U-BIX CORPORATION EDILBERTO B.

BRAVO

and

G.R. No. 177647

Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, - versus VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated: VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO, Respondent. October 31, 2008

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DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner U-Bix Corporation (U-Bix) hired on March 6, 1996 Valerie Anne H. Hollero (respondent) as a management trainee at its Furniture Division, with salary and allowances totaling P10,000 monthly. On May 1, 1996, it promoted respondent to facilities manager, with salary and allowances totaling P20,000 monthly. U-Bix later sent respondent and three other employees to the United States for two months of training for a newly acquired franchise, the ServiceMaster Company. The training commenced on July 4, 1996 and ended on September 3, 1996.

Before respondent left for the United States, she signed a contract with petitioner, the pertinent portion of which reads:
VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO shall remain in the employ of U-BIX CORPORATION for a period of five (5) years from completion of her U.S. Training otherwise she shall reimburse U-BIX CORPORATION for all costs (prorated) and expenses which U-BIX CORPORATION incurred for her (Hollero's) training in the U.S. (Underscoring and italics supplied)

On February 14, 1997, U-Bix, citing respondent's supposed pattern of tardiness, absences, neglect of duties, and lack of interest, terminated her employment for loss of trust and confidence.

U-Bix in fact filed on May 22, 1997 a complaint against respondent before the Labor Arbiter for the reimbursement of training expenses and damages. In its complaint, which was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97, U-Bix alleged that upon respondents return from her training abroad, she demonstrated gross neglect of her duties as shown by her continued tardiness, habitual absences, and failure to submit reports and/or documents on their due dates, attention to which was repeatedly called but she persisted in such conduct; that on December 17, 1996, respondent's superiors discussed with her the duties and responsibilities of a facilities manager and the work performance standards expected of her, following which or on December 18 and 19, 1996, she did not report for work without prior notice; that on December 23, 1996, respondent's superior Bill Malfitano (Malfitano) handcarried to her residence a memorandum requiring her to explain in writing her unauthorized absences, with a warning that failure to respond within 24 hours from receipt thereof would be considered a waiver of her right to give her explanation; that respondent, however, failed and refused to submit any explanation, constraining U-Bix to terminate her employment; and that on April 24, 1997, U-Bix's counsel wrote respondent a letter demanding the reimbursement of P187,510 training expenses but the same remained unheeded.

Subsequently or on August 25, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner U-Bix and/or its President-petitioner Edilberto B. Bravo. Her complaint, which was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-0805988-97, alleged as follows:

After her training abroad, she and her three other co-employees-trainees and an American manager who was assigned to the Philippines as part of the franchise agreement started the set-up of the new franchise in the country. She organized the launching of U-Bix's subsidiary company (Facilities Managers, Inc.), trained personnel on ServiceMaster methods of cleaning and customer service, and distributed chemicals and equipment from the United States to the various U-Bix branches upon Malfitano's advice and guidance. And during the second week of December 1996, she headed the cleaning personnel in cleaning the production plant in Sucat, Paraaque which lasted up to midnight for three days.

Respondent who was made to understand that she was the contact person of U-Bix and the head of the implementation team, was furnished a copy of her job description.

On December 17, 1996, Malfitano met with the implementation team and discussed the various roles of each member thereof, since setting up stage was about to end and the duties and responsibilities of each member were being streamlined.

From December 18-19, 1996, respondent suffered from loose bowel movement, preventing her from reporting for work. She, however, failed to notify the company of her absence.

On the second day of her absence or on December 19, 1996, Malfitano visited her during which she explained to him that she had no way to communicate with the office except by telephone but that her neighbors telephone was out of order. When she reported back for work on December 23, 1996, she was asked to explain why she did not advise the company of her failure to report for work on December 18 and 19, 1996. She reiterated her explanation given to Malfitano, apologizing for the inconvenience her absence caused the office.

On the same day that she reported for work on December 23, 1996, Malfitano advised her that he was recommending the termination of her services and asked her to, as she did, turn over her files and office keys. And he advised her not to report for work until further notice. She complied and did not receive any word from U-Bix until the first week of March 1997 when she received a letter informing her of her dismissal effective February 14, 1997.

NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 and NLRC-NCR Case No. 05988-97 were consolidated.

00-08-

By Decision of February 8, 1999, Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., found for U-Bix, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: A. in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 1. Declaring the dismissal of respondent Valerie Anne H. Hollero to be valid and legal, and 2. Ordering said respondent Valerie Anne H. Hollero to pay complainant U-Bix Corporation the amount of P187,510.00 with interest at 12% per annum, until fully paid, as discussed above.

B. in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-05988-97

1.

Dismissing complainant Valerie Anne H. Holleros complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims for lack of merit. (Underscoring supplied)

On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 018999-99), the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Finding that reinstatement was not feasible due to strained relations, it awarded respondent backwages and separation pay. Thus it disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered as follows: A. Dismissing the complaint of the respondent-appellee U-BIX CORPORATION, in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 for lack of jurisdiction; and, B. Finding the dismissal of complainant-appellant Valerie Anne H. Hollero in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-05988-97 to be illegal thereby ordering

respondents-appellees U-BIX CORPORATION/Edilberto B. Bravo to pay the former the following: 1. Backwages P520,000.00 2. Separation Pay 60,000.00; and Total P580,000.00

All other claims for damages are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, they filed a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of January 8, 2007, dismissed the same, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed NLRC Resolutions dated July 12, 1999 and March 14, 2000 in NLRC NCR CA No. 018999-99 are hereby AFFIRMED with the clarification that NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-03696-97 is dismissed for lack of merit instead of lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, faulting the Court of Appeals

I x x x IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A VALID CAUSE FOR RESPONDENT HOLLERO'S DISMISSAL. II x x x IN RULING THAT PETITIONER U-BIX FAILED TO OBSERVE THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN TERMINATING RESPONDENT HOLLERO.

III x x x IN RULING THAT PETITIONER U-BIX IS NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF RESPONDENT HOLLERO'S TRAINING EXPENSES.

In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid and just cause. While an employer enjoys a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees, managerial employees are also entitled to security of tenure and cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time and without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation.

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations of respondent's habitual absenteeism, habitual tardiness, neglect of duties, and lack of interest. Daily time records, attendance records, or other documentary evidence attesting to these grounds could have readily been presented to support the allegations but none was.

On the other hand, copies of respondent's Pay Advice Slips for SeptemberDecember 1996 show no deductions for absences or tardiness, except in the Pay Advice Slip for October 1-15, 1996 which deductions correspond to a duly approved leave of absence without pay from September 23-24, 1996 (subject of petitioners application filed on September 21, 1996).

A receipt acknowledging the turnover of keys on December 23, 1996 submitted by respondent substantiates her account of the meeting that took place when she reported back for work on that day, which document belies petitioners claim that she abandoned her work and that [o]n the evening of December 23, 1997, Mr. Bill Malfitano, one of respondent's superiors, went out of his way to deliver to the respondent a letter requesting for a written explanation as to her errant acts.

Malfitanos memorandum to respondent dated December 12, 1996, or close to two weeks before she was asked on December 23, 1996 to turn over the keys, stating that her leadership role in this implementation is critical to our success in meeting our customers needs and she had been introduced as the FMI manager responsible for our program implementation to the site coordinator at each of the U-Bix facilities, belies U-Bix's allegations of her habitual absenteeism, habitual tardiness, neglect of duty, and lack of interest.

Petitioners go on to lay stress on respondents failure to report for work on December 18-21, 1996 without notifying the office and without explaining her absence when she returned for work.

As the Court of Appeals observed, however,

Records likewise reveal that U-Bix failed to adduce evidence showing that Mr. Malfitano denied or corroborated [herein respondent] Valerie's claim that he had visited her on the evening of December 19, 1996 and accepted the explanation for her absence. While its pleadings below were silent on the matter, U-Bix admits now that Mr. Malfitano went to Valerie's house on said date but skirted the issue of whether or not he had accepted her explanation. That despite Valerie's absences from December 18 to 21, 1996 U-Bix only made issue of her absences on December 18 and 19, indicates that her condition had already come to the latter's knowledge thereafter, thereby excusing her absences on December 20 and 21. Thus, while the Court finds it thoughtless of Valerie not to have exerted diligent efforts to inform the office of the reason for her absence at the earliest time possible, it, however, believes in her claim that she informed Mr. Malfitano about it and that the latter had accepted her explanation. Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Assuming arguendo that respondent's four-day absence was not justified, absences must be habitual to be a ground for dismissal. that petitioners following contention is in order, viz: At all events, granting

In this day where over-the-counter medicines abound for common ailments such as loose bowel movement, Hollero's story of unabated LBM to cause her to be absent for 4 consecutive days starting December 18 to December 21, 1996 is simply incredible. Wors[e], in this day and age of high technology and modern telecommunication facilities in Metro Manila, Hollero's pitiful story that she had no other means of communicating with petitioner U-Bix except thru her neighbor's busted phone is even more incredible. These bespeak of an unresourceful and indifferent manager. It breaks one's credibility to believe that respondent Hollero was suffering for 4 consecutive days from unrelenting LBM such that she could not even request somebody to call her employer U-Bix of her predicament. x x x (Underscoring supplied),

there must be reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty. Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee, and where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with so severe consequence. Thus in Zagala v. Mikado Philippines Corporation, this Court found dismissal too severe a penalty on incurring of absences in excess of the allowable number.

Further, petitioners take respondent's failure to pray for reinstatement as an admission that her dismissal was valid. Such position glosses over respondents explanation that reinstatement would not be feasible due to the strained relations between her and petitioners. Besides, the merits of a complaint for illegal dismissal do not depend on its prayer but on whether the employer discharges its burden of proving that the dismissal is valid.

In another vein, the Court finds that petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid dismissal. Respondent being a manager did not excuse them from observing such procedural requirements.

Thus a first notice informing and bearing on the charge must be sent to the employee. The December 23, 1996 memorandum of Malfitano which he handcarried to respondent's residence on even date merely reads:
I am requesting that you send me a written explanation which satisfactorily addresses the two days you abandoned your management position without a call or any contact with the ServiceMASTER team or anyone within the U-Bix Organization. The two days I am referring to are Wednesday, December 18, 1996 and Thursday, December 19, 1996.

I am requesting that you respond in writing by 5 pm on Tuesday, December 24, 1996. If we do not receive a response within the time allotted we will have to consider this as waiving your right to provide any further explanation relating to this absence.

The notice does not inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to her dismissal. It does not contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance nor categorically state the effect on her employment if the charges are proven to be true. It does not apprise respondent of possible dismissal should her explanation prove unsatisfactory. Besides, the petitioners did not even establish that respondent received the memorandum.

Neither did petitioners show that they conducted a hearing or conference during which respondent, with the assistance of counsel if she so desired, had opportunity to respond to the charge, present her evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against her. The meeting with respondent on December 23, 1996 did not satisfy the hearing requirement, for respondent was not given the opportunity to avail herself of counsel.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that an employer who seeks to dismiss an employee must afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires. Expounding on this provision, this Court held that '[a]mple opportunity' connotes

every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.

With regard to U-Bix's complaint for reimbursement of training expenses, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction thereover. Consider the reason proffered for such ruling:

x x x In the instant case, while the principal relief prayed for is the reimbursement of damages for breach of a contractual obligation, the issue of whether or not Valerie should be held liable therefor necessarily includes the determination of the validity of her termination which can only be resolved by reference to, and application of, labor laws and jurisprudence. Thus, since the alleged breach of the Agreement is so closely intertwined with the issue of illegal dismissal, the resolution of both issues falls within the area of competence or expertise of the labor arbiters and the NLRC. (Italics in the original)

The legality of respondent's dismissal was, however, raised not by U-Bix's complaint but in respondent's Position Paper. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined from the allegations made in the complaint, and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters, as well as of the NLRC, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. U-Bix's complaint was one to collect sum of money based on civil laws on obligations and contract, not to enforce rights under the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or the collective bargaining agreement.

WHEREFORE, the January 8, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-0503696-97 is dismissed, not for lack of merit but, for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., Petitioner, Present: G.R. No. 155109

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. COURT OF APPEALS, LABOR ARBITER ANTONIO M. VILLANUEVA, LABOR ARBITER ARTURO L. GAMOLO, SHERIFF OF NLRC RABXI-DAVAO CITY, NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY, EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROIL DELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDO CAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR, CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO, ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO

MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOME CASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDRO HARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDO BASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSE AMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITO SABELLANO, CARMELITO TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITO ALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO, EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTO ANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDRO AQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA, CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDO MATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN, ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO, CARLITO BURILLO, LEO MORA, PABLO BUTIL, ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAH CAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDO CAPUYAN, EDGARDO ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIO ORTEGA, FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUS PATOC, RAMON CONSTANTINO, ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIO PLAZA, ROSALDO DAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS, PROCOPIO RAMOS, JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCO EMPUERTO, PATRICIO SALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON, ERNESTO ESTILO, BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI, CELSO HUISO, ALEX TAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL, SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSE TOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA and EDUARDO GENELSA,

Respondents.

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NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA

G.R. No. 155135

ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY, EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROIL DELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDO CAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR, CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO, ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOME CASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDRO HARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDO BASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSE AMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITO SABELLANO, CARMELITO TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITO ALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO, EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTO ANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDRO AQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA, CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDO MATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN, ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO, CARLITO BURILLO, LEO

MORA, PABLO BUTIL, ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAH CAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDO CAPUYAN, JUANITO NISNISAN, AURELIO CARIN, PRIMO OPLIMO, ANGELITO CASTANEDA, EDGARDO ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIO ORTEGA, FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUS PATOC, RAMON CONSTANTINO, MANUEL PIAPE, ROY CONSTANTINO, ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIO PLAZA, ROSALDO DAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS, PROCOPIO RAMOS, JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCO EMPUERTO, PATRICIO SALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON, ERNESTO ESTILO, BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI, CELSO HUISO, ALEX TAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL, SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSE TOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA and EDUARDO GENELSA, Petitioners,

- versus -

C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., EDITHA I. ALCANTARA, ATTY. NELIA A. CLAUDIO, CORNELIO E. CAGUIAT, JESUS S. DELA CRUZ, ROLANDO Z. ANDRES and JOSE MA. MANUEL YRASUEGUI, Respondents.

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NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), and its members whose names are listed below, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 179220

- versus Promulgated: C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., Respondent. September 29, 2010

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DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a) the consequences of an illegally staged strike upon the employment status of the union officers and its ordinary members and b) the right of reinstated union members to go back to work pending the companys appeal from the order reinstating them.

The Facts and the Case

C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Companys rank and file employees. The other parties to these cases are the Union officers and their striking members.

The Company and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that bound them to hold no strike and no lockout in the course of its life. At some point the parties began negotiating the economic provisions of their CBA but this ended in a deadlock, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike. After efforts at conciliation by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) failed, the Union conducted a strike vote that resulted in an overwhelming majority of its members favoring it. The Union reported the strike vote to the DOLE and, after the observance of the mandatory cooling-off period, went on strike.

During the strike, the Company filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) Ex Parte with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to enjoin the strikers from intimidating, threatening, molesting, and impeding by barricade

the entry of non-striking employees at the Companys premises. The NLRC first issued a 20-day TRO and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the Union and its officers and members from performing the acts complained of. But several attempts to implement the writ failed. Only the intervention of law enforcement units made such implementation possible. Meantime, the Union filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the preliminary injunction order. On February 8, 1999 the latter court dismissed the petition. The Union did not appeal from such dismissal.

The Company, on the other hand, filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Board to declare the Unions strike illegal, citing its violation of the no strike, no lockout, provision of their CBA. Subsequently, the Company amended its petition to implead the named Union members who allegedly committed prohibited acts during the strike. For their part, the Union, its officers, and its affected members filed against the Company a counterclaim for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and damages. The Union also assailed as invalid the service of summons on the individual Union members included in the amended petition.

On June 29, 1999 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, declaring the Unions strike illegal for violating the CBAs no strike, no lockout, provision . As a consequence, the Labor Arbiter held that the Union officers should be deemed to have forfeited their employment with the Company and that they should pay actual damages of P3,825,000.00 plus 10% interest and attorneys fees. With respect to

the striking Union members, finding no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during the strike, the Labor Arbiter ordered their reinstatement without backwages. The Labor Arbiter denied the Unions counterclaim for lack of merit.

On June 29, 1999 the terminated Union members promptly filed a motion for their immediate reinstatement but the Labor Arbiter did not act on the same. At any rate, the Company did not reinstate them. Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. The Company impugned the Labor Arbiters decision insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of the terminated Union members. The Union, on the other hand, questioned the declaration of illegality of the strike as well as the dismissal of its officers and the order for them to pay damages.

On November 8, 1999 the NLRC rendered a decision, affirming that of the Labor Arbiter insofar as the latter declared the strike illegal, ordered the Union officers terminated, and directed them to pay damages to the Company. The NLRC ruled, however, that the Union members involved, who were identified in the proceedings held in the case, should also be terminated for having committed prohibited and illegal acts.

The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the NLRC decision. Finding merit in the petition, the CA rendered a decision on March 20, 2002, annulling the NLRC decision and reinstating that of the Labor Arbiter. The

Company and the Union with its officers and members filed separate petitions for review of the CA decision in G.R. 155109 and 155135, respectively.

During the pendency of these cases, the affected Union members filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for reinstatement pending appeal by the parties and the computation of their backwages based on the CA decision. After hearing, the Labor Arbiter issued a resolution dated November 21, 2002, holding that due to the delay in the resolution of the dispute and the impracticability of reinstatement owing to the fact that the relations between the terminated Union members and the Company had been severely strained by the prolonged litigation, payment of separation pay to such Union members was in order. The Labor Arbiter thus approved the computation and payment of their separation pay and denied all their other claims.

Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiters resolution to the NLRC. Initially, in its resolution dated April 30, 2003, the NLRC declared the Labor Arbiters resolution of November 21, 2002 void for lack of factual and legal basis but ordered the Company to pay the affected employees accrued wages and 13 th month pay considering the Companys refusal to reinstate them pending appeal. On motion for reconsideration by both parties, however, the NLRC issued a resolution on August 29, 2003, modifying its earlier resolution by deleting the grant of accrued wages and 13th month pay to the subject employees, thus denying their motion for computation.

Upon the Unions petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the NLRCs denial of the terminated Union members claim for separation pay, accrued wages, and other benefits, the CA rendered a decision on February 24, 2005, dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplated illegal dismissal or termination cases and not cases under Article 263. Thus, the CA ruled that the resolution ordering the reinstatement of the terminated Union members and the payment of their wages and other benefits had no basis. Aggrieved, the Union sought intervention by this Court.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in these cases are:

1. Whether or not the NLRC properly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the individual Union members impleaded in the case;

2.

Whether or not the Union staged an illegal strike;

3. Assuming the strike to be illegal, whether or not the impleaded Union members committed illegal acts during the strike, justifying their termination from employment;

4. Whether or not the terminated Union members are entitled to the payment of backwages on account of the Companys refusal to reinstate them, pending appeal by the parties, from the Labor Arbiters decision of June 29, 1999; and

5. Whether or not the terminated Union members are entitled to accrued backwages and separation pay.

The Rulings of the Court

One. The NLRC acquires jurisdiction over parties in cases before it either by summons served on them or by their voluntary appearance before its Labor Arbiter. Here, while the Union insists that summons were not properly served on the impleaded Union members with respect to the Companys amended petition that sought to declare the strike illegal, the records show that they were so served. The Return of Service of Summons indicated that 74 out of the 81 impleaded Union members were served with summons. But they refused either to accept the summons or to acknowledge receipt of the same. Such refusal cannot of course frustrate the NLRCs acquisition of jurisdiction over them. Besides, the affected Union members voluntarily entered their appearance in the case when they sought affirmative relief in the course of the proceedings like an award of damages in their favor.

Two. A strike may be regarded as invalid although the labor union has complied with the strict requirements for staging one as provided in Article 263 of the Labor Code when the same is held contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. Here, the CBA between the parties contained a no strike, no lockout provision that enjoined both the Union and the Company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes.

No law or public policy prohibits the Union and the Company from mutually waiving the strike and lockout maces available to them to give way to voluntary arbitration. Indeed, no less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes in Section 3, Article XIII, preferential use of voluntary means to settle disputes. Thus

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA regarding the illegality of the strike. Social justice is not one-sided. It cannot be used as a badge for not complying with a lawful agreement.

Three. Since the Unions strike has been declared illegal, the Union officers can, in accordance with law be terminated from employment for their actions. This includes the shop stewards. They cannot be shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the Union appointed them as such and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the men in their respective work units.

As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that a union member has taken part in an illegal strike. It must be shown that such a union member, clearly identified, performed an illegal act or acts during the strike.

Here, although the Labor Arbiter found no proof that the dismissed rank and file Union members committed illegal acts, the NLRC found following the injunction hearing in NLRC IC M-000126-98 that the Union members concerned committed such acts, for which they had in fact been criminally charged before various courts and the prosecutors office in Davao City. Since the CA held that the existence of criminal complaints against the Union members did not warrant their dismissal, it becomes necessary for the Court to go into the records to settle the issue.

The striking Union members allegedly committed the following prohibited acts:

a. They threatened, coerced, and intimidated non-striking employees, officers, suppliers and customers; b. They obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the company premises; and c. They resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers.

Cornelio Caguiat, Ruben Tungapalan, and Eufracio Rabusa depicted the above prohibited acts in their affidavits and testimonies. The Sheriff of the NLRC said in his Report that, in the course of his implementation of the writ of injunction, he observed that the striking employees blocked the exit lane of the Alson drive with their tent. Tungapalan, a non-striking employee, identified the Union members who threatened and coerced him. Indeed, he filed criminal actions against them. Lastly, the photos taken of the strike show the strikers, properly identified, committing the acts complained of. These constitute substantial evidence in support of the termination of the subject Union members.

The mere fact that the criminal complaints against the terminated Union members were subsequently dismissed for one reason or another does not extinguish their liability under the Labor Code. Nor does such dismissal bar the admission of the affidavits, documents, and photos presented to establish their identity and guilt during the hearing of the petition to declare the strike illegal.

The technical grounds that the Union interposed for denying admission of the photos are also not binding on the NLRC.

Four. The terminated Union members contend that, since the Company refused to reinstate them after the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in their favor, the Company should be ordered to pay them their wages during the pendency of the appeals from the Labor Arbiters decision.

It will be recalled that after the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision on June 29, 1999, which decision ordered the reinstatement of the terminated Union members, the latter promptly filed a motion for their reinstatement pending appeal. But the Labor Arbiter did not for some reason act on the motion. As it happened, after about four months or on November 8, 1999, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters reinstatement order. It cannot be said, therefore, that the Company had resisted a standing order of reinstatement directed at it at this point.

Of course, on March 20, 2002 the CA restored the Labor Arbiters reinstatement order. And this prompted the affected Union members to again file with the Labor Arbiter a motion for their reinstatement pending appeal. But, acting on the motion, the Labor Arbiter resolved at this point that reinstatement was no longer practicable because of the severely strained relation between the company and the terminated Union members. In place of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter ordered the Company to pay them their separation pays.

Both parties appealed the Labor Arbiters above ruling to the NLRC. But, as it turned out the NLRC did not also favor reinstatement. It instead ordered the Company to pay the terminated Union members their accrued wages and 13 th month pay considering its refusal to reinstate them pending appeal. On motion for reconsideration, however, the NLRC reconsidered and deleted altogether the grant of accrued wages and 13th month pay. The Union appealed the NLRC ruling to the CA on behalf of its terminated members but the CA denied their appeal.

The CA denied reinstatement for the reason that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplated illegal dismissal or termination cases and not cases under Article 264. But this perceived distinction does not find support in the provisions of the Labor Code.

The grounds for termination under Article 264 are based on prohibited acts that employees could commit during a strike. On the other hand, the grounds for termination under Articles 282 to 284 are based on the employees conduct in connection with his assigned work. Still, Article 217, which defines the powers of Labor Arbiters, vests in the latter jurisdiction over all termination cases, whatever be the grounds given for the termination of employment. Consequently, Article 223, which provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall immediately be executory pending appeal, cannot but apply to all terminations irrespective of the grounds on which they are based.

Here, although the Labor Arbiter failed to act on the terminated Union members motion for reinstatement pending appeal, the Co mpany had the duty under Article 223 to immediately reinstate the affected employees even if it intended to appeal from the decision ordaining such reinstatement. The Companys failure to do so makes it liable for accrued backwages until the eventual reversal of the order of reinstatement by the NLRC on November 8, 1999, a period of four months and nine days.

Five. While it is true that generally the grant of separation pay is not available to employees who are validly dismissed, there are, in furtherance of the laws policy of compassionate justice, certain circumstances that warrant the grant of some relief in favor of the terminated Union members based on equity.

Bitter labor disputes, especially strikes, always generate a throng of odium and abhorrence that sometimes result in unpleasant, although unwanted, consequences. Considering this, the striking employees breach of certain restrictions imposed on their concerted actions at their employers doorsteps cannot be regarded as so inherently wicked that the employer can totally disregard their long years of service prior to such breach. The records also fail to disclose any past infractions committed by the dismissed Union members. Taking these circumstances in consideration, the Court regards the award of financial assistance to these Union members in the form of one-half month salary for every year of

service to the company up to the date of their termination as equitable and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL and its officers and members in G.R. 155135 for lack of merit, and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 59604 dated March 20, 2002. The Court, on the other hand, GRANTS the petition of C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. in G.R. 155109 and REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA M-004996-99 dated November 8, 1999.

Further, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL and their dismissed members in G.R. 179220 and ORDERS C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. to pay the terminated Union members backwages for four (4) months and nine (9) days and separation pays equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service to the company up to the date of their termination, with interest of 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such backwages and separation pays are paid. The Court DENIES all other claims.

SO ORDERED.
G.R.No.155109/ G.R.No.155135/ G.R.No.179220, March 14, 2012

C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, LABOR ARBITER ANTONIO M. VILLANUEVA, LABOR ARBITER ARTURO L. GAMOLO, SHERIFF OF NLRC RAB-XI-DAVAO CITY, NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY, EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROIL DELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDO CAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR, CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO, ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOME CASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDRO HARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME

MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDO BASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSE AMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITO SABELLANO, CARMELITO TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITO ALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO, EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTO ANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDRO AQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA, CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDO MATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN, ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO, CARLITO BURILLO, LEO MORA, PABLO BUTIL,

ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAH CAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDO CAPUYAN, EDGARDO ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIO ORTEGA, FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUS PATOC, RAMON CONSTANTINO, ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIO PLAZA, ROSALDO DAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS, PROCOPIO RAMOS, JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCO EMPUERTO, PATRICIO SALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON, ERNESTO ESTILO, BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI, CELSO HUISO, ALEX TAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL, SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSE TOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA AND EDUARDO GENELSA, RESPONDENTS. /

NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY, EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROIL DELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDO CAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR, CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO, ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOME CASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDRO HARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDO BASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSE AMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITO SABELLANO, CARMELITO

TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITO ALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO, EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTO ANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDRO AQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA, CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDO MATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN, ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO, CARLITO BURILLO, LEO MORA, PABLO BUTIL, ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAH CAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDO CAPUYAN, JUANITO NISNISAN, AURELIO CARIN, PRIMO OPLIMO, ANGELITO CASTANEDA, EDGARDO

ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIO ORTEGA, FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUS PATOC, RAMON CONSTANTINO, MANUEL PIAPE, ROY CONSTANTINO, ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIO PLAZA, ROSALDO DAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS, PROCOPIO RAMOS, JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCO EMPUERTO, PATRICIO SALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON, ERNESTO ESTILO, BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI, CELSO HUISO, ALEX TAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL, SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSE TOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA AND EDUARDO GENELSA, PETITIONERS, VS. C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., EDITHA I. ALCANTARA, ATTY. NELIA A. CLAUDIO, CORNELIO E.

CAGUIAT, JESUS S. DELA CRUZ, ROLANDO Z. ANDRES AND JOSE MA. MANUEL YRASUEGUI, RESPONDENTS. / NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), AND ITS MEMBERS WHOSE NAMES ARE LISTED BELOW, PETITIONERS, VS. C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution are the (1) Motion for Partial Reconsideration[1] filed by C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. (CASI) and (2) Motion for Reconsideration[2] filed by Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa AlsonsSPFL (the Union) and the Union officers[3] and their striking members[4] of the Courts Decision[5] dated September 29, 2010. In a Resolution[6] dated December 13, 2010, the parties were required to submit their respective Comments. After several motions for extension, the parties submitted the required comments. Hence, this resolution. For a proper perspective, we state briefly the facts of the case. The negotiation between CASI and the Union on the economic provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ended in a deadlock prompting the Union to stage a strike,[7] but the strike was later declared by the Labor Arbiter (LA) to be illegal having been staged in violation of the CBAs no strike-no lockout provision.[8] Consequently, the Union officers were deemed to have forfeited their employment with the company and made them liable for actual damages plus interest and attorneys fees, while the Union members were ordered to be reinstated without backwages there being no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during the strike.[9] Notwithstanding the provision of the Labor Code mandating that the reinstatement aspect of the decision be immediately executory, the LA refused to reinstate the dismissed Union members. On November 8, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision insofar as it declared the strike illegal and ordered the Union officers dismissed from employment and liable for damages but

modified the same by considering the Union members to have been validly dismissed from employment for committing prohibited and illegal acts.[10] On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled the NLRC decision and reinstated that of the LA. Aggrieved, CASI, the Union and the Union officers and members elevated the matter to this Court. The cases were docketed as G.R. Nos. 155109 and 155135.[11] During the pendency of the cases, the affected Union members (who were ordered reinstated) filed with the LA a motion for reinstatement pending appeal and the computation of their backwages. Instead of reinstating the Union members, the LA awarded separation pay and other benefits.[12] On appeal, the NLRC denied the Union members claim for separation pay, accrued wages and other benefits.[13] When elevated to the CA, the appellate court held that reinstatement pending appeal applies only to illegal dismissal cases under Article 223 of the Labor Code and not to cases under Article 263.[14] Hence, the petition by the Union and its officers and members in G.R. No. 179220. G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135, and 179220 were consolidated. On September 29, 2010, the Court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL and its officers and members in G.R. No. 155135 for lack of merit, and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 59604 dated March 20, 2002. The Court, on the other hand, GRANTS the petition of C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. in G.R. 155109 and REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA M004996-99 dated November 8, 1999. Further, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL and their dismissed members in G.R. No. 179220 and ORDERS C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. to pay the terminated Union members backwages for four (4) months and nine (9) days and separation pays equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service to the company up to the date of their termination, with interest of 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such backwages and separation pays are paid. The Court DENIES all other claims. SO ORDERED.[15] The Court agreed with the CA on the illegality of the strike as well as the termination of the Union officers, but disagreed with the CA insofar as it affirmed the reinstatement of the Union members. The Court, instead, sustained the dismissal not only of the Union officers but also the Union members who, during the illegal strike, committed prohibited acts by threatening, coercing, and intimidating non-striking employees, officers, suppliers and customers; obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the company premises; and resisting and defying the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers.[16] The Court further held that the terminated Union members, who were ordered reinstated by the LA, should have been immediately reinstated due to the immediate executory nature of the

reinstatement aspect of the LA decision. In view, however, of CASIs failure to reinstate the dismissed employees, the Court ordered CASI to pay the terminated Union members their accrued backwages from the date of the LA decision until the eventual reversal by the NLRC of the order of reinstatement.[17] In addition to the accrued backwages, the Court awarded separation pay as a form of financial assistance to the Union members equivalent to one-half month salary for every year of service to the company up to the date of their termination.[18] Not satisfied, CASI filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above decision based on the following grounds: I. IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT A PRECEDENT SETTING RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ESCARIO V. NLRC [G.R. No. 160302, 27 SEPTEMBER 2010] PARTICULARLY ON THE PROPER APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 264 AND 279 OF THE LABOR CODE SUPPORTS THE AFFIRMATION AND NOT THE REVERSAL OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS [CA], AND NEGATES THE ENTITLEMENT TO ACCRUED WAGES OF THE UNION MEMBERS WHO COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS DURING THE ILLEGAL STRIKE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER AWARDED THE SAME. II. IT IS RESPECTFULY SUBMITTED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED TO GRANT SEPARATION PAY TO THE UNION MEMBERS WHO COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS DURING THE ILLEGAL STRIKE CONSIDERING THAT JURISPRUDENCE CITED TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF SEPARATION PAY DO NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT CASE AS IT APPLIES ONLY TO DISMISSALS FOR A JUST CAUSE.[19] The Union, its officers and members likewise filed their separate motion for reconsideration assailing the Courts conclusions that: (1) the strike is illegal; (2) that the officers of the Union and its appointed shop stewards automatically forfeited their employment status when they participated in the strike; (3) that the Union members committed illegal acts during the strike and are deemed to have lost their employment status; and (4) that CASI is entitled to actual damages and attorneys fees.[20] They also fault the Court in not finding that: (1) CASI and its officers are guilty of acts of unfair labor practice or violation of Article 248 of the Labor Code; (2) the lockout declared by the company is illegal; (3) CASI and its officers committed acts of discrimination; (4) CASI and its officers violated Article 254 of the Labor Code; and (5) CASI and its officers are liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages to the Union, its officers and members.[21] Simply stated, CASI only questions the propriety of the award of backwages and separation pay, while the Union, its officers and members seek the reversal of the Courts conclusions on the illegality of the strike, the validity of the termination of the Union officers and members, and the

award of actual damages and attorneys fees as well as the denial of their counterclaims against CASI. After a careful review of the records of the case, we find it necessary to reconsider the Courts September 29, 2010 decision, but only as to the award of separation pay. The LA, the NLRC, the CA and the Court are one in saying that the strike staged by the Union, participated in by the Union officers and members, is illegal being in violation of the no strike-no lockout provision of the CBA which enjoined both the Union and the company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available to them under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settling their disputes.[22] We, therefore, find no reason to depart from such conclusion. Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code lays down the liabilities of the Union officers and members participating in illegal strikes and/or committing illegal acts, to wit: ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (a) x x x Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any Union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or Union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. Thus, the above-quoted provision sanctions the dismissal of a Union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a lawful strike.[23] In this case, the Union officers were in clear breach of the above provision of law when they knowingly participated in the illegal strike.[24] As to the Union members, the same provision of law provides that a member is liable when he knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. We find no reason to reverse the conclusion of the Court that CASI presented substantial evidence to show that the striking Union members committed the following prohibited acts: a. They threatened, coerced, and intimidated non-striking employees, officers, suppliers and customers; b. They obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the company premises; and c. They resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers.[25]

The commission of the above prohibited acts by the striking Union members warrants their dismissal from employment. As clearly narrated earlier, the LA found the strike illegal and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers, but ordered the reinstatement of the striking Union members for lack of evidence showing that they committed illegal acts during the illegal strike. This decision, however, was later reversed by the NLRC. Pursuant to Article 223[26] of the Labor Code and well-established jurisprudence,[27] the decision of the LA reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal.[28] The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employee, merely reinstated in the payroll.[29] It is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.[30] If the employer fails to exercise the option of re-admitting the employee to work or to reinstate him in the payroll, the employer must pay the employees salaries during the period between the LAs order of reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the higher court overturning that of the LA.[31] In this case, CASI is liable to pay the striking Union members their accrued wages for four months and nine days, which is the period from the notice of the LAs order of reinstatement until the reversal thereof by the NLRC.[32] Citing Escario v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division),[33] CASI claims that the award of the four-month accrued salaries to the Union members is not sanctioned by jurisprudence. In Escario, the Court categorically stated that the strikers were not entitled to their wages during the period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike. The Court further held that it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the latters time.[34] In this case, however, the four-month accrued salaries awarded to the Union members are not the backwages referred to in Escario. To be sure, the awards were not given as their salaries during the period of the strike. Rather, they constitute the employers liability to the employees for its failure to exercise the option of actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement following the LAs decision to reinstate the Union members as mandated by Article 223 of the Labor Code adequately discussed earlier. In other words, such monetary award refers to the Union members accrued salaries by reason of the reinstatement order of the LA which is self-executory pursuant to Article 223.[35] We, therefore, sustain the award of the four-month accrued salaries. Finally, as regards the separation pay as a form of financial assistance awarded by the Court, we find it necessary to reconsider the same and delete the award pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. Separation pay may be given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law.[36] It is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment.[37] It is oriented towards the immediate

future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement job.[38] As a general rule, when just causes for terminating the services of an employee exist, the employee is not entitled to separation pay because lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts.[39] The rule, however, is subject to exceptions.[40] The Court, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC,[41] laid down the guidelines when separation pay in the form of financial assistance may be allowed, to wit: We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed x x x.[42] We had the occasion to resolve the same issue in Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission.[43] Following the declaration that the strike staged by the Union members is illegal, the Union officers and members were considered validly dismissed from employment for committing illegal acts during the illegal strike. The Court affirmed the CAs conclusion that the commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike constituted serious misconduct.[44] Hence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members was not sustained.[45] Indeed, we applied social justice and equity considerations in several cases to justify the award of financial assistance. In Piero v. National Labor Relations Commission,[46] the Court declared the strike to be illegal for failure to comply with the procedural requirements. We, likewise, sustained the dismissal of the Union president for participating in said illegal strike. Considering, however, that his infraction is not so reprehensible and unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard of his long years of service, and considering further that he has no previous derogatory records, we granted financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after long years of service.[47] The same compassion was also applied in Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC[48] where the employee was declared to have been validly terminated from service after having been found guilty of driving without a valid drivers license, which is a clear violation of the companys rules and regulations.[49] We, likewise, awarded financial assistance in Salavarria v. Letran College[50] to the legally dismissed teacher for violation of school policy because such infraction neither amounted to serious misconduct nor reflected that of a morally depraved person. However, in a number of cases cited in Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[51] we refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to Union officers and members who were separated from

service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during the strike.[52] In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone Employees Association (PILTEA),[53] the strike was found to be illegal because of procedural infirmities and for defiance of the Secretary of Labors assumption order. Hence, we upheld the Union officers dismissal without granting financial assistance. In Sukhotai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals,[54] and Manila Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond Hotel) v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union,[55] the Union officers and members who participated in and committed illegal acts during the illegal strike were deemed to have lost their employment status and were not awarded financial assistance. In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals,[56] the Court held that the strikers open and willful defiance of the assumption order of the Secretary of Labor constitute serious misconduct and reflective of their moral character, hence, granting of financial assistance to them cannot be justified. In Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission,[57] we disallowed the award of financial assistance to the dismissed employees for their participation in the unlawful and violent strike which resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage because it constitutes serious misconduct on their part. Here, not only did the Court declare the strike illegal, rather, it also found the Union officers to have knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Worse, the Union members committed prohibited acts during the strike. Thus, as we concluded in Toyota, Telefunken, Chua and the other cases cited above, we delete the award of separation pay as a form of financial assistance. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration of the Union, its officers and members are DENIED for lack of merit, while the motion for partial reconsideration filed by C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated September 29, 2010 is hereby PARTLY RECONSIDERED by deleting the award of separation pay. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA PICOP RESOURCES, INC. ' SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (NAMAPRI ' SPFL), ARTEMIO Q. AVILA, ET AL.,cralaw Petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 148839-40

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and PICOP RESOURCES, INC., VELASCO, JR., JJ. Respondents. CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and

Promulgated:

November 2, 2006 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N cralaw

VELASCO, JR., J.:

cralawThis

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition puts to use both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of

Court, to reverse the March 7, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which enjoined the enforcement of the November 20, 2000 Writ of Execution of the Secretary of Labor and Employment; and its July 4, 2001 Resolution which granted the writ of preliminary injunction to

respondent PICOP Resources, Inc. and likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner.

cralawPetitioner

Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources Inc., 'Southern Philippines Federation of

Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL) is the recognized labor union of the rank and file employees in the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant of respondent Picop Resources, Inc. (PICOP) located in Bislig, Surigao Del Sur in Mindanao. Respondent PICOP is owned by Far East Cement Corporation, which operates the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant and was the former employer of said employees.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawIn

1997, PICOP suffered serious financial and operational problems that led to a declaration of a

temporary shutdown for six months. Doubting the motives behind the short term closure, NAMAPRISPFL filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Office for CARAGA Region in ButuanCity.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawOn

January 11, 1998, the NAMAPRI-SPFL members staged a strike by picketing and barricading all

roads leading to and from the premises of PICOP.In order to protect its interests, PICOP filed on January 13, 1998 a Petition for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with the Fifth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) located in Cagayan de Oro City, which issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 14, 1998, enjoining the union to remove all obstructions, man-made barricades, and to refrain from committing other acts that would prevent the resumption of the normal business operations of the company. Despite the NLRC directive, the NAMAPRI-SPFL members continued to prevent ingress to and egress from the company premises. Due to such unjustified defiance, respondent PICOP, on January 22, 1998, filed a complaint with the NLRC to declare the strike illegal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawOn

January 27, 1998, PICOP filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction over the labor dispute

before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On January 28, 1998, the Labor Secretary saw merit in the petition, assumed jurisdiction over the controversy, and issued an Assumption Order, directing all the striking employees to lift their picket and return to work.However, PICOP was required to accept the employees in the plywood division once the plant resumed operation, and with respect to the Paper and Kraft divisions, all returning employees should be admitted under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. In the same Order, the Petition for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction filed with the NLRC, and the Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal filed with the NLRC Branch XI Regional Arbitration were consolidated with the instant petition with the Labor Secretary.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawOn

February 21, 1998, respondent PICOP notified the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) that effective March 31, 1998, it was permanently shutting down the operations of its plywood plant, including its administrative and support services. As a result, NAMAPRI-SPFL members engaged in another strike and picketed PICOP's plant and mill on March 8, 1998.

cralawOn

March 31, 1998, PICOP dismissed the remaining workers and went through with the

permanent closure of the paper mill and plywood manufacturing plant.

cralawAfter

the parties submitted their position papers, the Labor Secretary issued the September 9,

1999 Order, the decretal portion of which states:

cralawWHEREFORE,

in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

cralawa.cralawDeclaring

the temporary shutdown at the paper and plywood cralawplants of Picop Resources, Inc. legitimate and the temporary cralawlayoff of the affected workers therein likewise legal;

b.

Declaring the permanent retrenchment of the workers at the plywood plant and its administrative and support services valid;

c.

Declaring the impeachment of Union President, Mr. Edgardo Diaz, illegal;

d.

Dismissing the NAMAPRI-Avila Group's 16 demands;

e.

Dismissing the NAMAPRI-Avila Group's prayer for actual, moral, exemplary damages and costs of litigation and attorneys [sic]; and

f.

Ordering Picop Resources, Inc. to pay, if it has not yet done so, separation benefits to all other workers at the plywood plant and its administrative and support services who have been permanently retrenched (emphasis supplied).

cralawPending

resolution of the issue of illegal strike which is yet to be heard, all the striking workers, except those already validly retrenched and paid their separation pay, are directed to return to work within 24 hours from receipt of this Order and Picop Resources, Inc. is hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may aggravate the situation.

cralawAtty.

Lita Aglibut, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Service, is hereby designated as the Hearing Officer to hear and receive evidence on the matter of illegality of the strikes within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and, thereafter, to submit a report/recommendation within twenty (20) days from the termination of the proceeding.

cralawThe

parties are further directed to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

cralawSO

ORDERED.

On September 20, 1999, the NAMAPRI-SPFL registered a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order of the Labor Secretary. On the other hand, PICOP also filed its Motion for Reconsideration on September 21, 1999 questioning the reinstatement of the striking employees. Both Motions for Reconsideration were rejected in the November 5, 1999 Order, the fallo of which reads:

cralawWHEREFORE,

in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the NAMAPRI-Avila Group is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by Picop Resources, Inc. is likewise hereby DENIED. In view, however, of the clarification made above, the Order dated September 9, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:

cralawPending

resolution of the illegal strike and the consequent termination issues which are yet to be heard, all the striking workers, except those already validly retrenched and paid their separation pay, are directed to return to work within 24 hours from receipt of this Order. Picop Resources, Inc. is hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking employees, except those already excluded, under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may aggravate the situation.

cralawAtty.

Lita Aglibut, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Service, is hereby designated as Hearing Officer to hear and receive evidence thereon within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and, thereafter, to submit a

report/recommendation within twenty (20) days from the termination of the proceeding.

cralawThe

parties are further directed to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

cralawThe

NAMAPRI-Avila Group's Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Cite in Contempt is likewise DENIED, in view of the clarification.

cralawSO

ORDERED.

Petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) entitled Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Picop Resources, Inc. ' Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), Artemio Avila, et al. v. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma, et al. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56566 disputing the legality and proprietary of the September 9, 1999 and the November 5, 1999 Orders of the Labor Secretary. Not to be outdone, respondent PICOP also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA entitled PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma, et al. and docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 56204 assailing the same Orders issued by the Labor Secretary.

Despite the pendency of these actions before the CA, petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL submitted a Motion to the Labor Secretary asking for a writ of execution to implement the September 9, 1999 and November 5, 1999 Orders. This was granted by the Labor Secretary on July 5, 2000. Consequently, on November 20, 2000, the Labor Secretary issued a Writ of Execution directing the NLRC Sheriff to proceed to the premises of PICOP to enforce its September 9, 1999 and the November 5, 1999 Orders. On November 29, 2000, Sheriff Edwin G. Manilag garnished the funds of PICOP deposited with the BPI-Bislig branch in BisligCity, amounting to PhP 51,170,198.42.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Threatened, on December 14, 2000, PICOP filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction with the appellate court in CA G.R. SP No. 56204.

Finding merit in the plea, the CA issued the March 7, 2001 Resolution, the fallo of which reads:

cralawWHEREFORE,

in order not to render the instant petition moot and academic and to preserve the rights of petitioner, the public respondents are enjoined from enforcing the writ of execution issued on November 20, 2000, as well as the Order dated February 23, 2001.

cralawRespondents

are directed to show cause, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof, why the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.

cralawSO

ORDERED.

cralawPetitioner

NAMAPRI-SPFL asked the court a quo to reconsider the March 7, 2001 ruling, but the

relief prayed for was declined in the July 4, 2001 CA Resolution. Worse, the CA decided to grant a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner contained in the fallo of the July 4, 2001 Resolution which we quote in toto:

cralawWHEREFORE,

private respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or motion to dissolve temporary order [sic] is DENIED for lack of merit.

cralawLet

a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon the posting by petitioner of a bond in the amount of Fifty Million (P50,000,000.00) Pesos to answer for all damages which private respondents may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that it is not entitled thereto.

cralawPetitioner's

motion for extension of thirty (30) days from June 5, 2001 within which to file its memorandum is GRANTED.

cralawSO

ORDERED.

cralawAggrieved

by the grant of injunctive writ, petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL now entreats the Court to

overturn the assailed Resolutions of the CA.

The Issue

The main issue for consideration is whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 Resolutions.

cralawOn

a procedural matter, respondent PICOP makes much of the unconventional manner by which

petitioner styles the instant action as one under Rule 45 which is an appeal by certiorari from a CA decision to the Supreme Court and simultaneously, also a special civil action under Rule 65 based on alleged grave abuse of discretion in a decision of the CA. However, in its Memorandum, NAMAPRISPFL clarified that it was actually a petition under Rule 45.

cralawWe

cannot give our imprimatur to this unorthodox strategy.

cralawAs

a general rule, a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct

because

applications.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw

cralawMeanwhile,

in Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., v. CA, we held that the remedy of

appeal under Rule 45 and an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, a party should not join both petitions in one pleading. In Mercado v. Court Appeals, we held that 'when a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case, 'his petition may be dismissed outright. We then further elucidated that:
cralaw cralawIndeed,

not infrequently, litigants and parties to a petition have invoked liberal construction of the Rules of Court to justify lapses in its observance. Hopefully, it is not simply a cover-up of their own neglect or sheer ignorance of procedure. While indeed this Court has on occasion set aside procedural irregularities in the interest of justice, it must be stressed that liberality of construction of the rules should not be a panacea for all procedural maladies. For this Court will not tolerate wanton disregard of the procedural rules under the guise of liberal construction.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawPetitioner

however relented and decided to stick it out with Rule 45 as the procedural rule to

govern its petition.

cralawAs

provided in Sec. 1, Rule 45, the petition for review must be from a judgment or final order or

resolution of the CA, Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, and other courts, whenever authorized by law. Since a petition for review is a mode of appeal, the judgment, order, or resolution must be one that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter in it.It is clear however, that the assailed

March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 CA Resolutions are merely interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The aggrieved party must await the final decision in the petition and then appeal from the adverse judgment, in the course of which the party may question the issuance of the interlocutory orders as errors of judgment. As there was still no final judgment from the CA at the time of the filing of the petition, then a petition for review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy.

cralawHowever,

when an interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, then a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule 65 can be availed of depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, granting arguendo that petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL instituted the instant petition under Rule 65 on the ground that the CA rendered the disputed Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion, still, the petition must fail because the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
cralaw

cralawIn

Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers' Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of Appeals, we held:
cralawIn

Placido Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we held that the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, unless the court commits a grave abuse of discretion.Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or whether the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power.

cralawSection

1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme

necessity.As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to present actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.

cralawMore

so, in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, we held that '[a]bsent a clear showing of

grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with.
cralawIn

the present case, petitioner NAMAPRI-SPFL miserably failed to demonstrate even an iota of the

alleged capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the court a quo.Without such showing, the grant of the extraordinary writ of certiorari has no basis.The monetary award to the NAMAPRI-SPFL members is fully secured by the PhP 50 million bond posted by respondent PICOP. The resort to Rule 45 is premature as petitioner could still question the said interlocutory orders once the CA case has been decided on the merits.

cralawTo

write finis to this action, the March 7, 2001 and July 4, 2001 CA Resolutions which enjoined the

July 5, 2000 Labor Secretary Order were maintained by the court a quo in its March 22, 2001 Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 60586, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for [is] accordingly GRANTED.Consequently, the Order dated July 5, 2000 of the then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma in 'In Re: Labor Dispute at Picop Resources, Inc., docketed as OS-AJ-0002-98 (NCMB-RB13-11-005-97) is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

cralaw cralawNo cralaw cralawSO

pronouncements as to costs.

ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawUpon

review, the said March 22, 2001 CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in NAMAPRI-SPFL-

Avila Group v. NAMAPRI-SPFL-TRUGILLO GROUP on September 12, 2001, the salient disposition of which is the annulment of the July 5, 2000 Order of the Labor Secretary.In effect, the legality of the two questioned CA Resolutions have been upheld and affirmed. Evidently, this petition is now moot and academic.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawWHEREFORE,

the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

cralaw

cralawNo

costs.

SO ORDERED.