CIVIL-MILITARY CRIMINALS: An Analysis of Wartime and Postwar Violence Variation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia

Presented to the Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree with honors of Bachelor of Arts

Harvard College March 2012

Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW......................................1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................2 CASE-SPECIFIC LITERATURE...4 FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LITERATURE...7 CONCLUSION.....32 II. WARTIME CRIME VARIATION IN THE BALKANS (19911995).33 METHODOLOGY......35 DATA...50 STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS....53 Bosnia.53 Croatia.....64 Serbia......76 CONCLUSION.....86 III. POST-WARTIME CRIME VARIATION IN THE BALKANS (1995 1998)....89 METHODOLOGY.....90 DATA.....109 STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS...110 Bosnia...110 Croatia...126 Serbia....133 CONCLUSION....140 IV. CONCLUSION...144 V. APPENDIX.151 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..152 TIMELINE OF EVENTS...153 GENEVA CONVENTIONS SIGNATORIES (AS OF JANUARY 1991)...156
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAR-CRIME DATA..160 NATIONAL COURTS WAR-CRIME DATA......169 Bosnian Courts.169 Croatian Courts.184 Serbian Courts..196

VI. WORKS CITED....200

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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION
Literature on the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia), Croatia, and Serbia between 1991 and 1998 abounds, but it almost exclusively focuses on the violence undertaken by each side, the ethnic tensions that fueled the violence, or the success or failure of international intervention. Few scholars explore the interplay between the human-rights violence experienced throughout the war and the structures that tactically allowed it to be carried outnamely, the militaries of each of the countries involved. Whenever scholars do touch upon the Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian state structures, they often cite a unique corruption or historically unchangeable bias as a major factor in the resultant genocide. During the Balkan Wars (and their aftermath), however, numerous atrocities of this kind were perpetrated by modern military and civilian government personnel of the former Yugoslav states. The crimes committed by security sectors between 1991 and 1998 by individuals from Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia were variable in type and scale, despite the common thread of ethnic tensions. In an effort to contribute to scholarship on how to prevent atrocities, this thesis aims to identify what controllable factors1such as civilian and military structures and operations contribute to an increased likelihood of certain types of crimes over others. Therefore, the broad question that guides this thesiswhy do some security sectors commit human-rights violations while others do not?tries to address this gap in the literature by applying it to the cases of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia during and after wartime. I will answer this question by arguing that, of the three states in

Controllable relative to centuries of ethnic histories. 2

question, those states that were influenced by international standards either on the level of the domestic governmentby changing their incentives for using the security sectoror on the level of the security-sector institutions themselves committed fewer human-rights violations than those that did not.

A. NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY

Before continuing, I must clarify the meanings of certain terms used frequently in this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, a government refers to an institution composed of civilians that rule the affairs and control the maintenance and administration of a given territory (OED government). A state, by extension, will signify a set of permanent, administrative, legal, and coercive systems with a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory (Tilly 1985: 170).! When used herein, the term state will therefore incorporate both the government and the security sector, which, following Monica Duffy Tofts definition, will be used to mean any and all agents capable of imposing order by force, thus encompassing the military, the police, and irregular forces; the term will be used interchangeably with armed forces (Toft 2010: 13). When referring specifically to the military, I will mean the organized force affiliated most directly with the national state. The spectrum used to classify types of crimes committed by armed forces in this thesis will be between top-down and bottom-up: policy crimes and individual crimes, respectively. A policy war crime will be defined as when an actor aided and abetted in large-scale human-rights violations and/or ordered

his subordinates to commit crimes of any magnitude. Conversely, an individual war crime will be identified when an actor has committed smaller-scale crimes, such as rape or murder, without clear orders from or coordination with a higher officer or leader. A hybrid crimean action categorized as a policy crime combined with an individual crimewill be identified when an actor has committed both these offenses. Such a command-based scale allows us to pinpoint the role of state-sponsored command structures in violations committed during conflicts. All of these terms, their meanings, and what they do not mean will be instrumental in the discussions to follow.

II. CASE-SPECIFIC LITERATURE

In the literature, critics are quick to broach several theories to explain this thesiss guiding question: why some security sectors commit human-rights violations and others do not. The most widely accepted theories, however, fall short in explaining the variation in these violations by armed forces in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Previous scholars who have asked questions similar to this thesis have concentrated on the stark differences between Western militaries and those in developing countries, where scholars posit most major human-rights violations occur. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) did indeed have elements that are not typically considered Westernits membership was restricted by ethnic quotas and held to one political orientation (Stepanovitch 1978: 87). Yet the JNA was considered by many (including the

United States, which contributed a significant amount of financial assistance to develop the JNA under Josip Broz Tito) to be more akin to Western militaries than to those of newly minted militaries in developing countries, in the sense that it had a long institutional history of unified defense command seen and treated as legitimate by the countrys political leadership (Stepanovitch 1978: 8687, 89). In addition, the former Yugoslavia, though not a democracy, was a modernized European (albeit Second World) country that throughout Titos reign was seen as economically and politically advanced and important enough to be the target of influence by the United States for its Cold War against the Soviet Union (Stepanovitch 1978: 89; Baskin and Pickering 2005: 2). Therefore, studies of the former Yugoslavia through this lens are not fully informative. Although the former Yugoslavia had a relatively Western military and was fairly modernized, other scholars might propose that the atrocities committed were mostly if not solely a result of ethnic tensions. Famous arguments cite that the violence was inspired by the hatred of the different factions of ethnic Serbs, ethnic Croats, and ethnic Bosniaks for each other. While the role of ethnic hatred in the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s cannot be refuted, this argument does not fully explain why these countries, all having experienced similarly fierce ethnic tensions, had such different wartime and postwar experiences with human-rights violations. In other words, in these cases, ethnic tensions were fairly constant, and yet Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia experienced variable levels and variable types of violence, indicating that prejudice is not the only factor that plays a part in how violence is manifested.

At this point, other critics might argue that atrocities are more likely to be committed in times of war. In these cases, this argument may be true given the difference in known numbers of human-rights violations before the war and those during the war, yet there are significant variations in individual and policy violence during peacetime immediately following the Dayton Peace Accords. Therefore, this thesis will explore both wartime and peacetime civil-military structures in order to accord a more satisfactory explanation to the imbalance in human-rights violations committed by the security sectors of these countries. All these interpretations are lacking because they do not ask the right questions. The following are the two questions (the first to be addressed by Chapter 2 and the second to be addressed by Chapter 3) that need to be asked in order to answer my general questionwhy do some militaries commit humanrights violations and some do not?about wartime and postwar Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia specifically: 1. What civil-military factors explain the variation in war-crime type (individual-level versus policy-level) among the states involved in the Bosnian and Croatian Wars? 2. What civil-military factors from Question 1 were present in the changes to defense and security institutions undertaken in the immediate aftermath (19951998) of the Bosnian and Croatian Wars? How much can the violence (or lack thereof) experienced by each of the involved states in this time period be explained by the new civil-military institutions? In other

words, how effective was the reform during this period of time in curbing the types of violence experienced during the war?

III. FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LITERATURE

In order to answer these questions, general security-sector structures and the interactions they have with other aspects of the state must be categorized. Several scholars of the civil-military nexus have offered classifications of the institutions involved in security-sector development and management. Peter J. Katzenstein and Deborah D. Avant have formulated comprehensive accounts of how the security sector interacts with its environment. In their sociological study of international national security, Katzenstein propose that the culture and institutions surrounding a state influence that states security interests and apparatus (Katzenstein 1996: 52). According to their arguments, the states international and domestic environments provide building blocks for how a state views itself, which in turn influences the states use of the security sector (Katzenstein 1996: 52). Katzenstein thus identify the importance of international and domestic norms in forming security-sector policy and structures. In the context of her concern over the privatization of security, Avant is more direct in her categorization of the influences on the security sector, as she describes three aspects of security-sector control: (i) political control, or who has the decision over force deployment; (ii) functional control, or the capacity of the security sector; and (iii) social control, or how much security-sector functioning is consistent with or reflects international values (56).

Using a framework informed and inspired by these accounts, I propose a set of five interactions that will correspond to specific independent variables: how the security sector interacts with its own internal structures (interaction #1 in Figure 1.1); civilian control or oversight over the security sector (interaction #2); the domestic publics oversight over the civilian leadership (interaction #3); the influence of the global community on the state (interaction #4); and how the security sector checks the civilian leadership (interaction #5). For the purposes of this thesis, then, Katzensteins focus on domestic and international norms defined as collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity (54)inform interactions #3 and #4, respectively, whereas Avants triad informs interactions #1 (functional control), #2 (political control), and #4 (social control). I will use the independent variables that correspond to these institutional interactions (see Table 1.1) to explain my dependent variables, individual violence and policy violence in wartime and post-wartime.

Interaction Civilian-government influence on security sector Security-sector influence on itself Domestic-public influence on civilian government Internationalcommunity influence on state Security-sector influence on civilian government

Measurable Independent Variable(s)

Civilian influence on military structure and functioning Formal structure Real control Professionalism N/A International-community influence on civilian government International-community influence on security sector Checks on civilians; ability to resist civilian immoral orders

Table 1.1: Institutional interactions and their corresponding measurable independent variables In order to properly use my framework in the following chapters, however, I must clarify the nature of these interactions by outlining the literature relevant to each piece of the framework.
A. INTRA-MILITARY RELATIONS

The ultimate goal of a states security sector is effectiveness: throughout peacetime, a states armed forces should be ready to respond to a threat to the state and its people and, during wartime, should be able to follow through to victory. In order to best achieve this goal, armed forces should be both professional and centralized to a situation-specific levelthe former to know the proper steps to use force to defend a state and the latter to be able to carry out these steps efficiently in a given circumstance. (1) PROFESSIONALISM Conceptions of a professional military man differ among the literature. In his 9

seminal work on civil-military relations in the Western world, The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington established the prevailing definition of professionalism. For Huntington, a professional military man is specialized in the field of use of violence, often exhibiting a technical expertise that is fostered through study and tactical experience (Huntington 1957: 1415). Yet, to Huntington, this same professional also holds a professional military ethic, which includes a set of shared values and ideologiesfrom prioritizing the group over the individual and overemphasizing the inevitability of war and immediacy of threats, to advocating for the constant development of military capacity and supporting careful calculations before entering into a security commitmentall culminating in a general respect for civilian authority (Huntington 1957: 1011, 63, 65, 67, 6869). Huntington uses his conception of the professional military ethic to build his seminal civil-military dichotomy: between subjective control and objective control. Subjective control requires a conscious overlapping of the civilian and military spheres to civilianiz[e] the military, making them the mirror of the state, whereas objective control involves separating the civilian and military spheres to allow for an autonomous military professionalism as required by his ethic (Huntington 1957: 83). Since articulating his idea in 1957, however, Huntington has come under scrutiny for the second part of his definition, which describes vague concepts (i.e., ethic and disposition) that are difficult to identify and measure (Feaver 1999: 227). Establishing a nuanced distinction between his conception and Huntingtons, Morris Janowitz argues that, although the ethic as Huntington

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defines itnamely the culture and values surrounding the military establishmentdoes influence decision-making and is related to the expertise that military men hold, the military is not a unified elite; in fact, members differ substantially in their ideological opinions (343). Thus, the ethic is in fact a generalization distinct from the actual operational development of a military professional (Janowitz 1960: 15). For Janowitz, a military professional is an expert in war-making and in the organized use of violence who also happens to experience social and political influences that every other member in society is also expected to experience (15).2 Peter Feaver argues that the definition of professionalism can be found in Clausewitzean logic, which makes operations the exclusive province of the militaryakin to Huntingtons definition of objective controlwhose technical expertise allows for the implementation of war strategy (Feaver 1999: 228). Eliot A. Cohen adds to this argument through his claim that the military should be professional in the sense that its members are concerned with military matters and leave politics to politicians (Cohen 2002: 227228). Because of the modern rebuttal to Huntingtons professional military ethic, for the purposes of this thesis, professionalism will refer only to technical, security-specific expertise developed through study and/or tactical experience; military professionals are thus responsible specialists who use their expertise to influence the practical approach to and conduct of war (Janowitz 1960: 343). (2) COMMAND AND CONTROL Though necessary, military professionalism is not sufficient to carry out the
2

This claim serves to later underscore his main argument: that the military and the civilian spheres are not nearly as separate as Huntington supposes. 11

security sectors primary goal of state protection. Without an effective command and control structure alongside professionalism, expert opinionsfrom either the civilian or military leadership3will not diffuse to the tactical level for actual implementation. Effectiveness, however, will be treated in two different ways in this thesis: effective formal command structures and effective at using these command structures (real behavior or use of these structures). Before continuing, however, the nebulous concept of centralization should be defined in terms of the two definitions of effectiveness this thesis is measuring: command and control, which connote different types of authority. The most influential scholar of centralization is James Q. Wilson, who in his work Bureaucracy argues that the most effective organizations function through decentralization. To Wilson, decentralization requires that the power to affect outcomes be given to those in lower ranks within the vertical hierarchy of the organization (Wilson 1989: 372). He argues that this delegation of discretion is what made Germans in World War II so successful; by allowing lower-level officers to make decisions given the on-the-ground context they are closest to, the Nazi army was able to overcome the operational uncertainties that come with war (Wilson 1989: 372). Wilson does give conditions to this delegation of discretion, however: it is almost always delegated in wartime situations, and must be accompanied by a mission-oriented command system (Wilson 1989: 16). A decentralized bureaucracy succeeds in its stated goals only if the people who are
3

When examining command and control, the interests and actions of the upper echelons will involve both civilian and military perspectives. In effect, then, the variables of command and control will overlap both intra-military and civilmilitary interactions in my framework. 12

granted the power to affect outcomes are clearly aware of and loyal to the will of the commander (Wilson 1989: 16). This is where Wilsons argument makes a distinction between two types of authority. Though he never puts names to these two authorities, Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole do in their argument about political and economic efficiency and effectiveness: formal authority and real authority. Aghion and Tirole define formal authority as the right to make decisions and real authority as effective [or de facto] control over decisions (Aghion and Tirole 1997: 1). In their dichotomy, an actor with formal authority has the default ability to affect outcomes or make decisions, but he or she may delegate this to others while still retaining the right to make decisions or veto them. In other words, an actor with formal authority may delegate decision-making to subordinatesusually an optimal strategy if the subordinates are much better informed about happenings on the ground, in the factory room, etc.but he or she can always reverse [his or] her subordinates decision (Aghion and Tirole 1997: 2). This delegation of real authority by those with formal authority is what Aghion and Tirole define as decentralization. Indeed, in his discussion of the US military establishment, Janowitz alludes to these notions of formal and real authority by claiming that the military displays a centralization in basic decision-making [i.e., formal authority], but at the same time a decentralization in implementing operations [i.e., real authority] (Janowitz 1960: 67). Martin Van Crevelds account of command does not stray too far from this

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theoretical framework. His Command in War uses this outlook in terms more familiar to a military establishment, developing a conception of military command, control, and communications (which he shortens to command). Although his account heavily focuses on the communication aspect of command logistics (namely intelligence gathering), his theory still contributes to an understanding of this papers specific treatment of centralization. Just like Wilsonright down to his reference to the German military establishmentVan Creveld refers to a mission-oriented command system when arguing that the most effective armies did not attempt to control everything from the top (Van Creveld 1985: 270). His account of command is divided into two distinct types of command: logistics, or function-oriented command, and operations, or outputoriented command (Van Creveld 1985: 6). This paper is most concerned with the latter command type, which Van Creveld defines as the command that enables the army to carry out its proper mission (Van Creveld 1985: 6). He goes on to claim that this command requires that orders be given clearly, but that monitoring from above should only be enough to ensure execution without chok[ing] the initiativeof subordinate commanders (Van Creveld 1985: 8). In this way, Van Creveld also acknowledges the dichotomy of formal versus real authority in that command can be interpreted as formal authority and control as real authority. Van Creveld appropriately concludes his discussion by claiming that military effectiveness is not only a result of a specific structural centralization or decentralization in the way delineated here, but also of the proper training and professionalism of its men and women (Van Creveld 1985: 271).

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All these major theorists see centralization as the circumstance in which formal authority and real authority are vested in the same actor or set of actors (namely, actors in the upper echelons of the formal structure) and decentralization as the circumstance in which the actor(s) with formal authority delegate real authority to subordinates. Accordingly, this thesis will determine whether there is an actor or group with clear formal authority before determining whether real authority has been delegated effectively. Therefore, in both wartime and postwartime, I will analyze each militarys formal command structure to determine whether it had a clear, vertical chain of command as Wilson, Janowitz, and Van Creveld all claim is necessary to ensure an agent is accountable to his superiors when carrying out a given policy. Without the proper centralized formal command, a state cannot expect to be successful with its use of the armed forces regardless of its real control. After this step, I will measure the real or de facto control of the agents by this formal structure, whether the lower rungs had the power to effect change beyond orders from the top. This will be determined using Feavers application of the principal-agent framework to civil-military relations, which can, with slight modification, in this case be applied to intra-military relations. Two variable conditions identified by Feaver, incentive alignment and information asymmetry, will be measured to determine the expected optimal realcontrol model that, if followed by any given security sector in those specific circumstances, will have the highest likelihood of policy success. In his discussion of working versus shirking, Feaver outlines the idea of incentive alignment as one in which the interests of the principal and the agent are the same or similar enough

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to aim for the same outcomei.e., policy success (Feaver 2005: 65). Information asymmetry, on the other hand, refers to the likelihood that the principal and the agent have differing levels of information about the situation on the groundwith the asymmetry generally assumed to favor the agent (Feaver 2005: 69). There are four sets of condition combinations and accompanying most effective models of real controlas illustrated by Figure 1.2, below.

Figure 1.2: Incentive-alignment and information-asymmetry condition combinations and corresponding expected real-control models In cases when incentives are not aligned and/or information asymmetry is low (principals have as much or more information than agents)the latter of which is much more likely in peacetimecentralized control is more likely to be effective in carrying out the principals policy if it is accompanied by actions

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taken to correct the incentive misalignment.4 In fact, even when incentives are not aligned and information asymmetry is high, leaders in the upper levels of a command structure would be more successful in their policy goals if they had more centralized control to force rebelliously inclined agents to carry out their policies and they aimed to correct the information asymmetry. However, in cases when the principal and the agent have aligned incentives and information asymmetry is highin other words, when the commander and the soldier have equal interests in carrying out the policy (e.g., ethnic cleansing) and there is a high likelihood that a soldier is better aware of the situation on the ground than his superiordecentralized control is more likely to lead to success in a given policy. In the fourth set of conditions, when incentives are aligned and information asymmetry is low (the higher-ups have a good sense of the on-theground circumstances), centralized control by leadership would be more likely to be effective. Feavers arguments about centralized control versus decentralized control as shown by Figure 1.2, however, also depend on the corrective measures that leaders put in place to address unfavorable conditions inherent in each case of information asymmetry and incentive misalignment. Feavers argument operates under the assumption that military and civilian leaders prefer and want to achieve the following conditions: low information asymmetry and aligned incentives. To address high information asymmetry, for example, a leader can institute or use monitors on the ground that are outside the formal chain of command to report
4

Incentive-alignment correctives in general help a state actor achieve and maintain centralized control. 17

information directly to the upper echelons or use information from reporters. To address misaligned incentives, on the other hand, a leader can provide disincentives for rebellion (e.g., purges, draconian punishments, etc.) or provide more incentives for working rather than shirking a leaders policy goal (e.g., rewards, promotions). However, if the state uses the military in a control approach that does not correspond to the situations conditions as shown in Figure 1.2 (e.g., if there is a centralized control when information asymmetry is high and incentives are aligned), then the state can expect lower policy effectiveness. Consequently, in my analysis, I will first measure the degree of centralized formal command, then measure the incentive alignment and information asymmetry that exist in the context of the case to determine the expected realcontrol model, and end by comparing that expected model with the de facto control alongside any corrective measures taken to address unfavorable conditions in each case. (3) IMPLICATIONS FOR MY FRAMEWORK AND CASES Both professionalism and level of centralization are two major ways a military can prepare to handle the fog of war and hope to achieve the highest possible policy efficacy (Clausewitz; Coakley 1992: 98; Osiel 1999: 61). These variables are thus necessary for proper intra-military functioning as set out in my framework. In particular, the content of the military professionalism (e.g., types of knowledge taught to enlisted soldiers and officers) as well as the level of centralized control in each states security sector will be crucial in my argument about the states ability to control the incidence of policy or individual security-

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sector crime during and after wartime in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.

B.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Clausewitz began the discourse on civil-military-relations theory with his claim that war is an extension of politics, introducing the idea that civilian government plays an integral role in the conduct of war (Clausewitz 1976: 87). Since his initial claim, Clausewitz has inspired a great many scholars to explore the interplay between the civilian government and the security sector. For the most part, this scholarship is divided into two camps: (i) US- or Western-centric civilmilitary affairs and (ii) comparative or international civil-military affairswhere most of the latter is primarily concerned with the possibility of military coups and how best to prevent a governments force apparatus from overturning the government itself. Little civil-military literature exists to deal with the threat of misdirected civilian leadersand therefore on how civil-military relations affect war crimes. (1) WESTERN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS Western-centric civil-military theories rest on the assumption that civilian control over the security sector is positive and something to be advocated. Michael Desch perhaps expresses it best: civilian control [is] necessary to preserve domestic liberty[and] produces better national policy (Desch 1999: 6). Early civilmilitary theorists all share this assumption, and even when they acknowledge the possibility of a faulty civilian leader, they still prioritize civilian choice and control over subordinate military men. Feaver actually states bluntly that civilians

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have the right to make mistakes, but that the military must remain subordinate and follow orders (Feaver 2005: 65). This is also Huntingtons point when he mentions the possibility of a statesman issuing an immoral order to his military subordinates; though he admits this can frequently [be] the case, Huntington insists that the military man will only rarely be justified in refusing to carry out the civilian order due to personal conscience (Huntington 1957: 78). This is a small part of his larger argument for objective civilian control over the militaryan approach that removes political inclinations from the security sector in the hopes of transforming the military into nothing more than an effective and capable vehicle for executing civilian policy (Huntington 1957: 83). This is in direct contrast to Huntingtons theory of subjective civilian control, whereby the civilian government attempts to reduce the gap between political concerns and military expertise by denying that the military and political spheres are separate at all and allowing members of the military to lead active political lives (Huntington 1957: 83). In his Professional Soldier, Morris Janowitz, another major player in Western civil-military theory, advocates for a middle position between Huntingtons subjective and objective control, claiming that the military should be professional in specific technical skills but, given the exigencies of modern warfare strategy, should also be versed in politics (Janowitz 1960: 10). Not only does he advocate for this middle ground, but he also argues that the military and the civilian spheres are not as separate as Huntingtons dichotomy would have us believe. Janowitz claims that the modern skill sets of military personnel (e.g.,

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more administrative) have brought the military and civilian professions closer than they have ever been (424). That said, Janowitz cautions that overemphasizing the similarities between the military and civilian spheres can lead to tension and an overly powerful military (440). Thus, he, like Huntington, comes to the conclusion that civilians should retain an important and respected authority over military men. Likewise, Feaver, a more modern scholar of Western civil-military relations, also claims that the military does not and should not have authority to override civilian orders, despite the fact that he joins Huntington in acknowledging that civilians can make mistakes (Feaver 2003: 65, 80). He justifies this stance by claiming that, in a democracy, the electorate would retroactively check a civilian official who makes a national-security blunder, thus keeping the civilians accountable (Feaver 2003: 66). This argument and the arguments of Huntington and Janowitz, however, do not necessarily apply outside the Western scope of civil-military scholarship to countries that do not have the same democratic accountability for misbehaving civilian leaders. An international perspective on civil-military relations must therefore be considered in order to make up for this limited scope. (2) INTERNATIONAL CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS Theories of international civil-military relations separate into two notable approaches, traditional theories and alternate theories, both of which are concerned with preventing the intervention of the security sector into the domestic political sphere (i.e., coups). The approaches differ, however, in that the first,

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more traditional approach advocates strict separation of the civilian and security spheres, whereas the second takes a more flexible approach to the relationship between the civilian and military leadership. In his theory of polyarchy, Robert A. Dahl supports the traditional camp of civil-military relations as well as Huntingtons conclusion by arguing that a militarys centralized and hierarchical chain of command can detract from democratic rule unless the military is sufficiently depolitized to permit civilian rule (Dahl 1971: 50). Indeed, with a perspective informed by Latin American military-coup attempts, he advocates Huntingtons objective control, in which the military has its own sphere and the civilian government its own hierarchically more powerful sphere. Deschs aptly named Civilian Control of the Military reinforces this traditional separation argument by resting his own argument on the assumption that coups are manifestations of a breakdown in civilian control of the military, taking for granted that the separation of civilian and military spheres and the ultimate superiority of the civilians is favorable in all cases (Desch 1999: 11). Most scholarship on civil-military relations for democracies relies on this separation thesis, claiming that, in order to have a legitimate democracy, civilian governments must fully control the military sphere not through the harshest methods of control (police surveillance, terror, etc.) but through methods dependent on law, values, interests, and public opinion (Kummel and von Bredow 2000: 11). The alternative camp of international civil-military relations finds its first (perhaps inadvertent) proponent in Morris Janowitz. In his Civil-Military

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Relations: Regional Perspectives, Janowitz begins to acknowledge that different cases deserve different analytical treatments. By allowing each scholar in his collection to pursue those variables which [each scholar] felt had the most powerful explanatory relevance and potential for a regions civil-military relations, Janowitz implies that the traditional separation system should not be applied to all cases given each ones socio-cultural particularities (Janowitz 1981: 13). Rebecca L. Schiff goes further with her concordance theory, which acknowledges that, in certain situations, the military can be vital for a countrys political and social development (Schiff 2009: 31). The theory stipulates that the threat of domestic military intervention is reduced when the military, society, and government agree on the militarys social composition, the political decisionmaking process, the recruitment process, and the militarys style (Schiff 2009: 13). She explicitly refrains from assigning substance to each of these indicators like some of her predecessors in the field might do. For example, she does not claim that the military style must prefer isolating the military from politics in order to prevent domestic military intervention. Instead, Schiff rests her argument on whether the actors agree on the variables. If the actors agree, this leads to a peaceful consensus among a countrys leaders that intuitively would prevent conflicts between them. In her own words, Concordance theory argues that three partnersthe military, the political cities, and the citizenryshould aim for a cooperative relationship that might involve separations but does not require it. Concordance theory sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationshipsCivil and military institutions need not be separate (like the US model) to prevent domestic military intervention. (Schiff 2009: 32)

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(3) IMPLICATIONS FOR MY FRAMEWORK AND CASES Although these alternative theories have begun to open the field up to different contexts, a gap remains in the ability of these theories to apply solutions to cases in which ethnic tensions permeate all levels of the state, such as those analyzed in this thesis. In particular, Schiffs concordance theory predicts domestic military intervention in such states but does not provide steps for preventing these inappropriate military involvements. I hope to address this gap in the literature by developing a theory that comes closer to offering solutions to the problem of stopping violence against civilians for the specific cases of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia from 1991 to 1998. Measurements of civilian control over the military will be important in my wartime and postwar analyses of Balkan civil-military relations. For example, Feaver outlines the mechanisms that civilians use to keep the military in line with civilian aims, including institutional checks, monitoring, and punishment (Feaver 2003: 86, 94). Feaver ranks these mechanisms in order of intrusivenessin effect asking which mechanisms are acceptable and which may cross a line into ineffective or disruptive oversight or micromanagement (Feaver 2003: 8687). In my analyses, I will use many of these oversight mechanisms as indicators to measure the extent and nature of civilian influence over the military, which will in turn be shown to have an effect on the number and type of crimes committed. Therefore, I will measure the level of authority the civilian government had over the security-sector apparatus and, combined with the intent or policies of the civilians, determine whether that enabled or inhibited (either malicious or

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reforming) policies during and after the war. The possibility of malicious civilian intentions plays little role in most Western-centric civil-military theories, however. These theorists assume that civilian control over the military puts checks on military excessiveness; in other words, they assume that civilians are less likely than military men to pursue humanrights violations or that civilian control is more important than preventing humanrights violations. Unfortunately, in the former Yugoslavia as well as several other countries over history, this has obviously not been the case. Thus, when applied to cases outside the traditional First World, these scholars civil-military models fall short. The theories emphasize the need for plain effectiveness without recognizing a very crucial issue inherent to it: that effectiveness can lead to extremely detrimental and extremely successful policies. In other words, they do not take into account issues of accountability for civilian leaders as well as military men. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., put it perfectly in his article about the postcommunist world in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: Another problem with the Western ideal of civilian supremacy is that it presupposes decent, law-abiding civilian government. Such supremacy becomes questionable when, as in the postcommunist world today, governments are neither liberal nor democratic and see the armed forces as potential tools of domestic repression. (Fairbanks 1996: 148) Thus, by identifying different levels of civilian control in the three Balkan cases using Feavers mechanisms, I will argue in Chapter 2 that civilian government control is not sufficient for full effectiveness and imply in Chapter 3 that perhaps effectiveness should encompass both policy implementation and the protection of civilians.

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C. INFLUENCE OF THE DOMESTIC PUBLIC ON THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

This variable is outside the scope of this thesis because it refers to the accountability of a civilian government to a populace through democratic governancean element not present in the former Yugoslavia. The term democracy will be used to mean a political system in which the government is responsive to all its citizens. Dahl claims that this responsiveness must be maintained through allowing all full citizensunimpaired opportunities: 1) to formulate their preferences, 2) to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, and 3) to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government (Dahl 1971: 2). By this definition, Yugoslavia does not qualify as a democracy, having been ruled by one man for several decades by the time it dissolved into civil war in 1991. Titos death in 1980 did spark interest in democratizing the federation by allowing for ethnic power-sharingthe Yugoslav President would rotate every year from one Republic representative to another (Drnov!ek 2000: 59)but ethnic entrepreneurs in Serbia and Croatia quickly stifled these democratic aspirations. During the subsequent era, 19911998, none of the three countries had demonstrated enough governmental accountability to be classified a democracy. Therefore, while it still seems likely that the influence of the domestic public on the civilian government can affect the incidence of human-rights violations, this case study necessitates that this factor not be addressed by this thesis.

26

D. INFLUENCE OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY ON THE STATE

This interaction encompasses the relationship between the global community and the civilian government as well as the relationship between the global community and the security sector. The content of this interaction can be subdivided into prevailing international norms and the mechanisms by which the global community can influence the state. (1) INTERNATIONAL NORMS In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer outlines international moral standards in the war convention, or the set of norms and principles to which the international community holds militaries across the globe. This war convention most relevantly includes: (i) the isolation of war to combat between combatants, allowing civilians their right to life; (ii) the utility and proportionality of war strategies, prohibiting any strategy that will not directly aid victory or that will aid victory at a smaller proportion to the greater cost; (iii) the right of a person not to be forced to fight or to risk his life; and (iv) the right to flee, an effort to address the moral implications of sieges (Walzer 1977: 42, 129, 135, 168). Walzer further argues that this war convention binds not only the state, but also the specific people who constitute the state apparatus. This includes the commander and individual soldier, both of whom are, by virtue of their humanity, capable of hesitating when given an order (Walzer 1977: 291, 311). Walzer also addresses standards for militaries during peacetime: he implies that the same laws governing the conduct of war bind any use of force in peacetime (Walzer 1977: 217). Walzer responds to criticisms of Just and Unjust Wars in Arguing About

27

War, in which he frames a military mans responsibility as an upward responsibility to his superiors and a downward responsibility to his subordinates (Walzer 2004: 2324). Walzer postulates that these responsibilities are fostered and enforced through the institutional hierarchy in which the soldier finds himself. Walzer expands a soldiers responsibility, however, by adding another directional responsibility outside of this structure, outward to civilians, which to him is less enforceable through institutions (Walzer 2004: 25). Here Walzer identifies a central concern of this thesis: the problem of enforcing responsibility when it falls outside of the formal structure, in particular to noncombatants. Relevantly, Walzer alludes to the requirement of soldiers in particularly threatening situations to refuse the ordersthe illegal or immoral ordersof their immediate superior (Walzer 2004: 27). In effect, this soldier would be working within the institutions to appeal up the chain of command over a superior officer to the [overarching moral norms of the] superiors of that superior officer (Walzer 2004: 27). Most of Walzers ethical arguments take concrete legal form in the Geneva Conventions, which employ international law to protect the wounded and sick (First and Second Convention), prisoners of war (Third Convention), and civilians (Fourth Convention) of signatories during both international and civil wars (Geneva Conventions 1949). How Walzer differs, however, is that he expands the Conventions legal arguments, which apply only to nationals of signatories, to ethical arguments that apply to all humans, thereby adding an element of prevailing moral norms to already legalalbeit little enforceable norms. As espoused by Katzenstein and Walzer himself, even as nebulous a

28

concept as norms, especially in the international arena, can have a significant effect on the formation, reform, or function of a state (Katzenstein 1996: 52; Walzer 1977: 133). This is due to an effect akin to the international demonstration effect, in which developments in one or several states pressure other states to develop likewise: international moral norms, once implemented or accepted by a large number of states, become a prerequisite for a states international legitimacy, thus pressuring states to adopt the norms. Approximately 95% of countries in the world, or 168 out of 178 countries, signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions before the Bosnian and Croatian Wars began in 1991 (see Appendix), showing consensus around many of Walzers arguments as adopted by the Conventions. As newly independent states seeking legitimacy on a worldwide stage, Bosnia and Croatia adopted the Conventions during the wars, on December 31, 1992, and May 11, 1992, respectively. Although this does not prove that either state was interested in keeping these promises during their civil wars, it does show that both Bosnia and Croatia were in some ways concerned about international acceptance through the adoption of international norms. (2) INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS The moral standards of the international community can only rarely act alone to influence an autonomous state and its security sector; as a result, the international community must also employ specific mechanisms to inject and enforce norms of global security such as those advanced by Walzer. The mechanisms that are most relevant to the cases used in this paper are threefold: (i) security-sector assistance on a bilateral, military-to-military level, (ii) security-sector assistance from

29

international organizations, and (iii) armed intervention. Examples of military-tomilitary security-sector assistance consist of direct funding, arms sales, and joint education or training programs. International organizations can also partake in these activities, but the main difference between mechanisms (i) and (ii) is in the source of such assistance: one state actor versus multilateral organizations. The third mechanism, armed intervention, signifies international-coalition military tactics aimed to end a conflict and/or establish peace afterward. (3) IMPLICATIONS FOR MY FRAMEWORK AND CASES It is very difficult to measure the effect of international norms themselves on a given state, considering that the norms are often either not codified (but rather are unwritten, moral understandings) or codified in laws that are difficult to enforce on an international level in real time (most modern international laws rely on retroactive punishment). Because of this, when analyzing the Balkan examples, I will focus on identifying the presence and content of international mechanisms in order to measure the influence of the international community on the states in question.

E.

MILITARY CHECKS ON THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

Probably the variable with the least literature, military checks on the civilian government is a new and potentially controversial concept for most civil-military theorists. For the most part, as argued in the Civil-Military Relations section above, theories of the interaction between a civilian leadership and a military leadership prioritize civilian control due to the idea that the military establishment,

30

composed of experts on the organized use of violence, should be checked by civilian interests. As I will show, however, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia had civilian leaders who led the organized violence to a significant degree, tarnishing this assumption. Given the fact that, in these cases, the accountability links between the domestic public and the civilian governments and between the international community and the civilian governments were either weak or nonexistent, the civilian leaders were essentially left to their own deathly devices. In an effort to address this missing accountability feature, I will test in the following chapters my hypothesis that, if a security sector undergoes a specific set of reforms to increase its checks on the civilian leadership, it will make policy crimes less likely in circumstances when the civilian leadership is not accountable to the domestic public and may continue to encourage ethnic hatreds as in the case studies in question. Along these lines, Tofts main argument is that implementing securitysector reform in postwar situations prevents the resurgence of violence (Toft 2010: 4). Toft is one of the only scholars to analyze accountability in civil-military relations from a military point of view. Using the cases of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, I will help fill in this hole in the literature and expand her argument by positing that the international community can institutionalize its norms of human rights more successfully through building the security sector and reforming it in ways compatible to these norms than through democratic institution-building, which, as these cases exemplify, has proven to be a difficult and (at best) long-term endeavor.

31

IV. CONCLUSION
The rest of this thesis will contain two different analyses of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia: one chapter on a wartime analysis and another chapter on a postwar analysis. In the following chapter, I will measure the relevant variables from my framework in each of the three countries to develop an argument to explain the wartime variation in violence. I will take a similar approach to Chapter 3, but I will use the most relevant variables for the postwar context to develop an argument to explain the different violence types found in each country from the end of the war to 1998. In Chapter 2, I will argue that these cases truly exemplify the primary problem of this thesis: that traditional ideals of civil-military relations in fact empower states to commit policy crimescalling for other accountability measures. Chapter 3 will test these accountability measures in the form of influence of international norms on the security-sector institutions.

32

CHAPTER 2:
WARTIME CRIME VARIATION IN THE BALKANS (19911995)

Map 1: Map skeleton from International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia website; temporary wartime autonomous areas roughly adapted from Burg and Shoup: 2000 Map 3.1 (75) and Maga! and "ani# 2001: Map 5 (xl)

In order to address the question of why certain security sectors in these three cases committed human-rights violations and others did not, I must first establish that these three cases fall outside the scope of current literature on security-sector accountability. This chapter will thus set up the puzzle of this thesis: that traditional arguments about the most effective interactions between the civilian and military sphereswhich in most cases claim to prevent misuse of the institutionsin fact allow for or encourage human-rights violations. I will set up this puzzle by investigating the civil-military institutional context of the Balkan Wars and explaining the variation in war-crime typepolicy versus individual between Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Specifically, the question to be answered in this chapter is: what institutional mechanisms in the nexus between civilian and military structures allowed specific war-crime types to prevail in each of the three countries? In response to this question, I conducted a close analysis of the two interactions from my framework most relevant to the wartime context: (i) civilian influence over the security sector; and (ii) intra-military relations as compared to each states respective war-crime counts. From the results of this analysis, detailed herein, this chapter will argue that high levels of civilian control over the military, centralization of formal command structures, and professionalism alongside the optimal real-control models led to more policy war crimes. On the other hand, low levels of the first three factors and a not-optimal real-control model led to fewer policy war crimes and more individual war crimes. In other words, all of the variables involving the security sector that would be expected to

34

help it carry out successful policy in fact empowered an ill-intentioned leadership to do just that.

I. METHODOLOGY
A. VARIABLES

The argument of this chapter hinges on the relationship between the dependent variable, or the variation in war-crime type among the three states, and the relevant independent variables as set out in Table 2.1. Specifically, my overarching framework should be modified to reflect the wartime context as shown in Figure 2.1. Due to the special circumstances (i.e., domestic violence and instability) of the downfall of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s, the domestic public did not have the ability to hold the resulting three governments accountable as discussed on p. 26, negating interaction #3. The wartime contexts also mean that efforts are highly focused on the tasks at hand (defending territory or accomplishing victory), as opposed to engaging in a serious consideration and reevaluating of military practices or civilian institutions, making interaction #5 irrelevant. This chapter will also not discuss the effect of the international community on the three statesnegating interaction #4 entirelybecause the majority of international involvement was confined to nonmilitary and mostly humanitarian matters; the international community only directly affected the security sectors in 1995, when it intervened to end the war. I will reserve an analysis of international involvement for Chapter 3, which will touch upon the postwar context and the effects of international standards in 35

building the accountability that was missing from wartime in many of these countries.

Thus, of the above general interactions between the state and the military, the interactions most relevant to wartime analysis are (i) intra-military organization and (ii) civil-military relations. Within these broader points of my framework, I will narrow my analysis in this chapter to the following four independent variables in comparison to my dependent variable (variation in warcrime type): (i) influence of civilian leadership on military structure and functioning, (ii) centralized or decentralized formal command, (iii) centralized or decentralized real control, and (iv) professionalism. Each of these four independent variables will be measured using specific sets of indicators for each of the countries in question. For a comprehensive view of the interactions, variables, and indicators, see Table 2.1 below.

36

Interaction

Measurable Independent Variable(s)

Centralized or decentralized command

Indicators
Reporting structure formations De facto use of reporting structure or power devolving within structure Technical expertise or inheritance of chains of command Extent to which civilians in high government positions form military strategy N/A

Intra-security sector interactions

Centralized or decentralized control

Professionalism

Civiliangovernment influence on security sector Domestic-public influence on civilian government Internationalcommunity influence on state Security-sector influence on civilian government

Influence of the civilian government on the military

N/A

International community influence on civilian government International community influence on security sector Checks and oversight mechanisms

N/A N/A

N/A

Table 2.1: Independent variables and corresponding indicators (1) CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS The first independent variable, civilian influence on military structure and functioning, will be measured by the overlap between civilian and military leadership as well as to what extent civilians in high government positions form military strategy. Influential military theorist Carl Clausewitz claimed war is simply an extension of politicsand this is especially the case in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, given how deeply ethnic tensions pervaded politics and society in these countries (Clausewitz 1976: 87). High-ranked Balkan civilian leaders were often ethnic entrepreneurs who exploited ethnic tensions for personal and political gain. Thus, obtaining a broader picture of the extent to which civilian leaders influence military strategy is essential. In addition, this variable will permeate the rest of the 37

variables; in other words, how involved civilians were in military functioning will flow through the discussions of reporting structures and security-sector control, as well as top-down professionalizing. (2) INTRA-MILITARY ORGANIZATION Under the categorical umbrella of intra-military organization (interaction #1 in Figure 2.1), I will be analyzing three variables: (i) formal command, (ii) real control, and (iii) professionalism. i. Formal Command Structures Most major scholars on the subjectWilson, Janowitz, and Van Creveldagree that a clear, vertical chain of command is necessary for proper policy followthrough. I will thus identify the nature of each states formal armed-forces structureincluding the effect of paramilitaries operating inside or outside the military structure. The military structure will reveal how military institutions and the command hierarchy interact through formal authority in order to determine whether it had centralized commandessentially, to what extent the military can be formally controlled by the military brass. Without a formal, mission-oriented command structure, a states military leadership is less capable of controlling its lower ranks and holding them accountable to military strategy (Wilson 1989: 371). In particular, then, this analysis will focus on whether the leaders even had the power to control the lower ranks through the structure in place if they had wanted to. This variable will indicate the following: less formal command over lower ranks means a lower likelihood of effective policy follow-through (and a higher likelihood of individual transgressions); less top-down control, by

38

definition, also affords more independence to local populations, which can lead to armed splinter groups that reflected a primal instinct for defense and security when the state fails to provide it. ii. Real Control A military may have the centralized formal command structure necessary for effectiveness in carrying out policy, but many times, especially during war, conditions can lead this formal structure to break down. In order to get a full picture of the capability of a states armed forces to carry out its policy, then, I will go beyond simply analyzing the military structure as it is designed and also evaluate its real-life performance in the field, or de facto control. De facto control can take the following three forms: the security sector functions as formally structured, real power shifts between principals or agents within the formal structure (which is still in place), or the structure breaks down due to its applicability or inapplicability to the surrounding conditions (as outlined below). Because ethnic tensions were prevalent among the populations in question, this chapter will make the assumption that individual agents were motivated by these ethnic tensions and possibly general self-interest. This can be seen in patterns of nationalism before the war as well as a history of intergroup antagonism; a pattern of ethnic domination and/or inequality; [and] the perception of contemporary intergroup competition as a zero-sum game (Burg and Shoup 2000: 4). In order to measure whether incentives of the principals and the agents were aligned, then, I will identify the policies of the civilian and military

39

principals and how they relate to the ethnic motivations of the agents.1 Given the fog of war, made notorious by Clauswitzian theory, and given that the focus of this chapter is crimes committed by armed forces during wartime, I will assume that information asymmetry is high throughout (Coakley 1992: 98; Osiel 1999: 61). Therefore, each states optimal model for effectiveness (either centralized or decentralized real control) will be determined by the policies it put forth and the extent to which individual agents in the hierarchy shared the same interests in carrying out the policiesin other words, by the incentive alignment. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the expected real-control setups expected to best achieve policy goals under different conditions of incentive alignment and information asymmetry adjusted for the wartime context.

Incentive alignment, then, matters both for military-military incentives and civilmilitary incentives. 40

Thus, I can compare the expected real control for each case with the de facto control of soldiers on the lower rungsindicated by the location of real authority as well as corrective actions (e.g., monitoring or punishment) taken by leadershipand determine whether this hurt or helped the state implement its policy goals. The analysis process for these two wartime intra-military variables is illustrated in Figure 2.3, below.

Using this method, I will argue that those states that had militaries with the necessary formal structure and the expected real control would have been more effective in carrying out their policies (i.e., war crimes or otherwise). On the other hand, policies would be less likely to be carried out effectively by those states that did not have the necessary formal structure or that, despite having the proper formal structure, had real control that does not match expectations and did not take the necessary corrective measures to account for unfavorable incentive

41

alignment or information asymmetry. Indeed, the latter will have therefore experienced a higher level of individual war crimes due to unchecked agent incentives. iii. Military Professionalism Each cases military command and control as discussed above are necessary for full effectiveness in carrying out a policybut they are not sufficient. The next indicator of policy effectiveness is professionalism, or the sophistication of the military establishment in standards of chains of command and technical and specialized expertise. One indicator of the level of professionalism among the armed forces is the relative newness of the respective countrys military. This will be measured by examining the relationship between the outgoing Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) and the military structures, doctrines, and manpower of each state military. How much each country inherited from the JNA, from organizational structures or doctrines to actual trained officers or soldiers, will affect the extent to which the chain of command (as an element of a professional army) was disrupted. If structures and manpower were even partly inherited, a state would at the very least not have to recreate its military professional infrastructure and capability entirely from scratch, particularly during the fog of war when the quick and thorough development of these factors is vital in determining the success or failure of military policy. Although this will include discussions about the inheritance of military structures, the nature of the manpower (i.e., trained or untrained) and capabilities (i.e., technology, arms) that

42

were inherited will be emphasized much more in order to get at this thesiss main definition of professionalism. (3) CONTROL VARIABLE Given that these independent variables change on a case-by-case basis, by narrowing down the civil-military institutional context to the situation of the postcommunist Balkans, this chapter is able to control the given time period (1991 1995), the isolated location (the former Yugoslavia), and the ethnic conflicts that occurred in each of the three countries during this time period at this location.

B. DATA COLLECTION

Data on policy versus individual war crimes committed by each state were collected from the war-crime-court conviction records of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as of each of the national courts. The decision to examine the relevant court records from national courts of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia was sparked because of the ICTYs unclear jurisdiction over the cases it chooses to hear. The ICTY vaguely stipulated that it confined itself to prosecuting the most senior leaders and transferred the intermediate- and lowerrank accused to competent national courts, all in order to fulfill its mission to prosecute former Yugoslav war criminals in the intended timeframe2 (United Nations 2009: 57). Despite this official stance on criminal jurisdiction, the ICTY trials have not been confined to conventional senior officials, having convicted at least 22 individuals who were sub-commander-level or below in military standing
2

The initial deadline for the full completion of trials was 2010 (United Nations 2009: 47). 43

(see Appendix). This inconsistencyand the inherent bias in only trying senior officials (i.e., an artificially low number of individual war crimes)called for a supplemental examination of national war-crime trial records for a more complete and accurate picture of the policy-to-individual war-crime ratio. Examining national courts war-crime trial records had its advantages and disadvantages, however. Bosnias court system has a thorough and complete online record of war criminals, their affiliations, and details about their crimes as convicted by its Special Panels for War Crimes from 2003 to the present. This panel is under the Criminal Division of the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina and comprises four councils, each with four judges. According to the court websites Common Secretariat section, one international judge is kept on the bench with three local Bosnian judges as a preventive measure against (ethnically) biased judgments (CBH). As stated by the Jurisdiction, Organization and Structure of the Court part of its website, the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina has jurisdiction over cases that endanger the state sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, national security, and international personality of [Bosnia], though it does not specify if this jurisdiction extends across borders to foreign nationalsi.e., Serbian or Croatian citizens (CBH). Croatian prosecution of war criminals, however, is splintered and decentralized, leading to difficult-to-find or nonexistent public records. Authority to prosecute falls to the district courts in an unspecified manner, with the actual number of war-crime convictions spread unevenly among its 15 localized courts instead of on a broad, national level as in Bosnia (Radalj 2011). Because of this

44

dearth of public records, in order to collect accurate numbers of war-crime convictions by the Croatian judiciary, I used secondary sources via war-crimetrial-monitoring organizations such as the Civil Committee for Human Rights (CCHR). According to the CCHR, most convictions in Croatian courts were fraught with issues. Numerous investigations and trials were conducted erroneously, with glaring discrepancies from internationally accepted procedural regulations, including insensitive treatment of witnesses and the occasional sentence that was not proportional to the crime (Kruhonja and Stojanovi# 2011: 11, 18). The scope of this chapter does not include the sentences of those convicted; it is more concerned with the quantity and quality (i.e., type) of the war crimes for which an accused is convicted than what punishment the court sees fit to assign to the crime. Thus, the mere existence of a conviction is considered in the data of war-crime variation, regardless of the sentence. Many Croatian trials were also conducted without the presence of the accused, without him or her in custody, and often without him or her even residing in Croatias territory3which meant the sentences determined by the courts could not be enforced. Trials of this nature, specifically those against members of units outside the Croatian military, were justified by invoking Croatias legal jurisdiction over foreign criminals whose crimes affect the Croatian state or whose own states laws would condemn said criminal to at least five years of jail time (Radalj 2011: 9). Despite this legal claim, this chapter does not consider in absentia convictions because of the

More than 400 accused have been tried in absentia since Croatian courts began investigating war crimes committed during the Balkan Wars (Kruhonja and Stojanovi# 2011: 8, 70). 45

possible consequences of these kinds of trialsnamely, overlapping convictions with other national courts or extralegal (i.e., biased) verdicts.4 Serbian war-crime-trial records were the medium between the extremes of the Bosnian and Croatian records. Serbian public records suffered from the same lack of concrete war-crime-conviction details (which sometimes inhibited their classification as policy versus individual) as the Croatian courts did, but Serbia did at least publicly post the initial indictments. In order to account for this slight primary-source discrepancy, data were collected from the war-crime-trialmonitoring organization Centre for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights and verified through comparison to the indictments in official Serbian records. According to Serbias Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, the jurisdiction to prosecute first-instance war crimes committed in the territory of the former SFRY, regardless of the citizenship, nationality, race or religious commitment of the perpetrator and the victim alike is confined solely to one court, the District Court of Belgrade (About Us, Republic of Serbia, Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor; Ellis 2004: 185). As far as mechanisms to prevent bias, it is important to note that the composition of the Serbian prosecution is fairly homogenous; only one prosecutor was born in Croatia, while the restincluding the Senior Advisor and the Secretary General of the officewere born in Serbia (About Us, Republic of Serbia, Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor). The composition of the bench, however, is less clear: the law establishing the judiciary for the war-crime court establishes that judge appointees must already be on the bench elsewhere in
4

Luckily, the incidence of these cases is low, so the impact of excluding them is negligible (e.g., at most nine out of 126 Croatian verdicts were tried in absentia). 46

the Serbian courtswhich does not necessarily automatically indicate Serbian ethnicity (Ellis 2004: 185186). Whether or how the ethnic compositions of prosecutors and judges affect convictions is uncertain. In order to account for the gaps in information and other difficulties with primary-source data acquisition, only information from the concluded verdicts5 on war crimes from all of these courts was included in the data of war-crime variation used in this chapter. In addition, all these national courts have trials that are still ongoing, so my data do not include indictments that have not been fully legitimized by a verdict.6 Therefore, ongoing trials, trials conducted in absentia, and other inconclusive or dismissed trials were ignored due to the inherent uncertainty. (1) PROS AND CONS OF A COURT-BASED APPROACH Generally, collecting qualitative data on war-crime variation in the postYugoslavia Balkans via court decisions (rather than, say, historical memoirs or other primary sources) is the best approach, but it is not without its drawbacks. For example, monitors of Croatian national war-crime courts have consistently raised concerns over political influence in the outcomes of certain trials, including the trying of an overwhelming number of Serb perpetrators compared to a relatively limited number of Croatian actors (Zoglin 2005: 55). Media hype surrounding some defendants over others can be seen in all of the courts, from the

Only those verdicts concluded as of January 3, 2012, have been considered in this chapter. If before this date a case was appealed and concluded in second instance, the data will reflect only the acts for which the accused was convicted in the latest court decision. If before this date a case was appealed and not concluded, it is considered an indeterminate case and thus not considered in the data. 6 At least 274 cases are still being investigated by Croatian courts, for example, and more than 600 are in trial but have not been concluded yet (Radalj 2011: 1). 47

high-profile cases taken on by the ICTY, such as Croatian general Ante Gotovina (who was recently found guilty), to the more local popularized figures like fellow Croat Branimir Glava! (Kruhonja and Stojanovi# 2011: 17). This bias-related objection is somewhat tempered by the courts appeal processes as well as the not-guilty verdicts issued in relation to ethnic or state affiliation of the accused. All of the national courts have processes for appeal by either the prosecution or the defense in each case. For example, as many as 59 out of 110 verdicts (53.6%) in Bosnian courts have been appealed, and, of those, as many as 11 (18.6% of the appealed cases) second-instance verdicts changed the first-instance verdict in some way. Additionally, Bosnian courts acquitted 22.7% of Serbian actors, 11.8% of Croatian actors, and 8.3% of Bosnian actors; Croatian courts acquitted or dismissed the charges for 24.1% of Serbian actors and 16.4% of Croatian actors; and Serbian courts acquitted or dismissed the charges of at least two Serbian actors, or two of almost all their convictions (all of the accused but one were Serb-affiliated actors). Though not definitive by any means, these signs indicate attempts by national courts to regulate bias in some manner. Another issue raised with the court-based approach is the possibility of courts to overlook certain real war crimes simply because they have not been brought to the table by the prosecution or other citizen petitions. This objection is especially relevant to the Balkan case, given the unprecedented sexual violence used in the war and the stigma and resulting silence that often accompanies being sexually assaulted or raped. Because of this, it is well within the realm of possibility that numerous actors who committed individual war crimes of this

48

kind have failed to be convicted by these courts. Additionally, the presence of foreign influences, namely in the form of foreign Muslim sympathizers who joined Bosnian Muslim extremist groups during the conflict, might mean that the crimes committed by these individuals go unnoticed and untried due to their foreign-national status or unknown whereabouts. The unofficial nature of these actors also precludes most of them from having kept membership records that might help prosecutors not only find the whereabouts of wanted war criminals, but also discover the identities of others previously unidentified. The possible missing war crimes are results of uncontrollable factors like social stigmas and inaccessible and unidentifiable criminals who acted alone, factors that would have equally affected other war-crime primary sources.7 Ultimately, however, using the records of the four major legal bodies involved in war-crime prosecutions of the time period in question was the best way to collect the type of data needed to test this chapters claims. The circumstances of the early-1990s Balkans lacked the cohesive, internal records on these matters that, for example, the Nazis kept during World War II, leaving war-crime-court convictions the only fairly accurate and comprehensive resources for an undertaking of this nature. Therefore, a central assumption of this chapter is that, through the in-depth review of evidence by competent and accountable8 judges,

Personal memoirs or accounts are subject to arguably even more public scrutiny than trials, which often employ witness-identity-protection programs. 8 All of the national courts used in this paper have been monitored not only by human-rights and legal-advocacy organizations, but also by the ICTY; the ICTY prides itself in advising, consulting, and training national judiciaries in the unique aspects of war-crime investigations and trials as well as providing information to 49

trials like those in the ICTY and national courts will have at the very least investigated and identified the existence and nature of the war crimes in question. This can be assumed given the basic legal procedural requirements met by each of the national courts as well as the international court, such as reaching a verdict only when there is no reasonable doubt as to the contrary. In order to proceed with the arguments in this paper, then, it is assumed that the records of the war crimes committed by certain actors are as accurate as can be determined by a retrospective look at events in which the judges and other observers were not present.

II. DATA
All results collected from the aforementioned sources have been tallied and organized via war-crime type (policy versus individual, and policy/individual hybrids) and country during the Balkan Wars. Both percentages and real numbers appear in each table in order to show the vast amount of variation among the different states, not only in proportion to one another, but also in sheer volume.
Individual War Crimes Associated with Policy War Crimes (Hybrid) 1 20% 4 26.7% 10 17.3% 15

STATE

Policy War Crimes 3 60% 6 40% 34 58.6% 43

Purely Individual War Crimes 1 20% 5 33.3% 14 24.1% 20

TOTAL:

Bosnia Croatia Serbia TOTAL:

5 15 58 78

Table 2.2: Results from ICTY convictions the public of each of the three countries through its Outreach Programme (ICTY Capacity Building and Outreach Programme). 50

STATE

Policy War Crimes 0 0% 17 27% 50 32.9% 67

Individual War Crimes Associated with Policy War Crimes (Hybrid) 2 16.7% 14 22.2% 49 32.2% 65

Purely Individual War Crimes 10 83.3% 32 50.8% 53 34.9% 95

TOTAL:

Bosnia Croatia Serbia TOTAL:

12 63 152 227

Table 2.3: Results from national-court convictions The results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 above show the drastic difference in warcrime-type variation between the convictions of the international court and those of the national courts (as seen in the percentage discrepancies by country; for example, according to the ICTY, 58.6% of Serbian war crimes were policy, while according to the three national courts it was 32.9%). This calls for joining these jurisdictional convictions to create a more accurate depiction of the variation among the three states. The combined results are found in Table 2.4, below.
Policy War Crimes 3 17.6% 23 29.5% 84 40% 110 Individual War Crimes Associated with Policy War Crimes (Hybrid) 3 17.6% 18 23.1% 59 28.1% 80 Purely Individual War Crimes 11 64.7% 37 47.4% 67 31.9% 115

STATE

TOTAL: 17 78 210 305

Bosnia Croatia9 Serbia TOTAL:

Table 2.4: Results from national court and ICTY convictions

Because Croatia was logistically supporting the HVO during the Muslim-Croat conflict in 19921994 and shared many goals, such as defending against Serbian encroachments, I have included HVO actors in the final war crime tally for Croatia (Shrader 2003: 50). 51

The variation as shown in Table 2.4 will serve as the primary dependent variable to be explained in the rest of this chapter. Secondary dependent variableswhich will serve to emphasize the ability of the four independent variables to contribute to effectivenesscan be found in some more qualitative data: i.e., success or failure of state policy from ethnic cleansing10 to defense. A states success or failure in accomplishing a stated wartime policy will be identified by the civilian governments and armed forces main goals during the conflict and the number of times these goals corresponded to the outcome. Whether a state succeeded in occupying a territory, for example, reflects the capability of the military leadership to coordinate efficiently and effectively (in ways predetermined by expected centralization models) with its lower rungs. A state failing to secure its borders or losing great territories to aggressor states, on the other hand, shows a deficiency in these same military command and control capabilities. One of the implicit goals for each state throughout this civil war was also to maintain law and order in the territories it claimed its own. The development of paramilitary organizations or other armed groups not only implies the states inability to control its populace, but also a general, growing sense of insecurity among a territorys population due to a perceived state-military ineffectiveness, giving rise to organic defense formations. Importantly, in addition, policingwith the ultimate goal of maintaining order and explicitly military functions were oftentimes conflated, leading to military I realize it is counterintuitive to consider war crimes or ethnic cleansing to be successes. As a result, then, I must qualify that success or failure will refer exclusively to the states viewpoint of its specific policies or goalsnot necessarily to Western or other actors moralities. 52
10

institutions and personnel adopting the same or similar purposes as policemen (and vice versa). In addition to the court data, I will then measure, alongside the other policies of each state (be they ethnic cleansing, winning the war, or territory acquisition), the level of law and order present in claimed territories in order to shed light on the ability of the armed forcesoften acting as policemento maintain control over its territory and people. It is difficult to say, however, where individual war crimes fit into the determination of success or failure; high or low levels of individual war crimes are not necessarily a success or failure of state policy, but simply tangential to it. For this reason, the sections on successes or failures will not discuss individual war crimes as policies, but simply treat them throughout each country-specific analysis as indications of the effectiveness of the military structure and functioning.

III. STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS

A. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

As early as 1991, the region of the former Yugoslavia that in 1992 was declared the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina began experiencing Serbian and Croatian plans for partition (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 144). These partitions took the form of several territorial gains from both surrounding states; before the conflict officially began, both Serbia and Croatia had declared autonomous regions within Bosnias borders (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 144). These states had seized upon Bosnias vulnerability as a territorial entity whose military capability had been dismantled, whose independent status was unknown, and whose national identity was

53

nebulous. Prior to the first attacks for territorial conquest by JNA forces under Serbian control in 1992, Bosnia had already been forced to consider defense its first priority. Several civil-military institutional factors, however, prevented it from successfully reaching this goalas well as any other top-down goals its civilian leadership may have set. A combination of all of these factorsBosnias scant competent civilian influence over the armed forces, decentralized formal military structure (and corresponding real control), and little professionalismaccounts for the countrys extremely low number (17.6% of the total) of policy war crimes. Bluntly put, the Bosnian government did not have the capacity to orchestrate atrocities even if it had the inclination to do so. Meanwhile, specific aspects under each of the aforementioned variablessuch as the Bosnian militarys lack of control over armed splinter groupsexplains the much higher concentration (64.7%) of individual war crimes. (1) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE ON MILITARY FORCES Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovi# and his civilian administration presented perhaps the biggest obstacle to Bosnias primary goal: effective military responses to Serbian and Croatian aggression. Izetbegovi#s ethnic bias was in sharp contrast to the military leaderships advocacy of banding all ethnicitiesand the paramilitaries that fight in their nametogether under one Army of BosniaHerzegovina (ABiH). Izetbegovi#s specifically Islamic nationalism could be traced to his leadership of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which sought to represent the Bosnian Muslim population. In 1991, his support of the SDAs

54

creation of a military force, the Patriotic League, outside of the Bosnian states Interior Ministry control illustrated his prioritization of this nationalism over proper legal state channels (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 181). Unlike in Serbia or Croatia, however, Izetbegovi#s nationalism was not shared by all other high leadership in the civilian or military structures, which led to splintering and lack of cohesion. Coupled with Izetbegovi#s and his advisors lack of military knowhow, this nationalist difference from the military leadership fed into the failure of state-initiated policiesfrom proper defense to Izetbegovi#s alleged desire to ethnically cleanse Bosnian Croats from the territory (Me!trovi# 2010: 325). This failure continued until Izetbegovi# replaced Sefer Halilovi# in late 1993 with one of his supporters, at which point Izetbegovi#s success in consolidating more civilian control over military operations might have been too little too late for Bosnia to recover from the massive military destruction it had experienced (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 186). Due to the decentralized nature of Bosnias armed forces (see below), power was concentrated in its local forces and local political leaders, which meant that the undertaking of statewide policies saw significant impediments. Because there was little to no coherency, consistency, and consensus in the upper echelons of the civilian government, not only did implementation of top-down policies suffer, but military operations did as well (Shrader 2003: 43). Therefore, there was a striking lack of cohesion and competence in military strategy formation at the civilian top. This civilian factor, combined with the decentralized official ABiH structure that lacked effective chains of command and untrained officers,

55

explains the paucity of policy war crimes relative to Bosnias overwhelming proportion of individual war crimes. (2) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURE During 1991, the secession of Slovenia and Croatias subsequent declaration of independence made the fall of Yugoslavia clear to Serbian leaders who insisted upon its preservation in order to create a Greater Serbian state. This fear of Yugoslav dissolution, however, meant that Serbian forces working within the JNA quickly disarmed all Territorial Defence (TO) forces within Bosnias territorydespite the fact that Bosnias 1990 constitution granted it control over TO forces to combat internal enemies (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 158). It took civilian leaders over a month after Bosnias independence (on March 5, 1992) to consider the threat from Serbia and Croatia serious enough to begin mobilization for their own defense force (Shrader 2003: 32). Because of this delay by the countrys leaders to ensure security of their territory, individual Bosnian actors started to collect arms and form their own defense forces as far back as mid-1991. These Muslim paramilitaries, namely the Patriotic League, the Green Berets, and the Muslim Armed Forces, led to an inefficient and disorganized management structure when eventually added to the late-coming ABiH (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 162). The corps commanders had to operate with these quasi-private military forces as well as other special purpose units that did not always report directly through their designated chain of command (Shrader 2003: 44). Indeed, much of the time, these paramilitaries operated with their own missions and command hierarchies (Shrader 2003: 44).

56

Early on, the ABiHs structures were hefty and unmanageable, with 80,000 men under one corps, in contrast to the Croatian Defence Councils 8,000 men per operational zone (Shrader 2003: 35). Underneath the formal operational control of these corps were a varying number of tactical brigades, police forces, and specialized troops (Shrader 2003: 25). It was only until late 1992 and early 1993, however, that these smaller units were organized in a strategic manner in order to facilitate higher C3command, control, and communications (Shrader 2003: 35). At the end of 1992, these brigades and other armed groups were organized into an unfixed number of Operational Groups whose territorial purviews changed with each mission (Shrader 2003: 35). It was only until March of the subsequent year that the commander of the corps reorganized the brigades and miscellaneous forces into four fixed Operational Groups with assigned territories and missions based on the threat faced in each territory (Shrader 2003: 3536). Too much formal splintering, however, led ABiH brigades to become quite inadequate in size by the end of 1993approximately 1,500 men per brigade (Shrader 2003: 38). Throughout these evolutions, inefficiency in formal operational structure led to more tactical power being indirectly transferred to militias rather than statecontrolled forcesthus plaguing Bosnia with severely decentralized formal military capacities that presented a rather disorganized front to its aggressive Croatian and Serbian adversaries. (3) REAL CONTROL Bosnias decentralizedand thus formally ineffectivecommand structure throughout its most critical hours hampered its ability to carry out policy. Beyond

57

this, Bosnian leaders did not implement corrective measures to operationally address the de facto decentralized control over rebelliously inclined agents. i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Control In terms of the Bosnian leaderships incentives, a lack of internal cohesion among Bosnias military and civilian leadership was apparent in the disagreements between Izetbegovi# and the ABiHs chief of staff (until his dismissal in 1993), Sefer Halilovi#. Halilovi# advocated for the multicultural defense of Bosnia against Izetbegovi#s hesitations over such plans (Burg and Shrop 2000: 194). As the conflict grew, Izetbegovi# and most of his supporters became increasingly associated with Islamic factions that sought to radicalize the ABiH by creating ideology-driven military structures and campaigns (Shrader 2003: 44). This all added up to the leadership projecting different goals from the civilian pedestal and the military pedestal. Though Izetbegovi# did advocate for an ethnic solution in a similar vein to his interlocutors in Croatia and Serbia (and what most soldiers on the bottom tiers may also have been in favor of), the fact that his top military leaders did not agreeand in fact argued vehemently for a multicultural objective already indicates an incentive misalignment within the institutional structure itself. This incentive misalignment was augmented by the multicultural demographics of Bosnia; according to the 1991 census, Bosnia was composed of 44% Muslims, 31% Croats, 17% Serbs, and 6% general Yugoslavs (Klemen$i$ and "agar 2004: 311). Therefore, some in Bosnias population may have advocated for an ethnic solution, but a majority probably did not advocate for Izetbegovi#s particular Muslim-only approach. That said, the reality was that the Bosnian

58

military brass advocated for a multicultural objective and peace whereas the primary concern of the soldiers on the groundboth those of the official ABiH and of the unofficial paramilitarieswas to defend themselves by any means possible in an environment already fraught with and biased by ethnic conflict. These armed forces were all-volunteer forces composed primarily of citizen soldiers, who, regardless of whether they were official soldiers or soldiers of their personal brigades, were known for their part-time military service when and where they pleased and for their often extreme, ethnically motivated views on the conflict (Shrader 2003: 34, 42). In an environment of this degree of incentive misalignment, a military should have centralized real control and have taken steps to correct the incentive misalignment in order to keep disagreeing agents in line with the objectives of the principals. In other words, in order for the Bosnian army to have succeeded in its policiesdefense, peace, and reduction of violenceFeavers argument calls for its armed forces to have placed both formal and real authority in its military leadership in order to curb the natural impulses of its subordinates. As was discussed in the previous section, formal command was quite decentralized. As will be discussed in the subsection to follow, Bosnias real control was decentralized as well, which, coupled with the unprofessionalism rampant in its forces, explains in part why the majority of war crimes committed by Bosnian forces were on an individual level as opposed to a policy level. ii. De Facto Control and Corrective Mechanisms Due in large part to lacking a formal structure of accountability, Bosnian military and civilian leaders were unable to check actors on the lower rungs. Unlike the

59

(sometimes drastic) checks undertaken by Croatian and Serbian officials, Bosnian leaders did not effectively disincentivize actions that contradicted high-level policy goals largely because higher-ups did not fully agree on policy goals and did not have the structural means to enforce them if they did. Paramilitaries that had been integrated into the ABiH structure, as well as those that had not, posed problems given their tendencies toward independent action. In August 1992, the ABiH incorporated the Patriotic League and the remaining individual TO forces into its ranks. The former had been created as a defense force independent of the states Interior Ministry in 1991 by the main Bosnian political party and with the approval of Izetbegovi# (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 181), whereas the latter was composed of Muslim Bosniaks who had refused to obey orders from Izetbegovi# in 1991 to disarm and had instead consolidated certain enclaves of the TO for themselves (Shrader 2003: 3334). Both of these incorporated forces still had splinter groups not officially integrated into the ABiHcalling into question exactly how much control Bosnian officials truly had over these independently created groups (Shrader 2003: 48). Other paramilitaries, such as the Green Berets and the Muslim Armed Forces, added their strengths to the ABiHs purpose of defensethough the Bosnian state had established little accountability, command, and control over these forces (Shrader 2003: 34, 48). And these were the paramilitaries that had some semblance of institutionalization; little more than heavily armed bandit gangs supported by extremist local and foreign leaders operated completely outside the ABiH (Shrader 2003: 46). ABiH corps commanders had neither the

60

official authority nor the resources to keep these radical groups in line with specific state objectives. Still, the civilian or military leadership rarely addressed opposition within itself, even through drastic measures (e.g., coup or purges), which could have led to more policy effectiveness. In fact, according to the memoirs of thencommander of the Bosnian army Halilovi#, even when Izetbegovi# had been kidnapped in 1992 and Halilovi# had been approached by Bosnian Muslim leadership to stage a coup and reintegrate Bosnia with Yugoslavia as a multiethnic state, he refused the offer and thus prevented a (very drastic indeed) joining of incentives among the Bosnian leadership (Burg and Shoup 2000: 131). Halilovi# was, however, dismissed in 1993, allegedly because he expressed his opinion that Bosnia should fight both the Serbs and the Croats at the same time (Burg and Shoup 2000: 194). Still, others who shared his opinion were kept on staff, showing that not all opposition was squelched as it may have been in Croatia or Serbia (Burg and Shoup 2000: 194). The inability of its leaders to rein in the incentives of those in the lower rungs of the command hierarchy means that Bosnia, along with having a decentralized command structure, also had decentralized controla very poor structural choice for the incentive misalignment of the Bosnian situation. (4) MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM As has been referenced in the discussion of Bosnias military decentralization, the ABiHs ineffectiveness was in large part due to the novelty and disorganization of its men. Unlike Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia had inherited hardly any military

61

institutions intact from the JNAneither doctrines, nor training, nor trained manpower. During the early days of Yugoslavias demise, Izetbegovi# had allowed the Serbian-controlled JNA to dismantle all the Bosnian-specific TO capabilities from Bosnian sites. The TO capabilities that remained after this disassembly remained in the hands of unofficially recognized, local actors,11 not in any official or institutionalized form (Shrader 2003: 33). When the Bosnian government finally established the ABiH, Muslim men who had been members of the TO before its disarmament and remained loyal to Bosnia were hired once again, and the numerous Muslim refugees from other regions of Bosnia helped supplement some remaining, rather large gaps in manpower (Shrader 2003: 34). Although this new TO force paralleled the previous TOs operational districts and major procedures, Bosnia experienced a professional setback because the JNA had crippled the previous functioning force and labor (Shrader 2003: 33). This led to the confusion over command and control that plagued all subsequent Bosnian military endeavors. Bosnias need to recruit a predominantly volunteer force presented significant problems for its military capacity as well; the overly zealous and passionate volunteers were untrained and often left unaccountable to the policies of the top (Shrader 2003: 42). Volunteer citizen soldiers often arbitrarily decided if, when, or where to serve regardless of specific orders (Shrader 2003: 42). The hastiness of Bosnias recruitment and force recreation from scratch during the fog of warand the resulting lack of accountability

Some of whom were Bosnian Croat as well as Bosnian Muslim (Shrader 2003: 33). 62

11

accounts for the majority of war crimes committed by Bosnian actors having occurred on an individual level. (5) SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF STATE POLICY As expected, Bosnias structural disorganization and minimal professionalism led to an ineffective military, illustrated by the lack of monopoly over the use of violence within its declared borders and its general failure to defend itself from outside aggression and territory acquisition. Serbian invasions and Croatian advances on Bosnian soil began in early April 1992 with campaigns of destruction by both sides to consolidate strategic holds and acquire ethnically cleansed lands (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005: 647).12 Combined with the command and control problems that emerged from ineffective chains of command and unaccountable militias, these territorial gains and encroachments were marred by widespread and extreme violence and insecurity. In 1992, Bosnia became the main theater of what became a Yugoslav civil war; huge chunks of Bosnias territory were claimed by both Serbian and Croatian sides, and, given Bosnias location (almost completely landlocked between the two opposing states), these aggressors had relatively easy access to unmanned and undefended towns. This overwhelming belligerence from its two neighbors (at least until a tentative alliance between Croatian and Bosnian forces against Serbia was forged in 1994) emphasized the dire need for an effective Bosnian defense capability. Instead, civil-military mismanagement and decentralization prevented even designated military police from securing law and order within its territory In fact, the extent of Serbian occupation reached as high as 70% of Bosnian territory (Maga! and "ani#, Map 5). 63
12

and often allowed these same law-enforcement officers to break the laws they were supposed to protect.13 The high level of ABiH decentralizationwhen in fact centralization would have boded better for the Bosnian leadershipand the mounting, uncontrollable power of paramilitaries posed a problem for top-down control and accountability, which in part explains the significant proportion of individual over policy war crimes committed by Bosnian actors. Carrying out policy war crimes is more difficult when a state has such little control over its territory; moreover, constantly battling for basic landholding does not allow for time and energy to be devoted to, say, building and securing concentration camps, or other war crimes that require a similar level of forethought and planning.

B. CROATIA

From 1991 to 1995, Croatia had a military in the middle of the spectrum between Bosnia and Serbia in terms of how close it came to the necessary central command and its expected real control. In addition, civilian leaders had a stronger pull on military strategy than in Bosniaespecially given the nationalism that grew in reaction to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the search for a new, independent identity in opposition to Greater Serbian threats. In contrast to Bosniawhose military capacity had been severely hampered by a lack of a place to startCroatian military logistics and manpower were partly inherited from JNA structures, specifically the TO organization, which had a more significant

During the lawlessness of war, criminal activity was pervasive among not only the Bosnian civilian population, but also soldiers and officers in ABiH units (Shrader 2003: 49). 64

13

composition of Croats than the broader JNA. All of these factors working in concert explain Croatias middle-ground status in terms of war-crime variation. Its military functioning was semi-efficient and semi-effective to the extent that it was able to carry out some top-down policies (29.5% policy war crimes and 20 more, in absolute terms, than Bosnia), but it was simultaneously plagued by a lack of control of its actors relative to Serbias, which led to a significant number of war crimes that were not directly imposed from above (23.1% of hybrid war crimes and 47.4% of individual war crimes, for a total of 70.5% of crimes that had no clear command responsibility). (1) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE ON MILITARY FORCES The leadership of President Franjo Tudjman was a primary feature of Croatian military strategy during the time in question. His influence, tracing back to his founding and leadership of the vehemently anti-communist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), permeated both the Croatian military (HV) in Croatia and the Croatian Defence Council forces (HVO) in Bosnia. Like Izetbegovi#, however, at first Tudjman had a difficult time accepting that defense was even necessary (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 39). In fact, despite the mounting Serbian offense during mid-1991, Tudjman still resisted further arming the HV, a decision many in the upper (and lower, or individual-soldier-level) ranks of the HV felt was dangerous. These disagreeing military officials thus looked the other way as advancing Assembly of the National Guard (ZNG) soldiers confiscated and kept weapons and

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other equipment from enemy depots (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 37).14 In many ways, in the early years, Croatia was plagued by a similar level of civil-military distrust as Bosnia. Despite the fact that Tudjman had held a host of military-related posts in his political career, many trained and professional military officers felt his expertise was inadequateespecially given that his posts were bureaucratic and did not grant him tactical experience (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 223). Still, the HDZ as a party, with the charismatic Tudjman at the helm, played a very influential role in military strategy and especially in filling military ranks. In trying to distance themselves from the former Yugoslavia and its supportersin order to maintain their mandate for an independent CroatiaTudjman and other influential HDZ officials purged all JNA loyalists from the police and new HV (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). The politicization of the army was so obvious that loyal HDZ supporters with little to no military experience replaced competent and trained Serbian or other officials deemed disloyal in high positions (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 211). The HDZs influence on the army helped civilian leaders secure their own chain of command that often overstepped the constitutionally outlined intra-military positions to execute orders directly from the President (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 35). Although the President did hold a constitutional role as commander-in-chief, Tudjman had an unprecedented direct line to order military operations to follow whatever (ethno-nationalist) strategies he had in mind (Ramet et al. 2008: 190). His strong leadership was sometimes

14

Only later did the civilian leadership (and its cronies within the HV) officially adopt the strategy of seizing weapons from JNA depots (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 39). 66

challenged, however, as by the Minister of Defense, General Martin %pegelj, who favored instead the traditional military command pyramid and building up the HVs armaments (Ramet et al. 2008: 198). The fact that %pegelj was made to pay for his disagreement and disobedience with a demotion to inspector-in-chief of the HV illustrated exactly how much influence Tudjman truly had over military structure and functioning (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 35). Tudjmans overwhelming personal and party influence over the military were coupled with strong nationalist aspirations. When the war turned from reclaiming Croatian soil to Bosnian land-grabbing in 1992, Tudjman favored expanding Croatias reach territorially by forcibly clearing land for Croats (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 13). Tudjmans coveting of territory played a large role in HV support of HVO territory gainand all the devastation that accompanied it (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 13). The HDZs nationalist wish to create a Croatian state (what was to be called the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna) independent of the allegedly aggressive and communist Serbian minority was carried out more systematically once law and order had been reestablished within Croatia after the January 1992 ceasefire (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 202). These state goals of a ceasefire and a Greater Croatia originated with the civilian party leadership. Therefore, once Tudjman and his government gained the confidence and ability to direct military policy, that policy was directed toward an anti-Serb political agenda. This, of course, led to a spike in the number of policy war crimes committed by Croatian Army actors after 1992not even including the actions of deceased and thus untried civilian leaders like Tudjman (see Table 2.6 on p. 76).

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(2) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURE Having planned its secession from Yugoslavia for some time, Croatia began preparing its military defense forces once its constitution was reformed in 1990. It had emulated Slovenia in creating its own extralegal (to the federal Yugoslavia) national-guard forces, which sparked the JNA to retaliate by secretly moving Croatias TO15 arms to JNA depotsmuch as it later dismantled Bosnias internal defense structure (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). Croatia created the ZNG as a military spoke of the police structure, which thus had the dual purpose of policeinternal defense against rebellion or insurrectionand military responses to external threats to Croatias law and order (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). In addition, it essentially mirrored the original TO in structure and personnelonly it was independent of the federal JNA structure and newly responsive to the Croatian leadership (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). In the early days of 1990, the ZNGs status was ambiguous, however, since it reported to both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, lending it a twopronged command structure (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). During the first year of the conflict in Croatia, the rather bizarre and haphazardly organized ZNG was Croatias primary defense force, and through its gradual rollback of Serbian forces, it collected weapons and equipment from enemy (JNA) garrisons without the approval of the upper echelons of the civilian chain of command (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 37). It was not until the HV was officially created in

As has been established previously, the TO forces were arms of the federal JNA in each republic for its particular defense and/or national policing (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 15). 68

15

1991, and the ZNG later integrated into it, that the ZNGs primary purpose as a military was finally clarified and command was solidified under the Ministry of Defense (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 204). A similar evolving story took place in regard to the predominance of paramilitary power in the country during the conflict on Croatian soil. As Vankovska and Wiberg explain, local politicians, especially members of the dominant HDZ, had a wealth of power, which they used to sponsor localized forces made up of volunteers or other willing and armed actors: the local Croat HDZ leaders built a similar politico-military symbiosis where small party chiefs, mostly local boys with often dubious records, got almost uncontrolled authority and created small armed groups on a local level. A year before the war started, there had been several party militiasin addition to the paramilitaries of HDZ, the HSP (Hrvatska Stranka PravaCroatian Rightist Party), [sic] had their so-called HOS (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage, Croatian Armed Forces). During the first and most chaotic phase of the war, all private security actors exercised military authority, often behaving like warlords promoting personal interests and profits. With little coordination from the central state bodies, the local bosses were the only protectors of law and order. (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 206) The power of paramilitaries, untrained volunteers, and citizen groups continued until the HVs command structure was officially finalized in September 1991, when the administrative General Staff was formed (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 47). At this point, the HV declared that the paramilitaries would be unified and incorporated into the official army structurealthough how quickly these independent groups adopted this new chain of command is unclear (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 207). At the very least, this meant that the HV leadership acknowledged the advantage of joining forces with the paramilitaries to consolidate Croatian policy goals and allow the local organized forces to follow through with their mission-specific tactics. Still,

69

Croatian formal command was splintered and ineffective in the first phase of the war from 1990 to 1991, after which point it evolved the centralized command necessary for effective functioning. (3) REAL CONTROL i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Control Along with Bosnia, Croatia was the other country whose territory was the main theater of the Balkan Wars. Throughout the initial conflict with Serbia, the Croatian states main goal was defense: both from internal rebels as well as external aggressors. After 1992, once a ceasefire halted Serbian advances temporarily, Croatian goals took a turn toward outward expansion; at a press conference on December 30, 1991, Tudjman stated his interests in a three-way partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to make way for the long-term interests of all three peoples (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 358). This statement and the accompanying HV military objectivesdefense and ethnic state-buildingcoincided with the default us-versus-them ethnic mentality of most Croatian citizens, and later citizen soldiers (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 209, 213). Because the incentives of the principals and of the agents were thus aligned, Feavers expected real-control model for Croatia would be decentralized control with some centralized information asymmetry correctives and incentive maintenance. ii. De Facto Control and Corrective Mechanisms Many of the decisions made from the Croatian side during the two wars, including most notably the 1991 mobilizing and arming of the HV with captured weapons and the cessation of planned action in Eastern Slavonia, were made from

70

relatively low levels of the chain of command (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 37). Although some actions, including the aborted mission in Slavonia, were in line with political motives, some, like the 1991 illegal arming, were carried out without the approval of the state leadership, on the personal initiative of officers and soldiers on the ground (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 37). Tudjman, however, imprisoned most of the individual orchestrators of the JNA arms heist for disobeying his orders, despite the fact that their actions were key element[s] of the war, showing that the Croatian leadership maintained a level of centralized control at the beginning of the conflict that was a poor fit for the conditions (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 37). Still, the 1991 seizure of weapons was generally in line withand indeed helped guaranteea policy put forth by the Croatian leadership (i.e., defense capability), showing that the incentive alignment was there. Even the decisions made that were expressly in line with political motivations, however, were often decided on a tactical level by officers who technically did not have the formal authority to do so and indeed were often decided without the knowledge of those officers who did. This was the case behind the 1992 HV withdrawal from the Sana river basin in the northwest of Bosnia: just before the general staff of the HV chief of staff, Anton Tus, and the inspector-in-chief of the army, %pegelj, had planned an offensive toward Doboj, three other generalslower on the command hierarchy than these twohad directly ordered the withdrawal (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 38). These examples,

71

coupled with the Croatian partnership with the HVO in Bosnian territory, illustrate a general decentralized control. In order to maintain the general circumstance of incentive alignment, civilian and military Croatian leaders used whatever means they had at their legal disposaland even beyond. Early on, for example, Tudjman purged those policemen or HV military men who possessed an inclination toward reconciliation with (what remained of) Yugoslavia (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). Despite decentralized decision-making in a centralized formal command, the Croatian leadership did take pains to maintain incentive alignment and correct for the high information asymmetry, as was apparent by %pegeljs demotion (p. 67). Decentralized control but clear command hierarchy allowed Croatian leaders to formally hold their soldiers accountable for their actions, yet, due to the majority of their volunteer forces having incentives similar to those of the leadership, could allow for individual action that furthered each policy even more successfully. Still, civilian and military leadership had incentives to ensure some measure of centralized control in order to maintain the incentive alignment and account for the asymmetry of information on the ground versus in the Defense offices. The Croatian leadership did maintain and correct these variables with monitors reporting directly to the President and disincentives (e.g., purges, imprisonment, demotions) to hinder Croatian policy follow-through or to rebel outrightyet these correctives were misplaced in the early years of the conflict when Croatia lacked a formal structure and was thus less militarily successful than in the later years. This hybrid approach to control, with the formal structure

72

evolution alongside it, in large part explains the variation in war-crime types committed by Croatian actors. Indeed, the proportion of policy war crimes versus individual war crimes shifted dramatically as 1991 ended and 1992 began (p. 76), when the majority of these command and control changes were taking place. (4) MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM Croatia was luckier in retaining trained and specialized officers upon its independence than Bosnia was, although it shared its neighbors fate in having its TO forces disarmed early on. A striking 84% of Croatian TO policemen and 88% of TO officers were Croatian (Ramet et al. 2008: 196). The chief of staff of the HV General Staff himself stated that, without the officers who came from the JNA and their professionalism, [Croatia] would have had many more casualties, losses, and defeats (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 49). Despite this important inheritance from previous Yugoslav military institutions, Croatian leaders found themselves increasingly suspicious of any connection to the JNA,16 which is what led them to reject simply adopting the SFRYs TO structure (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 203). Once Croatia had begun to form its own military, its leaders made the decision to combine both territorial defense and offense in a policemilitary hybrid, the ZNGin effect turning away from the legacy of the Yugoslavia they were trying to leave behind. In this way, the capital that Croatia could claim to have gained from its association to the JNA forces was mostly human capital; the JNA had rid Croatian territorial forces of most of their arms

This was due in large part to Serbian intelligence agents, who, when found out, were mostly JNA officers who tried to pass as Croatian loyalists (Ramet et al. 2008: 195). 73

16

and logistical equipment, and Croatia had refused to adopt any strict organization from the JNA. Still, having a significant portion of its forces (nearly 20,000 at the end of 1991) militarily educated and professional contributed to the eventual formation of an effective force (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 4950). This meant that, after a quick (relative to Bosnia, for example) consolidation of its force structure, Croatia was able to focus on policy-level strategies, which, given the immense influence of nationalist civilian leaders, ended up being geared toward war crimes just as much as it was toward territorial gains. Again, Croatias mixed record with all its variablesits strong nationalist civilian influence on the military that experienced some minor resistance, a somewhat disorganized force at the beginning that crystallized after 1992, and the inheritance of capable military manpower but a resistance to JNA leftoversis reflected in its middle-ground war-crime ratios (29.5% policy, 47.4% individual, and 23.1% hybrid). (5) SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF STATE POLICY Croatia suffered major territorial losses during the beginning of the war, overlapping chronologically with its faulty approach to command and control. With the militarys disorganization in the first crucial months of the confrontation with Serbian forces, however, Croatia saw as much as one-third of its territory taken over by oppressive outside forces (Maga! and "ani# 2001: Map 5). In August 1990, clashes began between the Croatian forces and the Serbian paramilitary formations, which had been spawned from the alienation felt by the Serb minority as a result of Croatias ethno-nationalist constitutional changes

74

(Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 202). Early on, with the operational support of JNA forces and political and social support from Serbian leaders, these Serbian paramilitaries were able to secure large portions of Croatian territory and establish Serb Autonomous Regions (SAO) in Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja, and western Syrmiawhich were soon collectively declared the Republic of Serbian Krajina (SAO Krajina) (Ramet et al. 2008: 91). Croatia had thus experienced significant territorial losses, which had in large part been a result of the inability of the incorrectly structured and controlled armed forces to handle armed insurrections. By late 1991, howeveronce it incorporated the paramilitaries and delegated real control to its lower echelonsthe HV had incorporated enough decentralized control in an environment of high information asymmetry and aligned incentives to succeed in rolling back Serbian advances and retaking parts of Serbian-held territory (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 35). The resulting ceasefire between the Croatian and Serbian sides allowed for both Croatian and Serbian military resources to focus on the Bosnian question, and the order that resulted from the ceasefire afforded the HV the time, energy, and space to form and execute plans for policy war crimes. Therefore, initially, Croatia suffered from meager command and poorly designated control over its national forces, partly as a result of its inheritance (or lack thereof) from the JNA and partly from adapting to independent Croatian paramilitary formations within its borders. As the war with Serbia escalated, however, Croatian civilian and military leaders were able to streamline C3 by incorporating and delegating power to the splintered paramilitaries and reforming

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their police/military approach enough to ensure a return to (some) law and order and strategic consensus among the higher and lower echelons. Such misplaced command and controland accompanying ineffectivenessuntil late 1991 enlighten the heavy emphasis on individual war crimes over policy war crimes committed by Croatian actors within the territory before the end of 1991:
1991 21.4% 67.9% 10.7% 100%

Policy Individual Both TOTAL

6 19 3 28

Table 2.5: War-crime variation of HV actors before the end of December 1991 This is in striking opposition to the heavy skew toward policy war crimes after December 1991, when the Croatian forces were properly organized for the situation at hand and better equipped to achieve their military goals for the circumstance in which they found themselves:
Post-1991 57.9% 26.3% 15.8% 100%

Policy Individual Both TOTAL

11 5 3 19

Table 2.6: War-crime variation of HV actors after end of December 1991

C. SERBIA

Relative to both Bosnia and Croatia during the Balkan Wars, Serbia had formally centralized but behaviorally decentralized armed forces that were loyal to and effectively controlled by civilian leadership and whose manpower, organization, and other logistics (e.g., procedures and doctrines) had been inherited almost

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intact from the JNA. Together, these factors in the Serbian civil-military nexus led to a high degree of effectiveness in implementing top-down policiesbut there was nothing positive about these successes. The resultant ruthless efficiency of the Serbian military accounts for the fact that a plurality of Serbian war crimes were policy war crimes (40%), while 28.1% were hybrid war crimes. Both proportions are far greater than the corresponding figures in the less competent Bosnia and Croatia. (1) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE ON MILITARY FORCES Slobodan Milo!evi#, the President of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia, was as influential a figure to Serbia as Tudjman was to Croatiayet the former and his administration were able to consolidate power in a more intense manner than was the latter. This was due in large part to Milo!evi#s strategic pandering to different demographics within Serbia: he stressed Yugoslav unity for former JNA members, a Greater Serbia for nationalists, and other reforms for intellectuals and workers (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 244). The two most relevant goalsthe preservation of Yugoslavia and the creation of a Greater Serbiacould be reconciled in the eyes of the JNA. Convinced by the civilian leadership that Serbias interest in Krajina and portions of Bosnia were steps to reforming Yugoslavia, these forces mobilized and fought for a reintegration of as much territory as possible into what after April 1992 was called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), composed primarily of Serbia and Montenegro, the former of which was the most influential of the two (the FRY is what this thesis will be referring to with Serbia). That said, civil-military disagreements

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did arise, but they usually stemmed from the JNAs insecurity about its future and were usually handled with ease and competence by civilian leadership. Such was the case near the end of the war in Croatia, when JNA officers urged Serbian civilian leaders to stop the war or else witness the dissolution or restructuring of the JNA by adamantly antiCroatian War political opposition. Milo!evi# responded to these demands by agreeing to a ceasefire in 1992 but at the same time discrediting the JNA leadership and subsequently purging those JNA leaders whom he considered unable to make the transition towards the new Yugoslav reality (Maga! and "ani# 2001: 206; Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 249). Basically, although as Serbian President he did not have the constitutional authority to be commander-in-chief of the JNA (that role was supposed to be filled by the FRY President), Milo!evi# had a very strong hold on military strategy, organization, and hierarchy and manipulated any or all of these to his will. This close and powerful influence in military affairs, combined with the JNAs centralized chain of command, allowed for Milo!evi#s policiesnamely those the ICTY and other courts today consider policy war crimesto have a receptive and willing audience of implementers. (2) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURE Serbia began by the fueling insurrections by Serbian minorities within Bosnia and Croatia, both rhetorically and logistically: Milo!evi# fueled Serbian nationalism and supported declarations of autonomy while JNA officers armed, financed, and tactically supported rebel movements in both territories (Mulaj 2008: 50; Maga! and "ani# 2001: 25). By establishing links to these independent paramilitary

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movements early on, the Serbian state was able to reproduce its already-effective hold on the JNA in a consolidated Serbian armed effort in each of the two territoriesand in fact pursue establishing a JNA presence in both Croatia and Bosnia (Dahlman and Tuathail 2005: 660; Hoare 2004: 32). Indeed, this consolidation of power was officially established in May 1992, when the JNA officially split into three territorially based forces: the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska (Army of RBS), the Yugoslav Army (JNA), and the Army of the Serb Republic of Krajina (Army of SAO Krajina) (Mulaj 2008: 91; Hoare 2004: 33). This meant that, for example, Serbian forces within Bosnia and Croatia had the advantage over the splintered Bosnian groups and the disorganized HV army in arms, logistics, command, control, and communications (Mulaj 2008: 92). This easily translatable chain of command allowed for quick and easy policy implementation in both territories, and the early JNA support of disorganized paramilitary activityin terms of securing the borders of the occupied territories gave Serbian actors fairly secured areas in which to implement these policies. All in all, however, Serbia had a clear and centralized chain of command that made the army well equipped to commit whatever policies (or atrocities) its leadership desiredwhich led Serbia to show the highest percentage of policy war crimes among the three states. (3) REAL CONTROL i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Control Upon the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia was thrown into political uncertainty. The republics within the federation began to promote their special,

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ethnic interests in the use of the finally activated 1974 constitution. This constitution led to more autonomy among the republics, which, for Serbia, was unacceptable (Mulaj 2008: 4849). This was in part due to the loss of Kosovo and Vojvodina as well as the presence of Serbian minorities in the other republics (Mulaj 2008: 49). It was in this context that Milo!evi# rose to power, advocating for the preservation of Yugoslavia with a Serbian majority or, if that could not be achieved, a Greater Serbia without the other ethnic minorities (Mulaj 2008: 49). Milo!evi# and his supporters in both the civilian and military sectors believed in Serbias historical rights to specific territories within Bosnia and Croatiaand advocated politics of force to regain these territories for the Serbian people (Mulaj 2008: 8588). The majority of JNA soldiers and officers had been part of the JNA prior to the dissolution of the state, which indicated some sympathy to the Serbian idea of maintaining a Yugoslavia that had paid them for their careers to date (Mulaj 2008: 50). When the chances of a united Yugoslavia began to look truly dim, these JNA soldiers had already been fighting on the side of Serbia for years and consequently saw themselves as aligned with Serbian interests (Mulaj 2008: 50). Many of the soldiersboth official JNA and unofficial paramilitarieshad volunteered their services, which implied agreement with the mission at hand due to self-selection. When Serbian civilian and military leaders shifted their tactical strategy to that of the demonstrative capacity of violence, they counted on the ethnic bias that generally pervaded their Serbian ranks (Mulaj 2008: 95).

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The fact that the JNA often forcibly enlisted refugees, however, meant that some of the soldiers on the ground might not have been as eagerly in support of the Serbian agenda (HRW World Report 1996: 250). Still, Serbian leaders used methods of harsh persuasion to keep the incentives of the armed footmen and the leadership in line (p. 82). ii. De Facto Control and Corrective Mechanisms Serbian forces within each territoryRBS forces, SAO Krajina forces, and affiliated paramilitarieswere satellites that, although they followed the Serbian chain of command, were not directly in Serbian territory and were instead in the thick of the ethnic conflict. In other words, although they were given policies of ethnic cleansing to carry out, The actual mechanics of ethnic cleansing included the random and mass executions of civilians, torture, rape, detainment in concentration camps, usurpation and destruction of private property, destruction of religious and cultural monuments, systematic discrimination, and massive forced deportation to territories controlled by non-Serb ethnic groups (International Crisis Group 2000: 35) as well as other rather disorderly and not necessarily ordered actions. Leaders in Serbia proper, then, gave Bosnian Serb or Croatian Serb satellite forces the freedom to conduct tactics that were in line with their main policy goal: creating a Greater Serbia. Although Belgrade and its JNA were not officially to be involved in the war within Bosnian territory according to the UNSC Resolution 752 of 1992, Bosnian Serb forces still maintained direct [daily] communication with the JNA general staff in Serbia (Mulaj 2008: 9192). In this way, formal command was still present, but decentralized controlin an environment of aligned incentives and high

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information asymmetrywas possible. And even when Serbia officially cut off relations with the Republika Srpska in 1994, there was still mounting evidence that officials in Serbia proper were still providing necessary logistical materials and manpower to the Bosnian Serbs (HRW World Report 1996: 252). It is as if the successes of 19921994 showed Serbian leaders the value in decentralized control of the Bosnian Serb war machine, and in 1994 they decided to test it out completely. Indeed, decentralized control was perhaps best exemplified by the release of thousands of Serbian criminals from Serbian prisons to be unleashed on Bosnia as part of Serbian paramilitary units (Mulaj 2008: 92). At the same time, Serbian leaders in Belgrade did still attempt to correct for unfavorable information asymmetry and to prevent incentives from becoming misaligned. They achieved this through monitoring and myriad incentives and disincentives. Serbian forces regularly involved local Crisis Staffs in administrative or logistical endeavors like coordinating prisoner-of-war camps, which allowed for smooth command and communication access akin to monitoring by the higher echelons to happenings on the ground (International Crisis Group 2000: 35). In terms of incentives, several Serbian military officers achieved swift promotions due to their accomplishments during the wars of the 1990s (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 250). But Milo!evi# was also notorious for his purges, three of which he accomplished within two years: at the end of 1991, in early 1992, and at the end of 1992 (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 249). In 1993, Milo!evi# fired Dobrica &osi#, who was President of the FRY, due to insufficient loyalty to Milo!evi#s cause (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 249).

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These actions were Serbias effort to correct for possible unfavorable conditions to ideally achieve lower information asymmetry through monitors (of sorts) and maintain aligned incentives through institutional incentives or disincentives. Despite this and the formal centralized command, the Serbian leadership still saw the value in a decentralized approach to control in a wartime situation in which the information nexus may never be symmetrical. It would thus be expected that this would lead to individual war crimes committed alongside policy crimesbecause policies were still, in the case of Serbia, effectively communicated and carried out through the formal structures and behavioral correctives in place, but lower echelons were given de facto control over tactical decision-making (e.g., details of how to run a death camp). Indeed, this expectation is reflected by the reality: a significant proportion (28.1%) of policy crimes were accompanied with individual crimes, and even more (31.9%) individual crimes were committed without a policy link. (4) MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM Compared to Bosnia and Croatia, Serbias military inheritance was very straightforward: due to several factors, the JNA decided to align itself with the Serbian government. Once Slovenia and Croatia decided to secede from Yugoslavia in 1991, the dissolution of the federation became a very real possibility for JNA officers who would no longer have a commanding state. The JNA had always been predominantly made up of Serbs (57% officer corps and even higher in higher command positions in 1983), but in the early 1990s this ethnic imbalance was exacerbated by large-scale desertion of Croats and Slovenes from the ranks in order

83

to join their own republics newly created forces (Mulaj 2008: 50; Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 241). During the beginning of the war with Croatia, partly because of this dominance of Serbs and partly because of Milo!evi#s insistence on the preservation of a rump Yugoslavia, the JNA joined forces with Serbia to defend a federal Yugoslavia by force (Had'i# 2002: 108). Because the JNA had no other option but to support the one republic that still held onto some wish to preserve the status quo, the JNA was forced to succumb to political command, most obviously in the form of the Serbian President (Had'i# 2002: 108). This meant that Serbia received a ready-for-action force with an already-institutionalized chain of command, the most equipment and arms (in addition to those that had been confiscated from Bosnian, Croatian, or Slovenian TOs), and professional and experienced manpower all geared toward pursuing Serbias objectives (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003: 245). Even when Serbian forces were split along the front lines in May 1992 (one branch for SAO Krajina forces in Croatia and another for the RBS in Bosnia), each force structure was still made up of the original institutions of the JNA that were redirected to the specific area for more efficient and streamlined use supporting the paramilitaries already on the ground. JNA officers, then, did not experience nearly as significant a disruption to their chain of command or professionalism as officers in Bosnia or Croatia, who had to adapt to almost entirely new hierarchies and modes of operation in the fog of war. (5) SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF STATE POLICY During the years considered, the main theaters of war and destruction were not located in Serbia proper; instead, the Serbian state had gotten a massive head start

84

in ensuring that the theaters of war were in the territories it coveted, Bosnia and Croatia. Having gained the support of Yugoslavias JNA early on, the Serbian state was able to use JNA forces to cripple the republic-specific TO forces to further inhibit the organization of Croatian or Bosnian resistance to Greater Serbian expansion. In addition, because Serbia was the primary aggressor from 1991 to 1995, much of the time military campaigns from Croatian or Bosnian forces simply regained their own territories and seldom invaded Serbian soil. These early strategic decisions meant that Serbia experienced relative order within its own borders, enabling its leadership to devote all of its forces and resources outward to its goal of a Greater Serbia in Krajina and RBS. Both these goals were temporarily recognized throughout the course of the war, when Serbian forces occupied and ran large portions of Bosnian and Croatian territory (SAO Krajina from 1991 to 1995 and the RBS from 1992 to the end of the war). In fact, Serbia controlled about two-thirds of Bosnian territory by 1992, and, until the summer of 1995, little territory changed hands (Mulaj 2008: 92). Therefore, Serbias fairly smooth takeover of Yugoslavias alreadyfunctioning military enabled it to think beyond the basics of creating a new force from scratch to larger-scale strategy. This, combined with the effectiveness of the JNAs and subsequent Serbian forces command structures and the ambitions of Serbias powerful civilian leaders, explains the striking concentration of war crimes committed by Serbian actors on a policy level (40%). The success of military and civilian leaders in pursuing top-down strategies of ethnic cleansing also sheds light on the individual/policy hybrid war crimes; with such disorderly

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(i.e., inhumane) commands coming from the institutions that are meant to keep order, it is no wonder such a large percentage of Serbian actors (28.1%) took this as a carte blanche and engaged in hybrid crimes.

IV. CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on institutional civil-military and intra-military interactions and used them to inform if, why, or how war crimes were committed by the armed forces involved. Through discussions on each countrys civilian and military leadership nexus, command, control, and military inheritance from the previous Yugoslav regime, it has concluded that policy war crimes result from states that have significant overlap between civilian and military structures, centralized formal chains of command, expected centralization level of control, and some (organizational or human) capital inherited from an already extant regime. Those states with low civil-military overlap, decentralized command, unexpected control, and low military inheritance have a higher prominence of individual war crimes over policy. Individual war crimes were pervasive among all civil-military circumstances, but actors in the situation of high civilian control, centralized command, optimal control for conditions, and high inheritance from the JNA committed more hybrid war crimes than actors in other circumstances. Although a definitive answer to this question is outside the scope of this chapter, it is a reasonable inference that these individual/policy hybrids were linked to a social breakdown that accompanies a states insistence on certain widespread, unnatural actions. When the civilian and military leaders of a state obligate

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subordinates to partake in large-scale ethnic cleansing and the war crimes that accompany it, as was most notably the case of Serbia in this study, some of these same subordinates seem likely to engage in war crimes without direct orders as well. This is perhaps because of the desperation of a fraying social order, or perhaps because they share the opinion that any such individual action would further their superiors (and their nations) goals. Results from the wartime analysis as summarized above are outlined in Table 2.8 below:
Country Bosnia Variables
Civilian influence on the military Formal command structures Real control Military professionalism Civilian influence on the military Low Decentralized Poor Low High 1991: decentralized; post1991: centralized 1991: poor; post1991: effective Medium High Centralized Decentralized (good) High

Results

Croatia

Formal command structures Real control Military professionalism Civilian influence on the military Formal command structures Real control Military professionalism

Serbia

Table 2.8: Summary of results by country and variable These findings indicate the primary puzzle of this thesis: that traditionally capable institutions are necessary but insufficient to prevent atrocities. The accompanying hypothesis, which will be tested in the chapter to follow, is that a consolidated hold on territory, civilian power over the military, and an effective and uninterrupted chain of command must be accompanied by accountability structures within both the military and civilian chains in order to prevent use of these institutions for human-rights violations. This leaves room to analyze the 87

effectiveness of state-to-state military-building or state-building efforts in situations rife with ethnic conflict. The Balkan case presents a unique opportunity for this type of study because of the 1999 resurgence of violence after significant international aid, military mentoring, and state-building efforts had been invested in the region. Thus, a strong showing in each of the criteria discussed in this paper can be either a blessing or a cursethe power falls on the state leaders to wield how they choose. The following chapter will try to enlighten how exactly states can be best equipped to choose wisely.

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CHAPTER 3:
POST-WARTIME CRIME VARIATION IN THE BALKANS (19951998)

The previous chapter ended with a puzzle. It showed that, in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, the variables that according to traditional literature should lead to a fully functional security sector indeed didbut the functions that it was enabled to carry out were policy and accompanying individual war crimes. Something beyond civilian control of the military, centralized formal command, conditionspecific real control, and technical professionalism is needed to ensure both effectiveness and accountability in cases of this nature. I will argue that this something is the influence of the global community, which adds a layer of accountability (i.e., international standards) to the already existing effectiveness variables. These three Balkan cases provide not only a wartime period isolated from international influence during which numerous crimes were committed (see Chapter 2), but also an immediate postwar context that was exposed much more heavily to the international community and can thus test my argument that the institutional variables infused with international standards led to fewer crimes. Thus, this chapter will seek to (i) identify international or national efforts to modify postwar military and police institutions in any way from their wartime counterpartsto prevent human-rights violations or otherwiseand (ii) evaluate the effect of these changes on human-rights violations by measuring the violations and using my framework of institutional interactions and accompanying variables.

I. METHODOLOGY
A. TERMINOLOGY
Human-rights violations by the security sector in the postwar context will take a similar approach to wartime categories: i.e., they will be divided into policy,

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individual, or hybrid crimes. A policy crime will signify an illegal or humanrights-abusing action either that is so massive that it requires top-down organization or whose outcome can lead to political change (e.g., assaults on high-profile political opposition). An individual crime, on the other hand, signifies a smaller-scale human-rights violation that did not result from a clear order hierarchy or did not directly affect the political landscape of the country. A hybrid crime, much like its wartime counterpart, is one that has elements of both a policy and an individual crime. However, because the distinction between policy and individual are more mutually exclusive in the postwar context than in the wartime context, there will be very few cases of hybrid crimes (if at all) in this chapter.
B. VARIABLES

The argument of this chapter hinges on the relationship between the dependent variable, or the variation in postwar violence type (policy, individual, or hybrid) among the three states, and the relevant independent variables as outlined in Table 3.1. In order to account for the postwar conditions, my framework will be modified as follows:

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As has been discussed previously (p. 26), the factor of the domestic public keeping the civilian government accountable is not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but also cannot be measured due to the short time span this thesis covers. Even though the Dayton Agreement that officially ended the Balkan Wars designed new democratic institutions in Bosnia, this thesis only analyses the postwar situation up to February 1998, just three years after the end of the war and too short a time to measure the long-term efficacy of these requirements. In fact, Bosnia had only experienced one election on each level of democracy by the time the Kosovo War began and this thesis ends its analysis: one presidential election, one parliamentary election, and one municipal election. Therefore, interaction #3 will be omitted in my postwar calculations. Luckily, however, the other interactions are all relevant to the postwar environment in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia: (i) intra-military organization, (ii) civil-military relations, (iii) influence of the global community on the state, and

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(iv) military checks on the civilian government, with a caveat on the third. Within these broader interactions, in my analysis I will measure the following five variables: (i) civilian influence on security-sector structure and functioning, (ii) formal command structures, (iii) real control, (iv) military professionalism, and (v) military institutions for checking the civilian government. These variables will be measured using country-specific indicators outlined below and, when applicable, will be compared to their corresponding wartime versions to determine change:
Interaction Measurable Independent Variable(s)
Formal command

Indicators
Formal structure and hierarchy of security sector Information asymmetry; incentive alignment; correctives thereof; de facto use of reporting structure or power devolving within structure Technical expertise; humanrights training Extent to which civilians in high government positions form military strategy

Security-sector influence on itself

Real control

Military professionalism

Civiliangovernment influence on security sector Domestic-public influence on civilian government International community influence on state Security-sector checks on civilian government

Civilian influence on securitysector structure and functioning

N/A International-community influence on civilian government International-community influence on security sector Institutions for checking civilian incentives

N/A Presence of international norms in civil-military relations Presence of international norms in other variables Checks and oversight mechanisms to empower individual morality

Table 3.1: Postwar independent variables and corresponding indicators

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(1) INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON THE STATE The international influence on the state, be it the civilian government or the security sector, will not be measured as its own independent variable. The other variables together form the institutional composition and image of the security sectorinternational standards only influence the content of the variables. The international influence will thus be identified in discussions of all the other variables, with specific references to the international component of the change or effect. That said, seeing as this thesis is concerned with institutional change and mechanisms, the source of the change (whether from domestic or international forces) does not matter as much as the substance and effect of the change (i.e., whether it is in line with international standards). i. International Influence on Civilian Government This variable is largely beyond the scope of this thesis because most of the international influence toward the civilian government during the period in question was centered on incentivizing democracy in Bosnia and Croatia and disincentivizing anti-democratic tactics of the Serbian government through sanctions. In terms of sanctions to Serbia, these international actions, mostly undertaken by the European Union and the United States, were aimed at preventing Serbian membership in world financial institutions, presumably as punishment for the Serbian government until it followed in Bosnias and Croatias semi-democratizing footsteps (Paes 2009: 56). As mentioned previously, democratization cannot be fully measured due to the limited time of this postwar analysis (only three years). This thesis, however, is particularly

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interested in security-sector institutions, so it will focus on the effect of international influences on the civilian arm of the state only as they affected the security sector. This will include, however, the influence of international standards on the incentives of the civilian and military leaders. Therefore, in discussions of the civilian influence over a security sector or a security sectors model of real control, the influence of the international community on the civilian government will become relevant. ii. International Influence on Security Sector This will be the focus of the international influence component of my analysis. International influence on the security sector can take many forms, which are all neatly organized in the other variables: civil-military relations, formal structures, real control, professionalism, and military checks on civilians. In this specific context, the international influence was biased to impose international standards established by the Geneva Conventions and the likes of Walzer in the hopes of creating more accountability in the post-atrocity security sector. The effects of these standards on the content of these independent variables, then, will be analyzed in each case. (2) CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS The first independent variablewhich corresponds to the civil-military relations interaction in my frameworkis the civilian influence on security-sector structure and functioningto be measured by the extent to which civilian leaders influence or determine military or police organization and policy. Obviously, this squares with the same variable in the wartime environment;

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indeed, one of the reasons 19951998 was chosen as the postwar timeframe was the continuity of the civilian administrations in all three countries (see p. 101 103 for a full explanation of the time period choice). The fact that Izetbegovi!, Tudjman, and Milo"evi! stayed in power, however, does not automatically indicate that they utilized their power in the same ways that they did during the warand in fact, in many cases, the reality was just the opposite. Therefore, this variable shed some important light on how the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military leadership changed or stayed the same as a result of the end of the war. It will also inform many of the discussions of the other variablesas it did in the wartime contextseeing as civilians often had power over the form the security sector took, how the form was utilized, and how the manpower was trained. The relevant international standards for the civil-military piece include respect for international organizations, mostly of an economic or security nature; respect for democracy, universal human rights, and self-determination of peoples; and the ability for universal human rights to be advocated from above, but at the same time allowing some measure of separation between policy-making [and] its execution (UN Charter, Articles 55-60; Policing Police in Bosnia 2002: 34). (3) INTRA-MILITARY ORGANIZATION Under the intra-military interaction section of my framework, I will analyze three variables: (i) formal command, (ii) real control, and (iii) professionalismall of which will be compared to their wartime counterparts.

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i. Formal Command The fact remains even in peacetime: a security sector must have a clear and centralized formal command in order to be effective. In order to measure this variable, then, I will take the same approach as in my wartime analysis: I will identify the formal structure of each states security sector, including the types of force functions it incorporates (i.e., police versus military). The relevant international standards for this variable include separate police and military commands with separate mandates, less formal latitude at the local level, and more accountability to centre (Policing Police in Bosnia 2002: 12). ii. Real Control This variable will be measured using the same indicator dichotomy that Feaver established and was used in Chapter 2: the circumstances created by information asymmetry and incentive alignment. Because this chapter isolates its analysis to peacetime, the fog of war has lifted and thus we can assume that information asymmetry is lower. Therefore, the two conditions most relevant to this analysis are low information asymmetry with aligned incentives and low information asymmetry with misaligned incentivesas shown in Figure 3.2, p. 98. It will also be assumed that, in the immediate postwar period, the incentives of the lower rungs of any given security sector have not changed too drastically from the ethnic tensions of wartime. In order to measure the variable of real control, then, I will first measure the incentive alignment in a given country to sort it into the most applicable square for its conditions: either purely centralized control or centralized control with incentive misalignment correctives.

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Because both remaining options are centralized, I will thus measure whether actors lower in the hierarchy are given de facto decision-making power rather than those in the upper echelons (decentralization) or whether those actors in the upper echelons are calling most of the shots (centralization). A similar, yet significantly simplified, process for analyzing a states formal command and real control over its security sector in a postwar environment is illustrated in Figure 3.3, p. 99.

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Similar to the argument in Chapter 2, using this process, I will argue that those of the three states that had militaries with a centralized formal command structure and the expected real control for their incentive-alignment condition will have been more successful in their postwar policies involving the security sector. Without the formal command structure and the appropriate real control for their situation, states will have experienced more individual action on the part of their armed forces due to an institutional lack of accountability. The relevant international standards for this variable include a reduction of political-party influences and general effective control models (Policing Police in Bosnia" 2002: 22, 33).

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iii. Professionalism The security sectors technical and specialized expertise will be measured as part of this variable, much as they were during wartime. However, the postwar situation calls for an expansion of the definition of professionalism to include not only expertise in the use of force but also specialization and training on the moral use of force. This is in large part because of the international focus during wartime on the ethnic and genocidal nature of the conflict and the immediate need after the war to address the ethnic tensions by introducing basic human-rights standards to the individual members of the security sector. I will argue that, although the security sector specializes in military-specific knowledge, without moral or human-rights training the security sector is more likely to see individuallevel human-rights violence against civilians and other military men. Thus, I will measure not only the quantifiable facts of whether there were trained men in a given armed force but also the content of the training that each security sector undertook and claimed to have processedif anyduring the addressed time period. The international standards for this variable include respect for codified procedures, rule of law, and human dignity, community policing, and separation of military and police expertise (Policing Police in Bosnia 2002: 13, 33). (4) MILITARY OVERSIGHT OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT The last chapter proved that the institutional mechanisms that would best lead to effective use of the security sector did in fact lead to effectiveness in the cases of Serbia and Croatiabut in the form of large-scale policy war crimes. In addition,

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the one variable of civilian control over the military, which is traditionally seen as a check on the misuse of power by the military, in fact contributed to this policycrime effectiveness. Thus, these states require another check on leaderships misuse of military power for harm against civilians beyond the institutional variables of centralized command, real control, mere technical professionalism, and civil-military relations. Here is where I propose a controversial theory: military checks on civilians. In practice, these are ways of empowering the individual soldier to distinguish right from wrong outside of orders from his superior. These types of safeguards can include military-justice systems, clear and codified doctrines, and military laws and standardsall of which teach that soldier about the legal and moral uses of force. Most of these safeguards would be instituted through professionalism. Thus, this interaction will not be measured as its own variable, but rather by identifying these kinds of military-civil checks within the moral aspects of the variable of professionalism. (5) CONTROL VARIABLE To keep as much control as possible across all three cases when they were no longer officially at war, I will measure the violence (dependent variable) perpetrated by each states armed forces during the period between the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the official beginning of the Kosovo conflictor December 14, 1995, to February 28, 1998. During this time, the same civilian leaders of each state who had expressed such ethnic motivations during the war remained in power, which indicates a certain level of continuity in top-down policy ambitions (i.e., ethnic

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solutions). Bosnias Izetbegovi! was President of Bosnia until March 14, 1996, and then was the first Bosniak member of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Presidency from that day until October 2000; Croatias Tudjman continued in his role as President until December 1999; and Serbias Milo"evi! was in power until October 2000. This thesis assumes that, despite the obvious changes in historical circumstance, each of these leaders still had similar biases to those they had carried and shown throughout the warnamely, territorial ambitions for their respective ethnic groups. This, then, calls for another explanationbeyond, say, a policy change of priority due to different leadershipfor why the three states had such different records of postwar policy crimes as each other and as they themselves had during the war. Also during this time, each state in question could call itself at peace in its respective territory, in that no external (or perceived as external) armed forces were attacking the state. This cannot be said of the period after February 28, 1998, in Serbia, when the Kosovo Liberation Army began an offensive against Serbian government offices.1 This allows for a peacetime assessment of military actions that is still close enough temporally to the experience of the war so as to be comparable but that also comprises a different range of interests and slightly more stability than in the fog of war. During this time, all three states experienced a return to a semblance of peace that generally coincided with national recovery,
1

Many officials in Serbia perhaps assumed that they were at war in Kosovo long before the official beginning of the war in February 1998. The distinction between policy crimes and individual crimes is not dependent on external factors, however, so crimes committed by officials who believed they were at war previous to 1998 will be counted as peacetime crimesand sorted appropriately into individualversus policy-levelregardless. 102

restoration, and rejuvenation of territory, interests, population, etc. The specific interests of each state during this time differed, but the fact that the time period, context, and ethnic origins were similar across the board allows for some control in this analysis.

C. DATA COLLECTION

In collecting and measuring human-rights violations by security-sector actors in the postwar environment, both commonalities and distinctions had to be drawn between these postwar crimes and those committed in wartime if the analysis necessary for this thesis is to be carried out. In particular, although wartime data collection (through courts) allowed for organization by culprit, postwar data collection (through international-organization reporting) allows only for organization by crime. Because of this, wartime crimes and postwar crimes will not be directly compared, but rather variation in the type of postwar crime will be compared between the three countries in the same timeframe. Data on postwar individual versus policy crimes committed by each states security sector were collected from two international organizations, the United Nations (UN) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), which had aggregated and synthesized the data from international and national monitoring organizations that today either do not exist or exist only in pieces. In the absence of primary sources, monitoring organizations were the most impartial, respected, and accurate of the available alternative sources of information for the postwar period in any of the three countries.

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(1) REASONING BEHIND CHOSEN INTERNATIONAL-ORGANIZATIONBASED APPROACH Postwar data are extremely scarce compared with wartime data, which are conveniently codified in international and national court records. In the direct aftermath of the war, international justice-making initiatives were concentrated on wartime reparationson getting Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to arrest and prosecute war criminals in either international or national courts based on the severity and extent of the indicted war crimes. This meant that the focus was less on preventing these types of crimes from spilling over into peacetime and more on administering justice for crimes committed during the war. Because of this, many postwar crimes were not prosecuted to the extent and comprehensiveness of war crimesif at all. Relatedly, the majority of postwar crimes were committed by police, which, in addition to having the closest access to civilians after zones were demilitarized, as law enforcement officers also had incentives to ignore laws that might incriminate them or their peers.2 Due to this lack of reliability, court records are not used in this analysis to tally the types of crimes committed after the war by security-sector officials. The other alternative to using reports from monitoring organizations would be relying on journalistic accounts. Unfortunately, both international and national media had biases. In general, international (i.e., Western) media coverage
2

The introduction of a different security sector may at first seem problematic to a comparison between wartime and post-wartime crimes. However, throughout the war, police officers, or military men acting in a policing capacity, also committed many of the crimes analyzed in Chapter 2. Similarly, in postwar cases, especially in Serbia, the police institution was treated like a military one in terms of the monopoly over the use of force in a given territory. Throughout my analysis, I will explore what the institutional effects of the muddled police-military dynamic were on the outcomes in each case. 104

on these countries was more frequent during times of conflict, when there was everyday violence to observe and report on to an international community more curious for shocking news stories (e.g., mass slaughter) than reports on the mundane workings of a nation far away (Jakobsen 2000: 132). Coverage by international media outlets thus decreased significantly once the bulk of the mass violence stopped in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia (Jakobsen 2000: 137). This shows a penchant on the part of international journalists for stories of large magnitude, influenced by the perceived wants of their readership or viewership. This presents a problem for my research in that, although some international stories may be useful because they identify large-scale crimes by each states security sectors, they are less likely to have documented individual-level crimes. For example, international media outlets covering events within Serbia following the end of the war focused almost exclusively on the aggression toward Kosovar Albanians and neglected myriad cases of state aggression toward opposition within the Serbian nation itself (Papanikolatos 2000: 116). Both of these types of top-down aggression, however, are important for a study of this nature, in which statesponsored actions against all civilians must be measured. For these reasons, international news sources were not used to collect postwar violence data. Following the war, Bosnian media outlets were either politically affiliated or independent, the latter mostly funded by international sources and thus usually perpetually underfunded (Taylor and Napoli 2003: 474475). This limited funding, combined with the general distrust by the majority of the Bosnian population toward its representative media during this time, illustrates the

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difficulties with Bosnian national journalistic sources (Taylor and Napoli 2003: 474). Those independent sources, though possibly well meaning, most likely did not have the proper resources to constantly monitor state institutions. Meanwhile, the Croatian media were significantly more biased in favor of state actors: the vast majority of influential media were state-controlled or privatized under the direction of a party boss (Malovi! and Selnow 2001: 146). Similarly, national media in Serbia were even more explicitly controlled by the state through patriotic programming; if any independent outlets did spring up, they were almost certain to succumb to censorship and intimidation (Papanikolatos 2000: 115; Thompson 1999: 113). In general, state-controlled media outlets in both Croatia and Serbia had an interest in not broadcasting the human-rights violations committed by their forces. Because of the limitations of other sources, data was therefore collected from UN and HRW reports. (2) PROS AND CONS OF INTERNATIONAL-ORGANIZATIONBASED APPROACH Although organizations of this nature were more impartial and accurate for these purposes than alternative postwar information sources, organizational monitoring was not fully comprehensive or without its biases. David Chandler, in his account of post-Dayton Bosnia, claims that human-rights-specific organizations tend to generalize their findings (tip-of-the-iceberg theories); if they witness one state actor committing a human-rights violation, they are likely to claim a pattern of violations among that group of state actors (96). Still, they were the only actors on the ground whose primary mission was monitoring and reporting crimes of the ilk

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addressed in this chapterand to do so relatively unimpeded because of such international attention on the human-rights factor (Chandler 1999: 97). Due to the general lack of comprehensive data for the postwar period, relying on general patterns noted from the reports of international organizations is the best avenue to the kind of dependent variable this analysis requires. Whenever I rely on general patterns, generalized statements, or anecdotes as evidence, it will be stated and/or cited as such (e.g., the major events used in the analysis, p. 110). Collecting data from international organizations was also not a solution to the problem of comprehensiveness inherent in the postwar period. These organizations, by virtue of not being associated with a specific state, were often plagued by lack of resources and organizationfactors that would hamper any fact-finding mission. Indeed, many of the organizations present on the ground in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in 1995 no longer exist 17 years later3 or have limited funds and capability to make their records publicly or easily accessible.4 To account for this, I have used reports published by the two organizations that could afford and did have the capacity to maintain their records from that timeand that also took information from the primary sources of the same monitoring organizations that today do not have records. The UN and HRW do provide a

The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) was established to monitor the situation on the ground in Bosnia in 1991 and continued until 1998 (Trbovich 2008: 372). In 2000, the ECMM was changed to the European Union Monitoring Mission and today monitors Georgia almost exclusivelywhich means that most if not all records from its previous namesake are not easily attainable (Dutch Ministry of Defence; EUMM). 4 According to its website, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights has recently filed for bankruptcy and has only limited files available via a partner organization. 107

semblance of comprehensiveness in their reports expressly because they published reports meant to be comprehensive; they consolidate their data into reports for a specific time period that are much more consistent and organized than the thousands of journalistic accounts available about, say, human-rights violations undertaken by the Bosnian security sector in 1996. The UN reports used for my data span from January 1996 to January 1998, while the HRW reports cover the two extremes of the period analyzed by spanning from January 1995 (almost 12 months before the war ended) to January 1999 (almost 11 months after peacetime ended).5 These accounts give chronological narratives of the human-rights situation within a given country, often organized by specific categories of human-rights violations, such as return of refugees, freedom of movement, ethnically motivated violence and evictions, personal security, amnesty, and war criminals (UNCHR E/CN.4/1997/9; HRW World Report 1999). These narratives are composed of dated anecdotes with as many details as possible for a given example, with the aim of communicating an accurate pattern of a states human-rights record following the war. The decision to use information synthesized and reproduced by respected international organizations as a source for this research is a tradeoff considering how poor other primary sources would be. Official national sources would be biased given the motive to show the international community an improvement or at least a lack of continuation of atrocities committed by state authorities.

See Bibliography for full list of reports used. 108

National sources for postwar information would also be biased by the fact that the onus to report violations lay with the same people who may have committed them and who had the incentive and ability to ignore or hide evidence of their existence. In addition, more impartial international media sources still had their fair share of biases regarding what to report and how to report it (see p. 104105). In this way, then, the best method was an international-organizationbased datagathering approach.

II. DATA
Because of the difficulties inherent in the crime-identification and collection process for each state, my dependent variable, the variation in crimes committed by the security sector, will be presented in a different way than in Chapter 2. As opposed to the quantitative wartime data, postwar data will be mainly qualitative. I will look at UN and HRW reports that aggregate primary documentation from a variety of NGOs and firsthand accounts and extract from this information general patterns and main events to use as the dependent variables to be explained. Exact numbers were unavailable, but enough examples in the reports show that the following patterns were significant and thus serve as the dependent variable:
Policy Individual Bosnia Low High Croatia Lowest Highest Serbia Highest Lowest

Table 3.2: General violence patterns in each state relative to one another

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The main events that will be used as illustrative examples for the policy violence patterns shown abovemainly because the UN and HRW sources used them as suchare outlined in Table 3.3 below. Background information for individual crimes will be provided later in my case analyses.
Main Events for Analysis Bosnia Croatia Serbia Territorial Eastern 19961997 Ethnic Slavonia Protests Cleansing

Table 3.3: Main events or anecdotal patterns by state

III. STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS

A. BOSNIA

(1) DEPENDENT VARIABLE After the signing of the Dayton Accords on December 14, 1995, Bosnia was officially no longer the theater of the war that had ravaged its territory for four years. The official end to the war did not necessarily bring a sudden drop in violence, however. Instead, in the aftermath of the war, the country experienced a period of gradual political and institutional recovery and reorganizationwith significant international intervention. Compared to its neighbor countries, Bosnia overall experienced the following patterns of security-sector violence:
Bosnia Policy Low Individual High

Table 3.4: Bosnias dependent variable, or the pattern of violence in Bosnia as compared to Croatia and Serbia

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As shown in Table 3.4, Bosnia maintained a low policy-crime rate relative to its individual-crime rate, although it represents a middle ground between Croatia and Serbia in both categories. Despite this country-wide record, however, Bosnias experience with security-sector crime differed extensively across its ethnic and legal boundaries. Table 3.5, below, shows this comparison among entities and takes into account the policies of each entitys (ethnic) leadership when evaluating policy crimes. The discussions to follow will explain these patterns.
Bosniak High Low BOSNIA HVO Low High RS Highest Highest

Policy Individual

Table 3.5: Violence patterns organized by de facto forces within Bosnian state relative to one another (2) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE OVER SECURITY-SECTOR FUNCTIONING As a result of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia was separated into two entities with equally legitimate administrative authority: the Croat-Bosniak Federation (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RBS) (Ramet 2006: 475). This meant that one state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, basically encompassed two mini-states with clear borders (the Inter-Entity Boundary Line or IEBL), independent leadership, and separate force structures of their own (see Formal Command Structures below). The agreement stipulated that Bosnia would have a collective presidency, a bicameral legislature, and a constitutional court above the entity level, yet it also allowed for separate civilian governments within each entitywith significant state-like power such as building relationships with neighboring states (Ramet 2006: 473; Bose 2002: 62). In essence, this meant that, no matter what policies the official Bosnian authorities espoused, the implementation of these policies through either

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of the two security sectors available (one in each entity) would have been formally hampered by this two-states-within-a-state reality. In this way, the Federation and the RBS were two different, almost sovereign actors under the theoretical umbrella of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ramet 2006: 476). Despite the fact that the collective presidency had de jure civilian command authority over armed forces, there was little to no de facto authority of the collective Bosnian presidency over the armies of the entities; the top Bosnian leadership also had no armed forces of its own, and the constitution delegated defense to the entity level only (Bose 2002: 65). It was clear, then, that the armed forces of each entity reported to the leadership of that entity leaving the Bosnian state in a similar disorganized civilian circumstance as during the war (Bose 2002: 73). In the entities, power over the security forces was divided along ethnic lines, manifested politically in ethnic parties: the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) (Cox 2001: 78). These ethnic parties had monopolies over political life in their entities; the SDA and HDZ were the dominating forces of political representation for the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat communities, respectively, in the FBiH, and the SDS was the same for the Bosnian Serb community in the RBS. Each of the parties solidified this hold on its ethnic groups and on all public institutionsbut most notably the security sectorthrough an effective and selfperpetuating system of patronage and opposition-targeting (Cox 2001: 7). It was clear that the SDS leadership had command over the RBSs security sectors, for

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example, by the constant threats and assaults on opposition leaders (HRW 1996; Marcus 1997: 18). The formal policing structures (p. 114117) that devolved power to the cantonal level thus allowed these ethnic parties to dominate the use of armed forces within the cantons6 that had their respective ethnic majority lending a unified ethnic front to an essentially decentralized formal police structure. The overall Bosnian civilian leadership, however, had little to no control over its two security sectors, and the resulting confusion largely explains the predominance of individual crimes after the war. However, Bosnian security forces did still commit a significant amount of postwar policy crimes (though still fewer than the number of individual transgressions). These crimesmainly largescale prevention of right of return or encouragement of ethnically compatible citizens to move to their corresponding entitywere consistent with the overarching policies of the entities and the goals of the dominant ethnic political parties in the postwar context: maintaining ethnic majorities within their territories. These policy crimes were able to be carried out more efficiently by the RBS than the FBiH because of the more organized and effective structure, control, and technical expertise of the RBS forcesand the sheer lack of control by the more multi-nationally inclined collective leadership of the Bosnian state. (3) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURES In general, the primary agenda of the international community for the postwar Bosnian state was to establish a secure environment, which consisted of
6

A canton is an administrative division of territory within Bosnia much like counties. 113

disarming, dismantling, and reintegrating paramilitaries into official armed forces, as well as peacekeeping (Ramet 2006: 474). On a formal level, these changes eliminated the numerous paramilitary forces on the periphery of formal structures that plagued the previously extremely decentralized Bosnian force. Daytons changes, however, added the formal command problem of two legitimate armed forces within one state reporting to different entities (and in many cases three because of the additional Bosnian Croat sector and its de facto control over a section of the FBiH forces; see Real Control below). Worse, the reforms introduced another level of armed authority beyond military forces: the independent and highly decentralized police (see Police sections of both entities). i. Croat-Bosniak Federation a. Military Within the Federation, despite the fragmentation of civic administration among 10 different cantons, defense was formally consolidated under one Federation force (Bose 2002: 43). Formerly Bosnian Croat forces, Bosnian forces, and peripheral paramilitary soldiers were integrated together as one military forcethough in reality the Croat and Bosniak forces operated separately (Bose 2002: 65). Formally, then, the consolidated FBiH force was centralized with a chain of command that ultimately reached the FBiH presidency (Bose 2002: 65). b. Police Police forces within the Federation were formally decentralized to the cantonal level (Bose 2002: 78). This meant that ethnically differenti.e., Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Muslimcantons had formal command over the local armed forces, and

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could thus affect their differing ethnic policies more forcefully. FBiH police did function more centrally on the cantonal level, though, serving the specific directives of their corresponding ethnic leaders. Each canton had an ethnic majority (see Figure 3.4) and a popularly elected legislature that elected a governor, who in turn appointed the prime minister; the latter two had exclusive jurisdiction and competence over police policy and use (Bose 2002: 79). Bose puts it perfectly: In the Croat-controlled 40% of the Federation, it is normally difficult, often impossible, to bring resources and facilities under the control of central Federation institutions, which is what Bosniacs [sic] usually prefer and push for. (Bose 2002: 78) Thisalong with the canton-level centralized real control of the police (see Real Control)explains why Federation policy crimes were almost exclusively committed by the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) or FBiH police, which had the newfound responsibilities of law and order.7 The polices entity-level decentralization but canton-level centralization allowed territorial policy to be translated into de facto policing actions in the form of large-scale refusal of rights of return and intimidation of refugees.

Indeed, the low number of cantons with Croat majorities relative to cantons with Bosnian majorities also enlightens why Bosnian Croat forces had slightly fewer policy crimes than Bosniak forces. 115

Figure 3.4: Federation cantons organized by ethnic majority (Bose 2002: 8081 and Map 3)

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ii. Republika Srpska a. Military Like the FBiH army, the Army of the RBS had essentially no checks from the general Bosnian leadership until the formation of a Standing Committee on Military Matters in 1999a year after the timeframe studied in this paper (Bose 2002: 65). The RBS constitution granted formal command of the Army of the RBS to the entitys President, who until 1997 was a member of the SDS (Papenkort 2005: 207; Ito 2001: 109). With some continued financial support from Serbia, the RBS thus kept much of its centralized wartime formal command structure intact (with Mladi! at the helm), although without direct structural incorporation into the JNA. b. Police The RBS police were also formally centralized, reporting directly to the RBS Ministry of Interior (which was also headed by SDS loyalists) (Bose 2002: 74). This centralization could be seen in how the RBS created one unified police body that was regionally subdivided, as opposed to the Federation, which had created eleven different and independent police forces (ten cantonal and one Federation level) (Muehlmann 2007: 38). In other words, the RBS had an explicitly top-down approach to formal police command that allowed for more entity-level policy to be carried out. In this way, the RBS police served as the primary means by which the RBS carried out policyterritorial and explicitly politicalon local or cross-entity levels in the postwar period.

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(4) REAL CONTROL Before delving into a full analysis of each entitys real control over its armed forces, it is important to note that both the Federation and RBS armies were allegedly under tight control of NATOs Implementation Force (IFOR)a multinational force mandated to regulate Bosnian armies and keep peace and security in the countryfor the majority of the immediate postwar period, which largely explains the general lack of any Bosnian army action, criminal or not (Sharp 19971998: 118). i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Real Control a. State Government During the postwar era, the international community was very involved in changing the incentives of the statewide civilian leadership in Bosnia away from the ethnically inclined wartime policies of Izetbegovi!. A Joint Interim Commission and a Joint Civilian Commission were created, composed of Bosnian state and entity leadership alongside representatives of international organizations involved in the implementation and maintenance of Dayton conditions (Chandler 1999: 61). The September 1996 elections added the joint-presidency, in which three presidents, one from each of the three ethnic majorities, would rule jointly (Chandler 1999: 62). This joint-presidency was an institution created to ensure respect for international standards of democracy and human rights through ethnic checks and balances, so that no one ethnic leader could have the formal authority or real power to use the security sector without the approval of the other two (Chandler 1999: 62). On a state level, then, the incentives of the civilian

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leadership were multinational in nature; with significant influence, pressure, and support from the international community, they strove to create a unified state of three ethnicities working in tandem (Chandler 1999: 6667). Still, the incentives of the security-sector agents remained ethnically motivated (p. 97), which misaligned stateagent incentives but aligned entityagent incentives. From the perspective of the state, then, the expected model for real control over its security sector would be centralized with correctives for the misalignment. b. Entities After Dayton, the main policies of civilian leadership in both entities were centered on keeping their entities ethnically segregated. RBS authorities often articulated their desire to keep their ethnic brethren behind Serbian lines, and Bosnian Croat authoritiesthough technically underneath the Croat-Bosniak Federationstill operated with ethnic territorial intentions (UNCHR E/CN.4/1997/9: 11). For example, Bosnian Croat civilians directed HVO troops to cause chaos to prevent the ceding of Croatian soil to the RBS in 1996 (Ramet 2006: 476). Meanwhile, Bosnian (Muslim) civilian authorities within the Federation also had their practice of politically motivated resettlement (HRW World Report 1997: 205). In the immediate postwar period, the incentives of the lower rungs of both entities security sectors were still in line with the ethnic tensions of the war. This was illustrated by the intense civilian-on-civilian crime that lay waste to Bosnia from 1995 to 1998. Even before security sectors of the RBS or the Federation officially became involved in refugee intimidation, civilians across the state

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assaulted, beat, looted, or burned the persons or property of rival ethnicitiesand policemen or servicemen participated in the violence individually as well (HRW World Report 1998: 241; Ramet 2006: 479). This meant that the incentives of security sectors lower rungs and of the authorities who controlled them were alignedleading to the expected real-control model for the entities to be centralized. ii. De Facto Control Severe decentralization characterized the de facto relationship between the Bosnian state and the security sectors operating within itthe armies and police of each of the entities. This was contrary to the expected model needed by the state, given its incentive-alignment conditions, in order for it to be effective in carrying out policies. This explains in large part why so few benevolent or multiethnic large-scale endeavors succeeded from top-down (state to canton) processes during the period in question. Federation militaries, though formally integrated and centralized supposedly regardless of ethnicity, in reality operated separated into Bosnian Croat and Bosniak forces (Bose 2002: 65, 7778). This meant that, unlike the RBS forces, the Federation military operated with decentralized control despite its centralized formal command. This decentralization explains why Federation soldiers committed mostly individual crimes, such as assaults, kidnapping, and, most frequently, forced evictions (UN E/CN.4/1997/56). Federation policy crimes, on the other hand, were committed almost exclusively by HVO or FBiH police, which were de facto centralized to cantonal (ethnic) leaders. In fact, until

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1998, the HVO-affiliated armed forceswhether police or military, which in the wars immediate aftermath was a hazy distinction for the Bosnian Croat forces that functioned as military police throughout the warreceived significant financial and technical support from Croatia (Innes 2006: 158). This explains why Federation police were not used for any multinational policies originating from entity leadership and explains the frequent use of police to achieve the territorial ambitions of ethnic parties. On the other hand, the RBS military and policehaving been formally centralizedwere de facto centralized as well. With the formal differentiation between local law enforcement and military functioning, however, the enforcement of territorial and ethnic boundaries fell on police forces, which had direct lines to politically motivated SDS party members in the RBS Ministry of Interior. Despite this de facto centralized control of the police, the fact that the RBS security sectors did not commit as many policy crimes as its fellow Serbian neighboring state was a result of the sheer difference in degree of real control over police (i.e., Serbia had even more real control). Moreover, the fact that RBS forces had the highest level of individual crimes alongside the highest level of policy crimes of the three ethnic authorities (Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb) is consistent with the explanation given to explain wartime Serbian individual crimes alongside policy crimes: the more a policy crime is advocated by the leadership of an armed force, the more likely the individual actors will feel compelled or justified in similar criminal acts of their own initiative.

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(5) PROFESSIONALISM Following the war, Bosnia suffered under an uneven balance of arms and professionalism for the two official forces operating in its territory. Federation forces were significantly less professionalizedin terms of technical expertise and weaponrythan RBS forces, which had been receiving this type of professional support from Serbias JNA throughout the war (Ramet 2006: 478). In order to correct this disparity, the international community insisted on reducing the arms to a more balanced level and on assisting Federation forces in boosting their level of professionalism. This consisted of such programs as the United Statess Train and Equip program that encouraged American militarycontracting companies such as Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), to build the [FBiH] Army into an effective, professional fighting force (Ramet 2006: 478). MPRIs goals were to weaponize and generally teach FBiH forces how to employ the destructive technology effectivelymy wartime definition of professionalism. There was also an effort to introduce a human-rights component to this military-professionalizing project through Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) seminars on the creation of a joint military doctrine (Innes 2006: 161). Still, at this time, the main goal of international professionalization in Bosnia was to heighten the countrys actual technical capacity; Bosnia was not seen as an aggressor but rather the victim. This nonfocus on micro, human-rights reforms allowed for some crimes committed by individual Bosnian soldiers to escape the oversight of international peacekeepers

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and military monitors (UN E/CN.4/1997/56: 8). The international community also attempted to professionalize processes and codes of conduct for the Federation police. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was established following its Dayton mandate to reform Bosnian police structure and functioning. For the majority of its first year, and indeed until mid-1997, its effectiveness, however, was debatable; it suffered from low manpower and from its requirement to be unarmed in the face of former paramilitaries legitimized as policemen and using their newfound influence in sporadic and criminal ways (Sharp 19971998: 118). This lack of international accountability on police in the first part of the postwar period explains why Bosnian and Bosnian Croat police actors committed a high level of individual crimes overall. By mid-1997, however, IPTF was having success in reforming Federation police, from regulating the size of the forces to screening policemen for war-crime records (Sharp 19971998: 134). The IPTF was introducing international standards, including those of democratic policing, separation of police and military functions, and respect for human rights, to the localized armed force of FBiH, which closely mirrors my concept of security-sector checks on civilians (UN E/CN.4/1998/13: 26). The timing of these changes corresponded with a decreased level of individual crimes committed by Bosniak forces after mid-1997 (UN E/CN.4/1998/13). Indeed, the IPTF professionalizing success also coincided with a general decrease in ethnically motivated territorial policy crimes by the Federation: Federation police had an improved track record after mid-1997 of respecting IPTF policies banning illegal checkpoints across the IEBL (UN

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E/CN.4/1998/13: 14, 15). Introducing international standards into the forces of the RBS was much more difficult, however (UN E/CN.4/1998/13: 27). Sharp, writing toward the end of the time period analyzed here, claimed that police reform in Republika Srspka [was] a greater challenge [than in the FBiH] because it require[d] disarming and disbanding thousands of paramilitary special forces assigned to protect indicted war criminals (Sharp 19971998: 135). Alongside that practical hurdle was an even simpler one: the permission of RBS authorities for international peacekeepers to enter their territory and assist them in the first place. Until the wartime and post-wartime President of the RBS, Radovan Karad#i!, was handed over to the ICTY in 1996, international collaboration with the entity was rife with difficulty (Ramet 2006: 477). The SDS leadership under Karad#i! hampered refugee returns, which posed a problem for international policing reforms that required the composition of local police forces[to] reflect pre-war ethnic breakdowns (Innes 2006: 178). Without the minorities returning to the RBS in the first place, however, the recruitment efforts to make RBS policemen ethnically diverse fell short. Until that time, the ability of international organizations to influence RBS security-sector forces in any wayfrom technical professionalism to human-rights educationwas hampered. Even after the change in leadership, there was no formal agreement to allow the IPTF to reform the RBS police until the end of 1998 (Innes 2006: 177). Beyond the international-standards component of police professionalizing, the RBS army had the same levels of technical professionalism

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as it had during wartime, when it had been supported and manned by the Serbian JNA. In addition, many RBS policemen were former paramilitaries who switched uniforms but retained their weapons and who had, throughout the war, become experienced in warfare but not law enforcement (Sharp 19971998: 118). The professionalism of the RBS police, then, fit into a narrow niche: it was able to handle military responsibilities but lacked technical expertise in policing, and it was even further from achieving the international standard of democratic policing. Therefore, the same kind of military-type professionalism that led the RBS to unchecked policy success in wartime also did so in post-wartime. (6) RESULTS All these variables explain not only the overall low incidence of policy crimes and high incidence of individual crimes committed by all forces within the recognized Bosnian territory in comparison to Croatia and Serbia, but also the variation across the different de facto forces within the Bosnian state. Overall, Bosnia suffered from severe decentralization that led to a mixed record of policy and individual crimes across its entities. The FBiH had a decentralized military under strict control of the international community but a police force centralized to ethnic parties and lacking accountabilityall of which led to a number of policy crimes by Bosniak or Bosnian Croat cantonal leaders via their iron grip on police. The RBS, on the other hand, had formal centralized command and control over its armed forces and police, but it utilized its police for the highest level of militarily efficient policy crimes within Bosnia with little accountability from the international community.

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B. CROATIA

(1) DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Croatia Policy Lowest Individual Highest

Table 3.6: Croatias dependent variable, or the pattern of violence in Croatia as compared to Bosnia and Serbia As shown in Table 3.6, the Croatian security sector committed the lowest number of policy crimes and highest number of individual crimes of the three states. Although some Croatian soldiers committed individual crimes, the majority of these were committed by Croatian police, who participated in widespread looting, theft, and assaults on non-Croat civilians. When police were not directly involved in attacks, oftentimes they neglected to punish perpetrators or maintain civilian security (UNCHR E/CN.4/1997/9: 13). Additionally, Croatia experienced a significant policy success in the peaceful transition of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Syrmia (henceforth called Eastern Slavonia) from the hands of Croatian Serb paramilitaries to those of the Croatian authorities. After the Croatian War, Serbian paramilitary forces had occupied Eastern Slavonia and incorporated it into the Serbian SAO Krajina for the remainder of the Bosnian War, until Croatian forces reclaimed SAO Krajinas main territories during Operation Storm (Coleiro 2002: 6465). Croatia had not targeted Eastern Slavonia in this military operation, however, partly due to its physical separation from the rest of the SAO Krajina. Following the Croatian advances, Croatia and Serb paramilitary forces signed the Erdut Agreement, which put the area under the protection of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia,

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Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) until its formal transition (Coleiro 2002: 6667). Eastern Slavonia was successfully transferred to Croatian authority in 1998, a feat that was considered a significant success for international intervention and peaceful compromise on both the Croatian and the Serbian sides8 (Coleiro 2002: 144). Both the violence patterns and the nonviolent event of Eastern Slavonia will serve as the dependent variables to be explained by the following institutional variables. (2) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE OVER SECURITY-SECTOR FUNCTIONING After Dayton, Croatian civilian authorities placed great importance on garnering respect from and inclusion in key international organizations (Samard#ija 1997: 8). In particular, Tudjman and his HDZ cronies were determined to see Croatia out of its postwar economic slump by opening it up even more to European Union marketsbut, in order to do so, Croatia had to prove it was in line with international standards, both economically and politically (Samard#ija 1997: 8, 13). This meant that, despite the possibility that Tudjman and his party still had ethnically motivated territorial ambitions, they had a bigger incentive to establish normal and productive relationships with their previously warring neighbors, Bosnia and Serbia (Samard#ija 1997: 16). Despite these new international ambitions, Tudjman still had as strong a hold on the military during peacetime as he had during wartime. Political

However much the latter actors were not directly affiliated with a state. Following the war, the SAO Krajina was abandoned as a policy by Serbian leadership when Serbia did not intervene to defend the Croatian Serbs during Operation Storm; later Milo"evi! insisted that the region was the concern of the Croatian Serbs (Coleiro 2002: 65-67). 127

patronage was the norm; Tudjman strategically placed his political allies from the HDZ in militarily powerful positions (Hendrickson and Smith 2006: 299). He controlled the salaries of his military cronies directlyand thus even in peacetime used the military as an appendage of [his] ruling party (Hendrickson and Smith 2006: 299300). Still, the Croatian governments new international ambitions following the war were examples of the international communitys influence on the domestic civilian incentives. These new incentives influenced how (minimally) the civilian government utilized its armed forces (i.e., Croatia had the fewest policy crimes of the three states). Indeed, international concerns were some of the primary considerations that prevented the circumstances of Eastern Slavonia during 1995 1998 from devolving into a territorial war between Croatia and Serbia ($imunovi! 1999: 133). The police, on the other hand, despite being formally centralized to the Ministry of Interior, conducted their real decision-making on a decentralized level, devolving to local county administrations or even to the policemen themselves (see sections below), showing a limited civilian top-down influence over the police in contrast to Tudjmans firm hold on the military. (3) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURES The formal command structure of the Croatian army remained identical to the structure of the last remaining years of the war; in the same way that, during (the latter years of) wartime, it was centralized and organized for maximum effectiveness, the postwar years only saw the introduction of more

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centralizationin the form of political influenceinto the Croatian armed forces (Edmund 2007: 127). Despite this same formal command structure (and real control; see below) as during wartime, the fact that the incentives of the commanders changed explains why postwar policy crimes were not prevalent in Croatia. The one drastic change in formal command structures occurred in the postwar transition from a joint force functioning in both military and police capacities to separate force structures for military and policing. Indeed, the special circumstances of Croatias secession from Yugoslavia meant that its police forcesas the only armed forces at Croatias disposalhad to be converted to carrying out military policy to defend the country in 1991. By 1992, however, police and military functions had been so blurred by the war on Croatias own territory that the former Croatian police were now involved not only in domestic law enforcement and defense, but also in military strategy and aggression in Bosnia (Ivkovi! and Haberfeld 2000: 201). After the war, then, though the Croatian government took to reforming the police structure, it remained an at least partially militarised organisation [sic] (Edmunds 2007: 126). The policing reforms that the Croatian government undertook established 20 police administrations within Croatias borders; by proliferating command into 20 structures relative to its previous incorporation into the one, consolidated command structure of the Croatian military, this action decentralized the police command structure (Edmund 2007: 135; Ivkovi! and Haberfeld 2000: 202). Despite this structural decentralization, another formal mechanism was put in

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place to ensure slightly more centralization: each of these administrations was to report directly to the nations Ministry of Interior, which established uniform organization and functioning for all of the administrations (Ivkovi! and Haberfeld 2000: 194). Thus, on a formal organizational command level, the Croatian police were less centralized than the military, but they still had some formal command ties to the civilian leadership. (4) REAL CONTROL i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Real Control During wartime, Croatian principals (the civilian and military leadership) and actors (the soldiers or officers) enjoyed aligned incentivesnamely, to regain territory they perceived stolen from them by any means necessary. Following the war, however, the principals signaled a stop to ethnically motivated policy, while actors still felt and acted on the ethnic tensionsillustrated by the sheer number of ethnically motivated crimes (from armed thefts or assaults to forced occupation of property or forced evictions and intimidation) committed by civilian individuals and those associated with the security sector (UN S/1996/1011). This incentive misalignment made it necessary for the Croatian government to control its security sectorboth military and policein a centralized manner that corrected for the incentive misalignment. ii. De Facto Control Tudjman and his political allies in the military had as much postwar centralized control over its functioning (or more) as Croatias constitution and the militarys own organization formally established in 1992. The fact that these civilian leaders

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had new, peaceful incentives explained such successes as the lack of military confrontation in the region of Eastern Slavonia and the dearth of policy crimes committed by the Croatian army. Unfortunately, the significant amount of individual crimes committed by Croatian forces during 19951998 remainsmostly attributable to the decentralized real control over the Croatian police. Although on paper the Croatian police were formally centralized and had uniform organizational structures, in reality the conduct of the policemen was not uniform (Ivkovi! and Haberfeld 2000: 200). Each of the police administrations, corresponding to Croatian counties, had de facto control over the running of the structures put in place by the Ministry of Interior; in effect, Croatian policing was truly decentralized. This meant that, despite the good intentions of the Croatian civilian leadership, the police were in reality not accountable to the incentives of the top beyond weak, formal organizational structures. (5) PROFESSIONALISM The Croatian military participated in a large number of professionalism programs after the end of the Bosnian war, including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program between Croatia and the US. Through this bilateral exchange, Croatian officers were exposed to the structure and functioning of the American military establishment as a model for Croatian reforms (Liebl et al. 2002: 7). This approach to Croatian military reforms was not new; back in 1994, the Croatian defense minister explicitly stated in a letter to the US Department of Defense that he wanted to use the USs military as a model (Gaul 1998: 1489).

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Not long afterward, MPRI started to build the Croatian forces to general fighting capacity, leading to Croatias success in 1995s Operation Storm (Gaul 1998: 14891490). Overall, however, security assistance by the international community was limited, as bilateral donors such as the US or Germany found the undemocratic context of the wider Croatian political system restricting to their hopes to democratize the Croatian armed forces or fully bring them in line with international standards of human rights (Edmunds 2007: 193). In terms of police reform, CIVPOLthe police-reform arm of the UN monitored the Croat and Serb policemen in two administrations in Eastern Slavonia as part of UNTAES (Holm 1999: 145). In the other 18 counties, however, there was no equivalent to Eastern Slavonias CIVPOL or Bosnias IPTF,9 which meant that Croatian police had no international monitoring group to train them on the proper use of their armed power and to keep them accountable (or help them keep civilian leaders accountable). This lack of accountability compounded the results of its introduction as a decentralized and separate armed force: more opportunity for unchecked individual action. Other, domestic-led professionalizing efforts, such as academy curriculum changes or corruption checks, were ineffective (Edmunds 2007: 138, 142). This overall lack of professionalism for police (many of whom had been taught the value of force rather than negotiation in public policing duties throughout the war) explains, alongside the de facto decentralized control of the forces, the significant

The OSCE, after having been present in the country in an exclusively political capacity, instituted a police-monitoring mission only in Eastern Slavonia in the fall of 1998 (Borchert and Zellner 2003: 18). 132

proportion of individual crimes committed by Croatian police actors (Edmunds 2007: 126). (6) RESULTS The Eastern Slavonia policy success and the lack of Croatian policy crimes can be explained by the civilian governments control over the military, centralized formal command and real control of the Croatian military, the civilian leaderships changed incentives, and the fresh professionalism that sprang from the civilian leaderships new goals. Croatias security sector was not completely in the clear when it came to postwar crimes, however; the governments lack of real control over the policing sectors and the lack of professionalism in the ranks led to a pattern of individual crimes committed by Croatian police over the course of 19951998.

C. SERBIA

(1) DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Serbia Policy Highest Individual Lowest

Table 3.7: Serbias dependent variable, or the pattern of violence in Serbia as compared to Bosnia and Croatia Table 3.7 outlines the Serbian security sectors pattern of violence against civilians in post-wartime as compared with its two other neighbors. It experienced the most policy crimes, as it had in the wartime period, but also a pattern of notably decreased individual crimes when compared with Bosnia and Croatia. This thesiss main illustrating example of Serbias top-down human-rights

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violations against civilians is the 19961997 elections and ensuing protests. Local Serbian elections were held in November 1996 and resulted in major support for a party opposing Milo"evi!s ruling party (HRW World Report 1998: 253). Threatened, Milo"evi! and his regime claimed an irregular election and annulled the results (HRW World Report 1998: 253). In that same month, several opposition leaders and supporters gathered throughout the countrybut most strongly in the capitalto protest the regimes electoral intervention, a set of protests that lasted until spring of the following year (HRW World Report 1998: 253). From December until the end of the protests, the Serbian government ordered police and special police to use whatever force was necessary to silence the demonstrators (HRW World Report 1998: 253).10 The bloody aftermath of these protests serves as anecdotal evidence of the kind of widespread and prolonged policy crimes committed by Serbian police that will be explained by the following variables. (2) CIVILIAN INFLUENCE OVER SECURITY-SECTOR FUNCTIONING Despite his firm hold on the Serbian state before 1995, Milo"evi! lost some legitimacy following his signing of the Dayton Accords. This was especially true among some of his staunchest supporters, the Serbian nationalists, who felt that this action signified, along with his abandonment of Croatian Serbs earlier in 1995, that their leader had officially abandoned the hope of a Greater Serbia

Milo"evi! offered the OSCE to analyze the legitimacy of the elections, but, to his dismay, the organization supported the claims of the opposition that the results had in fact had been accurate (HRW World Report 1998: 253). This, coupled with the public protests, eventually forced the regime to acknowledge and accept the results (HRW World Report 1998: 254). 134

10

(Ramet 2006: 504). Many of these nationalists had been active or taken posts of leadership in Serbias military during the warmost as a result of promotions made by Milo"evi! himself. As a result, Milo"evi!s hold on the military loosened slightly after December 1995, though he was able to check the militarys autonomy periodically throughout 19951998 and retain significant control over its use or non-use (Edmunds 2007: 87). Milo"evi! reacted by turning his attention to building up the Serbian police to do his bidding instead; the police had been recruited since 1993 from areas sympathetic to Milo"evi! and since then had been building loyalty to the regime and maintaining it through the new incentives Milo"evi! crafted (p. 138) (Ramet 2006: 498). The police was so centralized that special police units were often available at Milo"evi!s every whim (Trivunovi! 2004: 173). Therefore, though Milo"evi! may have lacked some ideological control over the military, he was able to keep formal, de facto, and ideological control over the police (see below), which he utilized to carry out his main postwar policy crimes: attacking protestors during the 19961997 protests and otherwise targeting members or leaders of the opposition (UN E/CN.4/1997/8: 20). (3) FORMAL COMMAND STRUCTURES Following the war, much like Croatia, the structure of the main JNA did not change significantly, except in the sense that it no longer recognized the SAO Krajina or RBS forces as part of its formal structure (Coleiro 2002: 6567). Otherwise, the military remained just as formally centralized as it had been (if not more). The one main change was the use of that structure by the leadership, which

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mainly meant not using the military; instead, Serbian leaders redirected their policy focus to internal Serbian order and consolidating Milo"evi!s powerboth policies accomplished (to an extent) through centralization of the police. Previous discussions of Serbias armed forces during the Balkan Wars centered on its military presences outside its own soil, as it occupied its fellow former Yugoslav republics and assisted satellite Bosnian Serb or Croatian Serb forces. On a domestic level, however, during the war Serbia had built up its police force to the level of a military (some 80,000100,000 total) and armed it accordingly (Ramet 2006: 498; Danopoulos et al. 2004: 163). The military, on the other hand, had 114,000 soldiers, making it comparable in size to the police force that was supposedly responsible for domestic law and order but in fact contributed in concrete ways to military endeavors (Danopoulos et al. 2004: 163). A mid1990s law began to restructure the command hierarchy of the police to consolidate and centralize it with the Ministry of Interior (Edmunds 2007: 156). Once the war was over, the police were considered an arm of the Serbian state equally forceful as the military (Danopoulos et al. 2004: 163). With the changes in political incentives of the military leadership (see Civilian Influence over the Military above), from the perspective of Milo"evi! and his cronies, the police were viewed as more preferable to carry out policy than the military (Danopoulos et al. 2004: 163). In this way, the functions of defense and policing were conflated into the single police structure on Serbias home turfas they had been for both of Serbias rival countries, Bosnia and Croatia, in the conflicts that had raged within them. Serbian leaders thus approached bolstering the postwar

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police structure in much the same way as they had the military during wartime: they continued to centralize the police management and formal command structure to emulate the militarys and allow for direct and efficient use by top civilian brass (Groenewald and Peake 2004: 7; Hinton and Newburn 2009: 79; Trivunovi! 2004: 172). This centralized approach to policing was a remnant of Serbias communist past, when the formal authority for policing functions in the republics was hardly ever delegated to the local (i.e., municipal) level but rather controlled authoritatively from above (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 75). (4) REAL CONTROL i. Incentive Alignment and Expected Real Control The main goal of the civilian regime during post-wartime was to protect [itself] through suppressing the opposition, which included Kosovo activism that threatened Serbias territorial integrity and Milo"evi!s hold on power (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 79). Although Serb ethnic supremacy was still part of the agenda, it took a backseat to consolidating and maintaining an authoritarian power that was increasingly becoming illegitimate (Edmunds 2007: 155). As mentioned above, by appearing to abandon Serbian ethnic territorial expansion in 1995, Milo"evi! lost some of the legitimacy he had gained by espousing the ethnic entrepreneurship that brought him to power in the first place. This loss of legitimacy led more active opposition groups to spring up among the Serbian citizenry, which, though undoubtedly feeling the same heightened ethnic tensions as during the war, also started clamoring for an end to Milo"evi!s one-man, onedecade reign (Ramet 2006: 505506). This was also apparent in the Serbian

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military ranks; at one point during the 19961997 protests, some military leaders crafted a letter claiming that if Milo"evi! asked them to intervene, they would refuse to fire upon their own Serbian citizens (Ramet 2006: 506). With a citizen base (from which he recruited for his security sector) rapidly diverging in their political outlook, Milo"evi!s regime faced an incentive misalignment with the very people they would be ordering to carry out their bidding. In a situation like this in peacetime, then, the expected real control would be centralized with incentive misalignment correctives. ii. De Facto Control The regimes control of the military was as de facto centralized as it was formally structured. By neglecting it in favor of the police, however, Milo"evi! disengaged the military from most action in the postwar periodalthough it had the proper institutional means to engage. The police, on the other hand, were de facto centrally controlled but alsoand more importantlyempowered through increasing militarization (see Professionalism below) (Edmunds 2007: 157). Despite his tight control over the decision-making process, Milo"evi! also instituted some actions to address the incentive misalignment his regime experienced during 19951998. In order to keep incentives in line with his, Milo"evi! awarded high management positions in the police under a system of patronagehaving done away with any form of merit-based promotional system (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 80). In addition, he instituted a campaign of organized crime from above and involved most Serbian police officers in its administration and its profitscreating a set of new, shared incentives (Hinton

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and Newburn 2009: 79; Trivunovi! 2004: 172). (5) PROFESSIONALISM The Serbian military kept a similar level of technical professionalism as it had during the war, except that the Serbian leadership shifted much of its energies (and budget) to the police at the expense of the militarys capability. The Serbian policemen, on the other hand, were trained and professionalized as essentially a domestic military force. The Serbian civilian leadership set up police ranks that emulated the JNAs ranks and set aside generous budgetary lines for such excessive weapons for law enforcement as tanks, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft guns (Edmunds 2007: 156; Danopoulos et al. 2004: 167168). In addition, the doctrines of the police were explicitly military in nature, illustrated by the anecdote that the police academy published an army textbook on tactics while the [JNA] did not have the money to print it for its needs (Danopoulos et al. 2004: 167168). Still, a lack of professionalism ran rampant in the higher ranks of the police who were exclusively politically promotedmen who, more loyal to the policy than proper police operations, turned a blind eye to organized crime sanctioned by the state and to individual crimes committed by their servicemen (Hinton and Newburn 2009: 80). This adds another explanation for why Serbia experienced individual crimes alongside policy crimes to the one offered in Chapter 2. In addition, due to the lack of regime change and paltry international intervention during the period analyzed, it can be assumed that there was no significant change in the ability of Serbian security-sector members to identify and correct human-rights abuses (Ramet 2006: 506).

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(6) RESULTS In post-wartime, Serbia experienced significant civilian control over the armed forces, centralized formal command and real control of the police, and high levels of technical professionalism among the police. This meant that Serbia emulated much of its wartime approach to its armed forces, only in the postwar period it transplanted this approach to a much more willing armed force than the military: the police. As during wartime, then, through these institutional capacities, Serbia was able to carry out the highest number of policy crimes among the three states analyzedand some accompanying individual crimes due to the top-down acceptance of manmade ethnic turmoil.

IV. CONCLUSION
Security Sector Institution

Country

Variables
Civilian influence over security sector Low

Results

Military

Formal command Real control Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control Civilian influence over security sector

Decentralized Decentralized (poor) Low Decentralized Decentralized (poor) High Centralized (Under IFOR control) Higher technically than wartime; low human rights High Decentralized at entity level; centralized at canton level Decentralized at entity level; centralized at canton level

Bosnia
Police CroatBosniak Federation

Military

Formal command Real control Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector

Police

Formal command

Real control

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Military

Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control

Mixed technically (but mostly on military matters); mixed human rights (higher after 1997) High Centralized (Under IFOR control) High technically; low human rights High Centralized at entity level Centralized at entity level High technically (but on military matters); low human rights High Centralized Centralized (good) High technically; mixed human rights

Republika Srpska Police

Military

Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control

Croatia
Police

Low
Decentralized Decentralized (poor) Mixed technically (but mostly on military matters); low human rights High Centralized Centralized High technically; low human rights High Centralized (even more than military) Centralized High technically (but on military matters); low human rights

Military

Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector Formal command Real control Professionalism Civilian influence over security sector

Serbia

Police

Formal command Real control

Professionalism

Table 3.8: Summary of postwar results by country and variable As shown by this analysis, the main differences across the security-sector institutions of the three states in question that together account for the variation in postwar crimes were changes in the incentives of the leaders, the relationship

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between policing and military functions, and the nature of professionalism. All of these factors were closely related to the impact of the international community on either the domestic-political or security-sector landscape of a given country. In the case of the FBiH, international intervention differentiated formally between policing and military functions, and, at least in the case of Bosniak cantons, human-rights-related education and training led to a lower incidence of individual crimes (and after mid-1997 policy crimes) than in their Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb neighbors. Incentives in the Croatian case as well as the relationship between the Croatian police and the Croatian military were influenced by international standards, which led to a significantly lower policycrime rate than its neighbors. Regardless of the change in the governments incentives for the better, however, a lack of human-rights professionalization led to the highest level of individual crimes by Croatian actors. Serbia, however, showed no signs of domestic-political respect for international standards, and (having shut out most international assistance whose values are opposed to these decisions) conflated the police with military capacity and responsibilities and continued with the same minimal respect for human rights among its forces leading to the highest record of policy crimes in the postwar period. In addition, these analyses show that the international community had more influence over the militaries than over the police forces. This was mainly because the militaries had been seen as the primary culprits in need of regulation. This explains in large part why the proportions of individual or even policy crimes committed by military men were so low in all these countries; the

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international community had a more physical hold on the Bosnian military via NATOs IFOR and a more professionalizing hold on the Croatian military than on each of the states policing counterparts. Taken together, these analyses show that, when international standards were adopted, actors within the security sector committed far fewer crimes, whereas when international values were rejected or unimplemented, crimes still ran rampant. This stands in contrast to the much more violent wartime context, when the international community was more focused on ending the war than introducing accountability measures or new incentives.

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CHAPTER 4:
CONCLUSION

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have argued that the cases of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbiacountries that were fraught with ethnic tensions in both wartime and post-wartimeillustrate a fundamental gap in the civil-military literature. These nations wartime experiences show that the same civil-military factors that the most respected theories argue lead to effective and accountable decision-making in reality led to very brutally effective policies without the accountability. In Chapter 3, I analyzed these cases in the postwar context to develop a new theory for how to prevent civilian governments as well as militaries from using their security-sector power to commit crimes. The findings of Chapter 3 concluded that, in general, crimes were less likely to be committed by security sectors that had incorporated the appropriate international standards into their institutional structures and functioning. More specifically, however, certain types of security-sector crimes (policy versus individual) were more likely to be committed under specific institutional conditions than under others. Individual crimes were more likely to be committed by security sectors that suffered from low civilian influence over the security sector, decentralized formal command structures, (expected or unexpected) decentralized real control for incentive-alignment conditions, and low professionalism. The first three factors delegate more decision-making power to the individual actors without topdown accountability, whereas the last variable lends the actors little knowledge about, or ability to do, their jobsor how to do their jobs according to international standards. These factors combined can empower an individual with ethnic grievances to have free rein to target enemy ranks without necessarily

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having any institutional backingexcept, importantly, weapons. Therefore, the analysis in the preceding two chapters has shown that, in order to curb individual crimes of this nature in this context, changing the incentives of the individual security-sector actors is paramountexpressly because, under the previously described conditions, the policymakers have little to no institutional sway. The other option is to change the institutional context by introducing reforms to reverse the institutional circumstances (e.g., by introducing more civilian control, formal centralized command, etc.) to allow for more effective top-down control of the security sectoryet this alone is not enough to ensure that crimes are not committed by the security sector. In these 1990s Balkan cases, individual crimes were also tangential results of cases that involved significant policy crimes, which illustrates the complexity of top-down crimes and the extent to which they affect the general psyche or incentives of individual actors. In order to get a full picture of how to curb individual crimes, then, we must address this thesiss implications for policy crimes. In these cases, the factors of high civilian influence over the security sector, centralized formal command structures, expected real control for incentive-alignment conditions, and high technical professionalism made a given security sector more likely to commit policy crimes. In a reversal of the conditions that lead to individual crimes, the first three factors enable leaders at the top to seize power over the use of security-sector institutions, while the fourth variable, technical expertise, simply adds an extra layer of efficiency on behalf of the security sectors to carry out given policies. In ethnically tense situations in

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which the top civilian or military brass have policy goals motivated by prejudice, these factors grant these policies a higher likelihood of de facto follow-through. This does not mean that we should immediately dismantle or reverse these structures, however. The case of postwar Croatiain which the mostly successful policy advocated by the government aligned with international human-rights standardssupports the claims of many theorists that these factors are necessary for a security sector to be effective in carrying out any policy. Instead of dismantling these institutions, then, an extra layer of accountability must be added to these factors. This means changing the incentives of the policymakers and individuals to be in line with international standards of human rights and democratic security-sector structuring. Ultimately, changing the incentives of the policymakers affects the incidence of both individual and policy crimesif accompanied by the institutional mechanisms necessary for effectiveness. Changing the incentives of state policymakers may obviously have a more direct link to policy crimes, but the policies they produce also often determine how individuals in that state act, as shown by the high incidence of individual crimes accompanying policy crimes in wartime and post-wartime Serbia. Still, changing the incentives of the individual agents is necessary but not sufficient to prevent individual crimes from occurring in ethnic-conflict-ridden circumstances. Other institutional factors beyond the introduction of international standards at the bottom play into the likelihood of individual crimes, however. Such is the case when there is an ethnically motivated civilian or military leadership with significant formal and real control over the

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security sectorwhich make policy crimes and their often-attendant individual crimes more likely due to individuals being put under duress by top, ill-meaning leaders. Overall, the cases of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia from 1991 to 1998 show that policy crimes can most likely be prevented if international standards are imposed at the top, whereas individual crimes can most likely be prevented when those standards are imposed at the bottom. The question beyond this, then, is whether policy crimes can be prevented by reform from the bottomwhen the civilian top wants policy crimes to occur. In terms familiar to this thesis, the incentives of the agents can theoretically prevail if the individuals incentives are changed, incentives are misaligned, individuals are morally professionalized, and there exists decentralized power and decision-making. This all depends on the presence or absence of top-down mechanisms of de facto control, however. Therefore, what the analyzed time period has not conclusively proven is whether policy crimes can also be checked by bottom-up accountability measures that eventually change the incentives of the agents and empower the individual to make choices about the violent use of their power. The case of the postwar CroatBosniak Federation police hints at this new form of accountability: after mid1997, IPTF efforts to introduce human-rights values to individual policemen coincided with a general decrease in the use of the police for ethnic territorial intentions. Yet the fact that this accountability was implemented and the favorable policy results were observed in only six months, and in only one police structure, prevents this datum from being conclusive. Therefore, this thesis leaves this

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question open in the hopes that future research can identify, through an analysis of a longer time period or other cases, whether bottom-up military checks on civilians can be truly effective in curbing top-down crimes. This thesiss main argument, however, within the scope of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia specifically, is that some security sectors commit humanrights violations and others do not because the ones that do commit crimes have not fully implemented international standards in either the domestic government or the security sector, while the ones that do not commit crimes have done so. Beyond the Balkan cases, this argument has ultimately hoped to achieve an ideal institutional design wherein both civilian governments and security-sector institutions incorporate international values. It has also tried to create a system by which when only one of the two (either the civilian government or the security sector) has internalized the international norms, the compliant one can check the noncompliant one to lead to a crime-free security sector. When the civilian government is the compliant one, as in postwar Croatia, this thesis has argued that the best institutional conditions are those that lead to most policy effectiveness. When the security sector is compliant, as in post-1997 FBiH police, reforms such as joint human-rights doctrines and democratic policing can check noncompliant civilian leaders. This argument has implications beyond the three Balkan cases that helped create it. Many countries around the globe are currently experiencing conditions similar to those that plagued the former Yugoslavia, be them wartime, postwartime, ethnically charged, or all of the above. My findings about the likelihood

149

of specific security-sector crime types given certain observable, civil-military institutions can be instrumental in the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or beyond when the international community strives to reform those countries security sectors for maximum effectiveness and maximum accountability. This thesis, through its in-depth analysis of three modern-day genocidal state actors, hopes to have added to a literature in dire need of new policy options for preventing morality-shattering atrocities.

150

APPENDIX

I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABiH FBiH FRY HDZ HOS HRW HVO HV HZ ICTY IPTF JNA RBS SAO SDA SDS TO UN UNHCR UNPROFOR UNTAES ZNG Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (wartime) Croat-Bosniak Federation Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Croatian Democratic Union (Croatia) Croatian Defence forces Human Rights Watch Croatian Defence Council Croatian Army Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Police Task Force Yugoslav Peoples Army Republika Srpska Serb Autonomous Region Party of Democratic Action (Bosnia) Serbian Democratic Party (Republika Srpska) Territorial Defence United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Protection Force United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium Croatian National Guard

152

II. TIMELINE OF EVENTS June 1991February 19981

1991 On June 25, Slovenia and Croatia secede from Yugoslavia. Croatian Serbs attempt to break off from Croatia in an effort to preserve as much of Croatia as possible for ethnic Serbs. The JNA assists this effort militarily, tipping off the Croatian War of Independence. Thousands of Croats and other non-Serbs are displaced from the areas of Croatia under Serbian control. In September, Macedonia becomes the third republic to secede from Yugoslavia. By the end of the year, Croatian Serbs and the JNA control one-third of Croatia, but the sovereignty of the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina is not recognized internationally.

1992 The UN brokers a ceasefire between Serbs and Croatia, ending major hostilities. Four United Nations Protective Areas are created in Croatia, encompassing the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Over 14,000 UNPROFOR troops administer these zones as a buffer between Serbs and Croats, with limited success. After a referendum, Bosnia declares its independence from Yugoslavia. In response, Bosnian Serbs declare the independence of a Republika Srpska within Bosnias borders. Serbia and Montenegro, the only remaining republics, reorganize into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The UN imposes sanctions on Yugoslavia. War breaks out between the Serbs of the Republika Srpska (aided by the JNA) and the Bosniaks and Croats who had supported Bosnias independence (aided by the Croatian government). Serbs begin the siege of Sarajevo, which is held by Bosniak Muslims. Bosnian Serbs use ethnic cleansing to ensure the integrity and continuity of their Republika Srpska. Ethnic cleansing also occurs in the Bosnian half of the country. The independence of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia is internationally recognized; they are admitted to the UN soon after.

Information in this timeline can be attributed to the following BBC profiles for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1066981.stm, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1097156.stm, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/5055726.stm, respectively. 153

1993 The ICTY is formed by a UN resolution. The alliance between Bosniak Muslims and Bosnian Croats breaks down, adding a third combatant to the fight. The three sides continue to wage war, with alliances created and dissolved between the three sides as best serves their purposes in the moment. This also results in differently affiliated Muslim groups turning against each other. The UN establishes safe havens, under UNPROFOR protection, for Bosnias Muslim population in Srebrenica, among other places.

1994 1995

The United States intervenes and forges a peace treaty between Bosniaks and Croats. A united Croat-Bosniak Federation is formed within Bosnia, opposite the Republika Srpska. NATO begins aerial bombings of Serbian military installations in Bosnia. The ICTY issues its first indictments and arrests its first suspects.

In August 1995, Operation Storm reclaims the UN Protective Areas, including the Republic of Serbian Krajina, for Croatia. In the process, thousands of ethnic Serbs are displaced, eventually leading to accusations of war crimes by Croat forces. Serbian forces overrun the UN safe zone at Srebrenica and kill over 8,000 Bosniak Muslims residing there. It is the worst war crime in Europe since World War II. The Croat-Bosniak Federation, assisted by the Croatian army, achieves major military victories over the Bosnian Serbs. NATO air strikes end as the Serbian position is weakened. Yugoslavia is forced to the bargaining table. On December 14, the Dayton Agreement is signed to bring the war to an end. Under its terms, the CroatBosniak Federation and the Republika Srpska would coexist within the country of Bosnia under a High Representative. UN sanctions on Yugoslavia are also loosened.

1996 The only UN Protective Area not retaken by Croatian forces comes under the jurisdiction of UNTAES peacekeeping forces. The siege of Sarajevo comes to an endthe longest sustained siege of a capital city in modern history. Croatia and Yugoslavia establish diplomatic relations. UN sanctions on Yugoslavia are formally lifted. Croatia joins the Council of Europe.

154

The ICTY convicts its first criminal, a soldier in the Serbian army who participated in the killings at Srebrenica. In November, protests begin throughout Serbiamost heavily in Belgradein response to Slobodan Milo!evi"s annulment of opposition victories in local elections. The Serbian police respond to these protests with force.

1997 1998 UNTAES hands over control of the last former Serbian enclave in Croatia to the Croatian government. In February, tensions between the province of Kosovo and the government of Yugoslavia boil over, leading to war. Slobodan Milo!evi", who as president of Serbia had dominated Yugoslavias government throughout the war, becomes de jure president of Yugoslavia. In February 1997, Milo!evi" signed a document recognizing the opposition victories that sparked the 1996/1997 protests. In March, protests in Serbia finally end. The EU declines Croatias entreaties for admission because the Franjo Tudjman regime does not meet its democratic requirements.

155

(Adjusted to reflect signatories as of January 1, 1991)2

State Parties
Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua Barbuda Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia BosniaHerzegovina Botswana and

III. GENEVA CONVENTIONS SIGNATORIES

Ratification/ Accession
26.09.1956 27.05.1957 20.06.1960 20.09.1984 06.10.1986 18.09.1956 14.10.1958 27.08.1953 11.07.1975 30.11.1971 04.04.1972 10.09.1968 03.08.1954 03.09.1952 29.06.1984 14.12.1961 10.01.1991 10.12.1976 31.12.1992 29.03.1968

State Parties
Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Rep.) Congo Cook Islands Costa Rica Cte d'Ivoire (Dem.

Ratification/ Accession
29.06.1957 14.10.1991 22.07.1954 07.11.1961 27.12.1971 08.12.1958 16.09.1963 14.05.1965 11.05.1984 01.08.1966 05.08.1970 12.10.1950 28.12.1956 08.11.1961 21.11.1985 24.02.1961 04.02.1967 07.05.2002 15.10.1969 28.12.1961

Excepting the three countries in question in this thesis: Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. This table is adjusted from the International Committee of the Red Crosss full table of State Parties/Signatories of the Geneva Conventions. See citation for website. 156

Croatia Cuba Cyprus Djibouti Dominican Republic Dominica Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Guinea Guyana Haiti Holy See

11.05.1992 15.04.1954 23.05.1962 06.03.1978 22.01.1958 28.09.1981 11.08.1954 10.11.1952 17.06.1953 24.07.1986 02.10.1969 09.08.1971 22.02.1955 28.06.1951 26.02.1965 20.10.1966 03.09.1954 02.08.1958 05.06.1956 13.04.1981 14.05.1952 21.02.1974 11.07.1984 22.07.1968 11.04.1957 22.02.1951

Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran (Islamic Rep. of) Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Kiribati Korea (Dem. People's Rep.) Korea (Republic of) Kuwait Lao People's Dem. Rep. Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Luxembourg

31.12.1965 03.08.1954 10.08.1965 09.11.1950 30.09.1958 20.02.1957 14.02.1956 27.09.1962 06.07.1951 17.12.1951 20.07.1964 21.04.1953 29.05.1951 20.09.1966 05.01.1989 27.08.1957 16.08.1966 02.09.1967 29.10.1956 24.12.1991 10.04.1951 20.05.1968 29.03.1954 22.05.1956 21.09.1950 01.07.1953

157

Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Monaco Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Niger Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua Guinea New

18.07.1963 05.01.1968 24.08.1962 18.06.1991 24.05.1965 22.08.1968 30.10.1962 18.08.1970 29.10.1952 05.07.1950 20.12.1958 26.07.1956 14.03.1983 22.08.1991 27.06.2006 07.02.1964 03.08.1954 02.05.1959 17.12.1953 20.06.1961 21.04.1964 03.08.1951 31.01.1974 12.06.1951 10.02.1956 26.05.1976

Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka

23.10.1961 15.02.1956 06.10.1952 26.11.1954 14.03.1961 15.10.1975 01.06.1954 10.05.1954 05.05.1964 14.02.1986 18.09.1981 01.04.1981 23.08.1984 29.08.1953 21.05.1976 18.05.1963 18.05.1963 16.10.2001 08.11.1984 10.06.1965 27.04.1973 06.07.1981 12.07.1962 31.03.1952 04.08.1952 28.02.1959

158

Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad Tobago Tunisia Turkey and

23.09.1957 13.10.1976 28.06.1973 28.12.1953 31.03.1950 02.11.1953 12.12.1962 29.12.1954 06.01.1962 13.04.1978 24.09.1963 04.05.1957 10.02.1954

Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Emirates United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Arab

19.02.1981 18.05.1964 03.08.1954 10.05.1972 23.09.1957 02.08.1955 05.03.1969 27.10.1982 13.02.1956 28.06.1957 16.07.1970 19.10.1966 07.03.1983

159

IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAR-CRIME DATA
Category of War Crime

Name

Simo Zari!

Miroslav Tadi!

Rasim Deli!

Affiliation (Possible civilian) Bosnian Serb; assistant commander for intelligence, reconnaissance, morale, and information in the 4th detachment; chief of national security; deputy to president of the civilian council in Od"ak (Possible civilian) Bosnian Serb; commander for logistics, commander of civil protection staff, member of Crisis Staff, member of exchange commission Bosniak; chief of staff of Main Staff of army of Bosnia Herzegovina

War Crime

encouraged torture and mistreatment of non-Serb detainees

Policy

aided and abetted deportation of non-Serb civilians; failed to prevent cruel treatment of detainees; intended to have non-Serb civilians displaced did not prevent crimes being committed by his subordinates in Camps rape, torture, and cruel treatment of prisoners (e.g., beat detainee until death; placed restrictions on water for detainees; cruelly informed prisoners that they would die with or without medical assistance; raped two females) failure to punish or prevent cruel treatment failure to punish or prevent plundering inhumane and cruel treatment and humiliation of civilians and prisoners; plunder of property; forced labor and unlawful detainment

Policy

Policy

Hazim Deli! Enver Had"ihasanovi!

Amir Kubura

Bosniak; deputy commander of #elebi!i prison camp Bosniak; senior officer of Bosnian Army Bosniak; senior officer of Bosnian Army

Individual but also Policy

Policy

Policy

Vinko Martinovi!

Bosnian Croat; commander of paramilitary unit

Individual

160

Zlatko Aleksovski

Bosnian Croat; commander of prison facility

Ivica Raji!

Bosnian Croat; commander of units of HVO

Mladen "Tuta" Naletili!

Bosnian Croat; founder and commander of paramilitary force Bosnian Croat; local commander of military police and "Jokers" unit of Bosnian Croat Army

Vladimir $anti!

Drago Josipovi!

Bosnian Croat; member of Bosnian Croat forces Bosnian Croat; member of "Jokers" unit of HVO police Bosnian Muslim; guard at #elebi!i prison camp Bosnian Serb; assistant commander for logistics for Bosnian Serb army Bosnian Serb; assistant commander for security and intelligence of brigade of Bosnian Serb Army Bosnian Serb; chief of engineering for Brigade in Srebrenica and Bratunac

Miroslav Bralo

Esad Land"o

%or&e %uki!

Momir Nikoli!

Dragan Joki!

Unlawful and inhumane treatment of prisoners (selected prisoners for use as human shields) commanded attack on civilian villages in Bosnia; detained civilians, abused families, and sexually abused women; ordered detention of Bosnian Croat officials and Muslim men able to join military committed torture, beatings, murder, and cruel treatment of prisoners of war and civilians; ordered destruction of Bosnian Muslim houses in Doljani actively took part in military attack on civilians and his presence encouraged his subordinates; murder of innocent man actively took part in military attack on civilians; murder of innocent man in front of his family; displacement of family and burning of its home confined Bosnian Muslim civilians (and a woman for two years' worth of sexual violations) personally tortured detainees in gruesome and cruel ways aided and abetted Bosnian Serb army's shelling of civilian targets in Sarajevo participated in cruel torture, beating, and murder of civilians; personally transferred Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica aiding murder and extermination (through facilitating technology for inhumane acts, like tools to dig mass graves, etc.)

Individual

Individual but also Policy

Individual

Individual

Individual but also Policy

Individual

Individual

Policy

Individual

Policy

161

Stevan Todorovi!

Dragan Obrenovi!

Dragomir Milo'evi!

Bosnian Serb; chief of police and member of Serb Crisis Staff Bosnian Serb; chief of staff and deputy commander of infantry brigade of Bosnian Serb Army Bosnian Serb; chief of staff to Stanislav Galic, commander of Sarajevo Romanija corps of Bosnian Serb Army; succeeded Galic as Corps Commander

beating, torture, and sexual torture of detainees and civilians; issued orders that denied rights to civilians helped organize (and failed to prevent) cruel treatment and murder of civilians

Individual but also Policy

Policy

Momir Tali!

Bosnian Serb; chief of staff/deputy commander of JNA corps in Bosnia

Radislav Krsti!

Zoran (igi!

Vidoje Blagojevi!

Bosnian Serb; chiefof-staff/deputy commander of Drina corps of Bosnian Serb Army Bosnian Serb; civilian mobilized as police officer at Omarska and Trnopolje camps Bosnian Serb; commander of Brigade

carried out campaign of sniping and shelling attacks on civilians in Sarajevo to instill terror without military advantage or purpose planned and helped implement genocide, torture, deportation, persecutions of civilians and plundering of their property; inhumane and cruel treatment of civilians and prisoners of war helped plan attack on Srebrenica enclave, as well as a campaign of shelling and other attacks to produce terror in populace; willingly gave his corps for the use of genocide and other persecutions in Srebrenica participated in cruel torture, beating, and murder of detainees murder of Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica and Bratunac failed to prevent the torture and murder of detainees; authorized his subordinates to deport detainees as well as use them for forced labor; failed to better the harsh conditions of the detention camp murder; failed to prevent inhumane conditions and cruel treatment (and rapes) of detainees

Policy

Policy

Policy

Individual

Policy

Milorad Krnojelac

Du'ko Sikirica

Bosnian Serb; commander of detention camp in Bosnia Bosnian Serb; commander of security at Keraterm detention camp

Policy Individual but also Policy

162

Predrag Banovi!

Bosnian Serb; guard at Keraterm camp

Milojica Kos

Goran Jelisi!

Bosnian Serb; guard shift leader at Omarska camp Bosnian Serb; held position at Luka camp Bosnian Serb; leader of reconnaisance unit of army Bosnian Serb; major general based around Sarajevo Bosnian Serb; member of "White Eagles," paramilitary group Bosnian Serb; member of special police unit

Committed torture, beatings, and murder of prisoners failed to prevent cruel treatment of detainees and took part in some torture and murder of detainees murder, cruel treatment, plunder tortured and raped (as well as gang-raped) victims; enslaved two women conducted campaign of daily attacks to instill terror through Sarajevo

Individual

Individual but also Policy

Individual

Dragoljub Kunarac

Individual

Stanislav Gali!

Policy Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

Mitar Vasiljevi!

Darko Mr&a

Ranko #e'i!

Bosnian Serb; member of Territorial Defense force and later police force

Miroslav Kvo)ka

Dragoljub Prca!

Bosnian Serb; police officer at Omarska camp Bosnian Serb; policeman and crime technician for Omarska camp; administrative assistant to commander of camp

murdered five men execution-style took part in and aided other policemen in shooting and killing 200 unarmed men murder, humiliation, degrading treatment, rape, and sexual violations (e.g., forcing men to perform fellatio on one another at gunpoint) failed to prevent cruel treatment of detainees; aided and abetted (or took part in) torture and murders of detainees

Individual

Individual but also Policy

Mla&o Radi!

Miroslav Deronji! Dragan Kolund"ija Dra"en Erdemovi!

Bosnian Serb; policeman and shift leader at Omarska camp Bosnian Serb; president of Bratunac Crisis Staff Bosnian Serb; shift commander at Keraterm camp Bosnian Serb; soldier

failed to prevent cruel treatment of detainees failed to prevent cruel treatment of detainees; actively took part in torture, sexual harassment and violence, and murder of detainees gave orders to Territorial Defense to attack Glogova failed to prevent inhumane conditions of camp murder (by firing squad) of 70 Bosnian Muslims in

Individual but also Policy

Individual but also Policy

Policy

Individual Individual but also

163

Srebrenica Bosnian Serb; soldier and military policeman in Foca Bosnian Serb; subcommander of military police Bosnian Serb; subcommander of military police Civilian Bosnian Croat; President of Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna torture, rape, and gangrape of civilian women and girls detained (in his apartment), raped, enslaved, and sold women

Policy

Dragan Zelenovi!

Individual

Radomir Kova)

Individual

Zoran Vukovi!

Dario Kordi!

Radoslav Br&anin

Blagoje Simi!

Milan Simi!

Civilian Bosnian Serb in Krajina Civilian Bosnian Serb; highest ranking civilian official in municipality of Bosanski Samac Civilian Bosnian Serb; member of crisis staff; president of municipal assembly

raped 15-year-old girl "planned, instigated, and ordered crimes" and attacks on civilians; ordered detention of Bosnian Muslims aided and abetted Bosnian Serb forces in their inhuman and cruel treatment of civilians

Individual

Policy

Policy

failed to prevent largescale policy of persecution and displacements

Policy

Milan Kova)evi!

Mom)ilo Kraji'nik

Civilian Bosnian Serb; member of Prijedor Crisis Staff Civilian Bosnian Serb; speaker of National Assembly of RBS, later member of expanded presidency of RBS

Biljana Plav'i!

Civilian Bosnian Serb; president of Bosnian Serb Republic (Republicka Srpska)

torture and beating of detainees genocide; ordered and carried out plan to deport and destroy Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats responsible for forced displacement, persecution, deportation, extermination, and inhumane acts against Muslim and Croat civilians organized and helped carry out persecutions of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croat, and other nonSerbs; supported ethnic separation that led to forced deportations and other cruel treatment of civilians; invited and in fact supported paramilitaries to help enforce ethnic separation; used public statements to "justify use of force against non-Serbs"

Individual

Policy

Policy

Policy

164

Du'ko Tadi!

Civilian Bosnian Serb; president of Local Board of Serb Democratic Party in Kozarac Civilian Bosnian Serb; president of Prijedor Municipality Crisis Staff; head of Municipal Council for National Defence in Prijedor

Milomir Staki!

Slavko Dokmanovi!

Civilian Croat Serb; president of Vukovar region

Slobodan Milo'evi!

Civilian Serb; President of Serbia, President of Supreme Defence Council, Supreme Commander of Yugoslav Army Croat Serb; PM and President of Krajina

Milan Babi!

Anto Furund"ija

Croat; commander of a unit of HVO

Ante Gotovina

Croat; Colonel General in Croatian Army and Commander of Split Military District

Mladen Marka)

Croat; Assistant Minister of Interior in charge of Special Police matters

actively participated in detainment of civilians to detention camps; torture and murder of civilians led campaign of ethnic cleansing of the municipality; organized and ordered deportation of non-Serb residents of municipality; established camps (e.g., Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje) aided and abetted as JVA and Serb paramilitaries beat and murdered nonSerbs from the Vukovar hospital organized and helped carry out the forced deportation of civilians in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia, as well as sexual assaults, murder, plunder, imprisonment, and torture of civilians; obstructed humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves; organized and carried out unlawful attacks on civilian sites for no clear military advantage Actively helped those explicitly committing war crimes torture and rape of woman and torture of Croatian soldier (by his subordinates) helped in the planning and preparation of "persecution, deportation, plunder, wanton destruction, two counts of murder, inhumane acts and cruel treatment" in Krajina region during Operation Storm helped in the planning and preparation of "persecution, deportation, plunder, wanton destruction, two counts of murder, inhumane acts and cruel treatment" in Krajina region during Operation Storm

Individual

Policy

Policy

Policy

Individual

Policy

Policy

Policy

165

Mario #erkez

Croat; commander of brigade of HVO

Zdravko Muci!

Croat; Commander of Celebi!i prisoncamp

Janko Bobetko

Croat; chief of main staff of Croatian army

Tihomir Bla'ki!

Mile Mrk'i!

Croat; HVO general and commander Serb; colonel in Yugoslav People's Army, commander of brigade for south; promoted to general in JNA and commander of operational group in Kordun

"unlawful confinement of civilians," inhumane and cruel treatment of civilians deliberately created inhumane conditions and terror for Bosnian Serb detainees; failed to prevent torture, cruel treatment, and beatings of detainees helped in organizing and carrying out persecutions of Serb civilians; inhuman treatment of civilians; theft of civilians' property inhuman treatment: human shields, beatings, etc. ; cruel treatment; ordered attacks against civilians withdrew JNA officers from guarding POWs at Ov) ara, which allowed Territorial Defence and paramilitary forces to commit murders; failed to prevent murders and other mistreatment participated in cruel torture, beating, and murder of detainees, and assisted in transporting female detainees for rape purposes violations of war or customs of war; failed to prevent murder, cruel treatment, devastation not necessary by war, destruction of historical and religious sites by his subordinates failed to prevent (and in fact most likely helped organize) attacks on civilian targets in Dubrovnik; and failed to punish perpetrators of said attacks murder, rape, inhumane acts, cruel treatment of civilians

Individual but also Policy

Policy

Policy

Individual but also Policy

Policy

Dragan Nikoli!

Serb; commander of detention camp

Individual but also Policy

Miodrag Joki!

Serb; commander of navy Serb; commander of second operational group formed by JNA (for military campaign against Dubrovnik) Serb; leader of Serbian paramilitary

Policy

Pavle Strugar (eljko Ra"natovi! "Arkan"

Policy

Individual

166

Milan Marti!

Serb; President, Minister of Defence, Minister of Internal Affairs in Serbiancontrolled Krajina

Mom)ilo Peri'i!

Vujadin Popovi!

Serb; chief of general staff of Yugoslav Army Bosnian Serb; Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Security of the Drina Corps, RBS army

Ljubi'a Beara

Drago Nikoli!

Ljubomir Borov)anin

Radivoje Mileti!

Milan Gvero

Vinko Pandurevi!

Bosnian Serb; Chief of Security in the RBS Main Staff Bosnian Serb; Chief of Security in the Zvornik Brigade, Second Lieutenant in RBS army Bosnian Serb; Deputy Commander of the Special Police Brigade (SBP) of the MUP Forces Bosnian Serb; Chief of the Administration for Operations and Training at the RBS Main Staff Bosnian Serb; Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs of the RBS Main Staff Bosnian Serb; Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel in RBS army

intended to displace Croat and non-Serb population from Serbian-controlled Krajina; failed to prevent persecutions; ordered shelling of Zagreb in 1995 aided and abetted in planning and carrying out of military campaign on Sarajevo civilians; failed to prevent the detrimental effects of this military campaign on civilians; aided and abetted plans of deportation and other inhumane acts against the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up) forced deportation, murder, genocide, extermination, inhumane treatment (postSrebrenica cover-up)

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

Policy

167

Milan Luki!

Bosnian Serb; head of "White Eagles," paramilitary group Bosnian Serb; a police officer in Vi'egrad

aiding and abetting persecution, murder, extermination, cruel treatment, inhumane acts aiding and abetting persecution, murder, extermination, cruel treatment, inhumane acts

Policy

Sredoje Luki!

Policy

168

V. NATIONAL COURTS WAR-CRIME DATA

(1) BOSNIAN COURTS
Name (last name, first name) Category of War Crime Year of Crime Year of Trial/Notes
appealed but upheld; helped El Mujahid extremist group perpetrate crimes; 2006

Affiliation

War Crime
war crimes against civilians: unlawful detention and torture of Croatian citizens war crimes against civilians: participated in and failed to prevent mistreatment and torture of civilian detainees crimes against humanity: torture, murder, rapes; participated in attack on Bosnian enclaves by RBS Army

Maktouf, Abduladhim

born in Iraq; Bosnian citizen; member of RBiH Army

Individual

1993

Andrun, Nikola

Croat; member of HVO Brigade Knez Domagoj; Deputy Head of Camp

Individual

September/ October 1993

appealed but upheld; 2006

Damjanovi!, Dragan

Kova)evi!, Nikola

Serb; member of RBS Army Serb; member of local Serb Defence Forces (SOS) that later became special unit of Territorial Defence (in 22 April 1992) in Sanski Most Municipality of Krajina Montenegrin; citizen of Serbia and BH; senior officer of Serbian military formation of Rogatica Battalion

Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2006

crimes against humanity: torture, unlawful detainment and transferal of civilians; failed to prevent widespread and systematic attacks on civilians

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2006

Paunovi!, Dragoje

crimes against humanity: ordered subordinates to use civilians as human shields and kill them

Policy

appealed, but upheld. 2006. Document states it was part of policy by Crisis Staff of SDS Rogatica and Serb Army

169

Samard"i!, Ne&o

Samard"ija, Marko

Bosnian Serb; member of army of Serb Republic of RBiH Bosnian Serb; Commander of 3rd Company of Sanica Battalion of Bosnian Serb Army Bosnian Serb; member of reserve police forces of RBS

crimes against humanity: sexual slavery, rape, and forcible transfer of civilians crimes against humanity: ordered subordinates to commit mass murder against civilians crimes against humanity: participated in small-scale attacks on villages, rapes, murders crimes against humanity: established women's detention center at order of higher official; subjected detainees to rape, sexual assault, and forced labor (even outside detention center) war crimes against civilians: torture of civilian detainees war crimes against civilians: torture of civilian detainees crimes against humanity: ordered detention of civilians; ordered murder and attacks on civilians; rape, torture, and forcible transfer of civilians

Individual but also Policy

2006

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2006

$im'i!, Boban

Individual

appealed; 2006

Stankovi!, Radovan

Bosnian Serb; member of Miljevina Battalion of Serb Army

Individual but also Policy

transferred from ICTY; aquitted of some counts of rape; 2006

Damjanovi!, Goran

Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Army

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2007

Damjanovi!, Zoran

Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Army

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2007

Jankovi!, Gojko

Bosnian Serb; Lieutenant in Serbian Army of RBiH in Kraljevo

Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2007

170

Jankovi!, Zoran

Bosnian Serb; member of army of Serb Republic of RBiH

Ljubinac, Radisav

Lu)i!, Kre'o

Mandi!, Mom)ilo

Bosnian Serb; member of army of Serb Republic of RBiH Bosnian Croat; Commander of HVO military police Civilian Bosnian Serb; deputy Minister of the Interior of Serb Republic of RBiH

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: human shields; torture; forcible transfer and Individual other but also inhumane acts Policy

appealed but upheld; 2007

appealed but upheld; 2007

NOT GUILTY

June/July 1993

appealed, but aquitted; 2007

Palija, Jadranko

Bosnian Serb; member of Serb Army in Krajina

Rami!, Niset

Bosniak; member of RBiH army

Tanaskovi!, Nenad

Vukovi!, Radmilo

Bosnian Serb; reserve policeman of RBS Bosnian Serb; member of army of Serb Republic of RBiH

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: actively took part in military attack on civilians; war crimes against civilians: rape, unlawful Individual imprisonment, but also Policy torture failed to protect civilians in times of war; war crimes against civilians Individual crimes against humanity: engaged in small-scale attacks on villages; unlawful imprisonment; murder; torture; rape; Individual forcible but also transfer Policy

2007

appealed but upheld; 2007

1992

appealed but upheld; 2007

appealed but mostly upheld; 2007

NOT GUILTY

appealed and aquitted; 2007

171

Ali!, $efik

Bosniak; Assistant for Security to the Commander of the Hamza Battalion Bosniak; member of Bosnian Territorial Defence and prison guard Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Military Police Unit Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Military Police Unit Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Military Police Unit Bosnian Serb; member of Serbian Military Police Unit

Bjeli!, Veiz

war crimes against prisoners of war war crimes against civilians: rape, torture; war crimes against prisoners of war

Individual

1995

Prosecution appealed and was charged as guilty; second instance appealed, but upheld; 2008, 2011

Individual

1992-1993

2008

Bo"i!, Zdravko

Blagojevi!, Mladen

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: opened fire on Bosniak civilian who had been detained in a primary school Individual

2008

2008

(ivanovi!, Zoran

NOT GUILTY

2008

Zari!, (eljko

Fu'tar, Du'an

Serb (from Serbia); shift leader at Keraterm camp

Kapi!, Suad

Bosniak; member of RBiH army

Kurtovi!, Zijad

Bosniak; member of RBiH army

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: failed to protect detainees from torture, ill treatment, or worse Policy war crimes against prisoners of war: killed four POWs Individual war crimes against civilians: tortured, humiliated, exposed to forced labor, and sexually assaulted Croat civilians; destruction of Individual

2008

2008 appealed by Prosecution, found guilty; 2008

1995

1993

appealed but upheld; 2008

172

cultural and historical monuments Bosnian Serb; deputy warden in Zvornik prison Bosnian Serb; Zvornik prison guard Bosnian Serb; Zvornik prison guard Bosnian Serb; Zvornik prison guard Bosnian Serb; member of reserve force of Public Security Station Visegrad aided and abetted and participated in torture and sexual abuse of detainees allowed Serb soldiers to mistreat detainees tortured a detainee tortured several detainees crimes against humanity: forced displacement, rape, sexual slavery, illegal imprisonment war crimes against civilians: conveyed orders from his superiors to his subordinates to attack Bosnian Muslim village; forced displacement crimes against humanity: participated in attacks on civilians; murder; forced labor; torture

Lazarevi!, Sreten

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2008

Stanojevi!, Dragan Markovi!, Mile Ostoji!, Slobodan

appealed but upheld; 2008 appealed but upheld; 2008 appealed but upheld; 2008

Individual

Individual

Lelek, (eljko

Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2008

Ljubi)i!, Pa'ko

Bosnian Croat; Commander of HVO Military Police Battalion in Central Bosnia

Policy

1993

2008

Mihaljevi!, Zdravko

Mitrovi!, Petar

Bosnian Croat; member of HVO Battalion Bosnian Serb; member of Serb police platoon

Individual

1993

appealed, but upheld; 2008, 2011

Pekez, Mirko (brother 1)

Serb (from Serbia); member of RBS Army

genocide of Srebrenica war crimes against civilians: rounding up and killing civilians in retaliation for death of comrade

Policy

2008

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

173

Pekez, Mirko (brother 2)

Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army

Savi!, Milorad

Pin)i!, Zrinko

Ra'evi!, Mitar

Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army Bosnian Croat; member of Croatian Defence Council; secretary of HVO Hrasnica Bosnian Serb; commander of prison guards at Fo)a KP Dom Bosnian Serb; assistant warden at Fo)a KP Dom

war crimes against civilians: rounding up and killing civilians in retaliation for death of comrade war crimes against civilians: rounding up and killing civilians in retaliation for death of comrade

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

Todovi!, Savo

$aki!, Slavko

Bosnian Croat; member of HVO Special Purposes Unit

Sipi!, Idhan

$krobi!, Marko

Stevanovi!, Miladin

Bosniak; member of RBiH army Bosnian Croat; member of Kotor Varos HVO Unit Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS

war crimes against civilians: rape crimes against humanity: punishment and mistreatment of detainees crimes against humanity: punishment and mistreatment of detainees failed to protect civilians in time of war: unlawful detainment; torture; forced labor war crimes against civilians: murder of civilian woman war crimes against civilian: murder

Individual

November 1992-March 1993

2008

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2008

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2008

Individual

July 1993

2008

Individual

1995

2008

Individual

July 1992

appealed but upheld; 2008

NOT GUILTY

2008

174

Stupar, Milo'

Trifunovi!, Milenko

D"ini!, Brano

Radovanovi!, Aleksandar

Jakovljevi!, Slobodan

Medan, Branislav

Todorovi!, Mirko

Radi!, Milo'

Bosnian Serb; commander of special police detachment of RBS Bosnian Serb; commander of police platoon of RBS Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2008

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2008

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2008

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2008

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2008

Todorovi!, Vaso

Vrdoljak, Ivica

Vukovi!, Ranko

Vukovi!, Rajko

Bosnian Serb; special police officer for RBS Bosnian Croat; member of HVO brigade Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army

genocide of Srebrenica crimes against humanity: torture and murder crimes against humanity: torture and murder crimes against humanity: murder; forcible displacement; participated in campaigns to do both of the above individual tasks together war crimes against civilians: torture

Policy

2008

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

Policy end of Juneend of July 1992

2008

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2008

NOT GUILTY

appealed and aquitted; 2008

NOT GUILTY

appealed and aquitted; 2008

175

Bundalo, Ratko

Zeljaja, Ne&o

Bosnian Serb; commander of Kalinovik Tactical Group of RBS Bosnian Serb; commander of Public Security Station of RBS Bosnian Serb; member of illegal armed formations in RBS

crimes against humanity; war crimes against civilians; war crimes against prisoners of war crimes against humanity; war crimes against civilians; war crimes against prisoners of war war crimes against civilians: failed to protect civilians in time of war war crimes against civilians: ordered subordinates to attack Panjik village and Tuzla town (UN safe area) carried out plan to forcible transfer civilian Muslim population; murder; inhumane treatment crimes against humanity: killed two individuals

Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2009 and 2011

Individual but also Policy

%oki!, Dragan

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2009 and 2011 found guilty in Croatian court, but wanted to serve in Bosnia; appealed but upheld; 2009

%uki!, Novak

Bosnian Serb; commander of Ozren Tactical Group of RBS Army

Policy

2009

%uri!, Gordan

Golubovi!, Blagoje

Bosnian Serb; reserve policeman of RBS Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army

Policy Individual but also Policy

2009

Hod"i!, Ferid

Bosniak; member of Territorial Defence for RBiH Bosnian Croat (but fought for Serbs); member of RBS police

Ivankovi!, Damir

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: forcible transfer; murder; inhumane treatment Policy

May 1992January 1993

2009 appealed but upheld; 2009; it was not proved he had sufficient superiorsubordinate position to control those below him in rank

2009

176

Kova!, Ante

Kujund"i!, Predrag

Bosnian Croat; commander of brigade military police of HVO Bosnian Serb; commander of Predo's Wolves (paramilitary working within military then within police of RBS)

war crimes against civilians: ordered subordinates to unlawfully detain and mistreat civilians; rape

Individual but also Policy

April-May 1993

appealed but upheld; 2009

Mari!, Zoran

Mejaki!, (eljko

Gruban, Mom)ilo

Kne"evi!, Du'ko

Nika)evi!, Miodrag

Perkovi!, Stojan

Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army Bosnian Serb; chief of security guards at Omarska camp Bosnian Serb; commander of one of three guard shifts at Omarska camp Civilian Bosnian Serb; no official position at Omarska camp or Keraterm camp (not part of security apparatus) Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army Bosnian Serb; commander of a company of RBS Army

crimes against humanity: rape, torture, inhumane treatment; forcible transfer; military attack on village war crimes against civilians: rounding up and killing civilians in retaliation for death of comrade crimes against humanity: murder, forced imprisonment, torture, rape

Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2009

Individual

2009

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2009

crimes against humanity: murder, forced imprisonment, torture, rape

Policy

appealed but upheld; 2009

crimes against humanity: murder, forced imprisonment, torture, rape crimes against humanity: rape, forced imprisonment crimes against humanity: forced imprisonment, torture, rape

Individual

appealed but upheld; 2009 appealed but partially upheld; 2009

Individual

Individual

2009

177

Radi!, Marko

Bosnian Croat; commander of HVO battalion

$unji!, Dragan

Bosnian Croat; Deputy Commander of the Vojno prison facility, member of HVO battalion

Brekalo, Damir

Bosnian Croat; member of HVO Battalion

Vra)evi!, Mirko

Savi!, Krsto

Bosnian Croat; member of HVO Battalion and guard of Vojno prison Bosnian Serb; Chief of the Trebinje Security Service Center and Minister of the Interior of the Serb Autonomous Region (SAO) of Herzegovina and Staff of the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

crimes against humanity: unlawful imprisonment, murder, forced labor, rape crimes against humanity: ordered inhumane treatment of detainees to create and maintain atmosphere of terror; forced imprisonment, torture, rape, murder crimes against humanity: aided and abetted in murder and abuse of detainees; rape, torture crimes against humanity: as guard, allowed subordinates to torture, rape, and otherwise abuse detainees; tortured, raped, abused detainees himself

Individual

July 1993March 1994

appealed but upheld; 2009, 2011

Individual but also Policy

August 1993-March 1994

appealed but upheld; 2009, 2011

Individual but also Policy

July 1993March 1994

appealed but upheld; 2009, 2011

Individual but also Policy

July 1993March 1994

appealed but upheld; 2009, 2011

crimes against humanity: forcible transfer, murder, torture

Policy

JuneSeptember 1992

appealed but upheld; 2009

178

Mu)ibabi!, Milko

Bosnian Serb; police officer of the SJB Nevesinje Bosnian Serb; member of paramilitary, commander of brigade of RBS Army

crimes against humanity: forcible transfer, unlawful imprisonment, torture

Individual but also Policy

JuneSeptember 1992

appealed but upheld; 2009

Savi!, Momir

Trbi!, Milorad

Bosnian Serb; Reserve Captain in the RBS Army

Veselinovi!, Rade

Bosnian Serb; member of RBS police

Babi!, Zoran

Bastah, Predrag

Vi'kovi!, Goran

Bosnian Serb; member of police unit Bosnian Serb; member of reserve RBS Army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Army

NOT GUILTY genocide of Srebrenica: participated in and ordered his subordinates to murder and mistreat civilians Policy crimes against humanity: unlawful imprisonment in detention center, torture, Individual forced labor, but also sexual assault Policy crimes against humanity: murder, forcible transfer, forced imprisonment Policy crimes against humanity: torture, murder crimes against humanity: torture, murder

2009

appealed but upheld; 2009

2009

no document available; 2010

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

appealed but upheld; 2010

appealed but upheld; 2010

Bo'ki!, Marko

Bosnian Croat (but fought for Serbs); member of Bosnian Serb police unit

#eti!, Ljubi'a

Bosnian Serb; reserve police officer for RBS

crimes against humanity: carried out orders to murder civilians in Srebrenica crimes against humanity: forcible transfer, murder, inhumane

Policy

Boston.com article http://www.bo ston.com/news /local/articles/ 2004/08/27/w ar_crimes_sus pect_charged_ in_boston/ ;2010

Policy

2010

179

treatment Bosnian Serb; member of Training Centre of Special Police Brigade of RBS Bosnian Croat; Secretary with the Municipal Secretariat for National Defence and later commander of HV First Battalion of Osijek Defenders Bosniak; member of RBiH Brigade

*irkovi!, Milivoje

crimes against humanity: murder

Individual

no document available; 2010

Glava', Branimir

Jakupovi!, Elvir

Karaji!, Suljo

Kli)kovi!, Gojko

Drlja)a, Mladen

Ostoji!, Jovan Novali!, *erim

Vukovi!, Radomir

Bosniak; commander of platoon of military police of RBiH Civilian Bosnian Serb; high office in municipality of Bosanska Krupa Civilian Bosnian Serb; Commission for Concessions of Republika Srpska Bosnian Serb; former Lieutenant Colonel of JNA Bosniak; member of army of RBiH Bosnian Serb; member of special police force of RBS

war crimes against civilians: ordered his subordinates to torture and murder civilians war crimes against prisoners of war war crimes against prisoners of war and war crimes against civilians: torture and murder

Policy

JulyDecember 1991

2010 no document available; 2010

Individual

Individual but also Policy

August 1994February 1995

2010

NOT GUILTY

2010

NOT GUILTY

2010

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: rape Individual

2010 September 1992

genocide of Srebrenica

Policy

2010 appealed and overturned, awaiting further trial; 2010, 2011

180

Tomi!, Zoran

Bosnian Serb; member of special police force of RBS

Ani!, Miroslav

Bosnian Croat; member of special purpose unit of HVO

Bogdanovi!, Velibor

Bosnian Croat; member of HVO in Mostar

Hand"i!, Enes

Bosniak; commanding officer of military police of 307th brigade of RBiH army

$ego, Osman

Tomi!, Ljubo

Josi!, Krsto

Bosniak; military policeman of the 307th Brigade of the RBiH Army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS Bosnian Serb; member of RBS

genocide of Srebrenica followed orders to attack villages of Grahovci, Han Plo)a, and Stupni Do; mistreatment, killing, torture of civilians war crimes against civilians; sexual assault; unlawful detention of civilians war crimes against civilians: torture, murder of surrendered civilians; failed to prevent subordinates' actions; ordered subordinates to detain and torture detainees war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment and transferal of civilians, murder, forced labor

Policy

appealed and overturned, awaiting further trial; 2010, 2011

Individual but also Policy

June 1993October 1993

2011

Individual

May 1993

2011

Individual but also Policy

July 1993March 1994

2011

Individual

July 1993

2011 appealed and acquitted; 2011 appealed and acquitted; 2011

NOT GUILTY

June 1992

Lalovic, Radoje

Bosnian Serb; warden of Correctional Institution (KPD) Butmir

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, inhumane conditions, forced labor Policy

June 1992

MayDecember 1992

2011

181

Soniboj, $kiljevi!

Bosnian Serb; deputy warden of Correctional Institution (KPD) Butmir Bosnian Serb; member of Crisis Staff of Klju) Municipality, Commander of Klju) Town Defense Command, and Deputy Commander of Klju) Battalion of TD Bosnian Serb; Commander of TD Staff of Klju) Municipality, member of Crisis Staff of Klju) Municipality and member of Klju) Town Defense Command Bosnian Serb; member of Bosnian Serb Kosovo Battalion Bosnian Croat; member of HVO's Jastrebovi sabotagereconnaissan ce platoon Bosnian Serb; member of Eagles of Grme) squad in RBS army

war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, inhumane conditions, forced labor

Policy

MayDecember 1992

2011

Adamovi!, Marko

NOT GUILTY

AprilDecember 1992

no document available; 2011

Luki!, Bo'ko

Bari)anin, Sa'a

NOT GUILTY crimes against humanity: sexual assault; unlawful detention of civilians; murder Individual

AprilDecember 1992

no document available; 2011

July 1992

2011

Doli!, Darko

NOT GUILTY war crimes against prisoners of war: murder of BiH soldier

July-August 1993

2011

Gaji!, Pavle

Individual

November 1994

2011

182

Ku'i!, Zoran

Markovi!, Miodrag

Bosnian Serb; member of training center for Special Police Brigade of RBS Army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS army

crimes against humanity: murder of Bosniak at order of superior war crimes against civilians: rape war crimes against prisoners of war: murder, torture, inhumane treatment, forced labor crimes against humanity: rape, murder

Policy

July 1995

2011

Individual

July 1992

2011

Osmi!, Alija

Tripkovi!, Novica

Bosniak; military police officer of BiH army Bosnian Serb; member of RBS army

Individual

July 1993March 1994

2011

Individual

April-June 1992

2011

183

(2) CROATIAN COURTS3

Name (last name, first name) Category of War Crime Year of Crime Year of Conviction /Notes

Affiliation
Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; policeman of SAO Krajina Croatian Serb; policeman of SAO Krajina Croat; member of Karlovac Police Administratio n Croat; deputy commander of HV battalion Croat; commander of HV battalion Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary

War Crime
war crimes against civilians: torture, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, mistreatment war crimes against civilians: torture, mistreatment

Keji!, Jablan

Individual

2011

Ivani'evi!, Stevo

Individual

October 1991-March 1992

2011

Baljak, Neboj'a

Individual

October 1991-March 1992

2011

Gojak, (eljko

crime against humanity: murder

Individual

October 1991 January 1991February 1992 January 1991February 1992

2011

Sokol, Goran

NOT GUILTY

2011

Husnjak, Ivan

NOT GUILTY

2011

Amanovi!, Goran

Munjes, Nikola

Jovi!, #edo

Croatian Serb; police member of Serb Krajina Serb; commander of military police unit of RBS

Cekinovi!, Mi!o 3

Serb; commander of territorial defence force of SAO Krajina military

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: mistreatment, unlawful detainment Individual war crimes against civilians: failed Individual to prevent but also torture Policy war crimes against civilians: ordered subordinates to mistreat civilians; tortured civilians; forced Policy displacement

1991-1994

2011

September 1991

2011

appealed but upheld; 2010

2010

Trials that were conducted in absentia are shaded in gray. 184

Zja)i!, Goran

Serb; member of police company of RBS Army

Jankovi!, Nedjeljko

Serb; member of bridage of JNA

Kosturin, Ivica

Croat; member of HV forces

Vrban, Damir

Croat; member of HV forces Croat; member of HV guard brigade

war crime against prisoners: torture war crimes against civilians: forced displacement of civilians from Krajina war crimes against civilians: torture and murder of civiilian war crimes against civilians: torture and murder of civiilian war crimes against civilians: murder and sexual assault

Individual

objections by monitoring group; 2010

Policy

OctoberNovember 1991

2010

Individual

September 1991

2010

Individual

September 1991

2010

Ragu", Damir Vide

Individual

November 1991

$kledar, (eljko

Croat; member of HV guard brigade

Kuzmi!, Bogdan

Miri!, Ivica

Serb; member of reserve unit of JNA Croat; HV Sisak Police Administratio n reserve unit member

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: murder, unlawful confinement (Vukovar hospital) war crimes against civilians: murder of Serb civilian war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, destruction of property war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, destruction of property

November 1991

2010 couldn't prove he acted in concert with Damir Vide Raguz; 2010 tried in absentia and cannot be enforced in Bosnia where he resides; 2010

Individual

October 1991

2010

%ermanovi!, Pero

Serb; member of illegal armed formations of SAO Krajina

Individual but also Policy

2010

Bradari!, Ljuban

Serb; member of illegal armed formations of SAO Krajina

Individual but also Policy

2010

185

#avi!, Dubravko

Serb; member of illegal armed formations of SAO Krajina

#avi!, Ljubi'a

Serb; member of illegal armed formations of SAO Krajina Croat; member of HV army Serb; member of paramilitary unit in Krajina Serb; member of paramilitary unit in Krajina Serb; member of paramilitary unit in Krajina Serb; commander of paramilitary unit in Krajina Serb; member of paramilitary in Krajina Serb; member of paramilitary in Krajina

Vuku'i!, Bo"idar

war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, destruction of property war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, destruction of property war crimes against civilians: murder

Individual but also Policy

2010

Individual but also Policy

2010

Individual

December 1991

Bijeli!, Miroslav

war crimes against civilians: murder

Policy

Pade"anin, Savo

war crimes against civilians: murder

Policy

Tep'i!, Duro

war crimes against civilians: murder

Policy

Bjelo', Rade

war crimes against civilians: murder

Policy

2010 tried in absentia and cannot be enforced where he resides; 2010 tried in absentia and cannot be enforced where he resides; 2010 tried in absentia and cannot be enforced where he resides; 2010 tried in absentia and cannot be enforced where he resides; 2010

Pesla!, Sreten

NOT GUILTY

2009

%uri!, Duro

Kufner, Damir

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

$imi!, Davor

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: torture, Individual murder, illegal but also detainment Policy war crimes against civilians: torture, Individual murder, illegal but also detainment Policy

2009

November 1991February 1992

2009

November 1991February 1992

2009

186

Vanca', Pavao

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

Poletto, Tomica

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

Tuti!, Zeljko

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

Ivezi!, Antun

Croat; member of HV platoon of military police

war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment

Individual

November 1991February 1992

2009

Individual

November 1991February 1992

2009

Individual

November 1991February 1992

2009

Individual

November 1991February 1992

Mamula, Petar

Serb; member of Serbian paramilitary group

war crimes against civilians: tortured and killed civilians already detained in facilities

Individual but also Policy

Hrastov, Mihajlo

Krnjak, Ivica

Magdi!, Gordana Geto'

Croat; member of HV special police Bosnian Croat; commander of special reconnaissanc e-anddiversion unit of HV Osijek Operational Zone Bosnian Croat; commander of squad within reconnaisanc e HV unit

unlawful killing

Individual but also Policy

September 1991

2009 http://www.c entar-zamir.hr/index. php?page=ar ticle_sudjenj a&trialId=59 &article_id=4 8&lang=en; appealed but upheld; 2009 http://www.c entar-zamir.hr/index. php?page=ar ticle_sudjenj a&trialId=28 &article_id=4 8&lang=en; 2009

war crimes against civilians: ordered torture, mistreatment, etc. war crimes against civilians: ordered torture, mistreatment, etc.

Policy

1991

2009

Policy

1991

2009

187

Konti!, Dino

Bosnian Croat; member of reconnaisanc e HV unit

Valenti!, Tihomir

Bosnian Croat; member of reconnaisanc e HV unit

Dragi!, Zdravko

Zinaji!, Du'an

Bosnian Croat; member of reconnaisanc e HV unit Serb; member of paramilitary unit

Atlija, Milan

Serb; member of RBS Army Serb; member of RBS Army

Jaramaz, %or&e

Pavlovi!, Stojan

Serb; member of Territorial Defence Headquarters

Urukalo, Duro

Serb; member of Territorial Defence Headquarters

Berberovi!, Branko

Serb; member of Territorial Defence

war crimes against civilians: ordered torture, mistreatment, etc. war crimes against civilians: ordered torture, mistreatment, etc. war crimes against civilians: ordered torture, mistreatment, etc. war crimes against civilians: terror, murder war crimes against civilians: planning and ordered murder of civilians war crimes against civilians: murder war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, torture, murder, forcible transfer war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, torture, murder, forcible transfer war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, torture, murder, forcible transfer

Policy

1991

2009

Individual but also Policy

1991

2009

Individual but also Policy

1991

2009

Individual

November 1991

2009

Policy

2009

Individual

2009

Policy

2009

Policy

2009

Policy

2009

188

Pejnovi!, Nenad

Ju'i!, Zlatko

Ju'i!, Ibrahim

Serb; member of SAOKrajina militia Bosnian Croat; Prime Minister of so-called Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia Bosnian Croat; Head of the Office of Crime Prevention at the Velika Kla du'a Public Security Office and Head of the State Security Office of the selfproclaimed Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia

war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, failed to prevent murder

Individual but also Policy

2009

NOT GUILTY

1993, 1994

2009

Vrane'evi!, Dragan

Cvjeti!anin, Nikola

Den)i!, Vlastimir

Kecman, Zoran

Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina paramilitaries Croatian Serb; member of TO of SAO Krajina Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary formations Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary formations

war crimes against civilians: rape, unlawful detainment war crimes against civilians: forced deportment, destruction of property, murder war crime against civilians: murder, ethnic cleansing war crimes against civilians: forced expulsion

Individual but also Policy

1993, 1994

2009

Individual

July 1991

2009

Individual but also Policy

October 1991

2009

Policy

April 1992

2008

Marke'i!, Luka

Croat; HV special police

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: murder of civilian and Individual

April 1992

2008

1991

2008

189

prisoners of war war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: murder of civilian and prisoners of war war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: murder of civilian and prisoners of war war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: murder of civilian and prisoners of war

Radi!, Zdenko

Croat; HV special police

Individual

1991

2008

Maras, Zoran

Croat; HV special police

Individual

1991

2008

Orlovi!, Ivan

Vu)eti!, Slobodan

Gunj, Peter

Croat; HV special police Croatian Serb; joined Serb paramilitaries within Croatia Croatian Serb; joined Serb paramilitaries within Croatia Croatian Serb; joined Serb paramilitaries within Croatia Croatian Serb; joined Serb paramilitaries within Croatia KosovoAlbanian; HV general

Individual

1991

2008

DISMISSED CHARGES

2008

Vuji!, Mirko

Peri!, Stevan

DISMISSED CHARGES war crimes against civilians at Berak: Individual murder, but also torture Policy war crimes against civilians at Berak: Individual murder, but also torture Policy

2008

September 1991-end of 1992

2008

September 1991-end of 1992 October 1991

Ademi, Rahim

Norac, Mirko

Croat; HV general

NOT GUILTY war crime against civilians and prisoners of war: failed to prevent and punish subordinates for murder and torture of civilians and war prisoners Policy

2008 referred to Croatia from ICTY; 2008

October 1991

referred to Croatia from ICTY; 2008

190

Simi!, Novak

Kikanovi!, Miodrag

Krstini!, Radovan

Croatian Serb; military police of RBS Krajina Croatian Serb; military police of RBS Krajina Croatian Serb; military police of RBS Krajina

war crime against civilians war crime against civilians war crime against civilians war crimes against prisoners of war: torture, inhumane treatment, murder war crimes against prisoners of war: torture, inhumane treatment, murder

Individual

May 1995

tried in absentia; 2008

Individual

May 1995

2008

Individual

May 1995

2008

Vuji!, Stojan

Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary

Individual

September 1991

2008

Pavkovi!, Dobrivoje

Cjeti!anin, Nikola

Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croat; commander of HV company

Individual

September 1991

2008

NOT GUILTY war crime against civilians: murder of family war crime against civilians: murder of family war crime against civilians: murder of family war crime against civilians: murder of family war crime against civilians: murder of family

appealed and acquitted; 2008

Madi, Tomislav

Policy

February 1992

2008

Juri!, Mario

Croat; member of HV brigade

Policy

February 1992

2008

Po'ti!, Zoran

Croat; member of HV brigade

Policy

February 1992

2008

Lazi!, Davor

Croat; member of HV brigade

Policy

February 1992

2008

Star)evi!, Mijo

Leskovac, (arko

Croat; member of HV brigade Croatian Serb; member of TO JNA in Krajina

Policy

February 1992

2008

NOT GUILTY

end of 1991 or beginning of 1992

2008

191

Po)u)a, Sa'a

Letica, Mile

Surla, Bo'ko

Croatian Serb; guard of Knin prison Croatian Serb; commander of regiment of TO of Glina Croatian Serb; commander of regiment of TO of Tenja

war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: torture, sexual assault

Individual

June 1991February 1992

2008

NOT GUILTY

SeptemberOctober 1991

2008

Gudelj, Antun

Vite'ki!, Enes

Croat; member of HV reserve police forces Croat; member of HV army

NOT GUILTY murder of Croatian public security officers who were involved in negotiations with Serbs Individual

JulyNovember 1991

appealed but upheld; 2008, 2010

July 1991 December 1991

2008

Margu', Fred

Croat; member of HV army Croat; member of HV army Croatian Serb; commander of 1st division of JNA Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of Serb TO Defence in Croatia Croatian Serb; member of Serb TO Defence in Croatia Croat; Commander of 72nd Battalion of

Dilber, Tomislav

Begovi!, Jovo

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: illegal detainment, torture, murder Individual war crimes against civilians: murder Individual war crimes against civilians: murder and destruction of property Policy war crimes against civilians: murder

2007

NovemberDecember 1991 NovemberDecember 1991

2007

2007

September 1991

2007

Miljevi!, Rade

Individual

September 1991

2007

Opa)i!, (ivko

NOT GUILTY

October 1991-April 1992

deceased; 2007

Bjedov, Milan

Dui!, Tomislav

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: torture, Individual

October 1991-April 1992 MarchSeptember 1992

2007

2006

192

Croatian Army Military Police

Vrki!, Ton)i

Baji!, Miljenko

Biki!, Josip

Bani!, Davor

Croat; deputy commander of 72nd Battalion of Croatian Army Military Polic Croat; member of intervention group of 72nd Battalion of Croatian Army Military Police Croat; member of intervention group of 72nd Battalion of Croatian Army Military Police Croat; member of intervention group of 72nd Battalion of Croatian Army Military Police

unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, unlawful detainment, mistreatment, murder

Individual

MarchSeptember 1992

2006

Individual

MarchSeptember 1992

2006

Individual

MarchSeptember 1992

2006

Individual

MarchSeptember 1992

2006

Bungur, Emilio

Croat; guard in 72nd Battalion of Croatian Army Military Police

Individual

MarchSeptember 1992

2006

Pupovac, Neven

Iharo', (eljko

Vrban, Ivan

Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary Croat; commander of HV military police platoon Croat; member of HV army Croat; member of HV army

war crimes against civilians: mistreatment, property destruction

Individual

FebruaryAugust 1992 NovemberDecember 1991 NovemberDecember 1991 NovemberDecember 1991

2006

NOT GUILTY

2005

Ka'elj, An&elko

NOT GUILTY war crime against civilians: torture, Individual

2005

2005

193

Perak, Luka

Croat; member of HV army Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of RS Krajina forces Croatian Serb; member of RBS army Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary

*ur)i!, Jovan

Dr"aji!, Milo'

Maksimovi!, Mladen

Mi'i!, Du'an

Savi!, Dragan

Vu)enovi!, Jovica

murder war crime against civilians: torture, murder war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment

Individual

NovemberDecember 1991

2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

tried in absentia; 2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

tried in absentia; thus, not counted 2005

Individual

AugustSeptember 1991

tried in absentia; thus, not counted 2005

Jurjevi!, Milan

NOT GUILTY

December 1991

appealed and acquitted; 2005, 2011 appealed and acquitted; 2005, 2011

To'i!, Davor

Bu)ko, Joakim

Mago), Zdenko

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: torture, Individual murder, forced but also displacement Policy war crimes against civilians: torture, Individual murder, forced but also displacement Policy

December 1991

OctoberNovember 1991

2005

OctoberNovember 1991

2005

194

Hudak, Darko

Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary

Bani!, Danor

Croat; member of HV military police Croat; member of HV military police; guard for Lora camp Croat; member of HV military police; guard for Lora camp

Gudi!, Ante

Boti!, An&elko

Davidovi!, Slobodan

Serb; member of "Scorpion," Serb paramilitary group

war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, forced displacement war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, illegal detainment war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war: torture, illegal detainment, murder

Individual but also Policy

OctoberNovember 1991

2005

Individual but also Policy

MarchSeptember 1992

2005

Individual but also Policy

MarchSeptember 1992

2005

Individual but also Policy

MarchSeptember 1992

2005

Individual

October 1991; July 1995

2005

Ore'kovi!, Tihomir

Croat; member of Croatian army Croat; member of Croatian army

war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder

Policy

October 1991

2003

Ro"i!, Ivica

Grandi!, Stjepan

Croat; member of Croatian army

Norac Kevo, Mirko

Croat; member of Croatian army Croat; member of Croatian army

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy

October 1991

2003

October 1991

2003

October 1991

2003

Cani!, Milan

PROSECUTION DROPPED THE CHARGES

October 1991

2003

195

(3) SERBIAN COURTS

Name (last name, first name) Category of War Crime Year of Crime

Affiliation
Serb; regional commander of Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; deputy commander of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the VukovarTerritorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the VukovarTerritorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA

War Crime
war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Vujovi!, Miroljub

Policy

Buli!, Milan

war crimes against prisoners of war: torture at Ov)ara

Individual

Vujanovi!, Stanko

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

September 1991

Milojevi!, Predrag

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

$o'i!, %or&e

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200 war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

%ankovi!, Miroslav

Radak, Sa'a

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

Vojnovi!, Milanu

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

Peri!, Jovica

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

Lan)u"anin, Milan

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

Dragovi!, Predrag

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200 war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

Mugo'a, Goran

196

Atanasijevi!, Ivan

Zlatar, Vujo

Ma&arac, Predrag

Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of the Vukovar Territorial Defence paramilitary included in JNA Serb; member of Territorial Defence force of SAO Krajina Serb; member of Territorial Defence police forces in Krajina Serb; member of Territorial Defence police forces in Krajina Serb; member of Territorial Defence police forces in Krajina Bosnian Serb; member of paramilitary unit Yellow Wasps Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Yellow Wasps Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Yellow Wasps Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Yellow Wasps Civilian Serb; president of Crisis Staff, Municipality, Provisional Government and War Staff Serb; Commander of the Territorial Defence Staff and member of the War Staff

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200

Individual but also Policy

$panovi!, Milan

Lazi!, Milorad

Maruni!, Mirko

Konjevi!, Nikola

war crimes against civilians and prisoners: killed 200 war crime against civilians: torture and cruel treatment at Stara Gradi'ka prison war crimes against prisoners of war: at police station of SAO Krajina war crimes against prisoners of war: at police station of SAO Krajina war crimes against prisoners of war: at police station of SAO Krajina

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

Individual

Individual

Individual

Dragi)evi!, Dragan

Slavkovi!, Dragan

Kora!, Ivan

Filipovi!, Sini'a

NOT GUILTY war crimes against civilians (Zvornik): torture, murder, sexual assault Individual war crimes against civilians (Zvornik): torture, murder, sexual assault Individual war crimes against civilians (Zvornik): torture, murder, sexual assault Individual

Gruji!, Branko

gave orders for war crimes against civilians in town of Zvornik gave orders for war crimes against civilians in town of Zvornik war crimes against prisoners of war: participated in firing squad in "Grabovo" pit at Ov)ara war crimes against civilians: murdered 6 Croat civilians at Banski

Policy

Popovi!, Branko

Policy

Sireta, Damir

Bulat, Pane

Croatian Serb; member of Territorial Defence Vukovar Croatian Serb; assistant commander of brigade for Serbian

Policy

Individual

197

Krajina Croatian Serb; soldier of Serbian Krajina battalion Croatian Serb; member of paramilitary under SAO Krajina control Montenegrin Serb; 1st Class Captain of the Yugoslav People's Army

Vrane'evi!, Rade

Kova)evac war crimes against civilians: murdered 6 Croat civilians at Banski Kova)evac

Individual

Pa'i!, Zdravko

war crime against civilians: murder

Individual

Kova)evi!, Vladimir

Trbojevi!, Boro

Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Bilogora Detachment Serb; member of Territorial Defence police Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina police forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina police forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina police forces Croatian Serb; member of SAO Krajina police forces Serb; member of 6th SAO Krajina brigade Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Scorpions Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Scorpions Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Scorpions Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Scorpions Serb; member of Serb paramilitary unit, Scorpions Croat; member of Croatian army, 77th independent batallion

Radivoj, Darko

Budisavljevi!, #eda

Malinovi!, Mirko

Bogunovi!, Milan

Grui)i!, Bogdan

Mali!, Nenad

Medi!, Slobodan

Petra'evi!, Pero

Medi!, Aleksandar

Vukov, Aleksandar

Medi!, Branislav

Mari!, Veljko

DISMISSED BECAUSE OF MENTAL ILLNESS OF ACCUSED war crimes against civilians: participated in siege of Topolovica; forcible transfer; Individual unlawful detainment; but also murder; torture Policy war crime against prisoners of war: murder; forcible detainment Individual (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment; murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment; murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment; murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment; murder Policy war crimes against civilians: murder, mistreatment, torture Individual ordered war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy (was ordered to carry out) war crimes against civilians: unlawful detainment, murder Policy war crimes against civilians: as part of "cleansing," murdered a Policy

September 1992

July 1995

July 1995

July 1995

July 1995

July 1995 October 1991

198

Kesar, Du'ko

of Grubi'no Polje Bosnian Serb; member of reserve forces RBS forces Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary, Pivarski (part of Zvornik TO) Croatian Serb; member of Serb paramilitary, Pivarski (part of Zvornik TO) Serb; member of Serb paramilitary, Pivarski (part of Zvornik TO)

Serb civilian in Rastovac war crimes against civilians: murder war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, theft, forced labor, unlawful detainment war crimes against civilians: torture, murder, theft, forced labor, unlawful detainment war crimes against civilians: campaign of terror to detained civilians, sexual assault March 1994

Individual

Savi!, Goran

Individual but also Policy

May-July 1992

*ilerd"i!, Sa'a

Individual but also Policy Individual but also Policy

May-July 1992

Jankovi!, Darko

June 1992

199

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