UST Golden Notes 2011

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
I.EFFECTANDAPPLICATIONOFLAWS A.WHENLAWTAKESEFFECT Q:WhendidtheCivilCodetakeeffect? A:August30,1950 Q:Whendolawstakeeffect? A:Lawstakeeffect: GR: After 15 days following the completion of its publication in the official gazette or newspaperofgeneralcirculation.
Note: after 15 days Law shall take effect on the16thdayfromdateofpublication
XPN:unlessotherwiseprovidedbythelaw. Q: What is meant by the phrase unless it is otherwise provided in the provision on effectivityoflaws? A:15dayperiodmaybelengthenedorshortened by Congress. The exception refers to the 15day period, not the requirement of publication, publicationbeingmandatedbydueprocess.
Note: No one shall be charged with notice of the statutes provision until the publication is completed andthe15dayperiodhasexpired.Thelawproduces no effect until and unless it completes the requirementofpublication.
Q: When will the law take effect if it is made to takeeffectimmediately? A: It shall take effect immediately after publication. The 15 day period after publication is dispensedwithbutpublicationisnot. Q: When will the law take effect if it states that itshallbeeffectiveuponapproval? A: The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date withoutitspreviouspublication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended.
Inasmuch as the law has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra, it took effect fifteen days after its publication. (Umali v Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992, [citing Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L63915, Dec.29,1986]) RULESONPUBLICATION Q:Arealllawsrequiredtobepublished? A: GR:Yes.Publicationisindispensable. XPN: 1. Municipal Ordinances (governed by the Local Government Code not the Civil Code) 2. Rules and regulations that are internal innature. 3. Letters of Instruction issued by administrative supervisors on internal rulesandguidelines. 4. Interpretative regulations regulating only the personnel of administrative agency. XPN to the XPN: Administrative rules and regulationsthatrequirepublication: 1. The purpose of which is to implement or enforce existing laws pursuant to a validdelegation; 2. PenalinNature; 3. It diminishes existing rights of certain individuals Q: Honasan questions the authority and jurisdiction of the DOJ panel of prosecutors to conduct a preliminary investigation and to eventuallyfilechargesagainsthim,claimingthat since he is a senator with a salary grade of 31, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, which has authority and jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. DOJ claims that it has concurrent jurisdiction, invoking an OMB DOJ Joint Circular which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Honasan counters that said circular is ineffective as it was neverpublished. Is OMBDOJ Circular No. 95001 ineffective becauseitwasnotpublished?
ACADEMICSCHAIR:LESTERJAYALANE.FLORESII UNIVERSITYOFSANTOTOMAS VICECHAIRSFORACADEMICS:KARENJOYG.SABUGO&JOHNHENRYC.MENDOZA Facultad de Derecho Civil V ICE C HAIR FOR A DMINISTRATION AND F INANCE : J EANELLE C. L EE VICECHAIRSFORLAYOUTANDDESIGN:EARLLOUIEM.MASACAYAN&THEENAC.MARTINEZ
UST GOLDEN NOTES 2011
A: No. OMBDOJ Circular No. 95001 is merely an internal circular between the two offices which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. It does not contain any penal provision nor prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain of penalty. Further, it does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. As such therefore, it need not be published. (Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice,G.R.No.159747,Jun.15,2004) Q: What is the effect of nonpublication of the law? A: The law shall not be effective. It is a violation ofdueprocess. Q: What must be published in order to comply withthepublicationrequirement? A: Publication must be in full or it is no publicationatallsinceitspurposeistoinformthe public of the contents of the lawsthe mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. (Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No.L63915,Dec.29,1986) Q: Judicial decisions form part of the law or the legal system of the land. Is compliance with the publication requirement for effectivity of laws necessaryforjudicialdecisionstobeeffective? A: No. The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because lawyers in the active law practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in advancereportsandtheSCRA(Royv.CA,G.R.No. 80718,Jan.29,1988) Q: Publication must be made in a newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.When is a newspaper of general circulation? A: 1. It is published within the courts jurisdiction 2. Published for disseminating local news andgeneralinformation. 3. 4. 5. B.IGNORANCEOFTHELAW Q: Differentiate mistake of law from mistake of fact. A:
MISTAKEOFFACT Wantofknowledgeof somefactorfacts constitutingorrelating tothesubjectmatterin hand. Whensomefactswhich reallyexistareunknown orsomefactis supposedtoexistwhich reallydoesnotexist. Goodfaithisanexcuse MISTAKEOFLAW Wantofknowledgeor acquaintancewiththe lawsofthelandinsofar astheyapplytotheact, relation,duty,ormatter underconsideration. Occurswhenaperson havingfullknowledgeof thefactscometoan erroneousconclusionas toitslegaleffects Notexcusable,evenifin goodfaith
It has a bona fide subscription list of payingsubscribers Not merely caters to a specific class of persons. Itispublishedatregularintervals.
Note:Ignoranceofaforeignlawisamistakeoffact
Q: Tina charged Eduardo with bigamy. He invokes as defense good faith and that he did not know that there was still a need for a prior declaration of nullity of marriage before he can contract a subsequent marriage. Is his defense tenable? A: No. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005)
Q: Eduardo was married to Ruby. He then met Tina and proposed marriage, assuring her thathewassingle.Theygotmarriedandlived together.Tina, upon learning that Eduardo had been previously married, charged Eduardo for bigamy for which he was convicted. Eduardo testified that he declared he was single because he believed in good faith that his first wife was already dead, having
CIVILLAWTEAM: ADVISER:ATTY.ELMERT.RABUYA;SUBJECTHEAD:ALFREDOB.DIMAFELIXII; ASST.SUBJECTHEADS:KARENFELIZG.SUPNAD,LAMBERTOL.SANTOSIII;MEMBERS:PAULELBERTE.AMON,ALSTONANARNA,OZANJ. FULLEROS,CECILIOM.JIMENO,JR.,ISMAELSARANGAYA,JR.;CONTRIBUTORS:LOISERAEG.NAVAL,MONICAJUCOM

not heard from her for 20 years, and thathe did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage beforemarryingTina. IsEduardoliableforthecrimeofbigamy? A: Yes. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina.Asageneralrule,mistakeof factorgood faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. It was theburdenoftheEduardotoprovehisdefense that when he married the Tina, he was of the wellgrounded belief that his first wife was already dead. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof thatEduardo acted in good faith, and would negate criminalintent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. Eduardo, however, failed to discharge his burden. (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005)
Q: What is the rule as regards difficult questions oflaw? A: In specific instances provided by law, mistake as to difficult questions of law has been given the same effect as a mistake of fact. E.g. Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may bethebasisofgoodfaith.[Art.526(3)] C.RETROACTIVITYOFLAWS Q:Dolawshaveretroactiveeffect? A: GR:Lawsshallhavenoretroactiveeffect. XPN:TINCREEP 1. Taxlaws 2. Interpretativestatutes 3. LawscreatingNewRights 4. CurativeStatutes 5. Remedial/procedural 6. EmergencyLaws 7. WhenExpresslyprovided 8. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided, accused is not a habitual criminal
XPN to the XPN: constitutional limits, where retroactivitywouldresultto:IE 1. Impairmentofobligationofcontracts 2. ExPostFactoLaws

Note: Incase ofdoubt: laws apply prospectively,not retroactively.
Q: May judicial decisions be given retroactive effect? A: No. When a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the newdoctrineshouldbeappliedprospectivelyand should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereon. (Rabuya,p.10) D.MANDATORYORPROHIBITORYLAWS Q: What is the status of acts which are contrary tolaw? A: GR: Acts that are contrary to the provisions of mandatory and proibitory law are void. (Art. 5,NCC) XPN:Wherethelaw: 1. Makes the act valid but punishes the violator, e.g. Marriage solemnized by a person notauthorizedtodoso; 2. Itselfauthorizesitsvalidity; 3. Makes the act merely voidable i.e. valid untilannulled; 4. Declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as legally existing, e.g. Child born after the annulment of marriageisconsideredlegitimate. E.WAIVEROFRIGHTS Q:Whatisaright? A: It is a legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act,orshallnotdoagivenact(Pineda,Persons,p. 23)
Q:Whatarethekindsofrights?Distinguish. A: 1. Natural Rights Those which grow out of the nature of man and depend upon personality. E.g. right to life, liberty, privacy, and goodreputation. 2. PoliticalRightsConsistinthepowerto participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government. E.g. right of suffrage, right to hold publicoffice,rightofpetition. 3. Civil Rights Those that pertain to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a stateorcommunity. E.g. property rights, marriage, equal protectionoflaws,freedomofcontract, trialbyjury.(Pineda,Persons,p.24) a. Rights of personalty or human rights; b. Familyrights;and c. Patrimonialrights: i. Realrights ii. Personal rights. (Rabuya Persons,p.19) Q:Mayrightsbewaived? A: GR:Yes. XPN: 1. Ifwaiveris: a. Contrarytolaw,publicorder, publicpolicy,moralsorgood customs. b. Prejudicialtoathirdperson witharightrecognizedby law. 2. Iftherightis: a. Anaturalright,suchasright tolife. b. Inchoate,suchasfuture inheritance. Q:Whataretheelementsofwaiverofrights? A:EKI 1. MustbeanExistingright 2. 3. The one waiving such right must have Knowledgeofevidencethereof Intention to relinquish said right. (Valderamma v. Macalde, G.R. No.165005,Sept.16,2005)
Q:Whataretherequisitesofavalidwaiver? A:AFCUNF 1. Waiving party must Actually have the rightheisrenouncing. 2. He must have Full capacity to make the waiver 3. WaivermustbeClearandUnequivocal 4. Waiver must Not be contrary to law, publicorder,publicmorals,etc. 5. When Formalities are required, they mustbecompliedwith. F.REPEALOFLAWS Q:Whatarethekindsofrepeal?Distinguish. A: Repeal may be express or implied. It is express if the law expressly provides for such. On the other hand, it is implied when the provisions of the subsequent law are incompatible or inconsistentwiththoseofthepreviouslaw. Q:Whataretherequisitesofimpliedrepeal? A: 1. Lawscoverthesamesubjectmatter 2. Latterisrepugnanttotheearlier Q:Whatistheruleonrepealofrepealinglaws? A:Itdependsuponhowtheoldlawisrepealedby therepealinglaw: 1. If the old law is expressly repealed and repealing law is repealed: the Old law is notrevived 2. If the old law is impliedly repealed and repealing law is repealed: the Old law is revived.
Note: Unless the law otherwise provides, in both cases.
G.JUDICIALDECISIONS Q: Are judicial decisions considered laws in this jurisdiction? A: No. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although inthemselvesnotlaws,areneverthelessevidence ofwhatthelawsmean.

Q: When do judicial decisions form part of the lawoftheland? A: GR: As of the date of the enactment of said law. This is so because the Supreme Courts interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construedlawpurportstocarryintoeffect. XPN: When a doctrine is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not prejudice parties who relied on the old doctrine. Q:Explaintheconceptofstaredecisis. A: It is adherence to judicial precedents. Once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Note: This doctrine however isnot inflexible, so that when in the light of changing conditions, a rule has ceased to be beneficial to the society, courts may departfromit. Courts are required to follow the rule established in earlierdecisionsoftheSupremeCourt.
H.DUTYTORENDERJUDGMENT Q: Can the Court decline to render judgment by reasonofsilenceofthelaw? A: No.No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiencyofthelaw.
Note: However, this duty is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make oramendit.
I.PRESUMPTIONANDAPPLICABILITYOF CUSTOM Q: What is the presumption in case there is doubt in the interpretation or application of laws? A: That the lawmaking body intended right and justicetoprevail(Art.10). Q:Whatarecustoms?
A: These are rules of conduct, legally binding and obligatory, formed by repetition of acts uniformly observedasasocialrule. Q:Howarecustomsproved? A: GR:Mustbeprovedasafact,accordingtothe rulesonevidence. XPN: Courts may take judicial notice of a custom if there is already a decision rendered bythesamecourtrecognizingthecustom. Q: What are the requisites to make a custom an obligatoryrule? A:PTOP 1. PluralityorRepetitionofacts 2. PracticedforalongperiodofTime 3. The community accepts it as a proper way of acting, such that it is considered Obligatoryuponall. 4. Practicedbythegreatmassofthesocial group. Q:Maycourtsapplycustomsindecidingcases? A: 1. In civil cases, customs may be applied by the courts in cases where the applicablelawis:SOI a. Silent b. Obscure c. Insufficient Provided said customs are not contrary tolaw,publicmorals,etc. 2. In criminal cases, customs cannot be applied because nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (There is neither crime norpunishment,withoutalaw). J.LEGALPERIODSS Q:Howdoyoucomputetheperiods? A:Year365days Month30days Day24hours Nighttimefromsunsettosunrise
Note: Month: if designated by its name: compute by thenumberofdayswhichitrespectivelyhas. Week: 7 successive days regardless of which day it wouldstart
Calendarweek:SundaytoSaturday Note: In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. PrimetownPropertyGroup,Inc.,theSCruledthatas betweentheCivilCode,whichprovidesthatayearis equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Q:Whatisthemannerofcountingperiods? A:Excludethefirst,includethelast; Step 1. From the reckoning date, add the period ornumberofdayswhichwillexpire. e.g.Calendardays,notleapyear: Dateofcommission=September3,2005 Prescriptiveperiod=90daysfromcommission 3+90=93 Step 2. From the total, subtract the number of days, calendar or not, until the difference is less that the number of days in a month. This difference shall be the date in the month immediately succeeding the last month whose numberofdayswassubtracted. 93 Less: September 30 =63 Less: October 31 =32 Less: November 30 =2 (December) November is the last month whose number of days was subtracted; hence, the remaining differenceof2shallbethedateinDecember,the monthimmediatelysucceedingNovember. Hence, the last day for filing the action is December2,2005. Q: In a case for violation of the Copyright law filed against her, Soccoro countered by saying that since the crime was found out on September 3, 1963, while the information was filed on September 3, 1965, the crime had already prescribed, since 1964 was a leap year. Hasthecrimeprescribed? A: Yes. Namarco v. Tuazon held that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. Since this case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late;
considering that the 730th day fell on September 2,1965theyear1964beingaleapyear. With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386) we have reverted to the provisionsoftheSpanishCivilCodeinaccordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30month and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours has added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty five days.(People v. Ramos GR L25265, May 9, 1978, Ramos v. Ramos GR L25644, May 9, 1978) However, when the year in questioned is a leap year, the 365 day rule is not followed because February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be countedasseparatedaysincomputingperiodsof prescription (NAMARCO vs Tuazon, GR No L 29131,Aug.27,1969). Q: What is the rule if the last day falls on a Sundayoralegalholiday? A: It depends. If the act to be performed within theperiodis: 1. Prescribedorallowedby:ROO a. theRulesofCourt b. anOrderofthecourt;or c. anyOtherapplicablestatute The last day will automatically be the nextworkingday. 2. Arises from a contractual relationship the act will still become due despite the fact that the last day falls on a Sunday oralegalholiday. K.APPLICABILITYOFPENALLAWS Q: When, where and upon whom do the followinglawsapply? 1. Penal laws Penal laws and laws of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all those who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory (Art. 14,NCC) GR:TerritorialityruleObligatorytoall who live or sojourn in Philippine territory.(Art.2,RPC) XPN: Treaty stipulations, Public InternationalLawprinciples.

E.g. a. Ambassadors b. Ministers c. International agencies enjoying diplomaticimmunity 2. Status laws Laws relating to family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines eventhoughlivingabroad(Art.15,NCC) GR:Nationality rule Binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though livingabroad. XPN: a. In case of divorce obtained validly by an alien pursuant to the rules that governs his country, the Filipino spouse shall be considered alsoasdivorced. b. Domiciliaryruleappliestostateless persons
Note: the basis for determining the personal law of an individual is either the Domiciliary Rule (Domicile) or Nationality Rule(Citizenship)
governed by the laws of the country in whichtheyareexecuted XPN: Philippine law shall apply in the following cases even though performed abroad: a. Acts are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of thePhilippines. b. Prohibitory laws concerning persons,theiractsorproperty,and those which have for their object public order, public policy and goodcustoms.(Art.17,NCC) Q:Whatisalaw? A: In its jural and concrete sense, law means a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state. (Diaz, Statutory Construction,p.1) Q: What is the effect of laws, judgments promulgated or conventions agreed upon in a foreigncountryonPhilippinelaws? A:Asregardsprohibitivelaws: GR: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and laws which have for theirobjectpublicorder,publicpolicyorgood customs are not rendered ineffective by laws, judgments promulgated or conventions agreeduponinforeigncountry. XPN:Art26,par.2oftheFamilyCode(FC),on mixed marriages where the foreigner obtained a divorce decree abroad and was therebycapacitatedtoremarry.
Note: in this case, even though divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as a mode of terminating marriage, still the marriage is terminated by virtue of a judgment of divorce and issuanceofadivorcedecreebyaforeigncourt.
3. GR:Lex Rei Sitae Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. (Art.16) XPN:LexNationaliiNationallawofthe person whose succession is under consideration, applies to: Testate/Intestate Succession as to 3 thingsonly:OAI a. Orderofsuccession b. Amountofsuccessionalrights c. Intrinsic validity of the testamentaryprovisions.
Note: The enumeration above is governed by the national law of the decedent, regardlessofplaceofdeath.
RealStatutesLawsonProperty
L.CONFLICTOFLAWS,RELATIVETODIVORCE Q: The second clause of the will of Joseph, a Turkish citizen and a resident of the Philippines, statesthat: xxx, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection withthis,mywill,bemadeanddisposedof in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
4. GR:Lexloci celebrationis(Art.17)forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be Law governing extrinsic validity of contracts,willsandpublicinstruments.
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply withthisrequest. Istheclauseabovequotedvalid? A: No, it is void. The second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it and the condition imposed, is null and void, being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides that Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Said clause is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern histestamentarydispositions.Saidconditionthen is considered unwritten, hence the institution of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid andeffective. Q:Explainthefollowingdoctrines: A: 1. Renvoi Doctrine(referring back) Renvoi takes place when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers the matter back to the lawoftheforum(Remission). 2. Transmission theory Provides that when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that refers it to a third country, the law of the third country shallapply. 3. Doctrine of Processual Presumption The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to beexactly the same as the lawoftheforum. 4. Doctrine of Operative Facts Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of unconstitutionality. Q: Edward is a citizen of California domiciled in the Philippines. After he executed his will, he went back to America and stayed there. During the post mortem probate of the will, Helen, his illegitimate natural child, opposed it on the ground of preterition. She claims that under Art. 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code, in case of succession, the national law of the deceased the civil code of California should govern., which provides that if a Californian not domiciled in California dies, the law of his domicile must govern. Lucy, on the otherhand, counters that under the same provision, the national law of the deceased should apply. Which law should be applied PhilippinelaworCalifornianLaw? A: Philippine Law should be applied. Where the testator (Edward) was a citizen of California, and domiciled in the Philippines, the amount of successional rights should be governed by his national law, that is, Californian law. However, theconflictoflawrulesofCaliforniaprovidesthat in cases of citizens who are residents of another country,thelawofthecountryofdomicileshould apply, hence, Philippine law on legitimes should be applied. This is so because California law itself refers the case back to the Philippines. The Philippine court has no other alternative but to accept the referring back, for to do otherwise, might result again in its referring back to the Philippines, which would give rise to a sort of an international football. (Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L16749.Jan.31,1963)
HUMAN RELATIONS
HUMANRELATIONS A.BREACHOFPROMISETOMARRY Q: Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? A: GR:No,abreachofpromisetomarryperseinnot an actionable wrong. There is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promisetomarry. XPN: When the act is not a mere breach of promise to marry but constitutes one where damagespursuanttoArt.21oftheCivilCodemay berecovered,suchas: 1. Where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA,G.R.No.97336,February19,1993) 2. Where one formally sets a wedding and go through and spend for all the preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony was about to be solemnized.( Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L20089 , December 26, 1964) Q: Maria met Ayatollah, an Iranian medical student, at the restaurant where she worked. A few days after, Ayatollah courted and proposed to marry Maria. The latter accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married. When the couple visited Maria's parents, Ayatollah was allowed to sleep with Maria during the few days of their stay. The couple continued to live together in an apartment. However, Ayatollah's attitude towards Maria changed. He maltreated herandwhenMariabecamepregnant,Ayatollah gave her medicine to abort the fetus. Despite the abuses, Maria continued to live with Ayatollahandkeptremindinghimofhispromise to marry her. However, Ayatollah told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Maria left and filed a complaint for damages against Ayatollah for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. May damages be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article21oftheCivilCode? A: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. But where a man's promise to marryistheproximatecauseoftheacceptanceof his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that the promise was only a deceptive device to inveigle her to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, Ayatollah's fraudulentanddeceptiveprotestationsoflovefor and promise to marry Maria that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, In short, Maria surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.(Gashem ShookatBakshv.CA,G.R.No.97336,February19, 1993) Q: Soledad a highschool teacher used to go aroundtogetherwithFrancisco,whowasalmost ten (10) years younger than she. Eventually, intimacydevelopedbetweenthemafterSoledad became an underwriter in Cebu. One evening, after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in Francisco's cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. After a few months, Soledad advised Francisco that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. Later their child was born. However, subsequently, Francisco married another woman. Soledad filed a complaint for moral damages for alleged breachofpromisetomarry.Maymoraldamages berecoveredforbreachofpromisetomarry? A: No. It is the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry. Moreover, Francisco is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirtysix (36) years of age, and as highly enlightenedasaformerhighschoolteacheranda life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with him, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to Francisco because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
(Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L14628, September 30,1960)

Note: To constitute seduction there must be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is noseduction.
Q: What are the elements of an action under Article21oftheCivilCode? A:LCI 1. thereisanactwhichisLegal 2. but which is Contrary to morals, good customs,publicorderorpolicy 3. theactisdonewithIntenttoinjure.
Note: Art. 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores or contrary to good morals and presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer asaresultofsuchviolation
10
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

I.PERSONSANDPERSONALITY A.CAPACITYTOACT 1.CIVILPERSONALITY Q: Distinguish juridical capacity from capacity to act. A:
JURIDICALCAPACITY CAPACITYTOACT
Definition Fitnesstobethe Powertodoactswith subjectoflegal legaleffect relations Acquisition Inherent(coexists Throughthefulfillment withthenatural ofspecificlegalactivities person) Loss Throughdeathandother Onlythroughdeath causes Inrelationtotheother Canexistwithout Cannotexistw/ojuridical capacitytoact capacity Limitation Art.38(restriction) Art.39(modification/ None limitation), amongothers 2.RESTRICTIONSONCAPACITYTOACT Q:Whataretherestrictionsoncapacitytoact? A:MIDIPC 1. Minority, 2. Insanity, 3. Deafmute, 4. Imbecility, 5. Prodigality, 6. CivilInterdiction Q: What are the circumstances that modify or limitcapacitytoact? A:IPAIDFATPIA 1. Insanity 2. Prodigality 3. Age 4. Imbecility 5. DeafMute 6. FamilyRelations 7. Alienage 8. Trusteeship 9. Penalty 10. Insolvency 11. Absence
Q:Howdoescivilpersonalitycease? A:Itdependsupontheclassificationofpersons: 1. Naturalpersonsbydeath 2. Juridical persons by termination of existence 3.BIRTH Q: How is personality acquired by natural persons? A: GR: Actual / Permanent Personality Personalitybeginsatbirth;notatconception XPN: Presumptive / Temporary The law considers the conceived child as born (Conceptuspronatohabetur)
Note: For there to be presumptive personality, the foetus must be born later in accordance with law and the purpose for which such personality is given must be beneficial to the child.
Q: May a fetus be considered born for all purposes? A: No. Only for purposes beneficial and favorable toit. Q:Explainthemeaningoftheclause:Bornlater inaccordancewithlaw. A:Afetuswithanintrauterinelifeof: 1. Less than 7 months Must survive for at least 24 hours after its complete deliveryfromthematernalwomb 2. At least 7 months If born alive: considered born, even it dies within 24 hoursaftercompletedelivery. Q: Does the conceived child have the right to be acknowledgedevenifitisstillconceived? A:Yes.Itisauniversalruleofjurisprudencethata child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and is capable ofbeing dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights provided it be born later in accordance with Law (De Jesus v.Syquia,G.R.No.L39110,Nov.28,1933).
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4.DEATH Q:Howdoescivilpersonalitycease? A:Itdependsupontheclassificationofpersons: 1. Naturalpersonsbydeath 2. Juridicalpersonsbyterminationof existence Q:What rule would apply in case there is doubt astowhodiedfirst? A:Itdependsonwhetherthepartiesarecalledto succeedeachother. 1. If successional rights are involved Art. 43 of the NCC: Survivorship Rule; and Rule 131, Sec. 3(kk): Presumption of simultaneityofdeathsbetweenpersons calledtosucceedeachother,applies. 2. If no successional rights are involved Rule131,Sec.3(jj)oftheRulesofCourt applies.(Presumptionofsurvivorship)
Note: Both are to be applied only in the absence of facts.
A: Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that onehalf of the proceeds should belong to Willys estate, under Sec.3(jj) par.5 Rule 131, Rules of Court, as the disputedoesnotinvolvesuccession. Underthispresumption,thepersonbetweenthe agesof15and60isdeemedtohavesurvivedone whoseagewasover60atthetimeoftheir deaths.TheestateofWillyendowedwithjuridical personalitystandsinplaceandsteadofWilly,as beneficiary.(1998BarQuestion) A.COMPARISONOFART.43ANDRULE131 SURVIVORSHIPRULEUNDERCIVILCODE Q: Explain the survivorship rule under the new CivilCode. A: If in doubt as to who died first between 2 or morepersonscalledtosucceedeachother: Burden of Proof: Whoever alleges the death of onepriortotheothershallprovethesame; Absent such proof: Presumption is they all died at the same time. There shall be no transmission of successionalrights. Q:Whataretheconditionsthatmaywarrantthe applicationofthesurvivorshiprule? A: It applies when the following conditions are present: 1. Thepartiesareheirstooneanother 2. Thereisnoproofastowhodiedfirst 3. Thereisdoubtastowhodiedfirst Q: What is the presumption under the survivorshiprule? A: Presumption of simultaneity of deaths. When two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, die, they shall be presumed to have diedatthesametime. PRESUMPTIONSONSURVIVORSHIPUNDERTHE RULESOFCOURT Q: Explain the presumptions on survivorship undertheRulesofCourt. A:TheRulesofCourtprovidethat: 1. whentwoormorepersons 2. perishinthesamecalamityand 3. itisnotshownwhodiedfirst,and
Q: Jaime, who is 65, and his son, Willy, who is 25, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to who died first. Jaimes only surviving heir is his wife, Julia, who is also Willys mother. Willys survivingheirsarehismother,Julia,andhiswife, Wilma. In the settlement of Jaimes estate, can Wilma successfully claim that her late husband, Willy, had a hereditary share since he was much youngerthanhisfatherandtherefore,shouldbe presumedtohavesurvivedlonger? A: No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy hadahereditaryshareinhisfathersestate. Under Art 43, Civil Code, two persons who are called to succeed each other are presumed to have died at the same time, in the absence of proof as to which of them died first. This presumption of simultaneous death applies in cases involving the question of succession as between the two who died, who in this case, are mutualheirs,beingfatherandson. Q: Suppose, Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son, Willy, as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that onehalfoftheproceedsshouldbelongtoWillys estate?
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4. there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one diedaheadoftheother,
Thesurvivorshipshallbedeterminedfromthe probabilitiesresultingfromthestrengthandage ofthesexesaccordingtothefollowingrules: Age/Sexofdecedentsatthe Whopresumed timeofdeath tohave survived DecedentA DecedentB Under15 Under15 Older Above60 Above60 Younger Under15 Under15 Above60 (younger) Differentsexes Above15 Above15BUT male BUTunder under60 Samesex 60 Older Between15and Under15 Between15 ORover60 and60 60 Q:Dothestatutoryrulesinthedeterminationof sequence of death absolutely apply in a case where indirect and/or inferential evidence surrounding the circumstances of the deaths exists? A: No. It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred"thatarerequiredtobecertainas tested by the rules of evidence. It is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (Joaquin v. Navarro, G.R. No.L5426,May29,1953)
Q: At the age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named her unborn child as her sole beneficiary.Whenshewasalreadyduetogive birth, she and her boyfriend Pietro, the father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resortinBataanwheretheywerevacationing. The military gave chase and after one week, they were found in abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked with bolos. Marian and the baby she delivered were both
found dead, with the babys umbilical cord alreadycut.Pietrosurvived. Can Marians baby be the beneficiary of the insurancetakenonthelifeofthemother? A: An unborn child may be designated as the beneficiary in the insurance policy of the mother. An unborn child shall be considered a person for purposes favorable to it provided it is born later in accordance with the Civil Code. There is no doubt that the designation of the unbornchildasabeneficiaryisfavorabletothe child. Between Marian and the baby, who is presumedtohavediedahead? A: If the baby was not alive when completely delivered from the mothers womb, it was not born as a person, then the question of who between two persons survived will not be an issue. Since the baby had an intrauterine life ofmorethan7months,itwouldbeconsidered born if it was alive, at the time of its complete delivery from the mothers womb. We can gather from the facts that the baby was completely delivered. But whether or not it wasalivehastobeprovenbyevidence. If the baby was alive when completely deliveredfromthemotherswomb,thenitwas born as a person and the question of who survived as between the baby and the mother shall be resolved by the provisions of the Rules of Court on survivorship. This is because the question has nothing to do with succession. Obviously, the resolution of the question is needed just for the implementation of an insurance contract. Under Rule 13, Sec. 3, (jj), (5) as between the baby who was under 15 years old and Marian who was 18 years old, Marianispresumedtohavesurvived. In both cases, therefore, the baby never acquired any right under the insurance policy. The proceeds of the insurance will then go to theestateofMarian. Will Prieto, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the proceeds of thelifeinsuranceonthelifeofMarian?
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A: Since the baby did not acquire any right under the insurance contract, there is nothing forPrietotoinherit.(2008BarQuestion) B.DOMICILEANDRESIDENCEOFPERSON Q: Distinguish between residence and domicile. A: Residence is a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent to which, when absent, one hastheintentionofreturning. Q: Where is the domicile of a natural person for the exercise of civil rights and fullfilment ofcivilobligations? A:Hisplaceofhabitualresidence. Q:Whereisthedomicileofjuridicalpersons? A: 1. The place fixed by the law creating or recognizingthejuridicalperson 2. In the absence thereof, the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise theirprincipalfunctions.
II.MARRIAGE Q:Whatismarriage? A: Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugalandfamilylife.Itisthefoundationofthe family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limitsprovidedbytheFamilyCode.(Art.1,FC) A.REQUISITES 1.NATUREOFMARRIAGE Q: What is meant by the law when it declares marriageasaninviolablesocialinstitution? A: Marriage is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The State has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security andstabilityoftheStatearelargelydependenton it.Itisintheinterestanddutyofeachmemberof thecommunitytopreventthebringingaboutofa condition that would shake its foundation and lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status aregovernedbylaw,notbywilloftheparties. (Beso v. Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ991211, January 28, 2000 [citing Jimenez v. Republic, G.R. No.L12790,August31,1960]) Q:Distinguishmarriagefromordinarycontract. A: MARRIAGE ORDINARYCONTRACT Asacontract Specialcontract Merelyacontract Socialinstitution Applicablelaw Governedbythelaw Governedbythelaw onmarriage oncontracts Righttostipulate GR: Not subject to stipulation Generallysubjectto XPN: Property stipulations relations in marriage settlements Capacitytocontract Minorsmaycontract thrutheirparentsor Legalcapacityrequired guiardiansorinsome instances,by themselves Genderrequirement Contractingparties Contractingparties mustonlybetwo maybetwoormore personsofopposite personsregardlessof sexes sex Dissolutionbyagreement Dissolvedonlyby Canbedissolvedby deathorannulment, mutualagreement neverbymutual amongothers. agreement 2.KINDOFREQUISITES ESSENTIALREQUISITES Q:Whataretheessentialrequisitesofmarriage? A: 1. Legalcapacityofthecontractingparties whomustbeamaleandafemale 2. Consent freelygiven in the presence of thesolemnizingofficer
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Q: What constitute legal capacity of the parties tomarry? A:ASI 1. Ageatleast18yrs 2. Sexbetweenmaleandfemale 3. Lackoflegalimpedimenttomarry Q: Are there other requirements, taking into consideration the age of the parties to the marriage,forthevalidityofsuchmarriage? A:Yes,dependingupontheageofthecontracting party. ADDITIONAL AGE REQUIREMENTS 18to21yearsold 22to25yearsold
Note: Absence of the additional requirement of parental consent does not make the marriage void butonlyvoidable.
4.
A:Voidable Irregularityinformalrequisites? A: Valid, but the party responsible for such irregularity shall be civilly, criminallyoradministrativelyliable. 4.MARRIAGECEREMONY
Parentalconsentand Marriagecounselling Parentaladviceand Marriagecounselling
Q:Whatconstitutesavalidmarriageceremony? A:Thatwhichtakesplacewiththe: 1. appearance of the contracting parties beforethesolemnizingofficerand 2. their personal declaration that they shall take each other as husband and wife 3. in the presence of not less that 2 witnessesoflegalage.
Note: No particular form of ceremony or religious riteisrequiredbylaw.
FFORMALREQUISITES Q:Whataretheformalrequisitesofmarriage? A:CAL 1. MarriageCeremony 2. Authorityofthesolemnizingofficer 3. ValidmarriageLicense 3.EFFECTOFABSENCEOFREQUISITES Q:Whatisthestatusofmarriageincaseof: 1. Absence of any of the essential requisites? A:Voidabinitio 2. Absence of any of the formal requisites? A:GR:Voidabinitio. XPN: Valid even in the absence of formalrequisite: a. Marriages exempt from license requirement b. Either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing officerhadtheproperauthority. 3. Defectinessentialrequisites?
Q:Ismarriagebyproxyallowed? A:Itdepends. 1. IfperformedinthePhilippinesNo,it is notallowed,hencethemarriageisvoid.

Note: Philippine laws prohibit marriages by proxy. Since the marriage is performed in the Philippines, Philippine laws shall apply following the principle of lex loci celebrationis.
2.
If performed abroad Whether it is allowedornotdependsuponthelawof the place where the marriage was celebrated(lexlocicelebrationis)
Note: As to marriages between Filipinos all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws enforced in said country where they are solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid here in the country, except thoseprohibitedunderArt.35(1),(2),(4), (5),(6),36,37and38.(Art.26,FC)
5.SOLEMNIZINGAUTHORITY Q:Whoareauthorizedtosolemnizemarriage? A:Itdepends: 1. Underordinarycircumstances: a. Incumbent judiciary member provided, within the courts (his) jurisdiction
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b. Priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any church/religious sect duly authorized provided at least one of the parties belongs to such churchorreligioussect. Consul general, consul or vice consul provided both parties are Filipinos and marriage takes place abroad. Mayors(Arts444and445ofLGC)
Note:IncludesActingMayor
c.
d.
2.
Marriagesinarticulomortis: a. Ship captain or airplane chief provided the marriage is performed: i. During voyage, even during stopovers ii. Between passengers or crew members b. Military commander of a unit who is a commissioned officer provided the marriage is performed: i. Inabsenceofchaplain; ii. Within zone of military operation; iii. Between members of the armedforcesorcivilians
contract and the affidavit is only required for the purpose of evidencing the act, not a requisite of marriage. It is the obligation of the solemnizing officer. It does not affect the validity of marriage (DeLoriav.Felix,G.R.No.L9005,Jun.20,1958). Q:Whataretheauthorizedvenuesofmarriage? A: GR: Must be solemnized publicly within the jurisdictionoftheauthorityofthesolemnizing officer: 1. Chambersofthejudgeorinopencourt 2. Church,chapelortemple 3. Office of the consulgeneral, consul or viceconsul XPN: 1. Marriageatthepointofdeath 2. Marriageinremoteplaces 3. Marriageatahouseorplacedesignated by the parties with the written request tothesolemnizingofficertothateffect.
Note: This provision is only directory, not mandatory. The requirement that the marriage be solemnized in a particular venue or a public place is not an essential requisite for the validity of the marriage.
A.EXCEPTIONS
Q: What must the solemnizing officer in a marriage in articulo mortis do after solemnizing suchmarriage? A: He shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths, that the marriage wa performed in articulo mortis and that he took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of a legal impediment to the marriage. (Art.29,FC) Q: Will the solemnizing officers failure to execute an affidavit that he solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis affect the validity of marriage? A: No, it will not.The marriage will be still valid. The Law permits marriages in articulo mortis without marriage license but it requires the solemnizingofficertomakeanaffidavitandfileit. However, such affidavit is not an essential or formal requisite of marriage, the same with a Marriage Contract. The signing of the marriage
Q: What is the exception to the rule requiring authorityofthesolemnizingofficer? A: Marriages contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizingofficerhadtheauthoritytodoso. MARRIAGELICENSE Q: What is the period of the validity of a marriagelicense? A: A marriage license is valid in any part of the Philippines only for 120 days from the date of its issuance and shall be deemed automatically cancelledattheexpirationofsaidperiod.
Note: If the parties contracted marriage after 120 days lapsed from the issuance of the marriage license, such marriage shall be considered void for lackofmarriagelicense.
Q: What is the effect in the issuance of a marriage license if a party who is required by law to obtain parental advice or undergo marriagecounselingfailedtodoso?
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A: The issuance of marriage license is suspended for 3 months from the completion of publication oftheapplication.
Note:Themarriageisvalidinthiscase.
Q: What is the status of the marriage if the partiesgetmarriedwithinsaid3monthperiod? A:Itdepends. 1. If the parties did not obtain a marriage license the marriage shall be void for lackofmarriagelicense. 2. If the parties were able to obtain a marriage license the marriageshall be valid without prejudice to the actions that may be taken against the guilty party. Q:Whoissuesthemarriagelicense? A: The local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habituallyresides.
Note: Obtaining a marriage license in a place other than where either party habitually resides is a mere irregularity.
B.EXCEPTIONS Q:Whatarethemarriagesexemptfromthe licenserequirement? A:MARCOSZ 1. MarriagesamongMuslimsormembers ofethnicculturalcommunities. 2. MarriagesinArticulomortis.

NOTE:ArticuloMortismeansatthepoint ofdeath,notmerelyindangerofdying.
3.
MarriagesinRemoteplaces.
NOTE:RemotePlacenomeansof transportationtoenablethepartyto personallyappearbeforethesolemnizing localcivilregistrar.
4.
5.
6.
A.FOREIGNNATIONAL Q: What is required from the contracting parties beforeamarriagelicensecanbeobtained? A: Each of the contracting parties shall file a separate or individual sworn application with the properlocalcivilregistrar.
Note: Foreigners are further required to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials before theycanobtainamarriagelicense. For stateless persons or refugees, in lieu of a certificate of legal capacity, an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriagemustbesubmitted.
7.
MarriagesbetweenpartiesCohabiting foratleast5years MarriagessolemnizedOutsidethe Philippineswherenomarriagelicenseis requiredbythecountrywhereitwas solemnized. MarriagesinarticulomortisSolemnized byashipcaptainorairplanepilot MarriageswithinZonesofmilitary operation.
Q: What is the status of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a license issued without the requiredCertificateofLegalCapacity? A: The marriage is valid as this is merely an irregularity in complying with a formal requirement of the law in procuring a marriage license, which will not affect the validity of the marriage. (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. 138322, October 2,2001)
Q: What are the requisites for the 5year cohabitation exception to the marriage license requirement? A:Therequisitesare:5DPAS 1. Living together as husband and wife at least5yearsbeforethemarriage. The5yearperiodmustbecharacterized by: a. Exclusivity the partners must live together exclusively, with no other partners, during the whole 5year period. b. Continuity such cohabitation was unbroken.
Note:Theperiodiscountedfromthedate of celebration of marriage. It should be the years immediately before the day of themarriage.
2.
No legal impediment to marry each otherDuringtheperiodofcohabitation.
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Note: The fiveyear period of cohabitation must have been a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of marriage.
3.
4.
5.
Fact of absence of legal impediment must be Present at the time of the marriage Parties must execute an Affidavit that they are living together as husband and wife for 5 years and that they do not haveanyimpedimenttomarry Solemnizing officer must execute a Sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage (Manzano v. Sanches, Mar.1,2001)
Q:PepitowasmarriedtoTeodulfa.Teodulfawas shot by him resulting in her death. After 1 year and 8 months, he married Norma without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.Whatisthestatusoftheirmarriage? A: Void for lack of marriage license.To be exempt from the license requirement under the 5year cohabitation rule, the cohabitation should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract and is characterizedbycontinuity,thatis,unbroken,and exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years. It should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absenceofthemarriage. In this case, Pepito and Norma are not exempt from the marriage license requirement because at the time of Pepito and Norma's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day because from the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about twenty monthshadelapsed. Q:WouldyouranswerbethesameifPepitowas separatedinfactfromTeodulfa? A:Yes,themarriageisstillvoid.Eveniftheywere separatedinfact,andthereafterbothPepitoand Normahadstartedlivingwitheachotherthathas alreadylastedforfiveyears,thefactremainsthat Pepitohadasubsistingmarriageatthetime whenhestartedcohabitingwithNorma.Itis
immaterialthatwhentheylivedwitheachother, Pepitohadalreadybeenseparatedinfactfrom hislawfulspouse.Thesubsistenceofthe marriageevenwheretherewasactualseverance ofthefilialcompanionshipbetweenthespouses cannotmakeanycohabitationbyeitherspouse withanythirdpartyasbeingoneas"husbandand wife".(Nialv.Bayadog,GRNo.133778,March 14,2000) MARRIAGECERTIFICATE Q:Whatarethedistinctionsbetweenamarriage licenseandamarriagecertificate? MARRIAGELICENSE MARRIAGECERTIFICATE Authorizationbythe Bestevidenceofthe statetocelebrate existenceofthe marriage. marriage. Notanessentialor Formalrequisiteof formalrequisiteof marriage. marriage. Q: Guillermo and Josefa lived together as husband and wife, but there is doubt as to whethertheygotmarried,sincenorecordofthe marriage existed in the civil registry but their relatives and friends maintained that the two in fact married each other and lived as husband and wife for more than half a century. Is GuillermomarriedtoJosefa? A: They are presumed to be married. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to beinfactmarried.Thisistheusualorderofthings in society and, if the parties are not what they holdthemselvesouttobe,theywouldbelivingin constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio always presume marriage. (Vda. De la Rosa v. Heirs of Vda. De Damian, G.R. No. 103028,Oct.10,1997) Note:Althoughamarriagecontractisconsidereda
primaryevidenceofmarriage,itsabsenceisnot alwaysproofthatnomarriagetookplace.(Delgado Vda.DelaRosa,etal.v.HeirsofMarcianaRustia Vda.DeDamian,etal.,G.R.No.103028,Oct.10, 1997)
B.EFFECTOFMARRIAGECELEBRATEDABROAD ANDFOREIGNDIVORCE Q:Whatrulesgovernthevalidityofmarriage? A:Itdepends:
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1. As to its extrinsic validity Lex loci celebrationis
Note: Locus regit actum the act is governed by the law of the place where it is done is adhered to here in the Philippines asregards the extrinsic validity ofmarriage.
1.
2. A: 1.
May the Filipino spouse remarry despite the fact that divorce is not validinthePhilippines? Will your answer be the same if it was avalidmarriagebetweenFilipinos?
2.
AstoitsintrinsicvalidityPersonallaw
Note: Personal law may either be the nationallaworthelawoftheplacewhere thepersonisdomiciled.
If the person involved is a stateless person, domiciliary rule applies, otherwise,lexnationaliiapplies.
Q: What is the status of marriages between Filipinos solemnized abroad in accordance with thelawinforceinsaidcountry? A: GR: Marriages between Filipinos solemnized outsidethePhilippinesinaccordancewiththe law of the foreign country where it is celebrated,ifvalidthere,shallbevalidhereas such. XPN: It shall be void, even if it is valid in the foreign country where the marriage was celebrated, if any of the following circumstancesarepresent:LIM2B2P 1. Lack of legal capacity even with parental consent (e.g. party is below18); 2. Incestuous; 3. ContractedthroughMistakeofone party as to the identity of the other; 4. Contracted following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a previous marriage but Before partition,etc.; 5. Bigamous or polygamous except as provided in Art. 41 FC on terminablebigamousmarriages; 6. Void due to Psychological incapacity; 7. VoidforreasonsofPublicpolicy Q:Suppose in a valid mixed marriage (marriage between a citizen of a foreign country and a citizen of the Philippines,) the foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad and was capacitatedtoremarry.
Yes,theFilipinospouseiscapacitatedto remarry just as the alien spouse is capacitated. Divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry will likewise allow the Filipino spouse to remarry. This is the rule laid down in Article 26 (2) of theFamilyCode. It should be noted however that the foreign spouse must be capacitated to remarry before the Filipino spouse may alsobecapacitatedtoremarry.
Note: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 16 of the NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorcesabroad,whichmayberecognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. (Van Dornv.Romillo,Jr.,GRNo.L68470,Oct.8, 1985)
2.
It depends. What is material in this case is the citizenship of the spouse who obtainedadivorcedecreeabroadatthe time the decree was obtained and not their citizenship at the time the marriagewascelebrated. If the Filipino spouse was naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country before he/sheobtainsadivorcedecreeandwas thereafter capacitated to remarry, the Filipino spouse will be capacitated to remarry.
Note: Although said provision only provides for divorce obtained abroad by the foreign spouse in a valid mixed marriage, the legislative intent would be rendered nugatory if this provision would not be applied to a situation where there is a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, one of whom thereafter is
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naturalizedasaforeigncitizenandobtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, as in this case. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. (Republic v. Orbecido III, GR. No.154380,Oct.5,2005) Thenaturalizationofoneoftheparties,as well as the divorce decree obtained by himorher,mustbeprovenasafactunder our rules on evidence. The foreign law under which the divorce was obtained must likewise be proven as our courts cannottakejudicialnoticeofforeignlaws.
However, if the Filipino spouse remained to be a citizen of the Philippines when he/she obtained a divorce decree abroad, such decree will not be recognized in the Philippines even if that spouse is subsequently naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country. This is so because at the time thespouseobtainedthedivorcedecree, he/she was still a citizen of the Philippines and being naturalized afterwards does not cure this defect. (See: Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, Sept.21,2005)
Note: Burden of Proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely upon him. Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, andevery reasonable doubt uponthe subject should be resolved in the negative. (Garcia v. Recio,G.R.No.138322,Oct.2,2001)
C.VOIDANDVOIDABLEMARRIAGES Q:Whatmaybethestatusofmarriages? A: 1. Valid 2. Void 3. Voidable
Q: What are the distinctions between void and voidablemarriages? A: VOIDABLE VOIDMARRIAGE MARRIAGE Statusofmarriage Voidable:Validuntil Voidabinitio annulled Petitionfiled DeclarationofNullityof Annulmentof Marriage Marriage Whomayfile GR:Solelybythe husbandorwife. XPN:Anyrealparty ininterest,onlyin thefollowingcases: 1. Nullityof marriagecases GR:Offended commenced Spouse beforethe XPN: 1.Parentsor effectivityof guardiansincases A.M.No.02 ofinsanity 1110.March 2.Parentsor 15,2003. guardiansbefore 2. Marriages thepartyreaches celebrated 21yearsoldon duringthe thegroundofLack effectivityof theCivilCode. ofParental Authority (DeDios Carlosv. Sandoval,G.R. No.179922, December16, 2008). PrescriptivePeriod GR:Within5years fromdiscoveryof theground XPN: 1.Lifetimeof spouseincasesof Noprescriptiveperiod insanity 2.Beforethe partyreaches21 incaseswhere parentsor guardiansmayfile annulment
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Children GR:Illegitimate; XPN:Those conceivedorborn ofmarriages declaredvoid Legitimate under: 1. Art.36 (Psychological incapacity),or 2. Art.52in relationtoArt. 53 JudicialDeclaration GR:Not necessarythatthere isjudicial Necessary declaration XPN:incaseof remarriage 1.VOIDMARRIAGE Q: What are the marriages that are void ab initio? A:LAaMBPIPS18 1. Absence of any of the essential or formalrequisitesofmarriage; 2. Contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with the consent of parents orguardians; 3. Solemnized without License, except those marriages that are exempt from thelicenserequirement; 4. Solemnized by any person not Authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had thelegalauthoritytodoso; 5. Contracted through Mistake of one of the contracting party as to the identity oftheother; 6. Bigamousorpolygamousmarriages; 7. Subsequent marriages that are void underArt.53FC; 8. Marriages contracted by any party, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage, was Psychologically incapacitated; 9. IncentuousMarriages(Art.37,FC) 10. Marriages declared void because they are contrary to Public policy (Art. 38, FC). A.ABSENCEOFREQUISITES GENDERREQUIREMENT Q: What is the status of a marriage between Filipinos if the parties thereto are of the same sex? A: Void. For a marriage to be valid, it must be betweenpersonsofoppositesexes. Q:Incaseofachangeinsex,canthepersonwho has undergone said change be allowed to marry another of the same sex as he/she originally had? A: It depends upon the cause for the change in sex. 1. If the change is artificial No, he/she cannot.
Note: The sex or gender at the time of birth shall be taken into account. He is still, in the eyes of the law, a man although because of theartificialintervention, he now has the physiological characteristics of a woman (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, Oct.22,2007)
2.
Note: When one suffers from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, a disorder that changes the physiological characteristic of a person, the court may grant the change of gender. In this case, the person must not take unnatural steps to interfere what he/she is born with. Nature has taken its due course in revealing more fully the male/female characteristics (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676,Sept.12,2008).
IfthechangeisnaturalHe/shecan.
Q: Jennifer was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. In her early years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was found out that her ovarian structures had minimized. She also alleged that she has no breasts or menstration. She was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) a condition where persons thus afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of androgen. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.WhatisJennifersgenderorsex?
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A: Male. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Jennifer here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of androgen, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes thegenderclassificationatbirth inconclusive.Itis at maturity that the gender of such persons is fixed. Jennifer has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly,hehasalreadyorderedhislifetothat of a male. He could have undergone treatment andtakensteps,liketakinglifelongmedication,to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in his development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. To him belongs the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that he is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying him as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified his position and his personal judgment of being a male. (Republic v. Jennifer Cagandahan,G.R.No.166676,Sep.12,2008) CONSENTFREELYGIVEN Q: What is the effect of lack of free and voluntaryconsent? A: When consent is obtained through mistake, fraud, force, intimidation or undue influence, or when either of the contracting party is of unsound mind at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the marriage is annullable. (Art. 45, FC) CONTRACTEDBYPARTYBELOW18 Q: What is the status of marriages where one or bothofthepartiesarebelow18yearsofage? A:itisvoidforlackoflegalcapacity. Q: Would your answer be the same if their parentsconsentedtothemarriage? A: Yes. Parental consent does not have the effect ofcuringthisdefect. Q: What if the marriage was a mixed marriage where the Filipino is 18 years old but the foreigner is below 17 years of age. What is the statusofthemarriage? A: It depends. If the national law of the foreigner recognizes 17 year old persons to be capacitated tomarry,thentheirmarriageisvalid,otherwiseit isvoid.
Note:Lexnationaliiapplies
LACKOFAUTHORITYOFSOLEMNIZINGOFFICER Q: What is the effect of lack of authority of solemnizingofficer? A: GR:Themarriageisvoidabinitio. XPN: 1. Express If either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizerhadthelegalauthoritytodo so.(Art. 35,FC) 2. Implied Article 10 in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code. If the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino citizen abroad solemnized by a Philippine consul assigned in that country is recognized as valid in the host country, such marriage shall be considered as valid in the Philippines. ( Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family RelationsLaw) SOLEMNIZEDWITHOUTLICENSE Q: Judge Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, some couples were able to get married by the simpleexpedientofpayingthemarriagefees.As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflectanymarriagelicensenumber.Inaddition, the judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of the solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties. Such marriage contracts were not filed with the Local Civil Registry.Aresuchmarriagesvalid?
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A: No. The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license, except in the cases providedfortherein.Complementarily,itdeclares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisitesshallgenerallyrenderthemarriagevoid ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.(Cosca v. Palaypayon, A.M. No.MTJ92721,Sept.30,1994) CONTRACTEDTHROUGHMISTAKE Q: For the marriage to be void, on what circumstancemustthemistakereferto? A: For marriage to be rendered void, the mistake in identity must be with reference to the actual physical identity of other party, not merely a mistake in the name, personal qualifications, character,socialstanding,etc.(Rabuya,p.213) BIGAMOUSMARRIAGES Q: If a person contracts a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a prior marriage, what isthestatusofthesubsequentmarriage? A: GR:Voidforbeingbigamousorpolygamous. XPN: Valid if it is a terminable bigamous marriage. Q:Whenisamarriageconsideredbigamous? A: It is when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.(Art.349,RPC)
Note:Thesameappliestopolygamy.
declaration of nullity of marriage. (In re: Salvador v.Serafico,A.M.200820SC,Mar.15,2010)

Note: Under Art. 40 of the FC, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage, there must first be a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. If a party fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, he or she runs the risk of being charged with bigamy as the marital bond or vinculuminthefirstnuptialsubsists(Mercadov.Tan GR:137110,Aug.,2000;Tev.CAGRNo:126746,Nov. 29,2009).
Q: May a person contract a valid subsequent marriage before a first marriage is declared void abinitiobyacompetentcourt? A: No. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial
Q: What are the special cases when subsequent marriageisallowed? A: 1. Marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner and procurement by the alien spouseofavaliddivorcedecreeabroad, capacitatinghim/hertoremarry. 2. Terminable bigamous marriages (Art. 41) 3. PSYCHOLOGICALINCAPACITY Q:Whatispsychologicalincapacity? A: There is no exact definition for psychological incapacity, but it was defined by the Supreme Court as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged bythepartiestothemarriage. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the mostseriouscasesofpersonalitydisordersclearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. (Santosv.CA,G.R.No.112019,Jan.4,1995) Q: What are the requisites of psychological incapacity? A: 1. Juridical antecedence must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may arise only after suchmarriage. 2. Gravity grave enough to bring about thedisabilityof thepartytoassumethe essentalmaritalobligations. 3. Permanence or incurability must be incurable. If curable, the cure should be
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beyond the means of the parties involved. Q:Whataresomeinstanceswhereallegationsof psychologicalincapicitywerenotsustained? 1. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. (CaratingSiayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, Oct, 27. 2004) 2. Mere sexual infidelity or perversion, do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity, as well as immaturityandirresponsibility.
Note:Itmustbeshownthattheseactsare manifestations of a disorderedpersonality whichwouldmakerespondentcompletely unable to discharge the essential obligations of a marital state, not merely youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. (Dedel vs CA, G.R. no. 151867, Jan.29, 2004)
ground of annulment of marriage. (2002 Bar Question) INCESTUOUSMARRIAGES Q:Whatmarriagesareconsideredincestuous? A:Thosemarriages: 1. Between ascendants and descendants ofanydegree; 2. Between brothers and sisters whether ofthefullorhalfblood.
Note: Regardless of whether the relationship betweenthepartiesislegitimateorillegitimate.
3.
4.
Disagreements regarding money matters. (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610,Oct.19,2007) Mereabandonement.
Note: There must be proof of natal or supervening disabling element in the personality factor that effectively incapacitates aperson fromaccepting and complying with the Essential Marital obligations of Marriage. (Republic v. QuinteroHamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20,2004)
VOIDBYREASONOFPUBLICPOLICY Q: What are the marriages that are void by reasonofpublicpolicy? A: 1. Collateral blood relatives (legitimate or th Illegitimate)uptothe4 civildegree; 2. Stepparents&stepchildren; 3. Parentsinlaw&childreninlaw; 4. Adoptingparent&theadoptedchild; 5. Surviving spouse of the adopting parent &theadoptedchild; 6. Surviving spouse of the adopted child & theadopter; 7. Adopted child & legitimate child of the adopter; 8. Adoptedchildrenofthesameadopter; 9. Partieswhereone,withtheintentionto marry the other, kills the latters spouse,orhis/herspouse.
Note: List is exclusive. If not falling within this enumeration, the marriage shall be valid. Such as marriagesbetween: 1. AdoptedandIllegitimatechildoftheadopter 2. Stepbrotherandstepsister 3. Brotherinlawandsisterinlaw 4. Parties who have been guilty of adultery or concubinage
5.
Sexualinfidelity(Republicv.Dagdag,GR No.109975,February9,2001).
Q: Would the state of being of unsound mind or the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be considered indicia of psychological incapacity, if existingattheinceptionofmarriage?Explain. A: In the case of Santos v. CA (240 SCRA 20, 1995), the Supreme Court held that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality may be indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder. However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality is a
2.PRESCRIPTION Q: What is the prescriptive period of the action or defense for thedeclarationof absolute nullity ofmarriage? A: None. The time for filing an action or defense forthedeclarationofabsolutenullityofmarriage, whetherinadirectorcollateralmanner,doesnot prescribe.
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Note: Any of the parties in a void marriage can file an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage eventhoughsuchpartyisthewrongdoer.
Q: What is the effect of death of a party in a petitionfordeclarationofnullityofmarriages? A: 1. Before the entry of judgment The court shall order the case closed and terminated without prejudice to the settlement of estate in proper proceedings. 2. After the entry of judgment The decision shall be binding upon the parties and their successorsininterest inthesettlementoftheestate. Q: May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriageafterhisdeath? A: No. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of thedeceasedspousetobringanullityofmarriage case against the surviving spouse. While A.M. No. 021110SC declares that a petition for declarationofabsolutenullityofmarriagemaybe filedsolelybythehusbandorthewife,itdoesnot mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are withoutanyrecourseunderthelaw.Theycanstill protect their successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. However,withrespecttonullityofmarriagecases commencedbeforetheeffectivityofA.M.No.02 1110 and marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code, the doctrine laid down in the Nial v. Bayadog case still applies; that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. (De Dios Carlos v. Sandoval,G.R.No.179922,December16,2008). Q: If the court denies a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity, may a party to the said case file another petition for declaration of its nullity basedontheabsenceofmarriagelicense? A: A petition to declare the marriage void due to absence of marriage license, filed after the court
denied a petition to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity, is barred by res judicata. There is only one cause of action which is the nullity of the marriage. Hence, when the second case was filed based on another ground, there was a splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. The petitioner is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage license because in the first case, he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the absence of a marriage license. Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, thepartiesmustventilateallmattersandrelevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, Oct. 31, 2006) Q: Is the declaration of nullity of marriage appliedprospectively?
A: No, it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage. However,although the judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the parties is concerned, it must be noted that the marriage is not without legal consequences or effects. One such consequence or effect is the incurring of criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory the State's penal laws on bigamy as it would allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages. (Tenebro v.
CA,G.R.No.150758,Feb.18,2004)
Q: While his marriage is subsisting, Veronico married Leticia, which marriage was later declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. When Veronico got married for the third time, Leticia filed a case for bigamy against him. For his defense, Veronico claims that effects of the nullity of his marriage with Leticia retroacts to the date when it was contracted, hence, he is not guilty of bigamy for want of an essential element the existence of a valid previous marriage.RuleonVeronicosargument.
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A: No. Article 349 of the RPC penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous valid marriage. Here, as soon as the second marriage to Leticia was celebrated, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated as the second marriage was contracted during the subsistenceofthevalidfirstmarriage.(Tenebrov. CA,G.R.No.150758,Feb.18,2004) Q: Is the judicial declaration of absolute nullity ofavoidmarriagenecessary? A: 1. For purposes of remarriage judicial declaration of absolute nullity is necessary.
Note: In the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage whichislegallyunassailable,heisrequired by law to prove thatthepreviousonewas an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaringsuchpreviousmarriagevoid. Note: If both spouses of subsequent marriage acted inbadfaith,suchmarriageisvoidabinitio.
Q: Gregorio married Janet. When he was employed overseas, he was informed that Janet left. Five years later, he filed an action for her to bedeclaredpresumptivelydeadwithoutalleging that he wishes to remarry. Will his action prosper?
A: No. A petition to declare an absent spouse presumptively dead may not be granted in the absenceofanyallegationthatthespousepresent will remarry. Also, there is no showing that Gregorio conducted a search for his missing wife w/ such diligence as to give rise to a "well founded belief" that she is dead. The four requisitesnothavingconcurred,hisactionforthe declaration of presumptive death of his wife should be denied. (Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053,Mar.17,1993)
Q: What is the effect if the parties to the subsequent marriage obtains knowledge that thespouseabsenthasreappeared? A: None. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee's mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage,willnotterminatesuchmarriage.(SSSv. Jarque Vda. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, Mar. 24, 2006)
2.
Note: Here, evidence may be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of the grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. But these need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such marriage void. (Rabuya, Civil Law Reviewer,2009ed)
For purposes other than remarriage nojudicialactionisnecessary.
SUBSEQUENTMARRIAGE Q: In what cases may a person enter into a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a priormarriage? A: In case of terminable bigamous marriages. If before the celebration of the subsequent marriage:ABD 1. The Absent spouse had been absent for 4 consecutive years (ordinary absence) or 2 consecutive years (extraordinary absence); 2. The present spouse has a wellfounded Belief that the absent spouse is already dead; 3. There is judicial Declaration of presumptive death in a summary proceeding.
Q:Mayamarriagebeterminatedextrajudicially? A: Yes. The recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage shall automatically terminate the terminable bigamous marriage unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriageordeclaringitvoidabinitio.(Art.42) In Art 42, FC, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage contracted under Art. 41 is necessary. Also, the termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided for in Art.42doesnotprecludethefilingofanactionin court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. (SSS v. Jarque Vda. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, Mar. 24, 2006)
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Q: When are nonbigamous subsequent marriagesvoid? A: The subsequent marriage of a person whose prior marriage has been annulled but contracted said subsequent marriage without compliance withArt.52,FC,shallbevoid. Before he contracts a subsequent marriage, he must first comply with the requirement provided forinArt.52,viz: The recording in the civil registries and registries ofpropertiesofthefollowing:JPDD 1. Judgmentofannulment; 2. Partition; 3. Distributionofproperties,and 4. Deliveryofpresumptivelegitimes Q: Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers on board a commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten (10) years earlier and had never been heard of ever since. Believing that her husband had died, Ana married Adolf Cruz Staedler, a divorced German national born of a German father and a Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required to submit the requiredcertificateofcapacitytomarryfromthe German Embassy in Manila, Adolf stated in the application for marriage license stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a ceremony officiated by the Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu, Batangas, as the local parish priest refused to solemnize marriage except in his church. Is the marriagevalid?Explainfully. A:Theissuehingesonwhetherornotthemissing husbandwasdeadoraliveatthetimeofthe secondmarriage. If the missing husband was in fact dead at the time the second marriage was celebrated, the second marriage was valid. Actual death of a spouse dissolves the marriage ipso facto whether or not the surviving spouse had knowledge of such fact. A declaration of presumptive death even if obtained will not make the marriage voidable because presumptive death will not prevailoverthefactofdeath. If the missing husband was in fact alive when the second marriage was celebrated, the second marriage was void ab initio because of a prior subsisting marriage. Had Ana obtained a declaration of presumptive death, the second marriagewouldhavebeenvoidable. In both cases, the fact that the German misrepresented his citizenship to avoid having to present his Certificate of Legal Capacity, or the holding of the ceremony outside the church or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer, are all irregularities which do not affect the validity of the marriage. (2008 Bar Question).
VOIDABLEMARRIAGES Q:Whatistheeffectifamarriageisvoidable? A: A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action forannulmet.(Rabuya,Persons,p.295) Q:Whatarevoidablemarriagesandhowmay theyberatified? A: GROUND RATIFICATION Marriageofaparty18 yearsofageorover butbelow21 solemnizedwithout theconsentofthe parents,guardianor personhaving substituteparental authorityoverthe party,inthatorder Eitherpartywasof unsoundmind Contracting party who failed to obtain parental consent: Through free cohabitation after attainingtheageof21.
Note: The parents cannot ratify the marriage. The effect of prescription on their part is that they are barred from contesting it but the marriage is not yetcleansedofitsdefect.
Insane spouse: Through free cohabitation after comingtoreason.
Injured party: Through free cohabitation with Consentofeitherparty full knowledge of the wasobtainedbyfraud facts constituting the fraud. Injured party: Through Vicesofconsentsuch free cohabitation after asforce,intimidation theviceshaveceasedor orundueinfluence disappeared. ImpotenceandSTD May not be ratified but actionmaybebarredby prescription only, which is 5 years after the marriage
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UNSOUNDMIND Q: What is the test in determining unsoundness ofmindasagroundforannulment? A: It is essential that the mental incapacity must relate specifically to the contract of marriage and the test is whether the party at the time of the marriage was capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the marriage. (Rabuyapersons,p.300) Q: Who may file annulment based on unsound mind? A: GR: The sane spouse has the legal standing to file the action for annulment only in cases where he or she contracted the marriage withoutknowledgeoftheothersinsanity. XPN: When the sane spouse had knowledge of the others insanity, action for annulment maybefiledonlybythefollowing; 1. Any relative or guardian or person havinglegalchargeoftheinsane 2. The insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity (Rabuya,p.301) FRAUD Q: What are the circumstances constituting fraudunderArt.45(3)? A:NPSD 1. Nondisclosure of conviction by final judgment of crime involving moral turpitude; 2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of marriage, she was Pregnant by a man other than her husband; 3. Concealment of Sexually transmitted disease,regardlessofnature,existingat thetimeofmarriage; 4. Concealment of Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality and lesbianism.(Art.46)
Note:Any other misrepresentation as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity is not a ground for annulment. Note: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of the marriage. Supreme Court refused to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advance stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been patent to the husband. (Buccat v. Buccat, G.R. No. 47101, Apr.25,1941)
Q: Aurora prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on the ground of fraud in obtaining her consent after having learned that several months prior to their marriage, Fernando had premarital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her the "non divulgement to her of such premarital secret" constituted fraud in obtaining her consent w/in thecontemplationofno.4ofArt.85,NCC.Isthe concealment by the husband of a premarital relationship with another woman a ground for annulmentofmarriage? A: No. The nondisclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with another woman is not a ground for annulment of marriage. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Art. 85, No. 4 of the NCC. (now, Article 46 of the Family Code). This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by lawtothosekindsorspeciesoffraudenumerated inArt.86.
Note: The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the 3 cases therein may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Art. 85 (now, Article 46 of the FamilyCode), fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Art. 85, for anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. (Anaya v. Palaroan,GRL27930,Nov.261970)
DRUGADDICTION Q: Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all, for the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage,andlegalseparation? A: 1. Declarationofnullityofmarriage: a. The drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligationsofmarriage;
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b. It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and incurable: IMPOTENCE Q:When may impotence be a ground for annulmentofmarriage? A:CPUII 1. Exists at the time of the Celebration of marriage 2. Permanent (does not have to be absolute) 3. Incurable 4. Unknowntotheotherspouse 5. OtherspousemustnotalsobeImpotent Q: In case there is no proof as to the potency of onespouse,shallhebeconsideredasimpotent? A: GR:No.Presumptionisinfavorofpotency. XPN:Doctrineoftriennialcohabitation. Q:Whatisthedoctrineoftriennialcohabitation? A: If after 3 years of living together with her husband, the wife remained avirgin, the husband is presumed to be impotent. (Rabuya, Persons, p. 310) SEXUALLYTRANSMITTEDDISEASE Q: When may affliction of a sexually transmitted disease(STD)beagroundforannulment? A:Requisites:AESIAF a. OneofthepartiesisAfflictedwithSTD b. STDmustbe: a. Existing at the time the marriage is celebrated b. Serious c. apparentlyIncurable c. The other spouse must not be Aware of theothersaffliction d. InjuredpartymustbeFreefromSTD. Q: Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible, serious and incurable. Her boyfriend Joseph was aware of her condition and yet married her. After two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that she would probably never be able to bear him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his marriage with Yvette annulled on the ground that Yvette has STD. Yvette opposes the suit contendingthatJosephisestoppedfromseeking annulment of their marriage since he knew even before their marriage that shewas afflicted with HIVvirus.
2. a. b. c. The drug addiction must be concealed; It must exist at the time of marriage; There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug addiction; The case is filed within five (5) yearsfromdiscovery. Annulmentofmarriage:
d. 3. a. b.
Legalseparation: Thereshouldbenocondonationor consenttothedrugaddiction; Theactionmustbefiledwithinfive (5) years from the occurrence of thecause. Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.(BarQuestion1997)
c.
Q: If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? A: In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality shouldoccuronlyduringthemarriage,theywill: 1. Not constitute as grounds for declarationofnullity.(Art.36,FC) 2. Constitute as grounds for legal separation.(Art.55,FC);and 3. Not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable. (Arts. 45 and 46 of theFC)(2002BarQuestion) VITIATEDCONSENT Q: When is vitiated consent a ground for annulmentofmarriage? A: GR: Consent of either party was obtained by force,intimidationorundueinfluence XPN: If the same having disappeared or ceased,suchpartythereafterfreelycohabited withtheotherashusbandandwife
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Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriagewithYvetteprosper?Discussfully. A: No. Concealment of a sexually transmitted diseasemayannulthemarriageiftherewasfraud existinginthepartyconcerned.Inthiscase,there was no fraud because Joseph knew that Yvette wassufferingfromHIVwhenhemarriedher.(par 3,Art.46,FamilyCode) Q: Differentiate Articles 45 and 46 of the Family CodeonSTDasgroundforannulment A: ARTICLE45 ARTICLE46 Affliction Concealment The act of concealing Thefactofbeing is the ground for afflictedistheground annulment as it forannulment constitutesFraud Whetherconcealedor Theremustbe not concealment MustbeSeriousand Doesnothavetobe Incurable seriousandincurable
force,intimidation,orundueinfluence Within5yearsfromthe timetheforce, intimidation,orundue influencedisappeared orceased
Injuredparty
Eitherpartywasphysicallyincapableof consummatingthemarriagewiththeother,and suchincapacitycontinuesandappearstobe incurable Injuredparty Within5yearsafterthe celebrationofmarriage
Eitherpartywasafflictedwithasexually transmissiblediseasefoundtobeseriousand appearstobeincurable Injuredparty 5.PRESENCEOFPROSECUTOR Q: What is the role of the prosecutor or Solicitor General in all cases of annulment or declaration ofabsolutenullityofmarriage? A: They shall take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not suppressed. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated. Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing thefabricationorsuppressionofevidence. Q: When is the nonintervention of the prosecutor not fatal to the validity of the proceedingsinthetrialcourt? A:Incaseswheretherespondentinapetitionfor annulment vehemently opposed the same and where he does not allege that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. (Tuasonv.CA,G.R.No.116607,April10,1996) Q:Whataretheactionsprohibitedinannulment and declaration of absolute nullity of marriage cases? A:CCSSJ 1. Compromise 2. Confessionofjudgment 3. Stipulationoffacts 4. Summaryjudgment 5. Judgmentonthepleadings Within5yearsafterthe celebrationofmarriage
Q: Who may file and when should the petition forannulmentofvoidablemarriagesbefiled? A: WHOMAYFILE WHENTOFILE Marriagewassolemnizedwithouttheconsentof theparents,guardianorpersonhaving substituteparentalauthorityovertheparty Contractingparty Parent,guardian,or personhavinglegal chargeofthe contractingparty Sanespousewhohad noknowledgeofthe othersinsanity Anyrelative,guardian orpersonhavinglegal chargeoftheinsane Insanespouse Within5yearsafter attainingtheageof21 Atanytimebeforesuch partyhasreachedthe ageof21
Eitherpartywasofunsoundmind Atanytimebeforethe deathofeitherparty Atanytimebeforethe deathofeitherparty Duringalucidintervalor afterregainingsanity
Theconsentofeitherpartywasobtainedby fraud Injuredparty Within5yearsafterthe discoveryoffraud
Theconsentofeitherpartywasobtainedby
30
Note: What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession (Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35). Thus, stipulation of facts or confession of judgment if sufficiently supported by other independent substantial evidence to support the main ground relied upon, may warrant an annulment or declarationofabsolutenullity.
6.PENDENCYOFACTION Q: What is the duty of the Court during the pendency of the action for annulment, declaration of absolute nullity of marriage or legalseparation? A: The Court shall, in the absence of adequate written agreement between the spouses, provide forthe: 1. Supportofthespouses 2. Support and custody of the common children. 3. Visitationrightsoftheotherparent. 7.EFFECTSOFNULLITY Q: What rule governs the liquidation of properties in marriages declared void or annulledbyfinaljudgment? A: 1. Voidmarriages: GR: The rules on coownership under theCivilCode.(Valdesv.RTC) XPN: Art. 43(2) of the Family Code in marriages declared void under Art. 40. (Art.50) 2. Voidable marriages under Art. 45: shall be liquidated in accordance with Art. 43(2)oftheFamilyCode.(Art.50)
Note:InbothinstancesunderArticles40and45,the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement enteredintobeforethemarriage.Sincetheproperty relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties. (Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044,January19,2011)
A:Thefinaljudgmentshallprovidefortheff: 1. Liquidation,partitionanddistributionof thepropertiesofthespouses; 2. Custody and support of the common children;and 3. Deliveryoftheirpresumptivelegitimes, Unless such matters had already been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings, in which case, the final judgment of nullity or annulmentneednotprovideforthosewhichhave alreadybeenadjudicated.
Note:Wheretherewasafailuretorecordinthecivil registry and registry of property the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the property of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes, it shall not affect third persons.(Arts.52&53)
Q: What must the final judgment of nullity or annulmentprovide?
Q:Whataretheformsofpresumptivelegitime? A: 1. cash 2. property 3. soundsecurity Q: What must be done by a person whose prior marriage was annulled or declared void if he wishestoremarry? A: He must comply with the requirement provided for in Art. 52, before he contracts a subsequentmarriage,viz: The recording in the civil registries and registries ofpropertiesofthefollowing:JPDD 1. Judgmentofannulment; 2. Partition; 3. Distributionofproperties;and 4. Deliveryofpresumptivelegitimes. III.LEGALSEPARATION A.GROUNDS Q:Whatarethegroundsforlegalseparation? A:PALFACSILA 1. Repeated Physicalviolence or grossly abusive conduct against petitioner, commonchild,childofpetitioner; 2. Attemptto corrupt or induce petitioner, common child, child of petitioner to engage in prostitution, or connivance in suchcorruptionorinducement;
31
3. 4. 5. Attempt by respondent against Lifeof petitioner; Final judgment sentencing respondent toimprisonmentofmorethan6years; Drug Addiction or habitual alcoholismof respondent;
Note:It must exist after celebration of marriage
2. 3.
6.
7.
8. 9.
Physical violence or moral pressure to Compel petitioner to changereligious or politicalaffiliation; Bigamous marriage Subsequently contracted by respondent in the Philippinesorabroad SexualInfidelityorperversion; Lesbianism/homosexuality of respondent;
Note: It must exist after celebration of marriage
4.
10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondentwithoutjustifiablecausefor morethan1year. Q: Lucita left the conjugal dwelling and filed a petition for legal separation due to the physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusiveconductshehadsufferedatthehandsof Wiliam, her husband. William denied such and claimed that since it was Lucita who had left the conjugal abode, then the decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art.56 (4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. Should legal separation be denied on the basis of Williamsclaimofmutualguilt? A: No. Art. 56 (4) of the FC does not apply since the abandonment that is a ground for legal separation is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. In this case, Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct. Such act does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. Since this is so, there is no mutual guilt between them as there is only one erring spouse. (Ong Eng Kiam v. CA,GRNo.153206,Oct.23,2006) Q:What acts are considered acts of violence underR.A.9262? A: 1. Causing, threatening to cause, or attempting to cause physical harm to thewomanorherchild;
5.
6.
Placing the woman or her child in fear ofimminentphysicalharm; Attemptingtocompelorcompellingthe womanorherchild: a. to engage in conduct which the womanorherchildhastherightto desistfrom;or b. desist from conduct which the womanorherchildhastherightto engagein, Attempting to restrict or restricting the womans or her childs freedom of movementorconductby: a. Force,or b. threatofforce; c. physical,or d. otherharm,or e. threatofphysicalorotherharm; f. intimidation directed against the womanorchild. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the womans or her childs movement orconduct: i. Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/hisfamily; ii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the womans children insufficient financialsupport; iii. Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her childofalegalright; iv. Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victims own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
32

sexual activity which does not constituterape,by: a. Force,or b. threatofforce; c. physicalharm,or d. through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/hisimmediatefamily; Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distresstothewomanorherchild. This shall include, but not be limited to, thefollowingacts: a. Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; b. Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the womanorherchild; c. Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; d. Destroying the property and personalbelongingnessorinflicting harm to animals or pets of the womanorherchild;and e. Engaging in any form of harassmentorviolence; Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of accesstothewomanschild/children. A: Protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child and granting other necessary relief. (Rabuya, Persons, p.376) Thereliefgrantedunderaprotectionorderserves the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victims daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcementagencies.Theprotectionordersthat may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order (TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). Q:Whomayfileforprotectionorder? A: 1. Theoffendedparty; 2. Parents or guardians of the offended party; 3. Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree ofconsanguinityoraffinity; 4. Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units(LGUs); 5. Police officers, preferably those in chargeofwomenandchildrensdesks; 6. Punongbarangayorbarangaykagawad; 7. Lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcareproviderofthepetitioner; 8. At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.
7.
8.
Note: The Supreme Court decided to withhold the names and identities of women and child victims, from the court records in order to respect their dignity and protect their privacy. These rulings give effect to the provisions of R.A. 9262. The confidentiality or nondisclosure rule covers the withholding of information relating to the personal circumstances of the victim which tend to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members. In the aforesaid cases, the names of the victims were substituted with initials. (People v. Melchor Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, Sept.19, 2006; People v. Alexander Mangitngit, G.R. No. 171270, Sept. 20, 2006)
B.DEFENSES Q: What are the grounds for denial of petition forlegalseparation? A:C4MPDR 1. Condonationofactcomplainedof; 2. Consent to the commission of the offense/act; 3. Connivance in the commission of the act; 4. Collusion in the procurement of decree ofLS; 5. Mutualguilt;
Q:WhatisaProtectionOrderunderR.A.9262?
33
6. 7. Prescription: 5 yrs from occurrence of cause; Death of either party during the pendency of the case (LapuzSy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L31429, Jan. 31, 1972); Reconciliationofthespousesduringthe pendencyofthecase(Art.56,FC). 1. 2. A: Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legalseparation? Hastheactionprescribed?
8.
1.
Q: What is the prescriptive period for filing a petitionforlegalseparation? A: An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause (Art. 57, FC). An action filed beyond thatperiodisdeemedprescribed. Q: William filed a petition for legal separation in 1955 grounded on Juanitas adulterous relations allegedly discovered by William in 1945. Was Williamsactionalreadybarredbyprescription? A: Yes. Under Article 102, NCC, an action for legal separation can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from andafterthedatewhensuchcauseoccurred. In this case, Williams action is already barred because of his failure to petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. (Brown v.Yambao,G.R.No.L10699,Oct.18,1957)
Note: This casewas decidedunderthe civil codenot underthefamilycode.
Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is a ground for legal separation unless upon returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to cohabit with Ariel which is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case,thereiscondonation. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines or abroad is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code. Whether the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having convertedintoIslam,isimmaterial.
2.
No.UnderArticle57oftheFamilyCode, the aggrieved spouse must file the action within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause. The subsequent marriage of Ariel could not have occurred earlier than 1990, the time he went to Saudi Arabia. Hence, Rosa has until 1995 to bring the action under the Family Code. (1994 Bar Question)
C.COOLINGOFFPERIOD Q:Whatisthemandatorycoolingoffperiod? A: The requirement set forth by law that an actionforlegalseparationshallinnocaseshallbe tried before 6 months has elapsed since the filing of the petition, to enable the contending spouses to settle differences. In other words, it is for possiblereconciliation.
Note: There is no coolingoff period if the ground alleged are those under R.A. 9262 (Antiviolence againstWomenandChildren).
What is the effect of failure to interpose prescriptionasadefense? A:None.Whileitistruethatprescriptionwasnot interposed as a defense, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. (Brown v.Yambao, G.R. No. L 10699,Oct.18,1957) Q: Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5. 1988. In 1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted into Islam, Ariel married Mystica, Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1, 1992 when Ariel returned to thePhilippineswithMystica.Rosafiledanaction forlegalseparationonFebruary5,1994.
D.RECONCILIATIONEFFORTS
Q: What is required of the Court before legal separationmaybedecreed? A: The Court shall take steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and must be fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation ishighlyimprobable
34

E.CONFESSIONOFJUDGMENT Q:Whatistheruleinrenderingajudgmentof legalseparationbaseduponastipulationoffacts orconfessionofjudgment? A:Adecreeoflegalseparationcannotbeissued solelyonthebasisofastipulationoffactsora confessionofjudgment.Thegroundsforlegal separationmustbeproved.Neitherconfessionof judgmentnorsummaryjudgmentisallowed. Note:Whatthelawprohibitsisajudgmentbased exclusivelyormainlyondefendant'sconfession.( Ocampov.Florenciano,G.R.No.L13553,February 23,1960) EXTENTOFINQUIRYOFPROSECUTOR Q: After learning of Juanitas misconduct, William filed a petition for legal separation. During his crossexamination by the Assistant Fiscal,itwasdiscoveredthatWilliamlivedwitha woman named Lilia and had children with her after the liberation. The court denied the petition on the ground both of them had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barredtherightofactionunderArt.100,NCC. William argues that in crossexamining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia, who was nothiswife,theAssistantFiscalactedascounsel for Juanita when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, to interveneforthestate.Ishisargumentcorrect? A: The argument is untenable. It was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that Juanita's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable him to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is the fact of William's cohabitation with Lilia, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Such evidence of misconduct is a proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses. Article101NCC,callingfortheinterventionofthe state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) emphasizes that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon the partiesthemselves.Itisconsonantwiththispolicy thattheinquirybytheFiscalshouldbeallowedto focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not. (Brown v.Yambao,G.R.No.L10699,Oct.18,1957) Q: Who may file, when and where should the petitionforlegalseparationbefiled? A: Whomay Husbandorwife file Within5yearsfromthetimeof Whentofile theoccurrenceofthecause FamilyCourtoftheprovinceor citywherethepetitionerorthe respondenthasbeenresidingfor Whereto atleast6monthspriortothe file dateoffilingorincaseofanon resident,wherehemaybefound inthePhilippines,attheelection ofthepetitioner
F.EFFECTSOFFILINGPETITION Q:What are the effects of filing of a petition for legalseparation? A: 1. The spouses shall be entitled to live separatelyfromeachother. 2. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the court shall designate either the husband or the rd wife or a 3 person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnershipproperty.
G.EFFECTSOFPENDENCY Q: What is the effect of the death of plaintiff spousebeforeadecreeoflegalseparation? A: The death of plaintiff before a decree of legal separation abates such action. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. Even if property rights are involved, because these rights aremereeffectsofthedecreeoflegalseparation, being rights in expectation, these rights do not come into existence as a result of the death of a party.AlsoundertheRulesofCourt,anactionfor legal separation or annulment of marriage is not
35
one which survives the death of spouse. (Lapuz v. Eufemio,G.R.No.L31429,Jan.31,1972) Q: May the heirs of the deceased spouse continue the suit (petition for decree of legal separation) if the death of the spouse takes placeduringthependencyofthesuit? A: No. An action for legal separation is purely personal,therefore,thedeathofonepartytothe action causes the death of the action itself actionpersonalismoriturcumpersona.
Note: Incases where one of the spouses is dead as well as in case the deceaseds heirs continue the suit,Separation of property and any forfeiture of sharealreadyeffectedsubsists,unlessspousesagree toreviveformerpropertyregime spousesispurelypersonal.TheCivilCoderecognizes this (1) by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; (2) by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already granted.(Lapuz v. Eufemio, G.R.No.L31429,Jan.31,1972)
Q: May the wife who has been granted legal separation petition be allowed to revert to her maidenname? A:No.Themarriagebondnothavingsevered,the womanremainstobethelawfulwifeoftheman.
Note: Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art.373,CivilCode)ispermissiveandnotobligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). Under the present article of our Code, however,theword"may"isused,indicatingthatthe use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon marriage. This is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways providedbythisArticle.(Yasinv.Hon.JudgeShariah Districtcourt,G.R.No.94986,Feb.23,1995)
H.EFFECTSOFLEGALSEPARATION
Q: What are the effects of decree of legal separation? A: 1. Spousesentitledtoliveseparately;

Note:Marriagebondnotsevered
2.
ACP/CPG shall liquidated;
be
dissolved
or
Note:But offending spouse shall have no righttoanyshareofthenetprofitsearned by the AC/CP which shall be forfeited in accordingw/Art.43(2).
3.
4.
5.
6.
Custody of minor children is awarded to the innocent spouse (subject to Art. 213,FC); Offending spouse is disqualified to inherit from innocent spouse by intestatesuccession; Provisions in will of innocent spouse which favors offending spouse shall be revokedbyoperationoflaw; Innocent spouse may revoke donations he/she made in favor of offending spouse;
Note: Prescriptive period: 5 years from finalityofdecreeoflegalseparation
7.
Innocent spouse may revoke designation of offending spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy (evenwhenstipulatedasirrevocable).
Note: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than bedandboard separation of the
Q:Whichofthefollowingremedies, a. declarationofnullityofmarriage, b. annulmentofmarriage, c. legalseparation,and/or d. separationofproperty, can an aggrieved spouse avail himself/herselfof: a. If the wife discovers after the marriage that herhusbandhasAIDS? A: Since AIDS is a serious and incurable sexually transmissible disease, the wife may file an action for annulmentof the marriage on this ground whether such fact was concealed or not from the wife,providedthatthediseasewaspresentatthe time of the marriage. The marriage is voidable even though the husband was not aware that he hadthediseaseatthetimeofmarriage. b.Ifthewifegoes(to)abroadtoworkasanurse and refuses to come home after the expiration ofherthreeyearcontractthere?
36

A: If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) monthsfromtheexpirationofhercontract,sheis presumed to have abandoned the husband and he may file an action for judicial separation of property. If the refusal continues for more than one year from the expiration of her contract, the husband may file the action for legal separationunder Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the ground of abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she leaves the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The intention not to return cannot be presumed during the 30year periodofhercontract. c. If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife has been a prostitute before they gotmarried? A: If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife was a prostitute before they got married,hehasnoremedy.Nomisrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground for an action for the annulment of marriage (Article 46FC). d. If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop notwithstanding advicefromrelativesandfriends? A: The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husbands sexual infidelity is a ground for legal separation (Article 55, FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of propertyforfailureofherhusbandtocomplywith his marital duty of fidelity (Article 135 (4), 101, FC). e.Ifthehusbandbeatsuphiswifeeverytimehe comeshomedrunk? A: The wife may file an action for legal separationon the ground of repeated physical violence on her person (Article 55 (1), FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of propertyfor failure of thehusband to comply with hismaritaldutyofmutualrespect(Article135(4), Article 101, FC). She may also file an action for declaration of nullityof the marriage if the husbands behavior constitute psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration ofmarriage.(2003BarQuestion) I.RECONCILIATION Q:Whataretheeffectsofreconciliation? A: 1. AstotheDecree: a. Duringthependencyofthecase:LS proceedings terminated in whateverstage b. After the issuance of the decree: FinaldecreeofLStobesetaside 2. AstothePropertyRegime: GR: With respect to separation of properties,thesameshallsubsist. XPN: The parties, however, can come into an agreement to revive their previous regime. Their agreement must beunderoathandmustcontainalistof thepropertiesdesiredtobereturnedto the community or conjugal property and those which will remain separate, a listofcreditorsandtheiraddresses. 3. As to capacity to succeed: The Family Code does not provide for the revival of revoked provisions in a will originally made in favor of the offending party as aresultoftheLS.Thisabsencegivesthe innocent spouse the right to choose whether the offending spouse will be reinstituted. 4. As to the forfeited shares: Those given tothechildrencannotbereturnedsince thespousesarenolongertheownersof such. But those given to the innocent spousemaybereturned.
Note:Inanactionforlegalseparationontheground of adultery filed by the husband, even though the defendant wife did not interpose the defense of prescription, nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decreeoflegalseparationorannulmentofmarriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. Also, the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense by livingwithanotherwoman. This is an exception to the Rules of Court provision that defenses not raised in the pleadings will not be considered since provisions on marriage are substantive in nature.(Brown v. Yambao, G.R. No. L 10699,Oct.18,1957)
37
Q: Does reconciliation automatically revive the formerpropertyregimeofthespouses? A: No. If the spouses want to revive the previous property regime, they must execute an agreement to revive the former property regime, which agreement shall be submitted in court, together with a verified motion for its approval. (Art.67,FamilyCode) The agreement to revive must be under oath and specify: 1. The properties to be contributed anew totherestoredregime; 2. Those to be retained as separated propertiesofeachspouse;and 3. The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing toeach. Q: How does Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation differfromeachother? A: DECLARATION LEGAL OFNULLITYOF ANNULMENT SEPARATION MARRIAGE Marriagebond Noeffect, marriage bond remains valid liquidated pursuanttothe ordinaryruleson coownership. XPN:Marriages declaredvoid underArt.40 whichshallbe liquidatedin accordancewith Art.43 (2).(Valdesv. RTC) propertyorconjugal partnership,shallbeforfeited infavorofthecommon children,or iftherearenone,the childrenoftheguiltyspouse byapreviousmarriage,or indefaultofchildren,the innocentspouse
Donationspropternuptias GR:Shallremainvalid.[Art. 43(3)] XPN: 1. ifdoneecontractedthe marriageinbadfaith, suchdonationsmadeto saiddoneeshallbe revokedbyoperationof law. 2. ifbothspousestothe marriageactedinbad faith,alldonations propternuptiasshallbe revokedbyoperationof law. Insurance Ifonespouseactedinbad faith,innocentspousemay revokehisdesignationas beneficiaryintheinsurance policyevenifsuch designationbestipulatedas irrevocable.[Art.43(4)] Succession Ifonespousecontractedthe marriageinbadfaith,heshall bedisqualifiedtoinheritfrom innocentspousebytestate andintestatesuccession.[Art. 43(5)]
Dissolved
Dissolved
Statusofchildren GR:Illegitimate XPN:Children conceivedor bornof marriages before declarationof nullityunder Arts.36and53 considered legitimate GR:Governed eitherbyArticle 147orArticle 148ofthe FamilyCode. Thus,property regimeshallbe
Legitimate
Propertyrelations ACP/CPGshallbedissolved& liquidated.[Art.43(2)] Shareofspouse,who contractedthesubsequent marriageinbadfaith,inthe netprofitsofthecommunity
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IV.RIGHTSANDOBLIGATIONSBETWEEN HUSBANDANDWIFE A.ESSENTIALOBLIGATIONS 3. Exercise parental authority over childrens property (Republic v. CA, Molina,G.R.No.108763,Feb.13,1997).
Q: What are the rights and obligations of the spouses? A: 1. Essentialmaritalobligations(EMO):LOR a. Livetogether
Note: Includes consortium and copulation
Q: May the performance of essential marital obligationsbecompelledbycourt? A: GR: Performance of EMO under Art. 68 cannot be compelled by court because it will beaviolationofpersonalliberty. XPN: Giving support (Arroyo v. Arroyo, G.R. No.L17014,Aug.11,1921)
2. 3.
4. 5.
6.
Observe mutual love, respect, fidelity c. Rendermutualhelpandsupport Fixthefamilydomicile(Art.69,FC) Jointlysupportthefamily(Art.70,FC) a. Expenses shall be paid from the communityproperty b. In the absence thereof from the income or fruits of their separate properties c. In the absence or insufficiency thereof from their separate properties Managethehousehold(Art.71,FC) Not to neglect duties, or commit acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor, orinjurytofamily(Art.72,FC) Either spouse may practice any legitimate profession/business, even without the consent of the other. (Art. 73,FC) b.
Note: Other spouse may object on valid, seriousandmoralgrounds.
Q:Whofixesthefamilydomicile? A:Thehusbandandwife.
Note:IncaseofdisagreementtheCourtshalldecide.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decidewhether: a. Objectionisproper;and b. Benefit has accrued to the family beforeandaftertheobjection.
Note: The foregoing shall not prejudice rightofcreditorswhoactedingoodfaith.
Q:WhenmaytheCourtexemptonespouse fromlivingwiththeother? A: 1. Ifonespouseshouldliveaboad. 2. Othervalidandcompellingreasons. Note:TheCourtshallnotgranttheexemptionifit isnotcompatiblewiththesolidarityofthefamily. Q:Fromwhereshalltheexpensesforthe supportofthefamilycomefrom? A: 1. Communityproperty 2. In the absence thereof, from the incomeofseparateproperties. 3. Intheabsenceofsuchincome,fromthe separateproperties. Q:Canaspouseobjectintheexercisebythe otherofhis/herprofession,occupationor business? A:Yes,butonlyonvalid,seriousandmoral grounds.
Note:Otherspousemayobjectonvalid,seriousand moralgrounds. Incaseofdisagreement,thecourtshalldecide whether: a. Objectionisproper;and b. Benefithasaccruedtothefamilybefore andaftertheobjection. Note:Theforegoingshallnotprejudicerightof creditorswhoactedingoodfaith.
Q:Whataretheotherobligationsofspouses? A: 1. Exercise the duties and enjoy the rights ofparents; 2. Answer for civil liability arising from injuriescausedbychildrenbelow18;
39
Q: What law shall govern the property relations ofspouses? A: GR:Philippinelawsshallgovern,regardlessof placeofcelebrationandresidenceofspouses, in the absence of contrary stipulation in a marriagesettlement.(Art.80,FamilyCode) XPN:Lexreisitaeapplies: 1. Wherebothspousesarealiens; 2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts: a. affecting property not situated in thePhilippines;and b. executed in the country where the propertyislocated; 3. With respect to extrinsic validity of contracts: a. enteredintointhePhilippines;but b. affecting property situated in a foreigncountrywhoselawsrequire differentformalitiesforitsextrinsic validity Q: What governs the property relations of spouses? A:Thepropertyrelationsshallbegovernedbythe ff.inthestatedorder: 1. Marriagesettlement 2. ProvisionsoftheFamilyCode 3. Localcustom Q: Marriage being a contract, may the parties enter into stipulations which will govern their marriage? A: Yes, only as to their property relations during the marriage subject only to the condition that whatever settlement they may have must be within the limits provided by the Family Code. However, the nature, consequences, and effects of marriage cannot be subject to stipulation. (Rabuya,Persons,p.398)
Note: Future spouses may agree upon the regime of absolute community of property, conjugal partnershipofgains,absoluteseparationofpropetry oranyotherregime.
Note:Thewaivermustbeinapublicinstrumentand recorded in the office of the local civil registrar wherethemarriagecontractwasrecordedaswellas intheproperregistryofproperty.
A.MARRIAGESETTLEMENTS
Q:Whatisamarriagesettlement(MS)? A: It is a contract entered into by spouses about to be married for the purpose of fixing the terms and conditions of their property relations with regardtotheirpresentandfutureproperty. It is also refered to as Ante Nuptial Agreementor MatrimonialContract.(Pineda,2008edition) Q:WhataretherequisitesofavalidMS? A:ISER 1. Inwriting; 2. Signedbytheparties; 3. Executed before the celebration of marriage; rd 4. Registration(tobind3 persons).
Note: The provisions in the marriage settlement must be in accordance with law, morals or public policy,otherwisesuchagreementisvoid(Paras,Civil Code,bookI,pp.516)
Q: What are the additional requirements for the validityoftheMS? A: ADDITIONAL FACTUALSITUATION REQUIREMENT Theff.mustbemadea Ifoneofbothofthe partytotheMS, partiesare: otherwisetheMSis void: Parents;or 1821yearsold thoserequiredtogive consent Sentencedwithcivil interdiction Disabled Guardianappointed bythecourt Guardianappointed bythecourt
Q: Are rights over share in the community or conjugalpropertywaivableduringthemarriage? A: GR:No. XPN:Incaseofjudicialseparationofproperty.
Q:Mayamarriagesettlementbemodified? A:Yes.ForanymodificationintheMStobevalid: 1. The requisites for a valid MS must be present; 2. Theremustbejudicialapproval; 3. SubjecttotheprovisionsofArts.66,67, 128,135,and136.
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Q: What is the effect on the ante nuptial agreement in case the marriage is not celebrated? A: GR: Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts in consideration of the marriage shallberenderedvoid. XPN: Those not dependent upon or is not made in consideration of the marriage subsists. B.DONATIONSBYREASONOFMARRIAGE Q: When are donations considered as donations byreasonofmarriage? A: Those donations which are made before the celebration of the marriage, in consideration of thesame,andinfavorofoneorbothparties. Q:Whataretherequisitesfordonationspropter nuptias(DPN)? A: 1. Madebeforecelebrationofmarriage; 2. Madeinconsiderationofthemarriage; 3. Made in favor of one or both of the futurespouses. Q: What are the requisites if donation be made byonespouseinfavoroftheother? A: 1. There must be marriage settlement (MS) stipulating a property regime otherthanACP; 2. Donation in the MS be not more that 1/5ofthepresentproperty; 3. There must be acceptance by the other spouse. C.VOIDDONATIONSBYTHESPOUSES Q: What is the rule regarding donations made betweenspouses? A: 1. Beforethemarriage: GR: Future spouses cannot donate to each other more than 1/5 of their present property(Excessshallbeconsideredvoid) XPN: If they are governed by ACP, then each spouse can donate to each other in their marriage settlements present property without limit, provided there is sufficient property left for their support and the legitimesarenotimpaired. 2. GR: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between spousesareconsideredvoid. XPN: Moderate gifts on the occasion of any familyrejoicing.
Note: The aforementioned rules also apply to commonlawspouses.
Duringthemarriage:
Q: Why are donations between spouses during marriageconsideredvoid? A: 1. To protect unsecured creditors from beingdefrauded; 2. To prevent the stronger spouse from inposing upon the weaker spouse transfer of the latters property to the former; 3. To prevent indirect modification of the marriagesettlement.
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Q: What are the grounds for filing an action for revocation of a DPN and what their respective prescriptive periods? A:
GROUNDS(Art.86) 1. Marriageisnotcelebrated XPN:Thoseautomaticallyrenderedvoidbylaw Groundfornullity: a.Contractedsubsequentmarriage beforepriormarriagehasbeen judiciallydeclaredvoid b.anyothergrounds 3. Marriagetookplacewithoutconsentofparents,whenrequiredby law 4. Marriageisannulledanddoneeactedinbadfaith 5. Uponlegalseparation(LS),doneebeingtheguilty spouse 6. Donationsubjecttoresolutoryconditionandittookplace 7. Doneecommittedanactofingratitude Periodd 5yrs PRESCRIPTIVEPERIOD ReckoningPoint Timethemarriagewasnot solemnizedonthefixeddate.(art. 1149)
Revokedbyoperationoflaw Finalityofjudicialdeclarationof nullity(ifactionistorecover property) Timethedonorcametoknowthat therequiredparentalconsentwas notobtained. Finalityofdecree TimedecreeofLShasbecomefinal Happeningoftheresolutory condition. Fromdonorsknowledgeofthe commissionofanactofingratitude.
2. Marriageisjudicially declaredvoid
5yrs
5yrs 5yrs 5yrs 5yrs 1yr
Note:Actsofingratitude: 1. Commissionofanoffenseagainsttheperson,honororpropertyofthedonor,hiswifeorhischildren underhisparentalauthority 2. GR:Imputationtothedonoranycriminaloffenseoranyactinvolvingmoralturpitude XPN:ifthecrimewascommittedagainstthedoneehimself,hiswifeorhischildrenunderhisauthority 3. Unduerefusaltosupportthedonorwhenheislegallyormorallyboundtogivesuchsupport.
PROPERTYREGIMESS Q:Whatarethedifferentpropertyregimeswhichmaybeadoptedbyfuturespouses? A: 1. AbsoluteCommunityofProperty(ACP) 2. ConjugalPartnershipofGains(CPG) 3. AbsoluteSeparationofProperty(ASOP) 4. AnyotherregimewithinlimitsprovidedbytheFamilyCode
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Q:DistinguishACP,CPGandASOP. A: ACP CPG Whenitapplies 1. 2. Whenspouses: 3. 1. Adoptitinamarriage settlement; Whenthefuturespousesadoptitin 2. Donotchooseanyeconomic amarriagesettlement. system;or 3. Adoptedadifferentproperty regimeandthesameisvoid. 4. Whenfuturespousesadoptit inamarriagesettlement ACPorCPGisdissolved Priormarriageisdissolved duetodeathofonespouse andsurvivingspousefailedto complywiththerequirements underArt103(judicial settlementproceedingofthe estateofdeceasedspouse) Byjudicialorder.Judicial separationofpropertymay eitherbevoluntaryorfor sufficientcause. ASOP
Consistof Allthepropertiesownedbythe spousesatthetimeofmarriage becomecommunityproperty Eachspouseretainshis/her propertybeforethemarriageand onlythefruitsandincomeofsuch propertiesbecomepartofthe conjugalpropertiesduringthe marriage Effectofseparationinfact TheseparationinfactshallnotaffecttheregimeofACP.But: 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; 2. When consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summaryproceeding. 3. In case of insufficiency of community or conjugal partnership property, separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. Spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereoftosatisfythelattersshare. (Arts.100&127,FC) Effectofdissolution Upondissolutionandliquidation ofthecommunityproperty,what isdividedequallybetweenthe spousesortheirheirsisthenet remainderofthepropertiesof theACP. Upondissolutionofthe partnership,theseparateproperty ofthespousesarereturnedand onlythenetprofitsofthe partnershiparedividedequally betweenthespousesoftheirheirs.
43
Q:Whendothepropertyregimescommence? A: Property regime commences at the precise momentofthecelebrationofthemarriage. Q:Intheabsenceofamarriagesettlement,what property regime governs the property relations ofspouses? A: GR:Absolutecommunityofproperty.(Art.75, FC) XPN: 1. For marriages contracted prior to the effectivityoftheFamilyCodeon August 3, 1988, conjugal partnership of gains shall govern the property relations. This is so because Article 119 of the New Civil Code will apply. The provisions of the Family Code shall have no retroactiveeffectbecauseitshallimpair vestedrights. 2. Subsequent marriage contracted within one year from the death of the deceased spouse without liquidation of the community property or conjugal partnership of gains, either judicially or extrajudicially, as required under Arts. 103and130oftheFamilyCode.Insuch case, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the subsequent marriage. (Rabuya, Civil LawReviewer,p.100). REVIVALOFFORMERPROPERTYREGIME Q: What are the grounds for the revival of a formerpropertyregime? A:1CARAPS 1. Civil interdiction of the prisonerspouse terminates; 2. Absenteespousereappears 3. Court authorizes Resumption of administration by the spouse formerly exercisingsuchpower; 4. Spouse who has Abandoned the conjugal home returns and resumes commonlifewiththeother; 5. Parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; 6. Reconciliation and resumption of common life of spouse who had been separatedinfactforatleast1year; Spouses agree to revive their former propertyregime. TRANSFEROFADMINISTRATIONOFEXCLUSIVE PROPERTY Q: What are the grounds for transfer of administration of the exclusive property of each spouse? A:Whenonespouse:CFAG 1. is sentenced to penalty with Civil interdiction; 2. becomes a Fugitive from justice or is hidingasanaccusedinacriminalcase; 3. isjudiciallydeclaredAbsent; 4. becomesaGuardianoftheother.
Note: Transfer of administration of the exclusive property of either spouses does not confer ownership over the same. (Rodriguez v. De la Cruz, GRNo.3629,Sept.28,1907) Spouses contribute to the family expenses proportionately to their income and the value of theirproperties. On the other hand, their liability to creditors for familyexpensesissolidary.
7.
D.ABSOLUTECOMMUNITYY 1.GENERALPROVISIONS Q:Whenshalltheabsolutecommunityof propertycommence? A: At the precise moment of the celebration of the marriage. i.e. actual time the marriage is celebratedonacertaindate.
Note: Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any othertimeshallbevoid.
Q:Whatlawgovernstheabsolutecommunityof property? A: 1. Familycode 2. Provisionsoncoownership
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2.WHATCONSTITUTESCOMMUNITYPROPERTY Q:Whatconstitutesthecommunityproperty? A: Includes: 1. Allthepropertyownedbythespouses: a. at the time of the celebration of themarriage;or b. acquiredthereafter; 2. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, if expressly made to formpartofthecommunitypropertyby thedonor,testatororgrantor; 3. Jewelries,etc.; 4. Winningsingambling. Excludes: 1. Property acquired during the marriage bygratuitoustitleanditsfruits; XPN:Ifexpresslyprovidedbythedonor, testator or grantor that they shall form partofthecommunityproperty 2. Property for personal and exclusive useofeitherspouse; XPN: Jewelries shall form part of the ACPbecauseoftheirmonitaryvalue. 3. Property acquired before the marriage by one with legitimate descendants by former marriage and its fruits and income; 4. Those excluded by the marriage settlement. Q: In absence of evidence, does property acquired during the marriage belong to the communityproperty? A: Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless proven otherwise by strong and convincing evidence.(Art.93) Q: Mister, without Misis consent, executed a special power of attorney in favor of Drepa in order to secure a loan to be secured by a conjugal property, which loan was later obtained. When the loan was not paid, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold on auction. Misis seeks the declaration of the mortgage and sale as void invoking Art. 124 of the FC. Will the wifesactionprosper? A: Yes. The settled rule is that the sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife (Guiang v. CA, 353 Phil. 578). The absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale or encumbrance null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Neither would the conjugal partnership be liable for the loan on thegroundthatitredoundedtothebenefitofthe family.Thesweepingconclusionthattheloanwas obtained by the husband in order to finance the construction of housing units, without however adducing adequate proof, does not persuade. (Homeowners Savings &Loan Bank v. Dailo,G.R. No.153802,Mar.11,2005) Q: In a sale of a piece of land that she and her husband,David,owned,Lorenza,whowitnessed the sale, signed on the page reserved for witnesses to the deed. When the buyer sought toregisterthesale,itwasdeniedbytheRegister of Deeds for lack of the wife's consent to the sale.Decide. A: The register of deeds is incorrect. A wife, by affixing her signature to a deed of sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. The consent need not always be explicit or set forth in any particular document so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was in fact given.(Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No.141323,Jun.8,2005)
Note: In this case, it will be noted that the sale was entered into prior to the effectivity of the FC. Because of such, Art. 173, in relation to Art. 166 of the Civil Code, would have applied if there was a finding of lack of the wife's consent. Under said provisions, the sale would have been merely voidable,andnotvoid.
Q: Andres sold a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal partnership to Pepito. Days before the sale, Kumander, his wife, assented to such by signing a document entitled "Marital Consent" contained in a jurat, which was then sworn to beforethesamenotarypublicwhonotarizedthe deed of sale, and then appended to the deed of saleitself.Istheconveyancevalid? A: It depends. The use of the jurat, instead of an acknowledgment, does not elevate the marital consent into the level of a public document but instead consigns it to the status of a private writing. Hence, the presumption of regularity does not apply and the wife still needs to prove its genuiness and authenticity as required under the rules of evidence. (Pan Pacific Industrial Sales
45
Co.,Inc.v.CA,G.R.No.125283,Feb.10,2006
Note: The fact that the document contains a jurat, and not an acknowledgment, should not affect its genuineness or that of the related document of conveyance itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale. In this instance, a jurat suffices as the document only embodiesthemanifestationofthespouse'sconsent, a mere appendage to the main document. (Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 125283,Feb.10,2006)
9.
Q: Will losses in gambling be charged upon the communityproperty? A:No (Art.95). However,anywinningstherefrom shallformpartofthecommunityproperty. 3.CHARGESUPONANDOBLIGATIONSOFTHE COMMUNITYPROPERTY Q:WhatarethechargesupontheACP? A: 1. The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate childrenofeitherspouse; 2. All debts and obligations contracted duringthemarriageby: a. the designated administrator spouse for the benefit of the community b. bybothspouses c. by one spouse with the consent of theother; 3. Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family mayhavebeenbenefited; 4. All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon thecommunityproperty; 5. All taxes and expenses for mere preservationmade during marriage upon the separate property of either spouseusedbythefamily; 6. Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity forselfimprovement; 7. Ante nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefitofthefamily; 8. The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for theexclusivepurposeofcommencingor completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self improvement; Payment, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of thedebtorspouse,of: a. Ante nuptial debts of either spouse which did not redound to the benefitofthefamily; b. the support of illegitimatechildren ofeitherspouse; c. liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi delict;
Note: The payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtorspouse upon liquidation of thecommunity
10. Expenses of litigation between the spouses. XPN: Suit is found to be groundless, it cannotbechargedagainsttheACP. 4.OWNERSHIP,ADMINISTRATION,ENJOYMENT ANDDISPOSITIONOFTHECOMMUNITY PROPERTY Q: To whom does the right to administer the communitypropertybelongto? A: GR:Itbelongstobothspousesjointly. XPN: If one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties capacitated or able spouse may assume sole powersofadministration Butsuchpowersdonotinclude:DAE 1. Disposition; 2. Alienation;or 3. Encumbrance oftheconjugalorcommunityproperty. Q: In case of disagreement, whose decision shall prevail? A: That of the husband but subject to recourse to thecourtbythewifeforproperremedy.
Note:Prescriptiveperiodforrecourseis5yearsfrom thedateofthecontractimplementingsuchdecision.
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Q: In cases of alienation, disposition or encumbrance of the community property, and one spouse is incapacitated or unable to participate in the administration of the community property, is the approval of one spouse enoughfor said alienation, disposition or encumbrancetobevalid? A: No. Both spouses must approve any dispositions or encumbrances, and consent of the other spouse regarding the disposition must bein writing, otherwise, the matter should be brought to court and the court will give the authority, if proper. Such consent or court approval must be obtained beforethealienation,etc.,otherwise,suchwillbe voidandobtainingsuchconsentorcourtapproval afterwards will not validate the act. A void act cannotberatified. Q: What if one spouse acts without the consent oftheotherorwithoutcourtapproval? A: If one spouse acts without the consent of the other or without court approval, such disposition orencumbranceisvoid. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting rd spouse and the 3 person which may be perfected as a binding contract upon acceptance bythespouseorcourtapproval. Q: When may one spouse resort to obtaining court approval for any alienation, encumbrance ordispositionofcommunityproperty? A: In absence of the written consent of the other spouse. Q: What if the community property is insufficienttocovertheforegoingliabilities? A: GR: The spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. XPN: Those falling under paragraph 9 of Art. 94.(Antenuptialdebts,supportofillegitimate children, liabilities incurred by spouse by reason of a crime or quasidelict) in which casetheexclusivepropertyofthespousewho incurred such debts will be liable. However, if the exclusive property is insufficient, payment willbeconsideredasadvancestobededucted from share of debtorspouse. (Art. 94 (9) of theFamilyCode) Q: What is the rule on donating a community propertybyaspouse? A: GR: A spouse cannot donate any community propertywithouttheconsentoftheother. XPN: Moderate donations for charity or on occasion of family rejoicing or distress. (Art. 98) Q: If a spouse abandons without just cause his family or fails to comply with obligations to the family, what are the remedies of the spouse present? A:Petitionthecourtfor: 1. Receivership; 2. Judicialseparationofproperty; 3. Authority to be the sole administrator oftheabsolutecommunity. Q:Whenisthereabandonment? A: When a spouse leaves the conjugal dwelling withoutintentionofreturning.
Note:3 months disappearance without any information as to the spouses whereabouts shall be prima facie presumption of abandonment of the otherspouse.(Art.101,FC)
Q:Mayspousessellpropertytoeachother? A: GR:No,suchsaleisconsideredvoid XPNs: 1. When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlement; 2. When there has been a judicial separation of property under Articles 135and136ofFC(Art.1490,NCC). Q: During his lifetime and while he was married to Epifania, Joseph acquired a piece of land whichhethensubsequentlyconveyed,bywayof a purported sale, to his other woman, Maria. Is the sale of the piece of land by Joseph to his mistressproper? A: No. The proscription against the sale of property between spouses under Art. 1490 applies even to common law relationships. In an earlier ruling, the SC nullified a sale made by a husband in favor of a concubine, after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home
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where his wife and children lived, and from whence they derived their support, for being contrarytomoralsandpublicpolicy.Thesalewas regarded by the court as subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Ching v.CA,GRNo.165879,Nov.10,2006). 5.DISSOLUTIONOFCOMMUNITYREGIME Q:HowistheACPterminated? A: 1. Deathofeitherspouse; 2. Legalseparation; 3. Annulment; 4. Judicial separation of property during marriage. 6.LIQUIDATIONOFTHEABSOLUTECOMMUNITY ASSETSANDLIABILITIES Q: What is the applicable procedure in case of dissolutionofACP? A: 1. Inventoryofallproperties; 2. Paymentofcommunitydebts;
Note: First, pay out of the community assets. If not enough, husband and the wife are solidarily liable for the unpaid balancewiththeirseparateproperties
3. 4. Equaldivisionofnetcommunityassets Unlessthereis: a. An agreement for a different proportion;or b. Avoluntarywaiverofsuchshare; Delivery of the presumptive legitimes of thechildren; Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custodyofcommonchildren. Delivery to each spouse of his/her remainingexclusiveproperties;
5. 6.
If no judicial proceeding is instituted, the survivingspouseshall,judiciallyorextrajudicially, liquidate the community property within 6 months from the death of the deceased spouse. (Art.103) Q: What if the surviving spouse failed to liquidate the community property within 1 year from the death of the deceased spouse contrary toArt.103,FC? A: Failure to do so would render any disposition or encumbrance involving community property of theterminatedmarriagevoid. E.CONJUGALPARTNERSHIPOFGAINS. 1.GENERALPROVISIONS Q:WhatistheregimeofCPG? A: It is the property relation formed by the husband and the wife by placing in a common fund: 1. the proceeds, product, fruits and incomeoftheirseparateproperties; 2. thoseacquiredbythemthrough: a. effort b. chance Q: When shall the conjugal partnership commence? A: At the precise moment when the marriage ceremonyiscelebrated. Q:Whatlawgovernstheconjugalpartnership? A: The rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the Family Code and by the spousesintheirmarriagesettlements. 2.EXCLUSIVEPROPERTYOFEACHSPOUSE Q: What are the exclusive properties of the spouses? A: 1. Those brought into the marriage as his/herown;
Note: A property purchased before the marriage and fully paid during the marriage remains to be a separate property of either spouse. (Lorenzo v. Nicolas,L4085,July30,1952)
Q: What is the applicable procedure in the dissolution of the ACP in case the marriage is terminatedbydeath? A: Community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate ofthedeceased.
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2. 3. Those acquired during the marriage by gratuitoustitle; Those acquired by right of redemption, barter or exchange with exclusive property; Thatpurchasedwithexclusivemoneyof eitherspouse.
Note: The controlling factor is the source of the money used, or the money promised to be paid. (Rivera v. Bartolome, C.A.,40O.G.2090)
4.
1. If full ownership was vested before the marriage it shall belong to the buyer spouse. 2. If full ownership was vested during the marriage it shall belong to the conjugalpartnership. Q: Yamane asserts that the parcel of land, which was purchased at auction, belonged to the conjugal partnership of him and his late wife. In the title, his name appeared to be merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, his late wife. The purchase took place prior to the advent of the Family Code. Is the property conjugal or paraphernal property of his latewife? A: Conjugal. In this case the provisions of the Civil Code would apply since the purchase took place before the FC took effect. Under Art. 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. In this case, there was no proof that the property had been acquired exclusively by Yamane's late wife. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature in the absence of strong, clear and convincing evidence that it was acquired using the exclusive funds of said spouse. (Spouses Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006) Q: Dolores seeks to recover a parcel of land, alleging that she and her husband acquired such during their marriage, that it formed part of their conjugal properties and that he sold it without her consent. She presents as evidence their marriage contract and the initial tax declarationovertheproperty.Decide. A: Recovery is not warranted. The rule is all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that it was acquired during the marriage. Here, Dolores's evidence consisted of her marriage contract and the initial tax declaration over the property. She did not identify when she and her husband first occupied and possessed the land. Neither did shepresent any witness to prove that they first occupied the property during their marriage and that they both, worked on the land. (PintianoAnno v. Anno,G.R. No. 163743, Jan. 27, 2006) Q: Josefina, purchased a parcel of land using, according to her, her own funds. Although the
Q: What are the rules in cases of improvement ofexclusiveproperty? A: 1. Reverse accession If the cost of the improvement and the additional value is more than the value of the principal property at the time of the improvement, the property becomes conjugal. 2. Accession If the cost of the improvement and the additional value is equal to or less than the value of the principal property, the entire property becomes the exclusive property of the spouses 3.CONJUGALPARTNERSHIPPROPERT Q:WhatconstitutesCPG? A: 1. Those acquired during the marriage withconjugalfunds; 2. Those obtained from labor, industry, work or profession of either or both spouse; 3. Fruits of conjugal property due or received during the marriage and net fruitsofseparateproperty; 4. Share of either spouse in hidden treasure; 5. Those acquired through occupation suchashuntingorfishing; 6. Livestock in excess of what wasbrought tothemarriage; 7. Those acquired by chance such as winningsingamblingsandbettings. Q: What are the rules if a property is bought on installmentspaidpartlyfromtheexclusivefunds ofthespousesandpartlyfromconjugalfunds? A:
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titles to the lots were issued inthe names of the spouses, the dorsal portions thereof contained an entry showing that Eduardo had waived any right over the properties as they were bought out of the savings of Josefina.When a complaint forsumofmoneyagainstherhusband,Eduardo, prospered, the lot was levied upon. Does the parcel of land belong to the conjugal partnership? A: Yes. Since Josefina failed to prove that she acquired the properties with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo, it should be presumed and considered as belonging to the conjugal partnership. Art. 105 of the FC, which provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before it took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws, applies in this case. There was no evidence adduced by Josefina showing that she had acquired a vested right in this regard. Thus, as it appears that the properties were acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Josefina and Eduardo, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. (Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.,G.R.No.151967.Feb.16,2005) 4.CHARGESUPONANDOBLIGATIONSOFTHE CPG Q:WhatarethechargesupontheCPG? A:D2T2E2VAS 1. Support of the spouses, their common children and the legitimate children of eitherspouse; 2. Debts and obligations contracted by onewithouttheconsentoftheotherto theextentthatthefamilybenefited; 3. Debtsandobligationscontractedduring the marriage by an administrator spouse, both spouses or one with the consentoftheother; 4. Taxes, liens, charges, expenses upon conjugalproperty; 5. Taxes and expenses for mere preservationofseparateproperty; 6. Expenses for professional, vocational or selfimprovement courses of either spouse; 7. Antenuptial debts to the extent the familyhasbeenbenefited; 8. Value of what is donated or promised to common legitimate children for professional, vocation or self improvementcourses; 9. 5.ADMINISTRATIONOFTHECPG Q: To whom does the right to administer the conjugalpartnershipbelong? A: GR:Itbelongstobothspousesjointly. XPN:If one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties capacitated or able spouse may assume sole powers of administration Butsuchpowersdonotinclude:DAE a.Disposition; b.Alienation;or c. Encumbrance of the conjugal or communityproperty. Q: In case of disagreement, whose decision shall prevail? A: That of the husband but subject to recourse to thecourtbythewifeforproperremedy.
Note:Prescriptiveperiodforrecourseis5yearsfrom thedateofthecontractimplementingsuchdecision.
Expensesoflitigation.
6.DISSOLUTIONOFCPGREGIME Q:Howistheconjugalpartnershipterminated? A: 1. Deathofeitherspouse; 2. Legalseparation; 3. Annulment; 4. Judicial separation of property during marriage. 7.LIQUIDATIONOFTHECONJUGAL PARTNERSHIPASSETSANDLIABILITIES Q: What are the steps in the liquidation of the CPG? A:R2D4IPA 1. Inventoryofalltheproperties; 2. Restitutionofadvancesmadetoeachof thespouses; 3. Reimbursement for use of exclusive funds; 4. Debts and obligations of the CP are paid; 5. Deliveryofexclusiveproperties;
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6. Payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each of the spouses; Divisionofthenetconjugalpartnership; Delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes; Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custodyofchildren. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Judicialdeclarationofabsence; Lossofparentalauthorityasdecreedby thecourt; Abandonment or failure to comply with familyobligation; Administrator spouse has abused authority; Separation in fact for one year and reconciliationishighlyimprobable.
7. 8. 9.
Q: Upon termination of the marriage by death, how shall the community property be liquidated? A: The community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estateofthedeceasedspouse. Q: In the absence of a judicial settlement proceeding, how shall the community property beliquidated? A: The surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either, judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of thedeceasedspouse. Q: What are the effects if the community propertyisnotliquidated? A: 1. Any disposition or encumbrance made by the surviving spouse involving community property of the terminated marriageshallbevoid. 2. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relationsofthesubsequentmarriage F.SEPARATIONOFPROPERTYOFTHESPOUSES ANDADMINISTRATIONOFCOMMONPROPERTY BYONESPOUSEDURINGTHEMARRIAGE Q: In what ways can there be judicial separation ofproperty? A: Judicial separation of property may either be voluntaryorforsufficientcause. Q: What are the sufficient causes for judicial separationofproperty? A:CJLASA 1. Civil interdiction of the spouse of petitioner;
Q: What are the effects of judicial separation of propertybetweenspouses? A: 1. The absolute community or conjugal partnershipisdissolved; 2. The liability of the spouses to creditors shall be solidary with their separate properties; 3. Mutualobligationtosupporteachother continues; XPN:Whenthereislegalseparation 4. Rights previously acquired by creditors arenotprejudiced. G.REGIMEOFSEPARATIONOFPROPERTY Q: What governs the regime of separation of property? A: 1. Marriagesettlement 2. FamilyCodeinsuppletorycharacter. Q:Whatarethekindsofseparationofproperty? A: 1. Astoextent: a.Total b. Partial In this case, the property not agreeduponasseparateshallpertainto theabsolutecommunity. 2. Astokindsofproperty: a.Presentproperty b.Futureproperty c.Bothpresentandfutureproperty Q: What are the rights of the spouses under the regimeofseparationofproperty? A: 1. Each spouse shall administer, dispose of, own, possess, and enjoy his or her ownseparateproperty,withoutneedof theconsentoftheother.
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2. Each spouse shall own all earnings from his or her profession, business and industryandallfruits,natural,industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. Propertyacquiredbyboththroughtheirworkor industry Governedby Ownedincommonin rulesofco proportiontotheirrespective ownership contributions Presumption Property acquiredwhile livingtogether presumed obtainedbytheir jointefforts, workorindustry andownedby Nopresumptionofjoint theminequal acquisition. shares. Actualjointcontributionof Ifonepartydid money,propertyorindustry notparticipatein shallbeownedbythemin acquisition: commonproportion. presumedto havecontributed However,theircontributions throughcareand arepresumedequal,inthe maintenanceof absenceifprooftothecontrary familyand household (Buenaventura v. Buenaventura, G.R.No.127358, Mar.31,2005) Forfeiture Whenonlyoneis inGF,shareof partyinBFinthe coownershipbe Ifoneofthepartiesisvalidly forfeitedinfavor marriedtoanother,his/her of: shareinthecoownershipshall 1. their accruetotheACPorCPG common existinginthemarriage. children 2. innocent IfthepartywhoactedinBFis party notvalidlymarriedtoanother indefaultof/ orifbothpartiesareinBF,such waiverbyany/all sharebeforfeitedinmanner common providedinlastparofArt.147 children,orby their descendants Proofofactualcontribution Notnecessary Necessary
Note: For as long as it is proven that property was acquired during marriage, the presumption of conjugality will attach regardless in whose name the propertyisregistered.
Q: What are the liabilities for family expenses of the spouses under the regime of separation of property? A: GR: Both spouses shall bear the family expensesinproportiontotheirincome. XPN: In case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separateproperties. Spouses shall be solidarily liable to creditors forfamilyexpenses. H.PROPERTYREGIMEOFUNIONSWITHOUT MARRIAGE Q: What is the property regime of unions withoutmarriage? A: ART.147 ART.148 Applicability 1. No legal impedi ment Presenceoflegalimpediment: to 1. Adulterous marry; relationships 2. Void 2. Bigamous/polygamous marriag marriages eon 3. Incestuousvoid the marriagesunderArt37 ground 4. Voidmarriagesby of reasonofpublicpolicy psychol (Art.38) ogical incapac ity. Salaries&wages Separatelyownedbythe Ownedinequal parties.Ifanyismarried, shares his/hersalarypertainstothe CPGofthelegitimatemarriage. Propertyexclusivelyacquired Belongstoparty uponproofof acquisition Belongstosuchparty throughexclusive funds
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The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses. (Villanuevav.CA,G.R.No.143286,Apr.14,2004) UnderArt.148,onlythepropertiesacquiredbyboth parties through their actual joint contribution of money property or industry shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. (Agapayv.Palang,G.R.No.116726,July28,1997)
Q: What property relation governs in case marriage is declared null and void on the groundofpsychologicalincapacity? A: The property relation between the parties is governed by Art. 147 of the FC. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be consideredashavingcontributedtheretojointlyif said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenanceofthefamilyhousehold."Unlikethe conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple'sseparatepropertyarenotincludedinthe coownership. Q: Josefinas petition for nullity of her marriage to Eduardo was granted on the ground of existence of a prior marriage. She now asserts that since her marriage to Eduardo is void, their property relation is to be governed by the rules on coownership under Art. 148 of the FC and not by Art. 144 of the Civil Code. In this regime, Eduardo has no share at all in the properties since no proof was adduced by him as regards his participation in their purchase. However, she did not prove that she acquired the properties using her personal funds and prior to her cohabitation with Eduardo. Is her contention correct? A: No. Art. 148 of the FC does not apply since, in said article, a coownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a preexisting valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. Petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidencethatshecontributedmoney,propertyor industry in the acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a coowner of the property. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the first marriage of Eduardo,
under normal circumstances, the same should be presumedtobeconjugalpropertyofEduardoand Josefina. (Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.,G.R. No. 151967. Feb. 16, 2005) Q: Francisco and Ermindas marriage was nullified by the trial court due to psychological incapacity. He did not contest the decree of nullity but he assailed the division in the properties which was contained in the decree. He asserted that the properties were acquired through his efforts and that she had no contribution whatsoever in their acquisition and maintenance; hence, she should not be entitled to a joint share in their properties. Is Franciscos contentioncorrect? A: No. The property relation between the parties is governed by Art. 147 of the FC. Under this article, there is a presumption that the properties which they acquired during their cohabitation were acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition thereof shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if his or her efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of thehousehold.
Note:Inthiscase,Franciscohimselftestifiedthathis wife was not a plain housewife but one who helped him in managing the family's business. Hence, Erminda is rightfully entitled to a joint share in their properties. (Gonzales v. Gonzales,G.R. No. 159521, Dec.16,2005)
Q: Romeo and Juliet lived together as husband andwifewithoutthebenefitofmarriage.During their cohabitation, they acquired a house. When they broke up, they executed an agreement where he agreed to leave the house provided Julietwillpayhisentireshareintheirproperties. She failed to do so but she also ignored his demand for her to vacate. Romeo sued her for ejectment which the court granted. Was the courtcorrectingrantingthesame? A: No. Under Art. 147 of the FC, the property is coownedbytheparties.Undersaidprovision, in the absence of proof to the contrary, any property acquired by commonlaw spouses during their cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship in such a case is essentially governed by the rules on coownership. Thus, Romeo cannot seek the ejectment of Juliet therefrom. As a coowner, she is as much entitled to enjoy its
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possession and ownership as him. (Abing v. CA,G.R.No.146294,Jul.31,2006) Q: In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the US Government, contracted a bigamous marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of rice land with the title being placed jointly in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda to recover both the rice land and the house and lot, claiming them to be conjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were coowners of the rice land, and with respect to the house and lot she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase,howdoyoudecidethecase? A: Carol's action to recover both the rice land and the house and lot is wellfounded. Both are conjugal property, in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the husband's death took place prior to the effectivity of saidlaw.However,evenunderArt.144,Civil Code,thesameconclusionwouldhavebeen reached in view of the bigamous nature of thesecondmarriage.(1998BarQuestion) Q: Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, Luis is gainfully employed, Rizza is not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of thehouseholdchores. After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary earnings during that period the amount of P200,000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the P500.000.00 used by the commonlaw spouses to purchase the property, P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a buildingbelonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of cohabitation from their separate property, a car worth P100.000.00 being used by the common law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizzabyherparents. Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation,andtheyaskyoutogivethemyour legal advice on how, under the law should the bank deposit of P200,000.00 the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P100.000.00beallocatedtothem? A: Art. 147 of the Family Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them inequalsharesandthepropertyacquiredbyboth of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, worker industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not participateintheacquisitionbytheotherpartyof any property shall be deemed to have contributedjointlyintheacquisitionthereofifthe former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Thus: 1. the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be divided equallybetweenLuisandRizza. 2. the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of them through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on coownership. Hence, Luis gets 2\5whileRizzagets3\5ofP500.000.00. 3. the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been donated to her by her parents.(1997BarQuestion) Q: In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a widow thirty (30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined earnings a parcel of riceland. After Rico and Cora separated, Rico livedtogetherwithMabel,amaidensixteen(16) years of age. While living together, Rico was a
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salaried employee and Mabel kept house for Rico and did fulltime household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel of coconut landwasacquiredbyRicofromhissavings. After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and married Letty, a single woman twentysix (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico and Letty, Letty bought a mango orchard out of her own personalearnings. 1. Who would own the riceland, and what property relations governs the ownership?Explain. 2. Who would own the coconut land, and what property relations governs the ownership?Explain. 3. Who would own the mango orchard, and what property elations governs theownership?Explain. A: 1. Rico and Cora are the coowners of the riceland. The relations is that of co ownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph). Addendum: However, after Rico's marriage to Letty, the half interest of Rico in the riceland will then become absolute community property of Rico andLetty. 2. Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The relation is a sole/single proprietorship (Art. 148. Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, and not Art. 147 Family Code). Addendum: However, after Rico's marriage to Letty, the coconut land of Rico will then become absolute communitypropertyofRicoandLetty.) 3. Rico and Letty are the coowners. The relations is the Absolute Community of Property (Arts, 75, 90 and 91, Family Code).(1992BarQuestion) VI.THEFAMILY A.THEFAMILYASANINSTITUTION Q:Whatisincludedinfamilyrelations? A: 1. Betweenhusbandandwife 2. Betweenparentsandchildren 3. Among other ascendants and descendants 4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of thefullothalfblood. Q:Whatgovernsfamilyrelations? A:Thelaw. Q:Whataretherequisitesbeforeasuitbetween membersofthesamefamilymayprosper? A: 1. Earnest efforts toward a compromise havebeenmade; 2. Sucheffortsfailed; 3. The fact that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but the same have failed appears in the verified complaintorpetition.. Q: In a complaint filed by Manolo against his brother, Rodolfo, it was alleged that the case "xxx passed through the Barangay and no settlement was forged between the plaintiffs and defendant as a result of which Certification toFileActionwasissuedxxx".Rodolfomovedto dismiss for failure to comply with a condition precedent that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement among the parties had been exerted butthatnonewasreached.Decide. A: The case will prosper. There was in fact substantialcompliancewithArt.151oftheFamily Code since the spouses alleged in the complaint for ejectment that the case "xxx passed through the Barangay and no settlement was forged between the plaintiffs and defendant as a result of which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I, Tondo, Manila xxx". It bears stressing that under Sec. 412 (a) of R.A. 7160, no complaint involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be institutedorfileddirectlyincourtforadjudication unless there has been a confrontation between thepartiesandnosettlementwasreached. Moreover, the phrase "members of the same family" found in Art. 151 of theFamily Code must
55
be construed in relation to Art. 150 thereof. (Martinez, et al. v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084. Jun.28,2005)
Note: A sisterinlaw or a brotherinlaw is not covered by these two provisions. Being an exception to the general rule, Art. 151 must be strictly construed. (Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L28394, Nov. 26,1970)
B.THEFAMILYHOME Q: What is meant by family home (FH) and how isitconstituted? A:Itisthedwellinghousewherethehusbandand wife and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated; it is constituted jointly by the husbandandthewifeorbyanunmarriedheadof afamily. Q:CanFHbeconstitutedonahouseconstructed onalandbelongingtoanother? A:No. Reason:Thelandwherethehouseiserectedisan integralpartofthehomeandthehomeshouldbe permanentincharacter.
Note: A house constructed on rented land or by tolerance of the owner is not a permanent improvement on the land and the home will thus be temporary.
Q: What are the exceptions to the rule that the FH is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment? A:LTPM 1. Debts due to Laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who rendered service or furnished materials for the constitution ofthebuilding; 2. NonpaymentofTaxes; 3. DebtsincurredPriortoconstitution; 4. Debts secured by Mortgages on the familyhome.
Note: Exemption is limited to the value allowed in theFC
Q: A complaint for damages was filed against Hinahon in 1986 when she incurred liabilities as early as 1977, which action prospered in 1989. The house and lot that she owned was levied upon and sold at auction. She assails the levy and sale on the ground that it was her family
home and therefore exempt from execution. Decide. A: It is not exempt. Under Art. 155 of the FC, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot was not constituted as a familyhome,whetherjudiciallyorextrajudicially, at the time that the debtor incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constitutedassuchbyoperationoflawonlyupon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family home. (GomezSalcedo, et al. v. Sta. Ines, et al.,G.R. No. 132537, Oct. 14, 2005) Q: What are the guidelines in the constitution of thefamilyhome? A:1SAPOC 1. FHisdeemedconstitutedfromthetime of Actual occupation as a family residence; 2. Only1FHmaybeconstituted; 3. Must be Owned by the person constitutingit; 4. MustbePermanent; 5. Same rule applies to both valid and voidable marriages and even to common law spouses; (Arts. 147 and 148) 6. It Continues despite death of one or both spouses or an unmarried head of the family for 10 years or as long as thereisaminorbeneficiary. Q:WhoarethebeneficiariesofaFH? A: 1. Husband and wife, or unmarried head ofthefamily 2. Parents (may include parentsinlaw), ascendants, brothers and sisters (legitimate or illegitimate) living in the FH and dependent on the head of the familyforsupport Q:Whataretherequisitesinthesale,alienation, donation, assignment or encumbrance of the FH? A:Thefollowingmustgivetheirwrittenconsent: 1. ThepersonwhoconstitutedtheFH; 2. The spouse of the person who constitutedtheFH;
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3.
Note:Incaseofconflict,courtshalldecide.
Majority of the beneficiaries of legal age.
Q:Whataretheclassificationsoffiliation? A:LILA
GENERALRULE EXCEPTIONS Legitimate Conceivedorbornwithinavalidmarriage Illegitimate
Q: What are the requisites for the creditor to availoftherighttoexecute? A: 1. Hemustbeajudgmentcreditor; 2. His claim must not be among those exceptedunderArt.155; 3. He has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Art. 157. Q: What is the procedure in exercising the right toexecute? A: 1. Creditor must file a motion in the court proceeding where he obtained a favorable judgment for a writ of executionagainsttheFH; 2. There will be a hearing on the motion where the creditor must prove that the actual value of the FH exceeds the maximum amount fixed by the Family Code, either at the time of its constitution or as a result of improvements introduced after its constitution; 3. If the creditor proves that the actual valueexceedsthemaximumamout,the courtwillorderitssaleinexecution; 4. If the family home is sold for more than thevalueallowed,theproceedsshallbe appliedasfollows: a. The obligations enumerated in Art. 155mustbepaid b. The judgment in favor of the creditor will be paid, plus all the costsofexecution The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgmentdebtor(Art.160,FamilyCode). VII.PATERNITYANDFILIATION Q:Towhatdopaternityandfiliationreferto? A: Paternity and filiation refer to the relationship existingbetweenparentandchild. Note: Filiation may be by nature or adoption. Filiationmaybelegitimateorillegitimate.
Conceivedandbornoutsideavalidmarriage Legitimated Conceivedorbornoutsideofwedlockofparents withoutimpedimenttomarryatthetimeof conceptionandhadsubsequentlymarried. RequisitesofLegitimation: 1. Nolegalimpedimentforparentstomarry attimeofconception; 2. Validmarriagesubsequenttochildsbirth. Adopted (PleaserefertorelatednotesonAdoptionlaws)
A.LEGITIMATECHILDREN Q: When is a child conceived by artificial inseminationconsideredlegitimate? A:Thefollowingconditionsmustbepresent: 1. The artificial insemination is made on thewife,notonanotherwoman; 2. Theartificial inseminationonthewifeis done with the sperm of the husband or of a donor, or both the husband and a donor; 3. The artificial insemination has been authorized or ratified by the spouse on a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child;and 4. The written instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificateofthechild. Q: What is the rule on status of child where the mother contracted another marriage within 300 daysafterterminationoftheformer? A:Thechildshallbeconsideredasconceived duringthe: 1. Formermarriageifchildisborn: a. Before 180 days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage,provideditisborn b. Within 300 days after termination offormermarriage 2. Subsequentmarriageifachildborn:
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a. b. 180 days after the celebration of thesubsequentmarriage; even though it be born within 300 days after the termination of the formermarriage.
Illustrations: 1. 180thdaytakesplacebefore300thday Subsequent marriage Former marriage solemnized terminated Born during this period: 2.
180th day from solemnization of subsequent marriage
300th day from termination of former marriage
Born during this period: Conceived during Subsequent Marriage
th th 180 daytakesplaceafter300 day
Former marriage terminated
Subsequent marriage solemnized
300th day from termination of former marriage
180th day from solemnization of subsequent marriage
Born during this period: Conceived during Former Marriage
Born during this period: Conceived during Subsequent Marriage
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Q:Distinguishactiontoimpugnlegitimacyand actiontoclaimlegitimacy. A:
ACTIONTOIMPUGN ACTIONTOCLAIM LEGITIMACY LEGITIMACY Remedy Actiontoclaim legitimacy Actiontoimpugn (compulsory legitimacyorillegitimacy recognition) Realpartyininterest GR:Husband XPN:Heirs,incases GR:Child where: 1. Husbanddied beforethe XPN:Heirsofthechild, expirationofthe incaseswhere: periodforbringing 1. Childdiedinstate theaction; ofinsanity 2. Husbanddiedafter 2. Childdiedduring filingthe minority complaint,without havingdesisted; Note:Mustbefiled 3. Childwasborn within5years. afterthedeathof husband. Prescription GR:Duringthelifetime ofthechild 1yearhusbandreside inthesamemunicipality XPN:Lifetimeofthe orcitywherebirthtook putativefather place Incaseswherethe 2yearshusband actionisforthe resideNOTinthesame recognitionof municipalityorcity illegitimatechildby 3yearshusbandis openandcontinuous livingabroad possessionofthe status.
2.
Proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the case of children conceived throughartificialinsemination; In case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
3.
Q:Whatarethegroundstoimpugnlegitimacyof thechild? A: 1. Physicalimpossibilityforthehusbandto have sexual intercourse with his wife withinthefirst120daysofthe300days which immediately preceded the birth ofthechildbecauseof: a. Physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife, b. The fact that the husband andwife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was notpossible,or c. Serious illness of the husband which absolutely prevented intercourse;
Q: When does the prescriptive period start to run? GR: The prescriptive period for filing action impugning the legitimacy of the child shall be counted from the knowledge of birth or its recordinginthecivilregistry. XPN:Ifthebirthwas: 1. Concealedfromor 2. Was unknown to the husband or his heirs,theperiodsshallbecountedfrom the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the act of registration ofsaidbirth,whicheverisearlier. CLAIMINGFILIATION Q: Is the right to claim filiation transmissible to theheirsofthechild? A: GR: The right to claim filiation may be used only by the child. It is not transmissible to the heirs. XPN:Incaseswherechilddied: 1. Duringminorityor 2. Inastateofinsanity. Q: When should an action to claim legitimacy be brought? A:Itdependsonwhoisbringingtheaction: 1. Bythechildduringhislifetime 2. By his heirs within 5 years should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity
Note: Questioning legitimacy may not be collaterally attacked.Itcanbeimpugnedonlyinadirectaction.
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B.PROOFOFFILIATION Q: What are the different kinds of proof of filiation? A: Proof of filiation has two kinds: Primary and secondary. 1. Primaryproofconsistsoftheff: a. Record of birth appearing in civil registrarorfinaljudgment; b. Admission of legitimate filiation in public document or private handwritten instrument signed by parentconcerned. 2. Secondaryconsistsoftheff: a. Open and continuous possession oflegitimacy; b. Any means allowed by the Rules of Courtandbyspeciallaws.
Note:Continuousdoesnotmeanthattheconcession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealmentthoughwithoutpublicity. There must be a showing of permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own by continuous and clear manifestation and paternal affection and care. (Mendoza v. CA, G.R. No. 86302, Sept.24,1991) To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributedtopurecharity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparentdesiretohaveandtreatthechildassuchin all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. (Jison v. CA, G.R. No. 124853, Feb. 24,1998) Note: For illegitimate children, if the action is based on par. 2 of Art. 172 (secondary proof), the action may be brought only during the lifetimeoftheallegedparent.
Q:Whataretherulesonprovingfiliation? A: GR: Primary proof shall be used to prove filiation. XPN: In absence of primary proof, secondary proofmayberesortedto.
Q:Rosanna,assurvivingspouse,filedaclaimfor death benefits with the SSS upon the death of her husband, Pablo. She indicated in her claim that the decedent is also survivedby their minor child, Jeylynn, who was born in 1991. The SSS granted her claim but this was withdrawn after investigation, when a sister of the decedent informed the system that Pablo could not have sired a child during his lifetime because he was infertile. However in Jeylynns birth certificate, Pablo affixed his signature and he did not impugn Jeylynns legitimacy during his lifetime. Was the SSS correct in withdrawing the death benefits? A: No. Under Art. 164 of the FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access under Art. 166. Further, upon the expiration of the periods for impugning legitimacy under Art. 170, and in the proper cases under Art. 171, of the FC, the action to impugn would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. In thiscase,thereisnoshowingthatPablo,whohas the right to impugn the legitimacy of Jeylynn, challenged her status during his lifetime. Furthermore, there is adequate evidence to show that the child was in fact his child, and this is the birth certificate where he affixed his signature. (SSS v. Aguas, et al.,G.R. No. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006) Q: In an action for partition of estate, the trial court dismissed it on the ground that the respondent, on the basis of her birth certificate, was in fact the illegitimate child of the deceased and therefore the latter's sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners. However, trial court failedtoseethatinsaidbirthcertificate,shewas listed therein as adopted. Was the trial court correctindismissingtheactionforpartition? A: No. The trial court erred in relying upon the said birth certificate in pronouncing the filiation of the respondent. However, since she was listed therein as adopted, she should therefore have presentedevidenceofheradoptioninviewofthe contentsofherbirthcertificate.Inthiscase,there is no showing that she undertook such. It is well settledthatarecordofbirthismerelyprimafacie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
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conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. (Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, GR No. 141501,July21,2006) Q: In a complaint for partition and accounting with damages, Ma. Theresa alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Vicente, and therefore entitled to a share in the estate left behindbythelatter.Asproof,shepresentedher birth certificate which Vicente himself signed thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. Is the proof presented by Ma. Theresa sufficient to prove her claim that she is an illegitimate childofVicente? A:Yes.CitingtheearliercaseofDeJesusv.Estate ofJuanDizon,(366SCRA499),theSupremeCourt held that the Ma. Theresa was able to establish that Vicente was in fact her father. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth,awill,astatementbeforeacourtofrecord, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. The rule is, any authentic writing is treated not just as a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (Eceta v. Eceta,G.R.No.157037,May20,2004) Q: Gerardo filed a complaint for bigamy against Ma. Theresa, alleging that she had a previous subsisting marriage when she married him. The trial court nullified their marriage and declared that the son, who was born during their marriage and was registered as their son, as illegitimate.Whatisthestatusofthechild? A: The first marriage being found to be valid and subsisting, whereas that between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void and nonexistent, the child should be regarded as a legitimate child out of the first marriage. This is so because the child's best interest should be the primordial considerationinthiscase. Q:GerardoandMa.Theresa,however,admitted that the child was their son. Will this affect the statusofthechild? A: No. The admission of the parties that the child was their son was in the nature of a compromise. The rule is that the status and filiation of a child cannotbecompromised.Art.164oftheFCisclear that a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. (Concepcion v.CA,G.R.No.123450.Aug.31,2005) Q: What is theeffect of Ma. Theresas claim that the child is her illegitimate child with her second husbandtothestatusofthechild? A: None. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Art. 167 of the Family Code. This proscription is in consonance with, among others, the intention of the law to lean towards the legitimacy of children. (Concepcion v. CA,G.R. No. 123450. Aug. 31, 2005) Q: In a petition for issuance of letters of administration, Cheri Bolatis alleged that she is thesolelegitimatedaughterofdecedent,Ramon and Van Bolatis. Phoebe, the decedent's second wife, opposed the petition and questioned the legitimate filiation of Cheri to the decedent, asserting that Cheris birth certificate was not signedbyRamonandthatshehadnotpresented the marriage contract between her alleged parentswhichwouldhavesupportedherclaim. In said birth certificate, it was indicated that her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of Ramon andVan Bolatis, and contains aswell the word"married"toreflecttheunionbetweenthe two. However, it was not signed by Ramon and Vanemon Bolatis. It was merely signed by the attending physician, who certified to having attended to the birth of a child. Does the presumptionoflegitimacyapplytoCherimon? A: No. Since the birth certificate was not signed by Cher's alleged parents but was merely signed by the attending physician, such a certificate, althoughapublicrecordofaprivatedocumentis, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution, which is, the fact of birth of a child. A birth certificate, in order to be considered as validatingproofofpaternityandasaninstrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. There having been no convincing proof of respondent's supposed legitimate relations with respect to the decedent, the presumption of legitimacy under the law did not therefore arise in her favor. (Angeles v. Angeles Maglaya,G.R.No.153798,Sept.2,2005) Q: On the basis of the physical presentation of theplaintiffminorbeforeitandthefactthatthe alleged father had admitted having sexual intercourse with the child's mother, the trial court, in an action to prove filiation with
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support, held that the plaintiffminor is the child of the defendant with the plaintiffminor's mother. Was the trial court correct in holding such? A: No. In this age of genetic profiling and DNA analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice asevidence to prove paternity and filiation before courts of law. This only shows the very high standard of proof that a child must present inordertoestablishfiliation.
Note:Thebirthcertificatethatwaspresentedbythe plaintiffminor appears to have been prepared without the knowledge or consent of the putative father. It is therefore not a competent piece of evidence on paternity. The local civil registrar in this case has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. Similarly, a baptismal certificate, while considered a public document, can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on thedatespecifiedthereinbutnottheveracityofthe entries with respect to the child's paternity (Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73). Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same (Jison v. CA, 350 Phil. 138). (Cabataniav.CA,G.R.No.124814.Oct.21,2004)
C.ILLEGITIMATECHILDREN Q:Whoareillegitimatechildren? A:Childrenconceivedandbornoutsideavalid marriage. Q: In what instances may an illegitimate child usethesurnameoftheirfather? A:RAP 1. Filiation has been Recognized by the father through the record of birth appearinginthecivilregister 2. Admissioninpublicdocument 3. Private handwritten instrument is made bythefather
Note: Provided that the father has the right to institute an action beforetheregularcourtstoprove nonfiliationduringhislifetime.
D.LEGITIMATEDCHILDREN Q:Whatislegitimation? A: Legitimation is a remedy or process by means of which those who in fact not born in wedlock and should therefore be ordinarily illegitimate, arebyfiction,consideredlegitimate. Q:Whoareentitledtolegitimation? A: Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any impedimenttomarryeachother. Q: Are children born of parents, who at the time of conception and birth, were minors may be legitimated? A: Yes. RA 9858 amended Art. 177 of the Family Code in allowing children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of themwerebeloweighteen(18)yearsofage,tobe legitimated. Q:Whataretherequisitesoflegitimation? A: 1. Child must have been conceived and bornoutsideofwedlock; 2. Childs parents, at the time of formers conception, were not disqualified by anyimpedimenttomarryeachother; 3. The subsequent valid marriage of the parents.(Art.177,NCC) Q: Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye, 16 years old, they started living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. When Faye reached 18 years of age, her parents forcibly took her back and arranged for her marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the marriage, Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work. During their marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, Laica. When Faye was 25 years old, Brad discovered her continued liaison with Roderick and in one of their heated arguments, Faye shot Brad to death. She lost no time in marrying her true love Roderick, without a marriage license, claiming that they have been continuouslycohabitingformorethan5years. WasthemarriageofRoderickandFayevalid?
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A: The marriage was void because there was no marriage license. Their marriage was not exempt from the requisite of a marriage license because Roderick and Faye have not been cohabiting for atleast5continuousyearsbeforethecelebration of their marriage. Their lovers trysts and brief visitations did not amount to cohabitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that for the marriage to be exempt from a license, there should be no impediment for them to marry each other during the entire 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye could not have cohabited for 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye could not have been cohabited for 5 continuous years without impediment because Faye was then legallymarriedtoBrad.(2008BarQuestion) WhatisthefiliationstatusofLaica? A: Having been born during the marriage of Faye and Brad, she is presumed to be the legitimate child of Faye and Brad, she is presumed to be the legitimate child of Faye and Brad. This presumption had become conclusive because the period of time to impugn her filiation had already prescribed. Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground that based on DNA results, Roderickisherbiologicalfather? A: No, she cannot impugn her own filiation. The law does not allow a child to impugn his or her own filiation. In the problem, Laicas legitimate filiation was accorded to her by operation of law whichmaybeimpugnedonlybyBrad,orhisheirs in the cases provided by law within the prescriptiveperiod. Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biologicalparents? A: No she cannot be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents. In the first place she is not, under the law, the child of Roderick. In the second place, her biological parents could not have validly married each other at the time she was conceived and born simply because Faye was still married to Roderick at that time. Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived or born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the child were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, may be legitimated. (2008 Bar Question) RIGHTSOFCHILDREN Q: What are the rights of legitimate and illegitimatechildren? A: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Surname Bearthesurnameof Bearthesurnamesof eitherthemotheror bothparents(mother thefatherunderR.A. andfather) 9255 Support Receivesupportfrom: 1. Parents; 2. Ascendants;and Receivesupport 3. inpropercases, accordingtoprovision brothersand ofFC sistersunderArt 174. Legitime FullLegitimesand Shareisequivalentto othersuccessional oftheshareofa rightsundertheCivil legitimatechild Code Periodforfilingactionforclaimoflegitimacyor illegitimacy Forprimaryproof: His/herwholelifetime his/herwholelifetime regardlessoftypeof proofprovidedunder Forsecondaryproof: Art172 onlyduringthelifetime oftheallegedparent Transmissibilityofrighttofileanactiontoclaim legitimacy Yes No Righttoinheritabintesto Norighttoinheritab intestofromlegitimate childrenandrelativesof Yes fatherandmother underArt992,NCC (IronCurtainRule)
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VIII.ADOPTION A.DOMESTICADOPTIONLAW 1.WHOCANADOPT Q:Whomayadopt? A: 1. Filipino; 2. Alien; 3. Guardianwithrespecttohisward. Q: What are the qualifications of a Filipino who mayadopt? A:LPGFEC16 1. MustbeofLegalage; 2. InaPositiontocareforhischildren; 3. Goodmoralcharacter; 4. Fullcivilcapacityandlegalrights; 5. Not been Convicted of any crime involvingmoralturpitude; 6. Emotionally and psychologically capable ofcaringforchildren; 7. GR: At least 16 years older than adoptee XPN: It is not necessary that adopter be atleast16yearsolder: a. Adopter is the biological parent of theadoptee, b. Adopter is the spouse of adoptees parent. Q: What are the qualifications of an alien who mayadoptunderR.A.8552? A:SD3 1. Possesses Same qualifications as those enumeratedforFilipinoadopters; 2. His country has Diplomatic relations withthePhilippines; 3. GR: Has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the application for adoption and maintains such residence until adoption decreehasbeenentered. XPN: a. He is a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, b. He is married to a Filipino and seeks to adopt jointly with his th spouse a relative within the 4 degreeofconsanguinityoraffinity, c. He is married to a Filipino and seeks to adopt the legitimate or illegitimate child of his filipino spouse.
Q:Howmayaguardianadopthisward? A: A guardian may only adopt his ward after termination of guardianship and clearance of his financialaccountabilities. Q: What is the rule when a person seeking to adopthasaspouse? A: GR: Such person must adopt with his spouse jointly. The general rule is that husband and wifeshalljointlyadopt. XPN: 1. One spouse seeks to adopt the legitimatechildoftheother; 2. One spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimatechild; 3. Spousesarelegallyseparated. Q: Spouses Primo and Monica Lim, childless, were entrusted with the custody of two minor children, the parents of whom were unknown. Eager of having children of their own, the spouses made it appear that they were the childrens parents by naming them Michelle P. LimandMichaelJudeLim. Subsequently, Monina married Angel Olario after Primos death of her husband. She decided to adopt the children by availing the amnesty given under R.A. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. She filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old and Michael, 18. Both Michelle and Michaelgaveconsenttotheadoption. The trial court dismissed the petition and ruled that Monina should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. Monina, in a Motion for Reconsideration argues that mere consent of her husband would suffice and that joint adoption is not needed, for the adoptees arealreadyemancipated. Is the trial court correct in dismissing the petitionsforadoption? A: Yes. Section 7 Article 3 of R.A. 8552 reads: Sec. 7Husbandandwifeshalljointlyadopt,xxx. The use of the word shall in the abovequoted
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provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it but natural to requirethespousestoadoptjointly.Therulealso ensuresharmonybetweenthespouses. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Monina, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by Monina herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denyingthepetitionsforadoptiononthisground. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michael Jude P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 16899293, May 21, 2009) Q: Is joint adoption still needed when the adopteesarealreadyemancipated? A: Yes. Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled suchassupportandsuccessionalrights. ADOPTEE. Q:Whomaybeadopted? A: 1. Any person below 18 of age who has been administratively or judicially declaredavailableforadoption; 2. Legitimate child of one spouse by the otherspouse; 3. Illegitimate child by a qualified adopter to improve the status of said child to thatoflegitimacy; 4. Person of legal age, if prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by adoptersastheirchildsinceminority; 5. Child whose adoption has been previouslyrescinded; 6. Child whose biological parents have died provided no proceedings have been initiated within 6 months from timeofdeath. Q:Whatisthedefinitionofchild? A:Achildisanypersonbelow18yearsold. Q:Whatisthedefinitionofchildlegallyfreefor adoption? A: A child voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the DSWD, freed of his biological parents, guardians,adoptersincaseofrescission. Q: Whose written consent is necessary for adoption? A: 1. Adoptee,if10yearsofageandover; 2. Biological parents of the child, if known or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legalcustodyofthechild; 3. Legitimate children of the adopter, if 10 yearsoldorover; 4. Illegitimate children of the adopter, if 10yearsoldoroverandlivingwithhim; 5. Spouseoftheadopted,ifmarried; 6. Spouseoftheadopter,ifmarried. Q:Bernadettefiledapetitionforadoptionofthe threeminorchildrenofherlatebrother,Ian.She alleged that when her brother died, the children were left to the care of their paternal grandmother, Anna, who went to Italy. This grandmother died however, and so she filed the petition for adoption. The minors gave their written consent to the adoption and so did all of her own grownup children. The trial court granted the decree of adoption even though the written consent of the biological mother of the children was not adduced by Bernadette. Was the trial court correct in granting the decree of adoption? A: No. The rule is adoption statutes must be liberally construed in order to give spirit to their humane and salutary purpose which is to uplift the lives of unfortunate, needy or orphaned children. However, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings on the part of the courts should not to be anchored solely on those principles, but with due regard likewise to the natural rights of the parents over the child. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
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may be terminated and vested in the adoptive parents. In this case, since the minors' paternal grandmother had taken custody of them, her consentshouldhavebeensecuredinsteadinview of the absenceof the biological mother. This is so underSec.9(b)ofR.A.8552,otherwiseknownas the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Diwata failed in this respect, thus necessitating the dismissal of her petition for adoption. (Landingin v. Republic,G.R.No.164948,June27,2006) Q: On what grounds may an adoptee seek the rescissionoftheadoption? A: 1. Attemptonthelifeoftheadoptee; 2. Sexualassaultorviolence; 3. Abandonment and failure to comply withparentalobligations; 4. Repeated physical or verbal maltreatmentbytheadopter.
Note: Adopter cannot rescind but may disinherit the adoptee.
2. 3.
4. 5.
Deemed a legitimate child of the adopter; Acquires reciprocal rights and obligations arising from parentchild relationship; Righttousesurnameofadopter; In legal and intestate succession, the adopters and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biologicalparentshadleftawill,thelaw on testamentary succession shall govern.
Q: What are the grounds by which an adopter maydisinheritadoptee? A: 1. Groundless accusation against the testator of a crime punishable by 6 yearsormoreimprisonment; 2. Found guilty of attempt against the life of the testator, his/her spouse, descendantorascendant; 3. Causes the testator to make changes or changes a testators will through violence, intimidation, fraud or undue influence; 4. Maltreatment of the testator by word ordeed; 5. Conviction of a crime which carries a penaltyofcivilinterdiction; 6. Adultery or concubinage with the testatorswife; 7. Refusal without justifiable cause to supporttheparentorascendant; 8. Leadsadishonorableordisgracefullife. Q:Whataretheeffectsofadoption? A: 1. GR: Severance of all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee and the same shall then be vested on theadopters XPN: In cases where the biological parentisthespouseoftheadopter;
Q: State the effects of rescission of the adoption intheDomesticAdoptionActof1998(RA8552). A: 1. If adoptee is still a minor or is incapacitatedRestorationof: a. Parentalauthorityoftheadoptees biologicalparents,ifknownor b. LegalcustodyoftheDSWD; 2. Reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopters and adoptee to each other shallbeextinguished; 3. Court shall order the civil registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her originalbirthcertificate; 4. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission; 5. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescissionshallberespected. Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unmarried. His first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 30 years old. His second, with Carla, producedtwosons:JonandRyan.Histhird,with Donna, bore him two daughters: Vina and Wilma. His fourth, while Elena, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from a previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy,now 13years old, whom they consider as their own. Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they consider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the midwife who attended to Sandys birth. All the children, including Amy, now live with Andrew in his house.
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Is there any legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To the legal adoption of SandybyAndrewandElena? A: No, there is no legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew. While a person of age may not be adopted, Amy falls within two exceptions: (1) she is an illegitimate child and she is being adopted by her illegitimate father to improve her status; and (2) even on the assumption that she is not an illegitimate child of Andrew, she may still be adopted, although of legal age, because she has been consistently consideredandtreatedbytheadopterashisown child since minority. In fact, she has been living withhimuntilnow. There is a legal obstacle to the adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena. Andrew and Elena cannot adoptjointlybecausetheyarenotmarried. In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to claim support from Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina, Wilma and Sandy assuming that all of them have the meanstosupporthim? A: Andrew can claim support from them all, except from Sandy, who is not his child, legitimate,illegitimateoradopted. Can Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina, Wilma and Sandy legallyclaimsupportfromeachother? A: Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma can ask support from each other because they are half blood brothers and sisters, and Vina and Wilma are fullblood sisters (Art. 195 [5], Family Code), butnotSandywhoisnotrelatedtoanyofthem. CanJonandJanelegallymarry? A: Jon and Jane can legally marry because they are not related to each other. Jane is not a daughterofAndrew.(2008BarQuestion) B.INTERCOUNTRYADOPTIONACTOF1995. (RA8043). ADOPTER Q:Whomayadopt? A: 1. Anyalien; 2. Filipino citizen, both permanently residingabroad. Q: What are the qualifications needed for a Filipinooralientoadopt? A: 1. At least 27 years old and 16 years older thanthechildtobeadoptedatthetime of the application unless adopter is the parentbynatureofthechild; 2. If married, his spouse must jointly file foradoption; 3. Has the capacity to act or assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority; 4. Not been convicted of a crime involving moralturpitude; 5. Eligibletoadoptunderhisnationallaw; 6. In a position to provide for proper care and support and give necessary moral values; 7. Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child mandated by the UN convention of rights of Child and the Philippine Laws; 8. Comes from a country with which the Philippines has diplomatic relations and adoption is allowed under his national law; 9. Possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the laworotherapplicablePhilippinelaws. Q: Sometime in 1990, Sarah, born a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and her AmericanhusbandSonnyCruz,filedapetitionin the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina,canthepetitionbegranted? A: It depends. If Sonny and Sarah have been residinginthePhilippinesforatleast3yearsprior totheeffectivityofR.A.8552,thepetitionmaybe granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted because the American husband is not qualifiedtoadopt. While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refiled upon the effectivity of R.A. 8552. This is the law applicable, the petition being still pending with the lower court. Under the Act, Sarah and Sonny must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien, is qualified to adopt, for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a th relative within the 4 degree of consanguinity or affinity, Sonny, an alien, is not qualified to adopt because he is neither a former Filipino citizen nor
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married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualifiedtoadopt,theirpetitionhastobedenied. However, if they have been residents of the Philippines 3 years prior to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here until the decree ofadoptionisentered,theyarequalifiedtoadopt the nephew of Sarah under Sec 7(b) thereof, and thepetitionmaybegranted.(2000BarQuestion) ADOPTEE Q:Whomaybeadopted? A: Only a legally free child may be adopted providedthefollowingaresubmitted: 1. Childstudy; 2. Birthcertificate/foundlingcertificate; 3. Deed of Voluntary Commitment/Decree of Abandonment/Death Certificate of parents; 4. Medicalevaluationorhistory; 5. Psychologicalevaluation; 6. Recentphoto; Q:Whatisthedefinitionofchild? A:Achildisanypersonbelow15yearsold. Q:Whatisalegallyfreechild? A: A child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the DSWD of the Philippines, in accordance with the Child Youth andWelfareCode
Note: No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown that thechildcannotbeadoptedinthePhilippines
ofthechild Q:Whatistrialcustody? A:Itisthepreadoptiverelationshipwhichranges 6 months from the time of the placement. It starts from the actual transfer of the child to the applicant who, as actual custodian, shall exercise substitute parental authority over the person of thechild
Note: 1. Ifunsatisfactorytherelationshipshallbe suspended by the board and the foreign adoption agency shall arrange for the childsvoluntarycare. If satisfactorythe Boardshall submit the written consent of the adoption to the foreign adoption agency within 30 days aftertherequestofthelattersrequest.
2.
IX.SUPPORT Q:Whatissupport? A: It comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical assistance and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family, including the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the ageofmajority.(Art.194,FC) Q:Whatarethecharacteristicsofsupport? A:PRIMPEN 1. Personal 2. Reciprocal on the part of those who are bylawboundtosupporteachother 3. Intransmissible 4. Mandatory 5. Provisional character of support judgment 6. Exemptfromattachmentorexecution 7. Notsubjecttowaiverorcompensation A.WHATITCOMPRISES Q:Whatcomprisessupport? A: Support comprises of everything indispensable for:SDCMET 1. Sustenance 2. Dwelling 3. Clothing 4. Medicalattendance 5. Education includes schooling or training for some profession, trade or
GR: There shall be no physical transfer of a voluntarily committed child earlier than 6 monthsfromthedateofexecutionofDeedof VoluntaryCommitment. XPN: 1. Adoptionbyrelative; 2. Childwithspecialmedicalcondition.
INTERCOUNTRYADOPTIONBOARD Q: What is the function of InterCountry AdoptionBoard? A: The Inter Country Adoption Board acts as the central authority in matters relating to inter country adoption. The Board shall ensure that all the possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that the intercountry adoption is in the best interest
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vocation, even beyond the age of majority Transportation includes expenses going to and from school, or to from placeofwork 3. Parents and their legitimate children, and the legitimate and illegitimate childrenofthelatter; Parents and their illegitimate children, and the legitimate and illegitimate childrenofthelatter; Legitimate brothers and sisters whether fullorhalfblood.
6.
4.
Q:Whataretherulesontheamountofsupport? A: Amount of support shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. It shall be increased or reduced proportionately, according to the increase/reduction of necessities of the recipient andtheresourcesofthepersonobliged. Q:Whatarethedifferentkindsofsupport? A: 1. Legalrequiredorgivenbylaw; 2. Judicialrequiredbycourt; Maybe: a. Pendentelite b. Inafinaljudgment 3. Conventionalbyagreement. Q: What are the rules on support of illegitimate childrenofeitherspouse? A: It depends upon the property regime of the spouses. 1. ACP: a. Exclusive property of the debtor spouseshallbeliable. b. If the exclusive property is insufficient, the community is liable.
Note: The same being considered as advance made by the absolute communitytosaidspouse.
5.
2.
CPG: a. Property of the debtorspouse is liable. b. If the debtor spouse has no property or the same is insufficient, it may be enforced againsttheconjugalproperty.
B.WHOAREOBLIGED Q: Who are persons obliged to support each other? A: 1. Spouses; 2. Legitimateascendants&descendants;
Q: Are brothers and sisters not legitimately relatedlikewiseboundtosupporteachother? A: GR:Yes. XPN: when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimants fault or negligence. In this case, the illegitimate brotherorsisterhasnorighttobesupported. Q:Whatarethesourcesofsupport? A: SOURCESOFSUPPORT During After PendingLitigation Marriage Litigation Spouses ACP GR: From the community propertyassets XPN: If Art 203 GR:No applies, that if the obligationto claimant spouse is support the guilty spouse, he/she is not XPN:Ifthere entitled to isLegal Fromthe support. Separation. community Inwhich property CPG case,the Support is courtmay considered an requirethe advance of such guiltyspouse spousesshare. togive support *The rule does not apply if the spouses are under ACP based on Art 153. Children Fromthe Fromthe Fromthe separate community community propertiesof property property thespouses
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Q:Towhomdoestheliabilitytosupportdevolve upon? A:Inthefollowingorder:SDAB 1. Spouse 2. Descendants in the in the nearest degree 3. Ascendantsinthenearestdegree 4. Brothersandsisters Q: Belen, in behalf of her minor children, institutedapetitionfordeclarationoflegitimacy and support against Federico, their alleged father, and Francisco, father of Federico. It appears that the marriage of the two was annulled due to the minority of Federico. May Franciscobeorderedtogivesupport? A: Yes. There appears to be no dispute that the children are indeed the daughters of Federico by Belen. Under Art. 199 of the FC, Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons inthefollowingorderhereinprovided: 1. Thespouse; 2. Thedescendantsinthenearestdegree; 3. The ascendants in the nearest degree: and 4. Thebrothersandsisters. The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. Here, since it has been shown that the girls' father, Federico, had no means to support them, then Francisco, as the girls grandfather, should then extendthesupportneededbythem.
Note: The second option in Art. 204 of the FC, that of taking in the family dwelling the recipient, is unavailing in thiscasesince the filing of the case has evidently made the relations among the parties bitter and unpleasant. (Mangonon, et al. v. CA, et al.,G.R.No.125041,Jun.30,2006)
Q: Marcelo and Juana called Dr. Arturo to their house to render medical assistance to their daughterinlawwhowasabouttogivebirthtoa child. He performed the necessary operation. When Dr. Arturo sought payment, Marcelo and Juana refused to pay him without giving any goodreason.Whoisboundtopaythebillforthe servicesrenderedbyArturo? A: Her husband, not her father and mother in law. The rendering of medical assistance in case
of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (Art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by whichlifeisjeopardized. Her husband denies liability on the ground that it was not he who requested Dr. Arturos assistance.Decide. A: That it was not the husband who called and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as Marcelo, in view of the imminent danger to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable.(Pelayo v. Lauron,etal.,GRNo.L4089,Jan.12,1909) C.SUPPORTDURINGMARRIAGELITIGATION Q: What is the source of support during the pendency of legal separation, annulment and declarationofnullityofmarriageproceedings? A: The spouses and their common children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute communityortheconjugalpartnership. Q: Are the spouses still obligedto render mutual support after final judgment granting the petition? A: GR: No. The obligation of mutual support ceases afterfinaljudgment. XPN: In case of legal separation the Court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to theinnocentone.
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D.AMOUNT Q:Whatistheamountofsupport? A:Amountshallbeinproportiontotheresources ormeansofthegiverandtothenecessitiesofthe recipient. Q: May the amount of support be reduced or increased? A: Yes. Support may be decreased or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and theresourcesofthepersonobligedtofurnishthe same. E.WHENDEMANDABLE Q: When is the obligation to give support demandable? A: From the time the person who has a right to receivesupportneedsitformaintenance. # Q:Whenshallsupportbepaid? A: Only from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Note: The right to support does not arise from mere fact of relationship but from imperative necessity without which it cannot be demanded. The law presumes that such necessity does not existunlesssupportisdemanded. F.OPTIONS Q: What are the options given to persons giving support? A: 1. ToGiveafixedmonthlyallowance;or 2. ToReceiveandmaintaintherecipientin thegivershomeorfamilydwelling. Q: After 1 month of marriage, husband repeatedly demanded from wife to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals." Because of her refusal, he maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on her. To escape his lewd designs and avoid further harm, she left the conjugal home and took refugeinherparent'shouse. She filed an action for support which was dismissed on the ground that the husband could notbecompelledtogivesupportifhiswifelived outside of the conjugal home, unless there was legalseparation.Isthedismissalproper? A: No. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wifeifsheisdrivenawayfromtheconjugalhome becauseofhisownwrongfulacts.Inthiscase,she was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of her husbands lewd designs and physical assaults. She may claim support from him for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugalhome.(Goitiav. CamposRueda,G.R.No. 11263,Nov.2,1916) G.ATTACHMENT Q: Is the right to receive support subject to attachmentorexecution? A: GR: No. The right to receive support and any money or property obtained as support cannot be attached no be subject to execution to satisfy any judgmentagainsttherecipient. XPN: In case of contractual support or support given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachmentorexecution. Q: Jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time. What is the exception with respect to the provisional character of judgment for support andtheapplicationofestoppels? A: Judgment for support is always provisional in character. Res Judicata does not apply. The lower court cannot grant a petition based on grounds, suchasbigamy,notallegedinthepetition.Sucha decision based on grounds not alleged in the petitionisvoidonthegroundofnojurisdiction. However, if the lower courts void decision is not assailed on appeal which dealt only with the matter of support, the losing party is now estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity and the SC will not undo the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage null and void for beingbigamous. It is axiomatic that while a jurisdictional question mayberaisedatanytime,thishoweveradmitsof an exception where estoppel has supervened. (Lamv.Chua,G.R.No.131286,Mar.18,2004)
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Q: Edward abandoned his legitimate children when they were minors. After 19 years from the time Edward left them, they, through their mother, finally sued him for support, which the court granted. The court ordered him to pay 2M pesosassupportinarrears. Edward assails the grant of the support in arrears as erroneous since under Art. 203 of the FC, there was never any demand for support, judicial or extrajudicial, from them. Rule on his contention. A: No. Edward could not possibly expect his daughters to demand support from him considering their tender years at the time that he abandonedthem.Inanyevent,themotherofthe girls had made the requisite demand for material support although this was not in the standard form of a formal written demand. Asking one to givesupportowingtotheurgencyofthesituation is no less a demand just because it came by way of a request or a plea. (Lacson v. Lacson, et al.,G.R.No.150644,Aug.28,2006) Q:NoelhelpedLeabyextendingfinancialhelpto support Leas children with Edward. May Noel seek reimbursement of his contributions? If yes, fromwhommayhedoso? A: Yes. Pursuant to Art. 207 of the FC, Noel can rightfully exact reimbursement from Edward. This provision reads that "[W]hen the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support." The resulting juridical relationship between the Edward and Noel is a quasicontract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. (Lacson v. Lacson, et al.,GRNo.150644,Aug.28,2006) Q: Fe and her son Martin sued Martins alleged biological father Arnel for support. Arnel denied having sired Martin arguing that his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in long before Martins conception.As a result, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. The said motion was granted by the court. Did the order of the court convert the complaint for support to a petition forrecognition? A: The assailed order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed Fe to prove their cause of action. But even if the order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 665), the Supreme Court allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Furthermore, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to the action for support. (Agustinv.CA,G.R.No.162571,June15,2005). Q: Can DNA testing be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating the constitutional rightagainstselfincrimination? A: Yes. In People v. Yatar (428 SCRA 504), the Supreme Court had already upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. Moreover, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizure and in the infringement of privacy of communication wheretheconstitutionalrighttoprivacyhasbeen criticallyatissue. If,inacriminalcase,anaccusedwhoseverylifeis at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, so much more so may a party in a civil case, who does not face such dire consequences, be likewise compelled. DNA testing and its results is now acceptable as object evidence without runningafoulselfincriminationrightsofaperson. (Agustinv.CA,GRNo.162571,Jun.15,2005) X.PARENTALAUTHORITY A.GENERALPROVISIONS Q:Whatispatriapotestas? A: The sum total of the rights of parents over the persons and property of their unemancipated child. Q:Whatdoesparentalauthorityinclude? A:Itshallinclude: 1. Caring for and rearing of such children forcivicconsciousnessandefficiency; 2. Development of their moral, mental andphysicalcharacterandwellbeing.
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Q: What are the characteristics of parental authority? A:JoNaRePuTe 1. Jointly exercised by the father and mother; 2. Naturalrightanddutyoftheparents; 3. Cannot be Renounced, transferred or waived; XPN:Incasesauthorizedbylaw; 4. Purelypersonal;
Note: It cannot be exercised through agents.
Q: What is the rule as to the custody of a child below7yearsofage? A: GR: No child below 7 years of age shall be separatedfromthemother XPN: When the court finds compelling reasonstoconsiderotherwise
Note: The paramount consideration in matters of custody of a child is the welfare and wellbeing of thechild
5.
Temporary.
Q: What are the rules as to the exercise of parentalauthority? A: 1. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the personsoftheircommonchildren.
Note: In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there isajudicialordertothecontrary.
2. If the child is illegitimate, parental authorityiswiththemother. Q: What is meant by the parental preference rule? A:Thenaturalparents,whoareofgoodcharacter and who can reasonably provide for the child are ordinarily entitled to custody as against all persons. Q: Who shall exercise parental authority in case oflegalordefactoseparationofparents? A:ParentdesignatedbytheCourt. Q: What shall the Court take into account in the designationoftheparent? A: All relevant considerations, especially the choiceof thechildoversevenyearsofageexcept whentheparentchosenisunfit.
Q: If the parents are separated de facto, who between them has custody over their child/children? A: In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both are entitled to the custody of theirchild/children. The parent who has been deprived of the rightful custody of the child may resort to the remedy of habeas corpus. (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. No. 162734,Aug.29,2006) Q: The petition for declaration of nullity filed by Crisanto against his wife included a prayer for custodypendenteliteoftheir4yearoldson.The supplication for custody was based on the alleged immorality of the mother who, the husband asserted, was a lesbian. However, the trial court citing Art. 213 of the FC, denied Crisanto's prayer for temporary custody of his son, there having been no compelling reason to soorderit.Wasthetrialcourtcorrectindenying Crisantosprayerfortemporarycustody? A: Yes. The petitioner failed to overcome the so called "tenderage presumption" rule under Art. 213 of the FC. There was no compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. 'Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the errant spouse from exercising proper parental care.
Note: The general rule that children less than seven years of age shall not be separated from the mother finds its raison d'etrein the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care. This is predicated on the "best interest of the child" principle which pervades not only child custody cases but also those involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status and minors in
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conflict with the law. (PabloGualberto v. Gualberto, G.R.No.154994/G.R.No.156254,Jun.28,2005)
Q: In a petition for habeas corpuswhich he filed beforetheCourtofAppeals,Joeysoughtcustody of his minor son from his former livein partner, Loreta. Joey alleged that the child's mother was abroad most of the time and thus, he should be given joint custody over their son. The CA howeverdeniedthepetition,andonthebasisof Art. 213, par (2) of the FC, awarded custody of the child in favor of the mother. Was the CA correct in denying Joeys petition for habeas corpusforthecustodyofhisminorson? A: Yes. Under Art. 176 of the FC, parental authorityoveranillegitimatechildisvestedsolely in the mother, and this is true notwithstanding that the child has been recognized by the father as his offspring. At most, such recognition by the father would be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child (David v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82). Custody over the minor in this case was therefore awarded correctly to the mother, and this is all the more so in view of Art. 213 of the FC which lays down the Maternal Preference Rule. There is alsonoshowingthatJoeywasabletoshowproof of any compelling reason to wrest from the motherparentalauthorityovertheirminorchild.
Note:However,theCAerredinapplyingSec.6,Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision applies only when the parents of the child are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are leaving separately de facto. In this case, the child's parents were never married. Hence, the portion of the CA decision allowing thechild, uponreachingthe ageof ten, to choose which parent to live, should be deletedtherefrom.(Brionesv.Miguel,etal.,G.R.No. 156343.Oct.18,2004)
liberty. Moreover, Art. 213 of the FC deals with the adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award ofcustody by the court. While the petitioners can raise it as a counter argument in the custody suit, it may not however be invoked by them to prevent the fatherfromseeingthechild.
Note: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Art. 211 of the FC, both parents in this case have joint parental authority over their child and consequently joint custody over him. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody, bothparents are still entitled to the custody of their child. (Salientes, et al. v. Abanilla, et al.,G.R. No.162734,Aug.29,2006)
Q: In a petition for habeas corpus that was filed by Loran against his estranged wife, as well as againsthisparentsinlawwhomheallegedwere unlawfully restraining him from having custody of his child, the trial court issued an order directing the aforesaid persons to appear in court and produce the child in question and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint. Does trial court's orderruncountertoArt.213oftheFC? A:No.Theassailedorderofthetrialcourtdidnot grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but was merely a procedural directive addressed to the petitioners for them to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his
Q: The tug of war over custody of their minor son resulted in Ivy's filing of a petition for habeas corpus against Ernesto before the RTC. The trial court then granted temporary custody over the child to Ernesto. Who has jurisdiction overhabeascorpuscases? A: The RTC. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals still retain jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving minors despite the passage of Rep. Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) the law conferring upon family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. SC had earlier ruled that it would be difficult for persons seeking the whereabouts of minors to seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceableonlywithintheirrespectiveterritorial jurisdiction. This lack of recourse could not have beenthelegislativeintent,andthusR.A.8369did not effectively divest the High Court and Court of Appeals of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The primordial consideration always is the welfare and best interest of the child. As it stands then, the RTCs, thru the appropriately designated Family Court branches, the CA and the SC have concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions. Since in this case, the petition was first filed before the RTC of Quezon City, then the latter acquired jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might issue conflicting orders. (ReyesTabujara v. CA, et al., GRNo.172813,July20,2006)
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B.SUBSTITUTEANDSPECIALPARENTAL AUTHORITY Q: What is the order of substitute parental authority? A:GOC 1. SurvivingGrandparent; 2. Oldestbrotherorsister,over21years; XPN:unfitordisqualified 3. ActualCustodianover21year; XPN:unfitordisqualified C.EFFECTSOFPARENTALAUTHORITYUPONTHE PERSONOFTHECHILDREN Q: What are the rules regarding the right to custodyoverthechild? A: GR: Parents are never deprived of the custodyandcareoftheirchildren. XPNS: 1. Forcause
Note: the law presumes that the childs welfare will be best served in thecareandcontrolofhisparents.
2.
If in consideration of the childs welfare or wellbeing, custody may begiveneventoanonrelative.
Q: What is the basis for the duty to provide support? A: Family ties or relationship, not parental authority.
Note: The obligation of the parents to provide support is not coterminous with the exercise of parentalauthority.
Q: What is the scope of the parents right to disciplinethechild? A:Personsexercisingparentalauthoritymay: 1. Impose discipline on minor children as mayberequiredunderthecircumstances. 2. Petition the court for the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures upon the child, which include the commitment of the child in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in childrens homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. Note: Such commitment must not exceed30days. Q: What are the limitations on the exercise of the right to discipline the child and what are its consequences? A:Personsexercisingsuchrightisnotallowedto: 1. treat the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;or 2.inflictcorporalpunishment. Otherwise,thefollowingareitsconsequences: 1.Parentalauthoritymaybesuspended; 2. Parent concerned may be held criminally liable for violation of RA 7160 (Special Protection of Children against Abuse, ExploitationandDiscriminationAct) Q: To whom may special parental authority be granted? A: 1. Schooladministratorandteachers; 2. Individual entity or institution engaged inchildcare.
Q: What is the rule on the parents duty of representation? A: GR: Parents are dutybound to represent their unemancipated children in all matters affecting theirinterests; Note: This duty extends to representation in courtlitigations. XPN: A guardian ad litem may be appointed by the court to represent the child when the best interestofthechildsorequires.
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Q: What are the distinctions between substitute parental authority and special parental authority? A: SUBSTITUTE SPECIALPARENTAL PARENTALAUTHORITY AUTHORITY 1. Exercised Exercisedincaseof: concurrentlywith DAU theparental authorityofthe 1. Death, parents; 2. Absence,or 3. Unsuitabilityof 2. Restsonthetheory parents. thatwhilethechild isinthecustodyof theperson exercisingspecial parentalauthority, theparents temporarily relinquishparental authorityoverthe childtothelatter. Q: What is the liability of persons exercising specialparentalauthorityoverthechild? A: They are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Note: Parents, judicial guardians or those exercising substitute parental authority over the minor are subsidiarily liable for said acts and omissions of the minor.
Q: What are the kinds of properties of a minor? Distinguish. A: ADVENTITIOUS PROSFECTITIOUS Earnedor acquiredbythe 1. Property childthroughhis workorindustry givenbythe byonerousor parentstothe gratuitoustitle; childforthe 2. Ownedbythe latterto child; administer; 3. Childisalsothe 2. Ownedbythe parents; usufructuary,but thechildsuseof 3. Parentsare thepropertyshall usufructuary; besecondaryto 4. Property allcollectivedaily administered needsofthe bythechild. family; 4. Administeredby theparents. Q: What are the rules regarding the use of the childsproperty? A: 3. The property of minor children shall be devoted to their support and education unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. 4. The parents have the right to use only the fruits and income of said property forthefollowingpurposes: a. Primarily,tothechildssupport; b. Secondarily, to the collective daily needsofthefamily. Q: What is the rule on disposition and encumbranceofthechildsproperty? A: The parents, as legal guardians of the property of their minor children, do not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter, such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property, and even then, only with the courts prior approval, secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth under theRulesofCourt. Q: What is the rule on lease of property belongingtominorchildren? A: GR: The parents, as legal guardians of the minors property, may validly lease the same, even without court authorization, 1.
D.EFFECTSOFPARENTALAUTHORITYUPONTHE PROPERTYOFTHECHILDREN
Q: Who exercises legal guardianship over the propertyofanunemancipatedchild? A: The father and the mother, jointly, without needofcourtappointment.
Note: In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Q:Whenisaparentrequiredtopostabond? A: If the market value of the property or the annualincomeofthechildexceeds50,000Php.

Note: The bond shall not be less than 10% of the value of the property or annual income. (Art. 225, FC)
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because lease has been considered as an act ofadministration. XPNS:Courtauthorizationisrequiredif: 1. If the lease will be recorded in the RegistryofProperty; 2. If the lease is for a period of more than one year, because this is already deemedanactofdominion. E.SUSPENSIONORTERMINATIONOFPARENTAL AUTHORITY Q:Whenisparentalauthorityterminated? A: 1. Permanent:DED a. Deathofparents; b. Emancipationofthechild; c. Deathofchild. 2. Temporary:AGAFIAitmayberevived a. Adoptionofthechild; b. AppointmentofgeneralGuardian; c. Judicial declaration of Abandonment; d. Finaljudgmentdivestingparentsof PA; e. IncapacityofparentexercisingPA; f. JudicialdeclarationofAbsence. Q:WhatarethegroundsforsuspensionofPA? A:CHAINB 1. Gives Corrupting orders, counsel and example; 2. Treats child with excessive Harshness andcruelty; 3. Subjects/allows child be subjected to Actsoflasciviousness; 4. Conviction of crime with penalty of civil Interdiction; 5. Culpable Negligence of parent or personexercisingPA; 6. CompelschildtoBeg.
Note: If the person exercising PA has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to Sexual Abuse,he/sheshallbepermanentlydeprivedofPA.
GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred and renounced. XPN:Incaseauthorizedbylaw.
Note: Parents may exercise authority over their childrensproperty.
XI.EMANCIPATION Q:Howdoesemancipationtakeplace? A:Byattainmentofmajorityattheageof(18) eighteenyears. Q:Whataretheeffectsofemancipation? A: 1. Parental authority over the person and propertyofthechildisterminated 2. Child shall be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save exceptions establishedbyexistinglaws. 3. Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of (21) twentyone. 4. The responsibility of parents or guardians for children and wards below (21) twentyone under the second and third paragraphs of Art.2180 of the Civil Codeshallnotbederogated. XII.SUMMARYJUDICIALPROCEEDINGSINTHE FAMILYLAW Q: What are the matters subject to summary proceedings? A: 1. Petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse. 2. Petition for an order providing for disciplinarymeasuresoverachild. 3. Petition for approval of bond of parents who exercise parental authority over thepropertyoftheirchildren. 4. Judicial declaration of presumptive death. 5. Action of a child for delivery of presumptivelegitime 6. Judicial determination of family domicile in case of disagreement betweenthespouses 7. Objection of one spouse as to the professionoftheother.
Q: When may the suspension be revoked and parentalauthorityrevived? A:Theremustbeacasefiledforthepurposeorin the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefore had ceased and will not be repeated.
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Action entrusting parental authority over foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children to heads of institutions. 9. Annulment by wife of the husband's decision in the administration and enjoyment of community or conjugal property. 10. Appointment of one of the spouses as sole administrator but only when the other spouse is absent, or separated in fact, or has abandoned the other or the consent is withheld. ( Uy v. CA, G.R. No. 109557,November29,2000) Q: How shall matters subject to summary proceedingsbedecided? A: All cases requiring summary court proceedings shall be decided in an expeditious manner, withoutregardtotechnicalrules. Q: W filed a petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code, for the declaration of the presumptive death of her absentspouse,H,basedontheprovisionsofArt. 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the presumptive death of H. The Republic received a copy of the decision on Nov 14, 2001. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on Nov 22, 2001. The RTC held that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period and thus, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executory judgmentoftheRTC? A:No.InSummaryJudicialProceedingsunderthe Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Art. 247, Family Code, are immediately final and executory. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are 8. immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. The RTC's decision was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. (Republic v. BermudezLorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005)
Note: However, an aggrieved party may file a petitionforcertioraritoquestionabuseofdiscretion amounting to lack of discretion. (Republic v. Tango, G.R.No.161062,July31,2009)
XIII.FINALPROVISIONS Q:Whatistheruleontheretroactivityofthe FamilyCode? A: GR:TheCodeshallhaveretroactiveeffect. XPN:Noretroactivityifitwouldprejudicevested rights. Q:Whatisavestedright? A:Somerightorinterestinpropertythathas becomefixedorestablished,andisnolonger opentodoubtorcontroversy.Rightsarevested whentherighttoenjoyment,presentor prospective,hasbecomethepropertyofsome personaspresentinterest. XIV.FUNERAL Q:Whataretherulesregardingfuneral? A:GeneralGuidelines: 1. Dutyandrighttomakearrangementsin funerals in accordance with Art. 199, FC: a. Spouse, b. Descendantsinthenearestdegree, c. Ascendantsinthenearestdegree, d. BrothersandSisters; 2. Funeralshallbe: a. in keeping with the social position ofthedeceased, b. in accordance with the expressed wishesofthedeceased, c. Inabsenceoftheexpressedwishes, his religious beliefs or affiliation shalldetermine;
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3. Anypersonwhodisrespectsthedeador allows the same shall be liable for damages; If the deceased is married, the tombstone or mausoleum is deemed part of the funeral expense and chargeable against the community property or conjugal partnership property. the matter be left to his judgment and discretion whenhereacheslegalage. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, such that before a person can be allowed to change the name given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compellingreasonwhichmayjustifysuchchange. Otherwise, the request would be denied. (In Re: Petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in civil registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, Mar. 30,2005)
Note: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause forwhichthechangeissought.
4.
XV.USEOFSURNAMES Q: What are the grounds for change of name whichhavebeenheldvalid? A:CLEARED 1. One has Continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; 2. The change results as a Legal consequence,asinlegitimation; 3. There is a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to Erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicinganyone; 4. ThechangewillAvoidconfusion; 5. Thenameis: a. Ridiculous, b. Extremely difficult to write or pronounce, c. Dishonorable. Q: The petition filed by the parents in behalf of their minor son Julian Lin Carulasan Wang soughtthedroppingofthelatter'smiddlename, "Carulasan." The parents averred that their plan for Julian to study in Singapore and adjust to its culture necessitates the drop since in that country, middle names or the mother's surname are not carried in a person's name. They therefore anticipate that Julian may be subjected to discrimination on account of his middle name, which is difficult to pronounce in light of Singapore's Mandarin language which does not have the letter "R" but if there is, Singaporeans pronounce it as "L." Should the petition for the dropping of his middle name be granted? A: No. Petitioners justification for seeking the change in the name of their child, that of convenience, was characterized by the Supreme Court as amorphous, to say the least, and would not warrant a favorable ruling. As Julian is only a minor and has yet to understand and appreciate thevalueofanychangeinhisname,itisbestthat
Q: Can a person change his registered first name andsexonthebasisofasexreassignment? A: No. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, Oct. 22, 2007) Q: What are the procedural requirements for a petitionforchangeofname? A: 1. 3 years residency in the province where thechangeissoughtpriortothefiling; 2. Mustnotbefiledwithin30dayspriorto anelection; 3. Petitionmustbeverified.
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Q: What is the Rule with regard to the use of surname by a child who is (1) legitimate, (2) legitimated,(3)adoptedand(4)illegitimate? A:
CHILDCONCERNED Legitimate Legitimated Adopted Illegitimate Conceivedpriorto annulmentofmarriage Conceivedafter annulmentofmarriage SURNAMETOBEUSED Fathers Adopters MothersorFathersif requisitesofR.A.9255 arecompliedwith Fathers Mothers SURNAMETOBE USED 1. firstnameand maidenname+ husbands surname 2. firstname+ husbands surname 3. husbandsfull name+prefix indicatingthatshe ishiswife(e.g. Mrs.) 4. retaintheuseof hermaidenname *useofhusbands surnameisnotaduty butmerelyanoption forthewife Shallresumeusing hermaidenname Choices: 1. resumeusing hermaiden name 2. continueusing husbands surname Unless: a. court decrees otherwise; b. sheorthe former husbandis married againto another person Wifeshallcontinue Art.372 usingthenameand surnameemployedby herpriortothelegal separation. Choicessameas widowedspouse.She mayuseher husbandssurname. Art.373
Divorced(atleastifthey allowitlaterorforthose whogotdivorcedduring thejapaneseoccupation)
FACTUALCIRCUMSTANCE OFTHEWIFE
Validmarriage(before husbanddies) Art370
Wifeis guiltyparty
Marriageis Annuled Art.371
Wifeis innocent
Q: Virginia Remo, a Filipino citizen, is married to FranciscoRallonza.Inherpassport,thefollowing entries appear: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiration of her passport, Virginia applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA, with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacementpassport.Virginia,relyingonArticle 370 of the Civil Code, contends that the use of thehusbands surnameby thewife is permissive ratherthanobligatory.IsVirginiacorrect? A: No. A married woman has an option, but not a duty,tousethesurnameofthehusbandinanyof the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. However, R.A. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name. These are death of husband, divorce, annulment, anddeclarationofnullityofmarriage. In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. However, once she opted to use her husbands surname in her original passport, she may not revert to the use of hermaiden name, except if any of the four groundsprovidedunderR.A.8239ispresent. Further, even assuming R.A. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of R.A. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. (Remo v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, Mar.5,2010)
LegallySeparated
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Q: What are the elements of usurpation of name? A:AUD 1. Actual use of anothers name by the defendant; 2. UseisUnauthorized; 3. Use of anothers name is to Designate personalityoridentifyaperson. Q: What are the remedies available to the personwhosenamehasbeenusurped? A: 1. Civil insofar as private persons are concerned: a. Injunction b. Damages 2. Criminal when public affairs are prejudiced. Q: Is the use of anothers name always actionable? A:No.Itisnotactionablewhenitisusedasstage, screenorpenname. Provided:GIM 1. UseisinGoodfaith; 2. No Injury is caused to the rights of the personwhosenamewasused; 3. UseisMotivatedby: a. Modesty b. desire to avoid unnecessary trouble c. other reason not prohibited by law ormorals. MIDDLENAME
Note: A middle name has practical or legal significance as it serves to identify the maternal pedigree or filiation of a person and distinguishes him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Art. 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of their father. Art. 174 of the Family Code gives legitimate children the righttobearthesurnamesofthefatherandmother, while illegitimate children, under Art. 176, as amended by R.A. 9255, shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case, they may bear the father's surname. In the case of these children, their registration in the civil registry requires that their middle names be indicated therein, apart of course from their given names and surnames. (In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang,454SCRA155)
Q: Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie. Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name be changedfrom"Astorga"to"Garcia,"whichisher mother's surname and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," which is his surname. This the trial court denied. Was the trial court correct in denying Honoratos request for Stephanies use of her mothers surname as hermiddlename? A: No. The name of an individual has two parts the given name or proper name and the surname or family name. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The Civil Code (Arts. 364 to 380) is silent as to the use of a middle name. Even Art. 176 of the FC, as amended by R.A. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a childmayuse. An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. As she had become a legitimate child on account of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to utilize the surname of her father, Honorato Catindig, and that of her mother, GemmaGarcia. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stepnanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, the High Court found no reason why sheshouldnotbeallowedtodoso.
Note: The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, predicated its ruling upon the statutory principle that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows a child with legitimate status. (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,G.R. No. 148311. Mar. 31, 2005)
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Q: Giana was born to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Gianas birth were not married to each other. While Andy was single at that time, Aimee was still in the process of securing a judicial declaration of nullity on her marriage to her exhusband. Giannas birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy and Aimee, registered the status of Gianna as legitimate, her surname carrying that of Andys, and that her parentsweremarriedtoeachother. Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Giannas birth certificate be successfully maintainedto: a. Change her status from legitimate to illegitimate;and A: A judicial action cannot be maintained to change the status of Gianna from legitimate to illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee. While it is true that Gianna is the biological daughter of Andy and Aimee conceived and born without marriage between them, Gianna is presumed, under the law as the legitimate child of Aimee and her husband. This filiation may be impugned only by the husband. To correct the status of Gianna in her birth certificate from legitimate child of Andy and Aimee to illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee will amount to indirectly impugning her filiation as the child of Aimees husbandinaproperaction.Whatcannotbedone directlycannotbedoneindirectly. b. Change her surname from that of Andys to Aimeesmaidensurname? A: A judicial action to change the surname of Gianna from the surname of Andy to the maiden surname of Aimee is also not allowed. Gianna, being presumed to be the legitimate child of Aimees husband is required by law to be registered under the surname of Aimees husband. While it is true that Giannas registered surname is erroneous, a judicial action for correction of entry to change the surname of Gianna to that of Aimees maiden surname will also be erroneous. A judicial action to correct an entry in the birth certificate is allowed to correct anerrorandnottocommitanothererror. Alternative Answers: It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna was born while Aimee was living with her ex husband. Neither does it show who filed the judicial action tocorrecttheentries. If the problem is intended only for purpose of determining whether factual changes are in order,thentheanswersare: a. A change from legitimate to illegitimate is proper upon proof of lack of marriage between Andy andAimee. b. If the child is considered illegitimate, then she should follow thesurnameofhermother. Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brought for the purpose of makingtheabovecorrections? A: Under R.A. 9048, only typographical errors are allowed to be corrected administratively. The change of status from legitimate to illegitimate is not a typographical error and even assuming that it is, its administrative correction is not allowed under R.A. 9048. Typographical errors involving status, age, citizenship, and gender are expressly excluded from what may be corrected administratively. The change of the surname is also not allowed administratively. R.A. 9048 provides for an administrativeprocedureforchangeoffirstname onlyandnotforchangeofsurname.
AssumingthatAimeeissuccessfulindeclaring her former marriage void, and Andy and Aimee subsequently married each other, wouldGiannabelegitimated? A: No, Gianna will not be legitimated. While the court may have declared the marriage void abinitioand,therefore,nomarriagetookplace in the eyes of the law, Gianna will still not be legitimated.Thisisbecauseatthetimeshewas conceived and born her biological parents could not have validly married each other. For their marriage to be valid, the court must first declare the first marriage null and void. In the problem, Gianna was conceived and born before the court has decreed the nullity of her mothers previous marriage. (2008 Bar Question)

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XVI.ABSENCE A.PROVISIONALMEASURESINCASEOF ABSENCE Q:Whatisabsence? A: Special status of a person who has left his domicile and thereafter his whereabouts and fate are unknown, it being uncertain whether he is already dead or still alive. (Olaguiviel v. Morada, 63O.G.4940) Q:Whatarethekindsofabsence? A: 1. PhysicalAbsence 2. LegalAbsence Q:Whatisprovisionalabsence? A: 1. When a person disappears from his domicile 2. Hiswhereaboutsareunknownand: a. hedidnotleaveanyagent b. he left an agent but the agents powerhasexpired Q:Whatistheremedyofaninterestedparty,a relativeorafriendoftheabsenteetoprotect thelatter'sinterest? A: They may petition the Court for the appointment of a representative to represent the absenteeinallthatmaybenecessary. Q:WhatisthedutyoftheCourtafterappointing therepresentative? A:TheCourtshall: 1. Takethenecessarymeasuresto safeguardtherightsandinterestsofthe absentee. Specifythepowers,obligations,and remunerationoftherepresentative. Regulatethepowers,obligationsand remunerationaccordingtothe circumstancesbytherulesconcerning guardians.
Note:Theadministratoroftheabsentee'sproperty shallbeappointedinaccordancewiththesame order.
B.DECLARATIONOFABSENCE Q:Whenmayabsencebejudiciallydeclared? A:Itdepends. 1. Where the absentee left no agent to administer his property after two (2) years without any news about the absentee or since receipt of the last news. 2. Wheretheabsenteehasleftapersonto administer his property after five (5) years. Q:Whomayaskforthedeclarationofabsence? A: 1. Spousepresent 2. Heirsinstitutedinawill 3. Relativeswhomaysucceedbyintestacy 4. Persons who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. Q:Whenshallthejudicialdeclarationofabsence takeeffect? A: Six (6) months after its publication in a newspaperofgeneralcirculation. C.ADMINISTRATIONOFTHEPROPERTYOFTHE ABSENTEE Q:Whenshalltheadministrationoftheproperty oftheabsenteecease? A:ADD 1. WhenabsenteeAppearspersonallyor bymeansofanagent. 2. WhenDeathoftheabsenteeisproved andhistestateorintestateheirs appear. 3. Whenathirdpersonappears,showing byaproperDocumentthathehas acquiredtheabsentee'spropertyby purchaseorothertitle.
2. 3.
Q:Whatistheorderofpreferenceinthe appointmentofarepresentative? A: 1. Spousepresent,except,whenlegally separated. 2. Intheabsenceofspouse,any competentperson.
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D.PRESUMPTIONOFDEATH Q:Whatarethekindsofpresumeddeath? A: 1. Ordinary presumption ordinary absence; absentee disappears under normal conditions without danger or ideaofdeath. 2. Extraordinary presumption qualified absence; disappearance with great probabilityofdeath. Q:Whataretherulesinordinarypresumptionof death? A:Incaseof: 1. a. Afteranabsenceofseven(7)years? A: The absentee is presumed dead for allpurposesexcept,succession. Afteranabsenceoften(10)years? A: The absentee is presumed dead for allpurposesincludingsuccession. Disappearance at the age of seventy six (76)yearsorolder: Afteranabsenceoffive(5)years? A: The absentee is presumed dead for allpurposesincludingsuccession. Disappearance upon or before reaching theageofseventyfive(75)years: his existence has not been known for four(4)years. Q: When is the absentee presumed to have died underanextraordinarypresumption? A: At the time of disappearance. i.e. when the calamitytookplace. Q: May a petition for the declaration of presumptive death be the subject of a judicial declaration, if it is the only question upon which acompetentcourthastopass? A: No. Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Moreover, It is clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot become final. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, cannotbecomefinalandexecutoryevenafterthe lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous andofnobenefittothepetitioner. Q: Juana married Arturo on January 1973. However, because the latter was unemployed the spouses constantly argued . Thus, Arturoleft the conjugal dwelling on October 1975. Years passed without any word from Arturo. Juana didnt hear any news of Arturo,his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. Believing that Arturo was already dead, Juana married Dante on June 1986. Subsequently, however, Dante's application for naturalization filed with the United States Government was denied because of the subsisting marriage between Juana and Arturo. Hence, on March , 2007, Juana filed a Petition for declaration of presumptive death of Arturo with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the Petition on the ground that Juana was not able to prove the existence of a wellgrounded belief that her husband Arturo was already dead as requiredunderArticle41oftheFamilyCode. a. Was the RTC correct in dismissing the petition basedonArticle41oftheFamilyCode? No. Since the marriages were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code it is the Civil Code that applies to this case not Art. 41 of the FC. Under the Civil Code, proof of well founded belief is not required. Juana could not have been expected to comply with the requirement of proof of "wellfounded belief" since the FC was
b.
2. a.
Q: When is the absentee presumed to have died underanordinarypresumption? A:Attheendofthefive,sevenortenyearperiod asthecasemaybe. Q: Who are presumed dead for all purposes including the division of estate among heirs in caseofextraordinarypresumptionofdeath? A:VAD 1. Person on board a Vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four (4) years since the loss of the vesselorairplane; 2. Person in the Armed forces who has taken pat in war, and has been missing forfour(4)years; 3. Person who has been in Danger of death under other circumstances and
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not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to taken place by the seventh year of absence, Dante. Moreover, the enactment of the FC in Arturo is to be presumed dead starting October 1988 does not change this conclusion. The FC 1982. shallhavenoretroactiveeffectifitimpairsvested rights.Toretroactivelyapplytheprovisionsofthe Further, the presumption of death cannot be the FC requiring Juana to exhibit "wellfounded subject of court proceedings independent of the belief"will,ultimately,resultintheinvalidationof settlement of the absentees estate. In case the her second marriage, which was valid at the time presumptionofdeathisinvokedindependentlyof it was celebrated. Such a situation would be such an action or special proceeding there is no untenable and would go against the objectives righttobeenforcednoristhere aremedyprayed thattheFamilyCodewishestoachieve. for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final b. Will the petition for declaration of determination of his right or status or for the presumptivedeath,therefore,prosper? ascertainmentofaparticularfact,forthepetition does not pray for a declaration that the No. Under the Civil Code, the presumption of petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for death is established by law and no court a declaration that he be presumed dead because declaration is needed for the presumption to hehadbeenunheardfrominsevenyears.Insum, arise. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, the petition for a declaration that the petitioner's Art. 83 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary to husband is presumptively dead, even if judicially have the former spouse judicially declared an made, would not improve the petitioner's absentee. The law only requires that the former situation, because such a presumption is already spouse has been absent for seven consecutive established by law. (Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. yearsatthetimeofthesecondmarriage,thatthe 180863,September8,2009) spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Since death is presumed to have Q:Discussthedistinctionsbetweendeclarationofpresumptivedeathforpurposeofcontracting subsequentmarriageandopeningsuccessionanddeclarationofabsenceunderRulesofCourt. A:
DECLARATIONOFPRESUMPTIVEDEATHFORPURPOSEOF: OPENINGOFSUCCESSION CONTRACTINGSUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE Applicablelaws Arts.390396,CivilCode Arts.4144,FamilyCode Whomayfilepetition 1. Spousepresent; 2. Heirsinstitutedinthewill; 3. Relatives who will succeed by intestacy;or 4. Those who have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death.(Sec.2,Rule107) Rule107,RulesofCourt DECLARATIONOFABSENCE
Absenteescoheirs,heirs,assigns, representativeorsuccessorsin interest
Spousepresent
Purposeofpetition Forthepurposeofcontracting subsequentmarriagebyspouse present Itistoappointanadministratoroverthe propertiesoftheabsentee.Thisisproper onlywheretheabsenteehasproperties tobeadministered
Toopensuccession
85
Whentofilepetition GR: 4 consecutive years absence of spouse and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absentspousewasalreadydead XPN: 2 consecutive years absence of spouse In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code(Art.41,FC) Effectivityofdeclaration 6 months after its publication of place and time of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and in the Official Upon institution of a summary Upon institution of a summary Gazette.Theordermustalsoberecorded proceedingincourt. proceedingincourt. in the Civil Registry of the place where the absentee last resided. (par. 2, Sec. 6, Rule107) Groundsforterminationofdeclaration 1. Absentee appears personally or throughanagent; Upon recording of the affidavit of reappearance ofthe absent spouse, 2. Absentees death is proved and heirs Upon recording of the affidavit of appear;or unlessthereisajudgmentannulling reappearance. the previous marriage or declaring 3. Thirdpersonappearsshowingthathe acquired title over the property of itvoidabinitio. theabsentee(Sec.8). Effectofreappearance It does not automatically terminate the subsequent marriage. To cause the termination of the subsequent marriage, the reappearance must be made in an affidavit of reappearance and the recording of a sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of such reappearanceinthecivilregistry. If, however, there was previous judgment annulling or declaring the prior marriage void, then the reappearance ofthe absent spouse, the execution of the affidavit, and the recording of the sworn statement shall not result to the termination of the subsequent marriage.
GR:Absenceoftenyears. XPN: If he disappeared after the age of seventyfive years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his successionmaybeopened
After2years: 1. From his disappearance and without any news about the absentee;or 2. Of the last news about the absentee. After 5 years: If he left an administrator ofhisproperty.(Sec.2)
If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (Art. 392, CivilCode)
The trustee or administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the propertyshallbeplacedatthedisposalof thosewhomayhavearightthereto.
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XVII.CIVILREGISTRAR A.ARTICLE407413 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. adoption naturalization lossorrecoveryofcitizenship, civilinterdiction judicialdeterminationoffiliation changes of name (Silverio v. Republic, G.R.No.174689,October22,2007)
Q:Whatisthecivilregister? A:Referstothevariousregistrybooksandrelated certificatesanddocumentskeptinthearchivesof the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulate, and of the Office of the Civil Registrar General. Q:Whatshallberecordedinthecivilregister? A: The following, concerning the civil status of persons: 1. 2. 3. Acts Events Judicialdecrees
Q:Whatiscivilstatus? A: The circumstances affecting the legal situation or sum total of capacities or incapacities of a person in view of his age, nationality and family membership (Beduya v. Republic, G.R. L71639, May 29, 1964). It also includes all his personal qualitiesandrelations,moreorlesspermanentin nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his beingmarriedornot. Q:Whataretheactsauthorizedtobeenteredin thecivilregister? A: 1. legitimation 2. acknowledgmentofillegitimate children 3. naturalization Q:Whataretheeventsauthorizedtobeentered inthecivilregister? A: 1. births 2. marriages 3. naturalization 4. deaths Q: What are the judicial decrees authorized to beenteredinthecivilregister? A: 1. legalseparations 2. annulmentsofmarriage 3. declarationsofnullityofmarriage
Q: What is the nature of the books making up the civil register and the documents relating thereto? A: The books and documents shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidenceofthefactsthereincontained. B.RA9048 Q:WhendidR.A.9048takeeffect? A:March22,2001. Q: What is the rule with regard to changing or correctionofentriesinthecivilregister? A: GR:Noentryinacivilregistershallbechangedor correctedwithoutajudicialorder. XPN: 1. clericalortypographicalerrorsand 2. changeoffirstnameornicknamewhich can be corrected or changed administratively by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). Q:Whatisaclericalortypographicalerror? A: Refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing , copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, that no correction must involved the change of , nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (Section 2(c), RA 9048)
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C.RULE108,RULESOFCOURT Q: May clerical or typographical errors be correctedunderRule108oftheRulesofCourt? A: No. The correction or change of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. (Silverio v.Republic,G.R.No.174689,October22,2007) Q:Whatisafirstname? A: Refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more names inadditiontothemiddleandlastnames. Q: John Lloyd Cruzada filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He alleged that his name was registered as John Lloyd Cruzada in his certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as male. Further, he alleged that he is a male transsexual. Prior to filing the petition, he underwent sex reassignment surgery Thailand. Thus, he seeks to have his name in his birth certificate changed from John Lloyd to Joanna, and his sex from male to female on the ground of sex reassignment pursuant to Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and108oftheRulesofCourtandRA9048. 1. May a person's first name be changed on thegroundofsexreassignment? A: No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor orextremelydifficulttowriteorpronounce; (2The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitionerandhehasbeenpubliclyknownbythat firstnameornicknameinthecommunity;or (3)Thechangewillavoidconfusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer asaresultofusinghistrueandofficialname. 2. May a person's sex as indicated in his certificate of birth be changed on the groundofsexreassignment? A: No. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial changeforwhichtheapplicableprocedureisRule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those providedinArticles407and408oftheCivilCode. These acts, events and judicial decrees provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those actsoreventsmentionedinArticle407.Neitheris it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that, all other matters pertaining totheregistrationofcivilstatusshallbegoverned byspeciallaws.Butthereisnosuchspeciallawin the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October22,2007)
Note: The jurisdiction over applications for change offirstnameisnowprimarilylodgedwiththecityor municipalcivilregistrarorconsulgeneralconcerned. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. Hence, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007)
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UST Golden Notes 2011 - Persons and Family Relations

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EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

CIVILLAWTEAM: ADVISER:ATTY.ELMERT.RABUYA;SUBJECTHEAD:ALFREDOB.DIMAFELIXII; ASST.SUBJECTHEADS:KARENFELIZG.SUPNAD,LAMBERTOL.SANTOSIII;MEMBERS:PAULELBERTE.AMON,ALSTONANARNA,OZANJ. FULLEROS,CECILIOM.JIMENO,JR.,ISMAELSARANGAYA,JR.;CONTRIBUTORS:LOISERAEG.NAVAL,MONICAJUCOM

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

XPN to the XPN: constitutional limits, where retroactivitywouldresultto:IE 1. Impairmentofobligationofcontracts 2. ExPostFactoLaws