CORPO DIGESTS: Republic vs. Sun Life Gokongwei vs. SEC
CORPO DIGESTS: Republic vs. Sun Life Gokongwei vs. SEC
CORPO DIGESTS: Republic vs. Sun Life Gokongwei vs. SEC
I. II. Republic v. Sun Life, G.R. No. 158085, 14 October 2005 [re: power to invest corporate funds in another corporation or business] Gokongwei v. SEC, 89 SCRA 337 (1979) [re: nature and functions of by-laws]
NIRC's definition of a "cooperative": association conducted by the members thereof with the money collected from among themselves and solely for their own protection and not for profit SC: Sun Life is a cooperative engaged in a mutual life insurance business -- (1) it is managed by its members, its management and affairs are conducted by member-policyholders; (2) it is operated with money collected from its members[-policyholders]; and (3) it is licensed for the mutual protection of its members, not for the profit of anyone NOTE: it does not follow that because respondent is registered as a non-stock corporation and thus exists for a purpose other than profit, the company can no longer make any profits earning profits is merely its secondary, not primary, purpose in fact, it may not lawfully engage in any business activity for profit, for to do so would change or contradict its nature as a non-profit entity it may, however, invest its corporate funds in order to earn additional income for paying its operating expenses and meeting benefit claims any excess profit it obtains as an incident to its operations can only be used, whenever necessary or proper, for the furtherance of the purpose for which it was organized under the Tax Code, although respondent is a cooperative, registration with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) is not necessary in order for it to be exempt from premium tax and DST
RULING: petition DISMISSED w/o prejudice as to WON Gokongwei's disqualification to run and sit as director of SMC is proper, after a new and proper hearing by SMC's BOD, appealable to the SEC en banc, and ultimately, back to the SC again GR: The validity and reasonableness of a by-law is purely a question of law; whether the by-law is in conflict with the law of the land, or whether the charter of the corporation or is in legal sense unreasonable and therefore unlawful is a question of law. where the reasonableness of a by-law is a mere matter of judgment, and upon which reasonable minds must necessarily differ, a court would not be warranted in substituting its judgment instead of the judgment of those who are authorized to make by-laws and who have exercised authority.
XPN:
a corporation: 1. has authority prescribed by law to prescribe the qualifications of directors 2. has the inherent power to adopt by-laws for its internal government, and to regulate the conduct and prescribe the rights and duties of its members towards itself and among themselves in reference to the management of its affairs 3. may prescribe in its by-laws the qualifications, duties and compensation of directors, officers, and employees any person who buys stock in a corporation does so with the knowledge that its affairs are dominated by a majority of the stockholders and he impliedly contracts that the will of the majority shall govern in all matters within the limits of the acts of incorporation and lawfully enacted by-laws and not forbidden by law any corporation may amend its by-laws by the owners of the majority of the subscribed stock therefore it cannot be said that Gokongwei has the vested right, as a stock holder, to be elected director, in the face of the fact that the law at the time such right as stockholder was acquired contained the prescription that the corporate charter and the by-law shall be subject to amendment, alteration and modification an amendment to the corporate by-laws which renders a stockholder ineligible to be director, if he be also director in a corporation whose business is in competition with that of the other corporation, has been sustained as valid based upon the principle that where the director is employed in the service of a rival company, he cannot serve both, but must betray one or the other the amendment in this case serves to advance the benefit of the corporation and is good doctrine of corporate opportunity: corporate officers are also not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private needs, and the act done in furtherance of private needs is deemed to be for the benefit of the corporation