Securing Apache, Part 10 - Mod - Security - LINUX For You
Securing Apache, Part 10 - Mod - Security - LINUX For You
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Right from Part 1 of this series, weve covered the major types of attacks being done on Web applications and their security solutions. In this article, I will reveal the tremendous capabilities of the Apache mod_security module, covering just a small part of what it can do.
From the development perspective, implementing security against the many attacks on Web apps doesnt just require extra coding and stronger validation, but often also results in complex and messy code, which may sometimes cause yet another security loophole. Security is often compared to a football game, where success requires the defense to quickly adapt, outrun, and outplay the attackers. Such a dynamic defense cannot properly survive in complex and messy code. Here, Web application firewalls come to the rescue and what else is better than mod_security.
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It is designed as an Apache module that adds intrusion-detection and prevention features to the Web server. In principle, its similar to an IDS that analyses network traffic, but it works at the HTTP level, and really well, at that. This allows you to do things that are difficult in a classic IDS. This difference will become clearer when we examine several examples. The attack prevention feature stands between the client and server; if it finds a malicious payload, it can reject the request, performing any one of a number of built-in actions. Some of the features of mod_security are audit logging, access to any part of the request (including the body) and the response, a flexible regular expression-based rule engine, file-upload interception, real-time validation and also buffer-overflow protection.
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Deployment architectures
mod_security can be deployed in two modes:
Embedded mode: Just add mod_security as a module into your Apache Web server. However, in this mode, it is not able to inspect the content of server headers. Network gateway: In this mode (recommended since all the Web traffic goes through the proxy), mod_security is installed as a reverse proxy (see Figure 1). If you are using this mode, ensure you also add mod_proxy and mod_proxy_http in Apache. This gives a single point to monitor, higher speed, high anonymity of the internal network, and mod_securitycan inspect the server header of the backend database.
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Introducing Cele
Installation
Basically, mod_security works on configuration and rules. The configuration instructs it how to process the data it sees; the rules decide what to do with the processed data. The configuration directives can be directly added to httpd.conf, but to avoid cluttering that, include a separate modsecurity.conf with this line in httpd.conf:
Include conf/modsecurity.conf
Installation is not straightforward, and also depends on the OS and Apache version you are using. But the slight trouble is negligible in comparison to the services mod_security offers. For detailed installation steps, refer to the documentation on modsecurity.org. A Windows version is also available, which has other customised versions of Apache and Apache modules.
Configuration
The basic modsecurity.conf looks like the following code:
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<IfModule mod_security.c> # Turn the filtering engine On or Off SecFilterEngine On # The audit engine works independently and can be turned # On or Off on a perserver or perdirectory basis SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly # Make sure that URL encoding is valid SecFilterCheckURLEncoding On # Unicode encoding check SecFilterCheckUnicodeEncoding On # Only allow bytes from this range SecFilterForceByteRange 1 255 # Cookie format checks. SecFilterCheckCookieFormat On # The name of the audit log file SecAuditLog logs/audit_log # Should mod_security inspect POST payloads SecFilterScanPOST On # Default action set SecFilterDefaultAction "deny,log,status:500" </IfModule>
Similarly, to check URL encoding, you can use SecFilterCheckURLEncoding; to control request body buffering, use SecRequestBodyAccess; to control what happens once the response body limit is reached, use SecResponseBodyLimitAction; and to specify the response body buffering limit, use SecResponseBodyLimit. The full list of configuration directives, their usage and syntax is at available on modsecurity.org.
raw transaction data, making it easy for rules to focus on the logic of detection. Currently, variables are divided into request, server, and response variables, parsing flags and time variables. You can use multiple variables in a single rule with the | operator.
OPERATORS: Specify a regular expression, pattern or keyword to be checked in the variable(s).
There are four types of operators: string-matching, numerical, validation and miscellaneous operators. Operators always begin with a @ character, and are always followed by a space.
ACTIONS: Specify what to do if the rule evaluates to true step on to another rule, display an
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error message, or any other task. Actions are divided into seven categories: disruptive, flow, metadata, variable, logging, special and miscellaneous actions. Here is a simple example of a rule:
SecRule ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx <script" id:101,msg: 'XSS Attack', severity:ERROR,deny,status:404
Here, ARGS and REQUEST_HEADERS are variables (request parameters and request headers, respectively); @rx is the operator used to match a pattern in the variables (here, this pattern is
<script); id, msg, severity, deny and status are all actions to be performed if the pattern is
matched. This rule is used to avoid XSS attacks by checking for a <script pattern in the request parameters and header, and generates an 'XSS Attack' message. The id:101 is given to the rule; it will deny any matching request with a 404 status response. Lets look at another example, for more clarity:
SecRule ARGS:username "@streq admin" chain,deny SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "!@streq 192.168.1.1"
This is an example of chaining two rules, and the transfer of control to another rule if the first rule holds true. The first rule checks for the string admin in the requests username parameter. If found, the second rule will be activated, which denies all such requests that are not from the 192.168.1.1 IP address. Thus, chaining rules help to create complex rules. Now, writing filtering rules for each attack will be very cumbersome, and also prone to human error. Here, mod_security provides users with another directive, SecFilter. This looks for a keyword in the request. It will be applied to the first line of the request (the one that looks like GET /index.php?parameter=value HTTP/1.0). In case of POST requests, the body of the request will be searched too (provided request body buffering is enabled). All pattern matches are case-insensitive, by default. The syntax for SecFilter is SecFilter KEYWORD.
SQL injection
Suppose you have an application that is vulnerable to SQL-injection attacks. An attacker could try to delete all records from a MySQL table, like this:
http://www.example.com/login.php?user=arpit';DELETE%20FROM%20users
Whenever such a request is caught by the filter, something similar to the following code is logged to audit_log:
======================================== Request: 192.168.0.207 [04/Jul/2006:23:43:00 +1200] "GET /login.php?user=tom';DELETE%20FROM%20users HTT Handler: (null)
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GET /login.php?user=arpit';DELETE%20FROM%20users HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.0.100 UserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; enUS; rv:1.8.0.4) Gecko/2006050 8 Firefox/1.5.0.4 Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 AcceptLanguage: enus,en;q=0.5 AcceptEncoding: gzip,deflate AcceptCharset: ISO88591,utf8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 KeepAlive: 300 Connection: keepalive mod_securitymessage: Access denied with code 500. Pattern match "delete[[:space:]]+f rom" at THE_REQUEST mod_securityaction: 500 HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error LastModified: Fri, 21 Oct 2005 14:30:18 GMT ETag: "82384bf833a5280" AcceptRanges: bytes ContentLength: 1215 Connection: close ContentType: text/html
In response to the attack, SecFilterDefaultAction is applied (the request is denied, logged, and the attacker gets a 500 error). If you want a different action to take place (like, redirect the request to a HTML page that can provide customised warning content), you can specify this in the rule, as follows:
SecFilter "delete[[:space:]]+from" log,redirect:http://example.com/invalid_request.html
To prevent more SQL injection attacks, we can add a few other directives like:
SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter "insert[[:space:]]+into" "select.+from" "drop[[:space:]]table" create[[::space:]]+table update.+set.+= union.+select or.+1[[:space:]]*= [[:space:]]1 '.+ xp_enumdsn xp_cmdshell xp_regread xp_regwrite xp_regdeletekey
The last five are particularly used for MS SQL server-specific injection attacks. The only problem with SecFilter is that it scans the whole request instead of particular fields. Here, SecFilterSelective is useful; it allows you to choose exactly what to search. The syntax is:
SecFilterSelective LOCATION KEYWORD [ACTIONS]
Here, LOCATION decides which area of the request to be filtered. Hence, for SQL injection, you can also use:
SecFilterSelective SCRIPT_FILENAME "login.php" chain SecFilterSelective ARG_user "!^[azAZ09\.@!]{1,10}$"
The above code will validate the user parameter, and allow only the white-list of characters we have given. If for some reason you cannot take this approach, and must use a deny-what-is-bad method, then at least remove single quotes ('), semicolons (;), dashes, hyphens (-), and parenthesis (()).
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XSS attacks
For XSS attacks, we can use the following directives:
SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter SecFilter "<(.|\n)+>" "<[[:space:]]*script" "<script" "<.+>"
Though these filters will detect a large number of XSS attacks, they are not foolproof. Due to the multitude of different scripting languages, it is possible for an attacker to create many different methods for implementing an XSS attack that would bypass these filters. Hence, here it is advised that you also keep on adding your own filters. To protect against an XSS attack done via PHP session cookies, you can use the following:
SecFilterSelective ARG_PHPSESSID "!^[09az]*$" SecFilterSelective COOKIE_PHPSESSID "!^[09az]*$"
Here, the attacker may try to use a string like /bin/./sh to bypass the filter but mod_security automatically reduces /./ to / and // to /, and also decodes URL-encoded characters. You can also use the white-list approach:
SecFilterSelective SCRIPT_FILENAME "directory.php" chain SecFilterSelective ARG_dir "!^[azAZ/_\.09]+$"
This chained rule-set will only allow letters, numbers, underscore, dash, forward slash, and period in the dir parameter. Filtering out command directory names is also a good option, and can be done as follows:
SecFilterSelective THE_REQUEST "/^(etc|bin|sbin|tmp|var|opt|dev|kernel)$/" SecFilterSelective ARGS "bin/"
Session fixation
During session fixation, in one of its phases, the attacker needs to somehow inject the desired session ID into the victims browser. We can mitigate these issues by implementing the following:
# Weaker XSS protection, but allows common HTML tags SecFilter "<[[:space:]]*script"
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# Prevent XSS attacks (HTML/Javascript injection) SecFilter "<.+>" # Block passing Cookie/Session IDs in the URL SecFilterSelective THE_REQUEST "(document\.cookie|SetCookie|SessionID=)"
The last two filters are chained, and will reject all parameters to the home argument that is a filename of more than 15 alpha characters, and that doesnt have a .txt extension. Similarly, you can prevent predictable resource location attacks also, and protect against sensitive file misuse, with two recommended solutions. First, remove files that are not intended for public viewing from all Web server-accessible directories. After this, you can create security filters to identify if someone probes for these files:
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_URI "^/(scripts|cgilocal|htbin|cgibin|cgis|wincgi|cgiwi n|bin)/" SecFilterSelective REQUEST_URI ".*\.(bak|old|orig|backup|c)$"
These two filters will deny access to both unused, but commonly scanned for directories, and files with common backup extensions. Web pages that are dynamically created by the directory-indexing function will have a title that starts with Index of /. We can use this as a signature, and add the following directives to catch and deny access to this data:
SecFilterScanOutput On SecFilterSelective OUTPUT "\<title\>Index of /"
Information leakage
Here, we are introduced to the OUTPUT filtering capabilities of mod_security, which you should enable by adding SecFilterScanOutput On in the configuration file. We can easily set up a filter to watch for common database error messages being sent to the client, and then generate a generic 500 status code instead of the verbose message:
SecFilterScanOutput On SecFilterSelective OUTPUT "An Error Has Occurred" status:500 SecFilterSelective OUTPUT "Fatal error:"
Output filtering can also be used to detect successful intrusions. These rules will monitor output, and detect typical keywords resulting from a command execution on the server.
SecFilterSelective SecFilterSelective SecFilterSelective SecFilterSelective SecFilterSelective SecFilterSelective OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT OUTPUT "Volume Serial Number" "Command completed" "Bad command or filename" "file(s) copied" "Index of /cgibin/" ".*uid\=\("
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mod_security is capable of intercepting files uploaded through POST requests and multi-
part/form-data encoding through PUT requests. It will always upload files to a temporary directory. You can choose the directory using the SecUploadDir directive:
SecUploadDir /tmp
It is better to choose a private directory for file storage, somewhere that only the Web server user account is allowed access. Otherwise, other server users may be able to access files uploaded through the Web server. You can choose to execute an external script to verify a file before it is allowed to go through to the application. The SecUploadApproveScript directive enables this, like the following example:
SecUploadApproveScript /usr/local/apache/bin/upload_verify.pl
RFI attacks
RFI attacks are generally easy to detect, with something like the following directive:
SecRule ARGS @rx (?i)^(f|ht)tps?://([^/]) msg:Remote File Inclusion attack # To detect inclusions containing IP address SecRule ARGS "@rx (ht|f)tps?://([01]?\d\d?|2[04]\d|25[05])\.([01]?\d\d?|2[04]\d|25[05])\.([01]?\d\d?|2[0 #To detect inclusions containing PHP function include() SecRule ARGS "@rx \binclude\s*\([\w|\s]*(ht|f)tps?://" "msg:'Remote File Inclusion'" # To detect inclusion ending with ? SecRule ARGS "@rx (ft|htt)ps?.*\?+$" msg:'Remote File Inclusion'
If you have an input field URL in your comment form, and you want to scan the value of URL for the string c99, you do it as follows:
SecFilterSelective "ARG_url" "c99"
The following configuration helps fight HTTP fingerprinting, and accepts only valid protocol versions:
SecFilterSelective SERVER_PROTOCOL !^HTTP/(0\.9|1\.0|1\.1)$
The following configuration allows supported request methods only, and helps fight XST attacks:
SecFilterSelective REQUEST_METHOD !^(GET|HEAD|POST)$
Often during the reconnaissance phase, attackers look for the Web server identity and version. Web servers typically send their identity with every HTTP response, in the Server header. Apache is particularly helpful here; it not only sends its name and full version, by default, but also allows server modules to append their versions. Here, you can confuse the attackers by using something like:
SecServerSignature "MicrosoftIIS/5.0"
PHP code cannot be injected directly, but it may be possible to have code recorded on disk to be executed later, using an LFI attack. The following rule will detect such an injection attempt, but will
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Logging
There are three places where, depending on the configuration, you may find mod_security logging information:
mod_security debug log: If enabled via the SecFilterDebugLevel and SecFilterDebugLog
directives, it contains a large number of entries for every request processed. Each log entry is associated with a log level, which is a number from 0 (no messages at all) to 4 (maximum logging). You normally keep the debug log level at 0, and increase it only when you are debugging your rule set. Apache error log: Some of the messages from the debug log will make it into the Apache error log (even if you set mod_security debug log level to 0). These are the messages that require an administrators attention, such as information about requests being rejected.
mod_security audit log: When audit logging is enabled (using the SecAuditEngine and SecAuditLog directives), mod_security can record each request (and its body, provided
request body buffering is enabled) and the corresponding response headers. Here is an example of an error message resulting from invalid content discovered in a cookie:
[Tue Jun 26 17:44:36 2011] [error] [client 127.0.0.1] mod_security: Access denied with code 500. Pattern match "!(^$|^[azAZ09]+$)" at COOKIES_VALUES(sessionid) [hostname "127.0.0.1"] [uri "/test.php"] [unique_id 3434fvnij54jktynv45fC8QQQQAB]
The message indicates that the request was rejected (Access denied) with an HTTP 500 response because the content of the cookie sessionid contained content that matched the pattern !(^$|^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$). (The pattern allows a cookie to be empty, but if it is not, it must consist only of one or more letters and digits.) Note: I once again stress that neither LFY nor myself are responsible for the misuse of the information given here. Any attack techniques described here are meant to give you the knowledge that you need to protect your own infrastructure. Please use the tools and techniques sensibly. This article has just scratched the surface of mod_security. For more details on rule writing and other important directives, please refer to ModSecurity Handbook by Ivan Ristic a must-read book for anyone interested in this topic. We will deal with other ways to secure Apache in the next article. Always remember: Know hacking, but no hacking.
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Tags: Apache, Apache HTTP Server, Apache module, apache web server, attack prevention, audit logging, buffer overflow protection, configuration files, dynamic defense, file upload, http, intrusion detection, LFY August 2011, malicious payload, messy code, mod_security, network traffic, regular expression, Securing Apache series, security loophole, security solutions, server attack, web applications, Web apps, Windows, WWW
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