclear.)2 simply because they, like other rulers, are “sensitive

2 3
For a brief discussion, see Chapter 3 of Scott D. Sagan and McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr. And Sidney D. Drell,
Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Reducing Nuclear Danger (New York: Council on Foreign
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Relations, 1994), p. 81.
 Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons • 7

to costs.” Saddam Hussein further illustrated the vital interests of other nuclear powers. States that ac-
point during, and even prior to, the war of 1991. He quire nuclear weapons are not regarded with indif-
invaded Kuwait only after the United States gave ference. States that want to be freewheelers have to
many indications that it would acquiesce in his stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for
actions. During the war, he launched missiles against example, would have to show caution, even in
Israel, but they were so lightly armed that little risk rhetoric, lest it suffer retaliation in response to
was run of prompting attacks more punishing than someone else’s anonymous attack on a third state.
Iraq was already suffering. Deterrence worked once That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that
again. its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the
Many Westerners write fearfully about a future culprit and take the opportunity to silence it by
in which Third World countries have nuclear striking a heavy conventional blow. Nuclear weapons
weapons. They seem to view Third World people in induce caution in any state, especially in weak ones.
the old imperial manner as “lesser breeds without the Would not nuclear weapons nevertheless provide
law.” As ever with ethnocentric views, speculation a cheap and decisive offensive force when used
takes the place of evidence. How do we know that a against a conventionally armed enemy? Some people
nuclear-armed and newly-hostile Egypt, or a nuclear- once thought that South Korea, and earlier, the
armed and still-hostile Syria, would not strike to Shah’s Iran, wanted nuclear weapons for offensive
destroy Israel? Yet we have to ask whether either use. Yet one can neither say why South Korea would
would do so at the risk of Israeli bombs falling on have used nuclear weapons against fellow Koreans
some of their cities? Almost a quarter of Egypt’s while trying to reunite them nor how it could have
people live in four cities: Cairo, Alexandria, El-Giza, used nuclear weapons against the North, knowing
and Shoubra el-Kheima. More than a quarter of that China and the Soviet Union might have
Syria’s live in three: Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs.4 retaliated. And what goals might a conventionally
What government would risk sudden losses of such strong Iran have entertained that would have tempted
proportion, or indeed of much lesser proportion? it to risk using nuclear weapons? A country that
Rulers want to have a country that they can continue launches a strike has to fear a punishing blow from
to rule. Some Arab country may wish that some other someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of
Arab country would risk its own destruction for the aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-
sake of destroying Israel, but why would one think nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to
that any country would be willing to do so? Despite incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be
ample bitterness, Israelis and Arabs have limited their sure of the reaction of other states.
wars and accepted constraints placed on them by North Korea provides a good example of how
others. Arabs did not marshal their resources and the United States imputes doubtful motives to some
make an all-out effort to destroy Israel in the years of the states seeking nuclear weapons. Between 1989
before Israel could strike back with nuclear war- and 1991, North Korea’s world collapsed. The Soviet
heads. We cannot expect countries to risk more in the Union and South Korea established diplomatic
presence of nuclear weapons than they did in their relations; China and South Korea opened trade
absence. offices in each other’s capitols and now recognize
Second, many fear that states that are radical at each other. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern
home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad. States that are stripped North Korea of outside support. The
radical at home, however, may not be radical abroad. revolution in its international relations further
Few states have been radical in the conduct of their weakened an already weak North Korea.
foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. Like earlier nuclear states, North Korea wants
Think of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic the military capability because it feels weak and
of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The threatened.5 The ratio of South Korea’s to North
pressures of competition cause them to behave in Korea’s GDP in 1993 was 15:1; of their populations,
ways that make the threats they face manageable, in 2:1; of their defense budgets, 6:1.6 North Korea does
ways that enable them to get along. States can remain have twice as large an active army and twice as many
radical in foreign policy only if they are tanks, but their quality is low, spare parts and fuel
overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear
states will be—or if their acts fall short of damaging 5
This section is based on Karen Ruth Adams and Kenneth N.
Waltz, “Don't Worry Too Much About North Korean Nuclear
Weapons,” unpublished paper, April 1994.
4 6
The Middle East and North Africa, 1994, 40th ed. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 363, 810. 1994–1995 (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 178–181.

7
8 • Kenneth Waltz

scarce, training limited, and communications and World country similar to North Korea. Losing
logistics dated. In addition, South Korea has the conventionally, it struck our forces with nuclear
backing of the United States and the presence of weapons. For unmentioned reasons, our superior
American troops. military forces had no deterrent effect. Results were
Despite North Korea’s exposed position, said to be devastating. With such possibilities in
Americans especially have worried that the North mind, Air Force General Lee Butler and his fellow
might invade the South and use nuclear weapons in planners called for a new strategy of deterrence, with
doing so. How concerned should we be? No one has “generic targeting” so we will be able to strike
figured out how to use nuclear weapons except for wherever “terrorist states or rogue leaders…threaten
deterrence. Is a small and weak state likely to be the to use their own nuclear, chemical or biological
first to do so? Countries that use nuclear weapons weapons.” The strategy will supposedly deter states
have to fear retaliation. Why would the North once or terrorists from brandishing or using their weapons.
again invade the South? It did so in 1950, but only Yet General Butler himself believes, as I do, that
after prominent American congressmen, military Saddam Hussein was deterred from using chemicals
leaders, and other officials proclaimed that we would and biologicals in the Gulf War.10
not fight in Korea. Any war on the peninsula would During the 1993 American–South Korean
put North Korea at severe risk. Perhaps because “Team Spirit” military exercises, North Korea denied
South Koreans appreciate this fact more keenly than access to International Atomic Energy Agency
Americans do, relatively few of them seem to believe inspectors and threatened to withdraw from the
that North Korea will invade. Kim Il Sung at times nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The North’s
threatened war, but anyone who thinks that when a reaction suggests, as one would expect, that the more
dictator threatens war we should believe him is lost vulnerable North Korea feels, the more strenuously it
wandering around somewhere in a bygone will pursue a nuclear program. The pattern has been a
conventional world.7 Kim Il Sung was sometimes common one ever since the United States led the way
compared to Hitler and Stalin.8 Despite similarities, it into the nuclear age. Noticing this, we should be
is foolish to forget that the capabilities of the North careful about conveying military threats to weak
Korea he ruled in no way compared with those of states.
Germany and the Soviet Union under Hitler and
Stalin. The control of nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons make states cautious, as the Will new nuclear states, many of them technologi-
history of the nuclear age shows. “Rogue states,” as cally backward and with weapons lacking effective
the Soviet Union and China were once thought to be, safety devices, be able to prevent the accidental or
have followed the pattern. The weaker and the more unauthorized use of their weapons and maintain
endangered a state is, the less likely it is to engage in control of them despite possible domestic upheavals?
reckless behavior. North Korea’s external behavior “War is like love,” the chaplain says in Bertolt
has sometimes been ugly, but certainly not reckless. Brecht’s Mother Courage, “it always finds a way.”11
Its regime has shown no inclination to risk suicide. For half a century, nuclear war has not found a way.
This is one good reason why surrounding states The old saying, “accidents will happen,” is translated
counseled patience. as Murphy’s Law holding that anything that can go
Senator John McCain, a former naval officer, wrong will go wrong. Enough has gone wrong, and
nevertheless believes that North Korea would be able Scott Sagan has recorded many of the nuclear
to attack without fear of failure because a South accidents that have, or have nearly, taken place.12 Yet
Korean and American counterattack would have to none of them has caused anybody to blow anybody
stop at the present border for fear of North Korean else up. In a speech given to American scientists in
nuclear retaliation.9 Our vast nuclear forces would 1960, C.P. Snow said this: “We know, with the
not deter an attack on the South, yet the dinky force certainty of statistical truth, that if enough of these
that the North may have would deter us! A land-war weapons are made—by enough different states—
game played by the American military in 1994
showed another side of American military thinking.
10
The game pitted the United States against a Third Eric Schmitt, “U.S. is Redefining Nuclear Deterrence, Terrorist
Nations Targeted,” International Herald Tribune, 26 February
1993.
7 11
A.M. Rosenthal, “Always Believe Dictators,” New York Times, Bertolt Brecht, Mother Courage and her Children: a Chronicle
29 March 1994, p. A15. of the Thirty Years’ War, trans. Eric Bentley (New York: Grove
8
R.W. Apple, “Facing Up to the Legacy Of An Unresolved War,” Press, 1966), p. 76.
12
New York Times, 12 June 1994, p. E-3. Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Sagan and Waltz,
9
John McCain, letter, New York Times, 28 March 1994, p. A10. Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47–91.
 Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons • 9

some of them are going to blow up. Through conventional world, they more easily lead to war
accident, or folly, or madness—but the motives don’t because less is at stake. Even so, it is difficult to
matter. What does matter is the nature of the think of conventional wars that were started by
statistical fact.” In 1960, statistical fact told Snow accident.14 It is hard to believe that nuclear war may
that within, “at the most, ten years some of these begin accidentally, when less frightening
bombs are going off.” Statistical fact now tells us that conventional wars have rarely done so.
we are twenty-five years overdue.13 But the novelist Fear of accidents works against their occurring.
and scientist overlooked the fact that there are no This is illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis.
“statistical facts.” Accidents happened during the crisis, and unplanned
Half a century of nuclear peace has to be ex- events took place. An American U-2 strayed over
plained since divergence from historical experience Siberia, and one flew over Cuba. The American
is dramatic. Never in modern history, conventionally Navy continued to play games at sea, such games as
dated from 1648, have the great and major powers of trying to force Soviet submarines to surface. In
the world enjoyed such a long period of peace. crises, political leaders want to control all relevant
Large numbers of weapons increase the possi- actions, while knowing that they cannot do so. Fear
bility of accidental use or loss of control, but new of losing control propelled Kennedy and Khrushchev
nuclear states will have only small numbers of to end the crisis quickly. In a conventional world,
weapons to care for. Lesser nuclear states may uncertainty may tempt a country to join battle. In a
deploy, say, ten to fifty weapons and a number of nuclear world, uncertainty has the opposite effect.
dummies, while permitting other countries to infer What is not surely controllable is too dangerous to
that numbers of real weapons are larger. An adver- bear.
sary need only believe that some warheads may One must, however, consider the possibility that
survive its attack and be visited on it. That belief is a nuclear state will one day experience uncertainty of
not hard to create without making command and succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability
control unreliable. All nuclear countries live through of regime. That such experiences led to the use of
a time when their forces are crudely designed. All nuclear weapons neither during the Cultural
countries have so far been able to control them. Revolution in China nor during the dissolution of the
Relations between the United States and the Soviet Soviet Union is of some comfort. The possibility of
Union, and later among the United States, the Soviet one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its
Union, and China, were at their bitterest just when opponent’s stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an
their nuclear forces were in early stages of act would produce a national tragedy, not an
development and were unbalanced, crude, and international one. This question then arises: Once the
presumably hard to control. Why should we expect weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic
new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable,
than the ones old nuclear states were able to cope least likely to lead to escalation and to regional or
with? Although some of the new nuclear states may global tragedy.
be economically and technically backward, they will
either have expert scientists and engineers or they Vulnerability of forces and problems of
will not be able to produce nuclear weapons. Even if deterrence
they buy or steal the weapons, they will have to hire The credibility of second strike forces has two faces.
technicians to maintain and control them. We do not First, they have to be able to survive preemptive
have to wonder whether they will take good care of attacks. Second, they have to appear to be able to
their weapons. They have every incentive to do so. deliver a blow sufficient to deter.
They will not want to risk retaliation because one or The uneven development of the power of new
more of their warheads accidentally strike another nuclear states creates occasions that permit strikes
country. and may invite them. Two stages of nuclear devel-
Deterrence is a considerable guarantee against opment should be distinguished. First, a country may
accidents, since it causes countries to take good care be in an early stage of development and be obviously
of their weapons, and against anonymous use, since unable to make nuclear weapons. Second, a country
those firing the weapons can know neither that they may be in an advanced state of development and
will be undetected nor what punishment detection
might bring. In life, uncertainties abound. In a
14
Scott Sagan has managed to find three, not all of which are
unambiguous. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and
13
C.P. Snow, "Excerpts from Snow's speech to American Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.
Scientists," New York Times, December 28, 1960, p. 14. 263.

9
10 • Kenneth Waltz

whether or not it has some nuclear weapons may not dangers than additional thousands in the hands of the
be surely known. All of the present nuclear countries United States or the Soviet Union. Such statements
went through both stages, yet until Israel struck assume that preemption of a small force is easy.
Iraq’s nuclear facility in June of 1981, no one had Acting on that assumption, someone may be tempted
launched a preventive strike. to strike; fearing this, the state with a small number
A number of causes combined may account for of weapons may be tempted to use the few weapons
the reluctance of states to strike in order to prevent it has rather than risk losing them. Such reasoning
adversaries from developing nuclear forces. A pre- would confirm the thought that small nuclear forces
ventive strike is most promising during the first stage create extreme dangers. But since protecting small
of nuclear development. A state could strike without forces by hiding and moving them is quite easy, the
fearing that the country it attacked would be able to dangers evaporate.
return a nuclear blow. But would one country strike Hiding nuclear weapons and being able to de-
so hard as to destroy another country’s potential for liver them are tasks for which the ingenuity of nu-
future nuclear development? If it did not, the country merous states is adequate. Means of delivery are
struck could resume its nuclear career. If the blow neither difficult to devise nor hard to procure. Bombs
struck is less than devastating, one must be prepared can be driven in by trucks from neighboring
either to repeat it or to occupy and control the countries. Ports can be torpedoed by small boats
country. To do either would be forbiddingly difficult. lying offshore. A thriving arms trade in ever more
In striking Iraq, Israel showed that a preventive sophisticated military equipment provides ready
strike can be made, something that was not in doubt. access to what may be wanted, including planes and
Israel’s act and its consequences, however, made missiles suited to the delivery of nuclear warheads.
clear that the likelihood of useful accomplishment is Lesser nuclear states can pursue deterrent
low. Israel’s action increased the determination of strategies effectively. Deterrence requires the ability
Arabs to produce nuclear weapons. Israel’s strike, far to inflict unacceptable damage on another country.
from foreclosing Iraq’s nuclear career, gained Iraq “Unacceptable damage” to the Soviet Union was
support from some other Arab states to pursue it. variously defined by former Secretary of Defense
Despite Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s vow to Robert S. McNamara as requiring the ability to
strike as often as need be, the risks in doing so would destroy a fifth to a fourth of its population and a half
have risen with each occasion. to two-thirds of its industrial capacity. American
A preemptive strike launched against a country estimates of what is required for deterrence were
that may have a small number of warheads is even absurdly high. To deter, a country need not appear to
less promising than a preventive strike during the be able to destroy a fourth or a half of another
first stage. If the country attacked has even a country, although in some cases that might be easily
rudimentary nuclear capability, one’s own severe done. Would Libya try to destroy Israel’s nuclear
punishment becomes possible. Nuclear forces are weapons at the risk of two bombs surviving to fall on
seldom delicate because no state wants delicate Tripoli and Benghazi? And what would be left of
forces, and nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy. Israel if Tel Aviv and Haifa were destroyed?
Nuclear warheads are fairly small and light; they are Survivable forces are seen to be readily deployed
easy to hide and to move. Even the Model-T bombs if one understands that the requirements of deterrence
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were small are low. Even the largest states recoil from taking
enough to be carried by a World War II bomber. adventurous steps if the price of failure is the
Early in the nuclear age, people worried about atomic possible loss of a city or two. An adversary is
bombs being concealed in packing boxes and placed deterred if it cannot be sure that its preemptive strike
in the holds of ships to be exploded when a signal will destroy all of another country’s warheads. As
was given. Now more than ever, people worry about Bernard Brodie put it, if a “small nation could
terrorists stealing nuclear warheads because various threaten the Soviet Union with only a single
states have so many of them. Everybody seems to thermonuclear bomb, which, however, it could and
believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs.15 would certainly deliver on Moscow,” the Soviet
Why should states be unable to do what terrorist Union would be deterred.16 I would change that
gangs are thought to be capable of? sentence by substituting “might” for “would” and by
It was sometimes claimed that a small number of adding that the threat of a fission bomb or two would
bombs in the hands of minor powers creates greater also do the trick.

15 16
E.g., David M. Rosenbaum, “Nuclear Terror,” International Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton:
Security Vol. 1 (Winter 1977), p. 145. Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 275.
 Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons • 11

Once a country has a small number of deliver- against the invader’s massed troops or retaliate
able warheads of uncertain location, it has a second- against one of its cities or a city of an ally. Thus in
strike force. Belatedly, some Americans and Russians 1991, the United States could have put pressure on a
realized this.17 McNamara wrote in 1985 that the nuclear Iraq and exacted a price for its invasion of
United States and the Soviet Union could get along Kuwait, but it would have been deterred from leading
with 2,000 warheads between them instead of the a headlong invasion of the country. As Marc Dean
50,000 they may then have had.18 Talking at the Millot has said: “Small survivable arsenals of nuclear
University of California, Berkeley, in the spring of weapons in the hands of regional adversaries are
1992, he dropped the number the United States might likely to become an important obstacle to U.S.
need to sixty. Herbert York, speaking at the military operations in the post-cold war world.”21 The
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which he fourth reason for America’s zeal in countering the
once directed, guessed that one hundred strategic spread of nuclear weapons is that, even in the hands
warheads would be about the right number for us.19 It of relatively weak states, they would cramp our style.
does not take much to deter. To have second-strike
forces, states do not need large numbers of weapons.
Small numbers do quite nicely. Almost one-half of
South Korea’s population centers on Seoul. North
Stability
Korea can deter South Korea by leading it to believe
that it has a few well-hidden and deliverable When he was Director of the CIA, James Woolsey
weapons. The requirements of second-strike said that he could “think of no example where the
deterrence have been widely and wildly exaggerated. introduction of nuclear weapons into a region has
enhanced that region’s security or benefited the
The weak versus the strong security interests of the United States.”22 But surely
nuclear weapons helped to maintain stability during
Nuclear weapons do not make lesser states into great the Cold War and to preserve peace throughout the
powers. Nuclear weapons do enable the weak to instability that came in its wake. Except for
counter some of the measures that the strong may interventions by major powers in conflicts that for
wish to take against them. them are minor, peace has become the privilege of
Americans believe, rightly, that the possession of states having nuclear weapons, while wars are fought
nuclear weapons has conferred benefits on us. Our by those who lack them. Weak states cannot help
weapons place limits on what other countries can do. noticing this. That is why states feeling threatened
In similar fashion, the possession of nuclear weapons want their own nuclear weapons and why states that
by other countries places limits on our freedom of have them find it so hard to halt their spread.
action. It lessens our power. William C. Foster saw At least some of the rulers of new and prospec-
the point when he was director of the Arms Control tive nuclear states are thought to be ruthless, reckless,
and Disarmament Agency. “When we consider the and war-prone. Ruthless, yes; war-prone, seldom;
cost to us of trying to stop the spread of nuclear reckless, hardly. They have survived for many years,
weapons,” he warned three decades ago, “we should despite great internal and external dangers. They do
not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear not, as many seem to believe, have fixed images of
proliferation would mean a substantial erosion of the the world and unbending aims within it. Instead they
margin of power which our great wealth and have to adjust constantly to a shifting configuration
industrial base have long given us relative to much of of forces around them. Our images of leaders of
the rest of the world.”20 Third World states vary remarkably little, yet their
A strong country invading a weak nuclear agility is remarkable. Are hardy survivors in the
country has to worry that it may use a weapon or two Third World likely to run the greatest of all risks by
drawing the wrath of the world down on them
17
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” through aggressive use of their nuclear weapons?
American Political Science Review, 84:3 (September 1990). Aside from the quality of national regimes and
18
Robert McNamara, “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: Is Star
Wars the Answer?” Millennium: Journal of International Studies the identity of rulers, the behavior of nations is
15:2 (Summer 1986), p. 137.
19 21
Cited in Robert L. Gallucci, “Limiting U.S. Policy Options to Marc Dean Millot, "Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional
Prevent Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Relevance of Nuclear Adversaries," The Washington Quarterly 17:3 (Summer
Minimum Deterrence,” Center for Technical Studies on Security, 1994), p. 66.
22
Energy and Arms Control, Lawrence Livermore National "Proliferation Threats of the 1990's," Hearing before the
Laboratory, 28 February 1991. Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 103rd Congress,
20
William C. Foster, Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign 1st Session, February 24, 1993 (Washington DC: GPO, 1993), p.
Affairs Vol. 43 (July 1965), p. 591. 134.

11
12 • Kenneth Waltz

strongly conditioned by the world outside. With to two of the participants. When asked recently why
conventional weapons, a status-quo country must ask nuclear weapons are so popular in Pakistan, Prime
itself how much power it must harness to its policy in Minister Benazir Bhutto answered: “It’s our history.
order to dissuade an aggressive state from striking. In A history of three wars with a larger neighbor. India
conventional worlds, countries willing to run high is five times larger than we are. Their military
risks are hard to dissuade. The characteristics of strength is five times larger. In 1971, our country was
governments and the temperments of leaders have to disintegrated. So the security issue for Pakistan is an
be carefully weighed. With nuclear weapons, any issue of survival.”23 From the other side, Shankar
state will be deterred by another state’s second-strike Bajpai, former Indian Ambassador to Pakistan,
forces. One need not be preoccupied with the China, and the United States, has said that
qualities of the state that is to be deterred or “Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear capability stems from
scrutinize its leaders. its fear of its larger neighbor, removing that fear
America has long associated democracy with should open up immense possibilities”—possibilities
peace and authoritarianism with war, overlooking for a less worried and more relaxed life.24 Exactly.
that weak authoritarian rulers often avoid war for fear
of upsetting the balance of internal and external
forces on which their power depends. Neither Italy
nor Germany was able to persuade Franco’s Spain to
Conclusion
enter World War II. External pressures affect state
behavior with a force that varies with conditions. Of Nuclear weapons continue to spread ever so slowly,
all of the possible external forces, what could affect and the world seems to fare better as they do so. Yet
state behavior more strongly than nuclear weapons? the rapid spread—that is, the proliferation—of
Nobody but an idiot can fail to comprehend their nuclear weapons remains a frightening prospect; the
destructive force. How can leaders miscalculate? For mind boggles at the thought of all or most countries
a country to strike first without certainty of success having them. Whatever the policies of the United
most of those who control a nation’s nuclear States and other countries may be, that prospect is
weapons would have to go mad at the same time. hardly even a distant one. Many more countries can
Nuclear reality transcends political rhetoric. Did the make nuclear weapons than do. One can believe that
Soviet Union’s big words or our own prattling about American opposition to nuclear arming stays the
nuclear war-fighting ever mean anything? Political, deluge only by overlooking the complications of
military, and academic hard-liners imagined international life. Any state has to examine many
conditions under which we would or should be conditions before deciding whether or not to develop
willing to use nuclear weapons. None was of nuclear weapons. Our opposition is only one factor
relevance. Nuclear weapons dominate strategy. and is not likely to dissuade a determined state from
Nothing can be done with them other than to use seeking the weapons. Many states feel fairly secure
them for deterrence. The United States and the Soviet living with their neighbors. Why should they want
Union were both reluctant to accept the fact of nuclear weapons? The answer usually given is “for
deterrence. Weaker states find it easier to substitute prestige.” Yet it is hard to imagine a country entering
deterrence for war-fighting, precisely because they the difficult and risky nuclear military business
are weak. The thought that a small number of nuclear mainly for the sake of buoying its amour propre and
weapons may tempt or enable weak countries to gaining the attention that doing so may bring.
launch wars of conquest is the product of feverish We can play King Canute if we wish to, but like
imaginations. him, we will be unable to hold the (nuclear) tides at
States do what they can, to paraphrase bay.25 What are the possible courses of action? I
Thucydides, and they suffer what they must. Nuclear concentrate on six main ones:
weapons do not increase what states can do 23
Claudia Dreyfus, "Benazir Bhutto," New York Times Magazine,
offensively; they do greatly increase what they may 15 May 1994, p. 39.
suffer should their actions prompt retaliation by 24
Shankar Bajpai, “Nuclear Exchange,” Far Eastern Economic
others. Thus, far from contributing to instability in Review. 24 June 1993, p. 24.
25
South Asia, Pakistan’s nuclear military capability, Editor’s note: During the early 11th century., Canute the Great
ruled Denmark, Norway, and, after defeating Edmund Ironside at
along with India’s, limits the provocative acts of both the Battle of Assandun, England. A 12th century historian, wishing
countries and provides a sense of security to them. to demonstrate the frailty of even the most comprehensive of
Recalling Pakistan’s recent history of military rule earthly powers compared to the might of God, invented the
and the initiation of war, some have expected the legendary tale of Canute’s unsuccessfully ordering the tide to
recede to make way for his battle plans. Hence the aphorism,
opposite. For a more reasoned view we might listen coined by William Shakespeare, “time and tide wait for no man.”
 Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons • 13

1. Some fear that weakening opposition to the make them or can figure out how to hide small
spread of nuclear weapons will lead numerous states numbers of them.
to obtain them because it may seem that “everyone is 3. Various proposals have called upon nuclear
doing it.”26 Why should we think that if we relax, states to help any non-nuclear state threatened by the
numerous states will begin to make nuclear weapons? nuclear weapons of others.29 This is sometimes called
Both the United States and the Soviet Union were “leveling the playing field.” But for countries like
relaxed in the past, and those effects did not follow. Pakistan, it is the bumps in the conventional field that
The Soviet Union initially supported China’s nuclear are hard to level. Promises of help against nuclear
program. The United States helped both Britain and threats are easily offered since they are largely
France to produce nuclear weapons. More recently, irrelevant. With the playing field unlevel,
the United States Department of Energy gave conventional attack is the fear.
technical assistance to Japan in the producing of 4. The effective way to persuade states to forego
weapons-grade plutonium.27 Moreover, America’s nuclear weapons would seem to be to guarantee their
treatment of states that break into the nuclear military security against conventional as well as nuclear
business varies with our general attitude toward threats. Few states, however, are able to guarantee
them. By 1968, the CIA had informed President other states’ security or wish to do so. And
Johnson of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons, guarantees, even if issued by the most powerful
and in July of 1970 Richard Helms, director of the states, will not be found sufficiently reliable by states
CIA, gave this information to the Senate Foreign fearing for their security. Even at the height of the
Relations Committee. These and later disclosures Cold War, America’s promise to extend deterrence
were not followed by censure of Israel or by over Western Europe was thought to be of doubtful
reductions of economic assistance.28 In September of credibility. Since guarantees given by others can
1980, the executive branch, against the will of the never be fully credited, each country is left to provide
House of Representatives but with the approval of for its security as best it can. How then can one
the Senate, continued to do nuclear business with country tell another what measures to take for its own
India despite its explosion of a nuclear device and defense?
despite its unwillingness to sign the NPT. North 5. If some states want nuclear weapons to use in
Korea’s weapons program aroused our strong oppo- attacking other states, defenses against nuclear
sition while Pakistan’s caused less excitement. On weapons appear to be an obvious remedy. Because of
the nuclear question as on others, treating differently the great damage that nuclear warheads can do,
placed countries differently is appropriate. Doing so however, a near perfect defense is at once required
has not opened the floodgates and prompted the wild and unachievable. For this reason, those who ad-
spread of nuclear weapons in the past, nor is it likely vocate defense resort to the nugatory argument that it
to do so in the future. would complicate the enemy’s attack and make it
2. Chapter VI of the NPT calls on the original five more expensive. No doubt, but improved defenses
nuclear powers to set a good example by reducing would, as ever, spur further offensive efforts and fuel
their nuclear arms and promising ultimately to arms races. If defenses did magically become
eliminate them. Substantial reductions have been absolutely reliable, they would simply make the
agreed upon in the past decade and more are easily world safe for conventional war. Perfect defenses
possible in the arsenals of the United States and would recreate the problem that nuclear weapons can
Russia without their reaching levels that would make solve. The notion of defending against absolute
the maintenance of second-strike forces difficult. weapons is attractive mainly to the technologically
Reductions may please non-nuclear adherents to the mesmerized and the strategically naive.30
treaty, but one wonders whether many of them 6. The one definitive way to stop the spread of
believe that nuclear states will reduce their arsenals nuclear weapons would seem to be to launch strikes
below the level required to maintain deterrent forces. to destroy other states’ incipient nuclear-weapons
States paring their arsenals may claim to be on the programs or to fight preventive wars—now termed
road to nuclear disarmament, yet the elimination of
nuclear weapons is well understood to be an
impossible goal so long as anyone remembers how to
29
Barbara Crossette, “UN Council Seeks Support to Renew Pact
26
Joseph Nye, "Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime," Curbing Spread of Nuclear Arms,” New York Times 6 April 1995,
International Organization Vol. 35 (Winter 1981). p. A7.
27 30
Arjun Makhijani, “What Non-Nuclear Japan Is Not Telling the For a brief treatment of nuclear defense, see Kenneth N. Waltz,
World,” Outlook, Washington Post, 10 April 1995, p. C2. “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political
28
Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, ch. 5. Science Review 84:3 (September 1990), pp. 741–3.

13
14 • Kenneth Waltz

“wars of non-proliferation”—against them.31 In truth, Nuclear weapons will long be with us. We
preventive wars promise only limited success at should keep in perspective both the benefits they
considerable cost. The trouble with preventive strikes bring and the dangers they pose. States with huge
is that one has to strike so hard that the country nuclear arsenals may accidentally fire warheads in
struck will be unable to resume its nuclear career for large numbers. One estimate has it that if Soviet
years to come. The trouble with preventive wars is missiles had accidentally gone off, 300 warheads
that one has to fight them, win them, and impose might have hit the United States and that our missiles
effective controls over the indefinite future. The were set to shoot as many as 500 warheads in return.
noblest wars may be those fought for the sake of The accidents of small nuclear countries would be
establishing and maintaining peace, but I for one serious enough, but only large nuclear countries can
hope we won’t take the lead in fighting them. do horrendous damage to themselves and the world.
I end with two thoughts. Nuclear weapons con- As ever in international politics, the biggest dangers
tinue to spread slowly, while conventional weapons come from the biggest powers; the smallest from the
proliferate and become ever more destructive. smallest. We should be more fearful of old nuclear
Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap, and they work countries and less fearful of recent and prospective
against the fighting of major wars. For some ones. Efforts should concentrate more on making
countries, the alternative to nuclear weapons is to run large arsenals safe and less on keeping weak states
ever-more expensive conventional arms races, with from obtaining the small number of warheads they
increased risk of fighting highly destructive wars. may understandably believe they need for security.
Not all choices are happy ones, and for some
counties nuclear weapons may be the best choice
available.

31
The term is used by Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons of the Next
Nuclear War,” Foreign Affairs 74:2 (March/April 1995), pp. 35–6.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

T
he University of California Institute from the United States and abroad participate in all
on Global Conflict and Cooperation IGCC projects, and IGCC’s publications—books,
(IGCC) was founded in 1983 as a policy papers, and a semiannual newsletter—are
multicampus research unit serving the widely distributed to individuals and institutions
entire University of California (UC) around the world.
system. The institute’s purpose is to study the In addition to projects undertaken by the
causes of international conflict and the op- central office at UC San Diego, IGCC supports
portunities to resolve it through international research, instructional programs, and public edu-
cooperation. During IGCC’s first five years, re- cation throughout the UC system. The institute
search focused largely on the issue of averting receives financial support from the Regents of the
nuclear war through arms control and con-fidence- University of California and the state of California,
building measures between the super-powers. and has been awarded grants by such foundations
Since then the research program has diversified to as Ford, John D. And Catherine T. MacArthur,
encompass several broad areas of inquiry: regional Rockefeller, Sloan, W. Alton Jones, Ploughshares,
relations, international environmental policy, William and Flora Hewlett, the Carnegie
international relations theory, and most recently, Corporation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the
the domestic sources of foreign policy. United States Institute of Peace, and The Pew
IGCC serves as a liaison between the aca- Charitable Trusts.
demic and policy communities, injecting fresh Susan L. Shirk, a professor in UC San
ideas into the policy process, establishing the Diego’s Graduate School of International
intellectual foundations for effective policy- Relations and Pacific Studies and in the UCSD
making in the post–Cold War environment, and Department of Political Science, was appointed
providing opportunities and incentives for UC director of IGCC in June 1992 after serving for a
faculty and students to become involved in in- year as acting director. Former directors of the
ternational policy debates. Scholars, researchers, institute include John Gerard Ruggie (1989–1991),
g o v e r n me n t o f f ic ia ls , a n d j o u r n a lis ts and Herbert F. York (1983–1989), who now serves
as director emeritus.
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING AT IGCC

T
he year 1994–1995 saw several In early 1995, IGCC joined the World Wide
critical events in the publishing Web (the multimedia subset of Internet users),
world: making not only text, but related full-color pho-
• Paper costs rose 25%; tographs, audio- and video clips, maps, graphs,
• Postal rates rose 10%; charts, and other multimedia information available
• Federal Executive emphasis to Internet users around the globe.
sparked explosive growth in public availability and Since “the Web” is expanding at a furious
use of Internet resources (the so-called pace, with new sites (including, most recently, the
“information superhighway”). U.S. Congress) added daily, the net result of our
With an ever-increasing demand for informa- electronic effort has been (conservatively
tion about the Institute and its products, along with estimated) to quadruple circulation of IGCC ma-
tightening of the California state budget, it was terials with no increase in cost—and without
clear that we needed to expand worldwide access abandoning printed mailings to those with no
to our publications—right when we needed to Internet access.
hold down publishing costs in the face of rising IGCC made a general announcement of its on-
expenses. “On-line” publishing was the answer. line services in the Spring 1995 IGCC News-letter
In cooperation with the University of (circulation ca. 8,000).
California, San Diego Graduate School of Internet users can view information about or
International Relations and Pacific Studies, in published by IGCC at:
December 1994 IGCC established a “Gopher”
server. Thus, all text-based IGCC materials and • gopher: irpsserv26.ucsd.edu
publications (including informational brochures, or, for www users, at URL:
newsletters, and policy papers) became available • http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc/igccmenu.html
via the Internet.
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

CURRENT PUBLICATIONS

IGCC-Sponsored Books
Power and Prosperity: The Links between Economics and Security in Asia–Pacific.
Edited by Susan l. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey
Transaction Publishers, c.300 pages, forthcoming 1996.
Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East
Volume I: Arms Control and Regional Security.
278 pages, 1995, $34.95.
Volume II: The Environment, Water, Refugees, and Economic Cooperation and Development.
411 pages, 1995, $62.00.
Edited by Steven L. Spiegel
Garland Publishers. Call (800) 627-6273.
Strategic Views from the Second Tier:
The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China.
Edited by John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu
Transaction Publishers, 284 pages, 1995, $21.95. Call (908) 932-2280.
Space Monitoring of Global Change.
Gordon J. MacDonald and Sally K. Ride
California Space Institute, 61 pages, 1992.
The Arab–Israeli Search for Peace.
Edited by Steven L. Spiegel
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 199 pages, 1992, $10.95. Call (303) 444-6684.
Conflict Management in the Middle East.
Edited by Steven L. Spiegel
Westview Press/Pinter Publishers, 446 pages, 1992. Contact IGCC.
Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific.
Edited by Miles Kahler
IGCC-SCC No. 2, 155 pages, 1991. Available online.
Europe in Transition: Arms Control and Conventional Forces in the 1990s.
Edited by Alan Sweedler and Randy Willoughby
119 pages, 1991.
Nuclear Deterrence and Global Security in Transition.
Edited by David Goldfischer and Thomas W. Graham
Westview Press, 199 pages, 1991, $29.95. Call (303) 444-3541.
18 •IGCC

The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.

Edited by David P. Auerswald and John Gerard Ruggie
IGCC-SCC No. 1, 187 pages, 1990.
Conventional Forces in Europe.
Edited by Alan Sweedler and Brett Henry, 102 pages, 1989.
The Soviet–American Competition in the Middle East.
Edited by Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller, and Jacob Goldberg
Lexington Books, 392 pages, 1988. Available from the publisher.
Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance.
Edited by Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby.
Lexington Books, 218 pages, 1987. Available from the publisher.

IGCC Policy Papers

Maritime Jurisdiction in the Three China Seas: Options for Equitable Settlement.
Ji Guoxing
IGCC-PP No. 19, c.55 pages, October 1995.
The Domestic Sources of Disintegration.
Stephen M. Saideman
IGCC-PP No. 18, c.40 pages, September 1995.
The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue III.
Edited by Susan Shirk and Michael Stankiewicz
IGCC-PP No. 17, c.88 pages, September 1995.
Ethnic Conflict and Russian Intervention in the Caucasus
Edited by Fred Wehling
IGCC-PP No. 16, 34 pages, August 1995.
Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons.
Kenneth N. Waltz
IGCC-PP No. 15, c.24 pages, August 1995.
Promoting Regional Cooperation in the Middle East.
Edited by Fred Wehling
IGCC-PP No. 14, 32 pages, June 1995.
African Conflict Management and the New World Order.
Edmond J. Keller
IGCC-PP No. 13, 16 pages, May 1995.
Intervention in Ethnic Conflict.
Edited by Fred Wehling
IGCC-PP No. 12, 42 pages, May 1995.
China’s Nonconformist Reforms.
John McMillan
IGCC-PP No. 11, 20 pages, December 1994.
The United States and Japan in Asia.
Edited by Christopher P. Twomey and Michael Stankiewicz
IGCC-PP No. 10, 50 pages, November 1994.
The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue II.
Edited by Susan Shirk and Chris Twomey
IGCC-PP No. 9, 88 pages, August 1994.
 PUBLICATIONS • 19

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures.

Etel Solingen
IGCC-PP No. 8, 30 pages, October 1994.
Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East II.
Paul L. Chrzanowski
IGCC-PP No. 7, 26 pages, April 1994.
Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era.
Lu Zhongwei
IGCC-PP No. 6, 21 pages, October 1993.
Regional Cooperation and Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia.
Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky
IGCC-PP No. 5, 35 pages, December 1993.
Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East.
David J. Pervin
IGCC-PP No. 4, 17 pages, June 1993.
Japan in Search of a “Normal” Role.
Chalmers Johnson
IGCC-PP No. 3, 45 pages, July 1992.
Climate Change: A Challenge to the Means of Technology Transfer.
Gordon J. MacDonald
IGCC-PP No. 2, 51 pages, January 1992.
Building Toward Middle East Peace: Working Group Reports from ‘Cooperative Security in the
Middle East,’ Moscow, October 21–24, 1991.
IGCC-PP No. 1, 43 pages, January 1992.

IGCC Policy Briefs

Environmental Security Middle East Environmental Cooperation
Gordon J. MacDonald Philip Warburg
IGCC-PB No. 1, February 1995 IGCC-PB No. 4, May 1995
Ethnic Conflict and International Inter- Derecognition: Exiting Bosnia
vention George Kenney
David Lake IGCC-PB No. 5, June 1995
IGCC-PB No. 3, April 1995

IGCC PUBLICATIONS
Single copies of IGCC publications are available at no charge, unless otherwise indicated. To receive a copy of the IGCC newsletter; to be
placed on the IGCC publications mailing list; or to order any of the institute’s current publications, please feel free to contact:
Jennifer R. Pournelle, Managing Editor
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0518
phone (619) 534-1979 or (619) 534-3352
Fax (619) 534-7655
email: jpournelle@ucsd.edu or ph13@sdcc12.ucsd.edu
URL: http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc/igccmenu.html
gopher: irpsserv26.ucsd.edu