NAVAL

AVIATION
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The aim of this paper is to underscore the historical importance of Naval Aviation not purely as combat aircraft flying from carriers and small ships to perform specific tasks, but as a cohesive organization procuring its own equipment and guiding its own training and doctrine. Historical examples will be used to demonstrate advantages and disadvantages of different naval aviation policies.

PHOENIX THINK TANK WWW.PHOENIXTHINKTANK.ORG

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Cover Photo: Buccaneer Naval Strike aircraft launching from HMS Ark Royal

CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 2.0 HistoricalCase studies of the importance of Naval Aviation post world war I ................................................................. 2 2.1 Taranto 1940 ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 2.2 Operations against Japanese -occupied Netherland east Indies ............................................................................. 3 2.3 Korea 1950-53 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 2.4 Suez 1956................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 2.5 Confrontation 1962-66 .................................................................................................................................................................... 6 2.6 The Falklands Campaign 1982 .................................................................................................................................................... 7 2.7 Summary .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 3.0 Conclusions/Recommendations........................................................................................................................................................... 9 3.1 History and carrier aviation .............................................................................................................................................................. 9 3.2 Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................................................. 11 References: ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12

1.0 INTRODUCTION
Naval aviation is a relatively recent addition to naval power, yet it has been extensively used in both world wars and a large number of limited conflicts. Navies were early customers of the initial flying machines. Like the Army, the Navy first saw a use for lighter than air machines to look beyond their limited horizons, for reconnaissance and spotting gunfire. The aircrews of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) then went on to become the first British airmen to attempt strategic bombing and air to air fighting. This was against the Zeppelin threat that hindered Royal Naval operations in the North Sea and created a degree of panic when they bombed Scarborough. This, later, aided the argument for a single air service to defend the Kingdom and attack the enemy at source. Necessity and desired missions saw the RNAS at the forefront of technical and doctrinal invention. They pioneered the use of radio to report immediately their findings and actions. The first aircraft carriers, both converted and purpose built were a British creation. The Royal Navy pioneered not only ships and embarked fixed winged aircraft but also all the modern technologies related to naval carrier aviation such as catapults and arresting wires. This ingenuity continued after World War II. Mirror/Projector sights and angled decks to assist in landing, particularly at night, and Ski Jumps were all created in Britain by Royal Navy personnel and technicians linked to the naval establishment. The Navy was also one of the leaders in development of helicopters as a capable tool in many roles.

The Navy saw aircraft as just another naval weapon platform, like steamships, submarines and torpedoes (arguably the first Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs)) that were developed as a result of technological advances. Naval Aviation was therefore an integral and logical part of naval war-fighting from its beginning. This logical approach was, and still is, matched by those navies having aircraft carriers.

Sadly, following World War I, in Britain and in Europe at large, the development of naval aviation was stymied both for economical and theoretical reasons. The economic instability and the powerful influences of airpower theorists like the Italian Giulio Douhet and American Billy Mitchell, encouraged the pooling of all air resources under the control of a single air service often ignorant of the requirements of naval aviation. The theories were not always supported by experience. As a result false strategies, very often based on conjecture, were developed. Such theories easily became convictions and, to support a new service they, too often, became cast in stone. Many are still expounded to this day, despite the fact that history has not always supported them. The Army, who had not developed their Royal Flying Corps (RFC) as fast as the RNAS, had a much larger number of aircraft and aircrew and thus provided the majority of the new service. After 1 April 1918, the date the Royal Air Force was formed out of the RFC and RNAS, naval aviation ended as a poor and distant relative of land-based aviation.

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The end result was that when the Fleet Air Arm was first asked to contribute to the survival of the nation in 1939 and, despite excellence in professionalism and an impressive history of innovation, it was forced into combat with old and barely adequate aircraft or new and inadequate ones. This trend was not universal. A determined commitment to airpower on the part of two of the leading navies of the pre-WW2 era, those of the USA and Japan, using technologies and ideas pioneered by the Royal Navy, proved naval aviation was indeed a fully-fledged component of war fighting and deterrence if directly linked to naval power and not simply viewed as an external supporting appendage, controlled and operated by a separate service Naval aviation proved to be able to contest airspace from land-based air forces, to deploy quicker and with less logistical requirements. It often proved a more flexible and a more surgical instrument both in war and peace. The United Kingdom has been a significant participant in naval aviation from the very inception of the concept but due to lack of investment it has fallen behind as an operational leader. The lack of investment was not just in simple cash terms but also the result of the theoretical dogmas expounded by an inexperienced but single-minded group. Yet, when properly equipped and supported, the Fleet Air Arm has always provided invaluable services to the nation. Unlike the majority of continental nations the United Kingdom has many commitments outside Europe. Most of these can only be realistically and cost-effectively supported by the Royal Navy. Carriers and an amphibious capability are as essential to this role today as they were in the past. The necessity to keep ahead of and deter those threatening our interests is creating a new world of missiles, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and cyber warfare while at the same time current systems and platforms continue to evolve . The Royal Navy must, therefore, continue to be at the forefront of invention.

2.0 HISTORICALCASE STUDIES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL AVIATION POST WORLD WAR I
2.1 TARANTO 1940: HOW TO TURN A BRILLIANT OPERATION INTO A MINOR TACTICAL NUISANCE DUE TO LACK OF CARRIER STRIKING POWER
3.1.1 TACTICAL SUCCESS
Objective of the Raid: o Primary: eliminating as much of the Italian Fleet as possible with the aim of forcing it to sea for a general engagement. o Secondary: destroy as much material/dockyard as possible. Planning of the raid initiated well in advance of the start of hostilities (first sketch made in 1935). Numbers: one carrier, 21 Fairey Swordfish. 12 used in the first wave, 9 in the second. Only 6 of those (first wave) carried a torpedo. 1 Results : o One Italian Battleship put beyond repair, Two Italian Battleships damaged o Three Cruisers and Two Destroyers damaged o Seaplane Base and Oil Storage Tanks damaged No support from land-based air was available. All the strike missions had to be provided by the Illustrious air wing.

2.1.2 ANALYSIS
Two of the Italian battleships recovered after half a year. Lack of main striking forces (torpedo armed Swordfish aircraft) restricted the amount of targets that could be attacked. Attack aircraft were not suited to the secondary attack profile, dive bombing. Lack of numbers in the strike force due to one of the carriers scheduled for the raid not being available as a result of previous battle 2 damage. No permanent damage inflicted to ground installations, Taranto was still usable as a base although it was not used again as such. The attack was not reproduced.

2.1.3 AFTERMATH

1 (Wragg 2004, 152-3) 2 Caravaggio, OHara.

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The original Taranto plan was much more ambitious with two aircraft carriers delivering three strikes. Yet even without the participation of HMS Eagle, the plan showed the intrinsic limitation of the FAA in 1940. The main strike aircraft, the Fairey Swordfish, could operate only at night because, for lack of fighters, the FAA was not able to contest enemy airspace. Although this was to an extent offset by the amount of training the FAA pilots, in fact the whole Royal Navy had practised night operations. Further, despite all its positive attributes - in fact because of them - the Swordfish had only a limited dive-bombing capability. Even so, the cruiser Trento, which was moored in the Mar Piccolo, had a lucky escape as a bomb crashed through the ship 3 without exploding . A recent analysis of the action ascribed the final result to the inability of the Royal Navy Theatre Commander to exploit the initial 4 tactical success, in part due to his inability to understand naval aviation. But the situation is much more complex than this analysis suggests. FAA resources were limited whilst political pressure to achieve a decisive result was high. Also even a single carrier required heavy surface escort and the deployment of a full range of subsidiary operations to ensure success and survival. The lack of an effective carrier-based fighter air defence component not only ruled out a daylight strike, which would have been much more effective, but prevented the task force from closing to strike range by day. Subsequent operations by American, Japanese and British task forces clearly demonstrated the need for balanced air wings (Offence and Defence). In the end, the limited strategic effectiveness of the Taranto Raid cannot be blamed on the Command at sea. Admiral Cunninghams decision to press on despite a massively reduced strike force is still commendable, leading as it did to a tactical success. Yet the lesson learned is that Taranto was the product of the long-term neglect of not only balanced investment, but actual investment in naval aviation.

2.2 OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPANESE -OCCUPIED NETHERLAND EAST INDIES : ADVANTAGE OF INDEPENDENTLY OPERATED NAVAL AIR
3.2.1 THE OPERATIONS
A series of consecutive operations targeting military and economic infrastructure: 19-04-1944 Sabang naval base; 17-05-1944 Refinery at Surabaya; 20-06-1944 Port Blair harbour; 25-06-1944 Sabang airfields; 08-1944 harassment raids against Japanese position in Sumatra; 11-1944 Attacks against airfields, oil installation and ports in Sumatra (Operation Outflank); 24-29-01-1945 Palembang oil refinery complex and surrounding airfields (Operation Meridian I and II). The operations had to contend with both enemy opposition and hostile weather, yet no raid was cancelled due to adverse weather. Air strikes conducted with variable numbers of aircraft from 55 (Belawan Deli) upward to 112 (Meridian 2). No support from land-based air was available or required. All the missions (reconnaissance, fleet defence, strike and counter air) were provided by the carrier air wings. Air wings were equipped with extremely effective naval aircraft (Chance Vought F4U Corsairs, Grumman TBF Avenger, Grumman F6F Hellcat, Fairey Firefly). At its peak the force included 4 carriers, 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Not a huge increase in the number of escorts for the increase in carrier numbers.

2.2.2 RESULTS
Japanese oil supplies severely disrupted, according to post war analysis the strikes, especially Meridian I and II, crippled Japanese fuel reserves. Japanese air forces in the area rendered ineffective. Air to air results clearly favoured FAA forces. In Meridian 1 the strike forces suffered 7 losses) inflicting 14 air to air kills (confirmed by Japanese sources) plus 6 probable. All Japanese attacks against the fleet repulsed without losses to British and Commonwealth ships.

2.2.3 CONSIDERATIONS The series of raids against Netherlands East Indies (NEI) targets had fundamentally different objectives to the Taranto raid. The operations were not conceived to obtain sea control but to achieve a strategic objective. In this light they are the product of a more sophisticated strategic outlook, derived more from Corbett than Mahan. The objectives were well chosen. The refineries around Palembang provided around 50% of Japanese empire oil, including essential aviation fuel and the targeting was extremely selective, aiming to destroy selected infrastructure and thus create a chokepoint in production to increase the effect rather than

3 (Wragg 2004, 152-3) 4 Caravaggio

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simply spread destruction. These operations were executed in the face of considerable air opposition from land-based forces. Yet despite the opposition, repeated raids were carried out and the carrier-based aircraft demonstrated their effectiveness. It is also relevant to point out that the area around Palembang was being used as a training area by the Japanese Army Aviation; the opposition therefore consisted of a large number of instructors and operationally experienced pilots whereas other allied operations in the same period were opposed by under-trained forces. The British force benefitted from a major carrier presence (4 in the raid against Palembang), large air groups and high quality aircraft. The basic fighter plane, the American built Chance Vought F4U Corsair, was one of the most successful aircraft of the conflict and in use until 1960 in several air forces. Its performance was not different from that of land-based aircraft; in fact in many ways it was superior, due to the basic ruggedness demanded of carrier-based aircraft. Before the massive raids on Palembang the force had undergone extensive training and undertaken smaller operations to increase its efficiency. It is also important to note that the bulk of the aircraft employed in this operation were of American design and origin. The lack of a sound pre-war naval aircraft acquisition policy had left the FAA bereft of an indigenous balanced carrier air group capability. American naval aircraft benefited from a complete integration of service experience and dedicated industry. While the massive naval air military-industrial complex of the US Navy is something that cannot be easily replicated, the importance of involving naval air warfare expertise in the development and production of naval aircraft cannot be overstated.

2.3 KOREA 1950-53: THE ADVANTAGE OF NAVAL AIR WARFARE EXPERTISE BEING DEVELOPED TO MEET PRECISE NAVAL NEEDS
2.3.1 OPERATIONS
The FAA was the first British element to respond to the crisis. FAA aircraft were in action almost immediately. FAA units in the Far East were ready and well equipped, this contributed to their immediate effectiveness. Minimal RAF contribution. Only three Sunderland flying boats and transport aircraft participated in the operations; this is in stark contrast with a complete naval carrier air wing always being on station. Availability of multirole aircraft (Fairey Firefly and Hawker Sea Fury) allowed the FAA to carry a broad range of missions: air superiority, escorts, close air support, reconnaissance and interdiction. The purpose-designed aircraft (Firefly, Sea Fury) proved superior to converted types (Seafire). Sea Furies even proved superior to jet fighters. One Mig-15 was shot down by a Sea Fury without any reverse losses. The Carrier Air Groups demonstrated much greater flexibility than land-based forces. They had the ability to shift operating areas quickly according to the need. Most of the successful deep interdiction missions were conducted by naval aircraft. The aircraft carriers were less vulnerable than land-based air forces. They were able to defend themselves and their security was never threatened by enemy forces. The carriers demonstrated a much higher sortie generation than locally based land airpower. Facilities provided by carriers were superior to those provided by the majority of land bases. In a seven month cruise in bad weather (with only 86 flyable days) HMS Theseus launched 3500 combat missions.

2.3.2 CONSIDERATIONS The deployment of a robust naval aviation capability in Korea offered the British government several advantages. Aircraft carriers were quick to respond to the UN call for help. And their contribution was immediately felt. The fact that the British Pacific Fleet was accustomed to operating with the US Navy through both previous wartime experience and constant joint exercises prevented any force integration problems. The first carrier air wing deployed aircraft (Supermarine Seafire 47s) that were the product of conversion from land-based fighters (the famous Spitfire). The differences in handling and requirement between land and sea environments meant that they were not able to take off with the same war load as Fireflies and Sea Furies (thus less rockets and bombs for multirole missions). Yet better aircraft were almost immediately available due to the better attention paid to naval aviation development following World War II. The first Sea Furies were operating from the second carrier deployed, HMS Theseus, who replaced HMS Triumph. Carriers allowed more flexibility, less dependence on ground security and through their inherent mobility were better positioned for deep interdiction missions and self-defence.

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2.4 SUEZ 1956: A JOINT BRITISH OPPOSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
2.4.1 OPERATIONS
Operation Musketeer, as it was called, proved the necessity to be able to draw on balanced and extensive military assets in support of a political goal, however limited. Combined arms enterprise involving Navy, Air Force and Army assets plus the equivalent assets from allied countries (France and Israel). External interference in operations (in this case US Sixth fleet) had to be effectively handled. In this case the naval instrument proved sufficiently flexible to reduce the interference of American ships on allied operations without endangering diplomatic relations. Both the French Marine Nationale and the Royal Navy demonstrated the effectiveness of conventional strike operations from carriers while the Royal Navy also implemented a medium sized helicopter based assault for the first time in history, expanding and complementing the parachute drop and the conventional amphibious assault. Carrier based air assets proved, once again, to be better suited to provide on station/on call missions than land based assets. While the majority of strike missions was flown by RAF and Arme de lAir planes based in Malta, Cyprus or Israel, range limitations precluded them from staying on the assigned targets for more than 10 or 15 minutes and they were unable to reach the Nile delta due to the same range limitations. While during pre-planned strike mission the limitation was not critical, it precluded these planes from conducting on station close air support. For example while during the airborne assault Cyprus based Venom and F84F attacked known concentrations and Hunters provided escort for the transport planes once the transports had dropped their cargo. Naval aircraft in the form of Sea Venoms, Sea Hawks, Corsairs and Wyverns had to remain on station to provide support for the British and French paratroopers. Strategic aviation assets (Valiant bombers) demonstrated a relative lack of effectiveness in attacking point targets (in this case Egyptian airfields). Despite the technological superiority of Egyptian aircraft (Mig-15 and Mig-17) over the majority of allied aircraft there was almost no interception of allied aircrafts due to extensive counter-air operations and extensive CAP (in the only air to air incident of the British participation was, in a twist of fate, a Canberra photo recon aircraft that was shot down by Afez al Assad, future Syrian president, in a British manufactured Meteor fighter). Carrier based planes, both British and French, were able to provide effective protection to downed aviators until rescued. The availability of a major base in theatre, Malta, allowed the carriers to reduce resupply time.

2.4.2 CONSIDERATIONS While Operation Musketeer and the entire Suez war is often remembered more for its political consequence and the supposed moral stain on the reputation of London and Paris, the truth is that it was a brilliant and effective joint military operation. Operation Musketeer represents one of the few occasions when a closely coordinated land and sea based operation was performed thus highlighting advantages and disadvantages of both sides of airpower. Before discussing these, an important disclaimer is necessary. Musketeer, like any military operation, was strongly restricted by available technology. In this case, airpower had to cope with the intrinsic limitation of the rushed development of jet aircraft of the late forties and fifties with a new generation of aircraft coming into line almost every year and with engineers more interested in performance rather than range. This forced every warring party to deploy a mix of reliable older piston engine or jet aircraft lacking in theoretical performance but being able to fly longer and farther away and new, top of the line, jet fighters lacking legs. This is the main reason why RAF Hunter participation to the operation was limited mainly to escorting the paratroopers on their way to Port Said and protecting Cyprus while the majority of the operations were conducted by older planes. In turn this prompted, at least initially, worries for a French or British pilot of meeting reputedly superior Egyptian Mig-15 and Mig-17, aeroplanes. That, in turn, did not play an overly important role because they were affected by the same fuel problems that were only compounded by the lack of training of Egyptian pilots on their new mounts. The usual contentions that RAF aircraft played only a marginal role in Musketeer or that the naval planes were obsolete and ineffective are both without foundation. Certainly Suez shows that strategic bombers were not an answer to all the problems. While Canberra medium bombers performed some effective attacks, those of the Valiant strategic Bombers were usually ineffective due to a relatively insufficient conventional bomb load and attack patterns not developed to deal with small targets like the Egyptian airbases they were tasked to destroy. Once again dive-bombing proved its advantages. In performing offensive counter-air mission tactical fighters proved much more effective despite being of an older generation. Effective training and design were arguably the most important factor. While the FAA or Aeronavale fighter bomber were certainly not more effective than RAF and AdlA ones they were certainly much more flexible. The carriers shifted station at least once, from the westerly station located in striking distance of the Delta to a more easterly location to support the assault on Port

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Said and Port Fuad. Also the shorter distance from the carriers to the targets allowed the naval aircraft more time on station that in turn allowed them to perform critical missions such as close air support, Cab Rank in FAA parlance, and to protect a downed pilot until rescue was available. In the latter mission the French Corsairs were priceless due to their long period on task times. While RAF and AdlA fighters provided the initial support for the airborne assault after 15 minutes these aircrafts had to leave. Corsair, Sea Venom, Wyvern and Sea Hawks were allowed to stay in position longer answering to calls from the ground troops. Of course, bases nearer than Malta and Cyprus would have allowed land-based aircraft to do the same (and a French wing did operate from Israel), but the political situation of the time was such that no allied bases were available. Indeed it can be said that without carriers the entire operation would not have been feasible due to the lack of local friendly support. RAF bases in the Suez Canal zone had been evacuated months before the operation. It can be also high-lighted that it was the loss of these important bases that in turn prompted the operation. The last important role played by naval air assets was much less glamorous. Small helicopters embarked on the major carriers and on the newly converted Commando carriers allowed a greater flexibility during the assault. Some units were landed by helicopters increasing tactical opportunities but perhaps even more important was the role of the helicopters in resupplying paratroopers and evacuating the wounded until the Port Said airfield was secured. These activities made what could have been a costly and difficult undertaking much easier.

2.5 CONFRONTATION 1962-66: CARRIERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY FLEXIBILITY.

2.5.1 OPERATIONS
Dual capability: conventional strike from fleet carriers and helicopter assault from commando carriers offering both deterrence and war fighting. Lack of available ground bases offshore: importance of deployable self-contained bases (i.e. carriers). Strong coordination between Task Force Ground and Naval components. The HMS Victorious group passage of the Lombok Strait in September 1964 provided a perfect example of the visible and successful demonstration of force. Conducting a similar operation with different resources from, for example, a distant, land-based airfield would have been ineffective or a cause for clear escalation, perhaps even violation of sovereign air space. While RAF resources were deployed in theatre they were never as effective as naval ones. Ability to rapidly reinforce areas under attack. Commando carriers, with or without troops embarked, afforded the ground commander with extreme flexibility in responding to crises. Simply moving the commando carrier to a different area allowed rapid redeployment of embarked air assets in support of different units. They often operated in two different areas on the same day (Long Jawi operation). Modern naval aviation is no longer purely fixed wing. Helicopters from surface combatants (Destroyers and Frigates) are routinely employed in support of sea control and land operations. Naval air assets, by virtue of their specific design (greater ability to withstand the elements), had a greater operational readiness than ones designed for land-based operations.

2.5.2 CONSIDERATIONS The confrontation with Indonesia probably tested the strength of naval aviation to its limit but also demonstrated its ability to provide much more flexibility than equivalent land-based assets. Two major limitations characterized the conflict. First there was a political dimension; force had to be restricted. Second there was an environmental dimension; Borneo was a backward operations area lacking modern or even old facilities. Roads and airbases were in short supply. Naval aviation, with its ability to deploy its own mobile bases (carriers and other ships) to the theatre solved the environment problem in a cost-effective manner. Building appropriate fixed land bases for the air component would have been prohibitive and would have increased the logistical effort (not only in financial resources but also in manpower thus adding another financial strain). In addition, land bases require their own defences. Carriers and commando carriers were simply moved to combat zones carrying all the required facilities. If necessary, helicopters were operated from primitive facilities ashore (Forward Operating Bases), but returned to the aircraft carriers for additional maintenance when that was required. Carriers also provided additional basing flexibility being able to move from one threatened area of the Borneo coast to another. Security was guaranteed by the carriers themselves. Only in one instance did Indonesian forces attack one of the commando carriers and the carriers response was by simply ramming and sinking the offending attack craft.

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A direct comparison can be made with all the security requirements of the fixed land bases employed by the US forces in Vietnam during the same time period. Not only was deployment tied up by logistical requirements but, additional financial resources were needed and considerable losses of material and personnel were experienced. Sea-based airpower is immune, or at least exponentially less vulnerable, to enemy action, especially when used in low-medium intensity operations. Conducting military attacks on carriers invites a political escalation and needs technological proficiency. No successful attacks against aircraft carriers have taken place since World War II. On the political side, the availability of naval air power offered a fully flexible instrument. The conventional strike capability was used in a visual deterrent role. It was a much more visible deterrence than the Vulcan bombers deployed in Malaya. The ability to move close to the adversarys coastline without leaving international waters but still within sighting range of coastal towns and inshore naval traffic proved invaluable in warding off attempts by the Indonesian government to escalate the crisis.

2.6 THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN 1982: CARRIERS AS A VITAL COMPONENT OF NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS.
2.6.1 OPERATIONS
The invasion of the Falkland Islands caught Britain by surprise. Defence funding had been concentrated entirely on Cold War expectations. The defence of our other long-term national interests (Sea Lines of Communication and Dependencies worldwide) had been neglected. The fixed wing Fleet Air Arm had been reduced to 2 frontline squadrons of six Sea Harrier aircraft each. The government was actively considering selling off its new Invincible class carrier but had, fortunately, just reprieved the amphibious assault ships. The War Cabinet under Prime Minister Thatcher ordered the Royal Navy to generate a Task Force and take back the Islands. Within four days, HMS Hermes had been withdrawn from refit, eight Sea Harriers were taken from the Headquarters Squadron and the Carrier Battle Group sailed with a total of 20 aircraft (8 aircraft in HMS invincible and 12 aircraft in HMS Hermes). Invincible had 11 pilots and Hermes, 18. The day after, the Amphibious Task Group, lead by HMS Fearless, sailed with 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines embarked. The Bde was enhanced by the Armys 3 Para Battalion and some other Army supporting units. Two squadrons of Naval Commando Support helicopters were embarked. 2 Para came later in the MV Norland. The theatre of operations was 8000 nautical miles away from Britain and the international community did not support the British initiative (except for New Zealand who offered to provide a frigate and the United States who did provide ordnance and equipment support). The Task Force faced an air threat of 200 Argentinian fixed wing aircraft (some of which were armed with Exocet sea-skimming missiles), a diesel attack submarine threat and a significant Argentinian Navy surface threat. Despite its earlier claims of being able to provide the fleet with air defence throughout the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Royal Air Force was conspicuous by its absence. This was especially important in that the Task Force lacked any Airborne Early Warning (AEW), essential to give fighters and ships timely and accurate positional warning of Argentine raids. Lack of AEW was critical to the Amphibious Group who had to make the best use of limited land cover to protect themselves. To most observers, the Argentinian position was impregnable. Overwhelming numerical superiority in the air and a land force of up to 8000 soldiers defending the Islands. The Command took full advantage of the Carrier Battle Group's mobility and flexibility. Tactical positioning and the layered air defence of combat air patrol aircraft, missile armed air defence frigates and destroyers and soft kill integrated weapons systems prevented any successful Argentinian air attacks against our capital ships. A Hunter killer submarine sank the Belgrano and persuaded the Argentinian Navy to stay in port. Sea Harrier fighters engaged enemy aircraft aggressively at every opportunity demonstrating from day one their superior fighter combat capability. Their early success proved to be a permanent deterrent to the Argentina air forces. On the arrival in theatre of the Amphibious Task Group, the focus of fighter air defence was transferred to defending the landings in San Carlos Water. Naval escorts and Army Rapier units attempted to protect the amphibious and logistic shipping in San Carlos Water as well as the Landing Force ashore against innumerable air attacks and, to the west, the Sea Harrier deterred approximately 450 surface/ground attack missions. Post-war analysis confirmed that the Sea Harrier had achieved 25 confirmed air-to-air kills. Many more Argentine aircraft appear to have been damaged. The Carrier Air Groups integrated weapons systems of fighters and ASW helicopters, as well as the escorts and Hunter Killer submarines (SSNs) enabled the Amphibious Task Group to land safely the 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, with its naval commando support helicopters, that successfully returned the Islands to British sovereignty. Tasking of the RAF Harrier GR3s was made less easy by their lack of naval experience, their belief that the carrier should react according to their fuel states and that they knew best. It was not helped by their attempt to task aircraft on board Hermes from Fearless where, at first the Divisional HQ stayed. The retention of the Carrier Borne Ground Liaison Officers (CBGLOs) might have improved liaison with the Landing Force.

2.6.2 CONSIDERATIONS

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The withdrawal from service of the HMS Ark Royal in 1977 signalled to the Argentinean government that Britain would probably be unable to oppose any meaningful invasion of the Falkland Islands. Further public statements by the British government that they intended to sell the new Invincible class carrier provided the Argentineans with assurance that this was the case. Unfortunately for them, their timing was wrong and Britain was able to put together a Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Task Force in April 1982 that, in the end, proved victorious. Since 1967, the British government had accepted the assurance of the Royal Air Force that they could provide air defence of the fleet for all operations within the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Operation Corporate was mounted to take back the Falklands with almost no war fighting assistance at all from the Royal Air Force. The Carrier Battle Group, the Amphibious Group and the Land Forces led by the Royal Marines conducted the operation without reliance on any land-based support for airborne early warning, air defence, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare or the close air support of our ground forces. The airfield at Port Stanley provided Argentinean forces with a resupply facility using Hercules aircraft and a ground attack capability using the Pucara and Mentor propeller driven aircraft. Argentinean fighter and fighter ground attack aircraft could not operate from the short runway which was kept under attack on a daily basis by nuisance bombing raids conducted by the Sea Harrier. The attempt to deny use of this airfield to the Argentine air force by the three long-range bombing missions conducted by Vulcan aircraft of the Royal Air Force from Ascension Island was commendable but completely unsuccessful. Two sticks of 21 bombs were delivered, only one of which cratered the very edge of the runway. A further stick of bombs failed to arm. The damage achieved did not prevent any Argentine air missions being conducted from the airfield. The Argentine air offensive launched from the mainland using Mirage and Sky Hawk fighter-bombers was not affected in any way by the unsuccessful Vulcan raids. During the Operation, a total number of 10 carrier capable RAF Harrier GR 3 ground attack aircraft were deployed to HMS Hermes. These were provided to help offset the dwindling assets of the embarked Sea Harrier force. The Sea Harriers flew close on 1500 war missions and lost 6 aircraft (none of these were in air combat). The Harrier GR 3 flew 150 war missions from Hermes and the Forward Operating Base (FOB) ashore. They were employed on ground attack missions, thereby releasing the Sea Harriers for their primary air defence role over the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). This made a huge contribution. They lost 4 aircraft (3 from enemy gunfire).

2.7 SUMMARY
Against huge odds, naval based airpower had once again proved itself in history. And all those historical vignettes have a common theme. Naval Aviation must be tailored to the navy's actual requirements; not those ascribed to it by a third party lacking in either naval air warfare expertise or knowledge of naval procedures. Aircraft are machines that are not in themselves so special that they need a single supporting service. The key to their operational success lies in their aircrews training, planning, tasking and control by the local scene of action commander and their integration with their host ships teams. In 1939, despite having being at the forefront of the creation of naval aviation, the Fleet Air Arm had been deprived of control of its own aircraft procurement. Even brilliant operations like the Taranto Raid failed to make a real difference. By 1944, the Fleet Air arm, equipped with more effective naval aircraft mainly from foreign sources and having been able to develop its own tactics outside the influence of other services, was able to mount a sustained offensive without direct support from land-based RAF resources. This trend only developed further in Korea. There, for the first time since its inception, the Fleet Air Arm operated specifically designed, top-of-the-line aircraft with great success. The Confrontation against Indonesia demonstrated very clearly that the role of naval aviation is much more than simply sinking ships. The combination of the threat of conventional carrier airstrike (deterrence) and the use of the commando carrier (war fighting) coupled with a Joint command understanding of the capabilities of Naval Aviation allowed the FAA to play a decisive strategic role in the campaign. The Falklands expedition again showed their vital need. Without airborne early warning, the Sea Harriers coped manfully and integrated with the air defence ships of both Task Groups. The RAF Harrier GR3s needed modification, particularly to avoid salt and weather damage but also to enable their inertial navigation system to be aligned. Their pilots needed familiarisation of a ski- ramp launch before flying out and their first deck landing was on-board MV Atlantic Conveyor. They were largely limited to Close Air Support of the Land Forces and, of course, had less need for such a degree of integration with other ships, nevertheless their lack of sea experience showed in many ways. All this was made simpler by the fact that the majority of air and ground crews were from the Naval Service and could assist the visiting RAF teams. On-board, naval air and ground-crews trained and worked closely with the ships company. Ashore they integrated with the Royal Marines. There was no need to indoctrinate them in joint

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operations. That was their daily habit. Most RAF pilots were totally unused to amphibious operations and had difficulty accepting naval ways, ways that are proven and normal to NATO navies.

3.0 CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 3.1 HISTORY AND CARRIER AVIATION

History has amply demonstrated that Naval Aviation in itself is not a panacea. Whilst it can perform a broad range of functions it is not always a complete solution by itself. Excellence in naval aviation is not a guarantee for success. Yet history has also shown that naval aviation is a powerful enabler if employed correctly and if correctly understood and equipped. The six examples described illustrate this paradigm.
1939-1940 Disadvantages: Through inadequate resources and long range planning, the FAA had no control over the procurement and design of its own resources. Lack of understanding of Naval Aviation limited its possibilities. Lack of a balanced air wing forced limited tactical options (night strike instead of more precise day strike) Lack of high-level naval aviation doctrine. Advantages Superior training, personal courage and tactical innovation used to develop unique capabilities such as night carrier strike. 1944-45 Disadvantages: Inadequate long term planning forced the FAA to rely on foreign sources for naval aircraft. Advantages: Balanced air wing allowed for round the clock operation. Several carriers and carrier wings allowed for real strategic effect (the Palembang raid targeted economic infrastructure, not ships like at Taranto). Use of USN aircraft allowed greater flexibility and cross-decking with the USN. 1950-53 Advantages: Lower response lag time at start of the crisis. High quality aircraft (Fireflies and Sea Fury) Proven technology (propeller driven aircraft) providing better overall capabilities (mainly range and loitering time) than new technology (early jet aircraft). Flexible choice of operating areas. Less vulnerability to enemy action than land bases (Several UN airbases located near the front for range requirement were forced to be evacuated). 1956 Disadvantages The technological situation was not stabilised enough to provide a balanced fully capable force. This caused complications for both supply and operational tasks. Advantages Flexibility of deployment the ease with which the naval aviations airfields were shifted to support a changing centre of operations Closeness to tactical area of operations allowed for greater support of land operations 1962-66 Advantages: Graduated response. Conventional deterrence. Pre-packaged basing in an area where basing facilities were primitive at best, non-existent at worst. Different types of employment: from conventional air-strike (strategic) to direct support of the land operation (operational-tactical). 1982 Disadvantages The British Government was completely unprepared for the Argentine invasion, creating the need for a very rapid and unplanned response.

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The operational fixed wing Fleet Air Arm had been reduced to a minimum 28 Sea Harriers in total, including reserves. The Argentine enjoyed massive numerical air superiority and had established full ground force control of the Islands. The need to call on a small number of RAF Harrier GR3s to back-up the Sea Harriers and which were in the event used in the main to provide close air support of ground forces. Distance to the theatre of operations was 8000 nm with the nearest support facility being Ascension 4000 nm from the combat zone. Promised air defence, AEW and ASW support of the Fleet was not forthcoming from the Royal Air Force. Advantages The dedication, integration and professionalism of all involved Task Force Units. The Sea Harriers reputation as an excellent visual air combat fighter aircraft. This was well understood by the Argentine. The Argentine fast jet pilots were not used to long transits over the sea to a combat zone and few of them had ever trained for ship attack. The Sea Harrier aircrews used their aircraft to better advantage than did the Argentine pilots. The Carrier Battle Groups mobility and flexibility. The deterrent value of our Hunter Killer submarines. The ability to force an entrance on a hostile shore by means of an amphibious capability with Royal Marines Commandos, supported by naval helicopters with minimal prior practice.

The ability of HMS Albion to quickly move from Singapore to the combat location and launch her helicopter contingent at maximum range for an operational mission stands out. This action shows why naval aviation needs to be naval. Other services helicopters based on land would have required a long transfer movement, considering the distances involved probably crated on board a transport ship, and then a wait for the logistic echelon to catch up. The carrier, whether conventional or commando ensured the immediate availability of airpower once the carrier reached its operational zone. The American experience in Vietnam is relevant. US Navy Carriers, while redeploying land-based assets took disproportionate times and due to the difficulties of building up sufficient supplies created the so-called bomb crisis. Still the act of simply putting aircraft on a carrier does not constitute naval aviation. To be effective an air group needs to be practiced in operating from a carrier; to reach maximum effectiveness the air group needs to be fully integrated with the carrier. Admiral Cunningham decided against transferring the HMS Eagle air component to the HMS Illustrious for that reason. An overriding lesson of the history is that naval aviation capability cannot be improvised; although it can be rapidly enhanced if a strong enough core of experienced specialist personnel are available and well versed in both equipment & operations. Two extreme situations stand out. At Taranto the Royal Navy displayed ingenuity, boldness and showed the destructive power of naval-based airpower, yet the overall strategic results were nowhere near as complete as they should have been. The Italian Royal Navy was not decisively beaten and its operations were not stopped. It can be argued that the original plan (two full carrier air wings) could have obtained more decisive results: results that could have been obtained also by framing the carrier raid in a broad operations scheme. It transpires that Taranto was a perfect example of both the Mahanian concept of sea control through annihilation, sinking enemy ships in the hope that their destruction would have modified operative conditions in the Mediterranean Sea; and also the Corbettian theory of maximisation of sea control...of using a limited/local sea control to try and achieve a broader more general level of sea control. In contrast with Taranto stands the Korean War. Here naval aviation, and by extension the entire UN navies, never sank enemy major combatants principally because none existed. Yet sea control was total. With full sea control achieved, UN navies and their air power were able to affect directly the overall strategy. Navies secured the flanks of the UN lines and threatened the flanks of the enemy lines and naval air power proved much more effective than land-based air power in assuring interdiction. Moveable bases (carriers) allowed for both dispersion and concentration and for redeployment of forces in support of specific targets. As far as the Royal Navys FAA is concerned, history has shown that when the service has been able to develop high performance aircraft suited to its needs, this has ensured commendable operational results. Fireflies were superior to Seafires despite raw numbers and the Sea Fury was certainly one of the more capable aircraft used in the conflict. While no spectacular operation comparable with Taranto was mounted, the fact is that they were not needed because a more balanced approach was making them unnecessary. Sound pre-conflict policy had guaranteed a prepared and effective Naval Aviation capability. After Korea the Fleet Air Arm again proved its capabilities during the Suez intervention. While that endeavour was tarred with political failure, the naval side of the operation was almost flawless and demonstrated the capabilities of both naval aviation and amphibious forces. And then, in 1967, Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, faced with a budget crisis, decided to abandon the future carrier project (CVA01) on the doubtful premise that there was no further requirement for Royal Naval operations east of Suez, out of the NATO area. It was a decision that would cost the Nation dearly. Fixed wing FAA operations were rundown but, since 1975,

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there have been 4 full wars outside this area; the Falklands 8000nm away from UK was entirely naval based; Gulf Wars I & II both heavily supported and facilitated by Britains remaining naval power and, of course, American Strike Carriers; Afghanistan the first troops in were Royal Marines inserted by helicopter from HMS Ocean and HMS Illustrious. The USN provides carrier- based air support from the Indian Ocean. Added to all this there was the very long ranged mission undertaken in 1972 by Britains last Strike Carrier, HMS Ark Royal, in which Buccaneer bombers conducted a fly past to dissuade successfully Guatemala from invading a country, then known as British Honduras, now called Belize. And now, in the Libyan campaign, we once again see the operational and cost effective advantages of Carrier air power v. shore-based; although it lacks the experience brought by FAA involvement. In stark contrast rests the Falklands war. Then, the United Kingdom and the Royal Navy were being seen by friends and foe as on the verge of abdicating naval aviation. Lack of strike carriers fuelled Argentinas enterprise. Yet the fact that a core of naval aviation capability was still present, coupled with professionalism and a little luck, allowed the expeditionary force to prevail. In many ways, the fact this capability remained was the saving grace of the whole operation. With the benefit of hindsight it is, frankly, an amazing triumph of convictions, and perhaps proof that Nietzsche was right when he said that Convictions are far more dangerous foes of truth than lies. Further to this have been countless other small operations than the ones portrayed here. Even if the entire operation was clouded in political doubts and recrimination, the ability of British and French naval aviation to provide almost all of the air support during Operation Musketeer, the assault on Egypt in 1956 is amazing. That operation clearly shows what naval aviation can do in support of an independent policy. In the present paper the focus has been on the military advantage of naval aviation. Yet Suez shows that naval aviation has also the incredible advantage to enable power projection alone. While the policy that led to that operation has been widely criticized the underlying fact is that Naval Aviation enabled this policy to be carried. Without carriers, aircraft and helicopters the allied Anglo-French fleet would never have been able to land troops at Port Said. The first British intervention in Kuwait also needs to be mentioned. British forces deployed there to defend Kuwait against a threatened Iraqi aggression. HMS Bulwark deployed within 24 hours of the start of the crisis since good intelligence had put her in the right place, and used her helicopters to deploy and support the troops. Additional British troops were flown into Kuwait by RAF transport but only with their personal equipment and light weapons. They had to requisition vehicles and wait for amphibious shipping to bring in more. The strike carrier Victorious took several days to arrive with her battle group from the South China Sea but then they were able to provide both air cover and close air support that, although not needed, dominated the area of operations. In contrast a single RAF Hunter squadron had deployed to Kuwait from Bahrain but lacked fuel, ammunition, spares and radar coverage had to be provided by Bulwark. RAF transport was being used to fly in troops so none was available to support the Hunters which left once Victorious arrived. As an extreme case of carrier usefulness as instrument of national policy there is also the almost forgotten intervention of HMS Ark Royal in 1972 to thwart a threatened invasion of British Honduras from Guatemala. Land based resources were not available, but a simple over-flight of a flight of two Buccaneers at maximum range was credited with stopping the invasion. And at the other end of the spectrum there are countless Humanitarian Interventions such as Sierra Leone or the great Boxing Day Tsunami tragedy; all where Royal Navy ships have operated far out of this line drawn on the map. Whilst the recurring problem of piracy, whether in South East Asia or Somalia is certainly to the East of Suez.

3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
History cannot predict the future; history instead makes you capable of making informed decisions. This is the role of history in the future of Naval Aviation; taking lessons from the past that we can apply in the future. In the constant advance of technology, it is important that naval air power is accepted as another naval weapon system. Naval aviators must have a say in naval aviation procurement. It is also important that a pool of specialist naval aviation engineers exists at all times. A good land-based aircraft is not by default a good carrier aircraft. Nurturing such capabilities requires a long-term commitment. What is really important is that history shows that unprepared naval aviation (i.e. with inadequate personnel and equipment) is not able to achieve decisive success, despite the expectation of its political authority or the individual courage and ingenuity of its members.

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Conversely, a properly conceived naval aviation capability is able to deliver results. The FAA proved itself a major UK contributor to the coalition in Korea and a strategically decisive major component of an essentially national force against Indonesia. It had been carefully and professionally built up following the disappointing long-term results of the Taranto raid. One can only wonder what an already fully developed FAA (compared to the status of the Japanese Imperial Navy Air Arm or the US Navy Naval Aviation in 1940) could have done to the Italian Royal Navy in Taranto and elsewhere in the early days of World War Two. We cannot be certain of what challenges the future will hold, but a properly resourced Fleet Air Arm, including a range of unmanned air vehicles will certainly provide a flexible and priceless political and operational instrument for dealing with future crises. The strategic deterrent value of the aircraft carriers will remain with their ability to provide a wide range of capability, from outright offensive attack missions, to the support of amphibious and land forces, to disaster relief. Showing the flag to assisting foreign governments and protecting the nations interests and dependencies worldwide will all remain vital to UK policy. A properly equipped and trained Royal Navy will continue to achieve those aims.

REFERENCES:
Caravaggio, Angelo, The Attack at Taranto, Tactical Success, Operational Failure in Naval War College Review Summer 2006, Vol. 59, No. 3 Cull, Brian, Aloni, Shlomo, Nicolle, David, Wings Over Suez: The Only Authoritative Account of Air Operations During the Sinai and Suez Wars of 1956 Grubb Street (2006) Evans, David and Peattie, Mark, Kaigun Naval Institute Press (2003) Grove, Eric From Vanguard to Trident, Naval Institute Press (1987) Hobbs, David, A Century of Carrier Aviation, Seaforth Publishing (2009). Lansdown, John R.P. With the Carriers in Korea Crecy Publication (1997) OHara Vincent P., Struggle for the Middle Sea Conway (2009) Peattie, Mark, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Airpower, Naval Institute Press (2003) Roberts, John, Safeguarding the nation Seaforth Publishing (2009) Smith, Peter, Task Force 57 William Kimber (1969) Van Der Bijl Nick, Confrontation, the War with Indonesia 1962-1966 Pen and Sword (2007) Wragg, David. Swordfish, The Story of the Taranto Raid. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2004.

Arrigo Velicogna is the principle author but much of this short History of Naval aviation is due to: -
Alexander Clarke. Cdr Sharkey Ward DSC AFC RN. Cdre Neill Thomas CBE DSC RN Cdr Tim Gedge AFC RN Cdre Steven Jermy RN Captain Michael Clapp CB RN Cdr David Hobbs RN

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